MONUMENTA IURIS CANONIC!

EDIDIT

INSTITUTUM JURI CANONICO MEDII AEVI PERQUIRENDO

(INSTITUTE OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAw)

SERIES C: SUBSIDIA

VOL. 1

SUB AUSPICIIS

S. CONGREGATIONIS DE SEMINARIIS ET STUDIORUM UNIVERSITATIBUS

E CJVJTATE VATICANA

1965

c::::.---MONUMENTA IURIS CANONIC! -

SERIES C: SUBSIDIA

VoL. 1

Proceedings of the

Second International Congress

of Medieval· Canon Law BOSTON COLLEGE, 12-16 AUGUST 1963

Edited by ~~)

STEPHAN KUTTNER and ~ JOSEPH RYAN

S. CONGREGATIO DE SEMINARIIS ET STUDIORUM UNIVERSITATIDUS

E CIVITATE VATICANA

THE USE OF THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' BY HOSTIENSIS

Bv J. A. WATT

It is scarcely necessary to urge the importance of the term plenitudo potesta­lis for the student of the papacy. As a formula relating to the expression of the primacy it has a history which began with Pope St. Leo I in 4461 and extends to its reception into the terminology of the dogma of papal primacy defined in 1870.8

The thirteenth century, the period with which I am concerned here, was the first period of which it can be said that there were few analyses of papal authority, whether by popes or theologians, by canonists or political publicists, which did not at some stage in the argument have recourse to it. The most cursory of glances into the ecclesiastical literature of the thirteenth century will reveal that the term had become a technical one and that its proper understanding is the key to the solution of many problems in the interpreta­tion of the theory and practice of papal monarchy.

The process by which this term became the received formula with which to denote the supreme papal jurisdictional power has not been studied in any systematic way. Riviere's pioneer article 'In partem sollicitudinis .•• Evolu­tion d'une formule pap ale '8 remains a good sighting shot, but it virtually ignored medieval jurisprudence. Those who have discussed the term per­ceptively in relation to legal material have generally done so somewhat in­cidentally to the primary examination of other questions, whether in the development of other aspects of papal primatial concepts and terminology, or in relation to papal power in temporal affairs, or in the formation of conciliar ideas or the medieval idea of sovereignty. Many such studies have said valu­able things about the evolution and meaning of the term, but they are not

1 'Vices nostras ita tuae credidimus charitatl, ut in partem sis vocatus sollicitudinis, non in plenitudinem potestatis.' Ep. 14, PL 54.671.

B • Approbante vero Lugdunensi concilio secundo Graeci profess! sunt: Sanctam Roma­nam Ecclesiam summum et plenum primatum et principatum super universam Ecclesiam catholicam obtinere, quem se ab ipso Domino in beato Petro Apostolorum principe sive vertice, culus Romanus Pontifex est successor, cum potestatis plenitudine recepisse vera­citer et humiliter recognoscit; et sicut prae ceteris tenetur fidel veritatem defendere, sic et, si quae de fide subortae fuerint quaestiones, suo debent iudiclo definlrl.' Const. dogm. 1 c. 4 (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion Symbolorum, No. 1834; cf. 466).

a Recherches des sciences religieuses 5 (1925) 210-31.

•

162 J. A. WATT

a substitute for a study of it in its own right.• If firm and agreed judgments are to be made about the development of canonist ideas about papal power whether generically, or specifically in relation to politics, there is perhaps some profit to be gained from submitting plenitudo potestatis to systematic semantic analysis.

The choice of Hostiensis for such an investigation has not been purely op­portunistic. His work offers unique scope for the scrutiny of the term. In general medieval esteem, he was the foremost thirteenth-century canonist. He wrote with an unrivalled knowledge and understanding of earlier canonist literature and was thus a truly representative product of the canonist tradi­tion. His views were presented with many signposts indicating their short and long term sources. But he was far from slavish in following authorities. There is an independence of mind about a commentator who can conclude a gloss with the remark that what he has just said was the view of Innocent IV 'cuius est hec tota glossa incerta, inutilis et confusa.' 5 Thus his writings offer the prospect of opinions which are both fair to the canonist tradition as a whole and are yet the product of an individual mind of high quality.

Then there is the very bulk of his work. 'If I wish to write briefly,' he said on one occasion, 'I find I write obscurely.' • Hostiensis wrote lengthily and repetitiously and though this often exposes the historian to tedium, it fre­quently spares him that ambiguity which the terseness of an Innocent IV could create even for Hostiensis himself. In the some 5,100 folio columns which comprise the early printed editions of his work, Hostiensis used the term in 71 contexts- 19 in the Summa, 51 in the Apparatus (or Lectura) on the Gregoriana and once in the Apparatus on the Extravagantes of Innocent IV.7 No other thirteenth-century canonist offers such scope for the investiga­tion of this term. My primary purpose here is to make available all the ma­terial for the study of the question. The medieval canonists have suffered

• The only studies since Rlvlere's, specifically on the term, known to me are: B. Jacqueline, 'Bemard et I' expression "plenitudo potestatls",' Bernard de Clairvaux (Paris 1952) 345-48;

Y. Congar, 'L'eccl!\siologle deS. Bemard,' Anal. Sacr. Ord. Cist. 9 (1953) 136-90, at 159-65 and 181-90; G. Ladner, 'The Concepts of "ecclesia" and "christlanitas" and their Relation to the Idea of Papal "plenitudo potestatis" from Gregory VII to Boniface VIII,' Sacerdozio e Regno da Gregorio VII a Bonifacio VIII (Mise. hlst. pont. 18; Rome 1954) 49-77; A. Hof, 'Plenitudo potestatis und Imltatio Imperii zur Zeit Innocenz' Ill,' ZKG 66 (1954) 39-71; W. Ullmann, 'Leo I and the Theme of Papal Primacy' JTS 11 (1960) 25-51 especially 40, 46; J. A. Cantinl, 'De autonomla judicis saecularis et de Romani pontificis plenltudine potestatis In tempmalibus secundum Innocentlum IV,' Salesianum 23 (1961) 407-80. Cf. also, E. Lewls, Medieval Political Ideas II (London 1954) 359-64.

5 Apparatus 1.38.3 11. 11. procuratore11. • '. • • dum breuls esse cuplo obscurus fio.' A pp. 5. 38. 3 s. v. longum esset. 7 Listed in Appendix B below.

. '

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 163

enough from partial presentations of their views based on a restricted selec­tion of texts.

There is a further reason giving significance to the evidence of Hostiensis • in relation to this term. He wrote at just the time when it attained a new

level of official solemnity. In the later 1260's, when Hostiensis was in the curia, Clement IV was discussing union with the Greeks, in negotiations which led to the Second Council of Lyons.8 The pope demanded of the Greeks their adherence to a Professio fidei containing a formulation of the concept of papal primacy and including the term plenitudo potestatis.9 This same creed was to be accepted by the General Council in 1274, and it might there­fore be considered that with this approval, the term plenitudo potestatis had become part of a formal definition of papal primacy.10 Thus in Hostiensis' time the formula was in process of completing a major stage in its evolution .

. This stage had begun with the inclusion by Gratian in the Decretum of the Leonine expression contrasting that fullness of power committed to the pope with the limited power of a bishop called 'in partem sollicitudinis. •u This contrast was made in two other canons reproduced by Gratian, one of Pseudo-Gregory IV, substantially modifying the Leonine sense,11 the other,

s For the narrative of these negotiations see D. J. Geanakoplos, Emperor Michatl Pa­laeologus and the West, 1258-82 (Harvard 1959) 200-04. For the Greek reaction to the term plenitudo potestatis, see D. M. Nicol, 'The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: the Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons, 1261-74,' Medieval Studies Presented to A. Gwynn, S. J. (Dublin 1961) 454-80 at 467 and 476-78.

9 See n. 2 above for the text of the first usage. It was used a second time: 'Ad hanc autem sic potestatis plenitudo consis tit, quod ecclesias ceteras ad sollicltudinls partem admittit; quarum multas et patriarchales praeclpue diversis privllegiis eadem Romana Ecclesla honoravit, sua tamen observata praerogativa turn in generalibus conciliis, turn in aliquibus aliis semper salva.' Denzinger-Bannwart No. 466.

IO This appears to be the view accepted by Vatican I (seen. 2 above). The Creed Itself was not however promulgated with the Council's legislation.

U This is not to say that there had been no earlier stages in the history of the term. The fact that it had already made its appearance in several canonical collections Is the most obvious evidence that the history did not begin with Gratlan. But I feel justified In claim­Ing that a new stage had opened with the Decretum both because in the general sense this work was the major turning point in the evolution of canonical science and in the specific sense, because his personal usage of the term in a dictum marked a stage In Its reception Into ecclesiastical jurisprudence. It may be observed that whilst it is undoubtedly true that Gregory VII had a developed concept of papal sovereignty, he did not choose to express lt with the term plenitudo potestatis. (It does not figure in Caspar's edition of the Register.) On the other hand, Innocent Ill made very extensive use of the term (see Appendix A be­low). Clearly there had been a considerable expansion of the fortune of the term In the twelfth century. Whilst something of this Is due to St. Bernard, the main agent of the change had been the canonist tradition.

11 The Leonine text became C. 3 q. 6 c. 8. The Pseudo-Gregory reads: • Sed sl quid

164 J. A. WATT

Pseudo-Isidorian, phrased in similar fashion, and also using it to emphasize papal primacy as expressed in the supreme appellate jurisdiction and the reservation of all major issues.13 With the increasingly comprehensive and meticulous glossing of the Decretum, the fortune of the term thus employed three times in canons and once by Gratian in a dictum,14 expanded consider­ably. After an initial hesitancy by the earliest decretists in seeing the full value of the term,15 contrasting with St. Bernard's enthusiasm for it,16 by the time of Huguccio it had reached a high level of development. The anti­thesis plenitudo potestatis: pars solliciludinis had undergone significant mod­ification and was used to state the principle that bishops derived their power of jurisdiction from the pope: they were 'vocati ab eo in partem sollicitudinis. • But more. Plenitudo polestatis had become detached from the antithesis. It was being used especially in two contexts- that of the supreme legislative authority and that of the supreme appellate jurisdiction. In the former case, plenitudo potestatis was postulated in the language of Roman law, either directly quoted or in language reminiscent of it. For the lex animata had been substituted the canon vivus, with all canon law in pectore suo,17 whose

(quod abslt) graue lntolerandumque el oblectum fuerit, nostra erit expectanda censura, ut nlchll prius de eo, qui ad sinum sanctae Romanae eccleslae confugerlt eiusque lnplorat auxlllum, dccernatur, quam ab elusdcm eccleslae fuerit auctoritate prcccptum, que ulces auas Ita allls lnpertlult ecclesils, ut In partem sint uocatae solllcitudinis, non in plcnltudinem potcstatls.' (C. 2 q. 6 c. 1 1).

