Moral theories***Util/consequentialism Good***Util for public policyUtilitarianism is the best ethics for deciding public policy.Braybrooke 4David Braybrooke, PhD Oxford and Professor of Government Emeritus and Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, The University of Texas at Austin; and Emeritus also at Dalhousie University, Canada. Utilitarianism: Restorations; Repairs; Renovations. 2004 p.3New, too, in the sense defined, is the emphasis that the things brought, together give to the politics of utilitarianism and, in particular, to the process of public policy-making. These things are barely touched upon in the current disputes just cited, which tend to concentrate upon the bearing of utilitarianism upon personal choices, and on the threat that Bernard Williams and others have held that it poses in such choices to the integrity of moral agents.' My emphasis on policy-making is especially distinctive in giving due weight to the operation there in modern democracies and elsewhere of the ubiquitous, continuing sub-process that constitutes what I call 'the Revisionary Process.' Here, policy proposals are continually being revised to win greater support; here, policies themselves are continually being revised to obtain more success with more people. Attention to the Revisionary Process disposes of objections that arise from trying misguidedly to assess utilitarianism, assuming that all options are given and a once-for-all solution to the problem of choosing them is to take final shape in the near future (chapter 1, 40; chapter 2, 45). Attention to the Revisionary Process disposes, too, of the objection that when (as utilitarianism would insist) decisions about social policies must turn on consequences we cannot know enough about consequences to know what decision to take. Given a continuing process, we do not have to know everything about consequences to make prudent decisions; the decisions are normally, continually, followed by opportunities for revision (see chapter 2). Some decisions about life-sacrifices that we may encounter during the process of public policy-making are ruled out by an elementary statistical consideration, namely, keeping in view the same population when we are comparing two policies for their effect upon it (see chapter 3). Other decisions, about sacrifices maybe very painful, but short of being life-sacrifices, are ruled out by judicious use of the notion of a comparative census, under which, instead of resorting to an interpersonal calculus of utility, we establish two or three categories and count the persons who fall into each of them under the policies to be compared (see chapter 4). Adverse consequences for some people do not then get masked by an overall utility score. Utility, personal and interpersonal, is not even the way to go in applying utilitarianism with the census-notion in real-world comparisons of policies. The way to go (see chapter 5) is to make careful systematic use of the concept of needs, making sure, before turning to more elusive subjects, of provisions for vital needs like food, clothing, and shelter. (The more elusive subjects are covered, along with needs, by Amartya Sen's 'capabilities' approach, with which I consider mine allied.) In its various applications the concept of needs has supplied surrogates for utility and by doing so accounts for the effectiveness that utilitarianism has had as a 'public philosophy,' to use Robert Goodin's phrase.Consequentialism for USFGGovernments must weigh consequencesHarries 94 (Owen, editor and founder of The National Interest, Senior Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies, Spring 1993/1994, The National Interest, Power and Civilization, Lexis)Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?, Lee immediately answers, Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice. This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is the ethic of responsibility rather than the ethic of absolute ends that is appropriate. While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered.Egalitarianism demands utility: consequentialism precludes zeroing out anyoneRonald Dworkin, Professor of Law and Philosophy at New York University, 1977, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 274-5. Utilitarian arguments of policy, however, would seem secure from that objection. They do not suppose that any form of life is inherently more valuable than any other, but instead base their claim, that constraints on liberty are necessary to advance some collective goal of the community, just on the fact that that goal happens to be desired more widely or more deeply than any other. Utilitarian arguments of policy, therefore, seem not to oppose but on the contrary to embody the fundamental right of equal concern and respect, because they treat the wishes of each member of the community on a par with the wishes of any other, with no bonus or discount reflecting the view that the member is more or less worthy of concern, or his views more or less worthy of respect, than any other.Moral absolutism suffers from tunnel vision that generates evil and political irrelevanceIssac 02 (Jeffrey, poli sci prof at Indiana Bloomington, dir Center for the Study of Democracy and Public life, PhD from Yale, Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, Ends, Means, and Politics, p. Proquest)As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of ones intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with good may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of good that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that ones goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.Util Good Calculation InevitableEthics require calculative thoughtThurschwell, assoc prof law @ Cleveland State, 2003 (Adam, Cardozo Law Review, March, lexis)From the outset, then. ethical responsibility renders political responsibility - and the "calculation" that it entails - both impossible and necessary. What issues from this paradox, according to Derrida, is an absolute ethical demand that we nevertheless attempt to perform the required political calculations - "incalculable 'justice that is the infinite responsibility of the ethical relationship requires us to calculate." n24 All the while, we must recognize that the results of these calculations will not themselves be "just" precisely to the extent that they are the result of a calculation, an accounting, a balancing or accommodation of interests, rather than the discharge of a singular and infinite responsibility. Justice never is or can be "present" in any given political program or platform, whether realized in practice or represented as an ideal. It remains suspended in the "to come" of a future that never arrives, and therefore cannever become the subject of knowledge or representation, because no calculation can do justice to the infinite responsibility that genuine justice demands. n25 Util > Rights TheoryUtilitarianism provides the simplest solutions to moral conflicts. Rights-based theories relies on questionable understanding of autonomy and cannot negotiate competing claims.Elfstrom 90Gerard Elfstrom, PhD and professor of philosophy at the Auburn University. Ethics for a Shrinking World. 1990. p. 21-22.But if utilitarianism and rights-based theories are similar, why choose the utilitarian? Utilitarianism has a bad name, and rights theories have strong rhetorical advantages. In recent history the language of rights has continually been used to press the claims of the oppressed and needy. Following the horrors of the Second World War, it was natural for the United Nations to formulate its highest goals and values in terms of rights. It has long been recognized that those who wish to press their claims in the strongest possible fashion will cloak them in the language of rights. There are, nonetheless, several good reasons for returning to embattled yet perennial utilitarian theory. Utilitarianism has parsimony on its side for one thing. It need not rely on difficult ideas of autonomy, personhood, or human dignity. It can get essentially the same results without them. A related advantage is that utilitarian theories do not drift off on ideas like autonomy, freedom, or democracy without asking why anyone should care about them. It is useful for demythologizing obscure ideas. Does `freedom' mean, for example, anything more than the ability to choose and act on one's choices? If not, why should anyone worry about it? Another abstract and obscure concept important for rights theorists is that of autonomy. They construct various arguments founded on claims that people are autonomous and that autonomy should be respected. The difficulty is that people display varying levels of autonomy, and it is stretching things to claim that some people in some situations are autonomous at all. The degree of autonomy enjoyed by the common soldier in the heat of battle and the experienced physician is totally different. The physician has expertise, is used to making judgments and acting upon them, can gain some detachment from his or her situation, and enjoys the respect and deference of others. The physician comes close to exemplifying what philosophers have in mind when they talk about autonomous being. The common soldier enjoys none of these qualities. Most people are arranged between the physician and the soldier in their possession of them. When analyzing moral responsibility, it is unrealistic at best to argue blandly that human beings are autonomous and to proceed from there. Moral responsibility is better served if it is asked in concrete terms what people can be expected to do and what kinds of institutions can he constructed to support a sense of responsibility. Utilitarianism is more amenable to bringing moral concepts down to earth and giving them concrete meaning than are rights theories. The other practical advantages of utilitarianism are more widely appreciated. It is very difficult for rights-based theories to explain what must be done when rights conflict or must be overridden. There is no room for compromise or negotiation when rights are at stake. Rights theorists are prone to think of this inflexibility as a benefit, a safeguard against the loss of rights. In real-world conflicts where opposing claims are at stake, however, conflict can easily harden into protracted, bitter struggle if there is common insistence on rights. Where opposing parties are convinced they have immutable rights, they are unlikely to compromise and likely to insist on their due to the bitter end. Utilitarian theories can accommodate these conflicts in ways very difficult for rights theories to match.Saving Most Lives GoodSaving the most lives is not calculative. Deon denies human dignity by failing to maximize life.Cummiskey 96(David, Associate Philosophy Professor, Bates College, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 129-131)It does, however, support the consequentialist interpretation. Since the moral demand to respect other persons is based on the equal moral status of all persons, Kants argument presupposes the equal value, or dignity, of all persons. Such beings are comparable, and the comparison demonstrates the equal objective value of all. The equal value of all rational being provides a clear basis for a requirement to maximally promote the flourishing of rational agency (chapter 5). Nonetheless, while the extreme interpretation must be rejected, the dignity- price distinction still accurately signifies the priority of rationality. If we refuse to sacrifice a person for the sake of the maximization of happiness or any other market value, then we have shown a reverence for such beings. But as we shall see more fully in chapter 9, this reverence is compatible with the sacrifice of some for the sake of other persons with dignity. It is mere dogmatic intuitionism or groundless deontology to insist that all such sacrifices are inconsistent with the equal dignity of all. At times the dignity principle seems to function like an inkblot where each sees whatever conclusions he or she is predisposed to accept. If one believes that a particular way of treating people is morally unacceptable, then such treatment is inconsistent with respect for the dignity of persons. Too often, when a deontologist uses the dignity principle as a normative principle, the cart is put before the horse: This reasoning presupposes that we have a standard of unacceptable conduct that is prior to the dignity principle. The dignity principle cannot then provide the reason why the conduct is unacceptable. The goal of the Kantian deontologist is to (directly) vindicate ordinary commonsense morality; but it is not at all clear how the dignity principle can even support the intuitive view that the negative duty not to kill is more stringent than the positive duty to save lives. How is the common view that we have only slight, if any, duties to aid those in desperate need consistent with the lexical priority of the dignity of persons over the price of the inclinations? Of course, on the one hand, it is commonly maintained that killing some persons to save many others fails to give due regard to the incomparable and absolute dignity of persons. On the other hand, it is maintained that respect for the dignity of persons does not require that one spend ones discretionary income on saving lives rather than on ones own personal projects. As long as one has done some minimum and indeterminate amount to help others, then one need not do any more. So the Kantian deontologist wants to use the dignity-price distinction to resolve conflicting grounds of obligation in an intuitively acceptable way, but it is far from obvious why allowing a loss of dignity for the sake of something with price is consistent with the dignity principle. In short, ordinary morality permits one to place the satisfaction of ones inclinations above a concern for the dignity of all. Consequentialists have produced indirect justifications for many of these common intuitive judgments; it would seem that those appealing to the dignity principle must rely on similar arguments. Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing onebecause dignity cannot be added and summed in this waythis point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hills example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the.extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equal and unconditional human dignityCummiskey 96(David, Associate Philosophy Professor, Bates College, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 145-146)We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract social entity. It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive overall social good. Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that rational nature exists as an end in itself (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kants normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

