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Policy Studies Review, Vol. 3 , No. 2, February, 1984
RAYMOND T A T A L O V I C H and B Y R O N W . D A Y N E S
MORAL CONTROVERSIES AND THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS: LOWI'S FRAMEWORK APPLIED T O THE ABORTION ISSUE
Public pol icy research t rad i t ional ly has focused on Congress' enactment o f social-welfare o r economic programs wh ich allocate re- sources among populat ion g roups o r sectors o f t he economy. Case studies o f t he Social Secur i ty Act , t he Wagner Act , t h e Fai r Labor Standards Act , t he Employment A c t o f 1946, and Taf t -Har t ley, t o c i te but a few, have been synthesized by Theodore J . Lowi (1964, pp. 677-715) , who proposes tha t governmental ou tpu ts can be classif ied as d i s t r i bu t i ve , regulatory , o r r e d i s t r i b u t i v e (Rip ley and F rank l i n , 1976; Smith, 1975; Zimmerman, 1 9 7 3 ) . Lowi f u r t h e r believes tha t pol icy t ypes af fect t h e legislat ive process, executive-legislat ive relat ions, and g r o u p conf l ic t . In t h i s essay we suggest t ha t abor t ion pol icy, which essentially i s a moral cont roversy, i s "social" regulat ion--a pub l i c pol icy t y p e to which Lowi g i ves l i t t l e attention. Thus , while Lowi's model is a beginn ing point fo r o u r analysis, it must be qual- i f i ed in th ree important ways t o expla in how issues such as abor t ion af fect t he pol icymaking process.
Abor t i on pol icy cannot be viewed i n terms o f Lowi's d i s t r i b u t i v e o r red i s t r i bu t i ve types. Abor t i on pol icy is n o t d i s t r i b u t i v e because it cannot b e disaggregated i n t o d iscrete pol icy outputs . Abor t i on pol icy is a deeply polarized controversy w i t h obvious winners and losers; in addi t ion, it i s no t cont ro l led by any "subgovernment," a feature of d i s t r i b u t i v e pol icymaking. Nor is abor t ion an example o f red i s t r i bu - t i v e pol icy which attempts t o reallocate wealth, p roper t y , and power among broad "classes" in society. Abor t ion pol icy does not fit th is category because abor t ion "on demand"--legally , a t least--would then be available t o a l l women in society, r i c h and poor. Some analysts put abor t ion in t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i v e category ,' a conclusion mistakenly d rawn because the abor t ion controversy ( l i k e red i s t r i bu t i ve issues) is extremely ideological. While we agree tha t ideology p lays a major role in a moral con t rove rsy such as abor t ion, we argue tha t ideology i s an a t t r i b u t e o f social regu la to ry pol icymaking.
Tha t abor t ion pol icy is a va r ian t w i th in the regulatory arena is indicated b y i t s legislat ive h i s to ry as well as by the na tu re o f th is d ispute. When t h e Supreme C o u r t in Roe v . Wade and Doe v . Bol ton (1973) legalized abor t ion during the f i r s t t r imester o f a pregnancy, it inva l idated a l l ex i s t i ng state laws banning abor t ions except in cases o f " therapeut ic" need. The contro l of abor t ions in the Uni ted States p r i o r to 1973--dating back t o t h e mid-nineteenth century- - re f lected the state governments' use o f "police powers" t o regulate publ ic health, safety, and morals.
Theodore J . Lowi mainly s tud ied economic policies, but var ious scholars agree tha t some issues do n o t have an economic impact. T . Alexander Smith (1975, p. 9 0 ) . when he appl ied Lowi's framework to the comparative s tudy o f pub l i c policies, called such issues "emotive symbolic" because they "generate emotional suppor t for deeply held values, but un l i ke the o the r t ypes [ o f pol icies] . . . the values sought a re essential ly non-economic.Il Smith classif ied abor t ion a s an "emotive symbolic" pol icy because the debate ove r legalized abor t ion i s
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r i c h in symbolism and ideological appeals. B u t legalized abor t ion means much more. Since abor t ion pol icy modifies the de l i ve ry o f health care services, it may have impact on family p lanning, f e r t i l i t y rates, populat ion g rowth , and conceivably on the welfare needs o f dependent ch i ldren. So o u r formulation o f abor t ion pol icy as "social" regulat ion ident i f ies i t s symbolic and substant ive qual i t ies. Nonethe- less, the moral dimensions o f t he debate ove r abort ion, we think, contrast t h i s kind o f pub l i c pol icy from most regu la to ry questions.
There is an emerging body o f l i t e ra tu re on regu la to ry policies which contrasts the l1oldl1 o r economic regulat ion from the "new" o r social regulat ion (Wilson, 1980; Li l ley and Mi l ler , 1977: and Weaver, 1 9 7 8 ) . In sp i te o f these semantic dif ferences, however, t he scholars in t h i s f ie ld genera l ly agree tha t t h e regu la to ry policies wh ich charac- ter ized government act ion from 1887 until World War I l - - t yp i f i ed by the ICC, the FCC, and the C A G - w e r e fundamental ly d i f f e ren t f rom the kind o f regulat ions being promulgated in the 1970s. which a re enforced by such agencies as t h e EPA, OSHA, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission. The former regulat ions, says Lester M. Salamon ( 1 9 8 1 , p. 1 5 0 ) . involved:
. . . con t ro l s over the terms o f e n t r y and the cond i t i ons o f operat ion i n p a r t i c u l a r i ndus t r i es . Much o f the e a r l y regu la t i on i n the United States took t h i s form, as e f f o r t s were made t o avoid excessive p r i ces i n such n a t u r a l l y monopol is t ic i n d u s t r i e s as u t i l i t i e s o r t o prevent destruc- t i v e competit ion and ensure market s t a b i l i t y . . . .
What i s happening today in regu la to ry pol icy, Salamon continues,
invo lves the establ ishment o f standards f o r c e r t a i n types o f a c t i v i t i e s o r the imposi t ion o f con t ro l s t o l i m i t the e f f e c t s o f these a c t i v i t i e s . . . e f f o r t s have been made t o p r o h i b i t o r discourage act ions t h a t endanger workers o r consumers, p o l l u t e the environment, o r v i o l a t e important soc ia l goals, such as equal employment.
That older regulatory policies were essential ly economic in charac- te r is clear enough, but the re seems t o be a qual i ta t ive d i f ference between abort ion pol icy as "social" regulat ion and the k inds of "new" regulat ions c i ted in the l i terature. L i l ley and Mil ler ( 1 9 7 7 ) . for example, trace the recent g r o w t h o f federal regulat ions to thirty statutes enacted during 1970-1975. Inc luded among these are: Clean A i r Amendments ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Noise Contro l A c t ( 1 9 7 2 ) , Federal Water Pollution Control Ac t Amendments ( 1 9 7 2 ) , Atomic Energy A c t ( 1 9 7 4 ) . and the Pension Reform Ac t ( 1 9 7 4 ) . Whereas the older regulat ions centered on the s t r u c t u r e o f an i n d u s t r y o r the marketplace, these newer regulat ions focus on the workplace and the product ion process. We would suggest t ha t a degree o f theoretical c l a r i t y would b e a c h k v e d by iden t i f y i ng p u r e "social" regulat ions as i nvo l v ing the use of au tho r i t y t o modify o r replace social values, inst i tu t ional practices, and norms o f in terpersonal behavior w i t h new modes of conduct based upon legal proscr ip t ions. T h i s formulation permi ts u s t o focus o n those regulat ions af fect ing social relat ionships because the moral ou tc ry fol lowing these government policies i s much more intense than what occurs when economic transactions a re being regulated.