13 • Ipsa namque ecclcsia, que prima est, ita rellquis ecclesiis ulces suas credldit largiendas, ut In partcm slnt uocatae solllcitudlnls, non In plenitudinem potestatis. Unde omnium appellantlum apostollcam sedcm eplscoporum ludicia, et cuncta maiorum negotia cau­larum eldem sanctae sed! reseruata esse liquet •. (C. 2 q. 6 c. 12).

u Diet. pr. C. 9 q. 3: • Sicut tot! us eplscopatus eccleslae In potestate sunt eplscopl, sic et ecclcslae totlus archleplscopatus ad dlocesim pertinent archieplscopl. Vocantur enlm epls­copl a metropolltano in partem solllcitudinis, non In plenitudinem potestatis. Sic quippe ulces auaa els lnpertlt, ut potestatem suam sib! non adimat.'

11 Taking their lead from Gratian himself. I have examined the early decretist position as part of a monograph, 'The Theory of Papal Monarchy In the Thirteenth Century: the Contribution of the Canonlsts,' to appear In Traditio 20 (1964).

11 Cf. De tonsidualiont 2. 8.16 (PL 182.752); 3.4.14 (ibid. 766); Epp. 131, 132 (ibid. 286-7). 17 A1 one example among very many of this styling of papal monarchy on the imperial

modl'l, d. llugucclo D. 18 c. 7 s.v. regula: 'Toclus luris canonlci noticla sit In pectore domini pnpe et toclua lurla legalis notlcla sit in pectore imperatoris' (Cambridge Pembroke Coli. MS 72 fol. 127••) and Alanus, Apparatus Ius naturale (second recension) lot. tit.: 'Ius enlm omne habet vel habere preaumitur princeps vel papa In pectore suo, ut C. de testibus J. Omnium' (Cod. 6.23.19; see the relevance of this text to the term plenitudo pol~slalis made clear by Hostlensls, below Appendix B No. 11) (Paris, BN !\IS Lat. 15393 fol. 13 .. ). Thia principle Will the origin of the formula whose later development has been so well traced by F. Glllrnann. 'Romanus pontlfex Iura omnia In acrlnlo pectoris sui censetur ha­bere, • AKKR 106 (1926) 156-74.

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 165

will likewise had the force of law, who was, too, legibus solutus. In the second case, plenitudo potestatis was associated with a second term, now too in reg­ular canonist usage, papa est iudex ordinarius omnium. This formula concisely summarized the principle that the papal curia was, in Maitland's classic phrase, • the omnicompetent court of first instance for the whole of Christendom. •ta Not very distantly placed from these contexts, was the list of maiores causae reserved to the pope alone, of which decretists had begun to draw up lists.t• Here then, by the close of the first decretist period, was something very like a theory of sovereignty, coherently expressed in relation to the term plenitudo poleslatis.

It is therefore not surprising to find the papal chancery of the 1190's be­ginning to make more regular use of the term, particularly after 1198.10 Of more immediate concern for the canonists was its occurrence in each of the Quinque Compilaliones Anliquae. Innocent Ill made particular use of it. In part, Innocent's contribution to the development was to give official bles­sing to the decretist concepts, in particular the papal position supra ius and as iudex ordinarius omnium. But more significantly he deepened its theo­logical foundation by linking it firmly with another term also now coming into routine chancery usage for the first time and entering the ius novum: vicarius Christi. With Innocent Ill, the concept of pleniludo poleslalis as plenitudo ecclesiasticae iurisdictionis emerged fully fledged.

This concept was spelled out in full by Hostiensis. The gist of what the decretists and early decretalists had said on the subject was repeated, gener­ally in expanded form. Amid much that is merely derivative from these

18 'Wllllam of Drogheda and the Universal Ordinary' Roman Canon Law in the Churth of England (London 1898) 100-31 at 104.

111 E. g. Huguccio D. 17 c. 3 s.v. huic soli sedi conussa MS cit. fol. 126"'. There ls a fuller and more Interesting list In the glosses of Cambridge, Gonvllle and Calus Coli. lllS 676 C. 2 q. 6 c. 4. s.v. ad caput suf(ragium, beginning 'Papa vero omnibus fldellbus ordinarius ludex est' and proceeding to divide the list into two, one headed 'circa episcopalem excellenclam papa sol us .•• , ' and listing eight ltems, the other, 'In a Ills etlam sol us papa .•• • and listing fourteen Items. A new development of this literary form came when the early decretallsls compressed the list Into a mnemonic verse as, for example, Tancred ( 1) 2 Comp. 5.13.4 • ... X. 5.31.8 s.v. sicut unire: 'quedam sunt que soli romane scdl reseruandc, que sunt 11111 quattuor uersibus comprehend!. Restltult pnpa sol us deponit et Ipse I Dlulditsle unit exlmit atque probatl Articulos soluat synodumque faclt generalem I Transfert et mutat, appellat null us ab lllo.' (London BM IllS Roy. 11. C. VII fol. 109•.) For the extension of this venlrylng by Hostiensis, see n. 21 below, and for lts direct relevance to the term pltnitudo polr"lati•, Appendix B Nos. 9, 10.

Ill The use of the term by Innocent Ill Is particularly Interesting In lbelf and formed the basis on which llostlensls worked. A representative selection of Innocentlnn texts ls reproduced In Appendix A below.

166 J. A, WATT

earlier authorities, two points are perhaps worthy of further notice. The first is that the attention given to the maiores causae reserved to the pope had expanded considerably. Huguccio, for example, had listed a mere eleven such cases, without further comment. Hostiensis said that his list contained over sixty cases and the space he gave to examining them runs to over six printed columns.21 The other is the emphasis so characteristic of Hostiensis' whole exposition, as it was of Innocent Ill's and Innocent IV's, on vicarius Christi as the basis of the pleniludo potestatis. The following are characteristic statements:

Dicamus igitur cum domino Innocentio iii. quod quicquid facit papa deus facere creditur. , .22

Actus nempe et dispensationes summi pontificis ex causa facti non sunt hominis, sed dei. .. 2a

Consistorium dei et pape unum et idem est censendum ... 24

Non est presumendum quod vicarius dei aliter iudicet quam ipse deus esset iudicaturus .. ,25

Et breviter die excepto peccato quasi omnia de iure potest ut deus .•. 21

These statements were not made entirely without the qualification that the pope must avoid decreeing anything that was sinful or might lead to sin or subversion of the Faith,27 But their strength will perhaps explain Hostiensis' hyperbolic plenitudo potestatis plenissima.2B

Hostiensis' view of the plenitudo polestatis, however, is of more significance than as being merely an ample and rhetorical restatement of an already exist­ing position.29 It was he, it seems, who was the first to introduce a new clarifica­tion of the concept by introducing a distinction between two sorts of power exercised by the pope. There was his ordinary power, 'potestas ordinaria •

11 After repeating the verse given in n.19 above, Hostiensls commented: 'Ex quibus

11 casus possunt elici. Raymundus vero In summa de caslbus 24 notat: tu die quod 60 aunt et plures, quos his versibus comprehend!. • There follow twenty-eight lines of verse and a commentary thereon, from which Nos. 9, 10 of Appendix Bare taken (Summa 1.32.3 cols. 280.87).

11 App. 4.17.13 1.11. casualiter. The gloss continues, 'dumtamen evldenter non peccet

nee facial contra fidem ut legltur et notatur supra, de transla. eplsco. Inter corporalla (1.7.2) et de concesa. prebe. Proposult (3.8.4). •

13 App. 3.34.1 1.11. et deo. 2' App. 1.7.3. 11.11. 11icem. 16 App. 2.1.12 1.11, per alios, ll8 App. 1.7.3 1.11. vicem. 17 Cf. n. 22 above, also: 'Quero lgl tur quid llcet sed! apostollce? Rn. quid queslvl? lmmo

quid non llcet? Omnia enlm llcent dummodo non faclant contra fidem. , , et dummodo non otrendct deum per peccatum mortale.' App. 3.34.7. &.11. tria.

11 See text No. 5 In Appendix B. Jfl For the theological basis of the primacy, Hostlensls relied especially on the Decretum

(see Nos. 10, 20, 30 and especially 60). Ilia formulation of the principle of the vicariate of Christ (~o. 10) drew heavily on early decretallst glosses, In particular of Tancred.

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTA TIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 167

or 'ordinata' when by virtue of his plenitudo officii, he acted according to the law already established. There was also his absolute power, 'potestas abso­luta' when by virtue of his plenitudo potestatis, he passed over or transcended existing law.30 'Absolute' here derived from 'legibus solutus' = 'solutus a legibus' = 'absolutus ': a Roman law origin. st

Hence the term plenitudo potestatis was not only a term descriptive of papal supremacy. It had also a more specific reference- to that power which inheres in the sovereign alone to act outside the ordinary course of law on his own judgment of the necessity for such action. It was in this sense that the pope was supra omnia iura, and its most typical expression was in the dispensatory power.82 But there were other expressions of it, almost as characteristic.38 One in particular concerned the making good of defect, the suppletio defectus.84

Hostiensis' starting point here was a decretal of Innocent Ill (1.6.39), where, in confirming an episcopal election made when some of the electors were under sentence of minor excommunication, he stated that he made the confirmation, 'supplentes de plenitudine potestatis si quis in ea ex eo fuisset defectus.' This clause, noted Hostiensis, was often used by Innocent IV; in -circumstances where he wished to remedy electoral defect to avoid the delays of a new election, he ratified what had been done 'supplens (defec­tum) de plenitudine potestatis.' 85 Generalizing from this particular context, Hostiensis deduced that the plenitude of power 'omnia supplet' and that in any proceedings the pope might use his plenitude of power to make good any defect.86 Dispensation was a use of the absolute power to set aside exist­ing law; suppletio was an act of the absolute power to remedy defects that had arisen either through the non-observance of existing law or because existing law was inadequate to meet the particular circumstances. In both

so The distinction between plenitudo potestatis and plenitudo officii Is In No. 5; and between poleslas ordinala and absoluta In No. 55. The meaning of potestas absolula is made quite clear: 'circa tale matrimonium possumus statuere quicquid placet de potestate nostra absoluta, Id est, de plenitudine potestatls,' No. 52.

