Catalan Nationalism

The death of Franco in 1975 signalled the transition of Catalan nationalismfrom a clandestine resistance movement to a movement demanding self-government for Catalonia. This book offers a fresh socio-political analysis of Catalan nationalism during the Francoist regime (1939–1975) and theSpanish transition to democracy.

Are the Catalans content with the outcome of the Spanish transition todemocracy? Is there a future for Catalan nationalism within the EU? Howdoes globalization impact upon the survival and development of nationswithout states such as Catalonia? Will increasing numbers of immigrantstransform regional identities? Has devolution fostered secessionism inCatalonia? These are some of the key questions discussed in this book.

Catalan Nationalism considers whether a nation without a state, such asCatalonia, is able to survive within larger political institutions such as Spainand the European Union. The author examines the different ‘images’ ofCatalonia presented by the main Catalan political parties. The book alsoprovides a study of the role of intellectuals in the construction of nation-alism and national identity in nations without states in the global era.

The key questions addressed in this book are highly relevant for the studyof devolution and its consequences, transitions to democracy and global-ization and national identity. Based on a successful combination of theory and innovative empirical research, the scope and depth of the book’s analysis will make it essential reading for students and academics in the fields of sociology, history, European studies and politics.

Montserrat Guibernau is a Reader in Politics at the Open University. Shehas previously taught at the universities of Cambridge, Warwick andBarcelona. Her publications include Nationalisms (1996), The Ethnicity Reader(1997) with John Rex, Nations Without States (1999), Governing EuropeanDiversity (2001), The Conditions of Diversity in Multinational Democracies (2003)with Alain Gagnon and François Rocher and, with John Hutchinson,Understanding Nationalism (2001) and History and National Destiny (2004).

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Routledge/Cañada Blanch Studies on Contemporary SpainSeries editors Paul Preston and Sebastian BalfourCañada Blanch Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies, London

1 Spain 1914–1918Between war and revolutionFrancisco J. Romero Salvadó

2 Spaniards in the HolocaustMauthausen, horror on the DanubeDavid Wingeate Pike

3 Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil WarThe brainwashing of Francisco FrancoHerbert R. Southworth

4 Red BarcelonaSocial protest and labour mobilisation in the twentieth centuryEdited by Angel Smith

5 British Women and the Spanish Civil WarAngela Jackson

6 Women and Spanish FascismThe women’s section of the Falange 1934–59Kathleen Richmond

7 Class, Culture and Conflict in BarcelonaChris Ealham

8 Anarchism and the Spanish Civil WarJulián Casanova

9 Catalan NationalismFrancoism, transition and democracyMontserrat Guibernau

10 British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil WarThe British Battalion in the International Brigade, 1936–1939Richard Baxell

11 The Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil WarHilari Raguer

Also published in association with the Cañada Blanch Centre:

Spain and the Great PowersEdited by Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston

Catalan NationalismFrancoism, transition anddemocracy

Montserrat Guibernau

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First published 2004by Routledge11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

Originally published in Catalan as Nacionalisme Català: franquisme,transició i democràcia by Pòrtic Editorial, Barcelona, 2002

© In this translation 2004 Montserrat Guibernau

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted orreproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, includingphotocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataA catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0–415–32240–5

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

ISBN 0-203-30025-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-33927-4 (Adobe eReader Format)(Print Edition)

To Joan Manel

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Contents

Acknowledgements ixList of abbreviations xi

Introduction 1

State, nation and nationalism 7Nations without states 9Objectives and structure 12

1 Nationalism and intellectuals in nations without states: the Catalan case 15

Intellectuals and nationalism 15Intellectuals and nationalism in nations without states 21Intellectuals and Catalan nationalism 24Summary 32

2 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism 34

The Falange 36The Army 38Social support 38The Catholic church 39National Catholicism as an ideology 42The creation of a surveillance state 45Against internal diversity 49

3 The re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Francoism 50

Confronting images 50The different stages of early Francoism 52The break with silence 55The great conspiracy 65Immigrants 67

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4 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain 70

The 1978 Constitution 72The 1979 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 76The main political parties of Catalan origin 79

5 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC 85

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) 85Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC)-Iniciativa

per Catalunya-Verds (ICV) 95Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC (PSC-PSOE)) 105

6 Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC 120

Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) 120Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC) 133The nationalist thought of Jordi Pujol 141

Conclusion 152

Globalization and national identity 152Survival and development of nations without states 158For a cosmopolitan Catalanism 161

Appendix: National position of the main political parties of Catalan origin 166

Notes 172Bibliography 188Index 196

viii Contents

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank those who have supported me while writing andthinking about this book. Salvador Giner, Àngel Castiñeira, Josep M. Vallès,Francesc X. Puig Rovira and Maria del Mar Serrano read parts of previousdrafts and offered their comments and criticism.

My gratitude also goes to a long list of people related to the differentpolitical parties and institutions considered in this book, including theGeneralitat (Autonomous Government) of Catalonia, CDC’s Institut deFormació, the Campalans Foundation, the Pi i Sunyer Foundation, the Centred’Estudis de Temes Contemporanis, the Nous Horitzons Foundation, the PSC(Socialist Party of Catalonia), CpC (Citizens for Change), ERC (Catalonia’sRepublican Left), ICV (Initiative for Catalonia-Greens), CDC (DemocraticConvergence of Catalonia) and UDC (Democratic Union of Catalonia).

A research grant from the One Europe or Several? programme of theEconomic & Social Research Council (ESRC) funded the research project‘Regional identity and European citizenship’, of which I was co-director, andpermitted me to enjoy a sabbatical period in which to write this book. Duringthat time, the European Institute of the London School of Economics invitedme as Visiting Fellow. Among my colleagues there I would like to thankAnthony D. Smith, Howard Machin, Paul Preston and Sebastian Balfour. Iwould also like to thank Helen Wallace, Director of the One Europe or Several?programme of the ESRC.

At the Open University, I have greatly appreciated Grahame Thompson’ssupport and advice. I also would like to thank Marilyn Denman and FranFord.

The translation of this book into English was financed by the OpenUniversity Department of Government and Politics Research Fund to whichI would like to express my gratitude. I would also like to thank DonnaGregory, Lorraine Ryan, Richard Pike and Sue Edwards for their work onthe preparation of the manuscript. At Routledge, I wish to thank JoeWhiting, Angie Doran and Amrit Bangard.

Finally, particular thanks are due to my parents, Antoni and Maria Dolors,for their constant encouragement, and to my nephew Joan Guibernau-Pujol,for the joy that he has brought us.

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Abbreviations

AP Alianza PopularBNG Bloque Nacionalista GalegoCC (a) Centristes de Catalunya

(b) Crist CatalunyaCDC Convergència Democràtica de CatalunyaCiU Convergència i UnióCNT Confederació Nacional de TreballadorsCpC Ciutadans pel CanviCrida, La Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i

la Nació CatalanaEDC Esquerra Democràtica de CatalunyaENE Entesa dels Nacionalistes d’EsquerraEPP European People’s PartyERC Esquerra Republicana de CatalunyaETA Euzkadi ta AzkatasunaEU European UnionEUiA Esquerra Unida i AlternativaFAI Federación Anarquista Ibérica FECEA Fundació Empresa, Catalunya, Europa i AméricaFET y de las Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva

JONS Nacional-SindicalistaFJCC Federació de Joves Cristians de CatalunyaFNC Front Nacional de CatalunyaFNEC Federació Nacional d’Estudiants de CatalunyaFOC Front Obrer de CatalunyaFRAP Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y PatrióticoFSC Federació Socialista de CatalunyaFUC Front Universitari de CatalunyaHOAC Hermandades Obreras de Acción CatólicaIC Iniciativa per CatalunyaICV Iniciativa per Catalunya-VerdsIU Izquierda UnidaJOC Joventut Obrera CatòlicaLOAPA Ley orgánica para la armonización del proceso autonómico

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MSC Moviment Socialista de CatalunyaNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNE Nacionalistes d’EsquerraNEI Nouvelles Équipes InternationalesNEU Nova Esquerra UniversitàriaOJE Organización de Juventudes EspañolasPAM Publicacions de l’Abadia de MontserratPCC Partit dels Comunistes de CatalunyaPCE Partido Comunista de EspañaPCI Communist Party of ItalyPCP Partit Català ProletariPI Partit per la IndependènciaPNV Partido Nacionalista VascoPOUM Partit Obrer d’Unificació MarxistaPP Partido PopularPRD Partido Reformista DemocráticoPSC Partit dels Socialistes de CatalunyaPSC (C) Partit Socialista de Catalunya (Congrès)PSC (R) Partit Socialista de Catalunya (Reagrupament)PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero EspañolPSUC-IC Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya-Iniciativa per

CatalunyaPSUC-ICV Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya-Iniciativa per

Catalunya-VerdsSDEUB Sindicat Democràtic d’Estudiants de la Universitat de

BarcelonaSEU Sindicato de Estudiantes UniversitarioUCD Unión del Centro DemocráticoUDC Unió Democràtica de CatalunyaUN United NationsUNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural

OrganizationUSC Unió Socialista de CatalunyaUSSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

xii Abbreviations

Introduction

Is there any future for Catalan nationalism? How does globalization influ-ence the survival and development of small nations without their ownsovereign state such as Catalonia? How will the growing numbers of immi-grants affect national identities? How will the political integration and theenlargement of the European Union impact upon a country like Catalonia?

These and other questions lead us to reflect on Catalan nationalism dur-ing the period which includes Francoism and the transition to democracy.Over this period, Catalonia as a country has been affected by a series of factorsthat have left an indelible mark on the evolution of its national identity.

The triumph of the insurrectionists in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)represented the almost complete annihilation of the autonomous Catalaninstitutions (although some continued in exile) and the proscription of thecountry’s language and culture. At state level, Francoism stopped the clockthat would have incorporated Spain’s destiny into that of the other Westerndemocracies. Francoism put an end to democracy and the party system, andinvolved the imposition of centralism, the establishment of Castilian cultureand language, the promotion of a conservative version of Catholicism andthe closing of the borders with Europe.

Different stages can be identified throughout the long years of Francoism;there is a stark contrast between the early situation of the Catalan nation-alist movement, almost disintegrated after the defeat of the legitimategovernment of the Second Republic (1939), and that of later years when thenationalist movement began to re-emerge.

The advent of democracy marked the transition from a clandestineCatalanism of resistance to a Catalanism that demanded greater autonomywithin the framework of the Constitution and the Catalan Statute of Auton-omy. During the transition to democracy we can establish a distinctionbetween different attitudes towards both Catalanism and Catalonia adoptedby the Spanish government. In general, without going into detail, and onsummarizing the aspects that are developed in the coming chapters, it ispossible to distinguish four historical moments.

1 After the death of Francisco Franco (1975) and the decision to proceedwith the democratic reform of the Spanish state (1976), the Spanish political

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forces considered that it was necessary to grant some kind of political recog-nition to the Catalan specificity defended by a powerful social movement of a democratic and nationalist nature involving resistance to Francoism,which had intensified at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s.This recognition, which would be expressed in the re-establishment of theGeneralitat (Autonomous Government) of Catalonia, the return of its presi-dent in exile, Josep Tarradellas (1977), and in the subsequent ratification ofthe new Statute of Autonomy (1979), would at least serve to legitimize thenew image of a democratic Spain that wished to join NATO and what wasthen called the European Economic Community.

2 Many Catalans were progressively disappointed by insufficient auton-omous funding and a slow and costly process of transferring powers from thecentral government to the autonomous institutions, accentuated as a resultof the attempted coup d’état in February 1981. During the 1980s and early1990s, the constant political demands of Catalan nationalism led some statepolitical forces to become alienated, and to fail to understand, the Catalanposition. On the other hand, the majority governments of the Unión del CentroDemocrático (UCD), and later of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE),left political Catalanism with little room for manoeuvre.1

3 The political, economic and social changes taking place in the new Spainwhich was beginning to embrace democracy modified the balance of forcesin Madrid. The period of governments with absolute majorities ended, andsuddenly, in this new political scenario, the votes of the Catalan nationalistcoalition Convergència i Unió (CiU) became ‘useful’ for the central govern-ments, first the PSOE (1993–1996) and later the Partido Popular (PP)(1996–2000). The CiU nationalists obtained certain ‘concessions’ in returnfor their contribution to the governability of Spain, and Catalan autonomybenefited from this. Meanwhile, an electoral dynamics established itself inCatalonia which, to date, has allowed the PSC (PSC-PSOE) to win in thegeneral elections, as well as the CiU coalition in the autonomous elections,a dynamics that has also maintained the PSC in Barcelona City Council andCiU in the Generalitat.

4 Since March 2000, the majority government of the PP no longer requiresthe support of CiU or of any other political party to govern, given the extentof its overwhelming victory which radically altered the balance of politicalforces at state level and also in Catalonia. It is this fourth historical momentwhich defines the present and prompts the need to reconsider Catalanism,for three main reasons:

a The absolute majority obtained by the PP, among other things, has undermined the bargaining power of the CiU government, which has lost its privileged position arising from its status as a ‘necessary’

2 Introduction

source of support for Spanish governments needing its votes to rule the country.

b The exhaustion of the different versions of a type of Catalanism mainlydesigned to oppose Francoism and elaborated by people who spent mostof their life during the dictatorship. This requires a generational changeto include people educated in the democratic period, new generationscapable of contributing to the development of a new Catalanism readyto respond to challenges and questions that did not exist just thirty years ago. For instance, after over twenty years of autonomy, what modelof self-determination and of Catalan society should be built; what conse-quences might the enlargement of the European Union (EU) have for Catalonia; what new possibilities will the Catalans have out of the progressive political integration of the EU; what kind of reactions and what consequences may arise out of an uncontrolled increase in thenumber of immigrants from outside Spain and often from outside theEU; how could the technological revolutions be confronted withoutlosing national identity; and, finally, how could democracy be ‘demo-cratized’ and new forms of civil participation be created with a capacityto engage the citizens?

c The transformation and consolidation of a new Spanish identity, unlikethat promoted by Francoism, and against which a large part of theCatalanism of the time, which still exists today, was created.

If all nationalisms construct their specificity starting from what differenti-ates them from others, and in general the term ‘others’ is not abstract butrefers to a very specific ‘other’ with which there is often a close relationship,then what happens when the ‘other’ changes? Quite simply, it is necessaryto reconsider one’s own ideas to avoid a useless and paralysing discourse,which does not respond to the challenges generated by the new situation.Over the last twenty years or so, Spanish identity has been transformed radi-cally, and the image of Spain perceived from outside is nothing like Franco’sSpain. However, in my opinion, Catalan nationalism has not reacted to this change.

Identities act as mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion, creatingimaginary limits between those who belong and those who do not belongto specific communities. Identities are often strengthened by referring to theexistence of a common enemy capable of bringing people together and rein-forcing a feeling of community among them. During the Francoist period,and also in some other periods of Catalonia’s history, Castile – or sometimesSpain used as a synonym of Castile – has been used as that external elementagainst which the Catalans have often fought. In other words, from a Castilianperspective, Spain was defined as an inflexible square within which it wasnot possible to fit triangular, conical or rhomboidal pieces which irremedi-ably collided with the limits, defined as immovable, of a state made to suitjust a few. If we were to concentrate on the Francoist period, it could be

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Introduction 3

argued that, for a long time, Spain was defined as a conservative, Catholic,centralist and traditional nation-state, with a rudimentary welfare system, alate industrialization and an attitude of mistrust and rejection towardsEurope. During this same period, Catalonia did not fit in with this imageof Spain dominated by a Castile whose ideal type was based on that ‘time-honoured Castilian gentleman’ that the regime’s ideologist José Pemartíndescribed in the initial years of Francoism.2 Catalonia, despite its traditionalsectors, defined itself as progressive, pro-democracy, pro-European, industri-alized, in favour of the decentralization of the state, and included importantsectors made up of left-wing Catholics and secular humanist groups.

But what is the situation after twenty years of political autonomy and afterthe accomplishment of the Spanish transition to democracy? At present thiswell-defined contrast between Spain (defined by Castile) and Catalonia, whichclearly delimited the symbolic borders between them while contributing tothe definition of both identities, has become more tenuous. The PSOE’svictory in the 1982 general election initiated a dramatic transformation ofthe traditional definition of Spanish identity inherited from Francoism. This process was completed after the PP’s landslide victory in 2000. But what principles define post-Franco Spain? Does Castile maintain itsprominence when it comes to defining the state, its culture and its language?

Spain is now an established democratic, modern, progressive (no lessprogressive than other European countries) nation-state, which is also decen-tralized, prosperous, industrialized and secular, enjoying a welfare systemthat is still weak (when compared with northern European countries), butwhich has been substantially improved over the last twenty years, anddisplays a clearly pro-European attitude. In spite of this, it could be arguedthat Spanish identity still includes some hindrances from the past, such asthe passion for centralism and the predominance of Castile; however, no-onecould deny that ‘Spain is not what it was’ and that it has managed to success-fully transform its image.

4 Introduction

Table I.1 Identities of Spain and Catalonia during the Francoist period

Spain (dominated and defined by Castile) Catalonia(nation-state) (nation without state)

Authoritarian (dictatorship) DemocraticCatholic Catholic/important secular sectorsCentralist Decentralization of the stateTraditional ProgressiveRudimentary welfare system Rudimentary welfare systemLate industrialization IndustrializedMistrust/rejection of Europe Pro-EuropeanPredominance of Castilian language Proscribed Catalan language and

and culture culture

But what has happened to Catalonia? Is Catalan identity affected by thisnew definition of Spain? As a result of the transformation of Spanish identity,Catalan identity is being forced to reconsider its relationship with Spain, andis above all compelled to review the argument that there is a radical contrastbetween Catalonia and Spain, now that the definition of Spain generated inthe Francoist period no longer matches the current situation, although, as Ihave just mentioned, some centralist and conservative Castilian attitudes stillpersist. This prompts the need to reconsider the Catalan nationalist discoursein order to adapt it to the present circumstances. It also requires an effort to base the specific nature of Catalonia on its culture, its language and, above all, on its citizens’ wish to decide their own political future as a nation. At present, both Catalan and Spanish identities stand for democracy, decentralization, the secular nature of the state, economic prosperity and acommitment to Europe. So, where are the differences? Should we concludethat the current idea of Spain fulfils the aspirations of Catalans, but also ofBasques, Galicians, Andalusians and the other peoples of Spain? Should thepresent political scenario be defined as a harmonious setting in which the con-stituent parts of the state consider themselves to be fully represented and identify with the definition of Spain?

If we compare the characteristics of the new Spanish identity with thecharacteristics I have attributed to Catalonia during the Francoist period, itis possible to argue that, in many respects, Catalonia and Spain are nowcloser, and theoretically this should favour the coexistence of the two. Notwithstanding this, the definition of twenty-first-century Spain shouldacknowledge that Catalonia is enclosed within the borders of Spain and thatthere is a power relation between the two which often involves a centralistand Castilian view of Spain, present in the main political parties that haveruled the country during its transition to democracy (UCD, PSOE and PP).Thus, regarding Catalonia, the Spanish central government has the capacityto decide on its optimal or advisable degree of autonomy, its adequate level

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Introduction 5

Table I.2 Spanish identity in 2002

Spain (nation-state)

DemocraticSecular stateDecentralizedModernWelfare system following EU modelIndustrializedPro-EuropeanThe predominance of Castilian language and

culture continues

of funding, the nature of the cultural and linguistic policies to be developedwithin the framework of the constitution, and the character and degree ofCatalonia’s role as a political player in the EU and other supranational insti-tutions. It is within this practical arena that the nature of Catalan identityand the relationship between Catalonia and Spain should be discussed.

The key point of this relationship between two identities that have becomecloser is to establish to what extent Catalonia is entitled to fulfil its desirefor self-determination. It is also a question of knowing what type of self-determination the citizens of Catalonia are aiming for and under whatconditions they are willing to develop multiple identities as Catalans,Spaniards and Europeans. In my view, it will be possible to harmonize thesethree levels of identity if two conditions are met. These are that people arenot compelled to choose among them, so that identification with one of thesegroups automatically excludes them from the possibility of identifying withthe other two, and that none of these identities are defined or perceived aslimiting acceptance of the other two. Indeed, multiple identities are onlypossible if they are not exclusive; that is, if they are defined in accordancewith democratic principles, which favour their compatibility. If one of theidentities, for instance the Castilian one, does not recognize the differencerepresented by Catalonia as a nation with its own language and culture, andinsists on not accepting the multinational character of Spain then it isunlikely, if not impossible, that Catalans will fully accept their Spanishcondition, as in that case, instead of perceiving being Spanish as an asset,they will only regard it as a limitation.

In my view, we are likely to witness a radicalization of Catalan nation-alism in the near future. Such a reaction will be closely connected withcurrent transformations affecting the nation-state. A phenomenon which isalready prompting Spain to radicalise its traditional centralist rhetoric basedon the pre-eminence of Castile, centralism and the linguistic and culturalhomogeneity of the State. A return to Francoism is completely impossible,among other reasons due to Spain’s new role as a member of NATO and, especially, of the EU. However, if the PP continues to accentuate itsconservative, pro-Castilian rhetoric, and restricts the construction of a newdemocratic and plural Spain, we are likely to witness a rise in pro-Catalanfeelings which may well result in the updating of a Catalan nationalistdiscourse originally intended to confront past situations.

At present, a revival of centralism and conservatism prevails within signifi-cant sectors of the central government, which tend to underestimate thecomplexity and strength of pro-Catalan sentiments. This could trigger therevival of a brand of Catalan nationalism originally designed to fightFrancoism. In my view, it is important to understand that the present cannotbe compared with previous political periods. The main difference betweenthe Francoist era and the current situation is that, while international publicopinion recognized to a certain extent the totalitarian character of Francoismand the legitimacy of Catalan demands, currently the Spanish state and its

6 Introduction

government in Madrid legitimately invoke their democratic credentials andrefer to the Autonomous Communities System as a model of how to respondto peripheral nationalisms. Within this new context it is easier to dismissany further Catalan demands and brand Catalan nationalism as a retrogrademovement threatening the unity and harmony of a democratic and decen-tralized state such as Spain. The partial media manipulation of someunfortunate linguistic conflicts (some real and others invented) betweenCatalan and non-Catalan speakers and of some shameful scenes with immi-grants provide further arguments to those seeking to disqualify any form ofCatalan nationalism. Catalonia runs the risk of constantly having to provethe democratic nature of its political demands and the legitimacy of itspeople’s will to develop and to promote its language and culture. The demo-cratic nature of the Spanish state is unquestionable; however, it should bestressed that democracy is a process in continuous evolution and not a sortof parapet against change. The new democratic Spain is not a monopoly inthe hands of a particular group, but rather the result of the plurality of allits peoples.

In order to concentrate on the analysis of Catalan nationalism as a socialmovement, I shall begin by offering a theoretical approach to the conceptsof ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘nationalism’. I will then introduce the concept of a‘nation without a state’ and discuss some of the reasons for its resurgenceover the last ten to fifteen years.

State, nation and nationalism

The nation has become one of the most contested concepts of our times.Many of the existing definitions of the nation focus on cultural, political,psychological, territorial, ethnic and sociological principles depending on the various scholars and politicians willing to define such a controversialterm. The lack of agreement on a single definition raises considerable difficulty when it comes to dealing with so complex a phenomenon. Thecrux of the matter is closely related to the link established between nationand state, and to the common practice of using the nation as a source ofpolitical legitimacy. The recognition of a community as a nation entailsspecific rights, because being a nation tends to imply a link to a particularterritory, sharing a common culture and history and demanding the rightto self-determination. Defining a specific community as a nation implies amore or less explicit acceptance of the legitimacy of the state that claims to represent it. However, if the nation does not possess its own state, then it involves an implicit recognition of the right of this nation to self-determination, which does not necessarily have to result in a demand forindependence.

The nation, however, cannot be considered in isolation. I argue that a clear-cut distinction needs to be drawn between three main concepts: ‘nation’,‘state’ and ‘nationalism’. By ‘state’, taking Max Weber’s definition, I refer

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Introduction 7

to ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legiti-mate use of physical force within a given territory’,3 although not all states havesuccessfully accomplished this, and some of them have not even aspired toaccomplish it. By ‘nation’, I refer to a human group conscious of forming acommunity, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcatedterritory, having a common past and a common project for the future andclaiming the right to rule itself. This definition attributes five dimensionsto the nation: psychological (consciousness of forming a group), cultural,territorial, political and historical. By ‘nationalism’, I mean the sentiment ofbelonging to a community whose members identify with a set of symbols,beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide upon their common polit-ical destiny.4 But still another term needs to be defined and distinguishedfrom the ones I have just mentioned – the nation-state. The nation-state isa modern institution, characterized by the formation of a kind of state whichhas the monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force withina demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subject to its rule bymeans of cultural homogenization.

Nation, state and nationalism form a triad defined by constant tensionbetween its three components. Hence, changes in the definition of one of the constituents have the capacity to influence and, to some extent, even alter the definitions of the other two. For instance, if belonging to a nationis defined in terms of common blood, the definition of the state and with itthat of citizenship, as an attribute conferred upon its members, will have toinclude blood as a sine qua non for membership. Consequently, any nation-alist movement emerging in these specific circumstances will focus uponcommon blood as a requisite for exclusion and inclusion in the nation thatthey want to defend and promote. In other cases where common ancestry isreplaced by territory or by the will to be a member of a particular nation asthe primary condition for membership of a particular state, the definition of the nation and the character of nationalism are altered accordingly.

This example refers to conditions for membership, that is, to elementswhich are considered to be indispensable to establishing a distinction betweenthose who belong and those who do not belong to the nation. But alterationsin the definitions of nation, state and nationalism are not restricted to condi-tions for belonging or criteria for membership.

The state’s self-definition as a unitary, a federal or even a multinationalpolitical institution holds significant consequences for the peoples livingwithin its boundaries. Once one of these self-definitions is adopted by aspecific state, it has the capacity to influence the definition of the nation.This is particularly evident in the case of being confronted with a state that declares itself to be multinational, thus assuming the coexistence ofmore than one nation within its territory. Such a position entails an auto-matic distinction between nation and state which challenges the commonlyaccepted coincidence between the two. A multinational state explicitlyacknowledges its internal diversity and, in so doing, it influences the diverse

8 Introduction

definitions of nationalism that may emerge within its territory. First, in thesecases, the nationalism instilled by the state will necessarily involve the accept-ance of the various nations included within its borders. This type ofnationalism tends to focus on shared constitutional rights and principles as elements able to hold together an otherwise diverse citizenry. Second, thenationalism emerging from some of the national minorities included withinthe state is strongly influenced by the state’s recognition of their status asnations. The minorities’ nationalism is bound to focus upon demands forgreater power and resources which will allow them to further the degree of self-government they enjoy – assuming that they are already entitled tosome political autonomy.

In a similar way, alterations in the definition of nationalism also have thepower to impact upon the definitions of both the state and the nation.Therefore, a nationalist discourse based upon the rejection, dehumanizationand portrayal of those who do not belong to the nation as ‘enemies’ and asa ‘threat’ will feed xenophobia and ethnic hatred. This type of nationalismis likely to foster a narrow definition of the nation based upon the exclusionof the different and the belief in the superiority of one’s own nation aboveall others. A state endorsing this sort of nationalism is likely to base itspolicy on the marginalization, or sometimes even the elimination, of ‘others’within its territory and/or the pursuit of a consistent assimilation policy.This type of state often engages in conflicts with other states as a result ofan aggressive economic and/or territorial expansionist policy.

So far I have offered some examples illustrating the close interrelationbetween the concepts of ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘nationalism’. A further consid-eration suggests that different definitions of the three elements of the triadcoexist simultaneously in different parts of the world, thus complicating even more their theoretical analysis and adding a further difficulty to theformulation of a general theory.

Nations without states

By ‘nations without states’ I refer to those territorial communities with theirown identity and a desire for self-determination included within the bound-aries of one or more states, with which, by and large, they do not identify.In nations without states, the feeling of identity is generally based on theirown common culture and history (which often goes back to a time prior tothe foundation of the nation-state), the attachment to a particular territoryand an explicit desire for self-determination. A nation without state is definedby the lack of its own state and by an impossibility to act as a political insti-tution on the international scene. A nation without state is based on theexistence of a community with a stable but dynamic core containing a setof factors which have generated the emergence of a specific identity. It shouldbe added, however, that nations are not unique, eternal or unalterable, andthat throughout history there are many examples both of the disintegration

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Introduction 9

of some nations that have played an important role during a certain periodand of the rise of new nations. There are also several examples of nations thathave had their own state in the past and which, for various reasons, havebecome stateless nations; this is the case of Catalonia and Scotland.

Self-determination, sometimes defined as political autonomy, does notalways involve outright independence although it often includes the rightto secession. Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country and Flandersrepresent only a few nations without states currently demanding the rightto self-determination, although with different nuances in each case. It couldbe argued that some of these nations do have some kind of state of their ownand could be considered as ‘quasi-states’, since a substantial number of powershave been devolved or are in the process of being devolved to their regionalparliaments. However, in all these cases, the powers transferred excludeforeign and economic policy, defence and constitutional matters. The ‘quasi-state’ that these communities enjoy is, as the term indicates, incomplete.This explains why it is still meaningful to refer to them as nations withoutstates.

The revitalization of nationalist movements in nations without states isclosely related to two interconnected factors: the intensification of global-ization processes and the transformations currently affecting the nation-state.

The prevailing forms of democratic nationalism emerging in a consider-able number of nations without states stand as a social movement defendingthe right of peoples to decide upon their own political destiny. The strengthof these movements and the character of their demands are not homogeneousand depend on each particular case. All these movements, however, seem toshare a will to promote their specific culture and language and a desire to feel represented by the political institutions deciding upon their future.The number of people involved in the movement measures the strength ofthis type of nationalism. Thus, a massive following is more difficult to ignoreif the state wants to maintain its credibility as a democratic institution.

The nationalism of nations without states tends to employ two main argu-ments to legitimize its discourse. First, a political argument stemming fromthe French Revolution (1789) and the War of American Independence(1776). This concerns the endorsement of democracy and popular sovereigntyas leading principles to legitimize the construction of the modern state. Inlate eighteenth-century France, sovereignty was taken away from the kingand the aristocracy and placed in the hands of the nation, which was under-stood to include the ‘whole people’, although, in the first instance, it wasassumed that the most educated and enlightened citizens would have to guidethe people and introduce them gradually to political life.