Tata lov ich and Daynes/Moral Controversies 209
We inc lude w i t h t h i s b r o a d d e f i n i t i o n s u c h recen t con t rove rs ies as school desegrega t ion ( a n d race re la t i ons g e n e r a l l y ) , t h e Equa l R i g h t s Amendment, gun con t ro l , g a y l i be ra t i on , obscen i t y , school p r a y e r , as we l l as abo r t i on . Such issues a r e fewer in n u m b e r t h a n economic d i s p u t e s but t h e y h a v e increased m a r k e d l y in recen t decades, a n d t h e i nd i ca t i ons a r e t h a t t h i s t r e n d w i l l con t i nue . Moreover , po l i c ies w h i c h genera te c o n f l i c t o v e r mora l i ssues pose se r ious p rob lems f o r demo- c r a t i c po l i t i cs a n d po l i t i ca l s t a b i l i t y . T h u s i t i s impor tan t t h a t a t ten - t i on b e g i v e n t o how these mora l c o n t r o v e r s i e s become po l i t i c i zed , w h y t h e y impact t h e po l i cymak ing p rocess in d i f f e r e n t w a y s t h a n economic regu la t i ons , a n d wha t f a c t o r s u n d e r l i e t h e p rob lem o f ach iev- ing a po l i t i ca l consensus o n s u c h ques t i ons . O u r ana lys i s o f t h e a b o r t i o n c o n t r o v e r s y p o i n t s t o t h r e e a t t r i b u t e s o f po l i cymak ing in t h e r e g u l a t o r y a rena wh ich , u n l i k e economic d i spu tes , cha rac te r i ze moral con t rove rs ies : ( 1 ) t h e ro le o f t h e j u d i c i a r y , ( 2 ) t h e r o l e o f ideo logy , a n d ( 3 ) t h e ro le o f s ing le - issue g r o u p s .
T H E J U D I C I A R Y
Low i did n o t p o i n t to a n y r o l e by t h e j u d i c i a r y as a po l i cymaker in t h e t h r e e po l i cy a renas h e i den t i f i es . However , r e d r e s s t o t h e c o u r t s p r o v i d e s a r e a d y mechanism f o r g e n e r a t i n g demands t h a t i s b e y o n d t h e immediate c o n t r o l o f o u r e lec t i ve l eadersh ip . L i k e abor t i on , t h e o t h e r examples o f social regu la t i on c i t e d above a r e s u b s t a n t i v e l y more t h a n s imp ly non-economic, mora l con t rove rs ies . A l l i n v o l v e cons t i t u - t i ona l ques t i ons o f c i v i l l i b e r t i e s a n d c i v i l r i g h t s . In recen t years , ques t i ons a b o u t women's r i g h t s , race re la t ions , obscen i t y , school p r a y e r , a n d " l i f es ty les " r e f l e c t i n g s u b c u l t u r a l mores have dominated t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s agenda. A concern f o r c i v i l l i be r t i es a n d r i g h t s has d i sp laced t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s t rad i t i ona l invo lvement in economic ques t i ons ( S c h u b e r t , 1965, c h . 6 ) .
Scho lars who s t u d y t h e a b o r t i o n c o n t r o v e r s y see a jud ic ia l ro le i n t h i s a rea because t h e Supreme C o u r t h i s to r i ca l l y enac ts po l i cy w h i c h " leg i t imates" b e h a v i o r (Neef , 1979). B u t more impor tan t l y , t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r " fundamenta l r i g h t s t t ad jud i ca t i on s t r i k e s a t t he h e a r t o f t h e debate o v e r lega l i zed abor t i on . In rev iew ing t h e app l ica- t i o n o f " subs tan t i ve " d u e p rocess in Roe v . Wade, among o t h e r cases, Paul B r e s t (1981, pp. 1063-1109) obse rves t h a t :
The judges and scho la rs who suppor t j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n u s u a l l y acknowledge t h a t t h e r i g h t s a t s t a k e - - v a r i o u s l y desc r ibed i n terms o f p r i v a c y , p r o c r e a t i o n a l cho ice , sexual autonomy, l i f e s t y l e cho ices , and i n t i m a t e assoc ia t i on - -a re n o t s p e c i f i e d by t h e t e x t o r o r i g i n a l h i s t o r y o f t h e Const i - t u t i o n . They argue t h a t t h e j u d i c i a r y i s nonetheless au tho r i zed , i f n o t duty-bound, t o p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l s a g a i n s t government i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h these r i g h t s , which can be d i scove red i n convent iona l m o r a l i t y o r d e r i v e d through methods o f ph i losophy o r a d j u d i c a t i o n . . . .
From t h i s pe rspec t i ve , t h e r e f o r e , we hypo thes i ze t h a t Congress a n d t h e Execu t i ve - - the p o p u l a r b r a n c h e s o f gove rnmen t - -wou ld b e re lega ted t o t h e pos i t i on o f h a v i n g t o reac t t o t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f "social" r e g u l a t o r y p o l i c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h i s emerg ing
21 0 P o l i c y Studies Review 3:2 Feb. 1984
area o f " p r i v a c y " r i g h t s . O u r rev iew o f t h e j u d i c i a r y ' s ro le in po- l i t i c i z i ng t h e a b o r t i o n c o n t r o v e r s y a f f i r m s t h i s p ropos i t i on .
Be fo re 1969 t h e r e was l i t t l e j ud i c ia l i nvo l vemen t in t h e a b o r t i o n issue, a n d advocates o f a b o r t i o n " re fo rm" p r i m a r i l y l obb ied t h e s ta te leg is la tu res f o r s t a t u t o r y changes. T h e f i r s t j ud i c ia l dec is ion o n t h e lega l i t y o f a s ta te an t i -abo r t i on law o c c u r r e d when t h e Ca l i f o rn ia Supreme C o u r t , in t h e case o f People v . Belous (1969) . i nva l i da ted t h e s ta te 's pre-1967 (p re - re fo rmed) s t a t u t e o n abor t i on . L a t e r in 1969 t h e f i r s t ruling by a federa l c o u r t came in t h e case o f U . S . v . Vu i t ch2 when t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e D i s t r i c t o f Columbia he ld t h a t t h e a b o r t i o n law g o v e r n i n g t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n was uncons t i t u t i ona l . In h i s 1971 r u l i n g , Judge G e r h a r d A . Cessel l res ta ted t h e legal p r i n c i - p les w h i c h h a d been enunc ia ted in t h e Belous case: ( 1 ) t h a t t h e sect ion o f t h e law p e r m i t t i n g abor t i ons to p r e s e r v e t h e mother 's l i f e o r hea l th was ambiguous a n d v io la ted t h e " d u e processl l c lause o f t h e Un i ted States Cons t i t u t i on : ( 2 ) t h a t women h a v e t h e right t o p r i v a c y in mat te rs re la ted t o fami ly , mar r i age , a n d sex; a n d ( 3 ) t h a t t h e i n te res ts o f t h e s ta te t o i n f r i n g e u p o n s u c h r i g h t s h a d n o t been demonst ra ted . Gessel l 's dec is ion also n o t e d t h e d i sc r im ina to ry app l i - ca t ion o f t h e Washington, D.C. law w i t h respec t t o t h e poor . In 1971 t h e Supreme C o u r t rev iewed t h i s case; it l e t t h e D i s t r i c t o f Columbia law s tand but ex tended t h e meaning o f a mo the r ' s " l i f e o r hea l th " t o i nc lude I lpsycho log ica l as we l l as phys i ca l we l l -be ing . "
D u r i n g t h i s pe r iod , legal cha l lenges t o t h e "o r i g ina l " s ta te a n t i - abo r t i on laws were mounted in seve ra l s ta te a n d fede ra l c o u r t s . By the fa l l o f 1970, t h e r e were f i v e s u c h cases b e f o r e t h e Supreme C o u r t , more t h a n t w e n t y in lower federa l c o u r t s , a n d many more in t h e c o u r t s of e leven states. A t t h e t ime o f t h e Roe dec is ion , t h e Supreme C o u r t cou ld c i t e p receden t based on e igh teen s ta te a n d federa l cases. T h e an t i -abo r t i on laws o f Connec t i cu t , Georgia, T e x - as, N o r t h Dakota , I l l i no is , Kansas, New Je rsey , Wisconsin, Ca l i f o rn ia , a n d F lo r i da h a d been dec la red i nva l i d ; but o t h e r s ta tu tes in Kansas, Louis iana, N o r t h Caro l ina , Ohio, U tah , Ind iana, Miss iss ipp i , a n d Sou th Dakota h a d been u p h e l d . O n a t least e i g h t occasions p r i o r t o 1973, t h e Supreme C o u r t h a d r e f u s e d to r e v i e w lower c o u r t dec is ions o n abor t i on , i n c l u d i n g t h e l andmark Belous decis ion: however , i n 1971 i t f i na l l y ag reed t o we igh t h e legal i ssues posed by t h e c e n t u r y - o l d Texas s ta tu te as wel l as t h e 1968 re fo rmed Georg ia law.
