Moscow Defense Brief · 2014-01-14 · 2 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Defense Industry Russia Joins the Fifth-Gen Game Russia Joins the Fifth-Gen Game Konstantin Makienko R ussia

Moscow Defense BriefYour Professional Guide Inside # 1, 2010

Worth the Wait

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 1

#1 (19), 2010

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Cover Photo: Russia’s fifth-generation fighter, the T-50, developed under

the Sukhoi corporation’s PAK FA project and first flown on January 29, 2010.

Photo taken on February 12, 2010, at the Komsomolsk-upon-Amur airfield,

during the T-50’s second test flight.

Photo by: Sukhoi Corporation

© Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010

Printed in Russia

CONTENTSDefense IndustryRussia Joins the Fifth-Gen Game 2

Energy SecurityRussia’s Efforts to Secure EU Gas Market 3

Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry 6

Arms TradeRussian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections 9

Naval Build-up and New Submarines in Asia-Pacific: Growing Security Risks 17

Armed ForcesInterview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, Commander of the Russian Navy 21

Facts & FiguresNon-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010 25

Our Authors 32

Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief2

Defense Industry

Russia Joins the Fifth-Gen Game

Russia Joins the Fifth-Gen GameKonstantin Makienko

Russia flew a prototype of its fifth-generation fighter on January 29, 2010, in what analysts agree was a major

milestone for the national aerospace industry. The Sukhoi corporation’s T-50 jet, developed under the PAK FA (Future Front Line Aircraft System) program, took off from a Komsomolsk-upon-Amur airfield for a 47-minute maiden flight. The aircraft is the first radically new Russian design that looks likely to enter commercial production since the first MiG-29 and Su-27 prototypes of the previous fourth generation took to the air back in 1977.

The maiden flight of the PAK FA has broken America’s complete monopoly on the development and production of fifth-generation fighter jets. It has also demonstrated that while not America’s equal militarily, Russia is still a solid second in terms of defense technology, outranking both Western Europe and China and punching well above its economic weight.

But while the maiden flight itself was a major coup for Russia, the success of the PAK FA program is not a foregone conclusion. Serious financial, technical and even political hurdles still remain. They have the potential to cause major delays or even stall the program completely.

In terms of technology, the biggest worry is the remaining •uncertainty over the so-called “next engine”. The existing T-50-01 prototype is equipped with deeply upgraded fourth-generation engines. And while they provide the necessary amount of thrust (even for supersonic cruising), they are not up to the fifth-generation spec in terms of the thrust-to-weight ratio and fuel economy. Many observers are skeptical about Russia’s chances of creating a proper fifth-generation engine that could compete with America’s Pratt & Whitney F119. Problems also remain with the new radar and other onboard equipment, but recent progress suggests that the risks here are moderate.The financial risks stem from uncertainty over Russia’s •economic prospects, which are too dependent on exports of oil, gas and other natural resources. The PAK FA project could well grind to a halt if the country suffers another economic shock like the one it went through in 2009, when the economy shrank by 8 per cent and the budget deficit spiraled to 5.9 per cent.

The political risk is that cumbersome Russian bureaucracy •could well stymie Indian participation in the program. And without the Indians, mass production becomes commercially unviable because the Russian Defense Ministry’s order for the new jets will be very modest.

But although it would take at least another decade to turn PAK FA into a proper combat system, the maiden flight of the T-50 has been a major boost for the Russian aerospace industry. Its existing customers can now see a clear way forward for their national air forces, and their choice of Russia as a supplier has been vindicated. Russia can now negotiate with potential foreign customers from a much stronger position, and that includes civilian contracts as well as military. Several countries, including Libya and Vietnam, have already expressed their interest in the future Russian fifth-generation fighter.

Of course, any serious military, political or commercial dividends of the PAK FA program hinge on Russia’s ability to take it from the prototype stage to mass production. If that happens, America’s F-35 and the Russian T-50 will be the only two players on the world market for combat aircraft after 2020. The European offerings, which are all based on essentially fourth-generation technology, will be marginalized, and Europe itself will most likely be eliminated as a serious competitor. That opens up very alluring and hitherto inconceivable prospects of cooperation between the Russian aerospace industry and some European aerospace powers which still retain a large degree of sovereignty and independence from the United States.

At present, very little is known about the T-50’s onboard equipment, and even less about its future missile systems, so there is no point trying to compare the Russian and American fifth-generation fighters in terms of their combat capability. But it would not be much of a stretch to say that regardless of the T-50’s actual strengths and weaknesses, it is guaranteed to seize up to 30 per cent of the market simply by virtue of not being American. The new Russian-Indian fighter clearly has excellent prospects on the Asia-Pacific markets, especially those which Russia has already staked. What is more, when paired with the Su-35, the T-50 could be an even more enticing offering that America’s much-vaunted bestseller of the future, the F-35.

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 3Russia’s Efforts to Secure EU Gas Market

Energy Security

Russia’s Efforts to Secure EU Gas MarketNatalia Grib, Kommersant publishing house special energy correspondent

Russia is pursuing a number of strategies to secure its presence on the European Union’s gas market. The most

obvious one is to build new pipelines bypassing the existing short overland routes. These include the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltics and the South Stream in the Black Sea region. A closer look at Russia’s energy policy also reveals that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is trying to help his Turkish counterpart to keep his hand firmly on the tap of the proposed Nabucco pipeline from the Middle East to Europe. Finally, there are signs that Moscow is trying to secure a role for itself in future Iranian energy projects, so as to make sure that cheap Iranian gas does not knock down prices on the European market. The results of these efforts should become obvious some time after 2015.

Strategy One: the gas “pincers”The idea of building offshore gas pipelines that would

bypass transit countries came to Vladimir Putin in 2004-2005. Russia’s Yamal-Europe pipeline, which was aiming to bring 33bn cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually from Siberian gas fields to consumers in Germany, was facing political obstacles in Belarus and Poland. Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko was refusing to grant Gazprom a long-term lease of the land plots for the new pipeline’s pumping stations. And the Polish authorities said the Russian gas giant should seek individual settlement with each Polish farmer whose lands the pipeline would cross - on top of demanding much higher transit fees. That is when the decision was made in Moscow to seek a direct route to Germany, bypassing the transit nations.

Russia’s then president and now prime minister, Vladimir Putin, said Germany would be taken into “gas pincers”. That is what the two proposed new gas pipelines, Nord Stream and South Stream, looked like on the map. The former would follow the route along the bottom of the Baltic Sea from Vyborg in Leningrad Region to the German town of Greifswald. The latter would take Russian gas along the bottom of the Black Sea from the pumping station of Beregovaya to the Bulgarian port of Varna.

The Nord Stream project, with annual capacity of 55 bcm and projected cost of 7.4bn euros, is much closer to fruition than South Stream. The first leg of the pipeline,

with a total length of 1,220 km and annual capacity of 27.5 bcm, is expected to become operational in 2011. The second leg should follow in 2012. But the project is facing financial hurdles. A new law that came into force in Germany on October 2009 limits the margin of profit for gas transit projects to 5 per cent. But shareholders of Nord Stream AG are determined to solve that problem. Among them is Gazprom itself, which owns a 51-per-cent stake, as well as BASF/Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas (20 per cent each), and Gasunie (9 per cent). If France’s GDF SUEZ accepts the invitation to join the project, it will own a 9-per-cent stake, while the shares of the two German partners will be reduced to 15.5 per cent each.

Gazprom has already signed new contracts to supply 21 bcm of gas annually via Nord Stream. The remaining 33 bcm of the pipeline’s capacity will be filled with gas rerouted from the existing pipelines that cross Belarusian and Ukrainian territory. As for South Stream, so far Russia has not even bothered to look for potential new customers. The new pipeline’s projected capacity is over 60 bcm. That makes it a viable alternative to the Ukrainian gas transit system (total transit capacity 120 bcm), on which 75 to 80 per cent of Russian gas exports to Europe now depend.

South Stream should take the route along the Turkish shelf of the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria, and then on to Italy and the south of Germany, with spurs from Bulgaria to Serbia and Hungary, and then on to Austria and north Italy. The total cost of the project is 8.4bn euros; annual capacity 63 bcm. The projected launch date is 2015. So far, the list of shareholders includes only Gazprom and Italy’s ENI (50 per cent each). But it is very likely that they will be joined by France’s EDF and possibly Turkey’s Botas.

Nord Stream has by now become a near certainty. The EU has even granted this project trans-European status, which means that it can use state guarantees to attract investment. South Stream, however, is still in the realm of discussion and speculation. For example, Turkish experts argue that Ukraine’s president-elect Viktor Yanukovich could improve relations with Russia in the area of gas transit so much that there would no longer be any need for a new pipeline bypassing Ukraine. But the Russian Energy Ministry and Gazprom have already expended so much effort on getting the EU countries along the proposed route of South Stream to join the project that the whole thing is now unlikely to

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief4Russia’s Efforts to Secure EU Gas Market

Energy Security

be simply called off – though the project can of course be reshaped yet again.

Strategy Two: the Turkish GambitTurkey, meanwhile, has found itself at the very epicenter

of many nations’ energy policy interests. Europe, the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia are all now wooing Ankara for political and economic cooperation. So far, only the EU has been successful. Five European energy companies (Germany’s RWE, Austria’s OMV, Romania’s Transgaz, Bulgaria’s Bulgargaz and Hungary’s MOL) signed a memorandum with Turkey’s Botas in June 2009 on building the Nabucco pipeline, using Turkey’s system of gas pipelines as a component of the transit route. Starting from 2015, the EU will begin to receive an additional annual 30 bcm of gas via Turkey.

The Nabucco project hoped to secure gas supplies from Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. But Russia has now signed a contract to buy all Azeri gas exports in the near and medium term. The Trans-Caspian pipeline project, which would connect Turkmen gas fields with Georgia and Turkey, has also been shelved. Supplies from Egypt (1bn cu.m.) and Iraq (6-10bn) are clearly not enough to keep Nabucco in business. And Iran cannot be used as a supplier for political reasons, at least for now. Against this backdrop, the Turkish government has invited Russia to use Nabucco as an export route. For Turkey, it does not matter where the gas comes from - Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan or Russia – so long as there’s enough of it for the pipeline to operate.

But Russia has other plans for cooperation with Turkey. In January 2010, Gazprom said that it now considers Turkey a strategic partner, along with Germany and Italy. What is more, Moscow has decided to waive the 1bn dollar fine owed to it by Turkey for buying less Russian gas in 2009 than it had originally contracted. In return, Vladimir Putin has secured a promise by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that Ankara would give a formal consent to the proposed route of South Stream by November 10, 2010. Russia also expects favors from Turkey during the upcoming privatizations of the gas pipeline networks of Istanbul (worth an estimated 2bn USD) and Ankara (500m-800m USD). Gazprom has also shown interest in the new Turkish underground gas storage facility now under construction in Tuz.

Work to secure Russian involvement in the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which is designed to reduce the volume of oil shipments via the Bosporus, is proceeding very slowly. Turkey wants to speed it up, but it refuses to allow Rosneft and Transneft to take a controlling 50-per-cent stake in the pipeline. This is why it has been decided to invite ENI to join the project. It is hoped that the Italians will help the Russians and the Turks reach an agreement. Italy played a key role in the project to build another pipeline from Russia to Turkey,

the Blue Stream, with annual capacity of 16 bcm. Gazrpom, ENI and Botas each own a 33.33-per-cent stake in the venture. But when Russia tried in 2005 to secure Turkish consent for building a pipeline to carry Russian gas to Israel via Turkish territory, Ankara said no.

Discussions are now under way on the Blue Stream-2 project to supply gas to Israel and Cyprus. It is not quite clear though which part of Cyrpus would benefit from this project - the north, which is under Turkish control, or the rest of the island, which is part of the EU. Moscow’s main goal in its dealings with Ankara is to secure as much clout in the region on energy policy issues as only Washington has wielded, until very recently. The United States still has a lot of influence on Turkey, but Ankara has been increasingly keen to make independent decisions. Whether or not Moscow’s ambitions will succeed depends on which of the two pipelines comes first to the finish line, South Stream or Nabucco. Whoever is the first to reach the consumer will secure guaranteed profits.

Strategy Three: Iran as a gas KlondikeThe world is changing. Every nation watching Iran now

has one thing on its mind. Everyone is waiting to see who will succeed in bringing Iranian gas to the EU market, and when. In late 2009, Russia and Iran announced an agreement between the two countries’ energy ministries to develop a joint energy action plan for the next 30 years. For Iran, this represents a chance to attract some of the 20bn dollars the country has been promised by foreign energy companies to develop the South Pars gas field (the world’s largest, containing 14 trillion cubic meters of high-quality methane, which is also cheap to produce). For Russia, which is lining up to take part in Iranian projects, the true objective is to have a say in steering Middle Eastern energy flows to the consumer markets.