Second, a cultural argument, closely related to the principles endorsed byRomantic nationalism. This refers to the value of cultural and linguisticdiversity together with the relevance of the different identities which nowattain a new and unprecedented salience. The nationalism of nations withoutstates often encounters ignorance, incomprehension and neglect on the part

10 Introduction

of those ruling the state which includes them. Isaiah Berlin defines nation-alism as ‘the result of the wounds inflicted by someone or something, on thenatural feelings of a society, or of artificial barriers to its normal develop-ment’.5 In the nationalist discourses of nations without states currentlyseeking recognition, it is common to find a detailed description and a listof grievances against the state. As Berlin points out: ‘Nationalism springs,as often as not, from a wounded or outraged sense of human dignity, thedesire for recognition.’6 The struggle for recognition entails the desire to beregarded and treated as an equal – as someone who has a voice and is ableto participate in the political processes affecting his or her future. Recognitioninvolves many dimensions which sometimes overlap. There are moral, social,political and even economic consequences for a state which decides toacknowledge the existence of different nations within its territory. In theprocess of recognition, pride and moral feelings prevail over economic com-pensation. Berlin writes:

Recognition is demanded by individuals, by groups, by classes, bynations, by States, by vast conglomerations of mankind united by acommon feeling of grievance against those who (they rightly or wronglysuppose) have wounded or humiliated them, have denied them theminimum demanded by human dignity, have caused, or tried to causethem to fall in their own estimation in a manner that they cannottolerate. The nationalism of the last two hundred years is shot throughwith this feeling.7

The nationalism of nations without states seeks to halt a relationship withthe state which is often marked by: (1) political dependence (sometimes alsoinvolving economic dependence); (2) limited or frequently inexistent accessto powers and resources; (3) restricted or even absent financial powers; and(4) in many cases, a restrained capacity to develop and promote one’s ownculture and language.

Nations without states claim the right to be recognized as political actorsand have a say in different fora, entrance to which has been up to nowrestricted to nation-states. Some may argue that the recognition of nationswithout states adds a further complexity to current international structures;they may add that this might lead to increasing fragmentation and is opposedto the advancement of internationalism. I argue that such positions ignorethe right of peoples to preserve and develop their cultures and decide ontheir political future.

Contemporary democratic nationalist movements in nations without statesinvoke the right to self-determination, a principle advanced by WoodrowWilson after 1918. It involved, at first, ‘equating the popular principle ofsovereignty with the attack on the remaining dynastic empires in Europe,and later with anti-colonialism generally. Secondly, it involved abandoningthe constitutional mode of settling disputed claims in favour of political

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Introduction 11

settlements’. In Mayall’s view, the historical fate of the principle of nationalself-determination is doubly ironic: it has tended to legitimize the state andonly the state, and it has elevated and institutionalized the progressive viewof human affairs by attempting to freeze the political map in a way whichhas never been previously attempted.8 He points at two major challenges tothe internal order: irredentism as the main essentialist challenge, and seces-sion as the main rationalist challenge. Irredentism, in modern political usage,has come to mean any territorial claim generally based on historical and/orethnic arguments made by a sovereign state to lands within another. Secessionrefers to the creation of an independent state out of a territory previouslyincluded within another state from which it has now separated. The term isalso often employed to describe unsuccessful separatist rebellions against thestate, which may or may not involve the use of violence.

In my view, the recognition of nations without states as global politicalactors does not necessarily involve them becoming independent. My argu-ment is that, while some nations without states may secede, most of themare likely to achieve greater political autonomy within the political institu-tions which are currently being developed. For instance, there are strongchances that further European integration will favour a greater presence ofnations without states, such as Catalonia, Scotland, the Basque Country andFlanders.

Objectives and structure

This book offers a socio-political analysis of Catalan nationalism duringFrancoism and the transition to democracy. The book is centred around threemain issues: (1) whether nations without states such as Catalonia will be ableto survive and develop in the foreseeable future; (2) the study of the different‘images’ of Catalonia presented by the main Catalan political parties; and (3)the analysis of the new mechanisms for the construction of national identityemerging in the global era.

The book is divided into six chapters. While the first chapter and theconclusion include theoretical reflections on the main issues consideredthroughout the book, the central chapters are devoted to an empirical studyof the Catalan case. In so doing they offer an analytical approach to a veryspecific type of nationalism, that of Western European nations without states.

Chapter 1 offers a critical analysis of the theories of Elie Kedourie, TomNairn, John Breuilly and Anthony D. Smith concerning the role of intel-lectuals in the construction of nationalism. The relevance of their theoriesin dealing with the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism innations without states is questioned, and an alternative and original theo-retical framework is constructed. This chapter also includes a study of thedifferent rational and emotional arguments often employed by Catalan intel-lectuals when constructing and seeking legitimacy for their nationalistdiscourses.

12 Introduction

Chapter 2 examines Francoism and the type of conservative and centralistnationalism defined in national Catholicism. The idea of Spain promoted by Francoism is contrasted with the national demands advanced by otherpeoples of Spain, in particular Catalonia. The chapter goes on to considerthe consequences of the defeat of the Second Republic and the establishmentof the Franco regime in 1939 for Catalonia and Catalan nationalism.

Chapter 3 refers to the different stages of Francoism and studies the pro-cesses that culminated in the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism in the late1960s and early 1970s. At the same time, it offers a typology of the differentresistance actions carried out during this period. This includes a distinctionbetween ‘symbolic actions’, ‘interference actions’, ‘elite actions’ and ‘solidarityactions’, while focusing upon the various agents involved in each type ofaction as well as on their objectives and recipients.

Chapter 4 briefly analyses the process initiated by the transition to democ-racy. It studies the new idea of Spain and considers the nature of theAutonomous Communities System established by the 1978 Constitution. Itthen offers an in-depth analysis of the different sections of the 1979 Statuteof Autonomy, which defines Catalonia, its language, culture, institutions andsymbols, and of the possible relations with other Catalan-speaking territo-ries, and offers a definition of who is to be considered as a Catalan. Thechapter concludes with an overview of Catalan electoral behaviour in thevarious regional elections since 1980.

Chapter 5 initiates the study of the views of the main Catalan politicalparties by examining their positions regarding five specific issues – their defi-nitions of Catalan identity, nationalism, immigration, the relationshipbetween Catalonia and Spain and that between Catalonia and the EuropeanUnion – which exemplify their different versions of Catalanism. The polit-ical parties considered in this chapter are: ERC (Esquerra Republicana deCatalunya, or Catalonia’s Republican Left), PSUC-ICV (Partit SocialistaUnificat de Catalunya, or Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia, later integratedin Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds, or Initiative for Catalonia-Greens) and PSC(PSC-PSOE) (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya, or Socialist Party of Catalonia,which is federated with the PSOE).

Chapter 6 continues the analysis of the main political parties of Cataloniawith a study of CDC (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, or DemocraticConvergence of Catalonia) and UDC (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, orDemocratic Union of Catalonia). It also includes a section on the work of Jordi Pujol, president of the Generalitat during the transition to democ-racy. Chapters 5 and 6 have been completed by examining various internaland external party documents and publications. They also include referencesto books, articles, talks and declarations by their political leaders.

The Conclusion begins with a careful analysis of the mechanisms andstrategies employed in the creation and maintenance of national identity inthe globalization age. It then moves on to discuss the possibilities of survivalfor nations without states and concludes by proposing a set of measures which

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Introduction 13

should contribute to updating Catalan nationalism in order to face the newpolitical and socio-economic challenges it has to confront at the beginningof the twenty-first century.

The Appendix contains a comparison in table form of the positions of thevarious political parties studied.

14 Introduction

1 Nationalism and intellectualsin nations without statesThe Catalan case

The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for the studyof the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in Western nationswithout states. In particular, it focuses on the role of intellectuals in the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Franco’s dictatorship.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part analyses how the rela-tionship between intellectuals and nationalism is tackled in the work of ElieKedourie, Tom Nairn, John Breuilly and Anthony D. Smith. The secondpart considers the specific context within which intellectuals operate innations without states. It concentrates on the study of the role of Catalanintellectuals in protecting their vernacular language and culture duringFranco’s regime together with the processes which, in the 1960s and 1970s,turned Catalan nationalism from an elite into a mass movement. In this partI also discuss the reasons why many intellectuals felt attracted to nation-alism, and some of the rational and emotional arguments often employed asmobilizing agents within Catalan nationalism.

Intellectuals and nationalism

When considering the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism, Ishall be following Anthony D. Smith’s definition of intellectuals as thosewho create artistic works and produce ideas. In so doing, I shall distinguishthem from the ‘wider intelligentsia or professionals who transmit and dissem-inate those ideas and creations and from a still wider educated public that“consumes” ideas and works of art’,1 although in practice, the same indi-vidual may fulfil all these different roles.

I will begin this part with a review of the theories of Kedourie, Nairn,Breuilly and Smith, since they have all devoted some sections of their workto the analysis of the relationship between nationalism and intellectuals. Butit should be stressed that their theories do not address the specific role ofintellectuals in nations without states. On the contrary, they neglect the needto establish a clear-cut distinction between those intellectuals operatingwithin the nation-state and contributing to the creation of ‘state nation-alism’, and those evolving within nations lacking a state of their own.

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An exception to this is represented by Kedourie’s analysis of intellectuals incolonial societies.

Elie Kedourie: on ‘marginalized men’

I began to rebel against the glory I could not be associated with.(E. Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa, p. 88)

Kedourie sustains a hostile attitude towards nationalism and defines it as asort of politics which is not concerned with reality; rather, ‘its solitary objectis an inner world and its end is the abolition of all politics’.2 He sees nation-alism as a disease which originated in the West and then spread to otherparts of the world. In his view, intellectuals are to be blamed for the gener-ation of a doctrine based on the assumption that nations are obvious andnatural divisions of the human race as history, anthropology and linguisticsprove.

According to Kedourie, alienated and restless intellectuals marginalizedfrom politics under the impact of Enlightenment rationalism turned toRomanticism and generated nationalism as a doctrine that would have thecapacity to grant them a major role within society.3 Kedourie is extremelycritical of Romantic intellectuals, such as Johann Gottfried von Herder andJohann Gottlieb Fichte, and fully identifies nationalism with Romanticism.Kedourie focuses on the role of intellectuals in colonial societies. He describeshow some Western-educated indigenous people became completely alienatedfrom their traditional societies and identified with the culture and mannersof the colonizers, only to discover that indigenous elites were excluded frompositions of honour and responsibility reserved for the white colonizers.Kedourie writes:

An Indian could be admitted to the civil service only if he had becomeso completely Europeanized as to be really and practically on the footingand imbued with the character of an English highly educated gentleman.But it did not prove to be the case that an Indian who had become‘imbued’ with such a character would be easily or automatically treatedlike an English gentleman.4

In fact, what Kedourie writes about indigenous elites in colonial societies ishighly relevant to the analysis of some indigenous elites in nations withoutstates, specially where some specific regional affiliation acts as a barrier forpromotion within the state’s socio-political and economic structure.

One of the main objections to Kedourie’s theory is that it fails to accountfor the nationalism defended and generated by ‘official’ intellectuals who have already secured honour and status within the state. In so doing, heignores the nationalism espoused by the colonizers, which included their ownintellectuals and political leaders. It could be argued that the colonizers’

16 Nationalism and intellectuals

nationalism was to be blamed for the exclusion experienced by indigenouselites who, in spite of being culturally homogenized and integrated, werenever viewed as ‘belonging’ to the colonizer’s nation.

Kedourie’s theory presumes a wide gap between active intellectual elitesand inert and disoriented masses. In his view, the only way to persuade thepeople to support the nationalist movement is through propaganda andcontrol over education. To mobilize the people, elites must

appeal to the indigenous beliefs and practices, invoke the dark gods andtheir rites, and transform purely religious motifs and figures into politicaland national symbols and heroes – which is all part of the ‘ethnicization’and nationalization of previously universal and transhistorical religions.5

Kedourie concedes that an elite of intellectuals captures the main injusticesendured by the mass of the population and constructs a nationalist doctrinewhose aim is to eliminate the unjust situation shared by all those belongingto the same nation, thus uniting elites and masses under a single banner.But, for him, the objective of these intellectuals goes well beyond the wishto end the unjust situation that their fellow countrymen and women areenduring. The intellectuals’ objective is to gain power in society and halttheir alienation and exclusion from positions of honour and privilege.

Tom Nairn: the people’s mobilizers

The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses intohistory; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood.

(T. Nairn, The break-up of Britain, p. 340)

Nairn approaches the study of nationalism from a Marxist perspective. Heconsiders nationalism as a bourgeois phenomenon, which can be derived fromthe class consequences of the uneven diffusion of capitalism.6 Nationalismgenerates and, at the same time, requires the exploitation of peripheries whose deprived elites have no alternative but to turn to the masses and engage them in the nationalist project. In this context, nationalism’s mainobjective is to fight against a concrete form of ‘progress’ promoted by thecolonial capitalist, while at the same time embracing a distinctive idea ofprogress generated by the intellectuals capable of leading the struggle againstcapitalist oppression.7

Nairn explains the emergence of nationalism in deprived areas as a reactionagainst the uneven spread of capitalism. But he also acknowledges the exist-ence of some exceptions to the connection he establishes between nationalism,backwardness and periphery.

To mobilize the masses and gain their support for the nationalist cause,the new intellectual elites have to work towards the construction of a ‘mili-tant inter-class community’ sharing a common identity even if, as Nairn

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Nationalism and intellectuals 17

stresses, they only share this identity in a mythical way. Nairn, as well asMiroslav Hroch and Peter Worsley, envisages a chronological progression inthe spread of nationalism from elite into mass involvement.

In Nairn’s theory, the support of the masses is crucial if a nationalist move-ment is to succeed. But what are the implications of turning to the people?He points at three main implications: (1) speaking their language; (2) takinga more kind view of their general ‘culture’, which had been relegated by the Enlightenment; and (3) coming to terms with the enormous and stillirreconcilable diversity of popular and peasant life.8

John Breuilly: the creators of ideology

Nationalist ideology has its roots in intellectual responses to the modern problemof the relationship between state and society.

( J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the state, p. 349)

Breuilly understands nationalism as a form of politics, principally opposi-tion politics. In his view, ‘the term “nationalism” is used to refer to politicalmovements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions withnationalist arguments’.9 Breuilly, in line with Kedourie and Nairn, stressesthe ability of nationalism to attain mass support and confers a pre-eminentrole on intellectuals and members of the professions as key figures in theconstruction of nationalist ideologies. But, according to him, ‘nationalismcannot be seen as the politics of any particular social class . . . [and] neithercan it be regarded as the politics of intellectuals’,10 although most nation-alist leaders are drawn from the professions.

In Breuilly’s view, the idea that ‘nationalism should be seen primarily as the search for identity and power on the part of displaced intellectuals isa gross exaggeration, even if that is what it means to many intellectuals in nationalist movements’.11 Breuilly admits, however, that the exclusionfrom expected positions suffered by some intellectuals and members of theprofessions may contribute to their support for nationalism as an ideology able to provide a new identity containing ‘images of an ideal state and an ideal society’ in which they will have a secure, respected and leadingposition.12

Breuilly points at two sets of arguments to explain the intellectuals’ attrac-tion to nationalism. First, although he portrays nationalist intellectuals asunsuccessful professionals, he argues that their failure is relative, since it involves both failing to obtain certain positions, and not attaining thefinancial and social status expected from the position attained. Here the argu-ment echoes that of Elie Kedourie’s theory about indigenous intellectualsbeing excluded from top positions in colonial societies and how this madethem turn to nationalism. Second, Breuilly argues that the excessive numberof intellectuals produced by some societies, and the inability to ‘absorb’ them,may also contribute to explain why some intellectuals turn to nationalism.

18 Nationalism and intellectuals

He perceives nationalist politics as elite politics in politically fragile states,or as a form of politics which can arouse mass support without having to tieitself too closely to the specific concerns of that support. The compellingcharacter of the nationalist ideology stems from the connection between the intellectuals’ portrayal of the nation and the common beliefs and oftenwidespread political grievances shared by large sectors of the population.Breuilly argues that symbols and ceremonies award nationalist ideas a definiteshape and force in two major ways: they project certain images of the nation,and they enable people to come together expressing some type of nationalsolidarity.

Anthony D. Smith: ‘in search of identity’

There is, in fact, an ‘elective affinity’ between the adapted model of a civic, terri-torial nation and the status, needs and interests of the professionals (and to alesser extent of the commercial bourgeoisie).

(A.D. Smith, National identity, p. 121)

In his early work, Smith confers pre-eminence on political and religious,rather than social and cultural, factors in the emergence of what he refers to as ethnic nationalism. He argues that the modern era is characterized bythe rise of what he calls the ‘scientific state’; that is, ‘a state whose efficacydepends on its ability to harness science and technology for collectivepurposes’.13 In his view, the emergence of the ‘scientific state’ challenges thelegitimacy of religious explanations and favours situations of ‘dual legi-timation’, in which rival grounds of authority dispute for the allegiance ofhumanity. Intellectuals, as the equivalent of pre-modern priests, are partic-ularly affected by this dispute.

According to Smith, the rise of a secular intelligentsia within the frame-work of the ‘scientific state’ has encountered several obstacles, including theoverproduction of highly qualified personnel, the opposition on the part ofentrenched hierarchical bureaucrats to the critical rationalism of the intelli-gentsia, and the use of ethnic or other cultural grounds for discriminationin admitting sections of the intelligentsia to public high-status positions.Smith emphasizes the crucial role of intellectuals as generators of ideologyand leaders of the nationalist movement in its early stages, although he ismore sceptical about their function once the nationalist movement develops.He rejects those who define intellectuals as fanatical power-seeking individ-uals, though he accepts that, in some instances, it is possible to point atsome excluded and resentful intellectuals, especially in colonial societies.Smith concludes that the beneficiaries of nationalism are the members of themobilized ethnie at large, since nationalism favours both the activation of themasses and the end of their role as passive objects of external domination,and the elevation of popular culture into literary ‘high’ culture performedby intellectuals. Against those who stress the invented nature of nations and

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Nationalism and intellectuals 19

nationalism,14 Smith highlights the ‘ethnic origins’ of most of the culturalelements selected by intellectuals in the construction of modern nationalism.

To explain the attraction that many intellectuals in different parts of theworld have felt for nationalism and their influential imprint on the ideologyand language of nationalism, Smith invokes the ‘identity crisis’ experiencedby people in general and the intellectuals in particular, stemming from the challenges posed to traditional religion and society by the ‘scientific state’. He argues that the ‘nationalist solution’ allows individuals to drawtheir own identity from the collective identity of the nation. In so doing,‘she or he becomes a citizen, that is, a recognized and rightful member of a political community that is, simultaneously a cultural “community ofhistory and destiny” ’.15 Here Smith stresses the relation between nationalidentity and citizenship, thus emphasizing the cultural and political aspectsof nationalism.

Similarities and differences

The writings of Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith firmly place intel-lectuals as the generators of nationalism. In so doing, these scholars coincidein defining nationalism as a modern political ideology, which, to be success-ful, requires the support of the masses; however, they regard the relationshipbetween intellectuals and the masses in very different ways.

Kedourie underlines the wide gap between intellectual elites and themasses. In contrast, Nairn accents the need to create an inter-class commun-ity united by a common objective, and Breuilly describes what we couldrefer to as an ‘interactive’ relationship between intellectual elites and themasses. Smith highlights the shared character of national identity amongmembers of the same nation.

Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith agree on the significance of masssupport if a nationalist movement is to succeed. They also emphasize thepower of culture, language, symbols and ceremonials as key constituents ofnationalism. What is lacking from their analysis is a specific theory consid-ering whether the task of intellectuals in nations without states is differentand, if so, to what extent, from the task of intellectuals in nation-states.Apart from Kedourie, who studies the relationship between intellectuals andnationalism in colonial societies, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith do not specifythe context within which the intellectuals they analyse live and develop theirtheories.

There is considerable literature on the role of intellectuals in oppositionalnationalisms; however, most of it concerns the study of underdeveloped coun-tries (Hobsbawm,16 Gouldner,17 Kautsky18). An exception to the considerableliterature devoted to the study of nationalism and intellectuals in colonialsocieties is exemplified by the work of Pinard and Hamilton, who study the participation of intellectuals in Quebec nationalism.19 On the other hand,the cultural history book Els intel.lectuals i el poder a Catalunya (1808–1975),

20 Nationalism and intellectuals

coordinated by Jordi Casassas,20 represents a magnificent contribution to the study of the role of intellectuals in a specific nation without state. But Casassas’ book, which is primarily empirical and of great historical value, fails to provide a theoretical framework for the sociological study ofthe relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in nations withoutstates. In what follows, I address this particular task.

Intellectuals and nationalism in nations without states

First of all I shall analyse the specific context within which intellectualsoperate in nations without states.

The socio-political context

The study of nationalism in nations without states requires a specific approachwhich should take into account two key factors. First, that sub-state nation-alism emerges within already established nation-states, and, second, the needfor an ‘alternative elite’ ready to challenge the state, construct a nationalistideology and lead the nationalist movement.

The nationalism of nations without states emerges within already estab-lished nation-states endowed with their own national education system, aspecific media system, a constituted power elite and a set of institutionsforming the state and defining its territorial, political, social and economicframework. Nation-states embody a cluster of institutions which both define and govern the country, while nations without states may or may notenjoy some kind of cultural or political autonomy as a result of the state’sdecision.

Often, more than one nation live under the umbrella of a single state.Almost invariably, one nation prevails over the others and plays a leadingrole in the governance of the country and also in defining its identity throughthe promotion of a specific culture and language, which generally involvesthe marginalization of minority cultures and languages. In Spain, Castileturned out to be the dominant nation to the detriment of Catalonia, theBasque Country and Galicia. In the United Kingdom, England became the dominant nation.

The mere existence of a community which considers itself to be a nationother than the one the state seeks to promote poses a threat to, and ques-tions, the legitimacy of the state wherever it is defined as a unitary politicalinstitution. Democratic states recognize internal diversity; however, they areoften reluctant to employ the term ‘nation’ when referring to their nationalminorities since the political consequences which this may entail, for instancethe recognition of a nation’s right to self-determination, are usually quiteproblematic. For this reason, the state tends to regard minority nationalismsas dangerous, or at least as an uncomfortable phenomenon to deal with.

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Nationalism and intellectuals 21

The ways in which the state responds to the demands of the nationalminorities included within its territory depend upon the state’s own nature,the specific character of the nationalist movement and the internationalsupport this is able to secure.

The emergence of a nationalist movement in a nation without state requiresthe existence of some intellectuals prepared to build up a nationalist discoursedifferent from, and often opposed to, that of the state. On the other hand,the intellectuals who fully represent the nation-state or who identify with itdevelop their work within already established frameworks created andsupported by the state. As the nation-state was in the process of being created,intellectual discourse was structured by the culture and language employedin the homogenization of its citizenry and the simultaneous marginalizationof regional languages and cultures. As a result, such intellectuals are oftencritical and even dismissive of regional nationalist movements.

The ‘potential elite’

Crucial to the development of nationalism in nations without states is theexistence and position occupied by the ‘potential elite’. By this I refer tothose educated individuals who, if the nationalist movement succeeds, arelikely to become its leaders. The potential elite includes:

1 Individuals who feel dissatisfied with the state’s treatment of theircommunity. The degree and strength of their dissatisfaction may vary.In some cases, it is connected to the intensity of the state’s repressiveand discriminatory measures which may range from cultural and socio-political measures to the use of force. Catalan intellectuals who engagedin resistance activities against Franco’s regime are a case in point.

2 Individuals who have been excluded from the state’s ‘official elite’ becauseof their regional origin. In such cases, individuals are unable to developtheir work within the state’s circles of power and influence, and have tocircumscribe their activities to their region. This could be exemplifiedby the widespread Castilian adverse attitude towards Catalans, which ledto their exclusion from influential positions in the Spanish economic andpolitical power structure during the nineteenth and most of the twen-tieth centuries.

3 Individuals who decide to prioritize their allegiance to the nationwithout state instead of aspiring to be integrated within the state’sofficial elite. This involves their commitment to the advancement of anational cause opposed to that of the state, which often translates itselfinto their automatic exclusion from the state’s selected elite. In thesecases, it is the individual’s choice rather than the state’s systematic exclu-sion of some people because of their regional origin which leads to theinclusion of these individuals in the category of potential elite.

22 Nationalism and intellectuals

In contemporary democratic Spain, the decision of some Catalan intellec-tuals to develop their work exclusively in Catalan automatically excludesthem from Spanish-speaking intellectual circles, unless their work is trans-lated into Spanish. It has been argued that this is a strategy by means ofwhich some educated people who would otherwise be unlikely to achieve aprominent position within the state’s elite – because of fierce competition –would easily obtain a prominent position within a nation which is smallerand where competition is bound to be less intense. This argument empha-sizes the self-interest of some individuals in promoting regional forms ofnationalism in order to gain access to privileged positions.

There are also, however, those intellectuals who play the pro-Spanish cardin Catalonia and who thus become representatives of the state ‘culture’ withinCatalan society. The same argument referring to an ulterior motive could beapplied in this case on arguing that the defence of a minority position inCatalonia which suits the state, and not one’s own merit, is what contributesto the renown and status of those intellectuals who generally receive thesupport of the intellectual circles at state level, but who often only work inCatalonia. In any case, we will always find a significant number of intellec-tuals who act out of their own principles, without ‘servitude’ and withoutgiving priority to their own personal promotion and interest.

In my view, although self-interest may in some cases play a substantialpart in explaining why some intellectuals support sub-state forms of nation-alism, it is misleading to explain all nationalist allegiances through economicmotivation and the desire for power. A genuine love for the nation and adesire for its flourishing inspires many nationalists, especially in those caseswhere the nation feels culturally, politically or economically oppressed.Devoting one’s life to the defence and enhancement of the specific characterof one’s own nation may act as a potent force. It provides meaning to theindividual’s life, while setting a concrete and clear-cut objective for his orher actions. Because individuals usually embark upon nationalist projects aspart of a group, they are bound to experience some kind of moral supportand solidarity as members of a movement with a common goal. The senseof belonging to a nation can somehow be lived through the experience ofcomradeship arising within the nationalist movement or party. In spite ofthis, differences among nationalist leaders are not to be ignored, since fierceconfrontation between them is a common phenomenon. Jealousy and compe-tition among intellectuals are also commonplace. They struggle to becomemore influential, be paid a higher salary, obtain more recognition or be offereda better job.

Having made these general considerations of the conditions in which therelationship between nationalism and the intellectuals of nations withoutstates evolves, I shall now initiate the study of the Catalan case.

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Nationalism and intellectuals 23

Intellectuals and Catalan nationalism

I am aware of the existence of substantial differences between the role ofintellectuals at the birth and the re-emergence of a nationalist movement thathas been dismantled. In the first case, it is necessary to awaken the nationalconscience and to construct a previously non-existent nationalist discourse. In the second case, it is a question of invoking feelings and arguments alreadyexpressed in previous nationalist discourse. In these circumstances, the causesof national dismantling should be analysed and the nationalist discoursereformulated.

The resurgence of Catalan nationalism during the Francoist dictatorshiptook place within a context marked by the devastating effects of the regimeon Catalan language and culture.21 It was a historical moment in which justsmall circles of intellectuals and clandestine political activists fought againstthe attempt to destroy the central components of Catalan identity, devotingall their effort to the cultivation of Catalan culture.

During Franco’s regime, the Catalan intellectual elite was divided betweenthose who supported Francoism and those who stood against it and tookupon themselves the task of maintaining the vernacular language and culture.Yet, while some of the former were incorporated into the mainstream Spanishelite, the latter were automatically excluded and often persecuted by theregime. When considering the initiatives to protect Catalan culture andlanguage that rose during that period, I shall distinguish between initiativesrising from particular individuals and groups, and those emerging from somesectors of two powerful institutions: the Catholic church and the University.These initiatives will be studied in detail in Chapter 3.

Think Catalonia

As a result of the Civil War and the imposition of the Franco regime, aselected group of Catalan intellectuals published a substantial number ofbooks and articles considering the nature of the country, its history and itsinhabitants’ character. These publications appeared between 1939 and 1960and shared a reconciliatory nature aimed at reconstructing and recovering ademocratic, self-governed, modern Catalonia. The contributions of JaumeVicens i Vives, Notícia de Catalunya (1954), and of Josep Ferrater Mora, Lesformes de la vida catalana (1944), stand out from among a considerable numberof books written during this period.22

The aim of Jaume Vicens i Vives on writing Notícia de Catalunya was tosearch for the characteristics of Catalan identity. It was a question of knowing‘who we have been and who we are if we want to construct an acceptablebuilding within the great framework of western society to which we havebelonged by direct filiation since Carolingian times’.23 The author encour-ages the Catalans to cultivate a historical conscience in order to understandthe ‘own, differentiated’ mentality of each people.

24 Nationalism and intellectuals

Vicens describes the Catalan as a man of the ‘March’, that is to say comingfrom the Spanish March, the trans-Pyrenean part of the Carolingian Europeanredoubt, ‘a geohistorical corridor [. . .] between two diverse geographic and cultural worlds’.24 As such, the Catalans are ‘incongruous and paradox-ical [. . .]. We are the result of different yeasts and, therefore, a good part of the country belongs to a biology and to a culture of crossbreeding’.25

But as Catalans, ‘we are also the result of a sea–mountain polarity, the conser-vatism of the mountains and coastal activism [. . .], the Pyrenean feudalmentality and the capitalist mentality of the coast’.26 A further character-istic defining Catalans is the fusion of home and family, individual and groupwork. However, the most important defining trait of the Catalan character,according to Vicens, is pactism,

that is the idea that a pact with sovereignty should regulate all thehuman and political order of the group. This has an inescapable feudalorigin; from seeing feudalism which connected people to people, notpeople to the land.27

Jaume Sobrequés, in his book El pactisme a Catalunya (1982), highlights theestablishment of pactism in the Catalan mentality and its application to allkinds of social relations.