81 The sources invariably cited by Hostlensis In this connexion are Dig. 1.3.31 and Cod. 1.17.4, cf. e. g. his major gloss on 3.8.4 s.11. supra ius No. 48.

az J. Brys, De dispensalione in lure canonico praesertim apud decretistas et decrtialistas usque ad medium saeculum XIV (Drugcs 1925) remains a valuable general account of the evolution of canonist dispensation doctrine. This can now however be studied more partic­ularly and more closely to the texts in S. Kuttner, 'Pope Luclus Ill and the Dlgamoua Archbishop of Palcrmo,' Gwynn Studies (n. 8 supra) 409-53.

aa Cf. No. 46 where plenitudo potestatis Is typically associated with iudez ordinarius sin­gulorum, as with Innocent Ill, Appendix A No. 6.

M Cf. Nos. 3, 9, 11, 12, 26, 37. 85 Cf. Nos. 3, 26, 37. H Cf. No. 11.

168 J, A. WATT

cases the absolute power, the pleniludo polestalis, stands revealed as a discre­tionary power over the established legal order, a prerogative power to act for the common welfare outside that order, if, in the pope's judgment, cir­cumstances made this necessary.

As such it was in constant use in governmental practice, and most of the contexts in which Hostiensis used the term in his Apparatus are occasions when he was noting its practical use in this way. By its means curial business could be expedited, delays shortened, litigation curtailed. 'We in the curia, • said Hostiensis, 'embrace this power with all our hearts as a safeguard against pernicious and useless legal subtlety standing in the way of truth. '37 But at the same time, he considered that it was a power to be used with great caution, as a power in the Pauline phrase • unto edification and not for destruction, • a discretionary power to maintain the constitution of the Church, not to undermine it.38 There were certain things that the pope could not do even by the plenitude of power, and there were other things which should not be done by virtue of that power.

Thus it was unlawful to act against the Faith:

Non potest tamen contra universalem statum ecclesie dispensare ... quod intelligo in fidei subversionem.39

It was unfitting to depart from the ius commune too frequently or to do so sine causa.co The pope could do so, but he should not, for the exercise of the plenitudo poleslalis was to further the utilitas ecclesie et salus animarum and not the self-interest of individuals. The setting aside of the ius commune must therefore always be an exceptional act impelled by grave reasons. If the pope did so act sine causa or arbitrarily, he put his salvation in danger.u

17 Cf. Nos. 64, 65. 38 2 Cor. 13.10; cf. No. 65.

111 3.8.4 '·"· di:sptnsart was the locus of Hostiensis' best discussion of the comprehensive­

ness of the dispensing power, cf. No. 48: • Hoc solum tene quod In omnibus potest dlspensare dummodo non sit contra fidem, et dummodo per dlspensatlonem suam evidenter non nutrlatur mortale peccatum, nee lnducat subverslonem fidel; nee perlculum animarum. Nam In tallbus null am habet contra deum penltus potestatem. , • •

eo Cf. No. 25 (here repeating the view of Innocent IV); No. 32 ('non decet eum quod semper utatur plenltudine potestatls et ale potentle sue non congrult et hac congruentia seu decentia conslderata .• • '); No. 48; cf. also .A pp. 5.33.9 '·"· ctrla raliont: 'Nee etlam decet lpsum a lure communi recedere sine causa. •

41 In 3.34.7 Innocent Ill had declared that In considering the issue in question (commuta­tion of c:rusaullng vows) he had kept In mind, 'quid llceat secundum aequitatem, quid de­ceat aecundum honestatem, et quid expediat secundum utllltatem.' This was the locus chosen by Jlostlcnsis for what might be called his principle of dectntia or congruenlia (see n. 40 for the use of tbtse words and Kuttner, art. cit. 427 n. 77 for the early decretallst barkground) and formed Its starting point. After stating his view of quid liceat (see n. 27 above), J lostlcnsls went on to consider quid dtctal: 'Quero utrum lpsum hec omnia deceat 'P

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 169

There was no question however, if the pope did so act, of his being liable to human judgment. He should be warned of the error of his ways and even publicly admonished, but he could not be put on trial if he persisted in his line of conduct:

Etsi imperator et totus clerus et totus populus simul conveniant ipsum, non possunt [eum] iudicare.42

No doubt the College of Cardinals, of whose dignity Hostiensis was a strong defender,43 should act as a de facto check against papal error. But it did not de iure share in the plenitude of power. It was fitting that the Cardinals should be included in the expression of that power, but the pope was not bound to include them.44 'There are those,' said Hostiensis, • who say that the pope cannot make any precept without the advice and consent of his brothers. Others hold the contrary. But whatever is said, this I can confess without trouble: that in the pope alone resides the plenitude of power' (hoc de piano fateor quod in solo papa plenitudo residet potestatio;).'5

Respondeo, aut causa subest sufficiens qualiter a lure scripto dcbeat deviare aut non: sl subest talis causa omnia quecunque licent decent et quecunque decent licent .•• et sumitur bee causa ex uno de quattuor, scilicet ex qualitate negocii de quo agitur, aut persone, aut temporis ••• ' There follows a warning about the particular contexts In which care must be exercised to establish that sufficient cause exists for a departure from established law­dispensations, provisions, favors ( • gratie ') - and a reflection on the importance of keeping the spiritual, of all powers, free from venality and debasement. As to quid t:rpediat: 'Num­quld et omnia fieri expediunt? Respondeo si ordine ludiclarlo agatur, semper expedit lustieiam facere et nunquam lpsam pervertere .•• licet quandoque propter scandalum dif­feratur ... Utilitas tamen reipublice maxime ecclesle del et salutis animarum est utilitatl private In omnibus preferenda .•• Expedlt etiam quandoque rlgorem temperare salvls veritatls substantialibus, dilatationes amputare, et lites abbrevlare, potlsslme In electlonl­bus et similibus .•• papa tamen solus (the emphasis on the personal power Is noteworthy) circa hoc potens est super omnes .•• ' There is no word in all this of any check on papal power except his own conscience: 'sin autem aliquid committal vel omlttat quo deus offendatur aut penitebit aut in extremo iudiclo apparebit.' App. 3. 34.7 s.o. tria fol. 122""

u Cf. No. 48. &3 As noted especially by J. B. S!igmuller, Die TM.tigkeit und Stellung der Cardindle bis

Papst Bonifaz V Ill. (Freiburg 1896) 274-6 and B. Tlerney, Foundations o( the Conciliar Theory (Cambridge 1955).

I find his view put most concisely App. 1.5.4.v. ecclesie gmerali: • Et nota hie quod car­dinales communem lmpendunt sollicltudinem pro statu ecclesie generalis sicut et papa, quod die ut notatur In salutatlone prohemli s. v. servus.' See also, Nos. 61, 63.

« • Multo forti us ergo decet papam consilia fratrum suorum requlrere. •• ut non aolum papa sed et cardinales includerentur etiam In exprrssione plrnitudlnia polestatls' (A pp. 4.17.13 s.o. fratres nostri). It is a misreading of this passage to inte.rpret it as meaning that the plenitudo potestatis is legally entrusted to pope and cardinals togf.'ther. llostlensis wrote • decet' not • debet.' His view was that while the pope alone had been granted the plenitudo poteslatis, it should be exercised with the advice of his cardinals.

u Cf. No. 47.

170 J, A. WATT

Not the least important part of that established legal order of which the pope was absolutus was the separation of the spiritual from the temporal power. It is necessary, finally, to examine how Hostiensis envisaged the relevance to it of the papal plenitude of power.

Hostiensis has so generally been considered an extremist in the matter of papal power in temporal affairs that it should be said at once that if he believed, as many later publicists were to profess to believe, that the pleni­tude of power was both 'quoad spiritualia et quoad temporalia,' he did not say so. He did say, however, that the emperor held plenitudo potestatis in lemporalibus.46 But though he thus believed in a real distinction of the powers, the papal plenitudo did have reference to lemporalia as well as spiri­tualia.

His arguments justifying this reference were often exaggerated in tone and somewhat tortuous in their course. But, stripped of rhetoric, the essen­tial argument as to what it meant in practice, is reasonably straightforward.

Normally speaking, the temporalia were under the charge of the emperor, who held his principatus from God immediate, had supreme legislative authority, was 'legibus solutus and even was vicarius Dei in temporalibus. In short, his was a plenitude of power in relation to the temporal order, and in the ordinary working of that order, papal authority had no part.'7

When the ordinary working failed, however, papal authority did have a role to play. The failure might be because of the sinfulness of the ruler, in which case he might be judged, by virtue of the papal plenitude of power given to him indistincte over all Christians.'s Or the failure might be through the negligence of rulers, or by vacancy of rulership, or because of the uncertain state of the law. In these circumstances the plenitudo potestalis would operate if necessary to make good defects of justice:

ce Cf. Nos. 14, 56.

'7 Cf. A pp. 4.17.7 s.u. regem: 'dlco tamen quod papa non habet se intromittere de tempora­

llbus In alterlus preiudlclum, Infra, eodem Per venerabilem § rationibus, sed imperator indis­tincte se intromlttit, quia a deo hee sib! est immediate commissum, ut supra, in principio hulus glosse: persona tamen lmperatorls si excedat etiam in temporalibus corrigi potest tanquam inferior per papam tanquam per superlorem, ut notatur infra, Per venerabilem I ratlonlbus v. fl.' 4.17.13 s.u. casualiter: 'Sed et quamvis persona imperatoris subsit pape et temporalia per quamdam consequentiam, tamen imperator magis potest in temporalibus que a deo immediate tenet ut supra dictum est' (where he had said: • imperator preest omnibus temporallbus immediate, et a deo hoc constitutum est, ut probant concordantie lnducte supra, eodem, Causam que. 11. (4.17.7), tamen et in his subest pape In casibus, et persona sua Immediate deo et pape nihllomlnus'); 'et ideo dummodo caveat a peccato d~ !psis potest disponere prout placet.'

48 As Indicated In the texts of the preceding note; see also Nos. 59, 62. For the plenitudo potestalis over non-Christlans, see No. 54.