Politics must weigh consequences their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticizeIsaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2 (Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), Ends, Means, and Politics, Spring, Proquest)As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of ones intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with good may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of good that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that ones goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.AT: Util Justifies EvilTheir accusations of utilitarianism are oversimplified and exaggerated utilitarianism does not justify evil.Palmer 92Richard Palmer, professor at SUNY Fredonia. Misguided Criticism of Utilitarianism. March 1992. Teaching Philosophy Vol 15, No. 1.It seems that such oversimplifications are often couched in hypothetical contexts that pretend to show that they are the only alternative possibilities. Hypothetical contexts or examples purporting to show that utilitarianism would endorse slavery, torture, etc., are often modeled along the following lines: Suppose that the only possibilities open to us were society exactly as it is but with the institution of slavery, and society exactly as it is but without the institution of slavery, and further suppose keeping society exactly as it is but instituting slavery were the action which would produce more good or less harm than any other alternative open to use, then slavery would be right. But slavery is not (would not be) right, so utilitarianism is wrong! But where would the claim slavery would not be right come from? Surely from our recognition that society (as it is) with slavery would be more morally objectionable than society (as it is) without slavery. So the supposition that society would be better, or produce more good, or less harm, is patently contrary to fact, contrary to intuition, and contrary to moral (including utilitarian) training. It seems to us that such contrary to fact subjunctives generate only contrary to fact conclusions: If slavery would improve society, (which it would not), then slavery would be right, (which it is not). If society would be improved by slavery (which it would not), then utilitarianism would endorse slavery (which it does not). Since utilitarianism would endorse slavery (which we know would not make society better) then utilitarianism must be false. Such is often the form of the critics suggestion. But in society as we know it utilitarianism would not endorse slavery, because slavery would not improve society, and so utilitarianism is not mistaken. The critics suppositions, that in society as it currently exists torture or slavery are the actions which of all the alternatives open to us, would produce more good or less harm for all people affected than any other actions, are so far-fetched that one does not (perhaps cannot) have any concept of the differences in societal circumstances which would have to prevail in order to make these actions preferable to any others.AT: Util Justifies SacrificesUtilitarianism does not justify sacrificing although people may be dying there is no reason to sacrifice another person. Utilitarianism only justifies sacrifice in a forced choice.Wasserman and Strudler 3David Wasserman, Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy and Alan Strudler, Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Director of the Ethics Program at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Can a Nonconsequentialist Count Lives?. Philosophy & Public Affairs, Volume 31, Issue 1 (p 71-94)In making choices about saving people from death, what moral significance should attach to the fact that one choice involves saving more people than another? Consequentialists typically have an easy time with such questions because they believe that the morally best choice produces the best consequences and that, other things being equal, more lives saved is a better consequence than fewer lives saved. The consequentialist position involves what might be called the compensation assumption: the proposition that other things equal, the gain that comes from saving a larger group of people somehow more than compensates for the loss that occurs by not saving some other, smaller group of people. If numbers have the moral importance that consequentialists suppose, then it should be at least presumptively right to sacrifice a person to save others; for example, it is unclear why one may not simply kill an innocent person and harvest his organs if doing so is the only available way of saving the lives of people who will die without those organs. In fact, however, the prospect of saving the lives of those people seems to provide no reason, or an exceedingly weak one, for killing an innocent person, even if there is no other way to acquire needed organs.AT: Util Hurts MinoritiesUtilitarianism supports the rights of the minorityBusiness Line 99(Business Line June 5, 1999 UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO POLITICS, ECONOMY, Lexis)In order that the principle of the greatest benefit to the greatest number does not lead to alienations, the excluded parties in the principle should not be the same all along. In other words, every individual in the community should be capable of being part of the greatest number. For example majoritarianism will not be supported by utilitarianism. if minorities are continuously excluded from the benefits of policies. The utilitarian philosophy evolved as a reaction to dominance of the religious/ethical dictums imposed by the church. Many of these dictums were violated in ordinary life of the masses of the people. A hypocritical society emerged.