Josep Ferrater Mora, in Les formes de la vida catalana (1944), describes the traits that, according to him, define the Catalan personality as an idealthat each Catalan approaches without ever attaining it,28 thus following themodel of the ‘ideal types’ used by Max Weber. The four characteristics thatdefine the Catalan character, and that are never expressed in their pure state,are: continuity, common sense (seny), moderation and irony. Ferrater pointsout, however, that it is necessary to study these four ‘virtues’ without forget-ting ‘the defects and the vices’, some of which arise from an exaggeratedexaltation of the virtues which may lead the Catalans to close in on them-selves and to scorn any other reality. From among ‘the motives whichtransform an open life into a closed life’, Ferrater pays special attention toresentment, as a defect or vice which ‘destroys the root of existence and driesup the sap of life’.29

For Ferrater, continuity is the most important characteristic of the Catalancharacter, because ‘to aspire to the continuity of life fundamentally meanswanting life to have meaning, that is that every action can be understood inaccordance with the whole of life’.30 Hence the importance of history.Salvador Giner, Lluis Flaquer, Jordi Busquet and Núria Bultà, whilereflecting on Ferrater Mora, write that ‘Catalonia is substantially tradition-alist, if we understand traditionalism not to be a doctrine, but a way of life,that is a way of respecting the past as such and wanting for it to last.’31

Continuity is revealed in the Catalans’ love and respect for work, and forwork well done, ‘which means that the way of working in Catalonia is almostalways a tradition and that any job, even the least manual of all, imperceptibly

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Nationalism and intellectuals 25

adopts the manner of the artisans’.32 In his view, work ‘in actual fact, repre-sents the withdrawal of the country into its essential refuge, the work thatburies disappointments and awakens new hopes’.33

Common sense (seny) is not the most important and even less the most deci-sive attribute of the Catalan character.34 For Ferrater, common sense is theexpression of the soul’s health and of the strength of the spirit. ‘True senymeans pursuing what is fair, proper and correct, even if this pursuit is some-times the most senseless action that can be imagined.’35 For the Catalan, totalk of seny reveals ‘the possession of an experience, and this means, first, that Catalan life is not at all a puritan existence’,36 although it is regulatedby moderation. On this particular point, and when comparing Ferrater’sviews with those of Vicens, it is relevant to note that Vicens refers to twoessential traits of the Catalan character – common sense (seny) and suddenenthusiastic fervour (rauxa) – as the two inscrutable poles of the Catalanhistorical character. Vicens points out that ‘sudden enthusiastic fervour(rauxa) is, however, temporary. What lasts is common sense (seny).’37

Moderation is an individual virtue, ‘indeed, there are no moderate peoples’.38

All Catalans are not always and necessarily moderate. Moderation is at thesame time limited and prolific. ‘If I shun excess, it is because I want thesurveyed land and the action accomplished to truly attain what excess canalmost never attain: efficiency.’39 Ferrater mentions as an example of moder-ation the sardana dance (the Catalan national dance). The sardana, a ‘mysticalring’, as the poet Joan Maragall said,

is truly profound, because it is the expression of the very root and heartof a people. Through the sardana we discover those same forms that wehave tried to describe [. . .] but if any one stands out and excels, it isprecisely moderation.40

Irony is a purification, a cleansing of experience that separates individualsfrom things. The Catalan, as an individualist person, wants to maintain thepossibility of making the decision to indulge in something. Therefore,Ferrater argues, irony emerges in a natural and spontaneous manner whenhe or she is offered anything that does not deserve complete dedication.41

Irony generally arises at times of crisis, which does not mean that peoplecannot be ironic on other occasions. However,

the predominance of irony at those times shows that its function is toconceal the desperation that is emphasized at these moments, and there-fore an ironic man is always, in a certain way, a desperate man.42

The vigilant conscience of Catalans leads them to live in crisis during all themoments of their history and not just in those moments which tend to beconsidered particularly critical. As Giner writes,

26 Nationalism and intellectuals

by conserving the critical spirit and a desperate condition, irony makesit possible for life to continue rowing in a sea of pain and of conscience.It prevents one from getting lost due to an excessive trust in oneself,and it eliminates arrogance and pride. The irony that overcomes the crisisand at the same time conserves it is a revealing irony.43

Attitudes towards Catalan culture

The analysis presented by Ferrater and Vicens leads the way into the studyof the different attitudes of contemporary Catalan citizens, especially of intel-lectuals and politicians, towards what is considered to be the ‘core’ of Catalancultural tradition. These attitudes vary greatly and are often spread amongthe different groups that form the social structure of Catalonia.44 FollowingSalvador Giner’s model, I shall distinguish between four ‘ideal types’, whichallow for a high number of qualifications. The four types are essentialism,pactism, españolismo, or ‘pro-Spanishness’, and cosmopolitanism.

Essentialism consists of conceiving the Catalan nation as a natural, eternaland unalterable being whose purity must be preserved, and which should be protected from all contamination. The biggest danger to which Cataloniais exposed, according to the essentialists, is the threat of ‘denationalization’,that is, the loss of the core defining its very identity as a unique nation. This attitude generally rejects the dynamic character of identity, and thepossibility of enriching the indigenous culture as a result of contact withdifferent cultures. For this reason, essentialists tend to adopt a defensive attitude and are often associated with a tendency to feel victimized, having been persuaded that Catalonia is constantly subject to unjustified attacks andassaults.

Although in principle the essentialist attitude consists of a sort ofemotional reaction excluding scientific analysis, [. . .] it is possible forsome versions of essentialism instilled with varying degrees of rationalityand enriched with a calm and lucid reflection on reality to exist.45

I would like to add that, as Àngel Castiñeira writes, often essentialism shouldbe understood as a reaction against external aggressions suffered at specifichistorical moments or periods.46

Pactism is one of the characteristic traits of Catalans that go back to thebeginning of feudalism. Pactism arises from a recognition of one’s own limi-tations in the face of the adversary, but such an apparent weakness can becomea positive force allowing individuals to take advantage of certain situations. Inpractice, pactism represents a willingness to negotiate under all circumstancesin order to save everything that it is possible to save, avoiding positions ofintransigence and of sudden enthusiastic fervour (rauxa). The whole Catalanpolitical class, both right- and left-wing, whether it preaches moderate nation-alism or autonomous federalism, exhibits very high levels of a pactist spirit.47

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Nationalism and intellectuals 27

Pro-Spanishness (españolismo) represents a rejection of Catalonia as a nationand a reduction of Catalan culture to a more or less folkloric variety of aunitary Spanish culture. The pro-Spanish attitude defends a single Spanishnation. Within ‘pro-Spanishness’, Giner distinguishes what he refers to asan ‘essentialist’ position, which does not accept either dialogue between thedifferent Hispanic cultures, or the possibility that the concept of Spanishnessis subject to a process of transformation as a result of the changes triggeredby the creation of the Autonomous Communities System, and a ‘pactist’position, which exemplifies a more open attitude towards the redefinition ofSpain following its transition to democracy.

In my view, it is necessary to add three versions of pro-Spanishness – oneright-wing and two left-wing. The first, professed above all by large sectors ofthe Catalan upper middle class and by the managers of those companies whichserve a state-wide market, considers the Spanish upper class to be the socialgroup to which they belong, or at least their reference group. The second,exemplified by broad sectors of the working class opposed to a dominant class,united above its regional affiliations, is best defended by strong trade unionsat state level. The third version is a pro-Spanishness of the Jacobin left with astrongly centralist conception of Spain and hostile to any federalist idea orredefinition of Spain as a multinational state. Right-wing pro-Spanishness andthe Jacobin left have often formed political alliances in order to prevent ini-tiatives aimed at recognizing the national diversity of the Spanish state.

Cosmopolitanism is a minority attitude, more diffused in the social struc-ture, with a historical precedent in libertarian proletarian internationalism– very important in Catalonia in the period preceding and during the CivilWar. Cosmopolitanism is a primarily intellectual attitude that defends a viewof the world in which ethnic, linguistic and national differences cease to actas barriers to human communication and cooperation.

Currently, at least two different groups defending cosmopolitanism can be identified. The first is formed by those who define themselves as ‘worldcitizens’, are hostile to any kind of Catalanism, and who often conceal acentralist pro-Spanishness. The second includes a somehow curious mixtureof a universalist vision of world culture and a radical Catalan nationalism.

Rational and emotional arguments as mobilizing agents in contemporary Catalan nationalism

Rational and emotional arguments become intertwined when intellectualsseek to awaken the nation and generate a mass nationalist movement.Rationality stems from the objective reasons invoked by nationalists when defending their case. Independence or greater autonomy may mean abetter economy by encouraging regional development and the right to retainregionally generated wealth; a higher quality of life; freedom from a seriesof constraints imposed by the state; and even a deepening of democracy byfavouring decentralization and self-determination.

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Emotions are aroused when the nation is presented as a community whichtranscends the limited lives of particular individuals, while providing themwith a collective sense of identity.48 Belonging to a nation, which is real inthe minds of its members, confers on them a sense of continuity groundedupon the sentiment of being part of a group portrayed as an extended family. Individuals are born into particular families in the same way as theyare placed within specific nations which act as major socializing agents.Individuals are brought up within particular cultures which define the wayin which they relate to themselves, others and nature. The use of a partic-ular language increases the sentiment of belonging to a community sharinga common history and a common set of values and practices. As in a family,membership of the nation implies a certain solidarity – in this case withfellow nationals. It also demands sacrifices and generates sentiments of loveand affection which generally become more prominent when the well-beingof the group is under threat.

Rational arguments

During Franco’s regime, the key objective was to restore democracy and,with it, the right of Catalonia to develop its language and culture, and recoverits autonomous political institutions. These were rational demands capableof arousing intense emotional reactions.

Now that over twenty years have passed since the Generalitat was re-estab-lished, what rational arguments do nationalist intellectuals and politiciansinvoke? The main nationalist current defends Catalonia’s need to enjoyincreasing levels of self-government, to be granted an individualized modelof funding which would allow it to fully develop its distinct identity and toprosper as a nation – this would include a review of inter-territorial soli-darity criteria and mechanisms – and to be recognized as a nation withinthe Spanish state. A significantly smaller current stands in favour of seces-sion. In their view, Catalonia will only thrive culturally and economicallyand become a fully fledged political actor if it becomes independent.

I distinguish three main rational arguments destined to convince not onlythose who share a strong sense of national identity, but also those who aresolely interested in supporting Catalan nationalism in so far as it provescapable of improving their quality of life, deepening democracy and/ordynamizing civil society:

1 Catalonia’s contribution to the Spanish coffers heavily outweighs theincome it receives from the central government. This is excessivelyunfavourable, even on the assumption that Catalonia has to contributemore than other areas of the state and has to show solidarity with the rest of Spain. Solving this grievance would automatically increasethe Generalitat’s spending power and improve the Catalans’ quality oflife.

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Nationalism and intellectuals 29

2 Political decentralization tends to strengthen democracy in as much asit brings decision-making processes closer to the people. Problems areidentified, analysed and resolved where they emerge. Regional politi-cians usually display greater awareness of the needs and aspirations oftheir electorates; thus, the argument follows, greater devolved powersfor Catalonia should result in greater efficiency at solving the problems of the community.

3 The devolution of powers to regional institutions requires the re-allocationof resources to facilitate discrete policies and regional budget plan-ning. These processes, in turn, contribute to the revitalization of civil society, encouraging local and regional initiatives, which include cultural,economic and social projects.

Emotional arguments

In Catalan nationalism, emotional arguments emphasize the sentiment ofbelonging to a cultural and territorial community which has suffered andrejoiced together throughout time. Emotional arguments evolve around fivemajor clusters: language, culture, history, territory and art.

For instance, a considerable number of people who suffered underFrancoism still hold live images of either their own or their loved one’sexperiences, which may include torture, imprisonment, exile, proscriptionand lack of freedom to cultivate their vernacular language and culture.Memories of oppression under Franco are connected with a long list of griev-ances, most of them concerned with repeated Spanish attempts to eradicateCatalan language, culture and political institutions.

Key historical events, invested with particular meaning and capable of arous-ing an emotional response when Catalans ‘tell their history’, include: (1) theWar of the Reapers (Guerra dels Segadors, 1640–1652), consisting of a Catalansecessionist uprising against the Spanish monarchy, mainly because of the fiscal pressure exerted by the crown;49 (2) the Eleventh of September 1714,when, after a massive Franco-Spanish attack, Barcelona surrendered – an eventwhich imposed the dissolution of the autonomous political institutions of thePrincipality and the subjection of Catalonia to a regime of occupation definedby the rigidly centralist and authoritarian monarchy of Philip V, when Catalanwas forbidden and Castilian proclaimed as the official language.50 More recenthistorical memories include the suppression of the autonomous government ofthe Catalan Mancomunitat (1913–1923) after the coup d’état perpetrated byGeneral Miguel Primo de Rivera. Autonomy was briefly re-established duringthe Second Republic – at that time Catalonia enjoyed a Statute of Autonomyand Autonomous Government (Generalitat). Both were abolished by Francoin April 1938.

The territory of Catalonia also leads to emotional references and differ-ences between those who limit it to the territory of today’s Catalonia (theCatalan autonomous community) and those who defend a broader concept

30 Nationalism and intellectuals

of the Catalan nation, often expressed with the term Països Catalans (CatalanCountries). These include the Principality of Catalonia, Valencia, the BalearicIslands and North Catalonia (part of France north of the Pyrenees up toPerpignan and Salses), incorporated over the feudal era into the domains of the count-king of Barcelona, and which for this reason share a commoncultural and linguistic heritage.

Particular landscapes are emotionally charged and portrayed as embodyingCatalan traditions, history and culture. The monasteries of Ripoll, Poblet,Montserrat and Cuixà (France); the mountains of Montserrat, the Canigó(France) and Montseny; or urban landscapes, such as the Plaça de Sant Jaumeand the Fossar de les Moreres in Barcelona, are among them. It is worthremarking on the great importance of territory in all nationalist movements,not only for the cultural and historical reasons that we have just mentioned,but also because territory is the nation’s ‘continent’. Territory providesresources and is where people build their homes and create their towns andcities. Territory unites them with their ancestors, who were born, lived,worked, fought and died there, and it is precisely in this respect that terri-tory evokes the continuity of the nation and becomes a sacred bastion:

The landscape is full of places which embody the experience and theaspirations of people. They are places which become centres of meaning;symbols which express various feelings, ideas and emotions. Some ofthem evoke a marked feeling of belonging to a certain group which weconsider to be an identifying mark. They become true symbols of a clearlynationalist character.51

For these reasons it is possible to establish a connection between the meaningof territory and the resolution to preserve it present in nationalist theory, andthe concerns of various environmental groups defending the preservation andpurity of the habitat.52

Certain selected works of art and artists turned into symbols of Catalanidentity are often portrayed as part of a corpus of Catalan high culture whichhas received international recognition. The work of Joan Miró, Salvador Dalí,Antoni Gaudí, Antoni Tàpies and Pau Casals, among others, stands side byside with fine examples of Romanesque art, such as the churches of the Boívalley, and other outstanding architectural works of art, such as the cathe-dral and the gothic area of Barcelona.

The elements forming Catalan identity also include displays of popularand traditional culture, such as the sardana, human towers (castells), tradi-tional festivities such as the Patum in Berga, Carnival in Vilanova and theDansa de la Mort in Verges, together with a large number of traditionaldances, songs, music and instruments.

A further and powerful symbol of Catalan identity which somehow escapesthe above typology concerns sport, football in particular. During Franco-ism, the Barcelona Football Club (Barça) was portrayed as a representative

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Nationalism and intellectuals 31

of the Catalan nation and exemplified resistance against the dictatorship.Whenever Barça and Real Madrid played each other, the significance of thematch went well beyond sport. At present, the symbolic content of thecampaigns to create a Catalan football team and a Catalan Olympiccommittee, together with the pledge for Catalonia to be allowed to competein international contests, like the Scottish or Welsh teams do, should not beunderestimated. This movement has galvanized a very large section of theCatalan population and is putting pressure on Madrid to reverse its initialnegative response.

The way in which people identify with, and relate to, language, culture,history, territory and art, but also to popular traditions and to those otherelements that have become symbols of a country, contributes to defining thecommunity to which they belong. It is important to emphasize that symbolsare effective because they are imprecise and conceal the heterogeneity of thenation. Symbols transform difference into the appearance of similarity, thusallowing people to invest the ‘community’ with ideological integrity. Thisaccounts for the ability of nationalism to bind together people from differentcultural levels and social backgrounds.

The power of emotional arguments stems from their capacity to appeal toindividuals who share the same culture, feel attached to a specific land andhave the experience of a common past and a project for the future.Intellectuals and political leaders (in some cases religious leaders should alsobe included) select and promote the key elements which conform nationalidentity, and they also re-create and generate occasions in which all thatunites those belonging to the nation is emphasized. These moments includevarious commemorations, national days, traditional festivities, sports contestsand a series of public events. The emotional dimension of nationalism springsfrom the feeling of belonging to a particular group and from sentiments ofsolidarity towards fellow countrymen and women with whom the individualshares his or her love for the nation.

Summary

On the one hand, intellectuals act as architects of the nationalist movementby providing cultural, historical, political and economic arguments to sustainthe distinctive character of the nation and to legitimize its will to decideupon its political future. On the other hand, intellectuals are subversive and construct a discourse which undermines the legitimacy of the currentorder of things. They denounce the nation’s present situation within the stateand offer an alternative to it by promoting the conditions and processes ofconflict. Intellectuals are to be considered as formulators of the nationalistideology. However, their task does not end here, since many of them alsoact as agitators and mobilizers of the nationalist movement. Valentí Almirall(1841–1904), Enric Prat de la Riba (1870–1917), Antoni Rovira i Virgili(1882–1949) and, currently, Josep Benet and Jordi Pujol, represent but a

32 Nationalism and intellectuals

few examples of key ideologists of Catalan nationalism who have turned intoextremely influential political leaders.

I have argued that two main factors define the socio-political contextwithin which intellectuals operate in nations without states. First, sub-statenationalism emerges within already established nation-states with their ownelites, culture and language, education and media systems and internationalrecognition as political institutions. Second, to be successful, sub-statenationalism requires the existence of an alternative elite able to construct adiscourse critical of the current status quo.

Let me attempt, in conclusion, a summary of the themes of this chapter.A combination of factors explains why intellectuals turn to nationalism innations without states. Against those who, like Kedourie, insist that intel-lectuals turn to nationalism for mere self-interest, I agree with Breuilly that,although this may sometimes be the case, such an assertion represents a grossexaggeration.

Altruism and the genuine desire for freedom for one’s own country oftenaccount for the intellectuals’ fascination with nationalism. For instance, inthe early stages of a nationalist movement, a certain degree of altruism andlove of country act as potent forces informing the intellectuals’ actions. Thesesentiments are bound to emerge with even greater intensity wherever, as there-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Franco’s regime shows, a nationalminority lives under repression. In such circumstances, endorsing theminority’s nationalism often involves not only the radical exclusion from thestate’s elite, but a considerable risk to one’s own life.

Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith agree on the great relevance of masssupport if a nationalist movement is to succeed. During Francoism, as I willanalyse in detail in Chapter 3, the greatest threat to the survival of the corecomponents of Catalan identity was the widening gap between an intellec-tual elite cultivating Catalan high culture and the mass of the populationmore vulnerable to the homogenizing policies of Franco’s regime. In addi-tion to this, the large number of Castilian-speaking immigrants from other parts of Spain coming to Catalonia – a movement favoured by the stateand combined with an absolute lack of political and economic resources andCatalan institutions to deal with it – contributed to the weakening of a thenproscribed Catalan language and culture. Catalonia received 1,400,000Castilian-speaking immigrants between 1950 and 1975, and during thatperiod Catalonia’s total population shifted from 3,240,313 to 5,663,125. I will analyse immigration and its consequences for Catalonia later on in the book.

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Nationalism and intellectuals 33

2 Portrait of a dictatorshipFrancoism

The Franco regime halted and even reversed the process of democratization,modernization and decentralization of Spain initiated during the SecondRepublic. Indeed, the main objective of the Franco regime was to end theSpanish transformation process threatening the monopoly of power that theCastilian, conservative, land-owning oligarchy, nostalgic of the empire, hadexerted for centuries. Once the last colonies had been lost (Cuba, Puerto Ricoand the Philippines in 1898), the Castilian oligarchy concentrated on guar-anteeing its control over the peninsula. In this context, the expansion ofsocialist and anarchist ideas and the threat of separatism, which in Cataloniawas revealed on 14 April 1931 with the proclamation of the Catalan Republicby Francesc Macià, at that time President of the Generalitat, exemplified thedangers most greatly feared by an oligarchy willing to hold on to power atall costs.

In this chapter I consider the key features of Francoism and the immediateconsequences of the imposition of this new totalitarian regime. I begin by reviewing the main supporters of the new regime: the Falange, the Army, the Catholic church and conservative sectors of the bourgeoisie andlandowners. I then move on to study national Catholicism as an ideology constructed to grant legitimacy to the new regime, and analyse the ‘surveil-lance state’ created immediately after the victory of the ‘nationals’. In thefinal part of the chapter I set forth the position of the Franco regime inrelation to Spain’s internal diversity.

The Franco regime was the result of a violent confrontation that broke out on 18 July 1936, when some sectors of the Army revolted against thelegitimate government of the Second Republic. The uprising rejected democ-racy, the party system, the separation of the church and the state, theautonomy of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, and the freedomand civil rights of the Spanish people. The fundamental objective of theinsurrectionists, who immediately called themselves ‘nationals’, consisted of re-establishing ‘order’ and eliminating all signs of communism andanarchism, then quite strong in some parts of Spain. The ‘nationals’ wanted to eradicate what they considered to be ‘red Spain’ (la España roja).In this context, the end of the Republic was presented as a necessity. On 30September 1936, the bishop of Salamanca, Enrique Pla y Deniel, published

a pastoral letter entitled The two cities, in which he described the Civil Waras a ‘crusade’. Until then, no ecclesiastic hierarchy had so explicitly expressedits support for the insurrectionist army. The point of reference of this pastoralletter was the blessing by Pope Pius XI of the Spanish exiles in Castelgandolfo(14 September 1936). On that occasion he had established a distinctionbetween the Christian heroism of the ‘nationals’ and the barbarity of the‘Republicans’. Pla y Deniel quoted Saint Augustine to justify the distinc-tion between the ‘earthly city’ (the Republican zone), dominated by hatred,anarchy and communism, and the ‘celestial city’ (the national zone), wherethe love of God, heroism and martyrdom were the norm.1 This implied a distinction between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ in the conflict, but even moreimportant was the fact that it provided the emerging regime with ideo-logical legitimacy. The ‘nationals’, who boasted that they had the blessingof God, fought against the ‘reds’, the ‘infidels’, and declared that they wereundertaking a war of liberation, a crusade. This proclamation became one of the pillars in the construction of the new Francoist state. On describingthe Civil War as a religious crusade, Franco succeeded in presenting himselfas the defender not just of Spain, but also of universal faith. As Paul Prestonpoints out, this ability to give the war a religious nature was taken advan-tage of to attract international support for the rebel cause. ‘Many BritishConservative MPs, for instance, intensified their support for Franco after he began to stress Christian rather than fascist credentials.’2 The religiousargument permitted the Fascist character of the insurrectionists to takesecond place.

Franco established himself as the head of the ‘National Uprising’ after thefortuitous disappearance of some of the other insurrectionist leaders andthanks to his skill at removing and marginalizing the rest. The Galiciangeneral was invested as head of state on 1 October 1936, and immediatelybegan a propaganda campaign to consolidate his leadership, which was still weak. All the newspapers in the ‘national’ zone had to include on theirfront page the inscription ‘One Motherland, One State, One Caudillo’ (UnaPatria, Un Estado, Un Caudillo), reminiscent of the Nazi expression used byHitler, Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer.3 It was at this time that Franco adoptedthe title Caudillo, a term that was intended to link him to the warrior leadersof Castile in the Middle Ages. Franco, like the heroes of the Reconquest ofSpain, defined himself as a ‘warrior of God against the infidels who threat-ened to destroy the faith and culture of Spain’; to be more precise one wouldhave to say Castilian culture and language.

When the Civil War ended (1939), Franco implemented a strong ‘nation-alization’ policy, employing all the resources available to him – both physicaland psychological repression, control of the media, education, the elites andthe bureaucracy – to create what could be called a ‘surveillance state’.Francoism exemplified the rise, for the first time in the history of Spain, ofa powerful modern state equipped with the necessary tools to embark upon

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Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism 35

the cultural and linguistic homogenization of the country. The new regimewas based on the exploitation of the ‘national’ victory and the defeat sufferedby the Republicans. The authoritarianism, the extreme and backward conser-vatism, the end of the freedom of expression, the international isolation andthe promotion of an ultraconservative Catholicism in favour of the regimehad to be endured by all the citizens of Spain who identified with democ-racy. Francoism defeated them all. In this context, the working classes facedcomplete misery.

In Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, there was an additional ele-ment to the feeling of defeat shared with the other Spaniards. It arose fromthe Francoist attempt to eliminate the cultural and linguistic differences ofthese peoples. Indeed, the implacable repressive policy implemented by thenew regime would only exacerbate the nationalist feelings of the nationalminorities, in particular Catalans, Basques and Galicians. The especially harshtreatment received by the Basques and the Catalans encouraged the forma-tion of a firm feeling of belonging in these communities – as a result thedichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was accentuated even further. The meas-ures imposed by the regime in order to homogenize the population deepenedthe abyss between the official public sphere and the private one.4

One of the unintended consequences that often arise whenever the stateseeks to undermine non-state national identities is that they become stronger.Shared external threats, conflict and the experience of repression tend togenerate internal cohesion and mobilization. They can also succeed in unitingdifferent social classes and interest groups, which have little in common orwhich even have antagonistic objectives. In similar situations, oppositionalnationalisms receive legitimacy and justify their existence by appealing tothe aggression suffered by the people they represent.

The pillars of Francoism can be found in the support of the Falange, theArmy, the Catholic church, the landowning class and important sectors ofthe bourgeoisie.

The Falange

José Antonio Primo de Rivera founded the Falange in 1933 and became itsmain leader. The Falange originally combined traditional patriotism withmodern authoritarianism. Its objective was to create a National Socialist statefree from class struggle. The Falange was mainly inspired by Italian fascismand defended the ideal of creating a bigger Spain through territorial expan-sion in the north of Africa and, above all, the recovery of strategic Gibraltar.The Falangists respected the Catholic church, but demonized Marxism andcapitalism. At the same time, they pressed for the introduction of land reformand for the nationalization of the banks and railways.

José Antonio was arrested in Madrid by the Republicans and transferredto Alicante prison (14 March 1936). Given his political relevance, it was notunthinkable to consider his liberation as a result of an exchange or agree-

36 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism

ment between Republicans and nationals, but this did not occur becauseFranco needed the Falange as a tool to mobilize the civil population and asa mechanism to allow identification with the fascist ideals of his Germanand Italian allies. It has been suggested that Franco feared that the returnof José Antonio, a charismatic person and the unquestionable leader of theFalange, would be an insurmountable obstacle to his intended manipulationof the Falange. Moreover, José Antonio had always been sceptical aboutcollaborating too closely with the Army, since, in his views, this could limitthe Falange’s role to that of acting as the ideology justifying a regime domi-nated by ‘a group of generals of depressing political mediocrity, committedto a series of political clichés, supported by old-style intransigent Carlism,the lazy and short-sighted conservative classes with their vested interests andagrarian and finance capitalism’.5

José Antonio Primo de Rivera was executed in Alicante prison on 20November 1936. Although the news appeared in the Republican and Frenchpress, Franco refused to acknowledge the death of the Falangist leader untiltwo years later. During this period, José Antonio became ‘the Missing Person’(El Ausente) and Manuel Hedilla, who accepted Franco’s version of events,became the temporary leader of the Falange. However, his leadership did notlast long because, in April 1937, he was imprisoned and sentenced to death,but not executed. At the same time, some of José Antonio’s writings werebanned by Franco – a fact which did not prevent the new regime from raisinghim up as a martyr while considering him to be a quasi-saint.6

Franco imposed the unification of the Falangists and the Carlists ‘fromabove’ with the Unification Decree of April 1937, thus creating the FalangeEspañola Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (FETy de las JONS). This merger did not eliminate the tensions and divergencesbetween Falangists and Carlists, and Franco took advantage of these tensionsto impose his leadership. The social radicalism of the Falange was toneddown, while Franco achieved indisputable control over what from then onwould be known as the ‘National Movement’ (Movimiento Nacional ).

Franco employed a substantial part of the ideology of the Falange toconstruct the ‘Movement’ and exploited nationalist rhetoric to distract thepeople’s attention from the country’s serious economic problems. Above all,though, Franco employed Falangism as a very useful tool to control themonarchist, with whom he played along in order to counteract the Falangistinfluence. The FET y de las JONS defined itself as the pillar of the newSpanish state and assigned itself ‘the role of giving Spain the profound feelingof an indestructible unity of destiny and faith resulting from its Catholicand imperial mission as a protagonist of history’.7 It also aspired to estab-lish an economic system capable of exceeding both individual and group orclass interests, and of multiplying wealth. Article 12 of the new Falangiststatute proclaimed Francisco Franco as its national head: the leader of a histor-ical period in which Spain could fulfil its historical destiny and attain theobjectives of the ‘Movement’. Franco, the leader, was only to be accountable

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Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism 37

to ‘God and history’. This confirmed his power over the Falange and theimpunity of his government.

The Army

The military uprising of 18 July 1936 divided the Army between thedefenders of the legitimate government of the Republic and those whosupported the coup d’état. The Army was the main guarantor of the Francoistdictatorship. In his book ¿Qué es lo nuevo?, José Pemartín, one of the regime’sideologists, wrote: ‘In what is truly military there is a superhuman essenceof idealism. Self-denial, discipline, honour: these are the main three militaryvirtues’, adding that, ‘the intense definition of Spain for me is a “Religious-military monarchy”. Outside this, there is “the Iberian land”, but there isno Spain’.8 The words of Pemartín echo those of the German historianHeinrich von Treitschke, who in his political writings attributed a sacredcharacter to war and noted its positive effects. Treitschke emphasized theattitudes that were personified in the army and gave them a supreme nature.His doctrine offered a valid model for the creation of totalitarian regimessuch as Francoism. Although the ideologists of the Spanish regime did notrefer to him directly as their source of inspiration, Treitschke’s influence hadfiltered through from German fascism and exerted a strong impact on theinitial stages of Francoism.9

A considerable section of the Army was monarchist and saw Franco as atransitional figure who would re-establish the Spanish monarchy. Variouscontacts with Don Juan de Borbón, son of King Alfonso XIII, revealed the political differences between Franco and the heir to the throne. Finally,in 1954, Franco and Don Juan agreed, under pressure from the former, tobring up Juan Carlos, Don Juan’s son, as the dictator’s possible successor.This agreement meant that Juan Carlos, on Franco’s insistence, would beeducated in Spain, attending the military academies of the three forces anduniversity. On 21 July 1969 Franco, who did not have a male heir, after a period of doubts and of considering various possibilities, announced to the Council of Ministers his decision to appoint Juan Carlos de Borbón asPrince of Spain and his future successor. The restoration of the monarchywas sealed.10

Social support

Franco had the support of the landowning class, and to a certain extent themoderate support of the so-called grandes de España or ‘grandees of Spain’,who were mostly monarchist. The new regime also achieved the approval ofthe industrial bourgeoisie, which, after a period of considerable convulsion,could now re-initiate its economic activities11 thanks to the re-establishmentof social order and the elimination of all revolutionary and reformist move-ments. Two main factors account for the bourgeoisie’s attitude in favour of

38 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism

the dictatorship. The first and foremost was the replacement of the Republi-can labour legislation by a conservative legislation which gave preference toobedience over efficiency as the most valuable quality of any worker. Thesecond factor was the compulsory membership of the so-called ‘verticalunions’. Many sectors of the bourgeoisie, including those from the Repub-lican zone, ended up supporting Franco and his conservative policies, more as a result of seeking social and economic stability than out of polit-ical and ideological conviction. With a few exceptions, the Basque and Catalan bourgeoisie supported the new regime. Their class interests were placed above other factors, such as national identity. Borja de Riquerand Joan B. Culla emphasize the constant and overall support of the Catalanbourgeoisie for the dictatorship and explain it as a tactical reinforcement of the social situation created by the Francoist victory, since, in their opinion, their ideological support for the principles of the new state shouldbe ruled out.12

The Catholic church

The main figures of the 18 July 1936 uprising were military conspiratorswithout any explicit religious motives. The idea of a ‘holy war’ or ‘crusade’only emerged after the failure of what had been planned as a quick coup d’état.