Tehran has lately been busy developing cooperation with foreign partners in an effort to avoid UN sanctions and especially any military action by Washington, which experts say is becoming increasingly likely. Over the past year Iran has signed a memorandum with Turkey, which will invest 4bn dollars over the period of 2010-2013, as well as several other agreements with India, the Anglo-Dutch energy giant Shell, and Gazprom. Meanwhile, Moscow and Delhi are trying to win Tehran’s support for the proposal to build the Peace gas pipeline connecting the South Pars field with India via Pakistan, with annual capacity of 60 bcm. And while India’s only concern is to secure another energy source for its growing economy, Russia’s goals here are more ambitions.

Moscow wants to make sure that new gas production in the Middle East and Central Asia is channelled to the Asia-Pacific markets rather than Europe. That is why the top

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 5Russia’s Efforts to Secure EU Gas Market

Energy Security

managers of Gazprom were not too distraught by the launch of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline (annual capacity 40 bcm). China is not prepared to pay too much for its gas anyway, so the new pipeline helps Russia by removing a potential competitor from the European market and diverting new gas production to the developing Asian markets. Meanwhile, continuing economic growth in China and India gives Russia hope that in time, it will find a buyer there for its more costly gas from the Siberian and Yamal fields.

The Iranian gas fields lie just below the surface, and most of the gas they hold is recoverable. Russia, meanwhile,

ranks first in terms of its total gas reserves, but only about 20 per cent of this gas is economical to produce at the current prices. This is why Russia is trying to orchestrate careful coordination of energy flows to the export markets with Iran and other members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). It hopes to prevent a price war with Iran on the European markets. These considerations are also part of the reason why Moscow supports sanctions against Iran in the IAEA framework. It seems that political backing for international sanctions never comes without some energy or military project in mind.

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief6Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry

Energy Security

Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear IndustryAnton Khlopkov

The long-awaited launch of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran may finally come this spring. If that happens,

commercial power generation could start before the year’s end – it usually commences about six months after a reactor goes live. However, in the case of Bushehr it could well take longer – the reactor there is not a standard run-of-the-mill unit, but rather a hybrid of Russian and German technology (more on that later). The political situation over the Iranian nuclear program could also bring further delays - although the UN Security Council sanctions now in effect against Iran (Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803) do not restrict cooperation with Tehran on building nuclear power plants.

Be that as it may, Russia made a strategic decision on whether or not to finish the construction of the first reactor at Bushehr back in 2007, and that decision is unlikely to be reversed now. Once the decision was made, first shipments of nuclear fuel to Bushehr began in December 2007. The last deliveries were made in January 2008. By February 2009, construction and installation works at the Bushehr plant were nearing completion . In January 2010, the reactor’s secondary coolant circuit passed hydraulic tests . As the date of the launch draws near, a closer look at the project’s turbulent history and unusual nature might well be in order.

Whichever way you look at Bushehr – the technology involved, the political environment, the financial complexity or the challenging physical climate – the project is quite simply unique. This nuclear plant is unlike anything else the Soviet specialists have ever built abroad – or indeed anything their foreign counterparts have built, either.

BackgroundWork on the project was launched by German specialists

in August 1975. The original plan was to build two 1,240 MW energy reactors based on the Convoy design. The first was to be finished by 1980, the second was to follow in 1981. But the project was suspended due to lack of funding in 1979, when Iran was facing a large budget deficit, and then completely shelved after the Islamic revolution.

The first time Russian specialists visited the Bushehr site was in 1994. Their job was to assess the damage done to what the Germans had built by the passage of time and air raids during the eight-year war with Iraq.

The general contractor of the project, Russia’s Atomstroyexport, undertook to deliver the first power generation block at Bushehr in a fully operational state under a contract signed on January 8, 1995, and Addendum One of August 29, 1998. The contract itself was based on a Russian-Iranian intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in building a nuclear power plant on Iranian territory, signed on August 25, 1992 .

It was 15 years on January 8, 2010 since the signing of the Russian-Iranian contract on the completion of the Bushehr NPP. Another big date is coming this August – it will be 35 years since works began at the Bushehr site.

Problems with subcontractorsIn January 1991 the government in Moscow ended its

subsidies to Soviet contractors building nuclear power plants for foreign customers. Officials recognized the importance of high-tech exports, and offered the exporters all kinds of support - except financial. That forced many companies to look for greener pastures. One such contractor, Atomenergoexport (which later became Atomstroyexport after a merger) had to diversify away from its core activity of building Soviet-designed nuclear energy reactors abroad.

The company ended up making a living off exports and imports of scrap metal, nonferrous metals and rare-earth elements, consumer electronics, clothes and shoes. It spent some of the proceeds on looking for new custom for its core nuclear business - mostly just business trips and consultations with potential clients who might want a Soviet/Russian-designed nuclear power plant. In later years it also did some pre-contract work on nuclear projects.

Another obstacle faced by potential new projects to build nuclear reactors for foreign customers was the shortage of Russian engineers and technicians with suitable experience. Back at the time, the last nuclear energy reactor built in the former Soviet Union itself was the No 6 reactor at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, Ukraine. That is why Ukrainian specialists were invited to work in Iran after they had completed their stints at Zaporizhzhya. At some point Ukrainians made up 80 per cent of all non-Iranian personnel working at the Bushehr site.

Meanwhile, the qualification and skills of the Iranian subcontractors working at Bushehr had proved inadequate.

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 7Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry

Energy Security

The Iranians had only minimal involvement in the project when the Germans were in charge. But under the January 1995 agreement between the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Iranian subcontractors secured a share of construction and installation jobs.

It took these subcontractors three years (from 1995 to 1997) to do the work that should have been done in 12 months. In order to keep the project on track, a Minatom delegation sent to Tehran in 1998 pushed through the decision that the Russian general contractor would finish the first reactor on its own. An agreement to that effect was signed on August 29, 1998 as an addendum to the main contract.

ClimateThe climate in the Bushehr area is very harsh. It is

extremely hot and humid, and there is lots of brine in the air due to the proximity of the ocean. That puts additional requirements on the equipment, because in a climate like that, even stainless steel goes to rust. A special painting technology had to be developed to protect the station’s structural elements.

The high temperatures pose further problems. The summer highs at the Bushehr site can reach +50C . When Russian specialists arrived in the late 1990s, air conditioning was not working yet, so temperatures within the containment area would sometimes hit 60C . The Germans who worked at the site in the 1970s had a special clause in their contract allowing them to put all work on hold during the summer heat waves.

Integration of German and Russian technology at Bushehr

By the middle of 1979, when the Germans departed, a lot of equipment at the two reactor sites had already been installed. It was then left mothballed for 20 years, so much of it was damaged, and some components were lost. When the Russian specialists arrived at Bushehr in 1994, all they saw was heaps of machinery that had gone to rust, and no manuals .

At the insistence of the Iranians, the Russian contractors had to integrate most of the German hardware already in place with the Russian VVER-1000 reactor design. The German engineers had left behind a total of 80,000 pieces of equipment and structural elements. Much of the technical documentation was lost, damaged or incomplete . Russia turned to Germany for help - but was rebuffed, primarily for political reasons, by the government in Berlin, which also imposed an embargo on exports to Iran of parts and components for the nuclear power plant.

A decision was made to take stock of the existing equipment using only Russian expertise. That took several years, but in the end tens of thousands of pieces of hardware were deemed fit for use with the Russian design. All of them are now part of the nuclear power plant.

Another important detail which is now mostly forgotten is that the initial German project would have allowed the Bushehr NPP to double as a water desalination plant. But that idea was abandoned in the later Russian iteration of the Bushehr design.

Financial hurdlesDuring the negotiations on the Bushehr contract,

Tehran agreed to pay in several installments upon completion of individual project milestones (as opposed to financing the project by means of a Russian loan). What is more, the Iranians agreed to pay 80 per cent in cash, and only 20 per cent in kind . That was one of the major incentives for Minatom to undertake the whole complicated project of finishing a nuclear power plant started by the Germans . The total value of the contract, as agreed in the 1998 protocol, was set at just over 1bn dollars.

Ever since the signing of the addendum to the contract in 1998, this figure has not been adjusted for inflation. A serious strengthening of the euro against the dollar posed a further problem, since some of equipment and material suppliers come from the Euro area.

In February 2007, work at the Bushehr site started to grind to a halt due to funding shortages. By the summer of that year, the Russian contractor had reduced the number of staff there from 3,000 to just 800 people . After some hard bargaining, during which the Russian general contractor even contemplated pulling out of the project, an agreement was reached with the Iranians that the growing cost of equipment and engineering works would be compensated once the reactor goes live. The size of that compensation will also be finalized once Bushehr becomes operational. This resolution of the financial problems enabled Russia to make first deliveries of nuclear fuel to Bushehr in December 2007, thus ruling out the possibility that the project would once again be abandoned.

Another difficulty the Russian contractor had to contend with was that it was impossible to obtain a state loan in Russia itself for getting the project rolling and for signing contracts with equipment manufacturers.

US pressureIn the period from mid-1990s to mid-2000s, Russia’s

cooperation with Iran, especially on nuclear energy, was

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief8Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry

Energy Security

the biggest thorn in the relations between Washington and Moscow. After 1995, the “Iranian issue” informed America’s stance on almost every single aspect of its dealings with Russia, and especially cooperation in high-tech areas, such as the International Space Station, peaceful use of nuclear energy, launches of American satellites by Russian carriers, etc . For nearly a decade the successive US administrations viewed Russian-Iranian cooperation on Bushehr as evidence of Moscow’s indirect support for the Iranian nuclear arms program.

Washington spared no diplomatic effort to persuade Russia to walk away from the Bushehr project, and to get several other countries to ban their companies from taking part. As already mentioned, Germany refused to cooperate with Russia for political motives and under US pressure. Ukraine and the Czech Republic soon followed suit. Ukraine’s Turboatom was due to supply the turbine for the nuclear plant. But those plans were cancelled during US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Kiev on March 6, 1998. Kiev pulled out of the Iranian project in return for Washington’s pledge to support Ukrainian membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and a (broken) promise of greater support for the country’s energy sector, especially in Kharkiv Region (as part of the so called Kharkiv Initiative). The Czech Republic’s ZVVZ Milevsko was due to supply ventilation and air conditioning equipment. But in March 2000, shortly before Madeleine Albright’s visit to Prague, the Czech government passed a law through parliament which effectively vetoed the deal. Russia’s Atomstroyexport therefore suddenly faced the problem of looking for alternative suppliers.

It also has to be said that apart from American (and also Israeli) criticism, Minatom had to fend off domestic opponents (although they represented a minority point of view). They argued that the Bushehr project would further sour the already tense relations with the West, and help Iran develop military uses for nuclear energy.

Not before 2005 did George W Bush recognize that the Bushehr nuclear plant poses no threat to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. And in December 2007 he welcomed the Russian decision to supply nuclear fuel to Bushehr, arguing that this would remove the need for Iran to build its own uranium enrichment facility or develop an independent nuclear fuel cycle capability. Part of the reason for US support was the deal signed by Moscow and Tehran on February 28, 2005, under which spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr plant would be shipped back to Russia.

Conclusion1. The Bushehr project signed 15 years ago is no longer

a “life raft” for the Russian nuclear industry, which struggled through the 1990s after state funding had suddenly dried up. But it was the 1bn dollar Iranian contract signed in 1995-1998 that had largely enabled the entire sector to preserve the expertise and retain specialists needed to build a nuclear power plant, at least until Russia managed to secure more custom from the Chinese (the new reactor in Tianwan) and the Indians (the Kudankulam project).

2. The project has largely lost its economic importance to Russia, and become more of a political cause. The chances of turning a profit on the whole venture are remote: the costs of this 1bn dollar contract have now spiraled to 3bn euros or more. Therefore the key benefits of Bushehr are political, inasmuch as it represents a practical implementation of Iran’s right to develop a peaceful nuclear program, and therefore alleviates the concerns in Tehran and other capitals of the developing world over alleged restrictions on their access to nuclear energy.

3. For many nations mulling a nuclear energy program of their own, the project has become an indicator or Russia’s credibility as a partner in big international high-tech projects. The country’s reputation is now at stake at Bushehr. So it really matters that despite sustained US pressure over many years, and the withdrawal of several third-country subcontractors from the project under pressure from Washington, the launch of power generation at Bushehr is now a matter of several months.