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 171

propter defectum iusticie ius reddimus, etiam in temporalibus.49

It was as if the plenitude of power provided a reserve of power for the whole constitution of Christian society, to be drawn on as required when, precisely for the lack of such, justice would otherwise go by default and the common welfare be endangered.6o

To claim, however, that the pope did have just such a discretionary power over Christian society as a whole was to move from the logic of dualism of the powers to the logic of a single society under a single sovereign head. The po­wers have been distinguished within the ambit of a single society of which, said Hostiensis, the head was the pope,

dominus spiritualium et temporalium, quia ipsius est orbis et plenitudo eius.61

There can be no doubt that to follow the fortune of the term plenitudo potestatis in the writings of Hostiensis and to record each one of the occasions of its usage, is to produce something like a treatise De romano pontijice, or at least, De iurisdictione summi pontijicis. For this term is the central piece in an analysis of papal sovereignty, ranging from its theological basis to its implementation in the practice of the papal curia. Hostiensis' seventy-one usages form a coherent whole, closely linked both to antecedent tradition, by an unusually thorough citation of sources, and to each other, by careful cross-reference. They present ensemble one of the most detailed studies of the primacy written by any single thirteenth-century writer.

What will be considered to have most significance about this analysis will no doubt be colored by the investigator's own particular interests. Recent studies in the papal jurisdictional theory of this century have been especially concerned with the question of the papal power in temporal affairs, or hiero­cracy as it is sometimes rather unspecifically called, and with the theoretical limits of papal power as being of significance in the development of constitu­tionalism. But it must be noticed that in the order of Hostiensis' thought, these are secondary issues. The primary issue is the concept of papal juris-

49 App. 4.17.13 s.u. cerlis causis. 60 This generalized position was argued particularly In relation to the decretal Lied

(2.2.10) where Hostiensis followed Innocent IV very closely. I have discussed this gloss briefly, 'The Development of the Theory of the Temporal Authority of the Papacy by the Thirteenth Century Canonists, • Historical Studies 2 (Papers read before the third Irish conference of historians, ed. M. Roberts, 1959) 16-28 at 22-23. One part of the gloss Is prin­

ted below, No. 42. lil Summa 4.17 § 10: 'ergo quo ad maioritatem unum caput est tantum, scilicet papa:

unum debet tantum esse caput nostrum, dominus spirltuallum et temporallum, quia ipslua est orbis et plenitudo eius, ut de dec. Tua nobis (3.30.26. Ps. 23.1), quia omnia commlsit Petro. , • ' On this exegesis of Ps. 23.1 cf. Innocent Ill, Appendix A No. 9.

172 J, A, WATT

dictional power in itself. It was only after the term pleniludo potestatis had become the received formula for the expression of papal sovereignty in prin­cipiis that Hostiensis considered the circumstances in which it could or should not he exercised, and how far it might he exercised in the temporal order.

That the concept of ecclesiastical sovereignty expressed by this particular term had been formulated before Hostiensis wrote, is clear from Innocent Ill's decretals and the early commentary thereon. Examination of the de­cretist background to early decretalist work makes it clear that no novelty of doctrinal essence was here involved. The decretals register a crystallization of terminology; sure mark of the maturity of the canonist understanding of the notion in question. The Professio fidei known to the Second Council of Lyons was but a more solemn acceptance of a position held generally much earlier, not least among canonists, expressed now with the help of a term which the canonists had made a technical one. In the form adopted at Lyons, pleniludo polestatis represented two things, both of which corresponded exactly to its canonistic history: the principle of jurisdictional primacy as such, in all its judicial, legislative, administrative and magisterial aspects, and more narrowly, the principle that prelates derived their jurisdiction from the pope.

There was, however, a third level of interpretation of the term: the plen­itude of power in its purest juristic form. This was the level at which the canonists were most deeply engaged, in that it concerned the practical ap­plications of supreme authority and considered its relationship to law al­ready in being and an ordo iuris already established. In short, a problem of developed legal theory, the concept of the power of the sovereign over law and the juridical order.

Progress was made with some simple distinctions about the nature of this power. The pope's jurisdiction was said to be exercised in a two-fold way. There was an exercise which had a recognized and regular place, established by existing law and translated into practice by existing procedures: his ordi­nary power. There was further his extraordinary power, inhering in him perso­nally and alone, by which- manifestation par excellence of sovereign authority -existing law and established procedures might be suspended, abrogated, clarified, supplemented. This was the prerogative power of the pope supra ius ; the plenitude of power seen in its most characteristic juristic form as the right to regulate the established legal machinery. Solutus a legibus, the absolute ruler might redispose any of the mechanisms of law. In the doing thereof, the plenitude of power was deployed in its most practical form.

Once the pleniludo olficii had been distinguished from the plenitudo poles­talis and the poles/as ordinaria from the poleslas absoluta (and with these distinctions I lostiensis seems to have made his most individual contribution

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 173

to the common stock of ·canonist ideas on papal power), it followed logically that the circumstances in which this power was used extra ordinarium cur­sum should be examined.

It was axiomatic that any power which had been given by Christ to His Church was for the purpose of fulfilling the end of the society which He had founded, not to thwart it. Therefore the prerogative power could only be exercised within these terms. Therefore 'absolutism' (solutus a legibus) was not licence for arbitrary government. If it was true that the will of the prince made the law, in the sense that there was no other authority which could make it; it was also true as a corollary that, where this will threatened the foundations of the society whose good the will existed to promote, it was no law. The Church was a society to save souls. Heresy and sin impeded salvation. Any act of the pope in quantum homo which was heretical or sinful in itself or might foster heresy or sin threatened the foundations of society and was therefore void.

These considerations make it clear that Hostiensis stood firmly with con­temporary jurisconsults of other laws and with theologians, in regarding society and the law as precedent to, and indeed creator of, sovereignty. He too required the 'prince ..• to operate within a framework of fundamental rules that corresponded to the basic presuppositions of the society which he governed.' 62 Indeed he read the principle in the Scriptures and considered it of general and natural validity for all rulers.

What if a pope chose to act outside the framework that the nature of so­ciety imposed on him?

As to a pope suspected of heresy, Hostiensis had little to say. lie repeated an established, even platitudinous, view in saying that he might be judged, but was not very specific as to how this was to be done, unless it were, • forte' by a general council. There was more to be said however about the pope and sin.

Hostiensis spoke of the personal freedom of individuals. Confronted with a doubt about the morality of a papal action, an individual was allowed to rest easy that the vicar of Christ, 'papa celestis,' was more likely to be in the right than anyone else. Nevertheless the individual conscience takes precedence over authority, and if it cannot be stilled, the pope must, as a duty, be disobeyed, and the consequences of disobedience suffered in Chris­tian patience. Similarly, as a duty enforced by divine precept, a suspect pope must be admonished, publicly if necessary. But there was nothing here of a theory of restricted monarchy. A pope whose personal morality

61 B. Tierney, • "The Prince Is not bound by the Laws": Accurslus and the Oril{lnl of the Modern State,' Comparative Studies in Societu and Historu 5 (1963) 3i8-400 al 387.

174 J. A. WATT

was suspect or whose official acts were sinful or conducive to sin was not, in Hostiensis's view, to be judged. In a case where after admonition he re­mained impenitent, Hostiensis saw no other appeal than to God and the Church triumphant. A pope's abuse of power was to be curbed only by his own conscience and his personal sense of the danger to his own salva­tion.

Loss of salvation is of course the ultimate sanction in the logic of Chris­tianity, and for Hostiensis, it was this consideration which must always dom­inate papal thinking about the exercise of the absolute power. The whole body of law and procedure had been established in the past to guarantee 'to each his own,' to maintain iustitia. Law and due legal process were the technical means by which the ordo ecclesiasticus was preserved from disrup­tion. The plenitudo potestatis, as the absolute power, was to be used to ensure that legal organization continued to· perform its function. If therefore that organization was defective in any way, the plenitudo potestatis was there to remove the obstacle that was impeding justice. When the pope was 'debi­tor iusticiae in omnibus,' the absolute power was a recognized way by which he fulfilled his function. Hostiensis was well aware of how curial action by virtue of the plenitudo potestatis could rectify the imperfections of the estab­lished order or thwart those who were manipulating it for private ends. But he thought that as a general rule the pope should be slow to depart from the common law and he also thought that he should take the fraternal advice of his appointed advisers before doing so. These counsels of prudence con­stituted that decentia which should hedge the action of absolute power. But these were not rules legally binding on him. A strong sense of legal fitness or sensitivity to that inner harmony which comprised the spirit of ecclesiastical jurisprudence made it desirable to respect existing law. But the pope was supra ius. Likewise it was fitting that the cardinals should be consulted so that it could be said that they were included in any expression of the plen­itude of power. But this was not a constitutional obligation. The pope was not under necessity of consulting them; there was no postulate that legislation promulgated without consultation was invalid. The Church was not ruled, at any rate de iure, by a constitutional monarchy, or an oligarchy of pope and cardinals.

Finally, it is necessary to summarize what Hostiensis had to say about the plenitude of power in connection with politics. First, a negative. He did not say that the pope held plenitudo potestatis in temporalibus. It was the emperor who held that position. But the temporalia did not constitute an independent, autonomous order. To Use the language of the Aristotelians (which llostiensis did not) the temporal order Was not self-sufficient or • perfect'. Its sovereignty could be assailed in a way that the sovereignty of the spiritual

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 175

order could not. Both might be fallible, but the pope was subject to God alone whereas the emperor might be subject to the pope.

The plenitudo potestatis in spiritualibus impinged on the temporal order in two main ways. In making these two points Hostiensis was revealing the very heart of his thinking about papal power in temporal affairs, though neither of them was very new in itself. Firstly, that power over all Christians, given 'indistincte' to the pope by the commission of the keys, meant that the person of an emperor or any ruler was justiciable before him for transgres­sions, even in the matters which were proper to the secular ruler. This was not a sanction operating only on the conscience of the individual, but had deposition as the logical consequence of prolonged impenitence. Secondly, by virtue of that same power, the pope had a general charge over the common welfare of Christendom, involving the power to act at the demand of !justice, 'cum requirimur.' More juristically expressed, this power was formulated as the prerogative power, the legal means by which the sovereign was enabled to act at the need of the status publicus seu utilitas communis, outside the established course of law. 'Plenitudo potestatis omnia supplet' - in the ecclesia conceived both as the ecclesiastical order and as Christendom. The line that separated the spiritual from the temporal was not drawn in such a way that such power in temporal affairs as was necessary to discharge the pope's responsibility for the general good of the ecclesia had been withheld from him. And it was for him alone to decide which matters did or did not require his intervention propter utilitatem communem. To his decision unquestioning obedience was demanded.

The University of Hull.

APPENDIX A

This selection of texts illustrating Innocent Ill's usage of the term plenitudo poteslatis has been limited to the strictly legal sources, as being those most Im­mediately relevant for canonists. But I have examined the Register, RNRI and the Sermones and have formed the conclusion that the texts given below are fully representative of the material as a whole.