Defining the Civil War as a ‘crusade’ reveals the position adopted by the most conservative Spanish ecclesiastic hierarchy, with the exception of the Basque Country and certain sectors of Catalonia, on endorsing themilitary uprising. A dogmatic and conservative version of Catholicismgranted the ‘nationals’ a very powerful legitimation of their regime, sinceneither the Falange nor Carlist traditionalism could offer solid enough ideo-logical support to sustain it. Franco and the church agreed on the rejectionof rationalism, the masons, liberalism, socialism and communism. Most ofSpanish society was traditionalist and Catholic and, in general, they respectedpriests and the members of the religious orders who had considerable social influence. It is true that the Republic had eliminated most of theirprivileges and that the clergy were the first to suffer the harsh religious perse-cution undertaken by the ‘Republicans’, but, in a predominantly rural societysuch as Spain, the power of the church was deeply rooted in the people’smentality. Several attempts had been made to reduce ecclesiastic privilegesin the past, but, after each attempt, the church had succeeded in recoveringits influence and in retaining considerable power. In addition, people did notdisregard the link between God and church; no-one wanted to be ‘damned’,and the church was the only institution claiming the power to ‘save, forgiveand damn’ in the name of God. These factors explain the great significanceattributed to the support of the official church enjoyed by the new regime.A further element to be considered concerns the wide gap between thementality of the inhabitants of cities, such as Barcelona and Madrid, and the

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Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism 39

rural population. Indeed, communism and anarchism had their main strong-holds in the cities. It should be stressed, however, that in Catalan rural areas being left-wing did not necessarily represent a lack of respect for the church.

The pre-eminent role of the Catholic church was useful both for the‘nationals’, who could argue that ‘God was on their side’, and for the churchitself, which acquired great influence over the political and social life of thenew regime. Franco constantly insisted on this point:

In accordance with our historical destiny, on 18 July 1936 we were againthe protagonists of an enterprise of supranational importance. A greatstruggle then began on our land to save the fundamental values ofChristian civilization [. . .] thanks to its religious content and spiritualsymbol, thanks to the explicit desire to work in favour of what Christian-ity is and represents, it was officially designated a Crusade, a just warpar excellence.13

The regime had the blessing not only of the Spanish church, but also ofthe Vatican. Thus, on celebrating victory in the Civil War in May 1939,Pope Pius XII sent a radio message to the new Spain:

It is with great joy that I speak to you, dearest children of CatholicSpain, to express our paternal congratulations on the grace of peace andvictory with which God has deigned to crown the heroism of your faithand charity, demonstrated through so many, so generous sufferings.14

On 20 May 1939, in a religious ceremony held in the Madrid church ofSanta Bárbara, Franco received the blessing of monsignor Isidro Gomá yTomás, archbishop of Toledo and primate cardinal of Spain. At the end ofthe ceremony, the Caudillo drew his sword in triumphant manner and handedit to the cardinal, who placed it on the altar, while Franco declared:

Lord, please accept the effort of this people, always Yours, which, withme, and in Your Name, has heroically defeated the enemy of Truth inthis age. Lord God, in whose hand is all Right and all Power, lend meYour assistance to lead this people to the full freedom of the Empire byYour glory and that of Your Church.15

There are two important points to be noted in these words: the tacit publicand official recognition of the crucial role played by the church in the newstate and the pre-eminence of symbols and rituals in a political regime thattook advantage of its religious nature. These elements were fundamental forthe defence of the state nationalism imposed by the dictatorship.

In its first agreement with the Vatican (1941), the Francoist state obtainedthe confirmation of the right of presentation (proposal of candidates) for

40 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism

episcopal appointments. This frustrated Franco’s expectations, as he antici-pated more concessions from the Vatican. Towards the end of the SecondWorld War, the Vatican was pleased with the new values guiding Spanishpolitics – these primarily consisted of using the regime’s Catholic faith todistance it from German and Italian fascism. This is probably why, duringthe period of ostracism endured by the regime after the Second World War,the Vatican never discouraged Spanish prelates or Catholics in general fromreaffirming their support for Franco. But the relationship of the Francoregime with the Catholic church was, of course, influenced by the inter-national context.

In 1945, at the Potsdam summit, the United States of America, the SovietUnion and Britain condemned the Spanish regime because it was establishedwith the support of the Axis powers. In the same year, the United Nationsconference in San Francisco approved a resolution which refused Spain entryto this organization. This situation was to change gradually from 1948onwards. In fact the beginning of the cold war and the ‘witch hunt’ againstcommunists undertaken by the United States led to a reassessment of theanti-communist nature of Francoism. Spain and the United States exchangedambassadors in 1951; in 1952 Spain was accepted as a member of UNESCO;in 1953 it signed the Concordat with the Vatican and the Madrid Pact withthe United States; and in December 1955 Spain was accepted into the UnitedNations.

The exaltation of the Catholic nature of the regime is illustrated by thefollowing examples. On 30 September 1945, Spain’s most influentialCatholic newspaper, Ya, was published with the following headline:‘Tomorrow Caudillo Day: A Catholic Head of State. Franco, servant of theHoly Catholic, and apostolic, Roman church.’ The article stated that ‘hislife, his doctrine and his work are in accordance with the principles and rulesof the church. This has just been solemnly declared by the Catholic hier-archy.’16 On 2 April 1946, on the commemoration of the ‘Glorious Victory’,the Falangist newspaper Arriba published on its front page: ‘The Catholicvictory of Franco. Magnificent religious unity of the people. The Catholicvoice is heard loud and free. Growing vitality and progress towards the fulfil-ment of a wholly Catholic life.’17

The conservative policies of Pope Pius XII, who in 1949 had excommun-icated the communists, were a useful ally for Franco. As already mentioned,Spain signed the Concordat with the Vatican in 1953, one year after theInternational Eucharistic Congress held in Barcelona – an event portrayed asa guarantee of Spanish loyalty to the Holy See. The Concordat implied theHoly See’s explicit recognition of the legitimacy of Francoism, in exchangefor important concessions to the Spanish church in tax and legal matters, theright to control education and the right to censor the media, publicationsand public events.

The support of the church was not homogeneous and, among others, somesectors of the clergy in the Basque Country and Catalonia questioned its

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Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism 41

endorsement of the Franco regime. Both communities had traditionallyenjoyed strong links between nationalism and very important sectors of thechurch. In the Basque Country, the predominantly Catholic Basque people’ssupport of the Republican cause and the Catholic nature of the Basqueautonomous government, led by José Aguirre y Lekube, prevented the execu-tion or assassination of the clergy and the destruction of sacred places duringthe Civil War, while in other parts of Spain they faced havoc and persecu-tion.18 It is worth noting that the Francoists executed fourteen Basque priestsin the autumn of 1936 because of their nationalist beliefs and, after the fallof the Basque Country in the summer of 1937, hundreds of laypeople andclergy suffered from exile, imprisonment and deportation to other areas ofSpain.19

In Catalonia, nationalism reappeared a few years later under the protec-tion of progressive sectors of the church opposed to the official message ofnational Catholicism. The festivities for the exaltation of the Mare de Déu deMontserrat, organized by Catalan nationalist Catholics in April 1947, consti-tuted the first major public gathering with clear Catalan nationalistconnotations since the end of the war (almost a hundred thousand peopleassembled at the Monastery of Montserrat). For the first time a few wordswere spoken publicly in Catalan. This concession cost the civil governor of Barcelona, Bartolomé Barba, his position, removed from office because ofhis ‘excessive tolerance’ towards the Catalans. A feeling of indignation wasprogressively spreading among a good number of Catholic laypeople andpriests, critical of the notable differences existing between the working classesand those devoted to the regime and favoured with a higher status. Criticalsectors within the church questioned the legitimacy of its alliance with theregime. The idea that the church should free itself from all relations withthe regime was circulated among the groups most concerned with socialproblems, in particular Acció Catòlica and the Hermandades Obreras de AcciónCatólica (HOAC).

National Catholicism as an ideology

The connection between the Catholic faith and the Spanish nationalismdefended by the regime had become very close. The definition of Spain as conservative, Catholic, Castilian and homogeneous was at the core ofFrancoist ideology. The desire for the political and cultural recognition of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia was not only disregarded butproscribed.

Franco adopted Catholicism as the defining trait of the Spanish character:‘Our state must be a Catholic state, both from the social and from the culturalpoint of view, as the true Spain always has been, is now and always will bedeeply Catholic.’20 The Catholic character of Spain was tied up to its specialmission as the defender of Christian values, a mission which, according toFranco, could only be carried out by a nation with the ‘special blessing of God’.

42 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism

The Catholic nationalization of culture implied a rejection of all Europeancultural, political and social movements – considered as anti-Spanish – anda return to the traditional values of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.Luis de Araujo-Costa and Ramiro de Maeztu were the main representativesof this trend, which was inspired by the works of Juan Donoso Cortés, Jaume Balmes and, in particular, Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo. As RaúlMorodo points out, ‘Catholic unity’ and ‘national unity’ were employed bythe regime to justify certain historical events and as a source of politicallegitimacy. The version of Spanish history defended by the regime began inthe fifteenth century with the Catholic Monarchs (Reyes Católicos) and theexpulsion of the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula, the establishment ofthe Inquisition and the persecution of Jews. Defence of religious unity coin-cided with defence of state national unity.21 This approach offered aprovidentialist view of history which did not explain the decline of Spaineither as depending on its failure to modernise in line with other democraticand industrialized European countries, or as a consequence of a malfunctionaffecting its socio-economic system, but rather attributed Spain’s backward-ness and all of its problems to a deviation from its national spirit, that is,to a weakening of religious moral unity, an abandonment of its providentialmission and a break with traditional values.

Two basic elements account for the differences among the various formsof fascism adopted in Spain, Germany and Italy. These concern the strategyfollowed to attain political power and the role attributed to religion. In theearly phases of fascism, the differences can be found not so much in the polit-ical tendencies of the new regimes as in the methods used to attain politicalpower. Franco was not the charismatic leader of a mass party like Hitler orMussolini, but rather came to power in a coup d’état supported by somesections of the Army. The Catholicization of fascism adopted by Francoismwas an original aspect that disassociated it from other forms of this ideology.The main representatives of what Morodo calls ‘Catholic fascism’22 includeBorja de Quiroga, marquis of Eliseda, Jorge Vigón, Eugenio Montes and JoséPemartín.

Pemartín was a distinguished member of the group formed around themagazine Acción Española, who made a significant contribution to Francoistideology. In 1938 Pemartín claimed that the Italian and German fascists hadnot created a new ideology. In his view, Spain was already fascist in thesixteenth century, when it was Una, Grande y Libre (United, Great and Free),and when the nation and the state were identified with the eternal Catholicideal. At that time, Spain had become the ‘Model Nation, the Alma Materof Christian and Western Civilization’.23 He considered that the new regimeshould be based on traditionalist principles in order to be genuinely national,that is, Spanish. Pemartín did not have any doubt that ‘The Spanish Nation,if it exists, is Catholic’.24

Spain was identified fully with Castile. Spanish history was reduced to theevents in which Castile played a leading part. The public presence of all the

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Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism 43

languages spoken in the state (obviously with the exception of Castilian) wasbanned, and the cultures of the national minorities were proscribed. Theprototype of Spanish man circulated by the regime was a traditional, Catholic,Castilian labourer. In this context, Manuel García Morente, an influentialintellectual who joined the Francoists at the beginning of the 1940s,published Ideas para la filosofía de la historia de España, a book in which heset forth the doctrine of the ‘Christian knight’, exalted the Middle Ages andstressed the trio Spain–Catholicism–Traditionalism.

Three key ideas attained a superior status in the national Catholic doctrine:motherland, unity and empire.

In the national Catholic discourse, the idea of the motherland (Patria)acquired a traditionalist meaning which constituted a link to the past. Francoemployed the term ‘motherland’ almost constantly to refer to the Spanishnation, a single nation which rejected the national character of Catalonia,the Basque Country and Galicia. In national Catholicism, the motherlandbecame an element of supreme political value. The term ‘motherland’,charged with a powerful emotional content, sought to reproduce the intimate‘mother–child’ relationship and to extend it to the political arena. Just as awell-behaved child would never endanger or dare to offend his or her mother,so the Spaniards had to unite in their loyalty to the motherland. In thiscontext, the Catalans, Basques and Galicians who aspired to independenceor to autonomy exemplified the most execrable sin, a separatism that involvedquestioning or rejecting the (imposed) motherland. In his speech deliveredin Madrid on 18 July 1943 on celebrating the ‘National Uprising’ (AlzamientoNacional), Franco declared:

The motherland is not just a geographic space through which our life passes orall the goods of which the nation consists, including spiritual and cultural goods;the motherland is all this and much more; it is the historical influence of ournation in the world; therefore our idea of the motherland does not allow fordisintegrating particularisms; its spiritual unity, its social unity and itshistorical unity form a single unity of destiny.25

Closely related to the idea of the motherland is the constant appeal to theunity (Unidad) of Spain, already emphasized in the above quotation. Unitywas defended at all levels – national, religious, social and political; it wasnecessary to prevent ‘the others’ from usurping the benefits arising from thelong-lasting continuity of Spain. This explains why Francoism and theSpanish right demonized class struggle and peripheral nationalisms. Francoinsisted that ‘In politics we represent unity, we are not right or left wing,we are Spanish because we have come to lift up Spain’:26

So that no-one can misappropriate the fruits of this efficient continuity,a base that is and always will be essential: Unity; national unity, reli-gious unity, social unity and political unity; a unity felt, defended and

44 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism

put into practice; not just proclaimed as a tactical supposition fromwhich to operate with impunity outside or against those postulates onwhich this unity is rightly based and which were definitively establishedin the Fundamental Laws of the National Movement.27

The idea of empire (Imperio) arose from the ideals of grandeur andsupremacy of the country in relation to others, and was also implied in Italianand especially German fascist doctrine. At the same time, fascism was firmlycommitted to nationalism as a means to link different populations. Imperialreferences disappeared from Franco’s speeches after the defeat of Germanyand Italy in the Second World War. However, with the well-known ‘mythof Spanishness’, an idea proposed by intellectuals from Acción Española, suchas Emilio Vizcarra, Ramiro de Maeztu and Isidro Gomà, an attempt wasmade to recover some kind of Spanish cultural empire embracing LatinAmerica and founded on Catholicism and the use of Castilian. The regimeestablished the 12 October, the day on which Christopher Columbus landedin America for the first time, as the Día de la Raza (Day of the Race),28 laterto become the Día de la Hispanidad (Spanishness Day), to commemorate andcelebrate Spain’s relationship with Latin America (the 12 October is still anofficial bank holiday in Spain).

The creation of a surveillance state

The most sinister aspect of the Franco regime is revealed in the reaction of the former head of the Legión, appointed by Franco as the regime’s press and propaganda chief officer, General José Millán Astray, to Miguel deUnamuno’s criticisms of the glorification of repression and war. These eventstook place on 12 October 1936 at the University of Salamanca in an officialfunction to commemorate the Día de la Raza. After a series of speechesstressing the importance of Spain’s imperial past and, in particular, after the words of Francisco Maldonado de Guevara, who described the Civil Waras a struggle between eternal, traditional Spanish values and the anti-Spainof the ‘reds’, the Basques and the Catalans, a Legionnaire shouted out ‘Long live death!’ (Viva la Muerte!), the battle cry of the Legión. Millán Astrayintervened, proclaiming the triple Nationalist chant of España! (Spain!), towhich those present ritually replied: Una!, Grande! and Libre! (United!Great! Free!). In this environment, the seventy-two-year-old philosopher andnovelist Unamuno, in his talk, branded the Civil War as uncivil, adding that ‘to win was not the same as to convince’ (vencer no es convencer), andstressing that the Catalans and the Basques were no more anti-Spanish thanthose present in that function. An indignant Millán Astray interruptedUnamuno and furiously shouted out: ‘Down with intelligence! Long livedeath!’ Among pushing and shoving, and in a situation of great tension,Doña Carmen Polo de Franco, the dictator’s wife, took hold of the writer’sarm and accompanied him home.29

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Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism 45

During the religious persecution of the Civil War, 6,832 priests and members of religious orders lost their life in Spain.30 This meant that almostall the clergy supported the ‘nationals’ and that after the war such per-secution was invoked to legitimize the violence exercised against theRepublicans. Violence was also resorted to in order to secure the position ofthe ‘victors’. Repression became a recurring characteristic of a regime basedon fear.

The British journalist A.V. Philips reports that in 1940 in Madrid approx-imately a thousand death sentences were issued each month. Between March1939 and March 1940, about 100,000 Republicans were executed inMadrid.31 According to Max Gallo, almost 4,000 people were executedbetween 1938 and 1953 in Catalonia.32 According to Borja de Riquer andJoan B. Culla, between a minimum of 130,000 and an estimated maximumof 150,000 people disappeared from Catalonia, due to death and exile. Thisrepresents over 4.5 per cent of the Catalan population in 1936.33 The prox-imity of the French border and the fact that Barcelona was one of the lastRepublican enclaves to surrender permitted the majority of the most activeopponents of Franco to go into exile, escaping death or imprisonment, beforethe arrival of the ‘nationals’.

Stanley G. Payne indicates that in some places during the first few weeksof the Civil War the executions were transformed into public spectacles.Referring to the ‘national’ zone, Payne writes that, on 25 September 1936,the Valladolid newspaper El Norte de Castilla protested because children were allowed to witness these scenes. On 15 November, the pro-nationalbishop of Pamplona, Marcelino Olaechea, delivered a sermon entitled ‘No more blood!’, demanding an end to executions outside the formal legal process (although in ‘national’ Spain these processes were limited todrumhead court-martials). Even the nazis and the Italian fascists who occa-sionally visited Spain were shocked by the intense degree of repression, andsome even suggested that such an extreme level of violence could be coun-terproductive.34

The ‘state of war’ decreed in July 1936 remained in force until 1948. Theregime branded its political opponents as criminals and employed exemplarypunishments to dissuade people from acting against the new state. Repressionwas omnipresent and indiscriminate. The Catholic church contributed to thelegitimation of the repressive actions, describing political opponents as‘sinners’ who deserved punishment. In spite of this, as demonstrated by HilariRaguer, the Catholic support for the Spanish right was neither pervasive norconstant.35

At the beginning of the cold war the Western powers viewed the estab-lishment of a dictatorship in Spain favourably, preferring it to the restora-tion of democracy and the possibility of a left-wing government coming to power. Franco took advantage of the anti-communist obsession of theUnited States and presented his regime as an effective antidote to Sovietexpansionism:

46 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism

The true Spain is fighting against red Russia and its satellites . . . . Itis the resurrection of a whole nation opposed to foreign invasion withexalted patriotism.36 [. . .]

Our victory embodies the salvation of Spain and prevents it frombecoming a Soviet colony. It embodies a restoration of the national unitythreatened by separatist traitors.37

Franco interpreted the Civil War as a struggle to free Spain from commun-ism, and to legitimize this statement he continuously denounced the SovietUnion’s support for the Republic. It is well known, however, that Francoenjoyed the support of Hitler and of Mussolini, and benefited from the non-intervention agreement signed by Britain and France in August 1936. Thisagreement ended up favouring the ‘nationals’ and harming the Republic. Aclearer attitude by the European powers in favour of the legitimate Spanishgovernment would have made it much more difficult for the Italians and theGermans to support Franco. It should be remembered that, after the SecondWorld War, Italy and the part of Germany not dominated by the SovietUnion joined the Western bloc in its obsession against communism, led bythe United States, while the Soviet Union (Yalta was by now forgotten)became the enemy par excellence.

Borja de Riquer notes the dramatic persistence of the repression exerted bythe regime and distinguishes between various stages. In his opinion, until 1944there was a very generalized and intense repression. This was followed by lessharsh periods, alternating with others in which intransigence reappeared(1948–1953 and 1958–1963).38 The executions of the communist JuliàGrimau García (1963), of the anarchists Francisco Granados Gata and JoaquínDelgado Martínez (1963), of the anarchist Salvador Puig Antich (1974) and offive activists from ETA and the FRAP (Frente Revolucionaro Antifascista yPatriótico) (September 1975) epitomize the culminating points of the violenceexercised during the Francoist period many years after the end of the Civil War.

The repression continued until the 1960s, at times when the opposition,still disorganized, was formed by small groups. Yet, a slow process by meansof which the international community was pushing the regime to abandonits totalitarian nature, in return for its acceptance by the democratic Westernnation-states, had begun.

In Catalonia and the Basque Country people lived with intense fear partlyjustified by the existence of a repressive police apparatus. The police and theFalangists held information on the citizens and supervised the issuing ofpermits, passports, safe-conducts and all kinds of documents. A bureaucraticmachinery was created to control the movements of the population. Apartfrom the accumulation of files on ‘controlled’ and ‘recorded’ people, thissurveillance involved a direct control and intensified police action. Duringthe early post-war years, it was not uncommon for groups of Falangists toburst into ballrooms, cinemas and train stations, stopping everything andforcing everyone to stand up, hold up their right arm and sing the Falangist

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Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism 47

anthem Cara al sol. In addition to the constant and systematic repressionand surveillance, there was a wave of accusations and of denunciations of‘reds’ incited by the regime.39

A further dimension of this surveillance state refers to the purging ofpublic employees regulated by the 10 February 1939 law. This law orderedall those affected to take the oath of allegiance to the ‘Movement’ within a period of eight days and to answer a questionnaire on their political and trade union activities both before and after 18 July 1936. The trial judgesconfirmed the truth of the answers with political reports elaborated by thepolice, the Guardia Civil, the Falange and sometimes the Military Informa-tion Service. The purge was exhaustive and severe in Catalonia. On 17February 1939, the Diputació of Barcelona announced the dismissal of all civil servants and other employees of the abolished Generalitat, some 15,860people, a number which does not include forces of law and order.40 Thepurging of civil servants was intended to punish those who did not supportthe regime and to guarantee the presence of a loyal, indoctrinated, althoughintimidated, bureaucracy throughout the state.

The purging also affected the private sector. It is well known that severalpurging commissions forced some members of the Barcelona Bar Associa-tion and the Medical Association to resign. Journalists were also subject toa rigorous purge. As for industrial and commercial companies, the purgefollowed an order regulating the procedures to dismiss and sanctionemployees. Employers had to submit to the Prefectura Superior de Policiaand to the Delegación Provincial de Trabajo a list of the employees that theywanted to dismiss or to sanction, and these institutions had to approve it.Some employers used the purges to dismiss some of their employees withouthaving to compensate them. Borja de Riquer mentions that in Barcelonaeven the staff of restaurants, cafes and hotels had to present a request to thepolice if they wanted to keep their job or obtain a new one. The purges, andabove all the dismissals, benefited those loyal to the regime, who occupiedmost of the positions made vacant as a result of the law of 25 August 1939.According to this law, 80 per cent of the positions in public organizationsshould be reserved for disabled veterans, former combatants, former prisonersand orphans and relatives of ‘national’ soldiers who had died in service. Atthe Barcelona City Council, for example, the first hundred jobs in the localpolice force were offered to former combatants, thirty of whom weredisabled.41

Maintaining the regime’s repressive apparatus required a considerablebudget. In 1946, 62 per cent of the annual expenses were reserved for militarypurposes.42 Apart from this, in the 1940s the economic policy implementedby the regime was totally inadequate in dealing with the extreme povertyfaced by the country. Thus, while it took most of the Western countrieswhich had participated in the Second World War between five and eightyears to recover the income and production levels and the standard of livingthey enjoyed in 1939, Spain had to wait over fifteen years after the end of

48 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism

the Civil War to reach the levels of 1935.43 In 1939, infant mortality was40 per cent higher than in 1935. Poverty, fear and the struggle for survivalwere the main concerns of most of the population.

Franco and his supporters created a totalitarian state under the protectionof a reactionary version of Catholicism and a fundamentalist version of statenationalism; both elements were artificially imposed upon an impoverishedpopulation. The opposition expected the defeat of nazism and fascism tofavour an external intervention aimed at overthrowing the dictator, but theallied powers never intervened to change the destiny of the Spaniards, prefer-ring a diplomatic blockade of the new state, which in turn led Franco toslacken the pace of social and cultural change.

Against internal diversity

One of the main problems of Spain, since its establishment as a single statein the eighteenth century, concerns the treatment of its national minorities.Throughout time, various attempts were made to solve this problem, butthe state was too weak to impose a lasting, effective policy. Spain was anunderdeveloped country, with very high levels of illiteracy, and this madeit difficult to impose a single language and a culture other than the localone of each region. Franco and his regime perpetrated the first serious attemptto culturally and linguistically homogenize the peoples of Spain.

After the war, most of the population was immersed in a climate of politicalpassiveness. Francoism had achieved its objective of neutralizing a popula-tion now almost exclusively concerned with its own survival. In Cataloniaand the Basque Country, the imposition of national Catholicism involved a policy of homogenization that deliberately rejected the specific identity ofthese two nations. Francoism sought to impose the way in which societyshould see itself and rejected the alternative images that both the Catalansand the Basques had formed, over time, of their own communities. Theelements constituting the Catalan and Basque nations included a well-definedterritory, a specific language and culture, a shared history and the memoryof their political institutions – now dissolved – in addition to a wish todecide their own common political destiny. Francoism pursued the annihila-tion of such alternative images deeply rooted in broad sectors of thepopulation, which ran counter to the image of Spain advanced by the dicta-torship. This opened up a deep rift between the communities that hadenjoyed the social and political recognition of their difference during theRepublic and a regime obsessed with the construction of a homogeneous,centralized Spain. The confrontation between two radically opposed views ofSpain could only be reconciled by establishing a clear-cut separation betweenthe official public sphere controlled by the regime and a civil society almostcompletely reduced to the sphere of private life. The official image thatoccupied the public space had no legitimacy. And the private image of thecommunity had no power.

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Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism 49

3 The re-emergence of Catalannationalism during Francoism

In this chapter I study the processes of cultural resistance which contributedto the survival of Catalan identity during the Franco regime. To begin with,I offer a brief analysis of three periods corresponding to the first stage ofFrancoism, and I then discuss the various actions that led to the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism after the Civil War. The chapter focuseson the following key periods of Catalan resistance to the dictatorship: (1)initial reactions to the Republican defeat and the desire for the new regimeto be short-lived; (2) the acceptance of an increasing consolidation ofFrancoism, together with the rise of a new generation opposed to the dictatorship; and (3) the unity of the Catalan resistance in its defence ofdemocracy and the right to political autonomy within the context of adecaying dictatorship. In the last part of this chapter, I examine some of the consequences of Castilian-speaking mass immigration from other partsof Spain into Catalonia.

Confronting images

Two opposing ideas of nation and state came into play in the Civil War.The Francoists offered an extremely centralized and uniform image of Spain.In contrast, the Republicans defended a moderately diffuse image of a statethat would allow the historical nations, Catalonia, Galicia and the BasqueCountry, to enjoy a certain degree of political and cultural autonomy. Itshould be noted, however, that the centralist view of the Spanish state wasnever exclusive to the Spanish extreme right, but rather a feature shared by most of the political spectrum. The main difference between Spanishpolitical forces lay in their attitude towards internal diversity: while demo-cratic parties accepted it, fascists rejected it.1

Franco’s victory led to the suppression of Catalan political institutions, thebanning of Catalan and the proscription of all the symbolic elements ofCatalan identity, from the flag (the senyera) to the national anthem (ElsSegadors).2

The Francoists, who called themselves ‘nationals’, professed a conservativeform of state nationalism unwilling to accept Spain’s national diversity, since

they saw Spain as a homogeneous country. For them, the unity of the Spanishnation was a non-negotiable principle. Their nationalism was the result of a reaction against modern ideologies, such as socialism and anarchism, andalso a rejection of the Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalist move-ments, regarded as a threat to the traditional socio-political structure ofSpain. The Republic had introduced progressive policies and tried to builda state in which the historical nations were recognized and received a substan-tial degree of cultural and political autonomy. The right-wing nationalismof the Francoists reacted by calling a halt to the modernization of the countryand by choosing to maintain the traditional structures defended by broadsectors of conservative Catholics.

The closed image of Spain imposed by the regime contrasted with theimage of a plural Spain (mainly defended by the Catalans, Basques andGalicians) capable of recognizing and celebrating the wealth of its linguisticand cultural heritage. The opposition between the authoritarian national-ism of Francoism and the nationalism of the Catalans, Basques and Galicians,willing to lay claim to their difference, was evident. On studying therelationship between these two types of nationalism it is essential to bear inmind that, while the regime enjoyed the power and the resources necessaryto impose its vision of Spain, the peripheral nationalisms were dismemberedand condemned to secrecy. Indeed, after the Civil War, the majority of themost important representatives of the democratic political parties banned by the regime went into exile, or were imprisoned or executed. The relation-ship between the ‘victors’ and the ‘defeated’ left no room for dialogue. The authoritarian state designed by Franco did not accept difference, andhad conferred on itself, by force, the power to decide on the status of thehistorical nations included within its territory. The regime’s aim was theircomplete annihilation as nations.

Faced with a repression which pervaded all daily activities, most, althoughnot all, Catalans responded with passive resistance. They had been defeated,their country had been destroyed and they now lived in precarious condi-tions. They had to confront the presence of an army which defended thedictatorship as well as an imported and imposed bureaucracy which onlyspoke and wanted to be addressed in Castilian.

The same efforts that the ‘nationals’ made to suppress any differentialaspect increased the distinction between ‘us’, the Catalans, and ‘them’, theFrancoists (identified with Castilian culture and language, conservatism,centralism and conservative Catholicism), although not all Catalans werenationalist, democratic and anti-Franco, and not all Castilians were supportersof the Franco regime. The submission of Catalan society in the public sphereencouraged a ‘tacit agreement’ and fostered a specific feeling of solidarityamong Catalans – sharing a situation of danger and collective oppression.Most Catalans, irrespective of their social class, regarded the Franco regimeand its officials as a common enemy, not least because the mere fact of being‘Catalan’ was sufficient to generate the suspicion and hostility of the regime’s

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Catalan nationalism during Francoism 51

agents. Only certain sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie received the Francoistvictory with relief and showed their support for the new fascist ideologycommitted to protecting their economic interests.

Catalan identity was preserved thanks to the dynamic and engaged actionof a very small intellectual elite, but above all thanks to family circles withinwhich Catalan was spoken and the most traditional and popular Catalanculture was maintained.

The different stages of early Francoism

Three different stages can be distinguished between the end of the Civil Warin 1939 and 1950.

1939–1944

The dictatorship was fully consolidated between 1939 to 1944. During thatperiod, many Spaniards thought that the future of Franco’s authoritarianregime depended on the outcome of the Second World War. Most of theSpanish Army did not participate in this world conflict. Only the BlueDivision, formed by volunteers, fought on the Axis’s side. Franco resistedHitler’s pressure to full engagement in the Second World War, arguing that Spain had just experienced a devastating war and could not embarkupon another one. Even so, Franco supported the fascists until their defeatseemed inevitable. From then on, Franco declared neutrality and adopted the tactic of rapprochement with the allied countries, especially the UnitedStates.