1. Slavery was outlawed by lots of lawmakers, even in white-dominated states, meaning that they found it more beneficial to free the slaves than to keep slaves. Thus util does not justify slavery.2. Slavery did not help the majority. The law of diminishing marginal utility says that the benefit of slavery to white people decreased for each black person that was enslaved.AT: Util Hurts EnvironmentHistorically, evaluating consequences has been a productive way of managing environmental problemsJamieson 8Dale Jamieson, Director of Environmental Studies and Prof of Environmental Studies and Philosophy AND Affiliated Professor of Law @ New York University. Ethics and the Environment. 2008. Pg. 85.Environmental ethicists have typically regarded consequentialism with suspicion. This may have to do with the fact that the most prominent version of consequentialism is utilitarianism, and utilitarianism inspires a neat deal of hostility among philosophers generally. Utilitarianism is often thought of as a crude view that prizes "usefulness" over other more important values and holds that "the end justifies the means." Exploitative policies say developers and government agencies are often called "utilitarian." and Contrasted with "preservationist" or environmentalist policies. However, as we have seen this simple minded idea of consequentialism is at best a caricature. Consequentialism, like other families of moral theories. comes in a variety of forms, some more sophisticated than others. Historically, consequentialists have a strong claim to being on the side of moral progress rather than being on the side of sexists, racists, and those who would despoil the environment. Furthermore, when it comes to concerns about the moral status of animals, consequentialists - even utilitarians -have been in the forefront, as we will see in detail in chapter 5. ***Deon Good***Consequential framework destroys intrinsic value to life- they reduce human life to a calculable object.Grisez, professor of Christian ethics @ Mount Saint Marys College and Shaw, Director of public information at Knights of Columbus, 94(Germain and Russell, Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics, ed. Haber, p. 25-26)