(a) Usages retained in the Gregoriana

1. 1.6.39 (4 Comp. 1.3.5) Quia pro certo didicimus, electionem de ipso factam canonicam exstltlsse,

ipsam auctoritate apostolica duximus confirmandum, supplentes de pleni­tudine potestatis, si quis in ea ex eo fuisset defectus, quod quidam lnterfuerunt election! eiusdem, qui ex sola partlclpatione in simplicls excommunlcatlonls laqueum inciderunt.

176 J. A. WATT

2. 1.8.4 (3 Comp. 1.7.3) Sane solus Romanus Pontifex in missarum solenniis pallio semper utitur

et ubique, quoniam assumptus est in plenitudinem ecclesiasticae potestatis, quae per pallium significatur; alii autem eo nee semper, nee ubique, sed in ecclesia sua, in qua iurisdictionem ecclesiasticam acceperunt, certis debent uti diebus, quoniam vocati sunt in partem sollicitudinis, non in plenitudinem potestatis.

3. 3.8.4 (3 Comp. 3.8.1) Licet autem intentionis non sit, investituras de vacaturis factas contra

canonum instituta ratas habere, qui secundum plenitudinem potestatis de iure possumus supra ius dispensare: •..

4. 4.17.13 (3 Comp. 4.12.2) Is vero super eos sacerdos sive iudex exsistit, cui Dominus inquit in Petro:

'Quodcunque ligaveris super terram, erit ligatum et in crelis.' Eius vicarius, qui est saccrdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech, constitutus a Deo iudex vivorum et mortuorum. Tria quippe distinguit iudicia: primum inter sanguinem et sanguinem, per quod criminale intelligitur et civile; ultimum inter lepram et lepram, per quod ecclesiasticum et criminale notatur; medium inter causam et causam, quod ad utrumque refertur, tarn ecclesiasticum quam civile, in quibus cum aliquid fuerit difficile vel ambiguum, ad iudicium est sedis apostolicae recurrendum, cuius sententiam qui superbiens contempserit observare mori praecipitur, id est, per excommunicationis sententiam, velut mortuus, a communione fidelium separari. Paulus etiam, ut plenitudinem potestatis exponeret, ad Corinthios scribens ail: 'Nescitis, quoniam angel os iudicabitis, quanta magis secularia 'I' (1 Cor. 6.3).

5. 5.38.14 (4 Comp. 5.14.5) llunc quoque dierum numerum indulgentiarum literis praecipimus moderari,

quae pro quibuslibet casibus aliquoties conceduntur, cum Romanus Pontifex, qui plenitudinem obtinet potestatis, hoc in talibus moderamen consueverit observare.

(b) Usages in the Compilationes not reproduced in the Gregoriana

(i) Compilatio Ill (the decretals from which these extracts are taken were reproduced In the Gregoriana, but in each case the plenitudo potestatis reference was there omitted).

6. 1.6.4 - X. 1.6.19 Practerea cum sedes apostollca caput omnium ecclesiarum exsistat, et Ro­

manus Pontlfex ludex sit ordinarius singulorum, quando de ipsa quis assumitur In praclatum altcrius, el posse obiicl non videtur, propter capitis privilegium, quod obtlnct plcnltudinem potestatis, quod de alia ecclesia eligatur, cum a capite membra reputarl non dcbeant aliena.

7. 3.8.2 - X. 3.8.5 Quia dlversltatem corporum diversitas saepe sequitur animorum, ne ple­

nltudo ecclcslasticae lurisdlctlonls In plures dispensata vilesceret, sed in uno potlus collata vlgcret. apostolicae sedi Dominus in B. Petro universarum ec-

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 177

clesiarum et cunctorum Christi fidelium magisterium contulit et primatum, quae, retenta sibi plenitudine potestatis, ad implendum laudabilius officium pastorale, quod omnibus earn constituit debitricem, multos in partem solli­citudinis evocavit, sic suum dispensans onus et honorem in alios, ut nihil suo iuri subtraheret, nee iurisdictionem suam in aliquam minoraret.

8. 5.17.1 =X. 5.34.10 .•. sed ipsum cum literis tuis ad sedem duxisti apostolicam destinandam,

intclligens, quod ex concessa nobis plenitudine potestatis citra poenam canoni­cam dispensare possimus, et ultra earn rigorem severitatis augere.

(ii) Collectio Rainerii Pomposiani (PL 216)

9. 1.1, also RNRI No. 18 {ed. Kempf 48) Quia singuli proceres singulas habent prouincias, et singuli reges singula

regna; sed Petrus, sicut plenitudine, sic et latitudine preeminet uniuersis, quia uicarius est illius cuius est terra et plenitudo eius, orbis terrarum et uniuersi qui habitant in ea.

10. 3.1 Huius etiam primatum Veritas per se ipsam expressit, cum inquit ad

eum: 'Tu vocaberis Cephas' (Jo. 1. 42), quod etsi Petrus interpretatur, caput tamen exponitur; ut sicut caput inter caetera membra corporis, velut in quo viget plenitudo sensuum, obtinet principatum, sic Petrus inter apostolos, et successores ipsius inter universas ecclesiarum prelatos, prerogativa precelleret dignitatis; vocatis sic ceteris in partem sollicitudinis ut nihil ei de potestatis plenitudine deperiret ..•

Sane cum ipse postmodum, immo Dominus potius, qui se in eo pati asseruit, 'Venio,' dicens ad eum, 'Romam iterum crucifigi,' romanam ecclesiam suo sanguine consecrasset, primatum cathedre successori reliquit totam in eo trans­ferens plenitudinem potestatis. . . Et secundum banc acceptionem vocabuli ecclesia romana non est universalis ecclesia, sed pars universalis ecclesie, prima videlicet et precipua, veluti caput in corpore; quoniam in ea plcnitudo potestatis existit, ad ceteros autem pars aliqua plenitudinis derivatur.

11. 5.2. Ne si universis universa licerent, par videretur in singulis iurisdictio sin­

gulorum, et ex hoc Petri navicula sine rcmige fluctuaret, Dominus noster earn ad similitudincm humani corporis figuravit, ponens romanam ecclesiam caput eius, et ad suum et ipsius obsequium ceteras secundum varia ofCicia dlgnita­tum et pro membris adaptans, non ut omnia membra eumdcm actum haberent, sed dum permanerent in unius corporis unitate, sic ad implcndam legem Christl alter alterius onera supportaret ut capiti suo, in quo est plcnltudo scnsuum, suis vicibus deservirent, nee eius sibi officium alicuius prcsumptionls audacla usurparet. Huius autem Domini et magistri omnium magisterium sanctl patres diligentius attendentes maiores ecclesie causas, utpote cessiones episcoporum et sedium translationes, sine apostolice sedis licentia fieri vetuerunt, ut ea que sola obtinet plenitudinem potestatis de his disponeret nee liceret alicul de epis­copatu ad episcopatum sine ipsius auctoritate transire.

178 J, A. WATT

APPENDIX B

There are listed below the seventy-one contexts in which the term plenitudo potestatis was used by Hostiensis. If it has been used more than once in the same context I have regarded it as one usage. I print all the significant texts, omitting those where it seems that nothing in substance or terminology is being added. Many individual texts are relevant to a number of different topics and I have thought it better therefore to list them in the order in which the reader encounters them, rather than to try to categorize them under specific headings. The references in the footnotes above are intended to provide a general classi­fication of texts according to subject matter.

SUMMA

1. Lib. 1. tit. 5. para. 12 (ed. Cologne 1612 col. 83)

2. 1.6.8 (90)

3. 1.6.13 (103) .•. et aliquoties gratificat et supplet papa de plenitudine potestatis, si

quis defectus est: hac clausula saepe utitur dominus noster, quae comprobatur infra, eo. Ilia (1.6.39), infra, de usu pallii, Ad honorem (1.8.4), infra, de concess. preb. Proposuit (3.8.4).

4.. 1.6.29 (114)

5. 1.8.2 (135) Notabis tamen quod in papa pallium designat plenitudinem potestatis

plenissimam, infra eo. Ad honorem (1.8.4), et arg. supra tit. i. Quanto ad fin. · respon. i., supra, de elect. Ilia quotidiana (1.6.39), infra, de cone. preb. Pro­posuit (3.8.4) § fin. unde quod dicit supra, de elect. Nichil est (1.6.44) § caete­rum ibi, 'sui plenitudinem officii,' expone, id est, potestatis, vel die, quod qui habet plenitudinem potestatis, habet plenitudinem officii, sed non convertitur ; vel rnelius ideo dicit hoc, quia tunc potest dici papam uti plenitudine officii, quando secundum iura ius reddit, ut ibi: quando vero transcendit iura, tunc utitur plenitudine potestatis, de quo habes multa exempla, infra, de offic. leg. § quid pertinet ad officium, vers. quid ergo, et seq.

6. 1.17.9 (201)

7. Ibid. • • • quarnvis papa sine causa dispensare possit de plenitudine potestatis,

pro eo quod non habet superiorern in hoc m undo, nee est qui corrigat vel emendet, attamen cum homo sit, peccare potest, et a dorninorurn domino et pontifice omnium pontificurn, si sine pamitentia decesserit, punietur ...

8. 1.21. § Et an cum bigamo (228)

9. 1.32.3 (281) Supplctque scilicet defectum, si quis est, de plenitudine potestatis, et com­

probatur, supra, de elect. Ilia quotidiana instantia (1.6.39), nam secundum ipsa m potest de lure supra ius dispensare, ut infra, de con cess. preb. et eccles. vacan. Proposuit (3.8.4) § ult. Item supplet defectum regis, vacante regno,

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 179

supra, de elect. Cum inter universas, (1.6.18) in fi., et defectum imperatoris, vacante imperio, infra, de foro comp. Licet, § 1 (2.2.10).