In the early months of 1939 almost all Catalan Republican leaders were in exile, and it was precisely in exile where an intense debate aboutCatalonia’s future arose between those who maintained that it was stillpossible to recover the Republic and the 1932 Statute of Autonomy, andthose who defended the independence of Catalonia from a position of radicalnationalism. The former supported some form of Catalan autonomy withinthe Spanish state. In contrast, the latter revealed a strong anti-Spanish atti-tude and subscribed to the theory that

nothing good can be expected from Spain, or from the Spanish, giventhat all possible forms of coexistence have been exhausted; the only validpolitical alternative for Catalonia is the struggle for independence.3

Joan Casanovas, from Unió Catalanista, or the Catalan Union, wrote that

Catalonia will not want to risk its peace and well-being, honour and lifeany more due to inland problems that should not affect it. Catalonia willwant to be an independent nation, master of its destiny and responsiblefor its own actions.4

52 Catalan nationalism during Francoism

In February 1939, the institutions of the Generalitat went into exile. Tenmonths had passed since the abolition of the Statute of Autonomy and thesuspension of the Generalitat, decreed by Franco on 5 April 1938. Once estab-lished in Paris, the President of the Generalitat, Lluís Companys, no longerassembled his government.5 On 18 April 1940, Companys formed the ConsellNacional de Catalunya, or National Council of Catalonia, the action of whichwas almost non-existent due to the German invasion of France, which dis-persed its members, many of whom found refuge in Britain and LatinAmerica. A few months later, on 13 September 1940, the Gestapo arrestedCompanys and handed him over to the Spanish authorities. The President ofthe Generalitat was initially transferred to Madrid, where he was interrogatedand tortured, and subsequently taken to Barcelona, where he was court-mar-tialled. Sentenced to death, Lluís Companys was executed in Montjuïc castleon 15 October 1940.

On 29 July 1940, on the initiative of the leader of ERC, Carles Pi i Sunyer,a new National Council of Catalonia was created in London, and was laterextended to include representatives of the Catalans exiled in Latin America.The new National Council defended the continuity of the Republic and self-determination for Catalonia within a federal Spain.

As political parties disintegrated in Spain as a result of the repression exercised by the new regime, the contacts and communication between the opposition groups inside Spain and those in exile became increasinglydifficult. In the winter of 1939–1940, the FNC (Front Nacional de Catalunya,or National Front of Catalonia) was founded in Paris. Although its ideol-ogy was not very clearly defined, its main supporters sought to transformthe FNC into an organization uniting all the Catalan anti-Franco organi-zations. The FNC was in favour of preserving Catalonia’s right to self-determination, and it supported the London National Council of Cataloniacreated by Pi i Sunyer. The FNC organized numerous resistance activitieson both sides of the border. After the dissolution of the London NationalCouncil of Catalonia (1945), the FNC lost influence and decided to join theConsell Nacional de Democràcia Catalana, or National Council of CatalanDemocracy.6

1945–1947

The victory of the allies in the Second World War was celebrated by theopponents of Francoism, who expected a rapid intervention by the alliedforces to overthrow the dictatorship and to restore democracy in Spain. Thisidea led to the reorganization of the governments of the Republic and of theGeneralitat in exile. All political parties increased their activity.7 In 1945,after a sector of ERC had opposed the initiative of Josep Irla, President ofthe Generalitat in exile, to reorganize the National Council of Catalonia,Carles Pi i Sunyer dissolved it. Josep Tarradellas, General Secretary of ERC,defended the creation of a new movement, Solidaritat Catalana, which would

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Catalan nationalism during Francoism 53

bring together all Catalan political and civil forces. The objective of thismovement was to coordinate the anti-Franco struggle and to re-establish theinstitutions of the Republic. It moreover defended a political alternative over-coming the limitations imposed by the 1931 Constitution and the 1932Statute of Autonomy.8

But the allied countries did not take any action to overthrow the Francoistdictatorship,9 with the exception of two United Nations resolutions. Thefirst (12 December 1946) recommended withdrawing ambassadors fromSpain, and the second (17 November 1947) denounced the Franco regime,arguing that it had been created with the collaboration of the Axis powers.The disappointment of the Catalan resistance emphasized the politicaldiscrepancies between the firm defenders of the re-establishment of theRepublic – ERC and the PSUC – and those in favour of initiating a provi-sional period of reflection to discuss the future organization of the state andthe status of Catalonia.10

1948–1950

The threat of a foreign intervention to restore democracy in Spain had evap-orated and very soon Franco received economic support from the UnitedStates (1951) and signed the Concordat with the Vatican (1953). As I havealready mentioned, Franco took advantage of the cold war to present hisregime as an instrument against the expansion of communism, a strategydestined to attain a more favourable international attitude towards the dicta-torship. On 4 November 1950, the United Nations revoked the 1946resolution and from 1955 onwards Spain would be present in all the inter-national institutions sponsored by the UN. These events led to a veryimportant internal crisis among the anti-Franco opposition and forced it toconsider new strategies.

The government of the Generalitat was dissolved on 24 January 1948,although Josep Irla continued to hold the presidency until 1954, the year in which Josep Tarradellas was elected President of the Generalitat after avery controversial process.11 The first Tarradellas government would beconstituted over twenty years later, within the framework of a new demo-cratic Spain.

The anti-Franco opposition failed in its attempt to overthrow the regime,not just because of the persistent and brutally repressive policies of theFrancoist state and the passive and tolerant attitude towards the dictatorshipadopted by Western countries, but also because of its own weaknesses andpolitical mistakes.12

First, I argue that the opponents of the dictatorship were incapable ofdesigning a unitary political alternative to Francoism. The personal and grouprivalries, arising from attitudes and actions which did not always coincide,and the contradictions between the resistance in exile and inside Cataloniaencouraged subjective and emotional behaviour, which made a common

54 Catalan nationalism during Francoism

strategy impossible. Second, opposition forces were convinced that, after theSecond World War, the allies would immediately intervene against theFrancoists, and this led them to focus their strategy on what turned out to bea mistaken assumption. Third, the opposition was too insensitive to the moraland material situation of the working classes in Catalonia and elsewhere. Notonly did triumphalist analyses of the end of Francoism predominate in mostof the editorials of the clandestine press, but they also underestimated thenature of and the social support for the dictatorship. Finally, the oppositionmade a further mistake by ignoring the complexity of the regime, and byneglecting an urgent and deeper reflection on the situation created byFrancoism and its specific characteristics. The combination of all these factorsmade it impossible to plan an effective policy of resistance.

The break with silence

From 1959, with the awareness that the future of Francoism was guaran-teed, a widening gap between large sectors of Catalan society and the regimeemerged. Only those members of the bourgeoisie who had renounced theirnational identity to protect their status and defend their class interests werestill satisfied.13 In this new stage, the homogenizing policies imposed by thedictatorship encountered the opposition of those who wanted to recoverdemocracy and protect Catalan identity. As a threatened national minority,the Catalans devised several kinds of counter-strategies aimed at rejectingthe uniformity dictated by the regime. In what follows, I examine armedstruggle and cultural resistance as strategies employed to combat Francoism.In doing so, I advance an original typology, which embraces various typesof actions aimed at strengthening the cultural resistance led by the Catalansduring this period.

Armed struggle did not take root among the anti-Franco opposition inCatalonia, which preferred using non-violent tactics. The only exception was the maquis, approximately 12,000 armed men who operated mainly inthe Pyrenees.14 The actions of the maquis were not very well organized dueto the absence of a prior agreement between the communist and anarchistpolitical tendencies that they represented. The activities of the maquis inten-sified between 1944 and 1950. From then on, only isolated groups, andsometimes even guerrillas operating almost alone, carried out scatteredactions around Catalonia. The last maquis to die in a direct confrontationwith the forces of law and order were Josep Lluís Faceries (1957), ‘Quico’Sabater (1960) and Ramon Vila ‘Caracremada’ (1963).15

Cultural resistance, that is, the use of all kinds of symbols of Catalan iden-tity in both the public and the private sphere, evolved from the performanceof isolated risky actions to the achievement of numerous activities enlistingmass support. Displaying the Catalan flag or writing graffiti in Catalan wereactions aimed at questioning the regime. These actions symbolically brokethe control of the public sphere wielded by the ‘others’ and confirmed the

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Catalan nationalism during Francoism 55

existence of opposition to the Francoist image of Spain. In the private sphere,resistance took place within family circles and among friends.16

Within the public sphere, four types of opposition actions can be distin-guished, some of which became more consolidated over time, while otherswere only feasible in the later stages of Francoism. I shall distinguish betweensymbolic, interference, elite and solidarity actions.

1 By symbolic action, I refer to a single, normally isolated action executedby a small group or even a single person. The main objective of a symbolicaction is to break the regime’s control of the public space. This categoryincludes, among others, painting graffiti, displaying flags and, in the Catalancontext, floral tributes where once stood monuments dedicated to illustriousor heroic Catalans that the regime had demolished. In Catalonia, symbolicactions were normally conducted in the street and in other public spaces,and were aimed at all possible witnesses who might be present.

2 By interference actions, I refer to isolated actions performed by small groupsduring public events organized by the regime. The aim of these actions wasto challenge the regime at its core by disturbing the rituals and ceremoniesthat were precisely intended to demonstrate that homogeneity and controlhad been successfully imposed. Interference actions involved a high degreeof risk, as in these cases considerable security measures were taken to preventany kind of disturbance. Interference actions were aimed at those attendingthe public event, but also sought to attract the attention of external observers,such as the international press or foreign representatives, informing them ofthe situation suffered by Catalonia, and by Spain in general.

There are numerous examples of interference actions on the long path whichfinally led the country to democracy in 1978.17 The most noteworthy is per-haps the one performed in 1960, during a visit by Franco to Barcelona. Onthis occasion, and to commemorate the centenary of the Catalan poet JoanMaragall, a concert was organized in the Palau de la Música Catalana. Francodid not attend, but four members of his cabinet were present. The programmeincluded El cant de la senyera, with lyrics by Joan Maragall, which has nation-alist connotations. It was removed from the programme at the last minute,but almost two hundred Catalan nationalists, above all members of theAcademy of Catalan Language and of the parapolitical group Crist Catalunya(CC), demanded its performance and, in the end, sang it themselves.18

3 I define elite actions as actions executed by a small, but fervent, group ofintellectuals. In Catalonia, the objective of these actions was to cultivateCatalan language and culture. The activities of the Institut d ’Estudis Catalans,or Institute of Catalan Studies, dismantled in 1939 and reorganized by Josep Puig i Cadafalch and Ramon Aramon i Serra in 1942, belong to thiscategory of action. The Institute was concerned with publishing books and

56 Catalan nationalism during Francoism

articles on medicine, science and other subjects in Catalan. In 1942 theInstitute resumed its teaching activity, limited to linguistics and the historyof Catalan literature, rendered possible due to the financial support of FèlixMillet i Maristany, former FJCC (Federació de Joves Cristians de Catalunya)member who led the patronage group Benèfica Minerva, which disappearedwith the creation of Òmnium Cultural. Another example of elite actions wereindeed the activities of Òmnium Cultural, an institution created in 1961 andlegally recognized in 1967. The teaching of Catalan to small groups and thesponsorship of the Premi d’Honor de les Lletres Catalanes, were some of its mostdistinguished actions.19 In the last stages of the dictatorship, Òmnium Culturalexperienced a dramatic increase in membership, rising from 639 membersin 1968 to 11,000 in 1971.

The first book legally published in Catalan since the Civil War came outin 1942. It was a religious publication produced under the auspices of theCatholic church. Between 1939 and 1946, publishing in Catalan was a veryrisky and difficult activity, which required the use of ingenious strategies toavoid persecution and imprisonment. For example, changing the date andplace of publication, limiting the number of pages as, according to the law,if a book had fewer than thirty-two pages, it was only censored by the localdelegation, without having to send it to Madrid, or publishing completelyclandestine books, such as those of Edicions de la Sirena (1943–1946) andEdicions de la Negra Nit (1945).20

The organization of clandestine cultural groups, such as Amics de la Poesia,Estudi and Miramar, and literary competitions, such as the literary festivalof the Nit de Santa Llúcia and the Cantonigròs Awards, were among the mostimportant elite actions.

The first clandestine Catalan classes go back to 1944, and involved onlythree or four people at a time. Later on, these activities received support fromvarious cultural and religious institutions. The number of Catalan coursesand students increased considerably in the 1960s, but Castilian continuedto be ‘the language of the Empire’, the language of authority and power,which had to be used in public. Catalan, restricted to domestic life and almostclandestine circles, was the language of freedom and resistance. As JoanTriadú indicated, choosing Catalan instead of Castilian meant going under-ground and rejecting the possibility of personal promotion.21 The effect ofthe omnipresent and constant cultural repression imposed on all signs andsymbols of Catalan identity favoured an increasing separation between anelitist Catalan high culture, of restricted access, and a weakened popularCatalan culture. The authoritarian state’s monopoly of the press, radio, tele-vision and the film industry accelerated the disintegration of a Catalan culturepredominantly produced and consumed by the elites.

To illustrate the magnitude and nature of elite actions, I offer a separatestudy of the actions led by two highly influential elite institutions, theCatholic church and the university.

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The Catholic churchThe position adopted by the Catalan Catholic church in relation to the regimewas not homogeneous. Although some ecclesiastic sectors supported it fully,others were critical, to different degrees, of the Francoist ideology andmethods. The latter sectors defended the long-standing role played by the church in the development and promotion of Catalan culture andlanguage over the centuries. The cultural activities of monasteries such asMontserrat, Poblet and Cuixà illustrate this. In addition, the work of bishopJosep Torras i Bages had established an intrinsic link between Catholicismand Catalan identity captured in the idea that ‘Catalonia will be Christianor will not exist’.22

On studying the Catalan church during the Civil War it is important to mention the sector led by Francesc Vidal i Barraquer, bishop of Tarragona,which positioned itself within the Republican legality, by deciding to defend Catalan culture. Vidal i Barraquer did not sign the collective letterfrom the Spanish bishops (Barcelona, 1937) in favour of the AlzamientoNacional.

Among those who adopted a position of neutrality in relation to the armedconflict were the theologian Joan Baptista Manyà, Carles Cardó, author of Lesdues tradicions (1943), and Josep Armengou, author of Justificació de Catalunya(1958). Other people more committed to the Republican Generalitat werethe Jesuit Joan Vilar i Costa and Josep Maria Tarragó i Ballús, founder of theUnió de Treballadors Cristians de Catalunya, or Union of Christian Workers ofCatalonia. Among those who evolved towards pro-Spanish, right-wing andfascist positions, Jordi Casassas mentions Llorenç Riber i Campins, Enric Plai Deniel, Isidre Gomà i Tomàs and Joan Tusquets.23

For its part, and deliberately disregarding the socio-religious situation inCatalonia, the regime sought to place people it could fully trust at the topof the ecclesiastic hierarchy of the country. Two main factors contributed tothe emergence of a rift between some sectors of the Catalan church and theofficial defenders of the regime.

First, some Catalan prelates and laypeople rejected a version of Catholicismimposed from the outside and which offered a much more conservativeoutlook than that existing in Catalonia prior to the Civil War. The increasinginfluence of French progressive Catholicism and the dissemination of theworks of Emmanuel Mounier, Charles Péguy, Jacques Maritain, GeorgesBernanos, Gilbert K. Chesterton and Henri de Lubac, among others,advanced a renewed image of Christianity, opposed to the conservativeversion promoted by the Franco regime.24

Second, some Catalan Catholics could not accept the regime’s flagrantrejection of everything which had a Catalan origin. The extreme conservatismand the visceral rejection of Catalan language and culture incited some sectorsof the Catalan church to voice a critical attitude towards a regime that defineditself as Catholic and that presented its leader as Caudillo por la gracia de Dios(Caudillo by the grace of God).

58 Catalan nationalism during Francoism

The Catalan church played a remarkable role in preserving Catalan, notjust through its use in sermons and religious education, but also as an instru-ment of culture and communication. The abbey of Montserrat contributedto the cultivation of Catalan through publications such as l’Infantil, Serra d’Or and Qüestions de vida cristiana, and through its patronage of bothreligious and non-religious books. In 1958, a group of Catholics concernedwith debates about the future of the church in modern societies, the need toovercome national Catholicism and the role of laypeople within the church,founded Editorial Estela (Estela Press) with the aim of promoting religiousbooks written in Catalan.25 The publishing house Publicacions de l’Abadia deMontserrat (PAM) was officially created in 1971.26 Starting from its fourthissue, the journal Qüestions de vida cristiana was published by Editorial Estela,which favoured contact between the Benedictine monks of Montserrat andthe publishing team, mainly personified in Jaume Lorés, one of the mostoutstanding Catholic thinkers of the time.

In the late 1940s, Catalan progressive Catholicism split into two sectors,those granting priority to the social question and those that placed thenational recovery of Catalonia in the foreground. Thus, the former estab-lished Catholic associations, such as the HOAC, Joventut Obrera Catòlica( JOC) and Acció Catòlica, with the aim of improving the living conditionsof the working class, while simultaneously challenging the hegemony of theregime’s vertical unions. The activities of the Institut Catòlic d’Estudis Socialsde Barcelona, or Catholic Institute of Social Studies of Barcelona, and of themagazine El Ciervo were at the forefront of social Catholicism.27

The latter sector of the Catalan church led numerous and varied activitiesaimed at protecting Catalan language and culture. The most active associa-tions included the Congregacions Marianes, the Virtèlia School and its Confrariade la Mare de Déu de Montserrat, Franciscàlia and the Torras i Bages group.Faith, culture, Catalan nationalism and modernity were the main guidingprinciples of the Study Section of the Lliga Espiritual de la Mare de Déu deMontserrat (1959), which would later give rise to the Centre d’Estudis FrancescEiximenis.

From the 1950s onwards, the Scout movement, created in the image ofthe movement founded in England by Robert Baden-Powell, enjoyed theprotection of the church. In Catalonia, the Scout movement acquired consid-erable nationalist connotations, arising from its emphasis on patriotism and love for the country, thus promoting meetings and trips to the coun-tryside which were used as a cover for parapolitical activities of oppositionto Francoism.28 The OJE (Organización de Juventudes Españolas, or SpanishYouth Organization), created by the regime, stood in opposition to the Scoutmovement.

A group of Catholic nationalists assembled around the CC movement,established in 1954 after a meeting of young leaders of religious associa-tions from the city of Barcelona convened by the Abbot of Montserrat,

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Aureli Maria Escarré.29 In its founding text, written by Raimon Galí, theCC denounced the defeat of the Catalan people by the ‘nationals’ anddescribed Catalonia as a destroyed country, a country that had lost its bear-ings and that could only begin its reconstruction by reflecting on the reasonsfor its defeat.30 According to Jordi Pujol, who was one of the early leadersof CC and who would be elected as president of Catalonia in 1980, intel-lectualism, culturalism and a lack of solidarity were the main negative factorsin Catalonia before the Civil War.31 Xavier Muñoz, leader of CC from 1956to 1961, stressed CC’s desire to distance itself from Francoism by denouncingthe regime’s misappropriation of the Catholic doctrine. In so doing, CCsought to separate religion from Francoism, thus stripping the regime of itsmoral legitimacy.32

The universityIn the first decade of the Franco regime, the official organization of studentlife revolved around the SEU (Sindicato de Estudiantes Universitario, orUniversity Students’ Union) under the control of pro-regime individuals.The SEU existed until the 1960s, when it was pushed out by the action ofthe anti-Franco university movement, which culminated in the creation of the SDEUB (Sindicat Democràtic d’Estudiants de la Universitat de Barcelona,or Democratic Students’ Union of the University of Barcelona) in 1966.

The FUC (Front Universitari de Catalunya, or University Front of Catalonia)was founded in November 1944 in Montserrat, bringing together studentsfrom different tendencies and origins who shared a commitment to thedefence of Catalonia and the struggle against fascism. In its first congress,after analysing Catalan politics prior to the Civil War, the FUC expressedthe need to reconstruct Catalonia politically: ‘Without a national mystiqueit is not possible to redress a people. National mystique, apart from a reli-gious ideal, is the only element capable of awakening the people’s will.’33

Their conviction, as well as what they regarded as their responsibility torebuild the nation, are spelled out in the following paragraph:

His [Enric Prat de la Riba’s] life tells us that students must be inter-ested in politics, but that politics is not about shouting and demon-strating; Catalan politics is about building. And to build we are the oneswith the best means at hand to become leaders prepared to guide theCatalan motherland. All those of us who love Catalonia should receivepolitical training.34

The social policy of the FUC was dominated by the cross-class approachesstemming from the Catholic church’s social doctrine. The FUC wished tounite the so-called Països Catalans politically. The essentialist vision of theFUC led it to state: ‘We consider any backing down and renunciation in thestruggle for a greater Catalonia to contradict the will of God and to be anact of betrayal to the land.’35 The actions of the Generalitat in exile received

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the support of the FUC until after 1947, when the Front almost completelydisappeared.

The university branch of the FNC had a more political character andconcentrated on what I have labelled ‘symbolic actions’. It should be high-lighted that the FNC collaborated with the French resistance during theSecond World War. In 1946, the FNEC (Federació Nacional d ’Estudiants de Catalunya, or National Federation of Students of Catalonia) led an attemptto unite efforts in order to openly confront the SEU and the Falangists. The FNEC’s main objective was to create a Catalan university within a free Catalonia enjoying the right to self-determination. The activities of theFNEC were mainly aimed at the Catalanization and democratization of the university.

In the mid-1950s, the anti-Franco university movement regained momen-tum and became a problem for the regime. The University of Madrid wasclosed for the first time in February 1956, and the University of Barcelonain November of the same year, as a reaction prompted by the vociferousstudent protest against events in Hungary. Solidaritat Universitària (1955–1956), which later would give rise to a union of socialist groups, advancedthe first alternative curriculum to the Francoist university. The new univer-sity would have to be autonomous, Catalan and democratic. The NEU (NovaEsquerra Universitària, or New University Left) was one of the numerous asso-ciations founded at the end of the 1950s, a period during which the FNECexperienced a process of revitalization. The Comité de Coordinació Universitària,or University Coordination Committee (1958–1959), a unifying body with representatives from the PSUC, NEU, MSC (Moviment Socialista deCatalunya) and sometimes the CC, granted priority to social issues abovenational ones.

University groups were involved in numerous solidarity actions whichbecame decisive in arousing the social and political passion, which, in the1970s, favoured the transition to democracy and the return to a party systemin Spain. Between 1960 and 1961, the university opposition movementpromoted three elite actions which achieved massive public support: thecampaign in favour of the creation of chairs of Catalan language and culturewithin the university; the campaign against the increasing influence of OpusDei; and the demand for amnesty for political prisoners and exiles.

At this point, I would like to examine two specific examples of elite actions,the former organized within the university sphere and known as theCaputxinada, and the latter led by a group of priests. Both actions took placein Barcelona in the mid-1960s, when the decline of the regime was begin-ning to be felt and the opposition was becoming stronger. In February 1965,a group of approximately 400 students and intellectuals gathered in themonastery of the Caputxins de Sarrià to create the SDEUB. They demandedfreedom of expression, of association and of research, and defended thecultural and linguistic pluralism of Spain, which they defined as a multi-national society. A few hours after the meeting began, the police besieged

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the venue, but did not enter, respecting the immunity of religious build-ings granted by the state to the church. The police maintained the siege forthree days. The Caputxinada led to the spontaneous condemnation of theregime by various sectors of Catalan society and immediate solidarity amongvarious anti-Franco circles.

The ‘demonstration of the priests’ on 11 May 1966 in Barcelona wasanother example of an elite action. On this occasion, 130 priests were involvedin a peaceful and silent march to the police headquarters on Via Laietana (a centrally located Barcelona boulevard), where they sought to deliver aletter of protest against torture inflicted upon the student Joaquim Boix.But, to the amazement of passers-by, the forces of law and order violentlydispersed and pursued the priests, causing commotion because, in general,the clergy was considered to be one of the pillars of the regime. This action led to the immediate repression of the most progressive sectors of the church. From then on the reaction of the Catholic hierarchy faithful tothe regime undermined the strength of the Christian progressive movement in Catalonia.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the influence of the 1968 student up-risings in France and the ‘Prague Spring’ favoured the proliferation of radicalorganizations within the university. The nationalist groups, however, dis-appeared from the university arena, which at that time perceived nationalistdemands as bourgeois. It was not until after Franco’s death (1975) thatnationalist groups re-emerged within the university.

4 The final stages of the regime witnessed an increase in the number ofwhat I have called ‘solidarity actions’. By solidarity action I mean an actionthat is usually instilled by a small elite but whose aim is to attain massmobilization. The objective of a ‘solidarity action’ is to show the opposition’sstrength by focusing upon a particular demand and presenting it as un-deniable given the massive support it receives. I identify a basic differencein relation to the context in which solidarity actions, symbolic actions andinterference actions are executed. While the last two intend to break theregime’s control of the public space at a time characterized by a high degreeof repression, solidarity actions are only feasible in an environment markedby a relative attenuation of the oppressive nature of the regime.

Solidarity actions are primarily aimed at the regime’s officials, who haveno alternative but to recognize the power of those who are ‘different’, butthey are also intended to attract the attention of the media and foreignobservers.

As an example, I shall mention just two of the frequent solidarity actionsthat proliferated in the last few years of the regime. These are the so-called‘Galinsoga affair’ and the demonstration of 11 September 1977 in Barcelona,two years after Franco’s death. On 21 June 1959, Luis Martínez de Galinsoga,Chief Editor of La Vanguardia, the main newspaper published in Catalonia,

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and a well-known anti-Catalan, attended mass in the Barcelona parish of Sant Ildefons. When the sermon began, Galinsoga addressed the sacristy toprotest because the mass was in Catalan. Galinsoga left the parish churchmuttering that todos los catalanes son una mierda (all Catalans are shits). Thisincident spread within Barcelona and, at the end of November 1959, a groupof people decided to launch a campaign against Galinsoga. They organizedpublic sessions tearing up copies of La Vanguardia and circulated leafletsdemanding that people stop buying the newspaper. They also wrote to thenewspaper’s advertisers, asking them to withdraw their publicity. The endof the campaign consisted of breaking the windows of the La Vanguardiabuilding and of ripping up copies of the newspaper at the Barcelona foot-ball club stadium after Sunday’s match. In this solidarity action, a smallgroup succeeded in mobilizing a broad section of the population in defenceof a specific demand: the resignation of Galinsoga. He was finally removedfrom office in February 1960. A few days later a leaflet entitled ‘Victory forCatalonia’ was circulated. It declared:

Above all this campaign has been of great value: it has shown to everyone,natives and foreigners, that Catalonia is alive, that Catalonia is standingup again, that Catalonia is conscious again, that Catalonia will once againbe a strong country.36

In the 11 September 1977 demonstration, a million people gathered todemand a Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia. Franco was already dead andthe political reform proposed by Adolfo Suárez, then Prime Minister of Spain,had been ratified by an overwhelming majority. Even so, the status thatCatalonia would achieve within the new democratic Spain had yet to bedecided. The Catalans, through this display of strength, manifested theiroutright rejection of a simple administrative decentralization of the state anddemanded political autonomy.

Cultural resistance in the private arena was exercised, above all, by the middleclasses and some sectors of the bourgeoisie critical of Francoism. Among theworking class and the rural population, maintaining the Catalan languageand culture was not the result of a systematic resistance strategy, as was thecase among the middle class. Most of the working class, rural and urban,did not have access to the clandestine circulation of Catalan literature, newsabout the creation of Catalan literary awards and the more or less clandes-tine teaching of Catalan. They spoke in Catalan because they always haddone, it was the language they had learned from their parents and at schooland it was normal to use it in everyday life. Catalan was employed to expresstheir most intimate emotions and feelings. Castilian was compulsory at work,at school and in dealing with state agencies. All official documents had tobe written in Castilian as it was the dominant language in public life; Catalanwas limited to the private sphere. Thus, when Catalans repeated the words

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of the ‘others’, they always used Castilian, the language of the ‘outsider’, thelanguage of power.

In any case, no-one is capable of completely controlling the thoughts ofothers. Languages are not given naturally and are not eternal, but they canbe perceived as such because a language not only transcends the life of indi-viduals in space and in time, but also gives them the opportunity to definethemselves, to relate to each other, to express their feelings and to distin-guish themselves from others and from nature.

The main questions concerning identity are: Who am I? Who are we?But, without a language, it is not possible to answer them. Identity speaksin a specific language for each individual; language generates a feeling ofintegration, a feeling of community among all its speakers and becomes asymbol of ‘belonging’ to a specific group, generating the distinction between‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Language allows the past to be recorded and sharedmemories to be evoked, and it is an instrument of social reproduction. Theimmediate identification and categorization of people according to thesubtlest differences in how they speak a particular language – as membersof a social class, a specific region or even a people – is an example of theclose connection established between identity and language, and the com-plex mechanisms employed when we endeavour to identify the ‘other’. In Catalonia, language is the distinguishing and most important element ofCatalan identity; hence the obsession of the Franco regime, and many others before it, to reduce the Catalan language to a philological curiositywithout any social use. The weakening of Catalan would irremediably markthe disappearance of the most original (and irreplaceable, once lost) featureof Catalan identity. To understand this reasoning, I would like to stress the great relevance that Spanish institutions confer upon the promotion ofCastilian, both inside and outside the state boundaries. It would be almostunthinkable to conceive of a Spain in which Castilian was not spoken andcultivated, just as it would be for a large number of Catalans to imagine aCatalonia in which Catalan, their own language, was not spoken. Even so,language is not an essential factor of national identity, as illustrated, forexample, by the persistence of Scottish identity, despite the loss of Gaelic.

Demands for the restoration of the Catalan language regained momentumwith the Nova Cançó (New Folk Song), a movement that emerged in the1960s. According to Salvador Giner,37 the Nova Cançó was able to encapsu-late the confrontation between different generations. It also embodied ideasstemming from the Western pacifist and ‘protest’ movements, anti-fascism,the resurgence of nationalism and pan-Catalanism. The Nova Cançó was orig-inally founded by a small middle-class intellectual group of amateur singersand soon developed into an entirely popular phenomenon. ‘Protest songs’and classical or modern poetry turned into lyrics enjoyed an extraordinarysuccess in all social segments of the Catalan-speaking territories. The moreCatalan singers were banned from the media and their concerts prohibited,the more popular they became. As Joan Triadú wrote,

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the Nova Cançó represented the arrival of youth and the conversion toCatalan, in public, of waves of dispersed youth, originating from themost decatalanized nursery due to the neutral years of Francoism [. . .]the Nova Cançó rehabilitated a culture.38

The great conspiracy39

Nationalism is based upon a political discourse capable of embracing differentpolitical ideologies. It has been appropriated by Marxism, liberalism, conser-vatism and right-wing and fascist ideologies, among others. One shouldconclude that nationalism is insufficient as a programme for political actionsince the ideology to which nationalism is linked decides how the nationwill be constructed, and what social, political and economic policies will bepursued in its name. In a stateless nation subordinated to a state engaged ina firm homogenizing process which disregards national minorities, a certaindegree of cooperation and of solidarity among opposition forces generallyemerges. The Assembly of Catalonia, founded in 1971, exemplifies thecapacity of Catalan nationalism to overcome, at a given moment, its internalideological divisions.40

Although the Franco regime underwent various modifications throughoutits existence, for example changes to the laws regulating the restrictionsapplied to the publication of books in Catalan (from some 450 a year from1970 to 1972, to 513 in 1973 and 611 in 197541), the Catalan languagewas not officially accepted as an optional subject in public schools until May 1975. As for the radio, Catalan stations, unable to compete with themonopoly of Radio Nacional de España, had to restrict the use of Catalan tofolkloric programmes. From 1974 to 1975, television broadcasting in Catalanwas limited to two hours per week. In addition, up to the end of Francoism,newspapers published in Catalonia were solely written in Castilian.