If there are no ethical absolutes, human persons, rather than being the norm and source from which other things receive their value, become simply items or commodities with a relative value-- inviolable only up to the point at which it is expedient to violate them in order to achieve an objective. It would then make no sense at all to speak of the immeasurable value of the human person from being. Far from being immeasurablethat is, beyond calculationthe value of a person would be quite specific and quantifiable, something to be weighed in the balance against other values.Utilitarianism destroys human dignity - Treats people as means to an endGrisez, professor of Christian ethics @ Mount Saint Marys College and Shaw, Director of public information at Knights of Columbus, 94(Germain Gabriel and Russell, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom p 28)

One arrives at a different judgment of how one ought to proceed in such circumstances if human life is regarded, not as one of the things of relative value which a person has, but as an intrinsic component of the person, and so as a value which shares in the dignity of the person. In denying that we can choose to kill one person for the sake of two, we really are denying that two persons are "worth" twice as much as some other real person. On this view it is simply not possible to make the sort of calculation which weighs persons against each other (my life is more valuable than John's life, John's life is more valuable than Mary's and Tom's combined, or vice versa) and thus to determine whose life shall be respected and whose sacrificed. The value of each human person is incalculable, not in any merely poetic sense, but simply because it is not susceptible to calculation, measurement, weighing, and balancing. Traditionally this point has been expressed by the statement that the end does not justify the means. This is a way of saying that the direct violation of any good intrinsic to the person cannot be justified by the good result which such a violation may bring about. What is extrinsic to human persons may be used for the good of persons, but what is intrinsic to persons has a kind of sacredness and may not be violated.