10. Ibid. col. 286 Plenusque vicarius extat: quamvis enim quilibet episcopus dici possit

vicarius Iesu Christi, 33. q. 5. Mulierem (C. 33 q. 5 c. 17), et supra, de sacra unct. cap. unic. ( 1.15.1) §ad exhibendum, versic. caput inungitur, et § sequent. versic. ad quod etiam, est tamen particularis; sed papa est vicarius generalis, unde omnia gerit de omnibus prout placet, iudicat et disponit, 9. q. 3: Cuncta per mundum et cap. Per principalem (C. 9 q. 3 cc. 18, 21), 2. q. 6 Ideo 1 et 2 (C. 2 q. 6 cc. 10, 17}, et de hoc satis not. supra, de translat. episcopi § cuius auctoritate, versicul. patet ex praemissis et praeced. et sequentibus; plenus, id est, habens plenitudinem potestatis, ad quam vocatus est, alii vero in par­tern sollicitudinis, supra, de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4), 2.q.6 Decreto et cap. Qui se scit (C. 2 q. 6 cc. 11, 14): ideo breviter die, quod dummodo contra fidem non veniat, in omnibus et per omnia potest facere et dicere quicquid placet, auferendo etiam ius suum cui vult; quia nee aliquis audet ei dicere, cur ita facis? 19 distinct. In memoriam (D. 19 c. 3), de poen. distin. 3 § ex persona (De pen. D. 3, diet. Grat. p. c. 31) et omne ius tollere, et de iure supra ius dispensare, infra de cog. spirit. cap. 1 (4.11.1), infra, de conces. prebend. et eccles. non vacan. Proposuit (3.8.4), quia veri Dei vicem gerit in terris, supra de translat. episcopi, Inter corporalia (1. 7 .2) res pons. 1 et cap. Quanto (1. 7 .3) respons. 1, infra, ut bene. eccles. Ut nostrum (3.12.1) § 1 versicu. porro: licet autem hoc possit, caveat quod non peccet, super quo vide quod notavl supra, de fil. presbyt. § fin. versicu. penult.

11. 1.44.4 (373) ••. nam in papa fallit, cuius plenitudo omnia supplet, arg. C. de test.

Omnium (Cod. 6.23.19: .•. toto iure quod in nostris est scriniis constitutum)

12. 2.27.5 (677) Servandus est enim solitus ordo iudiciorum, ut patet supra, de rescri.

Causam quae (1.3.18), sic et mos ecclesiasticus, infra eodem, cap. 3 (2.27.3): nee est generalis status ecclesiae debitus et antiquus per alicuius insolentiam subvertendus, supra, de sup. ne. prela. cap. 2 (1.10.2) § volentis. Quandocun­que tamen sententiam latam spreto iudiciario ordine, dominus papa ratam habet de plenitudine potestatis sicut patet infra, de accus. Ad petitionem (5.1.32)

13. 2.28.2 (705)

14. 2.28.4 (705) , , , solutus est princeps legibus ff. de legi. Princeps (Dig. 1.3.31) etlam

in casu excepto a canonistis, appellationem ad ipsum (sell. imperatorem) factam poterit recipere de plenitudine potestatis, contra quam non intendimus dispu­tare: verumtamen, ut iura et ius suum servet cuilibet, decet ipsum, ut C. de Iegi. Digna vox (Cod. 1.17.4), ii. q. i. Pervenit (? C. 7 q.1 c.20), infra, de sta. m on. In singulis (3.35. 7) § porro.

15. Ibid. 6 (705)

18. 2.30.6 (747)

180 J, A, WATT

17. 3.33.12 (1007)

18. 3.33.16 (1009) . . . dicunt et verius et hoc omnino teneas, quod papa de plenitudine

potestatis in omni voto dispensare potest, quod ab initio voluntarium fuit: peccat si sine causa dispensat, nee ei obediendum est, si manifeste liqueat, quod sit contra dominorum domini voluntatem, alias ei obediendum est.

19. 5.38. 7 (1663)

APPARATUS (LECTURA)

20. 1.1.2 s.v. retinuerit (ed. Paris 1511) fol. 4va (t. I) Nam et papa vocando prelatos in partem sollicitudinis non abdicat a

se plenitudinem potestatis, ii.q.vi. Qui se scit. (C.2 q.6 c.12) iii.q.vi. Multum (C.3 q.6 c.8)

21. 1.3.10 s. v. nostra auctoritate, 10Vb

22. 1.4.4 s. V. pontificibus, 25ra

23. 1.5.4 s. v. de gratia, 3ora

24. 1.6.16 s. v. coegit invitum, 38V&

25. 1.6.20 s. v. ante susceptionem, 41va . . . de plenitudine potestatis ex qua potest omnia beneficia conferre,

et omnibus ecclesiis providere, infra, de concess. pre. Proposuit (3.8.4) § ult. et c. Quia diversitatem (3.8.5), § sic tamen, in fine ... unde nee debuerunt suspicari quod papa provideat de plenitudine potestatis, quia nee dec~t quod ea utitur nisi ex causa, secundum dominum nostrum (i. e. Innocentmm IV)

26. 1.6.22 s. v. electionis tempore, 43rb Unde et dominus noster, quando peccat quis in forma sepe ratificat, sup­

plens de plenitudine potestatis ...

27. 1.6.28 s. v. consentire, 48r&

28. 1.6.36 s. v. in primo, 54vb

29. 1.6.39 s. v. de pleniludine potestatis, 55vb de qua infra, de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4)

30. 1.8.4 s. V. assumptus est in plenitudinem ecclesiastice potestatis, 77va Et nota quod papa dicitur assumptus quoniam ex quo in ipsum convene­

runt due partes cardinalium, nulla alia confirmatione eget, ut supra, de elec. Llcet (1.6.6.). Sed statim habet plenitudinem potestatis, ut sequitur. plenitu­dinem. tantam quod quantumcumque peccet (dummodo a fide non exorbitet) citra deum, a nemine iudicatur, xi. di. Si papa (D. 40 c.6), ix.q.iii. Aliorum (C. 9 q. 3 c. 14), et potest dicere et facere quicquid placet: licet in peccato commit­tendo, si de ipso llquet, non teneatur aliquis ei obedire. quod die et nota, infra, de tempo, or. Ad aures (1.11.5) § I. et infra, de conces. pre. Proposuit (3.8.4) et supra, de elec. Ilia (1.6.39). potestatis. sic ii.q.vi. Decreto, et supra, de elec. Significasti (1.6.4), et infra, de penit. Cum ex eo (5.38.14) in fine, et ex hac fiunt multe solutiones ad hominem: sed quo ad deum pertinet, ipse novit, infra,

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 181

de iudi., Novit (2.1.13). Et nota quod palleum in papa significat plenitudinem potestatis, ut hie: in aliis, plenitudinem officii.

31. 1.11.3 s. u. Romano pontifici, 99vb

32. 1.21.2 s. u. dispensare non licet, 112vab Potest ergo dispensare cum bigamo ... nee ipsum astringunt ilia con­

cilia ... nee aliqua constitutio seu regula apostolica cum non habet imperium par in parem .•. et dummodo contra fidem non veniat, contra quam non est talis dispensatio, potest dicere et facere quicquid placet, et de iure supra ius dispensare, ut legitur et notatur infra, de concess. pre. Proposuit (3.8.41) § licet et supra, de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4). Licet autem hoc posset facere, non decet eum quod semper utatur plenitudine potestatis, et sic potentie sue non congruit, et hac congruentia seu decentia considerata, dicimus quod non potest fieri, infra, de sta. mo. Cum ad monasterium, in fi. et xxxii. q.v. Si Paulus (C. 32 q. 5 c. 11) et l. dist. Miror (D. 50 c.5), nee hoc facere consuevit, excepto eo quod fertur de quodam panormitano archiepiscopo, cum quo Luciu& papa dicitur dispensasse, et quod Iegitur xxxiiii. di. Lector (D. 34 c.18), quamvis Nicolaus Furiosus non sine furore scripserit quod non possit bigamus plusquam asinus ordinari; et hie teneas remota prolixa glossa que hie antiquitus est signata: quam si times amittere, invenies earn in summa eo. tit. § fi. et infra, de concess. pre. Proposuit (3.8.4) plenius prosecuta.

33. 1.29.15 s.u. ordinet, 125ra

34. 1.29.21 s. u. teneatur, 126va

35. 1.35.4 s. u. illicite pactionis, 163Vb

36. ibid., s. u. autentica, fo. cit.

37. 1.36.1 s. u. minus firmitatis, 165ra quasi dicat, si forsan ibi posset notari in aliquo defectu facti vel iuris, nos

supplemus totum ex certa scientia de plenitudine potestatis, super quo vide quod notavi supra, de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4).

38. 1.38.2 s. u. infirmitate detentus, 169vb

39. 1.38.4 s. u. plenam fidem, 171va

40. 1.38.8 s. u. condemnandum, 173ra

41. 2.1.12 s. u. per alios, 4ra (t. II)

42. 2.2.10 s. u. uacante, 11ra hoc est propter defectum imperatoris in cuius lure tamen papa succedit.

Unde etsi alius rector alii superiori quam imperatorl subditus mortuus esset, vel nimis negligens reperiretur in reddenda iustitia, tunc non devolveretur iurisdictio ad papam, sed ad proximum superiorem. Si queras rationem diver­sitatis, bee est quia, sicut alias in consimili casu Iegitur, non est tanta communio inter papam et inferiores quanta inter eundem et imperatorem, infra, de testa. Requisisti (2.26.15) § secus autem: nam specialis coniunctio est inter papam et imperatorem, quia papa ipsum examinat et approbat et inungit, et impera­tor ei iurat tanquam domino, et ab eo tenet imperlum, et elus est advocatus, ut colligitur supra de elec. Venerabilem (1.6.34) et, lxlil. di. Ego Lodovlcus,

182 J. A. WATT

et c. Tibi domino (D.63 cc.30, 33). Et inde est quod de iure imperii, quod ab ecclesia romana tenet imperator, succedit papa imperio vacante. Quid ergo si non vacat imperium, nee imperator negligens est in iustitia facienda, sed tamen non potest ipsam reddere propter rebellionem et potentiam subditorum? Respondeo, non succedit papa in iurisdictione ipsius, sed debet eum adiuvare ad domandum rebelles. ar. xcvi. dist. Cum ad verum (D. 96 c. 6). Quid si rex vel alius princeps qui superiorem non habet mortuus est, vel in reddenda iustitia negli­gens reperitur? Respondeo, tunc dicendum est idem, quod in iurisdictione succedit, ar. xv.q.vi. Alius (C. 15 q.6 c.3), supra, de elec. Cum inter universas (1.6.18) ad fi. Sed si principatus non tenetur ab eo, non facit hoc de iure communi, sed de plenitudine potestatis quam habet quia vicarius Iesu Christi, supra, ti. i. Novit (2.1.13) § i. versi. non enim, et sequenti. Vel die quod vacantibus regnis non habet se intromittere papa, nisi in modum denunciationis, ut infra, eo. c. Novit (2.1.13), secundum dominum nostrum, cuius est hec tota glosa. Tu vero dicas quod vacantibus regnis et principatibus quibuscunque et ubicunque iudex etiam secularis negligens est in iustitia exhibenda, papa non solum de plenitu­dine potestatis, sed etiam de iure et consuetudine potest et debet iustitiam facere, quia de iure communi hi casus omnibus episcopis in suis civitatibus et dyocesibus sunt communes, ut patet in sequenti glosa, ubi et dominus noster videtur contrarium notasse.