The new Press and Printing Law came into force in March 1966. Preparedby Manuel Fraga Iribarne, then Minister of Information and Tourism, itrepresented a timid attempt to liberalize the regime. This law replaced theprevious, compulsory censorship by a ‘voluntary consultation’ with theauthorities and allowed press editors to be appointed freely.

This pseudo-liberalization process was paralysed by the state of emergencydeclared on 24 January 1969 under the pretext of combating ‘the studentsubversion’ – ‘the orgy of nihilism, of anarchism and of disobedience’ – thatprevailed in universities. This triggered a new wave of indiscriminate repres-sion against the opposition.42

The creation of the Taula Rodona, or Round Table, in 1966 stood as thefirst serious attempt to organize a united action of opposition to the regime.It was in this context that the Comissió Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques deCatalunya, or Political Forces of Catalonia Coordinating Commission, wasset up in 1969, formed by the PSUC, UDC, ERC and MSC. In the sameyear, the regime intensified its repressive activities with the appointment ofAdmiral Luis Carrero Blanco as Prime Minister.

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In 1970 the toughening of the regime was illustrated by the persecutionof Basque nationalism, which culminated in the court-martial held in Burgosof sixteen ETA members, six of whom were sentenced to death. In Catalonia,the opposition called for the mobilization of the citizens and about 300intellectuals locked themselves in the monastery of Montserrat for three days (from 12 to 14 December 1970) to protest against these sentences. The‘sit-in’ led to the constitution of the Assemblea Permanent d’Intel.lectuals, or Permanent Assembly of Intellectuals, which drafted a manifesto againstthe regime that had international echoes. This undoubtedly influencedFranco’s decision to commute the death sentences dictated against the sixETA members convicted in Burgos.

On 7 November 1971 about 300 people, representing different political,social and professional sectors of Catalonia, founded the Assembly of Catalonia,a clandestine organization which soon became the broadest and mostimportant unitary Catalan movement since the Civil War. No similar unitarymovement, in view of its scope and its relevance, was created in any otherpart of Spain. According to Josep Benet, a member of the Assembly, ‘withoutthe mobilizing power of the Assembly and its prestige, the Suárez govern-ment and even some Spanish democrats would hardly have taken the Catalannational demands into account’.43 The Assembly, initially founded by thesocialists and, in particular, the communists, received the economic supportof the group led by Jordi Pujol which subsequently joined it.44 The MSC andthe PSUC won over the support of significant sectors of the working classand of a high number of Castilian-speaking immigrants. They all voiced theneed to bring together democracy, left-wing policies and autonomy forCatalonia.

The main aims shared by the Assembly members were: ‘achieving a generalamnesty for political prisoners and exiles’, ‘the upholding of the fundamentaldemocratic rights: freedom of assembly, of speech and of association –including trade unions, of demonstration and the right to strike, which guar-antee the effective access of the people to economic and political power’, ‘theprovisional re-establishment of the institutions and of the principlesembodied in the 1932 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, as a clear expression ofthe right to self-determination’, and ‘the coordination of all peninsularpeoples in fighting for democracy’.45 Its motto was: ‘Freedom, Amnesty andStatute of Autonomy’.

The Assembly worked tirelessly to circulate these demands, in particularamong immigrants. Two campaigns were organized in 1972 and 1973 whichobtained strong popular support: ‘Why the 1932 Statute?’ and ‘In Catalan,everywhere and all levels’. Various bodies, cultural and religious groups, aswell as leading figures from Catalan society, gradually joined this movement.

The mobilizing action of the Assembly continued until the first demo-cratic parliamentary election held on 15 June 1977. From then on, therecently legalized political parties became the new political actors. The unityof the opposition did not last long and was replaced by competition between

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the ‘images’that the Catalans had of their country and of the status thatCatalonia should have within Spain, depending on their loyalties and on thepolitical interests of the different parties.

Immigrants

From the 1950s and up to 1975, Catalonia experienced a dramatic increasein its population. In 1950, the population of Catalonia was 3,240,313 and in 1975 it had risen to 5,663,125.46 Such a spectacular increase was largely due to the arrival of 1,400,000 immigrants from other parts ofSpain.

The high percentage of immigrant population and the complete absenceof Catalan institutions with the political and financial means to respond tothis phenomenon transformed immigration into a serious threat for thesurvival of Catalan identity. The immigrants were mainly young Castilian-speaking people, generally not very well educated, from different areas ofSpain and ignorant of the national, cultural and linguistic diversity of a Spainpresented by the regime as homogeneous. Most of these immigrants joinedthe unskilled industrial workforce concentrated in the industrial belt aroundBarcelona.47 By holding more than one job and by working long hours, mostimmigrants achieved a higher standard of living than the one that they hadin their place of origin. Thus, in 1967, in the province of Barcelona the per capita income was 62,615 pesetas a year, while in Seville, the richestpart of Andalusia, the income was 33,841 pesetas and in Jaén it was lessthan 23,000.48

In the 1960s, immigration and its impact on Catalan identity gave riseto a lively intellectual and political debate exemplified in the book Els altrescatalans (1964), in which Francesc Candel i Tortajada denounced the precar-ious living conditions endured by immigrants. Four main positionsconcerning immigration can be identified.

The first was represented by Jordi Pujol, the author of Immigració i inte-gració (1958), for whom ‘anyone who lives and works in Catalonia and whowants to be Catalan is a Catalan’.49 This definition focused on social iden-tity and not on ethnicity. Being Catalan was thus a question of choice, a freedecision. Pujol recognized the difficult conditions in which immigrants livedand defended their integration in a Catalan society which, in his opinion,should not change its historical identity. For Pujol, immigrants have rights,but they also have the duty to respect and accept the identity of thecommunity that receives them.

The second position was spelled out in the booklet by Manuel Cruells, Elsno catalans i nosaltres (1965), in which Cruells stressed the progressive distancebetween the two communities, the Catalan community and that of immi-grant origin. In so doing, he revealed the resistance to, and the rejection of,the Catalan language and culture by Castilian-speaking people.

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The third position was represented by a left-wing approach, situatedbetween social Catholicism and Marxism. According to this view, theoriesof assimilation and integration of immigrants should be rejected. Someauthors identified Catalan nationalism with the bourgeoisie, and neglectedthe strong anti-Franco and democratic component of Catalan nationalism.This position conferred absolute priority to class struggle and relegated thenational question to the background.50

A fourth, also left-wing, position was defended by the PSUC, whichdemanded the right of Catalonia to self-determination and the recognitionof Catalan as an official language. As Fernando Claudín said at the I PSUCCongress: ‘The non-Catalan comrades who have a role of responsibility inthe PSUC should strive to understand and speak Catalan. This would helpthem to merge more closely with the Catalan people.’51 By defending Catalanas the language of all the citizens of Catalonia, cutting across class bound-aries, and stressing that freedom for Catalonia as a nation could not bedissociated from social demands, the PSUC succeeded in raising the aware-ness of large sectors of the immigrant population. In so doing, the PSUCmade a crucial contribution to Catalonia’s social cohesion.

As Katherine Woolard points out, in Catalonia language is a key symbolof identity. Speaking in Catalan is a sign of assimilation and at the sametime is associated with incorporation into a network of Catalan friendships.Acceptance of the language is connected with recognition of some culturaltraits, such as hard work and personal commitment, which the Catalansappreciate and describe as one of their defining features.52 For his part, theAmerican sociologist Hans Johnston maintains that immigration in Catalonia was favoured by Catalan industrialization, rather than by a Spanishindustry organized by the state according to an internal colonial model. Inhis view, this placed the control of economic resources in the hands of Catalanpeople, a fact which contributed to increasing the value of Catalan culturein the eyes of the immigrants. Johnston also indicates that the main workers’ organizations supported nationalist demands during the anti-Francomobilization.

Although Johnston is correct in pointing at the Catalan bourgeoisie’scontrol of industry within Catalonia, in my view he is wrong to assume that,as a result of this, Catalan culture acquired greater prestige among mostimmigrants. Johnston not only describes an exaggerated level of integrationof immigrants, but also idealizes their attitude towards Catalan language and culture. Johnston argues that ‘most observers attribute the high statusgranted to the Catalan language to the higher economic status of the nativepopulation’.53 The following three objections can, however, be made toJohnston’s theory.

First, Johnston completely ignores the importance acquired in Cataloniaby a very significant and relatively powerful segment of Castilian-speakingimmigrants acting as the regime’s representatives. This group occupied key positions in the administration, the Army and the church, and formed

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a closed elite only accessed by some members of the pro-Franco Catalanbourgeoisie. During the dictatorship, a Castilian-speaking bureaucracyadministered Catalonia and I argue that this provides a potent argumentcapable of questioning the prestigious status that Johnston attributes toCatalan, unless he is referring to the last years of Francoism and the begin-ning of the transition to democracy. Catalan only began to enjoy a relevantstatus, capable of overcoming the confinement to which it had beencondemned, in the 1970s.

Second, Johnston’s assessment of the main workers’ organizations’ supportfor nationalist demands during the anti-Franco mobilization could lead usto some mistaken conclusions, both in relation to the analysis presented andto the conclusions that he draws from it. In a context of repression, in whichthe political parties and the unions acted in secrecy and were constantlycontrolled by the regime, there were very few militants. Indeed, the strengthof these organizations would only become clear in the 1970s, when theyachieved mass following. Johnston’s analysis does not establish any distinc-tion between the changing contexts of Catalan society during the differentstages of Francoism and the influence of the regime on the various attitudesadopted by immigrants towards accepting Catalan identity. His versioncorresponds to the years of the Assembly of Catalonia and to the process thatculminated in the 1979 Statute of Autonomy, but cannot be accepted as anaccurate description of the attitude of immigrants towards Catalan cultureover the Francoist period.

Third, any study of the immigration received by Catalonia duringFrancoism cannot ignore the negative attitude adopted by some sectors ofthe immigrant population who identified with Francoism, accepted the ideaof a centralized Spain and only spoke, or wanted to speak, in Castilian. TheFranco regime favoured Castilian-speaking immigration in Catalonia as afurther strategy aimed at eradicating Catalan identity, although most immi-grants were probably not aware of this. In addition, a distinction should bemade between an initial wave of immigration, which favoured Civil Warveterans who had fought on Franco’s side, and the immigration of the 1960sand 1970s, which included people from a younger generation.

As established by a weighty literature which describes and analysesFrancoism, during the years of the regime and in particular in its early stages,all signs and symbols of Catalan identity were banned, and the Catalans weresubject to contemptuous comments concerning their language and theirstatus. This favoured the emergence of feelings of superiority among somesectors of immigrants, fully identified with the single culture and languageimposed by the regime. This attitude was widespread in the administrationand in the Army, although not restricted to those spheres, and it only beganto change under the pressure of the anti-Franco opposition once the processfor political reform had been initiated in 1976.

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4 Catalonia within the newdemocratic Spain

The transition to democracy can be regarded as an attempt by the Francoistpolitical class to adjust its institutions to the requirements of modern society.In the 1970s, a growing dislocation between the social and the politicalsphere turned into a source of great concern for a regime forced to confrontthe numerous problems affecting Spanish society. Francoism, in spite ofvarious attempts to adapt itself to a changing domestic and internationalenvironment, remained ill-suited to rule a country experiencing continuousand deep transformations of far-reaching consequences – a country which hadevolved from a rural into an industrial society and whose wealthier and moreindustrialized areas were Catalonia and the Basque Country.

The dramatic demographic revolution of the 1960s included substantialinternal migrations which led to accelerated growth in urban areas. A newmiddle class and some sectors of the bourgeoisie, which had initiallysupported the regime, were now pressing for reform. Faced with an economycharacterized by a predominantly isolationist orientation, these new sectorssaw the importance of widening Spain’s outlook; in particular, they calledfor Spain to be integrated within the European Union (then the EuropeanCommunity). In 1975, with a million people unemployed and an inflationrate of 30 per cent, the deficiencies of Francoism and the need for changewere evident.1

Illiteracy had decreased considerably, from the 50 per cent recorded in1931 to 10.98 per cent for women and 10.44 per cent for men, in the latestages of Francoism.2 Moreover, Catholicism, which had been the main legit-imizing force of the Franco regime, entered an unprecedented crisis, whilewitnessing the emergence of a new secular society. All these changes shouldbe considered in the context of a new international political scenario, withinwhich Spain could only be fully accepted if it joined the Western democra-cies and, in order to do so, it was essential to create a new political systemcapable of changing the imposed image of a homogeneous, conservative Spainruled by a totalitarian regime. It was urgent to replace the Spanish arche-type created by national Catholicism. The forced isolation endured by Spanishsociety since the Civil War had gradually diminished. The impact of thenew technologies, communications and industrialization made it impossible

to silence the increasingly numerous voices calling for democratic reform.New values and lifestyles emerged that questioned obsolete political andsocial structures. The convergence of these factors stood as a sign of thegrowing disillusionment of many sectors of society with Francoism and this,in turn, generated a crisis of authority. It was difficult for the regime tosilence and confront the democratic demands of trade unions and politicalparties that were still illegal. Change became inevitable.

Breakdown or reform were the two options faced by Spanish people on thedeath of Franco in 1975. The political elite opted for reform but, as JoséLuis Cebrián indicates, the outcome implied a democratic break with thepast.3 While initially remaining faithful to Francoist legislation, the regimecommitted historical suicide on opening up the path to democracy. Thebreakdown of the system was induced from the top, and this created a pecu-liar situation: while the dictatorship disappeared with the death of thedictator, the public administration and the state institutions remained intact.

In this respect, Jordi Solé Tura maintains that the transition to democ-racy was possible due to a combination of three factors:4 (1) the institutionalstability deriving from the important role played by King Juan Carlos I insupporting political change; (2) the attitude of dialogue adopted by thevarious political parties committed to reaching a consensus on key issuescrucial to a successful transition to democracy – a reaction which followedthe overwhelming support given by Spaniards to the 1976 political reformproject and the first democratic election in 1977; and (3) the active mobi-lization of broad sectors of the population in favour of the democratizationof Spain, in contrast to the circumspect attitude adopted by the church andthe Army. This process broke with the Francoist legacy expressed in thefamous phrase todo está atado y bien atado (there are no loose ends).

Probably the most dangerous legacy of Francoism was the need for a demo-cratic response to the demands of the historical nations, which had enduredyears of repression topped by repeated attempts at their annihilation. It wasnecessary to overcome the reservations of conservative centralist politicianscommitted to the defence of a united and homogeneous image of Spain. Weonly need to recall the words of José Ortega y Gasset, ‘Spain is a thing builtby Castile’ and ‘Castile built Spain and Castile broke it up’, on interpretingMedieval history. From this perspective, Spain was portrayed as the result ofa process of incorporation imposed by Castile on the periphery because Castile‘knew how to command’. Another author from the same generation, ClaudioSánchez-Albornoz, wrote, ‘Castile built Spain and Spain broke Castile up’,and Ramón Menéndez Pidal considered the periphery (that is, what wasopposed to the central state) to be ‘dispersive and the product of decadence’.5

As Javier Tusell points out, these approaches can be found at the origin ofthe intellectual tradition of Spanish liberalism and contrast with a pluralvision of Spanish reality and culture.6

After almost forty years of confrontation and resentment between the‘victors’ and the ‘vanquished’ of the Civil War, the transition to democracy

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required what the left and some progressive Catholic groups referred to as‘national reconciliation’. It was imperative to replace the ‘culture of resis-tance’ by a ‘culture for democracy’.7

The 1978 Constitution

The 1978 Constitution resulted from the consensus reached by the mainpolitical parties elected in the first democratic election after the Civil War.The need to obtain the support of both Francoist reformists and anti-Francoistgroups generated continuous arguments while drafting the Constitution.Such discrepancies were reflected in the lack of precision and coherenceevident in some parts of the constitutional text. It should be noted that, forthe first time, Spain had a Constitution that was not the outcome of theopposition of a single political party to the others and which, in spite ofsome limitations and defects, offered a political model that ‘was not exclu-sive or divisive, but integrative’.8 The radically conservative character of thebrand of Spanish nationalism promoted by the Franco regime was questionedby the 1978 Constitution, which not only aspired to transform Spain into ademocratic state, but also recognized the existence of nationalities and regionswithin its territory.

The preamble to the Constitution proclaims the desire of the Spanishnation to ‘Protect all Spaniards and the peoples of Spain on exercising theirhuman rights, their cultures and traditions, languages and institutions.’9

Article 2, probably the most controversial, reveals the tension betweendefending the unity of Spain and the social pressure for the historical nation-alities of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country to be recognized:

The Constitution is based upon the indissoluble unity of the SpanishNation, the common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards, and recog-nizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities andregions forming it and solidarity between all of them.10

Even more important, though, is the outright rejection of the centralistmodel imposed by Francoism embodied in this Article, which at the sametime endeavours to reconcile the two ideas of the Spanish nation at stakeduring the Civil War. Article 2 declares that ‘unity’ has to be preserved,although it could be argued that ‘unity’ is somehow questioned by the recog-nition of ‘nationalities and regions’ at the heart of Spain. As Colomer states,this involves the recognition of ‘differentiated group consciousnesses’ formedhistorically.11 According to Solé Tura, it is very controversial and legallyambiguous to emphasize the unity of a ‘nation’ while recognizing the exist-ence of ‘nationalities’ within it.12 In this context, the reference to the ‘Spanishnation’ as the ‘common patria’ of all Spaniards seems implicitly compatiblewith the existence of other ‘small patrias’ such as Catalonia and the BasqueCountry.

72 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

The right to autonomy for the nationalities and regions forming Spainprompted the creation of the Autonomous Communities System. However,although Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, which during theSecond Republic had held plebiscites in favour of their own statutes ofautonomy, and which in 1978 were enjoying recently restored provisionalautonomous regimes, immediately gained ‘full autonomy’, other commun-ities had to undergo a five-year period of ‘restricted autonomy’ before doingso (Article 143 versus Article 151 of the Constitution). Once full autonomyhas been achieved, however, the Constitution makes no distinction betweenthe different communities; rather, it places nationalities with a strong feelingof identity embedded in a common culture, language and past on the samelevel as artificially created ‘communities’, lacking any previous sense ofidentity (Articles 143 and 144).

According to Enric Fossas, the Constitution limits itself to establishing prin-ciples and procedures leading to a territorial reorganization of power whichcould result in different political models. In his opinion, the so-called‘autonomous model’ is a ‘pre-constitutional’ model, because the ‘provisional’regimes of autonomy granted to various ‘communities’ prior to the Con-stitution determined its own drafting and its subsequent development. And itis also ‘sub-constitutional’, because the Constitution did not create the Auto-nomous Communities System – it did not create the autonomous communities,nor did it define their territories, determine their organization, or set up theirpowers. The Magna Carta restricts itself to determining ‘procedures’ in whichthe key figures are local representatives, who have to declare their desire forautonomy, and central state institutions, in particular the parliament, throughthe development of the so-called ‘Constitutional block’ (including statutes ofautonomy and laws delimiting their devolved powers) and the ConstitutionalCourt, as the supreme interpreter of the constitutional text through itsjurisprudence. Fossas stresses the singular nature of the 1978 Constitution,according to which the construction of the Autonomous Communities Systemis ruled by the so-called principio dispositivo. This establishes that the territorialrestructuring of the country must not be directed from the centre, but stemfrom the will of the various territories and their representatives, to which theConstitution offers several routes to political autonomy.13

The creation of the Autonomous Communities System endeavoured torespond to the nationalist demands of the Basque Country and Catalonia.Both communities believed that they were entitled to self-determination, andthat they had the power to press for a political solution to their claims.However, what some saw as a fair demand was regarded by others as a threatto the unity of the ‘Spanish nation’. Large conservative sections of the Armyand the civil service, as well as former Francoists, were hostile to the recog-nition of nationalities within Spain. Even today there is no agreement con-cerning the meaning of the term ‘nationality’. In fact, most politiciansbelonging to these ‘nationalities’ refer to them as ‘nations’ and use the expres-sion ‘Spanish state’ to avoid employing the term ‘Spanish nation’.

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Catalonia within the new democratic Spain 73

Once the Constitution had been ratified, there was a matter of implement-ing it. At the time, it was not clear whether the Constitution would lead toa simple administrative decentralization of the state or whether, on thecontrary, it would symbolize a true recognition of the cultural and politicalaspirations of the national minorities. In the words of Isidre Molas, grantingthem self-determination was quite equivocal, because it was not yet clearhow much real power would be devolved to Catalonia and how self-deter-mination would be defined.14 Joan Reventós, at the time leader of the PSC,feared that the recognition of political autonomy for the nationalities andregions would be reduced to mere rhetoric, thus posing a serious threat tothe future stability of Spain.15

The Constitution laid the foundations for a new territorial organization ofthe Spanish state, divided into seventeen autonomous communities. The rela-tions between some autonomous communities and the central governmenthave had their high and low points since 1978. The Constitution sought toreconcile the territorial integrity of the state with a considerable degree ofcultural and political autonomy for the nationalities and regions included init. This inevitably led to the rise of some tensions and problems betweentwo entities, the central state and the historical nationalities, seeking thesame objective; that is, the creation and promotion of the nation, but a nationfilled with a different content in each case. The Spanish state endeavouredto consolidate the Spanish nation, in order to obtain legitimacy and to avoidhaving to reduce its relations with the citizens to a simple political form ofinteraction defined by the concept of citizenship. From a position of Spanishnationalism, J. Ramón Parada argues that ‘preaching the differential aspectof [peripheral] nationalisms seems to be a political propaganda operation’,and defends the theory that, to maintain the unity of Spain, ‘an agreementbetween the Spanish-wide political parties [this excludes regional parities]is necessary and should be complemented with the impetus and guaranteeof the Crown’.16 Along the same lines and from supposedly progressivepositions, Roberto L. Blanco Valdés describes regional nationalist argumentsas ‘constitutionally unsustainable’ and ‘politically unacceptable’. He rejectsCatalonia and the Basque Country’s status as ‘nations’ and considers periph-eral nationalisms as a threat to the unity of the state. At the same time hespeaks in favour of a ‘re-establishment of the prestige of the state project andof the acceptance of the Spanish historical and cultural community’, fromwhich a new agreement among state-wide political parties should emerge.17

In many respects, the Generalitat acts as a quasi-state, since its devolvedpowers include the right to introduce socio-cultural policies aimed at re-generating the Catalan nation. In this process, the opposition between ‘us’(the Catalans) and ‘them’ (the Spanish state, in general equivalent to Castile)tends to be stressed. This inevitably results in a (potential or real) conflict ifthe following conditions are not met: first, the definition of Spain as a pluri-national state and the acceptance of the political, economic, cultural andmoral consequences arising from this fact and, second, the Catalans’ commit-

74 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

ment not to stir up radical nationalism leading to secession. These two condi-tions would foster mutual trust between a central state – defining itself asplurinational – and Catalonia – as a nation included within a state that recog-nizes it as such. If that were to be the case, national differences within Spainwould result in the harmonious and mutually enriching coexistence ofmultiple identities within a single state. A further layer of identity could beadded as a result of identification with the European Union. Unfortunately,the two conditions mentioned above have yet to be met in full.

It should be stressed that the Autonomous Communities System hasevolved from an initial ‘differentiating’ interpretation, which granted aspecial regime to Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia (TransitionalProvision 2, in relation to Article 152 of the Constitution), unlike that ofthe rest of the autonomous communities, towards a ‘homogenizing’ inter-pretation, resulting from the first Autonomous Agreements (1981) and thesecond Autonomous Agreements (1992), the objective of which was to reducethe scope of the principio dispositivo.18

Twenty-five years after ratifying the 1978 Constitution, the key debate onthe Autonomous Communities System revolves around whether it coulddevelop into an asymmetrical model. The argument behind such a wish isbased on the assumption that the de facto asymmetry implicit in the pluri-national composition of the state could lead eventually to a de jureasymmetry.19 According to Fossas, the open nature of the constitutionalprovisions and the validity of the principio dispositivo, have enabled theautonomous model to combine autonomy and asymmetry with some flexi-bility, in an attempt to reconcile the decentralization of power with theorganization of a plurinational state. This de jure asymmetry present in theAutonomous Communities System is above all clear in the different level ofpowers devolved to the autonomous communities, in their internal organ-ization, in their funding system and in the regulation of regional officiallanguages, but not in other aspects such as their representation in the Senate,constitutional reform and the composition of the Constitutional Court, whichdoes not have a federal structure.20

Thus, in Fossas’s view, the limitations of the autonomous model onreflecting the plurinational nature of Spain do not stem from the Constitutionbut from its subsequent development, which has involved:

1 Eliminating the constitutional recognition of the plurinational nature ofSpain, something which has diluted the initial distinction between‘nationalities and regions’, as a mechanism designed to recognize thespecific nature of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia within theAutonomous Communities System.

2 Granting Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia a considerably lowerlevel of autonomy than that which could have been obtained on applyinga more generous reading of the Constitution. This has generated constantdemands from the autonomous governments of Catalonia and the Basque

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Catalonia within the new democratic Spain 75

Country, led by nationalist parties. Such demands have encouraged thoseof other autonomous communities and this has forced the centralgovernment to extend to all communities the same powers that it hadinitially granted only to the historical nationalities.

3 Reducing the asymmetrical potential contained in the principio disposi-tivo – frowned upon by state parties – which has generated dissatisfactionamong nationalist parties demanding a special status for the nationali-ties they represent.

4 The lack of instruments facilitating the integration and participation ofthe historical nationalities in central state institutions.21

The 1979 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia22

Continuity over time and differentiation from others are the defining criteriaof identity. Both elements are stressed in the Statute of Autonomy.Continuity is emphasized in the first line of the preamble: ‘In the process ofregaining their democratic freedom, the people of Catalonia recover their insti-tutions of self-government.’23 The introduction to the version of the Statutepublished by the Generalitat in 1986 indicates:

The Generalitat, however, is not a newly created institution. It was estab-lished by the Catalan Parliament which met in Cervera in 1359 in thereign of Peter III the Ceremonious (1336–1387), as an associated bodydelegated to by the Catalan Parliament itself.

And continues:

In the fifteenth century the Generalitat was already carrying out execu-tive functions, not only in judicial and financial matters, but also inpolitics. Therefore, when on 29 September 1977 a Royal Decree provi-sionally re-established the Generalitat of Catalonia, before the ratificationof the 1978 Spanish Constitution, its nature as an age-old institution inwhich the Catalan people saw the symbol and the acknowledgement of theirhistorical personality was invoked.24

But continuity is not reduced to looking back. For Catalonia it also requiresfilling the gap between past and present. The Franco regime represented a‘black hole’ – a parenthesis of silence in the cultural and political life ofCatalonia. The 1979 Statute of Autonomy had to recognize this fact andredress the historical imbalance prompted by Francoism. In so doing, it sought to activate a shared project for the future of Catalonia – one that would strengthen the Catalans’ sentiment of forming a particularcommunity:

76 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

The collective freedom of Catalonia finds in the institutions of theGeneralitat a link with a long history of emphasis on and respect for the fundamental rights and the public freedoms of individuals and ofpeoples; a history which the people of Catalonia wish to continue, inorder to permit the creation of a forward-looking democratic society.25

The defining criteria of identity are continuity over time and differen-tiation from others – both fundamental elements of national identity.Continuity springs from the conception of the nation as a historically rootedentity that projects into the future. Individuals perceive this continuitythrough a set of experiences that spread out across time and are united by acommon meaning, which is something that only ‘insiders’ can grasp.

Differentiation stems from the consciousness of forming a community witha shared culture, attached to a particular territory, both elements leading tothe distinction between members and ‘strangers’, ‘the rest’, those who are‘different’. The preamble to the Statute is very clear on this point: ‘ThisStatute is the expression of the collective identity of Catalonia.’26 Further on, the text refers to the ‘collective life’ and to the ‘collective freedom’ ofCatalonia. The Statute offers a particular image of Catalonia and its rela-tionship with the rest of Spain. It defines its institutions as well as itsrelationship with the state ‘within a framework of free solidarity with theother nationalities and regions of Spain. This solidarity is the guarantee ofthe genuine unity of all the peoples of Spain.’27 Consequently, and in accor-dance with the Statute, Catalans have their collective identity recognizedwithin the state, but they are also constrained by the framework set up bythe Statute and the Constitution. They cannot aspire to independence unlessthe Constitution is changed. For this reason, and at least theoretically, it isassumed that Catalan nationalism should ‘reject’ the ideal of ‘one nation, onestate’. However, such an ideal is currently being defended by some Catalanpolitical forces which stand for outright independence to be achieved bypeaceful and democratic means.

The Preliminary Section of the Statute defines Catalonia as a nationalitywhich ‘in order to accede to self-government, constitutes itself as a Self-Governing Community in accordance with the Constitution and with thisStatute’ (Article 1.1) (it should be underlined that the sovereignty ofCatalonia is implied in this declaration) and the Generalitat as ‘the institu-tion around which the self-government of Catalonia is politically organized’(Article 1.2). The powers of the Generalitat ‘emanate from the Constitution,this Statute and the people’ (Article 1.3). According to these provisions, theConstitution defines the extent and number of devolved powers. ‘The people’(the Catalans) stand in third place. This point stresses the existence of a single sovereign demos in Spanish democracy, constituted by all Spaniards,including the Catalans, who, on ratifying the Constitution, allowed forCatalonia’s autonomy. This interpretation considers the Catalan people to be a ‘sub-group’ of the demos formed by all the citizens of Spain. We could

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Catalonia within the new democratic Spain 77

infer, in accordance with this reasoning present in the Constitution and in the Statute, that access to political power (kratos) by the Catalan peopleis determined by a demos of which the Catalan people form a part, and notby the specific free will of the Catalan people constituted as a ‘sovereigndemos’.28

Article 2 of the Preliminary Section of the Statute limits the territory ofCatalonia to the areas constituting the provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleidaand Tarragona. By circumscribing the territory of Catalonia to these fourprovinces, the Statute ignores the claims of some Catalan nationalists infavour of the reunification of the Països Catalans.29

Article 5 of the Preliminary Section of the Statute grants the Generalitatthe right to decide upon the territorial organization of Catalonia ‘withoutprejudicing the organization of the province as the local unit and a terri-torial division for implementing the activities of the state’. At the same timeit preserves the structure of the diputaciones provinciales (provincial councils),in spite of a certain overlapping between the latter and the territorialorganization established by the Autonomous Communities System.

Another controversial issue concerns the explicit rejection of a possiblefederation of autonomous communities as contemplated by Article 145 ofthe Constitution. This is a very important issue for those Catalan national-ists who demand the restoration of a formal link between the Països Catalans.According to the Statute, ‘cultural exchanges with other Self-GoverningCommunities and Provinces shall be encouraged and special attention givento all those with which Catalonia has had particular historical, cultural orcommercial links’ (Additional Provision Five). The Statute recognizes that‘the Catalan language is the heritage of other territories and communities’(Section One, Article 27.4) and, referring to Article 145.2 of theConstitution,30 provides that:

[T]he Generalitat may request the Government to conclude, and refer,if need be, to the Cortes Generales, for authorization, such treaties oragreements as shall permit the establishment of cultural relations withthe states where such territories are located and such communities reside.