Few decis ions o f t h e Supreme C o u r t c rea ted t h e p u b l i c o u t c r y genera ted by Roe v . Wade a n d i t s companion case, Doe v . Bo l ton . Jus t ice Blackman, who a p p a r e n t l y labored many mon ths in w r i t i n g t h e ma jo r i t y op in ion , seemed t o sense t h i s w h e n h e s ta ted t h a t t h e ruling I f . . . w i l l b e r e g a r d e d as one o f t h e worse mis takes in t h e c o u r t ' s h i s t o r y or one o f i t s g r e a t decision^."^ As a p u b l i c po l i cy statement, however , Roe did n o t r e f l e c t t h e po l i t i ca l ba lance o f power be tween the con tend ing pa r t i es . T h e Supreme C o u r t fa i led t o acknowledge t h e g r o w i n g R igh t - to -L i fe Movement n o r i t s i n t e n s i t y o f fee l ing : a n d t h e Jus t ices did n o t d isc r im ina te be tween t h e p u b l i c ' s ove rwhe lm ing accep- tance o f " t he rapeu t i c " abo r t i on a n d i t s res is tance t o p u r e l y e lec t i ve abor t i on . With t h e Roe decis ion, t h e u n b o r n c h i l d n o longer was t r e a t e d as someone possessing r i g h t s , a n d t h e Supreme C o u r t re jec ted appea ls based u p o n a rgumen ts t h a t t h e f e t u s i s a lega l "person. " T h u s , n o t o n l y d i d t h e Supreme C o u r t legal ize a b o r t i o n t h r o u g h o u t t h e U n i t e d Sta tes , but it den ied a n y v a l i d i t y t o t h e e th ica l be l i e f
T a t a l o v i c h and D a y n e d H o r a l C o n t r o v e r s i e s 2 1 1
which was centra l t o t h e pro- l i fe posit ion. Justice Blackman had argued tha t "when those t ra ined in the respective discipl ines o f medicine, phi losophy, and theology are unable t o a r r i v e a t any con- sensus" on the question o f when l i f e begins, the j ud i c ia ry " is no t in a posit ion t o speculate as to the answer." Nonetheless, the cou r t ' s opinion did state i t s view tha t t he major i ty o f Americans believe tha t l i fe begins a t birth.
In subsequent cases, t he Supreme Cour t considered questions af fect ing the implementation o f Roe.4 In these decisions, t he Cour t general ly inval idated state laws which undermined the mother's right t o an abor t ion as def ined by Roe v. Wade; fo r example, a minor does not need the permission o f he r pa ren ts in o r d e r to obta in an abor t ion and a wife does not need the concurrence o f he r husband. On the other hand, t h e Cour t uphe ld the power o f state legislatures and Congress t o re fuse funding fo r abor t ions u n d e r specif ied condit ions. In t h e famous case o f Hor r i s v. McRae, the Supreme Cour t upheld the const i tu t ional i ty o f th Hyde Amendment by which Congress res t r i c t s the use o f Medicaid funds t o pay f o r abor t ions f o r t h e poor. The decisions in these cases, argues Marian Neef (pp . 3 3 5 - 3 3 7 ) . show how t h e c o u r t defers t o Congress on policies wh ich allocate resources while sustaining i t s act ive role in making policies which legitimate behavior. A n d th i s , we argue, is t h e essential core o f llsocial" regulatory pol icy.
From another perspect ive, t he adjudication o f d isputes af fect ing the implementation o f Roe by the Supreme Court--not t o mention other federal courts--points t o a s ingular role which the jud ic iary has assumed in the area o f "social" regulatory pol icy. Donald Horowitz ( 1 9 7 7 ) makes a compelling case tha t the na tu re o f judicial decision- making has changed fundamentally today.' Where the cour ts t rad i - t ional ly resolved grievances between l i t igants in the adversary pro- cess, today we find the j ud i c ia ry engaged in problem-solving. In p ro tec t i ng the r i g h t s o f pr isoners, mental patients, welfare recipi- ents, and racial minorit ies, t he cou r t s are making substantive pol icy in wide areas; f o r example, when a judge specifies 8 4 minimum care s tandards in mental hospitals, t h i s kind o f judicial decisionmaking is no t t he isolated case, Horowitz (p .7) observes, but is:
. . . representat ive o f the t rend toward demanding pe r fo r - mance t h a t cannot be measured i n one o r two simple acts b u t i n a whole course o f conduct, performance t h a t tends t o be open-ended i n t ime and even i n the i d e n t i t y o f the p a r t i e s t o whom the performance i s owed . . . .
Compliance w i t h expl ic i t s tandards o f performance is ind icat ive o f the new social regulat ions, so t he j ud i c ia ry ' s ro le in implementing public pol icy in t h i s instance is comparable t o t h e role o f governmental regu la to ry agencies.'
Horowitz suggests tha t t he cour ts ' i n te rven t ion in social policies was legitimized by the school desegregation cases--beginning w i t h B rown v. Board of Education--but t h a t t h i s tendency has been re in- forced by the fact t ha t disaffected g roups seem to b e more wi l l ing to turn to the cou r t s t o redress grievances r a t h e r than the legislature o r t he executive. In the past, t h e p r i v i l eged used the cou r t s to o v e r t u r n acts o f t he popular branches o f government, whereas today,
2 1 2 Policy Studies Review 3 : 2 Feb. 1984
the disadvantaged ask the jud ic iary to make pol icy i n areas where Congress and the Executive refuse to act. The disadvantaged claim the i r c i v i l l iber t ies and c i v i l r i g h t s have been violated b y state action thus opening the door to jud ic ia l in tervent ion. T h i s scenario i s i nd i c - at ive o f "social" regulatory pol icy and suggests another major a t t r i - b u t e o f i t s pol icymaking process: t he ro le o f single-issue groups.
SI NCLE- ISSUE GROUPS
In Lowi's framework, d i f f e ren t constellations o f in terest g roups inf luence pol icymaking in each functional arena. Because d i s t r i b u t i v e pol icy is disaggregated to small un i ts- -such as the localit ies receiv ing publ ic works funds--Lowi contends tha t these "clientele" g roups are mainly invo lved in lobbying for those k inds o f programs. In con- t ras t , red i s t r i bu t i ve pol icy is shaped b y huge "peak1I associations l i ke the AFL-CIO, the Uni ted States Chamber o f Commerce, and the National Association o f Manufacturers. A l though "peak" associations represent hundreds o f t rade organizations, a degree of u n i t y is achieved on red i s t r i bu t i ve policies because o f t he i r "class" implica- t ions. In abor t ion pol i t ics, however, the coal i t ion-bui lding process was less extensive and did no t invo lve the peak associations. T h i s circumstance, we contend, can b e expected whenever lLmoral" cont ro- versies are placed on the pol i t ical agenda. F i r s t , such issues do no t a f fect t he immediate economic self- interest o f peak associations: sec- ond, the controversy engendered by moral issues would threaten the in ternal cohesion o f those huge organizations.