4. The Bushehr NPP is a good example of integration of Russian technology into Western designs. Russian hardware has been successfully merged with the German-designed structural framework. That could help Rosatom, the Russian nuclear industry giant, in its ambitions to partner with foreign companies in building nuclear power plants in Russia itself and abroad.

5. The experience of Russian-Iranian cooperation at Bushehr can be used to build more nuclear energy reactors on Iranian territory. One obvious possibility would be a second reactor at Bushehr itself. But any practical steps on that proposal would have to wait until Iran answers the key remaining questions on its past undeclared nuclear activities, and until the most sensitive issues of the Iranian nuclear dossier are resolved. Meanwhile, the very first step towards a second Bushehr reactor would be the beginning of power generation at the first reactor, which can be expected before the year’s end.

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 9Russian Arms Trade in 2009:

Figures, Trends and Projections

Arms Trade

Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and ProjectionsDmitry Vasiliev

Russian arms exports edged upwards by USD 150m in 2009 to USD 8.5bn (see Figure 1). Adjusted for the

0.3 per cent deflation1 of the US dollar, the real-terms growth was a modest 2.1 per cent, meaning that sales have essentially been flat over the past two years. That serves as further indication that the Russian defense industry has reached the limits of its export revenue generating capacity2. Further growth will require a serious upgrade of production facilities, as well as investment in skills and training. But for all that, Russian defense contractors can expect a sharp rise in their rouble earnings thanks to favorable exchange rate conditions (the rouble fell from 24.89 to 31.76 to the US dollar in 2009)3.

Surprise rise in defense contracts portfolioOfficial figures show that Russia’s portfolio of defense

contracts had reached USD 40bn by the end of 2009 - an increase of USD 7bn on the previous year. Rosoboroneksport (ROE), Russia’s sole authorized exporter of finished military equipment, secured an unprecedented USD 15bn of new sales last year. The previous record - USD 14bn - was set in 2006, when the Algerian and the first Venezuelan deals were announced (see Figure 1b)4. Taking inflation into account, 2009 has been as successful for the Russian defense contractors as 2006, despite the world economic crisis.

Indeed, if export contracts signed by independent suppliers of spare parts and components (worth an estimated USD 500m) are added to the final tally, 2009 becomes the best year ever for the industry.

It appears that demand for Russian weapons has been immune to the world economic crisis. Many observers were taken by surprise by the much higher than expected official arms exports figures - owing perhaps to the fact that many deals (such as the Venezuelan and Vietnamese contracts) had not been reported in the media. It is quite possible that ROE could have raked in even more orders (especially considering the ongoing talks with Saudi Arabia and Libya). But it appears that the capacity of the Russian defense contractors, hidebound as they are by all the aforementioned problems, simply cannot keep up with demand.

Key developments in 20091. Vietnam became Russia’s largest weapons customer

in terms of new contracts signed in 2009. It placed a large order (estimated at USD 4bn) for six Project 636M (Kilo class) conventional submarines and the requisite onshore infrastructure to be built by Russian companies. It also signed a contract for eight Su-30MK2 Flanker fighter jets, becoming one of Russia’s top six defense customers along with India, China, Algeria, Venezuela and Syria.

Figure 1. Russian defense exports in 2006-2009

Source: FSMTC, ROE; CAST Estimates.

* – Rosoboroneksport figures plus USD 500m, the estimated worth of contracts signed by independent suppliers of components, instruments and accessories. Figures for 2006 provided by the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation.

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief10Russian Arms Trade in 2009:


Arms Trade

2. Venezuela, which received a USD 2.2bn loan from Moscow in 2009 to be spent on Russian weapons, probably, was the second-largest customer. But it is not clear what exactly the Venezuelans have bought. The only known contract is for the delivery of 92 upgraded T-72M1M main battle tanks. The rest is pure speculation, though on the whole it is safe to assume that the new Venezuelan deal includes a large number of air defense missile systems and artillery equipment (S-300V and Pechora-2M SAM systems, Smerch MLR systems, Msta-S and Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers, etc.). Unofficial reports claim that the deal is actually much bigger than the size of the Russian loan would suggest, estimating it at up to USD 4bn.

3. According to open sources, not a single large contract was signed with India in 2009. The only new sale reported in the media is the purchase of five Ka-31 Helix E airborne early warning helicopters worth USD 100m.

4. For the first time in several years, fighter jets made by RSK MiG have become a significant export item. Deliveries have begun in earnest on an earlier contract for MiG-29K fighters to be based on India’s Vikramaditya aircraft carrier. Russia has also signed a EUR 400m contract with Burma for 20 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter jets.

5. The Russian Defense Ministry has made clear its intention to begin buying arms and military equipment abroad - and not just a few samples to gain access to foreign technology, but as part of the Russian army’s routine weapons procurement program. The announcement of the plan to buy a Mistral-class amphibious assault ship from France was the first signal of this new policy.

Identified deliveriesThe combined worth of Russian arms deliveries to

foreign customers reported in the open sources is USD 5.64bn

(See Table 1), accounting for roughly 65 per cent of the official arms exports figure of USD 8.5bn. If exports of spare parts, instruments and accessories (worth about USD 1bn) are included in the tally, the so-called transparency index will increase to 0.8 (80 per cent)5.

Aerospace equipment is still the largest category of Russia’s military exports (61 per cent of identified deliveries, see Figure 2). Arms and equipment for the ground forces ranked second (21 per cent of the total), followed by naval equipment and air defense systems (9 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively). Meanwhile, the share of aerospace equipment in the official ROE exports figures is 50 per cent (of the USD 7.44bn total), followed by arms and equipment for the ground forces (19 per cent), naval equipment (14 per cent) and air defense systems (13 per cent). The disparity between the official figures and our calculations is mainly due to the underreporting of naval and air defense exports in the open sources.

In our estimates of the destinations for Russian arms deliveries in 2009, Algeria ranks first with 29 per cent, followed by India (25 per cent) and China (12 per cent). ROE has not provided any regional breakdown of its exports figures.

Breakdown by type of equipment

Aerospace equipment. Our estimate of aerospace equipment deliveries in 2009 is USD 3.45bn. The bulk of that figure (USD 2.07bn) was generated by 41 fighter jets of the Su-30 Flanker family shipped to several countries, including: 20 Su-30MKI aircraft to India (including 2 fully completed jets and 18 assembly kits), 14 Su-30MKI(A) to Algeria, six Su-30MKM to Malaysia and one Su-30MK2 to Indonesia.

Deliveries began in earnest in 2009 on the contract to supply MiG-29K fighters for the future Indian aircraft carrier Vikramaditya (former heavy aircraft carrying cruiser

Figure 2. Breakdown of identified 2009 deliveries of Russian weapons by type and by country*

Source: CAST estimate based on open source information.

* – based on total deliveries estimate of USD 5.64bn. These calculations do not include the deliveries of spare parts, instruments and accessories (estimated at USD 1bn) because of the scarcity of details on those exports. The regional breakdown does not include the sales of Igla man-portable SAM systems, estimated at about USD 50m annually.



Arms Trade

Admiral Gorshkov). Russia’s RSK MiG corporation handed over to the Indians another four jets worth an estimated USD 180m. That means that six aircraft out of the total 16 have now been delivered.

Afghanistan and Azerbaijan seem to have been the two main destinations for Russian helicopter deliveries in 2009. Kabul received 13 Mi-17V-5 Hip assault landing helicopters, with the United States acting as an intermediary. Baku appears to have taken delivery of six Mi-17-1V transports. At least another 15 machines of the Mi-17 family were shipped to Iran, Bolivia, Iraq, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan and Egypt. China received three Ka-28 Helix anti-submarine helicopters. This list is almost certainly incomplete, as the 2009 production target of Vertolety Rossii, the umbrella corporation for Russian helicopter makers, was 180 units, of which 70 percent were destined for exports.

As in the previous two years, China was the main destination for aircraft turbofan engines under separate contracts. The 2009 deliveries include 122 AL-31FN engines (for China’s J-10 fighter jets), 15 RD-93 engines (for FC-1 fighters) and 11 D-30KP2 engines for H-6K bombers, worth an estimated total of USD 600m.

Arms and equipment for ground troops. Identified transfers of arms and equipment for ground troops in 2009 add up to USD 1.18bn. For the third year running, the T-90S main battle tank accounted for the bulk of exports in this category. Its largest recipient last year was India, which took delivery of 100 completed T-90S tanks and possibly several dozen assembly kits, worth an estimated USD 600m in total.

Naval equipment. Identified deliveries of naval equipment in 2009 stood at USD 537m. But judging from ROE’s official breakdown of deliveries by type of equipment, the actual figure is probably twice as high.

Algeria was the largest importer - it has taken delivery of one new Project 636M conventional submarine (USD 300m) and one refitted and upgraded Project 877EKM conventional submarine (USD 50m).

Also in 2009 Russia and India agreed on the final cost of refit and upgrade of the Admiral Gorshkov heavy aircraft carrying cruiser, which will be renamed into Vikramaditya once it becomes part of the Indian Navy. The new figure is USD 2.3bn, and the delivery date has been pushed back to 2012. The initial sum under the 2004 contract was USD 850m, with the completion date some time in 2008.

Air defense systems. Identified deliveries of air defense systems fell to just USD 460m in 2009 - a third of the previous year’s figure. But judging from ROE official reports, actual exports were closer to USD 1bn.

Open-source reports have allowed us to identify only the delivery of the new Pantsir-S1 (SA-22) gun-missile anti-aircraft system to Syria and the UAE. Media coverage of that contract has been fairly detailed. It is also known that Russia exports about USD 50m worth of the Igla man-portable

SAM systems every year. All the other transfers of air defense equipment could not be identified.

The beginning of shipments to Iran of the S-300PMU1 (SA-20) SAM systems (an upgraded version of the S-300PS units from the Russian Defense Ministry’s existing stock) was initially scheduled for the spring of 2009, but was later postponed until the fall of that year, and then suspended indefinitely for political reasons. Iran has already voiced its frustration on that account6.

Spare par ts, inst r uments and accessor ies. Deliveries in this category reached USD 1bn in 2009. Half of that figure was generated by independent exporters. In 2006, those exporters sold about USD 400m worth of their wares. Sukhoi, a combat aircraft maker, remains an undisputed leader in this area - its sales of spare parts and components remained unchanged from the previous year at USD 200m.

Regional breakdown

Algeria, which received a large number of Su-30 fighter jets in 2009, was the top destination for Russian arms deliveries (29 per cent of the total). It was followed by India (25 per cent), which took delivery of Su-30MKI and MiG-29 fighter jets, as well as T-90S tanks. China, which received large batches of aircraft engines, and probably SAM systems, was third (12 per cent). Syria ranked fourth with 8 per cent after importing 20 Pansir-S1 anti-aircraft systems. Malaysia and Venezuela share the fifth place with 5 per cent each. Vietnam and Afghanistan accounted for 3 per cent each. On the whole, Russian arms exports are fairly diverse in terms of the geography of their destinations.

Identified new contractsAccording to aggregate data from media sources, Russia

signed USD 6.89bn worth of new arms exports contracts in 2009 (See Table 2). That figure does not include the estimated USD 1bn in exports of spare parts, components and maintenance services. But the actual grand total of arms deals signed last year (including those not reported in the media) is much higher at USD 15.5bn. The Venezuelan contract, details of which have not been released, can account for some but not all of that difference.

For the first time in many years, naval contracts made up the bulk of the total new sales (58 per cent of identified contracts, see Figure 3), well ahead of aerospace equipment (32 per cent) and arms and equipment for ground troops (9 per cent). There have been some media reports about new air defense contracts in 2009, but their size is unclear. In the regional breakdown of new Russian arms exports deals, Vietnam leads with 63 per cent. China is a distant



Arms Trade

second with 10 per cent, followed by Burma with 8 per cent. ROE has not released its own regional breakdown figures for 2009.

By type of equipment

Naval. This category came out on top last year thanks solely to the signing of the large Vietnam contract for six Project 636M conventional submarines, worth an estimated USD 2.1bn. The contract also includes the creation of on-shore infrastructure, which will have to be built from scratch because Vietnam has never had any submarines. The total value of the contract is therefore much higher that the price of the subs themselves – USD 4bn is a conservative estimate.

The Vietnam deal was the largest not only in the naval equipment category, but across all categories. It was undoubtedly the contract of the year for Russia’s defense industry.

Aerospace equipment. Our estimate for new sales in this category is USD 2.24bn. The largest deal (worth about EUR 400m) was signed with Burma for 20 MiG-29 fighter jets (which had already been partially built when the contract was signed).