(Section One, Article 27.4)

It should be stressed that no reference is made to political relations.After considering the territory of Catalonia, the Preliminary Section turns

its attention to the language and symbols of Catalonia. Catalan is ‘thelanguage proper to Catalonia’ and ‘is the official language of Catalonia, as isCastilian, the official language of the whole of the Spanish state’ (PreliminarySection, Articles 3.1 and 3.2). This favours bilingualism since the Statuteindicates that:

The Generalitat shall guarantee normal and official use of both languages,adopting all measures necessary to ensure they are known, and creating

78 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

those conditions which shall permit their full equality with regard tothe duties and rights of the citizens of Catalonia.

(Preliminary Section, Article 3.3)

The text moves on to consider the Catalan flag. Here too it refers to conti-nuity embodied in tradition: ‘The Catalan flag is the traditional one of fourred stripes on a yellow background’ (Preliminary Section, Article 4).31 Thisflag is already present in fourteenth-century paintings of the Catalan fleet inthe Mediterranean. The Statute grants a privileged status to the flag. As iswell known, the Spanish and the Catalan flag share the same colours, butnot the same number of stripes. A foreign observer, ignorant of the symbolicvalue of the flag, would be amazed at the intensity of feelings which couldbe aroused by adding or suppressing some red or yellow stripes. The symboliccontent of the flag is passionately felt by the members of a community whohave turned it into their own, that is, into a symbol of their people.

The 1979 Statute of Autonomy refers to Catalonia’s territory, history,culture, language, symbols and a shared future project. It also includes directreferences to the Catalans’ consciousness of forming a differentiatedcommunity. This emphasizes the five dimensions – territorial, historical,cultural, psychological and political – that I attribute to the nation.32 Butyet another question arises: Who should be considered as a Catalan?According to the Statute, ‘the political status of Catalans shall be granted toall Spanish citizens who, in accordance with the general laws of the state,are legally resident in any of the municipalities of Catalonia’ (PreliminarySection, Article 6.1). This provision rejects racial or ethnic elements and re-states the declaration that appears in the preamble of the Statute, accordingto which the ‘Catalan people’ is identified with ‘all those who live and workin Catalonia’.

The main political parties of Catalan origin

To conclude this chapter, I offer an overview of the results obtained by themain political parties originating from Catalonia – CiU, PSC (PSC-PSOE),PSUC-ICV and ERC – in the seven elections to the Catalan parliament heldin the new democratic period. I also include some data about their perfor-mance in national elections.

In the first election to the Catalan Parliament (1980), the coalition CiU,formed in 1978 by CDC and UDC, obtained forty-three seats and becamethe main Catalan political force33 in direct competition with the PSC whichwould win in the national elections.

Jordi Pujol, once President of the Generalitat, focused his political strat-egy on the achievement of a rapid transfer of powers from the central gov-ernment to the autonomous institutions, a process that to a great extent wasfacilitated by Adolfo Suárez, then Prime Minister of Spain and one of the mainfigures in the transition to democracy. This took place at a time when Suárez’s

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Catalonia within the new democratic Spain 79

party, UCD (Unión del Centro Democrático, or Union of the Democratic Centre),needed CiU’s support to secure a majority in the Spanish parliament.

The 1981 attempted coup d’état prompted a U-turn in central Governmentpolicies. The newly appointed Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, underpressure from the conservatives, halted to any further devolution of powersto the autonomous communities. Meanwhile, all democratic political partiesfocused their efforts on consolidating the still weak emerging democracy,threatened by the attempted coup. At that point, as Miquel Caminal argues,‘all parties became prisoners of the worst type of censorship, that is self-censorship regarding what could or could not be done [. . .] responsibly’.34

The new centralist policies culminated in the ratification of the OrganicLaw for the Harmonization of the Autonomous Process (Ley orgánica para laarmonización del proceso autonómico (LOAPA)), passed with the votes of thegoverning party, UCD, and those of the PSOE. Only the CiU parliamentarygroup dared to oppose the LOAPA. The PSC’s decision not to submit theamendments ratified by the party’s executive committee led to the dismissalof Ernest Lluch as its parliamentary spokesperson and the resignation of twomembers of the PSC’s executive committee, Eduard Martín Toval and JoanPrats Català.35 The silence of the Catalan Socialists sparked off an internalparty crisis, and also contributed to the deterioration of the pro-Catalan imageof the PSC (PSC-PSOE) in Catalonia, since their silence had emphasized itsdependence on the PSOE.

In the 1980 autonomous election, the PSC received 22.3 per cent of thevote, compared with 29.2 per cent obtained by CiU. This caused great disap-pointment among the Catalan Socialists, who were convinced of their victory.Pujol, CiU’s leader, invited the PSC to enter into a coalition governmentwith his party. He repeated this offer twice, during the night of the elec-tion and in his appointment speech, but the PSC rejected it – a decisionwhich has resulted in the PSC’s exclusion from the Catalan government forover twenty years.

In the 1982 general election, the Catalan Socialists obtained a majority inCatalonia with 45.2 per cent of the vote. However, in the 1984 election tothe Catalan parliament, they only received 30 per cent, while CiU, whichhad obtained 22.2 per cent of the vote in the general election, now obtained46.6 per cent. Such electoral behaviour set up a pattern of political supportaccording to which Catalans have voted for the socialists in general elections,but have opted for CiU in the autonomous ones. This called into questionthe left’s belief, generated during the Francoist period, that only they couldfly the nationalist flag, but never a centrist coalition such as CiU. Followingthe 1984 election to the Catalan Parliament, the PSC experienced a slightfall, as from 29.8 per cent of the vote obtained in 1988 it dropped to 27.6 per cent in 1992 and 24.9 per cent in 1995. In the 1999 election, the PSC(PSC-PSOE)-CpC (Ciutadans pel Canvi, or Citizens for Change), led byPasqual Maragall, achieved a spectacular recovery on obtaining 37.9 per centof the vote, giving it 52 seats, compared with 37.7 per cent achieved by

80 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

CiU, which obtained 56 seats. It should be noted that the number of votesper seat varies in the different Catalan constituencies according to whethera particular area is more or less populated. In the 16 November 2003 election, the PSC (PSC-PSOE)-CpC lost 10 seats and obtained 42 seats, corresponding to 31.17 per cent of the vote. Against all predictions, the CiU,with its new leader Artur Mas, managed to obtain 30.93 per cent of thevote, which corresponded to 46 seats. As well as the PSC, it had also lost10 seats when compared to 1999, but the CiU still managed to win the elec-tion for a seventh time.

The PSUC obtained 18.7 per cent of the vote in the first autonomous elec-tion (1980), but suffered a serious setback in 1984, when its support declinedspectacularly, only obtaining 5.6 per cent of the vote. This collapse was dueto the internal crisis arising from the conclusion of the V PSUC Congress(January 1981), which approved the reference to Marxism-Leninism in theGeneral Secretary’s report, while at the same time rejecting its inclusion inthe ‘political clauses’ (tesis polítiques).

The division between core leaders was illustrated by the antagonismbetween the sector led by Pere Ardiaca, in favour of the Soviet experienceand against the Moncloa Pacts and the constitutional consensus destined topreserve the incipient Spanish democracy, and the sector led by Jordi Solé Tura and Jordi Borja, critical of the USSR and in favour of constitu-tional consensus among Spanish political forces. These divisions culminatedin the expulsion, in March 1982, of the PSUC President, Pere Ardiaca iMartín, and thirty members of the central committee (who subsequentlyformed the PCC (Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya, or Communist Party ofCatalonia)). In the June 1982 Extraordinary Congress, Antoni Gutiérrez iDíaz and Gregorio López i Raimundo were respectively re-elected as GeneralSecretary and President of the PSUC. But this crisis had broken into piecesthe ideological unity of the party, causing an irreparable erosion of thePSUC’s image as a party capable of accepting internal plurality. The outcomeinvolved a considerable number of party members abandoning the PSUC andmany of them joining the new PCC.

In the 1986 general election the PSUC, then in coalition with theNacionalistes d’Esquerra, (NE) or Left-wing Nationalists, and under the nameUnió de l’Esquerra Catalana, or Union of the Catalan Left, continued its declineand obtained less than 4 per cent of the vote. Its electoral failure led to the resignation of Gutiérrez i Díaz, to be replaced by Rafael Ribó i Massó.In 1988 the PSUC, now in the federation IC (Iniciativa per Catalunya, orInitiative for Catalonia), obtained 7.8 per cent of the vote, but, in the 1992autonomous election, the PSUC-IC only achieved 6.5 per cent. This newdecline was to a great extent influenced by the events of 1989 in the formerSoviet Union and by the general crisis of communism. In the 1995autonomous election, ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds, or Initiative forCatalonia-Greens) obtained 3 per cent of the vote, and in the 1999 electiona new decline gave the party led by Rafael Ribó only five seats, corresponding

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Catalonia within the new democratic Spain 81

to 2.5 per cent of the vote. In the 2003 election ICV, lead by Joan Saura,achieved a spectacular recovery, obtaining 9 seats corresponding to 7.3 percent of the vote. In May 1998, following the split between IC and IU(Izquierda Unida, or United Left), EUiA (Esquerra Unida i Alternativa, orUnited and Alternative Left) was formed as a federation of various partiesand groupings in favour of creating a Catalan version of IU.

ERC, the hegemonic party in Catalonia during the Second Republic,obtained 8.9 per cent of the vote in 1980, 4.4 per cent in 1984 and 4.1 percent in 1988. This scaling down in the number of votes can be attributedto ERC’s support of Pujol in the Banca Catalana case as well as to its sub-ordinate collaboration with CiU in the period 1980–1984, during whichHeribert Barrera was elected Speaker of the Catalan Parliament (10 April1980). Following the 1984 defeat, some ERC members joined the PSC.Meanwhile, the ERC Executive Committee (which Joan Hortalà i Araujoined) took a U-turn to seek the support of a more radical Catalan nation-alism. Two influential political forces joined ERC: a sector of La Crida (Cridaa la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalana, or Callfor Solidarity in Defence of the Catalan Language, Culture and Nation), andENE (Entesa dels Nacionalistes d’Esquerra, or Agreement of Left-wingNationalists). The predominance of these new political forces pushed ERCtowards a secessionist position. Thus, in the 1988 Congress, Heribert Barrerai Costa, the historical leader of the party, and ERC’s General Secretary, waselected President of the party and Joan Hortalà was replaced by Àngel Colom.The apparently irreversible decline of ERC came to a halt in 1992, when itobtained 8 per cent of the vote. It thus went from being the fifth parlia-mentary force in Catalonia to being third, behind CiU and the PSC.

ERC’s new impetus can be attributed to the election of Àngel Colom,from La Crida, committed to the independence of Catalonia and the unifi-cation of the Països Catalans by peaceful means. ERC’s secessionism attracted former members of Terra Lliure, or Free Land, who joined ERC in 1991, andalso the party Acció Catalana, or Catalan Action (1997). This expanded therank and file of ERC and at the same time confirmed a generational renewalinitiated by Àngel Colom and Pilar Rahola.

In the 1995 autonomous elections, ERC continued to rise and achieved 9.5per cent of the vote. The internal crisis opened up by the sanctioning pro-ceedings initiated by Colom against Carles Bonet and Jaume Rodríguez inApril 1996 culminated in the ‘Manifesto of the 229’, signed by over 220 ERCelected officials, against the proceedings. The outcome of the crisis was a splitled by Àngel Colom and Pilar Rahola in 1996, who together with other mem-bers of the Executive Committee created the PI (Partit per la Independència, orIndependence Party), which was short-lived. In the November 1996 electionto the ERC National Council, the list led by Jordi Carbonell, Josep LluísCarod-Rovira and Joan Puigcercós was elected. Carbonell took over the pres-idency of the party and Carod-Rovira became General Secretary. The split hadbeen overcome, but the party was weakened, as it lost support in both

82 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

parliamentary and municipal elections, and inherited a negative financial sit-uation. In the 1999 election, ERC obtained 8.7 per cent of the vote and wasagain the third political force in Catalonia, now with the same number ofseats as the conservative PP,36 which also obtained twelve seats. In 2003, ERCmanaged to double its 1999 results. It obtained a record 23 seats corre-sponding to 16.47 per cent of the vote. ERC became consolidated as the thirdpolitical force in Catalonia, one with the capacity to play a key role in theconstitution of a future government since neither the CiU nor the PSC hadachieved the majority. The PP obtained 15 seats, 3 more than in 1999.

CiU, the PSC (PSC-PSOE), the PSUC-IC and ERC were the main politicalparties in Catalonia during the transition to democracy. These parties offerdifferent interpretations of Catalan nationalism and present dissimilar‘images’ of Catalonia and of its relationship with the rest of Spain, whileproposing alternative future projects for the country.

The unity existing between the clandestine Catalan political forces duringFrancoism vanished with the arrival of democracy and the urge to competefor power. Generally speaking, it can be argued that the cooperation and soli-darity between nationalist parties representing national minorities, subject toconsiderable repression from the state that includes them, quickly disinte-grate whenever this state guarantees them a certain degree of autonomy. Assoon as political parties are allowed to participate in free elections, they havethe opportunity to obtain political power and to implement their politicalprogrammes and it is in their own interest to highlight the features whichdifferentiate them from other political formations. It should be recognized,however, as demonstrated on numerous occasions, for example during Franco-ism, that nationalism has the capacity to foster the emergence of politicalplatforms, where socialists, communists, Christian democrats or republicanscan converge. In my view, this reinforces my argument that nationalism, onits own, lacks a doctrine capable of shaping political action. Nationalism isnot sufficient to determine the policy of a party, except for short periods oftime when a nation is subject to repression and finds itself involved in a con-stant struggle to survive. Nationalism can adopt many different faces accord-ing to the political ideology of the party embracing it. Nationalism is theshape; socialism, social democracy, republicanism, liberalism or fascism arethe colours that can be used to create contrasting images of the nationalistmessage.

CiU, the PSC (PSC-PSOE), the PSUC-ICV and ERC hold different posi-tions concerning the future of Catalonia. The socialists and communistsforesee a development of the Autonomous Communities System turningSpain into a federal state. There are some differences between the PSC andthe PSUC-ICV which primarily concern the degree of autonomy thatCatalonia should aim for, and the emphasis placed by them on the protec-tion of Catalan national identity. Both parties are engaged with theintegration of immigrants into Catalan society and consider that Catalanculture has to merge its indigenous elements with those of immigrant origin,

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Catalonia within the new democratic Spain 83

in order to give rise to a new differentiated identity. For its part, and dueto its defence of secession and the creation of a Catalan Republic by peacefulmeans, ERC is different from the other political options and poses funda-mental challenges both to the Constitution and to the Statute of Autonomy.Finally, CiU has formulated a nationalist discourse aimed at protectingCatalan identity within the framework of the Spanish state. CiU’s nationalismstresses the distinct nature of Catalonia in relation to the rest of Spain anddemands higher levels of self-government for the Catalan nation.

The following two chapters consider the ideological content of these polit-ical formations, paying particular attention to their thinking on five basicaspects: (1) their definition of Catalan identity; (2) their definition of Catalannationalism (or Catalanism); (3) their views on immigration; (4) the rela-tionship between Catalonia and Spain; and (5) the relations between Cataloniaand the European Union.

The study of each political formation combines an analysis of internal partydocuments and statements, articles and books written by their leaders.Chapter 5 focuses upon the ideological content of ERC, the PSUC-ICV andthe PSC (PSC-PSOE), and Chapter 6 considers CDC and UDC. The finalsection of Chapter 6 is devoted to Jordi Pujol’s nationalist works. This deci-sion is justified, I believe, by his position as the most important ideologistof Catalan nationalism in the transition to democracy and the most influen-tial politician as President of the Generalitat of Catalonia since 1980. Chapter5 studies the Catalan left according to the chronological order in the forma-tion of the political parties considered, and Chapter 6 analyses the Catalancentre-right, beginning with CDC as the most influential component of theCiU coalition (now a federation).

84 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

5 Images of Catalonia IERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC

In this chapter I study the main left-wing Catalan political parties – ERC,PSUC-ICV and PSC (PSC-PSOE). I first offer a short historical backgroundto each of them, followed by an ideological definition, according to theirdocuments and statutes. The main part of each section consists of a detailedanalysis of their view on five key aspects – Catalan identity, Catalan nation-alism/Catalanism, immigration, the relationship between Catalonia and Spainand the relations between Catalonia and the European Union.

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)

ERC, the hegemonic party in Catalonia during the Second Republic, gavethe Generalitat its first two Presidents, Francesc Macià (1931–1933) andLluís Companys (1933–1940).

ERC defines itself as a left-wing Catalan political organization, indepen-dent from any political party outside Catalonia. In its 1993 IdeologicalDeclaration, ERC is defined as a blend of various political traditions thatinclude: secessionism represented by Francesc Macià’s Estat Català, or CatalanState Party; Lluís Companys’ Partit Republicà Català, or Catalan RepublicanParty; the federal republicanism present in many Catalan areas; the social-izing group of l’Opinió; and the working-class movement of libertarianinfluences. ERC takes on ‘the whole nation’, in reference to the PaïsosCatalans, as its direct area of action. Independence is its political objective.

The reduction in numbers suffered by ERC after the Civil War (a quarterof its 70,000 activists died or were imprisoned and half had to go into exile)signalled the irreversible decline of the party, which would not recover itsstrength until 1977.1 ERC maintained a separatist attitude at the beginningof the transition to democracy, refusing to participate in the Comissió delsNou (February 1977). Such an attitude was due to its objective not to mixSpanish demands with specifically Catalan ones. The re-establishment of theGeneralitat and the appointment of Josep Tarradellas as its President (1977)exemplified ERC’s strategy and the determination of its President.

ERC, although not yet legalized as a party, ran in the 1977 parliamen-tary election in the Esquerra de Catalunya, or Catalan Left coalition (with the

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Partido del Trabajo de España, or Spanish Workers’ Party, and the AssociacióCatalana de la Dona, or Catalan Women’s Association). ERC’s lack ofresources, the dismemberment of the party under Franco and the diversityof trends coexisting within it account for the poor electoral results obtainedat the beginning of the transition to democracy. One of ERC’s main assetsbefore the war was its leader and President of the Generalitat, Francesc Macià,whose charisma remained even after his death.

As already mentioned, ERC’s programme became more radical after 1992,on incorporating activists from the secessionist organization La Crida,2

including Àngel Colom, leader of La Crida between 1983 and 1986, andsubsequently ERC’s General Secretary (1989).

Catalan identity

ERC’s former leader and ideologist, Àngel Colom, argues that the ideas andvalues of Catalan identity, which favoured the economic and political resis-tance of Catalonia during the Franco regime, are currently devalued because,‘apparently, they do not fit in with the new economic and social conditionscreated by the transformations of recent years’.3 In Colom’s view, appeals toa genetic theory of the Catalan character and references to the theory of theVolksgeist, or spirit of the people, are no longer valid to explain nationalism.Colom puts forward an intellectual approach to nationalism which rejectsthe essentialist and naturalistic theories discredited by science4 and proposesre-examining the different scientific disciplines which deal with the relationsbetween the psychology of individuals and their societies, in order to find a scientific base from which to reconstruct a theory of national identity.5

He points at the socialization process of children, during which they learna language, basic attitudes and value systems, and argues that ‘language isnot fixed in the chromosomes, and is not independent from those that speakit, but rather everyone thinks and sees themselves in a certain language’.Language creates ‘a natural solidarity among those that speak it. Languagealone is only a part of a child’s learning, but expresses and conditions allother forms of learning’.6 Colom refers to the behavioural guidelines thatchildren learn early on in their lives and stresses the role of the family. Heconsiders that, rather than unifying the behaviour of individuals, valuesystems make it converge according to basic guidelines followed by mostpeople. Hence, a value system shared by a community contributes to accountfor its distinctive character when compared with that of other communities.Colom stresses the role of culture, language and territory, and indicates that‘a whole set of structures allows a system of shared values and a commonidentity to be maintained in a territory inhabited by thousands of people,prior to the establishment of modern states’.7

For Colom, the construction of a new nationalist theory requires the exist-ence of a ‘national factor understood as the generational transmission of

86 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC

guidelines for behaviour and values’. He rejects supernatural arguments andconsiders national identity as ‘a social phenomenon analogous to language’.8

In his view, a cultural theory of national identity implies assuming that thenation is not eternal. Even more importantly, in stark contrast with JordiPujol’s approach, but also against the positions sustained by the other Catalanpolitical parties, for which Catalan identity is compatible with Spanish iden-tity, Colom argues that ‘under the current conditions of our civilization, anation without state is doomed to disappear’. According to him, nationalidentity is optional, not imposed: ‘each person should decide whether toidentify or not with a collective project’.9 In the Països Catalans, people shouldchoose between Catalan and Spanish identity, being well aware of what thatchoice entails.10

ERC observes that both the Constitution and the Statute treat Cataloniaas a ‘linguistic minority’, because

the Constitution establishes the territorial nature of Castilian or Spanishin the whole territory [of Spain], all citizens being obliged to know itand entitled to use it. On the contrary, the use of Catalan is voluntary,as corresponds to a linguistic minority.11

ERC declares itself to be in favour of an ‘egalitarian multilingualism’, whichwould involve the establishment of a legal framework within which alllanguages would enjoy the same rights and duties. Such an arrangementwould reflect

the egalitarian official nature of the four languages [Castilian, Catalan,Basque and Galician] throughout the territory of the quadrilingual state. . . the pre-eminent official nature of each language within its linguisticdomain would be guaranteed and the right to the active personal use ofeach individual’s language preserved.12

According to ERC, the state should promote such an alternative linguisticframework and contribute to its funding in order to make egalitarian multi-lingualism effective.

Catalan nationalism/Catalanism

ERC’s Ideological Declaration defines the nation as ‘a community of peopleconscious of being linked by territory, history, tradition, culture, language,economy, and sharing the will to affirm such links and for them to berespected’.13 This Declaration emphasizes the pre-eminence of the nation andthe need to combine individual and collective rights to create a fully demo-cratic society. The Ideological Declaration proposes a set of national rights,led by the right to self-determination, defined as

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Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC 87

the right of any nation to freely decide on its political future, and tostand in equal terms with the rest of the nations of the world, by meansof the creation of a state or any other legal and political structure of its own.14

Other national rights include:

• the right to life, existence and collective identity;• the right to the territory which has been the specific geographic frame-

work of its historical development until the present time;• the right to the use and to the promotion of the nation’s own language

in all spheres of social life;• the right to safeguard its cultural traditions and its way of life;• the right to communicate freely and unhindered;• the right to the natural resources and to the benefits of their exploita-

tion, as well as the right to reinvest them in situ;• the right to live and to work in one’s own country and to regulate migra-

tory movements;• the right to market protection;• the right to establish the political, cultural and economic decision-

making centre within the nation’s territory and the rejection of depend-ence from any external organization whose sovereignty had not beenpreviously recognised; and

• the right to its own collective defence system.15

ERC’s objective is to achieve the independence of the Catalan nation withinthe European Union through peaceful and democratic means. Only theattainment of an independent Republic can lead to the international recog-nition of Catalonia, since international law only acknowledges sovereignstates.16 The Blueprint for the National Statute of Catalonia prepared by ERCproposes the constitution of the ‘Free state of Catalonia associated with theKingdom of Spain’.17

ERC’s message is targeted at the ten million inhabitants of the PaïsosCatalans, not as the imposition of a historical law or as a genetic legacy, butas a choice. The construction of a Catalan Republic is presented as an ‘ethicalimperative’ for Catalans aware of their collective responsibility.18 It is alsopresented as a ‘civic imperative’ stemming from the need to fight againstthe radical transformations which are currently threatening the survival ofCatalonia as an advanced country.19

Colom argues that a nation cannot survive without its own state. In his view,the Spanish state has become obsolete, inasmuch as it lacks a history or a valuesystem to unite the different nationalities forming it. He considers that thecurrent reshaping of international politics and the novel meaning acquired byself-determination as a result of post-1989 events taking place in EasternEurope has contributed to a further development of nationalism. Colom

88 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC

signals the need to offer a complete national reconstruction project to theyounger generations, which run the risk of adopting a contemptuous individ-ualist and sceptical attitude due to the cynicism, deterioration and corruptionthat dominate the world of politics.20 In Colom’s discourse, the CatalanRepublic does not just involve independence, but also a new model of state.The Republic ‘is not against the king, but against the Kingdom of Spain’.21

Carod-Rovira, ERC’s current leader, establishes a distinction between adangerous, xenophobic, reactionary, aggressive, authoritarian, expansionist,racist type of nationalism incompatible with diversity, and a nationalism ofliberation which seeks to protect the nation against military, economic,cultural or political aggression. The type of nationalism defended by ERCand defined by Carod-Rovira

does not therefore have an ethnic, but rather a democratic and integra-tive basis, as, far from wishing to impose any national form of life beyondits borders, it uses strictly peaceful and political means to obtain itsobjectives.22

It is a democratic and progressive type of nationalism, which has to emergeas a positive and constructive element, as a factor of social progress and civilcohesion, affecting all the citizens of the nation.

Carod-Rovira indicates that a modification of the Spanish institutionalframework in order to achieve full political sovereignty has so far proven tobe impossible and utopian. In his view the only way forward is to obtain apro-independence majority in the autonomous election and from there beginto create a Catalan state. He even declares a preference for the uncertaintyof some yet undetermined free state status for Catalonia, maybe in a feder-ation with other European peoples, to the certainty of a future with no horizonas an autonomous community within the kingdom of Spain.

Immigration

Àngel Colom is very cautious on presenting ERC’s political project, andseeks to confront the possible resistance arising from some people of immi-grant origin who live in Catalonia. To do so, Colom strongly asserts hisposition against xenophobia and racism. In his view, ‘modern states shouldbe extremely respectful of the identity of individuals [. . .]. They shouldrecognize the right to difference and the rights of minorities.’23 He declaresthat, in order to reconcile respect for difference with the creation of a sharedvalue system, the state and the political system should renounce patrioticrhetoric and concentrate on solving the problems of all citizens.24

In ERC’s nationalist project, independence becomes the means to turnCatalonia into one of the most advanced countries of Europe. Carod-Rovirastands in favour of halting the paternalistic discourse on immigration whoseonly effect, so far, has been the perpetuation of their condition as immigrantsfor second- and third-generation Catalans. According to Carod-Rovira:

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Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC 89

To deny that the descendants of immigrants of [non-Catalan] origin areCatalans is to marginalize them and to condemn them to always beingstrangers in this land, to enclose them in a monolingual Castilian ghettoimpervious to Catalan, to deny them the right to be as Catalan as anyoneelse and, often, even more than some others.25

On addressing the subject of immigration, ERC defines it as a social issueconcerning civil rights, but also as a cultural and political issue. ERCdenounces the inadequacy of the current Catalan legal framework, whichleaves fundamental rights and public freedoms – civil and political rights –in the hands of the state. Catalonia requires cultural and social policies toconfront this social phenomenon. ERC insists on the rights and duties ofimmigrants and asserts that

social integration is not equivalent to the assimilation or elimination ofthe cultural, religious and ethnic differences characteristic of the immi-grants’ countries of origin, but rather it involves emphasizing respect forand recognition of these differences, which become one more asset of ourown culture. To fully achieve this integrative function, as members ofsociety we must be aware of this role and eliminate from our subcon-scious any racist feelings that may still remain.26

At the same time, ERC spells out the duty of immigrants, above all non-EU immigrants, to make

an effort to participate in the social life of the country or municipalityin which they live, so that religious or cultural elements do not repre-sent an insurmountable obstacle to comply with our society’s conventionsand rules of coexistence,27

while bearing in mind that

a secular society such as ours which guarantees religious freedom, shouldnot be expected to make exceptions to the educational syllabi whichcould run against other fundamental rights, such as the principle ofequality.28

ERC advocates an active presence of the Generalitat on the Consejo Superiorde Política de Integración, or Spanish Council for Integration Policy, in orderto guarantee an adequate coordination between the various levels of publicadministration with powers concerning the integration of immigrants, espe-cially when establishing criteria on the number and destination of newimmigrants coming into Spain. In the Framework programme for the 2000general election, ERC takes into account the right to asylum and to refugeestatus, and recognizes the need to establish specific criteria on these issues.

90 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC

Catalonia and Spain

According to ERC, Catalonia’s problems arise from its submission to Spain.29

The historical antagonism between the political and economic structures ofSpain and those of the Països Catalans mirrors two national identities thathave remained divergent over time. In ERC’s view, Spain’s centralism andbackwardness have not been overcome. The main differences between Catalanand Spanish structures concern the territorial distribution of the populationand their differing productive frameworks.

In Colom’s view Catalonia’s outstanding position originates from its largerworking population and its higher levels of productivity when comparedwith the rest of Spain. A further difference arises from the antagonistic indus-trial models applied by the Catalans and the Spaniards. Yet, while Catalanindustry is based on indigenous individual initiative and, above all, on thefabric formed by small- and medium-sized companies, Spain basicallydepends on major international investments to create big industries.30

The disparities between Spain and Catalonia are not limited to theeconomic sphere, but also affect their antagonistic views on democracy andthe state. Colom emphasizes that ‘the kingdom of Spain enjoys all the formalinstitutions of a democratic state. [. . .] It recognizes the existence of nation-alities within its territory, but denies them the right to self-determination.’31

Furthermore he argues that, despite its liberal ways,

the Spanish state has a very undemocratic basis, because it maintains thepolitical and administrative structures shaped by moderate liberals inthe second third of the last [nineteenth] century. There are some basicideas more akin to the despotism of the Enlightenment than to the sover-eignty and power of the citizens.32

According to Colom, this is explained by appealing to various reasons: (1)the state’s will to pervade the life of its citizenry without leaving any spacefor action by other institutions, such as local government; (2) the need for astrong central administration acting throughout the Spanish territory andmonopolizing numerous functions; (3) the omnipresence of the state; and (4)its objective of creating a single nation.33

In Colom’s view, the idea of Spain as a nation-state only emerged afterthe Napoleonic wars, when the Crown lost the Castilian colonies in Americaand its domains were reduced to the Iberian Peninsula, with the exceptionof Portugal, Gibraltar, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands and a fewsmall colonies in America and Africa. From then on, the Kingdom of Spain changed its name and became known as Spain. This reduction in sizecoincided with the modern creation of the Spanish state and the will to forgea Spanish nation. The most illustrative example of this concerns the attemptto create a Spanish language, converting Castilian into Spanish. This tookplace in 1922, when the Royal Academy of the Castilian Language became

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Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC 91

the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language.34 In other words, the integrityof the Catalan identity, which was easy to maintain while the Spanish statewas weak and reduced its activities to little more than the collection of taxes,became threatened by the unstoppable transformation of Spain into a modernnation-state.