In making economic regulatory po l icy , Lowi found tha t t rade asso- ciations which represent the affected sector o f t he economy are the pr imary g roups lobbying Congress. In abor t ion pol i t ics, the "estab- l ished" g roups which became involved were in terest g roups represent- ing th ree b road constituencies: women's g roups , re l ig ious denomina- tions. and health-care organizations. S ix ty- three organizations endorsed abort ion l iberal izat ion in the ear ly 1970s and two- th i rds fe l l in to those three categories (Hard in , 1 9 7 4 ) , append ix ) . In addit ion, there were important l iberal groups--such as the American C iv i l Libert ies Union and the American fo r Democratic Action--and orga- nizations concerned w i th ch i l d ren ' s issues; y e t on l y one t rade union, the United Auto Workers, and no business t rade associations were among those 63 organizations. A similar p a t t e r n is found when one analyzes the g roups advocating pub l i c funding fo r abor t ions in 1979 (Alan Guttmacher Inst i tu te , 1 9 7 9 ) . Lowi follows the "p lura l is t " a rgu - ment which contends tha t "establ ished" in terest g roups a re ready and wil l ing to engage in pol i t ical combat t o p ro tec t t he i r economic i n te r - ests. So the re is l i t t l e need f o r in terests t o create "single issue groups1' which concentrate a l l t h e i r resources and energies on any one cause, No doubt the p lu ra l i s t assumptions apply to the largest number o f i n te res t g roups in the Uni ted States, but the re a re s ign i f i - cant exceptions to tha t general izat ion. As Mancur Olson ( 1 9 6 9 , pp. 160-161) observes, a small number o f g roups tend t o promote non- economic objectives; these inc lude phi lanthropic organizations, re l i - gious lobbies, and people committed to " lost causes.11 A similar argument is made by Cobb and Elder ( 1 9 7 2 , p. 8 3 ) in t h e i r s tudy o f agenda-bui lding. They state tha t cer ta in issues a re raised by "do- gooders1I or g roups motivated by humanitarian concerns who have no
T a t a l o v i c h and D a y n e d M o r a l C o n t r o v e r s i e s 213
vested economic in terest a t stake. We agree tha t single-issue g roups and broad-based social movements a r e the major actors in pol i t ic iz ing moral controversies. Single-issue g roups a re unique insofar as they are capable o f d i rec t l y i nvo l v ing the o rd ina ry c i t izen in pol i t ical action. B u t t h i s relat ionship between grassroots c i t izen activism, single-issue groups, and the pol icymaking process i s simply not obvious in any o f Lowi's functional arenas.
D u r i n g the 1960s. the advocates of abor t ion " re form" were mainly health-care professionals who wanted t o co r rec t a social ev i l ; they did no t begin th i s movement t o secure the right t o an abor t ion fo r them- selves as a pol i t ical consti tuency. The impetus for abor t ion reform came from a cadre o f act iv is ts belonging t o a d hoc g roups such as the Association fo r t he Study o f Abor t ion, New York Ci ty ; the Society for Humane Abor t ion, San Francisco; and the Cali fornia Committee on Therapeutic Abor t ion, Los Angeles (Tata lov ich and Daynes, 1981, ch. 2 ) . Lawrence Lader 119731, a long-time advocate o f legalized abor- t ion, po ints ou t t ha t many ind iv iduals , inc lud ing clergymen, health- care professionals, and concerned cit izens, were wi l l ing t o d i rect act ion, inc lud ing open violat ion o f t he law, to dramatize the need for abor t ion l iberal izat ion. The ex ten t o f c i t izen and single-issue g r o u p involvement in the abor t ion movement also is documented by the case studies which analyzed the successful pro-abor t ion lobbies in Hawaii, New York State, and Washington State (Ste inhof f and Diamond, 1977; Guttmacher, 1973; Fuji ta and Wagner, 1973; Lader, 1973, ch. 1 0 ) . The var ious g roups favo r ing abor t ion "reform" coalesced around the National Association fo r Humane Abor t ion organized in 1965; in 1969 the abor t ion act iv is ts establ ished the National Association for Repeal o f Abor t ion Laws. Following the 1973 Supreme Cour t decisions, th is organization was renamed the National Abor t ion Rights Action League, and remains a p r imary pro-choice lobbyis t in Congress.
The pro- l i fe lobby was unable to build a pol i t ical coalit ion w i th other establ ished in terest g roups and was, t o an even greater de- gree, organized around single-issue g roups ra the r than mult i- interest associations. A n exception t o t h i s pa t te rn i s t h e p ivota l role o f the Roman Catholic Church and i t s a f f i l ia ted organizations in promoting the pro- l i fe viewpoint in the Uni ted States. In terms o f the number o f Right - to-L i fe Committees, t he i r overa l l membership, and the sub- stantial f unds they were able to raise, it appears tha t the pro- l i fe lobby has a t t r i bu tes o f a "mass" movement. T h i s character is t ic o f t he p ro - l i f e movement was i l l us t ra ted by i t s ab i l i t y t o enter t he sphere o f electoral pol i t ics. For example, Democrat Ellen McCormack o f New York State qual i f ied f o r $100,000 in federal matching funds and was able t o enter t he ear ly pres ident ia l pr imar ies in 1976. Though pol l ing on ly about 1-4 percent o f t he vote in those elections, McCormack's candidacy led t o the founding o f New York ' s Right-to-Life Party- which, in 1978, outpol led t h e state's Liberal Par ty .
Single-issue g roups were impor tant t o b o t h sides o f t he abor t ion d ispute, and t h i s pa t te rn genera l ly seems t o b e ind icat ive o f moral controversies. To promote fundamental changes in mores requi res a body o f act iv is ts who are no t t i ed to g roups whose p r imary motiva- t ions are economic. On the o the r hand, the opposit ion to social change w i l l prompt a counter-organization by those people who feel threatened by the undermin ing o f t rad i t ional values. In h i s s tudy o f col lect ive behavior , Neil Smelser (1962, p. 289) observes tha t one
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condit ion which facil i tates the r ise o f social movements is societal changes which render t rad i t ional social norms especially repressive.
. , . Any disharmony between normative standards and actual soc ia l condi t ions can provide the basis f o r a movement whose ob jec t i ve i t i s t o modify the norms. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e when e i t h e r norms o r soc ia l condi t ions undergo r a p i d change i n a r e l a t i v e l y shor t t ime, . . . .
This hypothesis, Smelser asserts, explains the r ise o f t he c i v i l r i g h t s agitat ion for equal employment a f te r World War II. Moral contro- versies, by definit ion, engender serious ideological debate because social movements and single-issue g roups want t o legitimate norms which are fundamentally a t odds w i t h t rad i t ional social mores.
IDEOLOGY
According t o Lowi's framework, ideology is most important in red i s t r i bu t i ve pol icymaking, but it has less relevance t o economic regulat ion. We contend that ideology is important when "social" regulatory pol icy such as legalized abor t ion is considered and it operates a t many levels. On the one hand, moral controversies, b y the i r v e r y nature, prompt a v igorous intel lectual debate about the pol i t ical, philosophical, and legal reasoning o f prev ious generations. When ex is t ing norms are being challenged, the proponents t ry to show tha t t rad i t ional values are i r re levant , i f not downr igh t unsc ru - pulous, today. The c i v i l r i g h t s movement, f o r example, gained c red ib i l i t y by r e f e r r i n g to racism as a b y p r o d u c t o f slavery and the establishment o f white supremacy a f te r Reconstruction. The debate over g u n controls, similarly, f i nds the National Rif le Association opposing l iberals when these combatants i n te rp re t t he Framers' in- tentions rega rd ing the "right t o bear arms'! under the Second Amend- ment. Likewise, because state anti-abort ion laws were enacted over 100 years ago, t h e h is tor ica l reco rd impinges on the contemporary debate over legalized abort ion. Advocates o f the p ro - l i f e posit ion make the argument tha t t h e "original" abor t ion laws were in tended t o protect t he fetus, but the pro-choice proponents d ispute tha t con- tention. They argue tha t t he n ineteenth c e n t u r y laws were designed to protect t he mother from the unsan i ta ry and dangerous surg ica l techniques o f t h e day,
A t another level, ideology is used by the combatants t o extend one issue t o other related issues and thereby to convey a more wide- spread threat t o the pol i t ical order . Ideological appeals, therefore, focus the pol i t ical debate on long-term and potential effects o f a publ ic pol icy as well as i t s immediate consequences. Arguments against Medicare (a red i s t r i bu t i ve issue), f o r example, emphasized "creeping" socialism in America and i t s assault on capitalism and p r i va te responsib i l i ty . Much the same happened t o the abor t ion controversy--but after, not before, t he Supreme Cour t 's 1973 deci- sion. A review o f the pro- l i fe and pro-choice arguments shows how in tensely polarized and combative the abor t ion d ispute had become in the 1970s and continues in to the 1980s. Unl ike the debate ove r " therapeut ic" abort ions in the 1960s, t he arguments sh i f t ed t o the larger implications o f legalized abor t ion fo r American society.