A big contract, estimated at USD 320m, was signed for eight Su-30MK2 fighter jets with Vietnam. The deal does not include airborne weapons, which Vietnam intends to buy later. Another big contract (worth an estimated USD 720m) was signed with China for Al-31FN and D-30KP2 turbofan engines to be fitted on Chinese aircraft of indigenous design.

Russia’s largest helicopter contract last year (22 Mi-171 helicopters, worth USD 345m) was signed with the Iraqi

Air Force. The deal was mediated by the Pentagon. Another big contract (five Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters, worth USD 100m) was signed with India - that in fact was the only known Indian contract signed last year.

Equipment for ground troops. The estimated total of the contracts for this type of equipment signed last year is USD 625m. The largest of those was for the delivery of 92 upgraded T-72M1M main battle tanks from the Russian army stock, worth about USD 400m, to Venezuela.

Air defense systems. Estimating the value of air defense contracts signed in 2009 is difficult because these contracts were quite unusual. Kazakhstan bought ten S-300PS (SA-10) SAM systems from the Russian Air Force stock. But since the country is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, it clearly must have paid much less for them than other countries would have had to fork out. There have also been reports that Venezuela has agreed to buy an unspecified number of tracked chassis mounted S-300V (SA-12) SAM systems - but it is not clear whether a firm contract has actually been signed. The last time such a system was sold abroad was many years ago.

Regional breakdown

The Vietnamese contracts for diesel-electric subs and Su-30MK2 fighters account for the bulk of identified weapons deals signed in 2009 (62 per cent in dollar terms). China, which signed several contracts for Russian aircraft engines, came second with 10 per cent. Burma is third with 8 per cent (20 MiG-29 fighters), followed by Venezuela (6 per cent, T-72M1M tanks) and Iraq (5 per cent, Mi-171 helicopters).

Figure 3. Breakdown of identified arms exports contracts by type of equipment and region, 2009*

Source: CAST estimate based on media reports.

* – based on estimated total of USD 6.89bn. The figure does not include contracts for spare parts, instruments and accessories (USD 1bn) because no details on them are available.



Arms Trade

Prospects for 2010The existing portfolio of defense contracts should keep

Russian arms exports revenue steady for another five years. Projections for 2010 include the sale of about 40 fighter jets of the Su-27/30 Flanker family. Of these, India will receive 30 Su-30MKI jets, Indonesia three Su-27SKM’s and Vietnam four Su-30MK2’s. Final deliveries will probably be made on the Indian contract for 16 carrier-based MiG-29K fighters. But deliveries will commence on two other contracts with India - one for the upgrade of MiG-29 fighters to MiG-29SMT specification, the other for 80 Mi-17V-5 helicopters. That means that India will probably become the largest importer of Russian weapons in 2010 in terms of actual shipments. Russia is also expected to make first deliveries of the Yak-130 trainers to Algeria – the contract represents an important achievement for the Russian aerospace sector.

The main event in naval equipment exports will be the transfer to India of the recently completed Project 971I Nerpa (Improved Akula class) nuclear-powered attack submarine. In air defense sector, the contract with Syria for the Pantsir-S1 systems will be completed, but deliveries will continue to the UAE. Syria is likely to receive the first Buk-M2E (SA-17) air defense missile systems under a large 2007 contract. In the category of arms and equipment for ground troops, the main exports will include T-90S tank assembly kit supplies to India, as well as the Venezuelan contracts (including the upgraded T-72M1M tanks).

The biggest sales Russia hopes to secure in 2010 include proposed deals with India (for an additional batch of Su-30MKI jets and MiG-29K carrier-based fighters), China (new RD-93 aircraft turbofan engines), Vietnam (another batch of Su-30MK2 fighters) and Greece (under the BMP-3M infantry fighting vehicle program), as well as with Saudi Arabia and Libya.

ImportsThe Russian Defense Ministry last year clearly stated its

intention to begin importing arms and military equipment. What the generals have in mind is not just individual samples to gain access to foreign technology, but bulk contracts. Right now they see France, Israel and possibly Italy as the key partners in this area. The announcement in 2009 of the plan to buy a large (21,300 tonnes) warship from France – a versatile assault landing helicopter carrier of the Mistral class, to be precise - was a real shocker. The price of the ship is estimated as EUR 500m, and the entire program at about EUR 1bn. The rationale for the decision remains less than obvious – neither the Russian armed forces nor the national defense industry would benefit from such a purchase. The Defense Ministry came under heavy criticism following the announcement, and plans for the deal have now been shelved – but not necessarily cancelled altogether.

Last year Russia also signed a deal with France on licensed production of Thales Catherine thermal images for its T-90 tanks (the sample batch of the imagers was purchased in 2008). Production should begin in 2010 at the Vologda optical equipment plant, at the rate of 20-30 imagers per month. Russia has also signed a framework agreement with France’s Safran and Thales, outlining prospects for joint development of electronic systems. Last but not least, Moscow has begun talks with the French on buying their FELIN infantry combat suit.

Last year the Russian Defense Ministry bought 12 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Israel Aerospace Industries for USD 53m, including the mini-class Bird-Eye 400, tactical class I-View MK 150 and medium class Searcher Mk II drones. First deliveries on the contract will be made in 2010, and the ministry is already in talks to buy more. The FSB, the Russian security service, has decided to follow the Defense Ministry’s suit and is now looking to place an order for its own UAVs with Israel’s Aeronautics Defense Systems.

Recipient Weapon designation

No. ordered

Year of contract

Year(s) of deliveries

Delivered in 2009 Delivered by 2010, units

Notesmln USD units

ASIA

China AL-31FN jet engines

122 2009 2009** 500 122** Completed Contract value – USD 500m. For Chinese J-10 fighters

India Su-30MKI fighter kit

140 2000 2004-2012 (2014)

430 18** 69 Contract value – USD 3.3bn. Delivery of kits to be completed by 2012, India to complete assembly by 2014

Su-30MKI fighters

40 2007 2008-2010

80 2** 6 Contract value – USD 1.6bn

Table 1. Major* Identified Deliveries of Russian Arms in 2009


Arms Trade

Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections


No. ordered

Year of contract



Notesmln USD units

India MiG-29K/KUB carrier based fighters

12 / 4 2004 2008-2010

180 2 / 2 3 / 3 Contract value – USD 732m. For airborne carrier Vikramaditya (ex Admiral Gorshkov)

IL-38 aircraft upgrade program

5 2001 2005-2009

80 2* Completed Contract value – USD 205m. Airplanes equipped with Sea Dragon multimission avionics and electronic warfare suite. Contract includes delivery of 20 Uran Kh-35 (AS-20) anti-ship missiles, torpedoes and other arms

T-90S MBTs / T-90 MBT kit

124 / 223

2007 2008-2011

600 100 / n/a

124 / n/a Contract value – USD 1.24bn

Smerch MLR systems

38 2005 2007-2009

80*** 4-10** Completed Contract value – USD 450m

Vietnam Bastion coast based anti-ship missile system

1 batt. 2006 2009 150 1 Completed Contract value – USD 150m. Contract includes R&D works and a set of Yahont anti-ship missiles

Malaysia Su-30MKM fighters

18 2003 2007-2009

300 6 Completed Contract value – USD 910m, of which 30 % is paid in kind (palm oil). Another USD 270m will be offset against the Russian share in an aircraft servicing and component production joint venture to be set up in Malaysia.

Afghanistan Mi-17-V5 helicopters

61 n/a 2009-2016

100 9 9 Estimated contract value – USD 670m. US Department of Defense acts as an intermediary in the contract.

MIDDLE EAST

Algeria Su-30MKI(A) fighters

28 2006 2007-2009

1200 14 Completed Contract value – USD 2.4bn, of which USD 1.4bn represents the cost of armament and infrastructure

Kilo class (Project 636M) submarines

2 2006 2009-2010

300 1 1 Contract value – USD 600m

Syria Pantzir-S1 air defense systems

36 2006 2008-2010

330 20** 30** Estimated contract value – USD 600m

T-72 MBTs upgrade program

1000 2006 2007-2010

100 200 600 Contract value – USD 500m

UAE Pantzir-S1 air defense systems

50 2000 2009-2012

80*** 4-6** 4-6 Contract value – USD 800m



Arms Trade


No. ordered

Year of contract



Notesmln USD units

LATIN AMERICA

Venezuela Construction of a MRO center for Russian helicopters

- 2007 2007-2010**

100 n/a n/a Contract value – USD 400m

Construction of a plant for license production of AK-103 assault rifles and 7.62 cartridges

- 2006 2008-2010

160 n/a n/a Contract value – USD 475m

* – delivery value more than USD 80 mln.** – CAST estimate.*** – estimate based on a mid-value.Sources: Russian and foreign press; CAST estimates.

Recipient Weapon designation No. ordered Year(s) of deliveries Contract value, m USD

Notes

ASIA

China AL-31FN jet engines 122 2009** 500 For Chinese J-10 fighters

D-30KP2 jet engines 55 2009-2011 220** For Chinese H-6K air bombers

India Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters

5 n/a 100

Vietnam Su-30MK2 fighters 8 2010-2011 320 Fighters to be delivered without armament or training equipment

Kilo class (Project 636M) submarines

6 2011-2016** 4000 The contract includes the construction of the whole infrastructure for these submarines. Currently Vietnam doesn’t have a submarine fleet. The cost of the submarines themselves is estimated at USD 2.1bn.

Myanmar MiG-29 fighters 20 2010 560** Contract value – EUR 400m. The fighters are from production reserve.

Turkmenistan Kamaz trucks 1052 n/a 100

MIDDLE EAST

Iraq Mi-171 helicopters 22 2009-2011 345 US Department of Defense acts as an intermediary in the contract.

Yemen BTR-80A APCs 100 n/a 100

120-mm 2B1 towed mortar

50 n/a

Kamaz trucks 400 2009

LATIN AMERICA

Venezuela T-72M1M MBTs 92 n/a 400 Upgraded ex-Russian

* - contract value more than USD 80m.** - CAST estimate.Sources: Russian and foreign press; CAST estimates.

Table 2. Major* Identified Contracts for Delivery of Russian Arms Signed in 2009



Arms Trade

1 http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/CurrentInflation.asp.2 Rosoboroneksport would have been quite happy simply to repeat the financial results of 2008, let alone surpass them.3 Average exchange rate for the respective years.4 That year ROE, which had not yet been designated Russia’s sole arms exporter, signed USD 9bn worth of contracts.5 In our roundup of 2008 results (see Moscow Defense Brief, No 1, 2009) we managed to identify 80 per cent of the transfers, but the

figure did not include exports of components and spare parts. Had those been taken into account, the ratio would have been 0.9 (90 per cent).

6 However, it cannot be ruled out that up to three battalions of Buk-M1 (SA-11) SAM systems from the Russian army stock were secretly delivered to Iran in 2009. The transfer of these systems to Iran (“customer 102”), along with the S-300PS systems, was mentioned in the table of transfers of equipment assigned to Russia’s air defense units (under the Russian Air Force and Air Defense) as part of their reform. The table, which was based on directives of Russia’s Defense Ministry, has been circulating on the Web since early 2009. It is available at: www.ryadovoy.ru/forum/index.php/topic,382.0.html.


Arms Trade

Naval Build-up and New Submarines in Asia-Pacific: Growing Security Risks

Naval Build-up and New Submarines in Asia-Pacific: Growing Security RisksMikhail Barabanov, Andrey Frolov

Naval build-up in Asia-PacificAsia has become the most rapidly developing region of

our planet in the past few decades. Japan’s economy was the first to take off in the most spectacular way; it was followed by South Korea and Taiwan, and now China. The economies of India and Southeast Asia are also booming. Asia has become a major hub of manufacturing, technological innovation and business activity. In a space of just two generations, several large Asian nations and billions of their citizens have made a leap from the third world to the very peak of industrial

and urbanized civilization, and are now transitioning to post-industrial and information-based society. Asia is at the cutting edge of this transition. Rapid transformation of the region’s leading nations is causing major shifts in the global security landscape, with the emergence of new world powers (Japan, India, potentially Korea) and even superpowers (China). Economic growth has enabled several AsPac countries to achieve rapid modernization of their armed forces, which in many respects are now becoming some of the most advanced in the world. Growing defense budgets of leading Asian economies have turned Asia-Pacific into one of

Warships USA Europe Russia China India Japan Rest Asia Rest World Total World Incl. Total Asia

Nuclear-Powered Submarines

6 1 1 3 - - - - 11 3

Conventional Submarines

- 11 1 25 1 8 10 12 68 44

Aircraft Carriers

2 2 - - - - - - 4 -

Destroyers and Frigates

28 25 1 23 7 13 18 15 130 61

Corvettes 2 8 2 - 3 - 10 3 28 13

Large Amphibious Ships

6 11 - 12 2 2 9 1 43 25

Total warships 44 58 5 63 13 23 47 29 284 146

Table/Figure 1. New-Builds Major Warships Commissioned in the World in 2000-2009


Arms Trade


the two largest regional arms markets, along with the Middle East. As Asian economies continue their breakneck growth, that market will become even more important.