Deontology comes first, the means must justify themselves utilitarianism justifies any atrocity.Anderson, National Director of Probe Ministries International 2004 (Kerby, Utilitarianism: The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number http://www.probe.org/theology-and-philosophy/worldview--philosophy/utilitarianism-the-greatest-good-for-thegreatest-number.html)

One problem with utilitarianism is that it leads to an "end justifies the means" mentality. If any worthwhile end can justify the means to attain it, a true ethical foundation is lost. But we all know that the end does not justify the means. If that were so, then Hitler could justify the Holocaust because the end was to purify the human race. Stalin could justify his slaughter of millions because he was trying to achieve a communist utopia. The end never justifies the means. The means must justify themselves. A particular act cannot be judged as good simply because it may lead to a good consequence. The means must be judged by some objective and consistent standard of morality. Second, utilitarianism cannot protect the rights of minorities if the goal is the greatest good for the greatest number. Americans in the eighteenth century could justify slavery on the basis that it provided a good consequence for a majority of Americans. Certainly the majority benefited from cheap slave labor even though the lives of black slaves were much worse. A third problem with utilitarianism is predicting the consequences. If morality is based on results, then we would have to have omniscience in order to accurately predict the consequence of any action. But at best we can only guess at the future, and often these educated guesses are wrong. A fourth problem with utilitarianism is that consequences themselves must be judged. When results occur, we must still ask whether they are good or bad results. Utilitarianism provides no objective and consistent foundation to judge results because results are the mechanism used to judge the action itself.inviolability is intrinsically valuable.

Racism makes all forms of violence inevitable. It must be rejected in every instance

Memmi 2kMEMMI Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason,it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim(and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?).Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated;that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition.The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that ones moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences.Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy.One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view,if one can deploy a little religious language,racism is the truly capital sin.fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanitys spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments.All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death.It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. Recall, says the bible, that you were once a stranger in Egypt, which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday.It is an ethical and a practical appeal indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.AT: Util Good1) Theres no moral duty to maximize utility.

Kymlicka_:For it is entirely unclear why maximizing utility, as our direct goal, should be considered a moral duty. Whom is it a duty to? Morality, in our everyday view at least, is a matter of interpersonal obligationsthe obligations we owe each other. But to whom do we owe the duty of maximizing utility? Surely not the impersonal ideal spectator who often figures into such theory, for he does not exist. Nor to the maximally valuable state of affairs itself, for states of affairs do not have moral claims.

2) Util is circular, since theres no reason that we want happiness except that we want happiness.

Parfit_:According to desire-based theories, such reasons would have to be provided by facts about what would fulfill our present desires. If, after informed deliberation, we want future happiness as an end, this fact could give us instrumental reasons to have certain other desires, since it would give us reasons to want whatever would make us happy. But the fact that we had this desire could not be truly claimed to give us a reason to have it. Desires cannot be self-supporting. Our wanting happiness as an end could not give us a reason to want happiness as an end.

3) Utilitarianism is impossible.Utilitarianism strives to add and subtract happiness and pain, but this is impossible for two reasons.

First: Theres an infinite amount of happiness and pain, and its impossible to add and subtract infinity.

Bostrom_:The infinite case is fundamentally different. Suppose the world contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ( ). Call such a world canonically infinite. Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a[n] canonically infinite world contains an [both] infinite quantity of positive value and an infinite quantity of negative value. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good or bad. Yet in cardinal arithmetic, adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad in a canonically infinite world: none whatsoever. Aggregative consequentialist theories are threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to imply that if the world is canonically infinite then it is always ethically indifferent what we do. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause another holocaust or prevent one from occurring. If any noncontradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.