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In t h e U n i t e d States, t h e movement f o r abo r t i on " re fo rm" began about 1959, when t h e Amer ican Law I n s t i t u t e advocated abor t i on whenever t h e mother 's o r ch i l d ' s phys i ca l o r mental h e a l t h was endan- ge red , in cases o f fe ta l abnorma l i t y , o r when r a p e was ind icated. T h e debate o v e r abo r t i on r e f o r m was p ragmat i c , n o t ideological , a n d t h e opposi t ion cou ld n o t e f fec t i ve l y genera l ize t h e t h r e a t o f t he rapeu- t i c abo r t i on t o society. A L I - t y p e re fo rms were unambiguous because t h e y wou ld p e r m i t abo r t i ons t o o n l y a r e l a t i v e l y few women. D u r i n g t h e 1960s. t h e abor t i on issue was d e f i n e d as a "medical" p rob lem a n d opin ion e l i tes read i l y accepted t h e re fo rmers ' a rgumen t t h a t some 8,000 abor t i ons were pe r fo rmed annua l l y in t h e U n i t e d States though , technica l ly , t h e y were i l legal . T h e re fo rmers s imply wanted t o re - shape t h e c r im ina l code t o r e f l e c t p r e v a i l i n g medical pract ice. In add i t i on , a l l t h e s tates o p e r a t i n g u n d e r n ine teen th c e n t u r y abo r t i on s ta tu tes pe rm i t ted t h e te rm ina t ion o f a p r e g n a n c y when t h e mother 's l i f e was endangered a n d a few states al lowed abor t i on when t h e mother 's h e a l t h was th rea tened . T h u s , t h e movement f a v o r i n g added " the rapeu t i c " i nd i ca t i ons f o r abo r t i on seemed modest when compared t o t h e Cathol ic pos i t i on t h a t a l l abo r t i ons - - i nc lud ing those now legal-- were immoral a n d o u g h t t o b e p roh ib i t ed . A p p a r e n t l y t h e a rgumen ts f o r r e f o r m were e f fec t i ve because p u b l i c op in ion s u r v e y s during t h e 1960s show t h a t t h e ma jo r i t y o f Amer icans favo red the rapeu t i c abo r - t i ons (B lake , 1971, pp. 540-549). A n d during t h e y e a r s 1966-1970, t h i r t e e n s tates amended t h e i r abo r t i on laws in v a r y i n g degrees ac- c o r d i n g t o t h e A L I guideline^.^
U n l i k e t h e abor t i on debate o f t h e 1960s. e lect ive abor t i on is an issue amenable t o ideological appeals. D u r i n g t h e 1970s a n d 19805, as a r e s u l t , t h e an tagon is t s began t o link abor t i on t o o t h e r vo lat i le social issues such as women's r i g h t s , po l i t ica l conservat ism, a n d personal mora l i t y . T h e bes t research o n t h i s aspect is p r o v i d e d by Donald C r a n b e r g (1978, pp. 414-429), who determined t h a t p u b l i c a t t i t udes o n abor t i on a r e bes t exp la ined by one's op in ions o n such re la ted issues as homosexual i ty , ex t ramar i ta l re la t ions, sex educat ion, a n d p o r n o g r a p h y . P ro - l i f e rs a r e m u c h more conserva t i ve o n these issues t h a n pro-choice advocates. C r a n b e r g ' s f i n d i n g s ind icate t h a t abo r t i on today i s a code w o r d f o r one 's v iews o n a v a r i e t y o f moral issues.
T h e ideological n a t u r e o f t h e abor t i on debated today i s read i l y seen in t h e propaganda disseminated by b o t h sides. Pro- l i fe l i tera- t u r e compares t h e abor t i on ques t i on t o Dred Scott a n d t h e s lave ry issue, l a n d it sugges ts t h a t legal ized a b o r t i o n w i l l lead t o in fant ic ide, mercy killing, a n d t h e genocide wi tnessed during t h e Nazi holocaust (Wi l l , 1976, p. 96) . P ro - l i f e rs also con tend t h a t a genera l moral dec l ine th rea tens t h e c o u n t r y . In t h e words o f t h e Vat ican, Roe was "mora l ly monstrous," a n d Pa t r i ck Card ina l OIBoyle ca l led it a "catas- t r o p h e f o r America" ( S a r v i s a n d Rodman, 1973, pp. i x - x ) .
T h e American C i v i l L ibe r t i es Union, f o r example, opposes t h e H y d e Amend- ment because: I(. . . i t s o n l y p u r p o s e i s t o promote a p a r t i c u l a r re l i g ious v iew o n t h e ques t i on o f when l i f e begins." ' A n d t h e Execu- t i v e D i r e c t o r o f t h e Nat ional A b o r t i o n R i g h t s Ac t i on League sees Roe as a " tes t o f whe the r o u r society w i l l p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t s o f t h e indi- v i d u a l to lead h i s o r h e r o w n l i fe , f r e e o f t h e d i c ta tes a n d dogma o f o the rs . "10 In t h e 1970s. advocates o f legal ized abor t i on came t o v iew t h e w o m a r . ' ~ "right t o choose" a n abor t i on w i t h o u t governmenta l
T h e pro-choice advocates a lso link a b o r t i o n t o vo lat i le issues.
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i n te r fe rence as a l i b e r t y equa l in s ta tus t o t h e B i l l o f R i g h t s . T h i s syn thes i s r e s u l t e d p r i m a r i l y because t h e p r o - l i f e pos i t i on had , by now, become f u l l y i d e n t i f i e d by t h e pro-cho ice p r o p o n e n t s as a t h r e a t t o t h e p r i n c i p l e o f c h u r c h - s t a t e separa t ion . Shou ld o u r re l i g ious f reedoms in t h e U n i t e d Sta tes so eas i l y b e t ramp led upon , t h e y a r - gue , n o l i b e r t i e s wou ld b e secure . T h i s pos i t i on i s h e l d by t h e Re l ig ious Coa l i t ion f o r A b o r t i o n R i g h t s in oppos ing a n y p r o - l i f e amend- ment t o t h e Cons t i t u t i on , " w h i c h w r i t e s :
American l i b e r t i e s have been secure i n l a r g e measure because they have been guaranteed by a B i l l o f R igh ts wh ich t h e American people have cons idered t o be v i r t u a l l y unamendable. I f the f i r s t c lause o f t h e B i l l o f R igh ts , wh ich p r o t e c t s r e l i g i o u s freedom, shou ld p rove so e a s i l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o amendment, none o f t h e succeeding c lauses would be secure.