Given the lengthy coastlines of many Asian countries, and the importance of waterways for their global trade, it is unsurprising that the region’s navies are at the forefront of military modernization. Asia has become a hotspot of naval build-up. Most of the new warships launched in the world over the past decade were built for the Asian navies.

This has led to a radical shift in the balance of naval strength not just in Asia but on the global scale. While the Asian countries are rapidly beefing up their navies, the traditional powers such as the United States, Europe and the former Soviet Union have been reducing their numerical strength at sea for 20 years now, ever since the end of the Cold War. America, Britain and most NATO countries are now left with roughly half the numbers of ships they had 20 years ago. The former Soviet Navy, inherited mostly by Russia, has undergone even deeper cuts – by some 80 per cent – and a severe degradation of its combat capability. In Europe and Russia, the trend towards further reductions in the naval strength continues. The latest announcement to that effect has recently come from Britain – London is apparently considering a further downsizing of the Royal Navy, which could affect plans to build a second CVF aircraft carrier. Asian nations, meanwhile, are building and buying ever more ships, and the level of their technology is beginning to approach Western standards.

The focus of naval activity and the overall “center of naval power” is now shifting towards the Asia-Pacific region. This has several distinct consequences:

China and, to a lesser extent, India are becoming great •naval powers, capable of projecting that power beyond their own coastlines, and in future, on the global scale.

Concerned by China’s military build-up, other nations •in the Asia-Pacific region have stepped up their own naval programs. In some cases that process bears all the hallmarks of a regional naval arms race, directed predominantly against China.Whereas the naval strength of the AsPac nations is growing, •the navies of the “traditional” powers are shrinking. There is a distinct possibility that at some point in the future, these powers may have trouble ensuring “free access” to the region for themselves in the event of a crisis. That is an especially worrying possibility for the US Navy, which plays a crucial role in the region’s security system.The prospect of diminishing American naval power in the •region in the face of growing Chinese military strength could force many US allies in Asia-Pacific to rely less on Washington’s protection and more on their own navies. That seems to be the thinking behind South Korea’s naval programs.

Submarine forces in Asia-PacificOne of the most visible signs of the center of world naval

activity shifting to Asia-Pacific has been the numbers of modern new subs being built or bought by the AsPac nations. Several distinct trends have come to light:

• China is building a new generation of nuclear-powered submarines. After wasting a lot of time with its largely useless first-generation nuclear-powered submarines (five Type 091 Ming class attack submarines and one ballistic missile-carrying Type 092 Xia class submarine), Beijing has started to build nuclear-powered submarines of the next generation. It already has two versatile nuclear-powered Type 093 Shang class attack submarines and

Major surface warships 1990 2009

Total World Include total Asia Total World Include total Asia

Aircraft Carriers 31 1 21 2

Cruisers, Destroyers and Frigates

942 236 641 239

Corvettes 360 55 232 97

Large Amphibious Ships 273 110 198 99

Total major surface warships

1606 402 1092 437

Table/Figure 2. Share of the Asian Navies in the Global Naval Balance (major surface warships)


Arms Trade


two nuclear-powered ballistic missile-carrying Type 094 Jin class submarines. Several more are probably in the pipeline. If China manages to make these subs perform as expected, it will obtain a powerful instrument of achieving dominance at sea, as well as the capability to deliver a nuclear strike against targets on US mainland from the sea. A modern Chinese nuclear-powered submarine fleet would radically change the naval balance in the eastern Pacific. China’s capable new nuclear-powered submarines would pose a serious threat to the US Navy, and menace the fleets of America’s Asian allies. • India has begun building its own nuclear-powered submarines and acquiring them from Russia. In 2009, after long delays, India launched its first indigenous nuclear-powered Arihant submarines, which was designed and built with Russian assistance. In 2010, the country will receive a modern Russian Nerpa nuclear-powered attack submarine (Project 971I) under a lease agreement. Another such submarine should be handed over to the Indians at some point in the future. Project 971I (Improved Akula class) represents fairly advanced technology, so the combat effectiveness of the Indian nuclear-powered submarine fleet could even surpass that of China’s indigenously built submarines. For India as well as China, developing their own nuclear-powered submarine fleets is an important element of bolstering their superpower credentials.

• More Southeast Asian nations have acquired conventional submarines. Over the past decade, the number of countries in the Asia-Pacific region who possess submarines has grown substantially. Rapid economic growth has enabled Singapore and Malaysia to acquire conventional submarines. In 2009, Vietnam signed a contract for six Project 636M (Kilo class) submarines to be built in Russia. Once these are delivered, Vietnam will possess the largest submarine fleet in the region between China and Australia. In future, submarines could be acquired by Thailand, Burma and even Bangladesh. The overall numbers of modern conventional •subs in the Asia-Pacific region are growing. While new nations are acquiring submarine fleets, some of the existing conventional submarine fleets are being expanded. China, India and Pakistan are building and buying new conventional submarines only to replace the old and obsolete ones. But some other nations are planning to increase the overall size of their fleets. Under Australia’s new Defence White Paper, the number of its submarines should be increased to 12 from the current six. South Korea is rapidly increasing its own submarine fleet, and wants to have at least 18 submarines instead of 12. Indonesia, which already has two submarines, is in talks with Russia and South Korea to buy another two. Finally, Taiwan has not abandoned plans to acquire six new submarines.

Submarines 1990 2009

Total World Include total Asia Total World Include total Asia

Nuclear-Powered Submarines

367 7 153 9


479 120 275 140

Total submarines 846 127 428 149

Table/Figure 3. Share of the Asian Navies in the Global Naval Balance (submarines)


Total Submarines


Arms Trade


New security risks posed by growing submarine forces in Asia-Pacific

Such a rapid growth of the submarine forces of the Asia-Pacific nations will make these forces much more effective.

Meanwhile, the ability of most of the AsPac navies to defend against the increasingly capable submarine forces of the region’s leading nations is clearly inadequate. Apart from Russia, Japan is the only nation in the region that has advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which are nearly as effective as America’s own. Some other countries have technologically advanced but numerically limited anti-submarine warfare capabilities - these include Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, India, and possibly Singapore. China is so far lagging behind in that respect. As for the rest of the region’s nations, their navies cannot defend themselves against modern submarines. That means that even a small fleet of submarines can be an extremely potent weapon in any conflict with the technologically “backward” nations (or in a conflict between these nations themselves). On the other hand, even a small number of non-nuclear powered submarines (especially in the littoral zone) can pose a serious threat even to the most advanced navies, such as America’s. Just as 100 years ago, the submarine remains the only “legal” weapon which a small nation can rely on to pose a serious threat to a large nation. That is undoubtedly one of the key

reasons why many of the region’s nations are so interested in acquiring submarines.

The acquisition of modern nuclear-powered submarines by China and India will shift the naval balance even further. The nuclear-powered submarine is the battleship of the 21st century. Second-rate navies can do next to nothing against such a submarine. In any confrontation with such a navy, the nuclear-powered submarines is the “ultimate weapon”, which can obliterate the enemy’s entire naval strength and establish complete dominance at sea. Apart from Russia, Japan is the only nation in the eastern Pacific that has some limited and uncertain ability to defend against nuclear-powered submarines on its own, without America’s support. Even a small number of nuclear-powered submarines could give India massive advantage over Pakistan’s navy, or China against the navies of Taiwan and other potential adversaries. Chinese and Indian nuclear-powered submarines can effectively control all the strategic straits, representing a serious threat in the region for the navies of other great powers, especially the United States. The bottom line is, modern nuclear submarines will give India and China a strategic capability which they previously could not even dream of. In many situations (such as various local crisis scenarios) this capability would be even more effective and flexible than that offered by nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

Submarines 2009 2020

Nuclear-Powered Submarines (for China and India only) 9 25

Conventional Submarines 140 192

Table/Figure 4. Combined number of submarines in the navies of AsPac nations (projection)


Armed Forces

Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy

“The Navy should reflect the national interests and economic potential of our country” Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, Commander of the Russian Navy

Q: How would you describe the current state and the prospects of the Russian Navy?

A: The Navy is an instrument of foreign policy, its military support component, and an element of our country’s naval presence. It is needed in the areas where we need to defend the political and economic interests of our country. We believe that the shape of our Navy should be based on two key premises. First, the Navy should reflect the national interests and economic potential of our country, and second, the Navy should be well-balanced. Right now, everything is in place for us to develop the Russian Navy in this direction, and that is where we are heading. We cannot allow an imbalance in favor submarines of surface ships. We need to pursue well-balanced development, but the nuclear-missile carrying fleet remains out priority. And we are not talking just about ships or subs, we are talking about entire combat systems. And proceeding from the premise that the Navy needs to be well-balanced, we also need to understand that this type of the armed forces should be built using open architecture, where combat systems are fully fit to serve the key tasks facing the Navy. The choices we are making now will shape the Russian Navy beyond 2020 or 2030 - they will shape it up until 2050. So there is simply no room for mistakes.

Q: What is going on with the Bulava missile? Why is it not flying?

A: The situation is difficult but not hopeless, as some seem to believe. The overall idea behind the Bulava is sound. The problem is that our technological and manufacturing capability, as well as our ability to bring various defense contractors together to deliver this project have turned out to be much weaker than we expected. We are facing a crisis in some areas of technology. The Bulava is a litmus test that will show whether we can overcome this crisis or forever become a third-rate world power.

Q: So what now for the Bulava?A: We need to finalize the designs and eliminate all

the teething problems. We need to obtain a result, a reliable

result. And then we need to start thinking about the day after tomorrow. We need to start thinking now - in fact, we should have already started. We have already laid some foundations. But if we start redesigning the whole system, we will not see any serious results in missile building over the next few years. So, to answer you previous question, the missile is not flying YET, but it will fly. It will have to fly. It just needs to be built properly. But that is something our manufacturers need to sort out.

Q: What was the cause of the failure during the latest tests?

A: The cause of the failure? What does it matter, whether it was the ejection cartridge or not? Yesterday it was the ejection cartridge, before that is was the poor engineering and manufacturing of the steering mechanism of the first stage, next time it could be something else. It makes no difference. The real question is whether or not our defense contractors can manufacture such a missile. Are they up to the task? I think we have what it takes to build such missiles. Our defense industry has that capability, we just have some problems that need to be resolved.

Q: What about the Sineva liquid-fuel missile, which is already operational? Can it become a replacement for the Bulava?

A: Replacing the Bulava with the Sineva is just empty talk. Even those who have never served in the Navy understand this. These are two completely different weapons systems, with very different launch requirements. The Sineva may be a good missile, but it cannot serve as our main missile up until 2050, because it was designed back in the late 1990s. And what we are trying to do now is lay the foundations for the Navy that will last up until 2050. As for redesigning the Borei-class subs to carry the Sineva missiles, we are not going to do that either - such a redesign is simply impossible.

Q: Any chance of the Bark program being resurrected?A: We should not be going back, we should be moving

forward. Resurrecting the Bark missile complex, which was


Armed Forces


designed 20 years ago, would be an admission of defeat. We need new technology. Why resurrect something that can be nothing more than a stopgap? Our strategy is to overcome these problems we are facing now and move on to a new generation of technology. Let me remind you that the Bark missile weighs about 100 metric tons. It is yesterday’s generation of technology.

Q: How many submarines, including strategic subs, does the Russian Navy require to ensure our country’s security and deal with any threats from the sea?

A: We have a clear understanding of what we should get rid of, and what we should keep. Of course, we should have a nuclear fleet, and it should have a very high degree of standardization in terms of the components that we have now. But we are not talking about numbers. I am not going to talk about the numbers at all. What is really important is the quality, the capability that we can achieve. Once we achieve the quality that we need in some areas, then we can talk about the numbers. We already have the strategy of how the Navy should be used, it has already been approved. But the strategy of building this Navy has been under discussion for many years, and it has yet to be approved.

The Navy should be made up of diversified forces, not just ships and submarines. No Navy has fought on its own in the second half of the 20th century. Naval strength has always been deployed as part of a diversified group of forces. The essence of this approach is to have a diverse structure in the Armed Forces to fight on the ground, on the seas and in the air. The Navy, with is missile carriers and auxiliary ships, will be an element of that. There is nothing new in this approach, but that is the right approach.