The universe is infinite.Bostrom_ 2:In the standard Big Bang model, assuming the simplest topology (i.e., that space is singly connected), there are three basic possibilities: the universe can be open, flat, or closed. Current data suggests a flat or open universe, although the final verdict is pending. If the universe is either open or flat, then it [that] is spatially infinite at every point in time and the model entails that it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. There exists a common misconception which confuses the universe with the (finite) observable universe. But the observable partthe part that could causally affect uswould be just an infinitesimal fraction of the whole. Statements about the mass of the universe or the number of protons in the universe generally refer to the content of this observable part; see e.g. [1]. Many cosmologists [also] believe that our universe is just one in an infinite ensemble of universes (a multiverse), and this adds to the probability that the world is canonically infinite; for a popular review, see [2].Duchateau (2013):Well, The latest calculation by astrophysicists indicates that the distance across the observable universe is approximately 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 (100 septillion) miles, give or take a few blocks because [with] the figure has been rounded off. And thats only what we see. The number is so large, most astronomers dismiss it and simply say the universe is endless. infinite.Their math also suggests the universe has 100 billion galaxies and each of them has, roughly, 100 billion stars. Thats 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 (100 sextillion) stars, which is also a bit much, so Lets just say, again, there are an infinite number of them.

Thus, because there are infinite masses and infinite amounts of happiness and pain, you cant add or subtract infinity and Utilitarianism doesnt work.

Second: You cant aggregate pleasure and pain.Weinstien:Since pleasures follow each other serially, each vanishing as soon as the next appears, nobody can possibly experience aggregated pleasure. Hence, as we saw, aggregate pleasure cannot be a[n] coherent object of desire and, thus, cannot be a source of abiding well-being.

Thus, Util is impossible.

4) Utilitarianism justifies punishing the minority.To maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number, Utilitarianism justifies slavery, genocide of minority groups, and punishment of the innocent to give others happiness. Thus, we are obligated to reject Util. because it is not educational to promote slavery and genocide and violates the purpose of debate.

5) Utilitarianism doesnt achieve utilitarianism.Under Utilitarianism, people have to constantly calculate which action is going to be the greatest good for the greatest number, which violates utilitarianism because people will turn into calculating machines as they constantly try to figure out which action is going to be best. This means that, as the people calculate, they dont do anything, and inaction is not maximizing happiness, so utilitarianism cant achieve itself.

6) There is no consensus as to what is good.Carroll_: First, there are people who aren't that interested in universal well-being at all. There are serial killers, and sociopaths, and racial supremacists. We don't need to go to extremes, but the extremes certainly exist. The natural response is to simply separate out such people; "we need not worry about them," in Harris's formulation. Surely all right-thinking people agree on the primacy of well-being. But how do we draw the line between right-thinkers and the rest? Where precisely do we draw the line, in terms of measurable quantities? And why there? On which side of the line do we place people who believe that it's right to torture prisoners for the greater good, or who cherish the rituals of fraternity hazing? Particularly, what experiment can we imagine doing that tells us where to draw the line? More importantly, it's equally obvious that even right-thinking people don't really agree about well-being, or how to maximize it. Here, the response is apparently that most people are simply confused (which is on the face of it perfectly plausible). Deep down they all want the same thing, but they misunderstand how to get there; hippies who believe in giving peace a chance and stern parents who believe in corporal punishment for their kids all want to maximize human flourishing, they simply haven't been given the proper scientific resources for attaining that goal. While I'm happy to admit that people are morally confused, I see no evidence whatsoever that they all ultimately want the same thing. The position doesn't even seem coherent. Is it a priori necessary that people ultimately have the same idea about human well-being, or is it a contingent truth about actual human beings? Can we not even imagine [Thus] people with [have] fundamentally incompatible views of the good? (I think I can.) And if we can, what is the reason for the cosmic accident that we all happen to agree? And if that happy cosmic accident exists, it's still merely an empirical fact; by itself, the existence of universal agreement on what is good doesn't necessarily imply that it is good. We could all be mistaken, after all

7) Other forms of Utilitarianism devolve to Act Utilitarianism.

Habib:In it Lyons argues that rule utilitarianism collapses to act utilitarianism, because for any given rule, in the exceptional case where breaking the rule produces more utility, the rule can always be sophisticated by the addition of a sub-rule that handles cases like the exception. But the validity of this process on the utilitarian framework holds for all cases of exceptions, and so the rules will have as many sub-rules as there are exceptional cases, which, in the end, is to abandon the rule and be guided by the principle of utility, to seek out whatever outcome produces the maximum utility.

Thus, no matter what form of Utilitarianism my opponent defends, everything collapses to Act Utilitarianism, which should be rejected for the above reasons.