T h u s , t h e deba te o v e r a b o r t i o n has e v o l v e d to t h e p o i n t w h e r e pro-cho ice g r o u p s c h a r g e t h a t p r o - l i f e r s a r e trying t o underm ine o u r fo rm o f gove rnmen t a n d p r o - l i f e p r o p o n e n t s say t h a t a b o r t i o n advo - cates a r e was t ing human l i fe . Ideo logy has t r a n s f o r m e d t h e a b o r t i o n c o n t r o v e r s y f r o m a r e l a t i v e l y n a r r o w medical ques t i on t o one now i n v o l v i n g fundamenta l p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s c i rcumstance, l a r g e l y p r e c i p - i t a ted by t h e dec is ion , i s comparable to wha t happens in t h e course o f r e d i s t r i b u t i v e po l i t i cs . T h o u g h issues o f economic r e g u - la t ion d i v i d e t h e d i s p u t a n t s i n t o " l i be ra l " a n d "conserva t i ve " camps, t h e y usua l l y l ack t h i s i n t e n s i t y o f ideological war fa re .
T H E ROLE OF CONGRESS
Theodore J . Lowi a r g u e d t h a t Congress i s t h e p redominan t po l i cy - maker in t h e r e g u l a t o r y arena; but in mat te rs o f "social" regu la t i on , l i k e abo r t i on , we think t h a t Congress ' e f f o r t s w i l l b e d i r e c t e d ma in l y aga ins t t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s i n i t i a t i ves . A f t e r t h e Supreme C o u r t ou t lawed school p r a y e r in t h e 1960s. Congress cons ide red a cons t i t u - t iona l amendment t o r e v e r s e t h a t ruling. A n d in t h e p e r i o d s ince 1973, Congress has deba ted v a r i o u s measures t o r e s t r i c t t h e ava i lab i l - i ty o f abo r t i ons , p a r t i c u l a r l y funding leg is la t ion . In 1976 Congress- man H e n r y J . H y d e ( R - I l l ) , a n avowed opponen t of a b o r t i o n , became alarmed t h a t t h e Depar tment o f Hea l th , Educat ion , a n d Welfare was p a y i n g f o r 250,000 t o 300,000 a b o r t i o n s a y e a r a t a cos t o f $45 mi l - l ion. He i n t r o d u c e d wha t has become k n o w n as t h e H y d e Amendment. The f i r s t H y d e Amendment, enac ted in 1976, p r o h i b i t e d t h e u s e o f Medicaid f u n d s f o r abo r t i ons "excep t w h e r e t h e l i f e o f t h e mo the r wou ld b e endangered i f t h e f e t u s were c a r r i e d t o te rm. " Since t h e n e v e r y Congress has adop ted some v e r s i o n o f th H y d e Amendment as a r i d e r t o Depar tment o f Labor /Depar tmen t o f Hea l th , Educat ion , a n d Welfare a p p r o p r i a t i o n s leg is la t ion . However , p r o - l i f e e f f o r t s in Con- g r e s s t o s u p p r e s s a b o r t i o n h a v e n o t s topped he re .
E v e r y poss ib le maneuver was u s e d by p r o - l i f e Congressmen t o el iminate a n y ves t i ge o f a b o r t i o n po l i cy f r o m t h e law. In 1973, f o r example, Congress p r o h i b i t e d fede ra l f u n d s f rom b e i n g spen t o n f o r e i g n a i d i f t h e monies w e r e u s e d t o p a y f o r abo r t i ons . T h a t same y e a r fede ra l hea l th leg is la t ion i n c o r p o r a t e d "right t o conscience" amendments a l l ow ing a n y p h y s i c i a n or hosp i ta l r e c e i v i n g federa l f u n d s
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t o re fuse t o p e r f o r m abor t i ons . An t i -abo r t i on r i d e r s also were a t - tached t o t h e 1978 Depar tment o f Defense a n d fo re ign a i d b i l l s . In 1978 Representat ives D a v i d C. T r e e n (R-La) a n d Thomas M. Gagedorn (R-Minn) were successfu l in p r o h i b i t i n g t h e Un i ted States Commission o n C i v i l R i g h t s f rom col lect ing data o n abor t i on laws a n d pol ic ies o f t h e government . T h e Family Protect ion A c t o f 1980 speci f ied t h a t n o p r o g r a m rece iv ing federa l f u n d s cou ld p r o v i d e con t racep t i ve or abor - t i on counsel ing or legal serv ices t o a minor w i t h o u t f i r s t g e t t i n g t h e permiss ion f r o m t h e m ino r l s pa ren ts . A n d p ro - l i f e Congressmen in 1980 p r o h i b i t e d t h e Legal Serv ices Corpo ra t i on , w h i c h p r o v i d e d legal assistance t o t h e poor , f rom hand l i ng abor t i on cases.
T h e extens iveness o f t h e p r o - l i f e coun te r -o f fens i ve i n Congress suggests a deg ree o f fanat ic ism w h i c h i s less a p p a r e n t o n p u b l i c pol ic ies a f f e c t i n g economic d i spu tes . As Congressman H e n r y H y d e (1980, p. 4514) once sa id: " y o u d o n ' t compromise o n t h i s issue o f abor t ion. How d o y o u compromise when t h e issue i s a human l i fe- -not y o u r l i f e , somebody else's l i fe . " A s a r e s u l t , t h e c leavage in Con- g r e s s between p ro - l i f e a n d pro-choice leg is la tors has increased o v e r t h e yea rs s ince 1973. A n ex tens i ve analys is o f thirty votes o n abor - t i on leg is la t ion in t h e 93rd. 94th, 95th, a n d 96 th Congresses f o u n d t h a t a Representat ive 's ideology i s t h e s t r o n g e s t p r e d i c t o r o f h i s v o t i n g o n abor t i on leg is la t ion (Bardes a n d Tata lov ich, 1982; a n d V inovsk i s . 1976). Conserva t i ves a r e p r o - l i f e a n d l i be ra l s t e n d t o b e pro-choice. A secondary i n f l uence i s re l ig ion; Cathol ic Congressmen a re much more p ro - l i f e i n t h e i r v o t i n g behav io r t h a n Jewish o r Prot- es tan t Representat ives. O n t h e o t h e r hand , po l i t i ca l p a r t y a f f i l i a t i on i s much less impor tan t in exp la in ing how Congressmen vo te o n abor- t i on legis lat ion. T h i s f i n d i n g i s s ign i f i can t because t h e ex tens i ve research o n l eg i s la t i ve b e h a v i o r ind icates t h a t p a r t y a f f i l i a t i on normal- ly i s t h e most impor tan t va r iab le exp la in ing how Congressmen vote o n abor t i on legis lat ion. T h i s finding i s s ign i f i can t because t h e ex tens i ve research o n leg is la t ive behav io r ind icates t h a t p a r t y a f f i l i a t i on normal- l y i s t h e most impor tan t va r iab le exp la in ing how Congressmen vote on economic a n d social-wel fare pol ic ies. Vo t ing i n Congress o n abor t i on leg is la t ion, t he re fo re , a f f i r m s o u r hypo thes i s t h a t moral cont rovers ies a r e a n impor tan t v a r i a n t of r e g u l a t o r y po l icymaking.
In t h e y e a r s s ince Roe, n e i t h e r t h e House o f Representat ives n o r the Senate has vo ted o n a p r o - l i f e amendment t o t h e Cons t i t u t i on . It seems u n l i k e l y t h a t s u c h a n amendment cou ld ob ta in the necessary two- th i rds v o t e in each house o f Congress in add i t i on t o ra t i f i ca t i on by t h r e e - f o u r t h s of t h e states. t lowever , in t h e 97th Congress (1981-82), p r o - l i f e leg is la tors o n t h e Senate's Committee o n the Jud i - c i a r y a t tempted t o de f i ne away t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s con t ro l o v e r abo r t i on pol icy . T h e Hyde-Helms b i l l ( S . 158). w h i c h t h e Committee subsequen t l y h a d approved , wou ld def ine human l i f e as e x i s t i n g a t concept ion a n d de f i ne a l l human l i f e as I lpersons." I f enacted, t h i s leg is la t ion wou ld o v e r t u r n Roe since t h e Four teen th Amendment would the rea f te r g i v e " d u e process" r i g h t s t o a l l human " l i f e " f r o m t h e moment o f concept ion. T h u s , Congress has exe rc i sed an a c t i v i s t ro le in fo rmu la t i ng abor t i on po l i cy , but i t s agenda has been establ ished by t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s e a r l y i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h i s area. So t h i s caveat must b e added to Lowi ls a rgumen t t h a t r e g u l a t o r y po l i cy is Legis la t ive in charac te r .