Q: What will be the role of aircraft carriers in the whole strategy of building the Russian Navy?

A: An aircraft carrying fleet is not just aircraft carriers. It is a powerful combined-services group of forces. It has a general purpose, but it is also an element of strategic offensive forces, which serves a wide range of purposes. The most important for us is the issue of missile defense, air defense and space defense, where we have a serious gap. The aircraft carrying fleet should be an integral component of our single missile defense, air defense and space defense system.

Q: At what stage is the development of the new aircraft carrier?

A: Development is already under way. Under the existing schedule we should have the basic designs with the key tactical and technical specifications by the end of next year. After that, work will commence on more detailed designs.

Q: When can we expect the launch of the new ship?A: It is difficult to give a specific time frame. We need a

separate federal program to finance this work - funding this project from the general military procurement budget would hardly be feasible. With a bit of luck I think the ship can be launched by 2020.

Q: What will be the role of the Mistral-class helicopter-carrying ships, which the Navy is planning to buy from abroad?

A: For us the technology of building such ships is more important than the actual ships. We need to learn how to build such ships here in Russia, using the latest technologies. This experience will help us in building the future aircraft carriers, so this has relevance to your previous question.

Q: How many Mistral-class ships are you planning to buy from France?

A: We have determined that we need to buy one such ship, and build at least three more at the Russian shipyards, using technical assistance from the French.

Q: And what if the French refuse to provide such technical assistance in building the ships in Russia?

A: In that case we will work with other countries, which also have very modern and advanced technologies in building such ships - including the Netherlands, Spain, and others.

Q: There have recently been some reports in the media that the naval Su-33 aircraft will soon be replaced with the new MiG-29K.

A: It is true that the service life of the Su-33’s expires in 2015. We are preparing for their replacement, and in the very near future we are planning to buy a batch of at least 24 aircraft to be based on our aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. The first tests of these fighter jets have been successful. Over the period of September 28 - October 2, several MiG-29K’s performed successful landings and take-offs from the aircraft carrier.

Q: Does the Russian Navy command have any plans to modernize the logistics base in the Syrian port of Tartus?

A: The Russian Navy command has plans to create a naval station for combat ships in Tartus, including the ships of the Black Sea fleet. Right now this Navy logistics base there is the only Russian military base in the far-abroad [foreign countries that were not part of the former Soviet Union]. If an agreement is reached with the Syrians, the opportunities are very good there. The plan now is to create a proper naval station there, where ships of the Russian Navy will be able to replenish their water and food supplies or undergo repairs, and where the crew can spend some time ashore. By the way, in mid-July two Black Sea Fleet tug boats brought a new mooring float to Tartus. Of course, it is a bit too early to speak now about creating a fully-fledged military naval base there, but we have such plans for the distant future. We have a lot of respect for our Syrian colleagues. They are our allies who did not turn away from the Russian Navy even during the most difficult times, which I am glad to say are now in the past. At the same time, the Russian Navy’s financial capabilities are not what they were even as recently as 2008. We have to take into account that our finances have taken a hit in 2009 and 2010 compared to 2008 due to the economic crisis.

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 23Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy

Armed Forces

Q: Have there been any negotiations with other countries about setting up Russian naval bases there, for example, to counter piracy?

A: There have been, let us say, discussions rather than negotiations. There is an understanding of the need for this. When the right time comes, we can talk about it. It is a very delicate issue.

Q: Will Russia use Abkhazia as a base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet?

A: There will be a naval station in Ochamchira for several ships. Before this happens we need to complete the discussions with the Abkhaz side - that will happen in the very near future. But there will not be any large naval bases there, there will just be a good naval station. We will just keep a limited number of small ships there, ships of the second or third rank - no more than what we strictly need there.

Q: What awaits the Black Sea Fleet after 2017? Some politicians in Ukraine say that the Russian fleet needs to start preparing right now for future withdrawal from Sevastopol, so that no Russian ships are left there by 2017.

A: That is a matter of international relations and politics. Withdrawal of the Russian fleet from Sevastopol is not a pleasant topic for discussion for either Ukraine or Russia. But I have never heard Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko talk about it. On the contrary, he has always said that all of Ukraine’s commitments in terms of stationing the Black Sea Fleet will be fulfilled. Geographically, there is no better location on the entire Black Sea coast than the Akhtiarskaya Bay in Sevastopol to serve as a naval base. But apart from geography, there is also history. Have our relations with Ukraine really become so bad that we need to withdraw from Sevastopol after 2017? Does the majority of Ukrainian citizens demand the Russian fleet’s withdrawal after 2017? There is a great many people in Ukraine whose opinion on this issue is very sound. The presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol is a firm guarantee of stability along the entire Black Sea coast of the CIS nations. This needs to be considered very seriously. There are also proposals about [using the Black Sea Fleet] as an instrument to jointly address shared problems, taking into account Russian and Ukrainian national interests. The Black Sea Fleet is a very powerful instrument. So the situation is not hopeless. We should not harbor any delusions, but we should not despair either.

Q: Could the military naval base in Novorossiysk be used as an alternative to Sevastopol?

A: There have never been any plans to turn the Novorossiysk military naval base into the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. What we are talking about is having the capability for some of the Black Sea Fleet ships to be based on the northern coastline of the Russian Caucasus. So let us not confuse this with actually moving the main base of the fleet there. What we are now doing in Novorossiysk is

not dependent on whether or not we are going to stay in Sevastopol. We are creating a capability for the entire group of Russian Armed Forces in the region, including the Navy, to have a base on the Russian territory. That is our main and only purpose. Everything that can be used as a base for the fleet on the Russian territory will be used, within reason – and that is what we are already doing now.

Q: The Black Sea Fleet command has repeatedly complained about problems with rearming the fleet. Part of the problem is Ukraine’s negative attitude to this issue. The fleet is becoming old and obsolete, while new armaments are not being delivered. How are you going to address this problem?

A: To begin with, Ukraine cannot forbid us from doing what needs to be done here. And second, starting from this year and every year after that, we will begin the construction of one new ship and one new submarine for the Black Sea Fleet. That is starting from 2010. Those ships will be earmarked specifically for the Black Sea Fleet. We need to take into account that the area of the Black Sea Fleet’s operations is the entire Mediterranean. And much depends on what kind of fleet we want to have in the Black Sea in the first place. I, for one, am not at all sure that we really need to have heavy cruisers or nuclear-powered submarines there.

Q: There have been many reports lately that the Caspian Flotilla is ceasing to exist. Is it true that the flotilla will be replaced with an operational command?

A: This is all at the stage of discussion for now. We are now reaching the point where will be able to deploy the Caspian forces even beyond the Black Sea region. So the question is, should all those forces be placed under the single command of the Black Sea Fleet? They probably should. This needs to be considered. But for now, this is only a discussion.

Q: Before the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, ships of the Black Sea Fleet took part in the NATO anti-terrorist operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. Will our ships continue taking part in that operation?

A: We made a deliberate decision to end our participation in Active Endeavour. In August 2008, NATO took a very clear stance on that conflict. We were actually asked to recall the Ladnyy ship, which had been specially prepared for the operation and which was already on its way to take part in the exercise. We are not saying we should not take part, but we need to see what we are doing this for. If there is a need, if it is in Russia’s interests, then we will take part.

Q: Will Russia continue its participation in countering piracy off the Somali coast?

A: The anti-piracy effort is a completely different matter. It is a task for the entire civilized world. We believe that this effort should be held under the auspices of the United Nations, but we are prepared to cooperate with everyone, with any potential ally, in whatever way is practical. I stress – we are ready to cooperate with any potential ally. But that does not


Armed Forces


mean we are going to work under their command. We can participate in joint operations with NATO, as well as with others - such as the European Union, first of all, but also with the naval forces of Egypt, China, Turkey and other countries. There is no doubt that we need a coordination of joint efforts – but without our forces being subordinated to anyone else.

Q: Will only the Pacific Fleet ships be taking part?A: The Russian Navy ships will be taking part,

predominantly the ships of the Pacific Fleet, because the Indian Ocean is its area of responsibility. It is easier, simpler and cheaper to use the Pacific Fleet for this. The time it would take to deploy a Black Sea Fleet ship in that area is about

the same as for a Pacific Fleet ship. But it would be more expensive – sending just one ship via the Suez Canal will cost us several hundred thousand dollars, maybe even more. We could be talking millions of dollars here.

Q: There have been reports in the media that the Black Sea Fleet ships on patrol off the Georgian coast have taken to shooting down Georgian drones.

A: Shooting down foreign drones is allowed only in one’s own territorial waters. In the open seas, you are allowed to shoot them down only if you are sure they are attacking you. Apart from the events of August 2008, there have been no such incidents with the Black Sea Fleet.

Admiral Visotskiy was interviewed by RIA Novosti correspondent Sergey Safronov for Moscow Defense Brief


Facts & Figures

Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010

Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010*Mikhail Lukin, Aleksandr Stukalin, Kommersant Publishing House

* – the table lists air accidents and crashes which have led to a loss of aircraft from January 1, 2000 to date. The list includes only piloted planes and helicopters belonging to the Russian military. It does not include planes and helicopters lost for various reasons in 2000–2010 in Chechnya and Ingushetia, nor the aircraft lost in August 2008 in Georgia.

## Date Aircraft Side number

Location Unit Ca-sual-ties

Cause Details Crew

1 March 14, 2000

Su-24 Klimshchina village (Smolensk Region)

1st guard bomber air regiment

0 Crew error In adverse weather conditions, the pilot erroneously engaged drag flaps, which led to increased fuel consumption. The crew did not monitor the remaining fuel level, and when the fuel ran out, the engines stopped in mid-air

Maj Aleksey Semushkin, Capt Igor Kanyshkin

2 April 6, 2000

MiG-31 11 Kotlas (Arkhangelsk Region)

458th guard fighter air regiment

1 Pilot error The plane undershot the runway trying to land in adverse weather conditions. The impact broke the starboard main landing gear leg. The plane skidded from the runway, rolled over and caught fire. The pilot cabin dug itself into the ground

Col Gennadiy Mashevskiy, Maj Yevgeniy Stroitelev

3 May 11, 2000

Su-27K (Su-33)

71 red Severomorsk (Murmansk Region)

279th independent naval fighter air regiment

0 Technical problem

Steering system failure as the aircraft was flying upside down

Col Pavel Kretov

4 June 9, 2000

Su-25 Bashanta (Stavropol Territory)

368th assault air regiment

1 Unknown Several versions, including the plane falling into a spin, engine failure, steering system failure, explosion of an unguided missile

Capt Andrey Morozov

5 June 21, 2000

Il-76MD RA-76723 Privolzhskiy airfield (Astrakhan Region)

117th military transport air regiment

0 Technical problem

Steering, fuel and hydraulic system failure due to a short circuit in mid-flight, followed by a fire onboard. The plane was consumed by flames after emergency landing, but over 200 passengers and the crew escaped with their lives

Lt Col Andrey Zelenko, Capt Sergey Lyulin, Capt Oleg Medvedev, Capt Viktor Perepelitsyn, Senior Lieutenant Pavel Statsyuk, senior warrant officer Sergey Kochetkov

6 June 26, 2000

Su-24M 12 white Baltimor (Voronezh)

455th bomber air regiment

0 Pilot error Hard landing and fire onboard after the plane undershot the runway due to pilot error

Maj Leonid Bezdetkin, Col Yuriy Barkalov

7 July 21, 2000

Mi-8T 34 Levashovo (Leningrad Region)

138th independent combined air regiment

19 Pilot error Autorotation of an overloaded helicopter and crash landing due to pilot error

Maj Sergey Khlenkin, Capt Aleksey Kovtunenko, Capt Sergey Moskalev

8 October 25, 2000

Il-18 RA-74295 Batumi (Georgia) 8th air division 84 Navigation error

The navigator lost orientation in adverse weather conditions, the air traffic controller also made an error, and the plane flew into a mountain

Lt Col Valeriy Osyko, Lt Col Andrey Staroverov, Maj Vladimir Afanasev, Maj Aleksandr Kotov, Maj Oleg Urin, Senior Lieutenant Roman Strashnikov, Senior Lieutenant Yevgeniy Koryakovtsev, Maj Aleksandr Avkhimenya, Maj Sergey Savichev, warrant officer Aleksandr Blagodarov, warrant officer Leonid Ponomarev

9 February 26, 2001

MiG-31 22 red Zakhar Sorokin

Monchegorsk (Murmansk Region)


0 Technical problem

Power system failure and fire in the starboard engine with subsequent failure of the hydraulics. Nevertheless, the pilot managed to land the burning plane without loss of life

