MORE BLIND SPOTS IN EDUCATION BY PHILIP G. SMITH

THE ARTICLE BY RICHARD KNOWLES MORRIS, “The Blind Spot in Education”‘, is a laudable effort to cut through some of the confusion and obfuscation that pres- ently surround “ the debate over American Education.” Professor Morris’s opening remarks concerning the nature of the debate and its significance are ex- cellent. Unfortunately they lead only into what may be merely one more illus- tration of a kind of “blindness” in the thinking of certain critics. Morris speaks of experimentalism as “The dominant philosophy of education”2, and then dis- cusses two basic assumptions which he claims are “held by experimentalists in e d ~ c a t i o n . ” ~ H e does not tell us what grounds he has for claiming that exper- imentalists actually do hold these two assumptions. H e merely assumes that they do. He also assumes that, “ i t is these assumptions that dictate the aims, methods and curriculum to be a d ~ p t e d . ” ~

Is it not possible that these assumptions which Morris makes constitute a rather important “blind spot”? More specifically, is it not possible that Morris (and probably many other critics) are “blind” first, in assuming that experimen- talists do assume what i t is generally assumed they assume, and second, that present curricula and practices of the public schools are derived from or dictated by these (or any other) philosophic assumptions? Let us examine, first, the two basic assumptions which Morris fancies as experimentalist assumptions, and then look a t one or two other statements and assumptions which are made in the course of his article.

ASSUMPTIONS ON EXPERIMENTALISM We are told that experimentalists assume, “ (a) Knowledge is not represent-

ative, but immediately given in proces~ .”~ Surely not from the writings of John Dewey. A quick glance at Dewey’s Logic is enough t o dispel1 any such assumption of “immediate knowledge.” For example, Dewey writes, “...all knowledge as grounded assertion involves mediation ... The posi- tion here defended runs counter to the belief that there is such a thing as immedi- ate knowledge, and that such knowledge is an indispensable precondition of all mediated knowledge.”6 Or again, “ ... immediate qualitative experience is not it- self cognitive, it fulfills none of the logical conditions of knowledge and of objects qua k n ~ w n . ” ~

Whence this notion?

P H I L I P G. S M I T H is an Assistant Professor of Education at Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio. His paper is a critical response to an article which appeared in the October, 2954 issue of EDUCA- T I O N A L THEORY: Richard Knowles Mowis, “ The Blind Spot in Education.”

‘Appearing in Educational Theory, Vol. IV, No. 4, Oct., 1954, p. 274 et seq. cit. D. 277

SO>. cit. b. 279 4Op. cit. p. 281 50p. cit. p. 279 6John Dewey, Logic, Henry Holt & Co., N. Y., 1938, p. 139 7Op. cit. p. 522

94

MORE BLIND SPOTS I N EDUCATION 95

Professor Morris’ arguments concerning electrons, Indeterminacy and “Ulti- mate Reality” are weak, to say the least. H e speaks of experimentalists as“de- votees of science” and suggests that therefore they cannot doubt the “existence” of electrons, even though they cannot “see, hear, touch, taste or smell” them. Some study of Bertrand Russell may be instructive a t this point. Russell writes, “...electrons and protons-however, have the merit that they may be what ac- tually exists ... electrons and protons-assuming it scientifically correct to believe in them-do not depend for their existence upon being perceived; .... But although perception is not needed for their existence, i t is needed to give us a reason for believing in their existence.”s If by “devotee of science”, Professor Morris means someone who is so blindly devoted, for example, that he cannot doubt the existence of the electron and a score of other atomic subdivisionsg-then such a devotee is bound to be upset by the continually advancing reconstructions of science. On the other hand, if a devotee of science is one who believes with Dewey that,“ ... what ‘science’ means is simply the most authentic knowledge of nature, man, and society that is possible a t any given time by means of the methods and techniques then and there available,”1° then the hypothetical status of certain scientific concepts are not all disturbing.

When Morris (or anyone else) is tempted to suggest that his own interpre- tation of “ the advance of modern science” somehow demonstrates the truth of his own basic philosophic categories or assumptions, it is time he gives heed to the admonition of C. I. Lewis, who points out that, “Newly discovered scientific data might make such problems of fundamental concepts and classification easier-or more difficult-but of itself i t cannot solve them because, in the nature of the case, they are antecedent to the investigation.”“ Morris would have done better t o investigate carefully with his readers, what he calls “ able philosophical counter- arguments ... developed by A. 0. Lovejoy,’’12 rather than so quickly to lead us “ aside”. Actually, the way Professor Morris poses “representative knowledge- immediate knowledge” as a seemingly exhaustive dichotomy suggests that he has completely ‘‘missed” the experimentalist position. He thus not only fails to state the position correctly, he excludes it from his universe of discourse.

The second assumption which is attributed to the experimentalists, namely, tha t “ (b) as a philosophical method, experimentalism is identical with scientific method,”l3 is not so completely unwarranted. Nevertheless, when Professor Morris takes this assumption to mean an “emphasis upon induction, empirical experience, and experimentation regardless of supporting and defining theory be- hind the experiment,”’* or, that “according to the experimentalists, you experi- ment first and think later,”15 it would seem that once again he has “missed” the position. In any event, his arguments do not show what he claims, namely,

*Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, Simon and Schuster, N. Y., 1948, pp. 7-8 italics in original. 9See p. 279. loJohn Dewey, “The Determination of Ultimate Values or Aims Through Antecedent or a Priori

Speculation or Through Pragmatic or Empirical Inquiry”, National Society for the Study of Educa- tion, Thirty-Seventh Yearbook, Part 11, p, 482.