43. 2.27.18 s. v. dictus clericus vocem ad nos, 161vb

44. 2.28.52 s. v. quam verbo, 185vb

45. 2.28.56 s. v. decernerent, 190vb

46. 2.28.66 s. v. non tenere, 199ra • • • quandocunque appellatur a subdelegato, non appellatur ad subdele­

gantem, sed generaliter ad primum delegantem, ut ff. quis et a quo appel. I. 1 § 1, sol. 1 (Dig. 49.3.1): illam intellige secundum quam distinguitur, supra, de offl. delega. Super questionum § porro (1.29.27). Ab hac vero generalitate exclpitur papa ad quem appellari potest a quolibet ordinaria omisso rnedio, ut ii. q.vi. c.i. et ii. (C.2 q.6 cc.1,2), et per totum. Et hoc est propter plenitudinem potestatis quam habet, supra, de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4), et quia ordina­rius est singulorum, ix. q.iii. Cuncta et c. Per principalem (C. 9 q. 3 cc. 18, 21), et patet in eo quod not. supra, de offi. archipresby. Officium. ii. (1.24.3) § confesslones, et idem est a quocunque delegato vel subdelegato appellatur, secundum omnes, excepto uno casu tamen, quando scilicet appellatur a subdelegato delegati principls qui sibi retinuerat aliquid de iurisdictione, secundum id quod legitur et notatur supra, de offi. delega. Super questionum § porro (1.29.27); et sic hodie de facto servat curia. Nos autem salva plenitudine potestatls, qua conslderata nullum casu m excipimus, non putamus iuri congruere quod appellationem factam ab aliquo singulari delegato ordinariorum papa reclplat: sed remittat ut honor ipsis ordinariis iudicibus debitus deferatur, supra, eo. Ut debitus (2.28.59}, cum suis concordantiis, et quia natura iuris considerata semper a delegato debet ad delegantem et non ad alium appellari, ut Iegitur et notatur, C. qui pro sua iurisdi. iudi. dare ve. pos. 1. unica (Cod. 3.4.1). De hac materia notatur spaclosius in summa, eo. titu. § a quo ad quem, sub § ut autem.

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 183

47. 3.4.2 s.v. in synodo, gva Sunt enim cardinales pars corporis domini pape qui super omnes est nee

ab aliis iudicatur, ix.q.iii. Aliorum et c. seq. (C. 9 q.3 cc.14, 15), sed et cum eo orbem iudicant et disponunt; unde et satis equum est quod sicut sunt parti­cipes laboris, sic et aliquid sentiant privilegii singularis ••.

Inde est quod papa non consuevit, nee etiam potest secundum quosdam, aliquem de cardinalibus excommunicare vel ei aliquod preceptum facere, sine aliorum suorum fratrum consilio ex consensu . . . alii vero contrarium tenent. Quicquid tamen dicatur, hoc de piano fateor, quod in solo papa plenitudo residet potestatis, supra, de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4): contra scribere non in­tendo, ut patet in eo quod notavi, infra, de concess. preben. Proposuit (3.8.4).

48. 3.8.4 s. v. qui secundum plenitudinem potestatis, 34ra de hoc, supra, de usu pall. Ad honorem (1.8.4). supra ius. quasi dicat,

nullo iure astringimur, immo sumus positi supra omnia iura atque concilia, supra, de elec. Significasti (1.6.4) § penultima. Sed tamen perraro a lure com­muni volumus deviare. Hoc enim decet nos, licet non astringat, ff. de constl. prin. Princeps (Dig. 1.3.31), C. de leg. Digna vox (Cod. 1.17.4). Et ideo nee precise scribimus de facili contra ius alterius, ut supra, de rescrip. c.ii (1.3.2). Verum ex quo de voluntate nostra constat ei obediendum est, etsl postquam durum sit, xix.di. In memoriam (D.19 c.3), et c. Enim vero (D. 19 c.4), ix.q. iii. Cuncta per mundum et c. Per principalem (C. 9 q.3 cc.18, 21), ff. qui et a quibus man. liberi no. fi. Prospexit (Dig. 40.9.12). Et quamvis super hac materia multa notantur, tamen regulam tibi trado, quod sui ipsius tantam potestatem habet, quod etsi faciat et dicat quicquid placuerit, accusari non potest neque damnari ab homine: dummodo non sit hereticus, ut xl.di. Si papa. Po­test tamen et debet moneri in secreto, et etiam palam, si palam peccet mortaliter. Nam velit nolit, ipse subiaceret evangelice veritati quoad monitionem facien­dam: quia cuilibet dictum est ii.q.i. Si peccaverit. Sed quo ad hoc ut ibl dicitur 'die ecclesie ', non subiacet nisi in heresi. Dicas ergo hoc si sit lmpenitens • ecclesie, • id est, deo orando quod ipsum inspiret, et ecclesie triumphanti, ut oret pro ipso. Alias autem, etsi imperator et totus clerus et populus simul con­veniant ipsum, non poterint iudicare. Porro caveat sibi quia, etsi anima sua in manibus suis, tamen eidem pre ceteris si sic decesserit, iudicium terribilius imminet et intolerabilior cruciatus, ut patet ix.q.iii. Nemo iudicabit et c. Aliorum (C. 9 q. 3 cc.13,14) et sequentibus. In subditis autem tantam habet plenitudinem potestatis quod ex quo aliquid precepit, obediendum est, etlamsi dubium sit utrum mortale sit, dummodo conscientia vinci possit: sic lntellige xxiii. q. i. Quid culpatur (C. 23 q. 1 c.4), et notatur supra, de rescrip. Si quando (1.3.5). Sed si certum sit quod illud quod precipit est mortale, recognoscendum est papa celestis. xi. q. iii. Iulianus et c. Qui reslstit (C. 11 q. 3 cc. 94, 97), et multis aliis capitulis ibi positis: quia ecclesia triumphans nunquam falllt nee fallitur. Ideo si conscientia tua tibi dictet quod non obedias non recedas ab ea sed excommunicationem sustineas patienter, infra, de sen. ex. A nobis 11. et c. Inquisition! (5.39.28, 44); etiamsi erronea sit, nisi possls deponere errorem, infra, de symo. Per tuas ii. (5.39.40). Ubicunque ergo peccatum mortale lnsur­git ex lege divina, non debes obedire: ubi vero ex lege humana si~e canonica, semper obediendum est, ut supra, de consti. c. fi. (1.2.13): sic intelhge quod hie dicit, supra ius, scilicet, positivum, supra, de consue. c. fi. (1.4.11): quod potuit

184 J. A. WATT

quis instituere, potest destituere. xii. q.i. Certe (C. 12. q.t. c.18), et successor, supra, de elec. Innotuit (1.6.20) § multa, et patet in his que notantur supra, de preben. Extirpande (3.5.30) § i. De hoc tamen notatur plenius de tempori­bus ord. Ad aures (1.11.5) § 1. dispensare. etiam contra apostolum, sine lesione tamen fidei. xxxiiii. di. Lector (D.34 c.18), et canones apostolorum, lxxviii. di. Presbyter (D. 82 c. 5) et § seq. (diet. Grat.) et c. Si triginta (D. 73 c.5). Et contra vetus testamentum quo ad decimas, infra, de decimis, Ex parte (3.30.10). Et in voto, infra, de voto, c.i. (3.34.1). Et iuramento, xv. q.vi. c.ii. (C.15 q.6 c.2), supra, de rescrip. Constitutus (1.3.19). Non potest tamen contra universa­lcm statum ecclesie dispensare. xxiiii. q. i. Memor sum (C. 24 q. 1 c.10) et xxv. q.ii. Si ea destruerem (C.25 q.2 c.4). Quod intelligo in fidei subversionem. Alias enim non aufero, etsi velit mutare quadrata rotundis. Quid enim si vellet facere statutum quod omnes clerici de mundo contraherent, cum nee hoc prohibeat lex divina? Nee potest dispensare quod monachus habeat proprium, quod die ut notatur, infra, de sta. mo. Cum ad monasterium (3.35.6) § fi. Hoc solum tene quod in omnibus potest dispensare, dummodo non sit contra fidem, et dummodo per ·dispensationem suam evidenter non nutriatur mortale pecca­tum, nee inducat subversionem fidei nee periculum animarum. Nam in talibus nullam habet contra deum penitus potestatem: sic intellige. xxv. q.i. Sunt quidam (C.25 q.1 c.19), xv. dist. Sicut (D.15 c.2). Ergo contra legem canonicam potest dispensare indistincte, et contra divinam ubi sibi non est prohibitum dispensare, nee peccatum mortale est evidenter, et iunge quod notatur supra, de resti. spol. Litteras (2.13.13). Tamen si sine causa hoc faciat et si alios exoneret, in aliquibus tamen potest se onerare, et iunge quod notatur, infra, de voto, Magne (3.34.7), § 1.

49. 3.8.5 s. v. sed ad ilium, 35ra

60. 3.16.1 s. v. de iure, 55ra

61. 3.28.10 s. v. quod nisi probaverint, gora

52. 3.32.7 s. v. consummatum, 114vb-115ra Unde et circa matrimonium non consummatum potest ecclesia interpretari

et statuere quicquid placet, dumtamen iusta causa subsit, ut notatur infra, eo. Ex parte (3.32.14) § i vers. etiam si unus. Et hoc est quod evidenter voluit ostendere quando dixit 'sane quod dominus' etc., quasi dicat, nee obstat si oppo­nas quod quando aliquid interpretamur, vel statuimus per quod videatur solvi matrimonium coniugale, vi demur fa cere contra dominum qui dixit 'quos deus coniunxit' etc. (Matt. 19.6). Et per consequens videmur errare cum nihil pos­simus statuere contra deum, ut patet in eo quod notatur supra, de resti. spo. Litteras (2.13.13), § opinion!. Vere dico non obstat talis oppositio, quia ilia auctoritas intelligenda est de coniunctis, non tantum animo, sed etiam corpore. Ubi ergo deest coniunctio corporum, nihil facimus contra deum. Et ideo circa tale matrimonium possumus statuere quicquid placet de potestate nostra abso­luta, id est, de plenitudine potestatis; quod etiam verum est. Sed non ex­pedit quod In hoc casu nimis laxet habenas, nee etiam tutum est, ut patet in eo quod legitur et notatur infra, de spon. duo c. fi. (4.4.5), et supra, de transac. c. fi. (1.36.11), et infra, de frigl. c. fi. (4.15.7). Verum ex quo matrimonium consummatum est, hoc nequit fieri, quia cum per ipsam representetur confor-

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 185

mitas que consistit in carne inter Christum et ecclesiam, ut supra, de bigamis, Debitum (1.21.5). Hoc nullatenus rumpi potest.