Lt Col Mikhail Satanovskiy, Maj Vladimir Ovchenkov


Facts & Figures




Cause Details Crew

10 March 11, 2001

Su-24M Mozdok (North Ossetia)

4th air army 0 Pilot error The plane undershot the runway in adverse weather conditions and disintegrated on impact

11 March 22, 2001

MiG-29UB 35 km northeast of Akhtubinsk (Astrakhan Region)

929th state flight testing center

0 Technical problem

Fire in the starboard engine Col S.Seregin, Maj A.Voropaev

12 April 19, 2001

L-39C Novyy Mir village (Krasnodar Territory)

627th guard training air regiment

0 Technical problem

Fire in the engine Capt Vladimir Radchenko

13 May 17, 2001

Su-27 64 red Staraya Vasilyevka village (Tambov Region)

968th training and research combined air regiment

0 Technical problem

Fire, steering system failure Col Aleksandr Petrov

14 May 22, 2001

An-12MGA RA-12135 Myakotino village (Tver Region)


7 Unknown Versions include shifting cargo, steering system failure, engine failure

Maj Sergey Grishenko, Lt Igor Yeremeev, Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy Bozhkov, Maj Sergey Svishev, Capt Aleksandr Novikov, Capt Mikhail Aksyuchits, warrant officer Roman Popov

15 July 11, 2001

L-39C Gavrilovka village (Tambov Region)

644th training air regiment

2 Pilot error The plane hit the ground due pilot error while flying at extreme low altitude

Col Vladimir Rudenko, Maj Gennadiy Milovanov

16 July 17, 2001

Su-27K (Su-33)

70 Ostrov (Pskov Region)

279th independent naval fighter air regiment

1 Pilot error The pilot (Hero of Russia, Maj Gen Timur Apakidze) chose the wrong angle of attack and rate of descent during an imitation of landing on an aircraft carrier. (According to another version, the pilot blacked out during a high-G maneuver). The plane crashed onto the landing strip

Maj Gen Timur Apakidze

17 July 20, 2001

Mi-8 Lake Petropavlovskoye (Khabarov Territory)

11th Air Force and Air Defense Army

0 Pilot error Rotor blades touched the surface of the water during extreme low altitude flight and the helicopter fell into a lake

18 November 5, 2001

Mi-8MT Krasnyy Bor (Leningrad Region)

92nd special-purpose training and research helicopter squadron of Army Aviation

6 Pilot error The helicopter flew into a 250 meter transmission tower

Maj Oleg Gorynin, Capt Aleksey Aleksandrov, Capt Andrey Ivanov, Maj Aleksandr Dubnyuk, Capt Aleksey Moskalev, Lt Aleksandr Sytnikov

19 February 19, 2001

Su-24 Myshka village (Pskov Region)

722nd bomber air regiment

2 Pilot error The plane hit the ground during a nosedive maneuver due to pilot error

Maj Vladimir Shostenko, Lt Col Aleksandr Drozdetskiy


An-26 07 red Lakhta (Arkhangelsk Region)

403rd independent combined air regiment

17 Pilot error The plane descended below glide path altitude during night landing in adverse weather conditions and caught the treetops

Col Valeriy Popkov, Maj Yegor Kozyrev, Maj Viktor Karelskiy, Maj Viktor Kasukhin, Capt Sergey Khrulkov, Capt Yuriy Koledov, senior warrant officer Viktor Zakharchenko, warrant officer Aleksandr Obukhov

21 March 26, 2002

Su-27 Solovey Klyuch settlement (Maritime Territory)

22nd guard fighter air regiment

0 Technical problem

Steering system failure in mid-flight (other versions include engine failure and pilot error)

Capt Aleksandr Tsvetkov

22 May 7, 2002

Mi-8MT 15521 Kosh-Agas (Altay Republic)

337th independent combat helicopter regiment of Army Aviation

11 Pilot error During landing in mountainous terrain, the main rotor blades nicked a rock outcrop after a gust of wind and the helicopter fell into a deep ravine.

Lt Col Aleksandr Bukharov, Lt Col Sergey Ivashenkov, Maj Vyacheslav Yurev

23 June 14, 2002

L-39C Tikhoretsk (Krasnodar Territory)

627th guard training air regiment

0 Technical problem

Engine failure in mid-flight Capt Aleksandr Trubnikov, cadet Yevgeniy Vasilev


Facts & Figures




Cause Details Crew

24 June 20, 2002

L-39C Borisoglebsk (Voronezh Region)


1 Pilot error Crash landing due to pilot error. The pilot ejected while the plane was flying upside down and smashed into the ground

Cadet Yevgeniy Popov

25 August 12, 2002

L-39C Yuzhnaya Sosnovka (Tambov Region)


0 Technical problem

Engine failure in mid-flight Lt Col Yuriy Rogovastov, cadet Fedyaev

26 September 19, 2002

Mi-24P Verkhnyaya Vyrka village (Kaluga Region)

45th independent helicopter combat and command regiment of Army Aviation

3 Unknown Versions include pilot error in adverse weather conditions and a technical problem

Maj Valeriy Borzakov, Capt Igor Andreev, Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Brazgun

27 March 26, 2003

Ka-27PS Ussurian Gulf 289th independent combined anti-submarine air regiment

4 Pilot error After a night-time take-off from the deck of the big anti-submarine ship Admiral Tributs, the pilot lost orientation and pulled the stick back too sharply, after which the helicopter performed a semi-loop, lost speed, fell into the sea and sank

Lt Col Aleksandr Topyrychev, Capt Andrey Korovin, Capt Andrey Krasnoshekov, warrant officer Renat KhaMitov

28 June 19, 2003

MiG-29UB Armavir (Krasnodar Territory)


0 Crew error The crew failed to notice a fuel leak. The engines stopped after fuel ran out

Maj Aleksandr Tarasov, cadet Sergey Shapovalov

29 July 2, 2003 MiG-25RB Verkhniy Nyud (Murmansk Region)

98th guard reconnaissance air regiment

0 Crew error The pilot ejected shortly after take-off because of a false engine failure alarm

Maj Aleksandr Ryabov

30 July 14, 2003

L-39C Kushchevskaya (Krasnodar Territory)


2 Pilot error Crash landing due to pilot error. Maj Andrey Pilipchuk, Capt Roman Otkopnikov

31 July 24, 2003

Mi-8T Pesochnoye village (Samara Region)

109th training helicopter regiment

3 Technical problem

Engine failure in mid-flight. The crew were killed while trying to evacuate

Lt Yu.Neverov, warrant officer I.Ivanov, cadet S.Kiryushin

32 August 7, 2003

Su-24MR Bada (Chita Region)

313th reconnaissance air regiment

2 Navigation error

The plane lost orientation in adverse weather conditions during approach for landing and crashed into the side of a mountain due to air traffic control error

Maj Aleksandr Dorokhov, Capt Sergey Kupriyan

33 August 7, 2003

Mi-8T Sokol (Saratov Region)

131st training helicopter regiment

0 Pilot error Crashed into electricity pylons during extreme low altitude flight

34 August 23, 2003

2 Mi-24V Chernigovka (Maritime Territory)

319th independent helicopter combat and command regiment

6 Pilot error In breach of their flight plan, the crews of six helicopters, whose flight was being observed by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, attempted to perform an aerobatic stunt flying in pairs along the landing strip. In the last pair, the main rotor blades of the wingman helicopter caught the tail rotor of the leader due to pilot error; both helicopters fell to the ground and burst into flames

Lt Col Yuriy Aksenov, Senior Lieutenant Yuriy Usatov, Senior Lieutenant Vladislav Gvozdev, Capt Vladimir Khlyshuk, Capt Dmitriy Belov, Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy Derbenev


Tu-160 01 red Mikhail Gromov

Stepnoye (Saratov Region)

121st guard heavy bomber air regiment

4 Technical problem

Failure of the air pressurization and drainage system in the starboard fuel tank, which led to falling pressure within the tank and its subsequent disintegration. This caused a fire in two starboard engines

Lt Col Yuriy Deyneko, Maj Oleg Fedosenko, Maj Sergey Sukhorukov, Maj Grigoriy Kolchin

36 October 14, 2003

MiG-31 Borovaya settlement (Tver Region)

3958th guard airbase

0 Technical problem

During the first test flight after repairs, the starboard engine fire alarm went off. As the crew was attempting emergency landing, the RPM of the working starboard engine fell sharply, the hydraulics system failed and the plane's roll reached a critical 15 degrees, after which the crew ejected to safety

Maj Andrey YereMin, Maj Oleg Gutyrkin

37 November 12, 2003

MiG-29 Mt. Urasar (Armenia)

3624th airbase 1 Unknown The plane went into a spin during an aerobatic stunt (another version blames the crash on a technical problem)

Maj Konstantin Kardash




Cause Details Crew

38 January 22, 2004

Mi-8T 94 Lake Kalygir (Kamchatka Region)

317th independent combined air regiment of the Pacific Fleet

0 Pilot error Crashed during take-off from a frozen lake in adverse weather conditions (according to another version, the helicopter was landing, not taking off). The wreck could not be airlifted so it was cut into pieces and the pieces then transported overland so as not to pollute the lake.

Maj Mikhail Ostashovich, Irek Nazmutdinov, Nikolay Komyshev


Su-24M Khurba (Khabarovsk Territory)


0 Technical problem

Failure of the variable wing sweep mechanism - the wing went into extreme sweep angle (69 degrees) and did not respond to commands to take the landing sweep angle

Capt Zaytsev, Senior Lieutenant Kalenurov

40 March 4, 2004

Su-24MR 08 white Shatalovo (Smolensk Region)

47th independent guard reconnaissance air regiment

0 Technical problem

Swerved from the strip during taxiing and rolled over after repairs of the forward landing gear leg.

41 April 2, 2004

Mi-8 Asbest (Sverdlovsk Region)

933rd airbase 0 Unknown Crashed during approach for landing

42 April 15, 2004

Mi-24P 0 Pilot error The helicopter spun out of control during a U-turn and crashed due to a pilot error.

43 July 6, 2004

Mi-8SMV Zavorovo (Tula Region)


4 Unknown The helicopter exceeded critical speed after the external airflow pressure gauge started sending incorrect readings due to icing

Maj Sergey Stalmakov, Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Papanin, Capt Anton Shevtsov, Capt Aleksey Belyy

44 July 8, 2004

Tu-22M3 Soltsy (Novgorod Region)

840th heavy bomber air regiment

4 Technical problem

The plane's electric systems failed during landing, the fuel stopped flowing to the engines, the ejection systems also failed

Maj Oleg Tyapkin, Capt Ilya Laskov, Maj Nikolay Tolstov, Capt Aleksandr Ivanov


Mi-8MT Ust-Maimlya (Kamchatka Region)

329th independent combined air squadron of strategic missile troops

0 Technical problem

Technical problems after take-off (one version is that the fuel pumps lost power). The helicopter crash-landed, rolled onto the starboard side and caught fire

46 April 1, 2005

Mi-24P Yurga training ground

337th independent combat helicopter regiment

0 Pilot error Collided with a fuelling truck during complex and unplanned aerobatic maneuvers due to pilot error

Lt Col Sergey Voronov, Lt D.Safronov, Senior Lieutenant N.Stepanov

47 May 12, 2005

MiG-29 31 blue Andreapol (Tver Region)


1 Pilot error The pilot, while flying at extreme low altitude, attempted to perform the barrel-roll stunt, which was not part of his flight plan, botched the maneuver and crashed into the ground

Maj Valeriy Gusev

48 May 21, 2005

Su-25 32 Yavan (Tajikistan) 670th air group (899 guard assault air regiment)

0 Technical problem

Fire in the port-side engine and steering system failure in mid-flight

Maj Vadim Pryadchenko

49 June 1, 2005 MiG-31DZ Khotilovo (Tver Region)

790th fighter air regiment

0 Technical problem

The port-side landing gear leg disintegrated during landing due to manufacturing defects, the plane skidded from the runway, disintegrated and burst into flames

Maj Oleg Zabolotnyy, Capt Aleksandr Abushenkov

50 August 18, 2005

Mi-8MTV2 41 Khabarovsk (Central)

825th independent helicopter regiment

0 Technical problem

The tail rotor and boom pylon disintegrated in mid-air. The helicopter went into a spin and fell from 1,200 meters

Capt Andrey Ivanenko, Senior Lieutenant Oleg Novikov, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Korolev


Su-27K (Su-33)

82 red North Atlantic 279th independent naval fighter air regiment

0 Technical problem

The arrester wire snapped during landing on the deck of the Admiral Kuztenstov aircraft carrier, the plane careered into the sea and sank

Lt Col Yuriy Korneev


Su-27P 12 red Iotishkes village (Lithuania)