21 8 P o l i c y S t u d i e s Review 3:2 Feb. 1984
T H E ROLE OF T H E EXECUTIVE
In Lowi 's po l i cy f ramework , t h e execu t i ve has a p r i m a r y ro le in shap ing r e d i s t r i b u t i v e po l i cy , but v i r t u a l l y n o impact in d i s t r i b u t i v e po l i cymak ing . In t h e r e g u l a t o r y a rena, t h e e x e c u t i v e t h r o w s i t s s u p p o r t b e h i n d one s ide or t h e o t h e r in t h e d i s p u t e t o i n f l uence t h e leg is la t i ve outcome. A s t h e abor t i on c o n t r o v e r s y has deve loped, t h e execu t i ve has been less impor tan t t h a n Congress in fash ion ing a response t o t h e Roe dec is ion . Democrat ic cand ida tes f o r p r e s i d e n t genera l l y t r i e d t o a v o i d t h e a b o r t i o n issue or t o p laca te b o t h p r o - choice a n d p r o - l i f e pos i t ions ; on t h e Repub l ican s ide , b o t h R icha rd N ixon a n d Rona ld Reagan f i r m l y opposed lega l i zed abor t i on .
D u r i n g t h e 1972 p res iden t ia l campaign, R i c h a r d N i x o n re jec ted t h e pos i t ion o f t h e P res iden t ' s Commission o n Popu la t ion G r o w t h f a v o r i n g "on demand'' abo r t i on , a n d h e proceeded t o endorse T e r r a n c e Card ina l Cooke's e f f o r t s t o r e s c i n d New Y o r k S ta te 's n e w l y enac ted lega l i zed abor t i on law. N ixon ' s Democrat ic opponen t , George McGovern , was d i s t u r b e d by t h e pe rs i s tence o f t h i s i ssue in t h e campaign. McGov- e r n a r g u e d t h a t abo r t i on was a p r i v a t e ma t te r i n v o l v i n g t h e woman a n d h e r doc to r a n d t h a t o u r laws shou ld n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h a t decision; however , h e also be l ieved t h a t a b o r t i o n po l i cy shou ld b e l e f t to t h e s ta te gove rnmen ts . B y 1976 t h e p res iden t ia l cand ida tes a n d b o t h po l i t i ca l p a r t i e s h a d reac ted t o t h e 1973 Hoe decis ion. T h e Democrat ic P a r t y p l a t f o r m o f 1976 opposed e f f o r t s t o o v e r t u r n t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s r u l i n g w i t h a n amendment t o t h e Cons t i t u t i on , but t h e Repub l ican P a r t y p l a t f o r m adop ted a s ta tement f a v o r i n g a cons t i - t u t i ona l amendment " t o res to re p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e right t o l i f e for u n b o r n c h i l d r e n . " I ncumben t P res iden t Gera ld Fo rd , a Repub l ican , was uncomfor tab le w i t h h i s p a r t y ' s pos i t i on o n abor t i on , a n d h e p r e f e r r e d a cons t i t u t i ona l amendment a l low ing each s ta te t o make i t s own a b o r t i o n po l i cy . Rona ld Reagan, who was F o r d ' s cha l l enger in the 1976 p res iden t ia l p r i m a r y e lec t ions , s tood f i r m l y b e h i n d a p r o - l i f e amendment t o t h e Cons t i t u t i on .
In con t ras t , Democrat Jimmy C a r t e r w a f f l e d o n t h i s i ssue. He began h i s 1976 p res iden t ia l campaign by t a k i n g a pos i t i on w h i c h h i n t e d some sympa thy f o r t h e p r o - l i f e v iewpo in t . B u t i n A u g u s t , C a r t e r met w i t h a g r o u p o f Catho l i c B i shops a n d fa i led t o conv ince them o f t h e s i n c e r i t y o f h i s pos i t ion . C a r t e r was c r i t i c i z e d f u r t h e r in 1977 when, as P res iden t , h e a g r e e d t o funding r e s t r i c t i o n s for abor - t i ons w h i c h d i sc r im ina ted aga ins t t h e poor, a n d added h i s now famous de fense o f t h a t ac t ion : "Well, as y o u know, t h e r e a r e many t h i n g s in l i f e t h a t a r e n o t f a i r , t h a t wea l thy people can a f f o r d a n d poor peop le can ' t " ( T u c k e r , 1977, p. 64). T h u s , Jimmy C a r t e r remained pe rson - a l l y opposed t o a b o r t i o n but s u p p o r t i v e o f t h e Roe decis ion; h e did no t f a v o r a p r o - l i f e amendment t o t h e Cons t i t u t i on , but a p p r o v e d l im i t i ng p u b l i c funding f o r abor t ions .
B y 1980 a b o r t i o n h a d become a n in tense ly p a r t i s a n issue, a deve l - opment w h i c h has compounded t h e p rob lem o f consensus -bu i l d ing o n t h i s issue. I f a n y t h i n g , Ronald Reagan s t r e n g t h e n e d h i s pos i t i on among p r o - l i f e v o t e r s by r e f e r r i n g t o Roe as "an abuse o f power as b a d as t h e t ransg ress ions o f Watergate a n d t h e b r i b e r y o n Cap i to l H i l l " (Weiss, 1980, p. 734). T h e Repub l ican P a r t y p l a t f o r m o f 1980 re f lec ted Reagan's an t i -abo r t i on v iews; it ca l led f o r a p ro - l i f e amend- men t , r e s t r i c t i o n s o n p u b l i c funding f o r abo r t i ons , a n d t h e sc reen ing
T a t a l o v i c h and Oaynes/Moral Con t rove rs ies 219
o f p rospec t i ve federa l j u d g e s acco rd ing t o t h e i r v i e w s o n abor t i on . T h e Democra t ic P a r t y p la t fo rm, less ambiguous t h a n Jimmy C a r t e r ' s s ta tements o n abor t i on , was as f i r m l y in f a v o r o f Roe v . Wade as t h e Repub l ican p l a t f o r m was aga ins t i t . T h r o u g h o u t t h e 1970s. t he re fo re , t h e e x e c u t i v e was unab le t o rede f ine t h e te rms o f t h e a b o r t i o n debate so t h a t a po l i t i ca l reso lu t i on t o t h e c o n t r o v e r s y c o u l d b e found . Ra the r , t h e po l i t i ca l p a r t i e s t o o k d iamet r ica l l y oppos ing s tands o n abor t i on , a n d t h i s c i rcumstance cons t ra ined t h e b e h a v i o r o f t h e i r cand ida tes f o r Pres ident . Repub l icans u s e d t h e a b o r t i o n issue t o a t t r a c t Catho l i c vo te rs - -who no rma l l y s u p p o r t Democrats in p res iden - t i a l e lec t ions- -whereas Jimmy C a r t e r ' s i ncons is ten t v i e w s on a b o r t i o n re f l ec ted h i s c o n c e r n a b o u t los ing s u p p o r t f r o m po l i t i ca l conserva- t i ves , i n c l u d i n g Catho l i cs .
SUMMARY A N D IMPLICATIONS
To summarize t h i s case s t u d y o f a b o r t i o n po l i t i cs , t h e re la t i onsh ips be tween each po l i t i ca l va r iab le a n d Lowi 's f unc t i ona l a renas a r e o u t - l i ned below. One can see t h a t a b o r t i o n po l i cy can b e s t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a v a r i a n t o f r e g u l a t o r y po l i cymak ing .