53. 3.34.1 s. v. et Deo, 120vb

54. 3.34.8 s. v. pro defensione, 124va Credimus tamen, immo scimus quod papa est generalis vicarius Iesu Christi,

supra, de transl. epi. c. i. et ii (1.7.1,2), et immo potestatem habet non solum super christianos sed etiam super omnes infideles. Cum enim Christus plenariam receperit potestatem, unde ps.: 'Deus iudicium tuum regi da: et iusticiam tuam filio regis' (Ps. 71.2) et Math. ult.: 'Data est mihi omnis potestas et in celo et in terra' (Matt. 28.18); non videretur diligens sive sapiens paterfamilias nisi vicario suo quem in terra dimisit plenam super omnes potestatem dimisisset, ut et patet in eo quod notatur ex. d. n. de homici. Pro humani (Vl0 • 5.4.1). Ideo et dicitur de papa quod habet non sol urn potestatem sed etiam plenitudinem potestatis, supra, de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4), quia Petro et successoribus claves regni celorum dedit dicens, 'Quodcunque ligaveris etc.' (Matt. 16.19). Et iterum, 'Pasce oves meas etc.' (Joan. 21.17): oves autem non solum fideles, sed infideles per creationem, licet non sint de ovili, unde et sequitur quod papa super omnes habet potestatem et iurisdictionem de lure, licet non de facto: com­probatur hoc in eo quod legitur et notatur, supra, de elec. Significasti (1.6.4), supra, de malo. et obed. Solite (1.33.6), supra, de iudi. Novit (2.1.13).

55. 3.35.6 s. v. nee summus pontifex, 13Qrab

56. 3.49.2 s. v. generaliter compellantur, 171rb Ecclesie nempe et persone ecclesiastice imperialibus etiam legibus in

hiis astringi nequeunt, ut patet in eo quod legitur et notatur supra, de constitu. Que in ecclesiarum et cap. Ecclesia (1.2. 7,10) et de solu. cap. fi. (3.23.4) et de de­cimis, Tua (3.30.25) et infra eo. Non minus (3.49.4) et cap. Adversus (3.49.7); nee consuetudine contraria que in hac parte censenda est ecclesiis onerosa, et ideo remittenda, ut supra, de consuetu. cap. i. (1.4.1): quantum vero ad laycos potest princeps imperator sub his legibus condere et privilegia concedere, ut probant iura superius allegata: qui solus inter principes seculares solutus est Iegibus, ff. de legi. Princeps (Dig. 1.3.31), C. de leg. Digna vox (Cod. 1.17.4), et ipse solus mundi dominus dicitur, ff. ad I. ro. de lac. 1. de precario (Dig. 14.2.9), C. de quadri, prescrip. Bene a Zenone (Cod. 7.37.3). Ipse est enim unus et solus inter seculares principes per quem necesse est rei publice consuli, cui et datum est ius ut quodcunque constituerit, ratum sit, ff. de orig. iur. 1. ii § novissime, in fi. secunde, vel princi. tertie colu. (Dig. 14.2.9). Hanc lgitur plenl­tudinem potestatis in temporalibus non presumimus extendere ad aliquem prin­cipem secularem, quamvis et multi alii, non solum reges sed etlam inferlores, hanc sibi appropriant usurpando: sed errant, ut patet in eo quod legltur et notatur infra, qui fil. sint leg. Per venerabllem (4.17.13) § I. vers. fi. et Infra, de privileg. Sane (5.33.9).

57. 4.4.5 s. v. volumus, 14vb

58. 4.14.4 s. v. non separet, 27ra quia nee istud potest, supra, de malo. et obe. Cum inferior (1.33.16). Quid

est ergo quod inter christianos separatur coniunctl? Respondco, Jesus Chris­tus reliquit vicarium suum generale beatum Petrum et successores suos, supra,

186 J. A. WATT

de transl. epi. c.i. (1.7.1) et ex. d.n. de homici. Pro humani (VI0 • 5.4.1). Quibus reliquit plenitudinem potestatis, xxiiii. q.i. Quodcunque (C. 24 q.1 c.6), et ideo prohibitione facta per papam ipse videtur earn fecisse, et sic inter christianos non coniunguntur secundum deum (immo contra deum qui vult quod suo vica­rio pareatur): hi qui contra banc prohibitionem coniunguntur ideo sunt modis omnibus secundum deum semper separandi, nee facit hoc homo sed deus, id est, vicarius veri dei cui banc potestatem dedit, supra, de translat. epi. Inter corporalia (1. 7 .2) et c. Quanto (1. 7 .3).

59. 4.17.13 s. v. regionibus, 3sra Et hoc non solum quo ad spiritualia sed etiam quo ad temporalia: nam et

Iicet aliqui scripserint iurisdictiones adeo distinctas esse quod nihil ad nos de temporalibus, hoc tamen intelligi debet regulariter verum ubique terrarum inter christianos fideles unitatem ecclesie non scisma foventes, xxiiii q.i. Lo­quitur (C.24 q.1 c.18), et bonum obedientie ac plenitudinem potestatis nobis a deo commisse considcrantes.

60. Ibid. s. v. crucifigi, 33va scilicet, in te, ut sic urbs ista altera Hierusalem intelligatur, et effusione

tui sanguinis, qui primus meus vicarius es in terris, fundetur, firmetur et con­secretur hie locus quem elegi mihi, ut sic bee ecclesia sit caput et domina et princeps omnium ecclesiarum, non ab homine sed a me recipiens plenitudinem potestatis, xxii. di. Sacrosancta (D.22 c.2), et mater et magistra cunctorum fidelium, supra de summa trini. cap. ii. §penult. (1.1.2) et a xvii. dist. usque ad. xxiii. dist. per totum (from D.17 to D.23, all texts).

61. Ibid. s. v. fratres nostri, 3sva multo fortius ergo decet papam consilia fratrum suorum requirere ...

ut non solum papa sed et cardinales includerentur etiam in expressione pleni­tudinis potestatis.

62. Ibid. s. v. plenitudinem potestatis, 39ra hie satis patet ex vi locutionis, quod papa superest et preest omnibus;

quamvis videar solem facibus adiuvare, quia nulla adiectione indiget plenitudo, vl. q.l.c. Si omnia (C.6 q.l c.7), tamen silere nequeo, et banc maioritatem et potestatem et auctoritatem in omnibus et per omnia et super omnibus chris­tianis totius mundl indistincte sibi datam concedo, secundum ea quod plene notatur supra, de concess. preben. Proposuit (3.8.4). Habet enim papa ipse plenitudinem potestatis, ut hie, et supra, de electio. c. Ilia (1.6.39), supra, de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4). Et maior et superior est omnibus christianis, quod potest probarl multis rationibus nimis dilucidis et efficacibus.

63. Ibid. s. v. iudicabitis, 39rb scilicet tamen, papa et cardinales: participant ergo cardinales plenitudine

potestatis, ut legitur et notatur supra, eo. §, ver. sunt autem.

64.. 5.1.22 s. ll. ipsum providimus, svb

vere hie fuit providentia, non ius, secundum dominum nostrum: et per banc vlam provlslonls multa expediuntur In curia de plenitudine potestatis quam arnplexarnur totis affectibus, cum pernlciosa vel lnutilis subtilitas obviat ve­ritatl, ut hie et supra, de ludi. Dilectl (2.1.6): secus autem quando sine causa iura subvertit vel aufert ius alicul acquisiturn vel obstruit veritatem, ut patet in

THE TERM 'PLENITUDO POTESTATIS' IN HOSTIENSIS 187

eo quod notatur supra, de re iud. In causis (2.27.19), infra eo. Qualiter (5.1.24) § penulti. .

65. 5.1.24 s.v. et si tribus modis, 11rb In curia romana agitur de crimine duobus modis, sdlicet per modum iusti­

cie et per modum gratie: per modum iusticie, sex modis. . • Per modum gratie, multis modis. . . Quarto, si quid opponatur, totum deletur per modum pleni­tudinis potestatis, supra, de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4), supra, de elec. Ilia (1.6.39), quia dum quis nimis gloriatur et se supra exto1Jitur subditos gravando et opprimendo et iura et iusticiam passim et indifferenter pervertendo, labitur hec potestas in plenitudinem potestatis. Ad quam tamen si ex causa recursus habeatur et ea utatur quis serviendo deo et reipublice ac necessitatibus eccle­siarum, necnon oppressis et debilibus providendo, fulcimentum est veritatis et equitatis : que subtilitati perniciose sunt merito preferende, ut notatur supra, eo. Ad petitionem (5.1.22) § cum igitur v.i et rn. i., et supra, de voto, Magne (3.34.7) § i. Ad hoc etiam spectat quod legitur. ii Corinth. c. 'Nam etiam si am­plius aliquid gloriatus fuero de potestaten ostra quam dederit nobis dominus in edificationem et non in destructionem' (2 Cor. 13. 10).

66. 5.6.17 s. v. ligandi alque soluendi, 33ra

67. 5.31.11 s. v. absoluendum, 72rb

68. 5.:J7.9 s. v. non molesles, 96ra

69. 5.38.14 s. v. pleniludinem obtinet poteslatis, 102ra, 102rb-va alii vero vocati sunt in partem sollicitudinis, supra, de usu pal. Ad ho­

norem (1.8.4) .•. sed potest dici potestatis plenitudinem habitu tantum habent (scil. cardinales) in quantum scilicet romana censentur ecclesia que nunquam moritur, etiam si unus tantum cardinalis sit superstes. lxv. Si forte (D.65 c.9); et non usu, sicut supra, de baptismo, Maiores (3.42.3) § i. vers. fi. lurisdictionis vero potestatem habent in exercitio sicut est Sl!perius prelibatum, salvis forsan his que ratione excellentie dignitatis et eminentia ac prerogative summl pontificis sedi tantum apostolice reservantur, supra, de transl. epi. c. 1 (1. 7.1) et de of. leg. Quod trans­lationem (1.30.4), de quibus notatur supra, de exces. prel. Sicut unire (5.31.8). Finaliter te concedere oportet quod ad minus illam iurisdictionem habet col­legium quam et Iegatus apostolice sedis, que nee mortuo papa expirat ••.

70. 5.39.41 s. v. salulationis, 116ra

71. Extrav. Inn. I V, de appell. c. Cordi nobis ( = Vl0 .2.15.1), s. v. ut si nobis visum fuerit, 149vb