0 Navigation error

The pilot lost orientation during a flight from Leningrad Region to Kaliningrad Region. The air traffic control services were unable to help him. The pilot ejected after the plane ran out of fuel

Maj Valeriy Troyanov


L-39C Khanskaya airfield (Maykop, Adygeya)

761st training air regiment

0 Technical problem

Engine failure during approach for landing Senior Lieutenant Aleksey Bokunov, cadet Andrey Zaytsev

Facts & Figures



Facts & Figures




Cause Details Crew

54 January 16, 2006

Su-24MR Vozzhayevka (Amur Region)

523rd bomber air regiment

0 Technical problem

The variable wing sweep mechanism disintegrated and the wing could not be configured for landing (16 degrees angle). The crew ejected after burning the fuel off

Maj Voron, Koltsov

55 March 15, 2006

Su-24M 07 white Kuleshovka settlement (Voronezh Region)


0 Technical problem

Steering system failure in mid-air due to loss of pressure in the main and backup hydraulics systems

Maj Vladimir Sergeev, Capt Roman Ostroverkhov

56 June 28, 2006

Su-25 Sokolya Sloboda village (Bryansk Region)

899th guard assault air regiment

1 Unknown The pilot blacked out due to oxygen system failure in mid-air (another version is that the pilot had a micro stroke)

Lt Col Andrey Vakhovskiy

57 June 28, 2006

Su-24M 66 white Ostrov (Pskov Region)


0 Technical problem

The crew ejected during take-off due to a failure of the forward landing gear leg, the plane was destroyed by fire

Nikolay Fedotov, Sergey Krushin

58 July 10, 2006

Tu-134VKP 05 red Gvardeyskoye airfield (Crimea, Ukraine)

318th independent combined air regiment of the Black Sea Fleet

0 Bird strike Engine surge after a bird strike during take-off. The pilot aborted the take-off, but the plane careered past the end of the runway, smashed into objects on the ground and caught fire. Its passengers included the commander of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Masorin

Maj Oleg Gafiulov, Vladimir Aleev, Chubov

59 July 14, 2006

Mi-8 Pushkin (Leningrad Region)


0 Unknown Hard landing due to technical problems (another version blames pilot error)

60 July 27, 2006

MiG-29UB 01 blue Bolshoye Savino (Perm Territory)

Strizhy aerobatics group of the 237th guard aerospace equipment demonstration center

0 Bird strike Bird strikes took out both engines during take-off. The crew ejected to safety

Col Nikolay Dyatel, Col Igor Kurilenko

61 July 30, 2006

Su-24M Medovoye village (Kaliningrad Region)

4th guard independent naval assault air regiment of the Baltic Fleet

2 Pilot error Crashed into the ground while trying to descend below cloud level

Lt Col Viktor Poshekhontsev, Lt Col Boris Sedov


Mi-8MT Yuzhnyy settlement (North Ossetia)


11 Pilot error Crashed into trees in mountainous terrain and adverse weather conditions

Lt Col Aleksandr Sviridov,


L-39C Novokubansk (Krasnodar Territory)


1 Unknown The pilot lost control while practising exit from spin. The pyrocartridge in the instructor's ejection mechanism failed to go off

Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy Khrebtov, cadet Zaur Shaushev

64 March 21, 2007

2 MiG-29 Millerovo (Rostov Region)


0 Pilot error Collision with the ground during a nosedive maneuver

Lt Col Fakhradin Ulfanov, Maj Denis Chirkin

65 August 9, 2007

L-39C Khanskaya airfield (Maykop, Adygeya)

761st training air regiment

0 Technical problem

Engine failure during approach for landing Col Aleksandr Zhukov, cadet Konstantin Prokofev

66 August 23, 2007

Su-24M 63 white 115 km north of Khurba airfielf (Khabarovsk Territory)


0 Technical problem

Electric system failure

67 January 28, 2008

L-39C Kotelnikovo (Volgograd Region)


1 Pilot error The crew was practising climb for another landing attempt from flare-out altitude. The plane hit the landing strip (possibly due to icing). The instructor was killed during ejection

Senior Lieutenant Sergey Gorshkov, cadet Sergey Detkov

68 February 1, 2008

L-39C Armavir (Krasnodar Territory)


0 Technical problem

Engine failure in mid-air Maj Andrey Serov

69 March 20, 2008

Su-25 Novoselskoye (Maritime Territory)

187th guard assault air regiment

1 Pilot error The plane performed an unexpected maneuver during practice at a firing range and was hit by an unguided S-8 missile fired by its own wingman

Lt Col Sergey Yakovenko




Cause Details Crew

70 June 24, 2008

Mi-24 Kochubeyevskiy District (Stavropol Territory)

0 Unknown Fell shortly after take-off and caught fire

71 July 29, 2008

Su-27UB 44 blue Vozdvizhenka (Maritime Territory)

22nd guard fighter air regiment

1 Technical problem

Steering system failure immediately after take-off

Maj Sergey Levchenko, Lt Col Yuriy Abrosimov

72 October 17, 2008

MiG-29 11 white Khadakta village (Chita Region)


0 Technical problem

The airframe disintegrated in mid-air due to corrosion and metal-fatigue cracks

Capt Mikhail Polorotov

73 December 5, 2008

MiG-29 55 white Ingoda village (Chita Region)


1 Technical problem

The airframe disintegrated in mid-air due to corrosion and metal-fatigue cracks

Lt Col Valeryan Kokarev

74 December 19, 2008

Su-24M 02 Mosalskoye village (Voronezh Region)


0 Technical problem

Steering system failure in mid-air due to loss of pressure in the main and backup hydraulics systems (another version is starboard engine failure)

Lt Col Anatoliy Bolshechkov, Maj Sergey Babeshko

75 February 3, 2009

Mi-24 Nadezhdinka (Saratov Region)

626th training helicopter regiment

3 Technical problem

The main gearbox disintegrated in mid-air, the rotor jammed and the blades were torn off

Capt Sergey Safonov, Lt Ilya Kartashov, Senior Lieutenant Rinat Khubeev

76 March 17, 2009

L-39C Alekseyevskoye village (Krasnodar Territory)


1 Unknown Technical problem or pilot error Lt Aleksandr Zaytsev

77 May 4, 2009 Ka-27PL 45 yellow Baltic Sea 396th independent naval anti-submarine helicopter squadron of the Baltic Fleet

0 Pilot error During landing on the deck of the Yaroslav Mudryy patrol ship, the helicopter's blades caught the deck superstructure. The helicopter crashed onto the deck, then fell into the sea and sank

Lt Col Oleg Vashenko

78 June 17, 2009

Su-24MR Monchegorsk (Murmansk Region)

98th guard reconnaissance air regiment

0 Pilot error Because of a pilot error, the plane had excessive speed and roll during touchdown. It bounced off the runway, then fell and caught fire

79 June 19, 2007

Su-24M Kostino-Bystryanskiy village (Rostov Region)


0 Technical problem

Due to a variable wing sweep mechanism failure the wings could not be configured for landing. The crew ejected after burning off fuel

Lt Col Lev Balabanov, Capt Aleksey Kazakov

80 June 19, 2009

Mi-28N 43 yellow (Nizhniy Novgorod Region)

344th center for combat training and retraining of Army Aviation pilots

0 Unknown Exhaust from unguided missiles fired in hovering mode was sucked into the helicopter's air intake, causing engine surge. The helicopter hard-landed from an altitude of about 40 meters and rolled over onto the port side. The main rotor and the tail pylon were destroyed

81 August 16, 2009

Su-27UB and Su-27

18 blue and 14 blue

Zhukovskiy (Moscow Region)

Russkiye Vityazi aerobatics group of the 237th guard aerospace equipment demonstration center

2 Pilot error Mid-air collision due to loss of visual contact. The wingman bumped into the leader's canopy and nose cone

Col Igor Tkachenko, Col Igor Kurilenko, Lt Col Vitaliy Melnik

82 November 6, 2009

Tu-142M3 55 red Tatar Strait 568th independent combined air regiment of the Pacific Fleet

11 Unknown Fell into the sea during landing Maj Vadim Kapkin, Capt Aleksey Timofeev, Senior Lieutenant Pavel Cholak, Maj Aleksey Ablonskiy, Lt Artem Blank, Capt Sergey Gulyaev, Capt Konstantin Sholokhov, Lt Yevgeniy Dolgov, senior warrant officer Valeriy Voronkov, senior warrant officer Andrey Fefilov, senior warrant officer Nikolay Palamar

83 January 14, 2010

Su-27SM 86 red Galichnyy (Khabarovsk Territory)

6987th airbase 1 Unknown Versions include technical problems, pilot error, pilot blacking out

Col Vladimir Sobolev

Facts & Figures



Facts & Figures


Year Number of accidents Including crashes Fatalities

2000 8 4 105

2001 10 4 16

2002 8 5 34

2003 11 7 22

2004 8 2 8

2005 8 1 1

2006 10 4 15

2007 3 0 0

2008 8 4 4

2009 8 4 17

2010 1 1 1

Total 83 36 223

Combined statistics of air accidents involving Defense Ministry aircraft in 2000-2010

Type Number lost Fatalities

Su-24 15 6

L-39 13 54

Mi-8 12 8

Su-27 10 5

MiG-29 9 3

Mi-24 7 12

Su-25 4 3

MiG-31 4 1

Ka-27 2 4

Tu-134 1 84

Il-18 1 17

An-26 1 11

Tu-142 1 7

An-12 1 4

Tu-160 1 4

Tu-22 1 0

Il-76 1 0

Mi-28 1 0

MiG-25 1 0

Causes Number of accidents

Fatalities

technical problems 33 16

pilot error 28 90

unknown 14 31

navigation error 3 86

crew error 3 0

bird strike 2 0

Aircraft lost, by type Causes


Our AuthorsMikhail Barabanov. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Culture, then worked for the Moscow City Government. Editor-in-Chief of MDB since 2008. An expert on naval history and armaments.

Andrey Frolov. Graduated with an honours degree from the Faculty of Foreign Affairs of Saint Petersburg State University and in 2003 from the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations. In 2003–2004 – researcher at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center), executive editor of Yaderny Kontrol magazine (in Russian). In 2004 – project manager of Export control system transformation in Russia.

Natalia Grib is a journalism graduate of the Belarus National University. She took Reuters training courses in London and Radio Free Europe courses in Prague. Joined Kommersant, a leading Russian broadsheet, in 2002 as a special energy correspondent. Author of more than 2,000 articles on fuel and energy policy and of the book “The Gas Emperor”.

Anton Khlopkov is Director of the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and Editor-in-Chief of the Nuclear Club journal. He is a graduate of Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI). From 2000 to 2009 he has worked for the PIR Center (Center for Policy Studies in Russia), including as Deputy Director (2003–2007) and Executive Director (2007–2009). He is the Editor-in-Chief of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Encyclopedia (2009). Co-author of the monographs: “At the Nuclear Threshold: The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime” (2007); Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction Guidebook (2006); Nuclear Nonproliferation in Russian-American Relations: History, Opportunities and Outlook (2000); author of the monograph Iran’s Nuclear Program in Russian-American Relations (2001). He is an expert on nuclear proliferation and atomic energy issues.

Mikhail Lukin. Graduated in 1992 from Moscow State University with a degree in Journalism. In 1990 joined the Postfactum news agency as an editor. In 1993 became a staff member of the XX Century and the World think-tank, and in 1994–1997 worked as head of the information section in the National News Service. In 1997 became deputy director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House. Director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House since 2003.

Konstantin Makienko. Graduated from the Oriental Department of the Moscow National Institute for International Relations in 1995 and the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations in 1996. He was head of a project on conventional armaments at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center) in 1996–1997. Since September of 1997, he has been Deputy Director of CAST. He is the author of numerous articles on Russia’s military-technical cooperation with other countries.

Aleksandr Stukalin is a graduate of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Joined Kommersant, Russia’s leading broadsheet, in 1992 and became the newspaper’s editor-in-chief in 2004. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Russian Newsweek in 2005–2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Vedomosti newspaper in March-September 2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of Kommersant from October 2008 to date.

Dmitry Vasiliev. Graduated in 2004 from the State University – Higher School of Economics with a Master’s Degree in Strategic Management. From 2003 to mid-2004 worked as a risk evaluation analyst at Absolut Bank . CAST researcher since July 2004 , editor-in-chief of Eksport Vooruzheniy journal since 2005.

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Moscow Defense Brief · 2014-01-14 · 2 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Defense Industry Russia Joins the Fifth-Gen Game Russia Joins the Fifth-Gen Game Konstantin Makienko R ussia