V a r i a b l e A f f e c t i n g Importance o f A b o r t i o n P o l i c y V a r i a b l e
1. non-economic, moral s t r o n g
2. r o l e o f j u d i c i a r y s t rong
3. r o l e o f s i n g l e - i s s u e s t r o n g
4. r o l e o f i deo logy s t r o n g
va lues
as po l i cymaker
groups
5. r o l e o f Congress s t r o n g 6. r o l e o f Execu t i ve moderate
as po l i cymaker
L o w i ' s P o l i c y Arena
regu 1 a t o r y (va r i an t )
regu 1 a t o r y ( va r i an t )
r e g u l a t o r y ( v a r i a n t )
r e d i s t r i b u t i v e /
r e g u l a t o r y r e g u l a t o r y
regu 1 a t o r y ( v a r i a n t )
T h i s s t u d y o f t h e a b o r t i o n c o n t r o v e r s y sugges ts t h a t Lowi 's f unc - t i ona l app roach t o p u b l i c po l i cy ana lys i s needs t o b e mod i f ied t o accommodate t h e impor tan t ways in w h i c h "mora l " con t rove rs ies deve l - op. Fo r reasons o f t h e i r ( 1 ) ideological component, ( 2 ) t h e i nvo l ve - ment o f s ing le - issue g r o u p s , a n d ( 3 ) t h e ro le o f t h e j u d i c i a r y , we v iew these issues as a (soc ia l ) v a r i a n t o f r e g u l a t o r y po l i cy w h i c h dese rve special a t ten t i on . T h e i n t e n s i t y o f ideological w a r f a r e ex - p la ins w h y t h e debate o v e r mora l con t rove rs ies rages f o r l ong pe r iods o f t ime a n d w h y b road-based social movements o f t e n a r e r e q u i r e d t o p romote those k i n d s of social changes.
T h a t a n y gove rnmen ta l i n s t i t u t i o n , w h e t h e r t h e Supreme C o u r t or Congress , makes a dec is ion in s u c h po l i cy a reas does n o t bring t h e ma t te r t o a c lose necessa r i l y . Consensus -bu i l d ing i s more d i f f i c u l t w i t h mora l i ssues t h a n w i t h most po l i c ies a f f e c t i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n , r e g u - la t ion , o r e v e n r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . R e d i s t r i b u t i v e po l i c ies , s u c h as Social S e c u r i t y a n d t h e income t a x , can b e lessened in impact by becoming more " d i s t r i b u t i v e " in charac te r . B u t t h e r e i s n o o b v i o u s way t o mu te mora l con t rove rs ies because t h e an tagon is t s see these issues a s
220 Policy S t u d i e s Review 3 : 2 Feb. 1984
non-negot iable. T h u s , u l t ima te l y , mora l i ssues a t t h e na t iona l leve l o f gove rnmen t seem comparable t o t h e k i n d s o f vo la t i l e po l i t i ca l con- t rove rs ies w h i c h arouse "communi ty con f l i c t " a t t h e local leve l (Cole- man, 1 9 5 7 ) . In b o t h ins tances , d i spu tes o v e r social mores t e n d t o p e r s i s t u n t i l t h e y s imp ly fade in impor tance w i t h t h e passage o f t ime--when some d e fac to se t t lement o f t h e d i s p u t e in p u b l i c op in ion i s ach ieved- -or when a f i na l reso lu t i on i s p r o v i d e d t h r o u g h a cons t i - t u t i ona l amendment.
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
FOOTNOTES
Mar ian Huss Neef a r g u e s t h a t when Roe v . Wade was f i r s t p r o - mulgated, a b o r t i o n po l i cy c o u l d f i t in t h e r e g u l a t o r y a rena, but i t s s h i f t l a te r i n t o t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i v e ca tegory seems more appro - p r i a t e "as i n d i v i d u a l s a n d i n t e r e s t g r o u p s i nc reas ing l y seem t o v iew t h e p rob lem in 'pa r t i san a n d ideological ' terms.I l
T h e o t h e r cases were Griswold v . Connect icut , i n v a l i d a t i n g a s ta te law p r o h i b i t i n g t h e use o f con t racep t i ves by m a r r i e d cou- ples; Eisenstadt v . Ba i rd w h i c h n u l l i f i e d a s ta te law p r o h i b i t i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f con t racep t i ves t o u n m a r r i e d pe rsons ; a n d Doe v . Commonwealth's At torney w h i c h sus ta ined a s ta te sodomy law as app l i ed t o p r i v a t e consensual homosexual behav io r .
t i ea r ings b e f o r e t h e Subcommit tee o f t h e Commit tee o n t h e Jud i - c i a r y , U.S. Senate, 9 3 r d Congress , 2nd Session, o n S.J. Res. 119 a n d S.J. Res. 130, Pa r t I, p. 30.
See t h e fo l low ing : Planned Parenthood of Centra l Missouri v . Donfo r th , 428 US 52 ( 1 9 7 6 ) : Beal v . Doe, 432 US 438 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; Maher v . Roe, 432 US 464 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; Poelker v . Doe, 432 US 519 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; Colautt i v . F r a n k l i n , 439 US 379 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; Bel lot t i v . B a i r d , 443 US 622 11979) ; Harr is v . V i r g i n i a , 49 LW 3548 (1981) ; Syski v . V i rg in ia , 49 LW 3549 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; Brady v . Doe, 49 L\V 3473 (1981 ); Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, l nc . v . Bower,, 49 LW 3691 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; H.L . v . Matheson, 49 LW 4255 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; Horr is v . McRoe, 79-1268 ( s l i p o p i n i o n ) , dec ided June 30, 1980.
B y "social po l i cy " Dona ld L. Horowi tz means "po l i cy des igned t o a f fec t t h e s t r u c t u r e of social norms, social re la t i ons , o r social decis ion-making"; t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s v e r y c lose t o o u r v iew o f social r e g u l a t o r y po l i cy .
For a n ana lys i s o f how t h e c o u r t s w e r e u s e d t o p romote more v igo rous r e g u l a t o r y po l i cy by t h e O f f i ce o f C i v i l R i g h t s , see: Char les S. Bu l l ock I l l a n d James L. Regens, " T h e C o u r t s as a Source o f Regu la to ry Rev i ta l i za t ion : E x t e r n a l Agenda Se t t i ng a n d Equa l Educat ion Programs, " in Me1 D u b n i c k a n d A l a n R. G i te l - son, Eds., Symposium o n Regu la to ry Pol icy Ana lys i s , Policy Studies Review, 1981-82, pp. 565-572.
These s ta tes were : Miss iss ipp i , 1966; Colorado, 1967; Ca l i fo rn ia , 1967; N o r t h Caro l ina , 1967; Georg ia , 1968; M a r y l a n d , 1968; A rkansas , 1969; Delaware, 1969; Kansas, 1969; New Mexico, 1969; Oregon , 1969; Sou th Caro l ina , 1970; V i r g i n i a , 1970.
Tatalovich and Daynes/Moral Controversies 2 2 1
8. "Supreme C o u r t on Abor t i on , " America ( F e b r u a r y 3, 1977), p. 81. A ser ious c r i t i q u e o f t h e pro-choice pos i t ion i n terms o f t h e debate o v e r s lave ry can b e f o u n d in: William J. Voegel i , J r . , " A C r i t i q u e o f t h e Pro-choice Argument , " Review of Politics (Octo- b e r 1981). pp. 560-571.
9. " A b o r t i o n : A Fundamental R i g h t U n d e r A t t a c k , " Amer ican C i v i l L ibe r t i es Union pamphlet , n.d.
10. Nat ional A b o r t i o n R i g h t s Act ion League, l e t t e r by Karen hlulhau- ser , Execu t i ve D i rec to r , to p rospec t i ve c o n t r i b u t o r s o r members, n.d.
11. "Rel ig ious Freedom a n d t h e A b o r t i o n Con t rove rsy , " Rel ig ious Coal i t ion f o r A b o r t i o n R i g h t s pamphlet , 1978.
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