It would seem that it may be Professor Morris who is the “blind” devotee.

I1C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order, Charles Scribner’s Sons, N. Y., 1929, p. 6 . l2Op. cit. p. 279 13ibid 140p. cit. p. 280 I5Op. cit. p. 281

96 EDUCATIONAL THEORY

“ tha t this assumption is not defensible.”lG H e shows only that scientific method is more than a’rank empiricism-something which I suppose no one (certainly not an experimentalist) seriously doubts.

PROPOSITIONS OF SOME CRITICS The fact that Professor Morris failed to close his article a t the end of his

excellent opening remarks rather than proceeding to display his lack of understand- ing of the experimentalist position would be of no great importance except that i t does illustrate what may be a truly important “blindness” on the part of many critics of the current educational scene. Too often these critics seem to proceed by a kind of contorted sorites of non-sequitur-perhaps, as follows.

1. Many of the oustanding figures in recent educational work have been ex- perimentalists. Therefore experimentalism is the dominant philosophy of ed- ucation.

Persons who are in a position to dominate or dictate aims, methods, and curricula are therefore experimentalists.

Such persons often behave “as if” they believed “such and such”. There- fore, “such and such” are basic assumptions of experimentalism.

Experimentalists (and others) have been known to remark that a person’s philosophy should make a difference in his daily life. Also, there is an old wives’ tale in philosophy which states that everyone has a philosophy whether he realizes it or not. Current practices in the public schools are therefore derived from or dictated by experimentalism, the dominant philosophy.

There is thus a one to one relationship between practices in education and philosophic assumptions. Therefore, it is to the assumptions that one must turn if he desires to assess the merits of the practices.

If my philosophy of education should become dominant, the shortcomings of the public schools would be corrected.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

This kind of “reasoning” is, of course, so completely lacking in rigor-it is so “messy ”-that one almost instinctively hesitates (as if longing for a long-handled probe) before venturing to examine it. We should, nevertheless dig into it a t a few points a t least.

The general proposition to the effect that if a person believes “so and so” then he will behave in “such and such” ways, is correct-at least in form. T h e movement from the “if” clause to the “then” clause is logically determinate. In step three, above, we note that the movement is in the opposite direction; i t is logically indeterminate. It is a great temptation, when observing the actions and programs of some harassed public school administrator or teacher, to say to one’s self, “That poor dunce behaves as if he believed, say, ‘you should experi- ment first and think later’ ”. Having said this to one’s self, the next temptation is to say to others, “That man’s dunce-like behavior comes about because he believes ‘you should experiment first and think later’ ”. No matter how this sort of thing is disguised, it remains the formal fallacy of asserting the antecedent on the basis of a presented consequent.

lSOp. cit. p. 280

MORE BLIND SPOTS IN EDUCATION 97

On the other hand, a philosophy, when very carefully formulated, sometimes approaches, in form, a deductive system or calculus. It may be presented in the form of assumptions, primitive definitions, and postulates. If so, theorms are implicit and a number of them may be made explicit. I have yet to see, how- ever, any philosophic system which actually sets forth as logically determinate theorm a set of procedures and practices for everyday use in our public schools. Professor Morris states, “Philosophy and religion, in their most theoretical forms, have time and again dictated the course of human institutions and the practices that would perpetuate these institutions among men.”” I submit that it has been men, not philosophies, who have dicated. I t is men, not philosophies, who now form the aims, methods and curricula of our public schools. These men may or may not make their decisions in the light of basic philosophic insights. I t fre- quently appears obvious that many of them do not employ any such insight.

Harold Rugg is not alone in observing that few educators are actively con- cerned with educational theory. But this does not mean that we need a great many more “philosophers of education”-a great many more persons to engage in learned discourse about first principles. We certainly do not need any more persons whose powers of deduction are so esoteric that ordinary teachers cannot possibly follow them as they explain summarily the great conglomeration of prac- tices involved in our public schools in terms of a couple of assumptions. These assumptions presumably are then to be meekly accepted and worn in shame about the neck as a sort of philosophic albatross-a sign that these assumptions (not the deeds) have been weighed and found wanting.

We do need many, many more educators-administrators, classroom teach- ers-who have the disposition and ability to tackle the everyday problems of education with a t least a modicum of philosophic insight. Philosophers and teachers, in the field of education, should be concerned with the problem of devel- oping this disposition and ability. Each of the great systematic philosophies, when held thoughtfully, humbly, and generously, may make an important contribution to this development. None of them will when held as dogma which dictate par- ticular practices whose merits are to be assessed, not in terms of consequences, but in terms of derivation. The philosopher of education, regardless of the par- ticular set of first principles he finds most enlightening, would do well to give serious consideration to a view of philosophy expressed by one of the present “experimentalists in education.”

Philosophy . . . has the mission of helping men think more deeply about the consequences of their daily acts in order that they may with greater wisdom choose those consequences which help all men extend the depth of their thinking.”

17Op. cit. p. 278 18H. Gordan Hullfish, Philosophy and Education in Interaction, Columbus, 0. The Ohio State

University Press, 1944, p. 13.