For Josep Lluís Carod-Rovira, one of the most important problems in therelationship between Catalonia and Spain within the present legal frame-work concerns the inadequacy of autonomous funding, coupled with lowpublic investment by the state in Catalonia. Both these factors damage the material well-being of Catalans, curb economic growth and hinder theunequivocal vitality of Catalan enterprise. According to Carod-Rovira,‘Catalonia naturally finances Europe, but also Spain’.35 He adds:

The Catalan tax burden is so colossal that, while 70 pesetas out of every100 are returned to a citizen from here, 115 are returned to a citizen ofSpain. [. . .] Catalonia contributes 26 per cent more tax than the Spanishaverage and what the state returns to us is 24 per cent below average.36

He also argues that ‘the Spanish welfare state was built on the debt and theeffort of Catalonia’.37

In its Framework programme for the March 2000 general election, ERCdescribes the current situation as the final stage in a historical period whichrequires the renewal of an exhausted model of state.38 In its view, it is essen-tial to change the fundamental attitudes of the citizens of Catalonia,‘immersed in conformism because “everything is alright” and in defeatismbecause “there’s nothing we can do about it” ’.39 In this context, ERC con-siders that it is necessary to: (1) become aware of the seriousness of the cur-rent threats faced by the Catalan nation; (2) recover confidence in progressand combat the fatalism that has currently taken the form of economic deter-minism; and (3) recover confidence in political parties as essential instrumentsfor the transformation of society. ERC’s strategy therefore involves broaden-ing the base of Catalan republicanism and raising the ‘democratic tension’ inCatalonia and the Països Catalans, so that the legitimacy of the whole regimeand of its idea of the state are called into question.40 In the medium termERC, which defines itself as a party of government and not as a purely testi-monial or subordinate party or one holding the balance of power, proposesthe creation of a federal Republic as a first step ‘on the democratic path toindependence, which requires the support of the majority of the peopleexpressed freely in the polls’.41 This same Framework programme adds:

The attempt to assimilate the Catalan nation perpetrated by the Spanishstate since 1714, which became an attempted genocide under the mili-tary regime of General Franco, has generated in the most nationallyconscious part of the Catalan people an understandable hatred of all signs

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of Spanishness. This hatred refers to the state and not to the Spanishpeople, which has endured the same oppression from the oligarchy thatcontrols them.42

On analysing the relations between Catalonia and Spain a key aspect refersto the position and assessment of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy. HeribertBarrera, former General Secretary of ERC, urged the electorate to vote for the ratification of this Statute of Autonomy, in spite of pointing at itslimitations. In his view, the Statute stood as the first stage in the recoveryof Catalan national identity. On the occasion of the first election to theCatalan Parliament in 1980, Barrera bemoaned the precarious and abstractnature of Catalan autonomy. For Barrera, designing a nationalist policyrequired specifying its key objectives:

In addition to the ultimate, permanent objective of full sovereignty,which is the final horizon of the struggle, in our current precarious situ-ation we have another more immediate, urgent, pressing objective, thatof ensuring our national survival.43

Barrera argued that the Generalitat would fail if it was itself restricted tobeing a simple administrative device. The Catalan government requiredgreater self-government, and had to establish the target of re-CatalanizingCatalonia and of turning it into a model of efficiency and modernity. Thesesame objectives reflect the most serious problems that Catalan society wasfacing at the beginning of the transition to democracy – an identity crisis,an incongruity with the modern world and an economic crisis which,according to Barrera’s discourse, stemmed from the abnormal situation ofCatalonia as a nation lacking state structures.44 Heribert Barrera, when askedwhether the Catalans should be grateful to the ‘fathers’ of the Constitutionover twenty years after its ratification, replied:

Not at all! The fathers of the Constitution led the country to this situ-ation, to this mediocrity and, as for Catalonia, to a disastrous situationwith a very dark future. Grateful for anything to the fathers of theConstitution? I didn’t vote for the Constitution and – as PresidentTarradellas said to me one day – that is the greatest honour of mypolitical career.45

For his part, Barrera argues that the ERC’s objective is not a reform of theStatute as a means to broaden the powers of the Generalitat, but rathergaining direct access to sovereignty and rejecting an AutonomousCommunities System, which, in his view, stands as ‘the superposition of newinstitutions on the pre-existent central administration’.46

Àngel Colom denounces the historical oppression suffered by the Catalansand observes that the 1979 Statute did not eliminate it.47 He criticizes the

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Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC 93

Statute because it is opposed to the points that were agreed in the Assemblyof Catalonia.48

On assessing ten years of the Statute of Autonomy and after denouncingthe inadequacy of autonomous funding, Josep Lluís Carod-Rovira focuses hiscriticisms on three aspects. In his view, the 1979 Statute: (1) renouncescontrol over public order, a power that had been included in the 1932 Statuteof Autonomy abolished by Franco; (2) does not include – unlike what theConstitution established for Castilian – the duty to know Catalan, an omis-sion that allows, despite its status as an official language of Catalonia, theaberrant right not to know Catalan in practice; and (3) does not guaranteepolitical autonomy, but reinforces Catalan collective dependence.49

ERC criticizes the Statute of Autonomy and the 1978 Constitution which, in its view, have reduced Catalan autonomy to administrative self-government. In this respect, the Catalan nationalist parties

would be the representatives not of a nation but of a national minority,a minority in its own historical territory and an endangered phenom-enon, in the face of the onrush of the new technologies and the mediacontrolled from Madrid.50

Catalonia and the European Union

ERC considers the consolidation of the European Union as a necessary alterna-tive to the policy of the so-called ‘new world order’. Its objective is for theCatalan nation, once independent, to become a member state of the EuropeanUnion. In the meantime, and in order to guarantee Catalonia’s participationin EU decision-making bodies, whenever they discuss matters concerningCatalonia’s devolved powers or specific interest, as foreseen in other countries,Catalonia should have its own representatives in the EU.

On assessing the present situation, Carod-Rovira is sceptical towards theEU which, in his view, does not respect the rights of peoples and is guidedby the objectives of the states forming it. ERC’s leader defends the need fora direct Catalan presence in European organizations, which to date does notexist. He writes:

But we should not deceive ourselves; the Europe of the regions, whetheror not the driving force of anything, is a great Utopia. Without denyingthe help that unofficial bodies such as the AER can offer – above all ifthey propose to act as a lobby – the real situation is different.51

ERC supports the idea of creating a European Constitution, transferringmore power to the European Parliament and to the European Court of HumanRights. For ERC, the European Union should grant more power to the citizens of Europe, so that the Europe of states is replaced by a Confederation

94 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC

of peoples. The European Constitution should guarantee individual rightsand also the collective rights of historical nations lacking their own statesand establish the legal mechanisms necessary for them to exercise their rightto self-determination.52

Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC)-Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (ICV)

The PSUC defines itself as a popular national party whose policies aregrounded on the recognition of Catalonia’s right to self-determination, whilebringing to the fore the relationship between class struggle and the defenceof national identity. The PSUC endorses a policy closely linked to the fightfor, and development of, democracy in Spain with the support of the workingclass.53

The PSUC, an essentially communist organization, gradually transformedover the years, first becoming federated with other political parties to formIniciativa per Catalunya, or Initiative for Catalonia (IC) (1987), and laterthrough its almost complete disappearance due to the merger within thisfederation, which opted to run in coalition with the ecologist party Els Verdsor Greens (1993). The ‘fundamental and unrenounceable’ objective of thePSUC is the socialist transformation of society, in order to eliminate all formsof exploitation and oppression. The method of achieving this aim is to inten-sify and consolidate democracy. The PSUC

fights for the interests and aspirations of the workers of Catalonia andof all the social sectors that suffer from any kind of exploitation, oppres-sion or exclusion, as well as for the affirmation and expression of thenational personality of Catalonia within the overall peoples of Spain.54

The essential aims of the PSUC include a desire to contribute democraticallyto Catalan and Spanish politics.

The PSUC was formed on 23 July 1936, a few days after the Civil Warbroke out, as a result of the integration of four Catalan-wide politicalorganizations: the Federació Catalana del PSOE, or Catalan Federation of thePSOE, the PCC, the USC (Unió Socialista de Catalunya, or Socialist Union of Catalonia) and the PCP (Partit Català Proletari, or Catalan ProletarianParty). The creation of the PSUC, although precipitated by the 18 Julymilitary uprising, responded to a series of previously initiated contactsbetween these parties. The USC was the most well-established party, and its leader, Joan Comorera, became the first General Secretary of the newlycreated PSUC.

The incorporation of the PSUC into the Executive Council of theGeneralitat alongside ERC was crucial for the subsequent development ofthe party. During the Civil War, the PSUC granted priority to winning

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the war and to restoring the Republic, and this approach came up againstthe objectives of other working-class organizations, such as the trade unionCNT (Confederació Nacional de Treballadors, or National Workers’ Con-federation) and the political organization POUM (Partit Obrer d’UnificacióMarxista, or Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification), for which the con-flict was a revolutionary war which required social transformation as a pre-condition for military victory. These differences culminated in the tragicconfrontation known as the May 1937 events between the government ofthe Generalitat, formed by ERC and the PSUC, and the FAI (FederaciónAnarquista Ibèrica, or Iberian Anarchist Federation) and the POUM. The latterwere defeated, but the deaths and the subsequent political repression weighedheavily on the PSUC, which for decades endured the rejection of all collab-oration by the heirs of the POUM and the Catalan Socialists.

During Franco’s regime, the PSUC became the main and the best organ-ized clandestine political party in Catalonia. In this context the PSUC, whichmaintained its independence from the PCE (Partido Comunista de España, orSpanish Communist Party), adopted an identity that combined communism,the struggle for democracy and Catalanism, and that was capable of attractingthe support of various sectors of society beyond the strictly communist sector.The PSUC played a key role in the process of social and cultural integrationof the thousands of immigrants who came to Catalonia in the 1960s, whichavoided Lerrouxist phenomena such as those that occurred at the beginningof the twentieth century. The PSUC was also important as an instigator ofthe Assembly of Catalonia in 1971.

The advent of democracy imposed the need to abandon plural unitaryplatforms and to replace them with more precise definitions of each polit-ical formation. In this new period, the PSUC began a complex process which,finally, led to its dismemberment. Trouble was initiated when the‘Eurocommunist’ sector, which followed the trend of the Communist Partyof Italy (PCI) since 1973 under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer and linked to the Eurocommunism defended by Santiago Carrillo, leader of the PCE, stood up against the ‘legitimist’ sector, which considered unitarydemocratic strategies as a stage en route towards a self-styled USSR-type revolution. This confrontation culminated in the 1978 PCE Congresswhen Carrillo attributed the lack of electoral support received by the party to the need to make further progress with Eurocommunism andproposed, among other symbolic measures, the suppression of any referencesto Lenin and Leninism in the statutes of the party. This also led to a crisisin the PSUC, which materialized in its V Congress, as already mentioned inChapter 4.

IC was founded in 1987 as a federation of parties whose objective was topromote a national left-wing alternative. The federation originally consistedof three parties: the PSUC, the PCC and the EN. IC was a federation, ratherthan a coalition, and from the start it sought the support of independent

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people. IC formed its own governing bodies and a protocol, although veryconsiderable power was given to the founding parties. In 1989, as a resultof a different position adopted on terrorism in a vote in the Catalan Parlia-ment, the two representatives of the PCC were excluded from the ICparliamentary group and, at that point, the PCC announced that it no longerformed part of IC.

IC’s III Assembly (Barcelona, 1993) meant the organizational consolida-tion and definitive social launch of the project for the renewal of the left led by the PSUC and represented by IC. The period that began in 1993 ischaracterized by the increasing importance of environmentalism, whichculminated in IC’s alliance with Els Verds.

The Statutes of the PSUC, approved in 1997, specify the objectives of thisparty in post-Franco Spain:

the defence of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and its development and progressive transformation within the framework of the peaceful coexistence of Spaniards, the defence and extension of individual andcollective freedoms and the consolidation and intensification of a genu-inely representative democracy both at the institutional level and at thatof the people’s participation; the national reconstruction of Catalonia, itsself-government, the consolidation and progressive development of theStatute of Autonomy and of the institutions to be formed on the roadto self-determination; the attainment of the objectives corresponding tothe interests and the aspirations of workers and of popular sectors.55

In Article 8, Section Two of the Statutes (1997), the PSUC designates ICas the sole instrument for militancy and political action, and adds that thePSUC carries out all its political and social mediation through ICV, definedas ‘a political formation whose fundamental values are freedom, justice,equality, solidarity, national rights and the defence and preservation of theenvironment’.56 The terms that define ICV are: left-wing, democratic, national,transforming, caring, pacifist, egalitarian, feminist and environmentalist. ICVdescribes itself as a new type of political formation which intends to artic-ulate the transforming left, going beyond the limits of traditional politicalparties. It should be noted that communism is absent from this definition,in sharp contrast with initial formulations of the PSUC’s ideology.

In the following sections I establish a distinction between the positiondefended by the PSUC, which mainly corresponds to the beginning of thetransition to democracy, and the position of ICV as a new political forma-tion which took over from the PSUC and became consolidated after the 1989revolutions in Eastern Europe, involving the dismantlement of the SovietUnion and the fall of communism, which deeply affected communist andsocialist parties around the world, with a few notable exceptions, such asCuba and China.

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Catalan identity

Antoni Gutiérrez, former General Secretary of the PSUC, argues that thereis a Catalonia different from that exemplified by conservative nationalism.Gutiérrez is aware that the PSUC is pursuing a new idea of Catalonia, in harmony with the working class.57 In his view, Catalonia is a nationalcommunity with a millennial culture, language and history, although herecognizes, and this is crucial in the Catalan communist discourse, that 40 per cent of the Catalan population originates from other parts of Spain.58

The ‘image’ of Catalonia defended by the communists rejects the idea of animmutable and eternal nation. In their view, Catalonia has a territorial basis,a history, a language, specific features, culture and traditions that lie at theheart of its identity. Today’s Catalonia is the outcome of the actions and the projects of its citizens. Therefore, the national reconstruction of Cataloniashould be understood as the reconstruction of a common homeland for all the people who live in Catalonia, irrespective of their origin, language orculture.59

According to the PSUC, to consider the Catalan nationality solely as aproduct of the bourgeoisie is as wrong as to reduce it to its popular elements.The features that have created the modern Catalan nationality are: (1) theestablishment of an economic space which is different from that of the restof Spain, where the industrial revolution took place a century later than inCatalonia; (2) the persistence of a popular culture based on a language anda collective psychology arising from a historical past which became strongerdue to the differences in the development of economic structures; and (3) the relationship between some sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie and acentralist and bureaucratic Spanish state, able to guarantee the repressionagainst the increasingly political opposition embodied by some sections ofthe Catalan working class.60

Rafael Ribó, currently IC’s leader, acknowledges the existence of a series oflinguistic, cultural and historical factors common to the Països Catalans: ashared history as members of the Crown of Aragon ruled by the Count-Kingof Barcelona; a common language and culture; socio-economic factors, inparticular the problems stemming from the policies applied by the Spanishcentralist state; and the possibility of developing a collective consciousnessdespite the lack of common political projects.61 The areas forming the Països Catalans currently enjoy different degrees of cultural and linguistic con-sciousness. Ribó believes that it is necessary to work towards a ‘programmeof collective awakening’ for the Països Catalans and that the first step shouldconsist of the elaboration of a common political programme.62 For the PSUC,the cultural and socio-economic heritage shared by the Països Catalans repre-sents an important legacy that should be enriched and protected.63

ICV defines the Catalan nation as a framework of social, economic, histor-ical and cultural specificity, which, like any nation, is constantly transformingitself. ICV argues that, ultimately, it is for the citizens of Catalonia

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to hold the instruments capable of determining their individual and collec-tive life.

For ICV, Catalonia is its people, irrespective of their geographic andcultural origin and the language they use.64 ICV defends a plural Catalanidentity and insists that ‘Catalonia is a single people’ which should not besubjected to any kind of division by way of language. Everyone is entitledto express themselves in the language of their choice and not to be discrim-inated against for this reason. In this context, ICV invokes the idea thatCatalan culture has always been the product of a ‘mixture’ of many socialingredients without losing its own specificity. As we shall see later on, thisidea is somehow related to the concept of Catalan culture as a ‘melting pot’ used by the PSC. ICV’s aim is to construct a society that ‘integrates thedifferent cultural contributions of its components, having Catalan as its specific heritage, irrespective of the language that each person prefers to use’.65

Catalan nationalism/Catalanism

The PSUC distinguishes between two types of Catalanism – one it definesas ‘conservative and folkloric’ and the other as ‘popular Catalanism’. ThePSUC central committee considers Catalanism as a historically popularmovement with a proven ability to integrate the working class, while endeav-ouring to seek unity with the other peoples of Spain – a Catalanism that hasfought for the transformation of Spain into a democratic federation. PopularCatalanism assumes that Catalans will be the main actors in Catalan politics.The PSUC insists that mass Catalanism – it never uses the expression ‘nation-alism’ – can only be a left-wing popular Catalanism, based on its capacityto integrate, and on its universalism and solidarity. Popular Catalanismcannot be compared with the traditional Catalan culture intended for theworking class, but rather seeks to turn the working class into the main actorof cultural development.66

In the framework paper of the VIII Congress, the PSUC declares that: ‘In a situation such as ours, with a state consisting of several nationalities,the struggle for emancipation and social transformation is combined with the struggle for national rights.’67 This paper reflects the PSUC’sconcern for a Catalonia which, in its view, is losing influence and directcontrol over its industrial and financial sectors, lacks sufficient power and issubjected to expressions of cultural standardization. It argues that: ‘We couldbe reduced to the expression of nationality as a synonym of language andculture. Although such a restrictive vision would encourage essentialistdebates (are we or are we not a nation?), without adequate political powerwe would not even be able to maintain that identity.’68

ICV defends a plurinational idea of Spain which should fully recognize thehistorical nationalities. The document Sobirania i Solidaritat. Cap a l’EstatFederal (November 1994) argues:

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The full recognition of the plurinational nature of the Spanish state hasto involve the possibility to exercise the right to self-determinationunderstood as the free ability of peoples to make their own decisions.This right is not, however, necessarily identified either with indepen-dence, although this is one of the possible solutions, or with sanctioninga text in a single act, such as a constitutional or statutory referendum.69

According to Miquel Caminal, a distinctive trait of ICV in relation to self-government refers to its insistence on the defence of a unitary strategy,inherited from the PSUC and from the Assembly of Catalonia.70 Indeed, Ribó argues that Catalonia’s self-government has only advanced under theauspices of political unitary consensus among Catalan political parties, a policy never fostered by the CiU government. In his view, ‘one of theessential points that should define a feasible alternative programme for social, political and progressive change should involve a reflection on self-government by all political forces’.71

ICV rejects the politically successful appropriation of the image ofCatalonia and its symbols that, in their view, CiU and Pujolism have carriedout for so long,72 and supports the idea of a plural Catalan identity. ICVconsiders that there are different types of Catalan nationalism and stands for the sovereignty of the Catalan nation in a context within which thepopular sectors take central stage. For ICV, national freedoms should beclosely connected to individual democratic freedoms and social achievements:‘The political power currently enjoyed by Catalonia within the frameworkof the Statute of Autonomy and any further demands for greater self-government should primarily be employed to the benefit of the popularsectors.’73

ICV’s demands greater self-government by observing and developing theStatute, advocating a constitutional reform including the modification of theSenate, invigorating the Catalan Parliament by bringing it closer to the citi-zens, as well as setting up a funding system based on solidarity amongregions, including a fair and sufficient and financial autonomy for Catalonia,joint tax responsibility and inter-territorial solidarity.74 In point 6 of ICV’sprogramme for the 12 March 2000 general election, they proposed thefollowing objectives for the Catalan language:

1 recover full normality in the use of Catalan as the language proper toCatalonia in all spheres of society;

2 achieve recognition and full respect for the plurinational, pluriculturaland plurilinguistic reality of the Spanish state; and

3 foster the external promotion of the Catalan language in all spheres.

In addition to these objectives, they wish to promote the regular presenceof ‘the four official languages of the state in day-to-day life in conditions ofequality, both in official use and in the socio-economic sphere’.

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Immigration

In this section, it is again necessary to highlight the crucial role played bythe PSUC during the Franco regime and the early years of the transition todemocracy, when the word ‘immigrant’ solely referred to people from otherparts of Spain. However, at the beginning of this new century, most immi-grants originate from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe; such a change isradically transforming the socio-cultural and political parameters onceemployed to analyse the Spanish-speaking immigration received by Cataloniain the 1960s. The term ‘immigrant’ therefore has a different meaning inthese two historical periods.

The PSUC argues that its main contribution to Catalonia’s national recon-struction consists of the connection it managed to establish betweenCatalonia’s native working class and that from other areas of Spain, unitingthem in the struggle against exploitation and for the national liberation ofCatalonia.75 Rafael Ribó observes that with ‘the struggle for freedom, withthe struggle for rights as a distinct community, the historical tradition ofthis century continues’.76 Ribó considers that the progressive abandonmentby the Catalan left of its nationalist demands and its inability to confrontSpanish centralism are the main reasons for its electoral defeats.77 In contrastwith Marx’s well-known statement, ‘the working men have no country’,78

Ribó writes that ‘the working class itself is national, in so far as it operatesand develops in a certain historical setting, that is within a national struc-ture that characterizes the social formation’.79

From the PSUC’s perspective, the reconstruction of Catalonia shouldcombine the recovery of the essence of Catalan peculiarities and traditionswith the promotion of an open project in which all Catalan citizens couldtake part.80 In this context, Catalan culture should be enriched by the variouscontributions of the immigrant population.81 The idea of an ‘immutableCatalan culture’ is rejected, and it is argued that the reconstruction ofCatalonia should be based on the defence of the working class; the normal-ization of the Catalan language; a rejection of the idea that two opposingcultures, the Catalan and the immigrant, coexist in Catalonia; and the consol-idation of democracy and of the Autonomous Communities System.82

The final objective is to transform Catalonia into the homeland of all of its citizens.83 It should be stressed that as early as the VIII Congress (1988),the PSUC predicted the increasing complexity that was to affect Catalonia’ssocial composition, the reason being the rising number of non-Spanish immi-grants, prepared to do those jobs rejected by indigenous workers because oftheir poor economic or social status.84

In the PSUC’s view, it is of vital importance to recover a dynamic civilsociety, capable of engendering popular movements, something that can onlybe attained if all Catalan workers unite.85 It is imperative to avoid antagon-ism between the two communities based on language and ethnic origin by all means.86 Being a Catalan, as Jordi Borja argues, means belonging to a community and accepting that this involves enjoying full rights to

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participate in the construction of its collective future. The marginalizationof Catalans born in other areas of Spain would be critical and would createa serious social fracture.87

In its 1993 general election programme, ICV refers to non-Spanish immi-gration as a new challenge that Catalan society needs to confront. In 2003,during the writing of this book, immigration has become one of the mostpressing and controversial issues facing Catalonia, the rest of Spain and theEuropean Union. According to ICV, Catalonia needs to construct a societyenriched by the coexistence of people from different cultures and origins. It is essential to counteract any outbreak of racism and xenophobia and toprevent the emergence of a dividing line making social sectors or classescoincide with particular ethnic groups.

It is also necessary to prevent this division from being sanctioned by lawsleading to the marginalization and discrimination of the political and socialrights of people residing in the same place because of their origin. In its2000 general election programme, ICV advanced a series of measures destinedto favour the social integration of immigrants and pointed at diversity as ‘anecessary condition for the viability of urban industrial societies such asours’.88 ICV criticizes the different models of integration applied by theUnited States, France and Great Britain because, according to this party, allthree have failed, in part, in not recognizing that a large number of coexist-ence conflicts arise from social asymmetries and not from cultural differences.According to ICV, social integration is only possible whenever adequate legal integration measures are in place. For ICV, cultural integration isimpossible if minimum levels of socio-economic integration and the dis-appearance of inequalities are not successfully achieved.

ICV is in favour of extending European citizenship to all those who havelived in the European Union for at least three years as a strategy aimed atguaranteeing the right to free movement, voting rights and the right to settlein any member state.89 It should be added that, in ICV’s view, it would beutopian to consider that an idyllic view of multiculturalism can be achieved,‘as there will always be a certain threshold of conflict in the coexistence ofgroups which set themselves apart from each other’.90

Catalonia and Spain

The PSUC’s discourse defines Catalonia as a nation integrated in the Spanishstate. According to Ribó:

Throughout its history, the Spanish state has used the idea of a singlenation [. . .] to reproduce ideologically an abstract equality and uniform-ity which hinders the free expression of the different communities.91

Ribó condemns the strong centralist component present in the constructionof the Spanish state, a centralism that in most periods has been accompanied

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by political authoritarianism,92 invoked by very different political tenden-cies which share a strong Spanish nationalism.93

In 1990, IC defined Spain as a multinational state and pointed to therecognition of sovereignty and national trends as preconditions for demo-cratic advancement towards a federal union. In its view, the AutonomousCommunities System represents one of the first steps in the process thatshould lead to federalism.94

The PSUC supported the 1979 Statute of Autonomy. Josep Benet, thehistorical leader of the Catalan left, requested a mass positive response to thereferendum on the Statute, because he considered that this would increasethe power of Catalonia on negotiating with the Spanish state. For Benet, theStatute was the means to make Spanish centralism disappear.95

Another element to be found in the communist discourse refers to the ideathat Catalonia should contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Spain.96

Although the Catalan communists defend the idea of a federal democraticrepublic for Catalonia, they accept the monarchy in so far as it is capable ofconstitutionally guaranteeing a true democracy, which recognizes the sover-eignty of the Parliament and does not hinder social and political democracy.97

The PSUC demands self-determination for all the peoples of Spain,98 andpostulates a reform of the Constitution aimed at the creation of a federalstate reflecting the multicultural nature of Spain.99

According to the PSUC, federalism is a means to go beyond the currentmodel of state and it should be applied not just to Spain, but also to theEU.100 The resolution of the ‘national issue’ lies in the self-determination ofthe nationalities included within the Spanish state. For the PSUC, Catalonia’sself-determination responds to a demand for sovereignty without whichcooperation with Spain on an equal level is impossible. Sovereignty is alsoessential to guarantee Catalonia’s presence within the European Union.101

Equality between the languages, cultures and nations forming Spain shouldbe achieved within a context of solidarity. The Catalan communists defend self-determination for Catalonia as an effective tool to strengthen its nationalcharacter, its language and culture, while simultaneously improving theliving conditions of its citizens. The PSUC argues that Catalonia, as a histor-ical nation, is entitled to assert its viewpoint and to establish relations withinits national sphere, and that this would encourage cooperation among thePaïsos Catalans.102

For its part, in its Fifth National Assembly (1998), ICV considered that ‘ifthe Spanish state does not advance decisively in its self-definition as a pluri-national, pluricultural and plurilinguistic reality, organized freely in a federal manner, this will turn into a serious obstacle for the well-being and development of its peoples and citizens’.103 Article 2.4 of the Principlesand ideology of ICV stresses that, as a result of the autonomous process,Catalonia is not a sovereign body, because the only constituent subject is theSpanish nation, and because the Spanish state has been created taking thenational sovereignty of the Spanish people as a starting point, while a federal

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state would originate from an agreement between pre-existing sovereign com-munities. ICV concludes that ‘the Spanish state is a plurinational reality witha territorial basis and asymmetric federalism is the formula which would allowunity to be reconciled with the recognition of internal diversity’. This typeof federalism, that ICV also describes as ‘asymmetric plurinational’, involves:

The recognition of differential powers in areas such as language, culture,media, internal security and others that may arise from national partic-ularities applied in such a way that the use of these powers does notentail economic privileges for one autonomous community or benefitsfor its dominant social groups. The process of federalization requires afunding system based on the principles of sufficient financial autonomy,joint tax responsibility and solidarity; it also involves recognizing self-determination as a means of exercising the sovereignty of peoples.104

The process towards asymmetric federalism should have two phases. Thefirst should involve a boost to political autonomy and the development ofthe potentialities of the Constitution, while the second phase should includea reform of the Constitution and the establishment of a broad agreementamong the different political parties, significant institutions and the citizens.While acknowledging that over twenty years of enjoying the 1978Constitution has resulted in a very substantial degree of decentralization and a considerable devolution of powers and resources to the autonomous com-munities, ICV stresses that the Spanish constitutional framework containssome ‘limitations, insufficiencies and contradictions which should lead to itsreform’. They also note that a constitutional amendment is essential toadvancing asymmetric federalism, to attaining an effective recognition of theplurinational nature of Spain, to modifying the concept of sovereignty andto expanding rights and solidarity.105 At the same time, it would be neces-sary to bear in mind the changes caused by the progressive politicalintegration of the European Union and new migration flows.

Catalonia and the European Union

In this section I distinguish between the PSUC’s position before Spain joinedthe European Union and subsequent statements by ICV, corresponding to adifferent political context marked by membership of the EU.

In the document Europa comunitària: una proposta del PSUC (1987),published just before the first election to the European Parliament that tookplace in Spain in June 1987, the PSUC expressed its support for Spain’smembership of the EU (then the European Community). The PSUC consid-ered its struggle for a united Europe, with its peoples and citizens as themain actors, to be an important part of the democratic advance towardssocialism. As early as 1987, the PSUC demanded the status of European electoral district for Catalonia, and stood for a Europe aspiring to ‘break up

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geographic limitations and corporatist selfishness, while respecting nationaland regional characteristics’. The PSUC supported the consolidation of anautonomous Europe, to which it proposed to contribute through its collab-oration with other left-wing European political forces. The text mentions thePSUC’s coincidence with the PCE regarding this particular matter.

ICV stands in favour of the economic, political and social unity of theEuropean Union forging ahead with the setting up of a federal structurecapable of promoting both the whole and each of its parts as a sharedheritage.106

According to ICV, the ability to attain social and environmental qualityexemplifies one of the main challenges currently faced by the left, whichshould also prove its critical and innovative competence in tackling this issue.A positive outcome would only be possible through transnational collabora-tion among left-wing organizations. From this perspective, the EU representsa strategic option for the European left, which wants to advance in the devel-opment of transformation policies. This is why the European Union, in ICV’sview, should not be restricted to monetary integration, but rather shouldevolve in matters concerning labour strategies, safety regulations, social cohe-sion and the coordination of macroeconomic policies.

ICV is in favour of a progressive, prosperous, social, educated, environ-mentally friendly and caring EU, but also of an EU capable of democratizingits own institutions and accepting the challenge posed by its enlargementto include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Article 2.5 of thePrinciples and ideology of ICV says:

We want the European Union to be the instrument to overcome thelimitations of traditional states, to strengthen the interrelation betweenits peoples, to ensure the peace and well-being of all its members.

Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC (PSC-PSOE))

The PSC (PSC-PSOE) stresses the plural nature of the origin of politicalCatalanism and defines its own type of Catalanism (it rejects the expression‘Catalan nationalism’ to define its discourse) as based upon an idea of thenation and of society in which the citizens play the main role.107 Federalismis considered as a decisive aspect of the PSC’s progressive Catalanism, whichrejects the dichotomy between Catalans and Spaniards as well as referencesto the Spanish state as an ‘external enemy’.

The PSC’s aim is to create a classless society, free from exploitation, domin-ation, discrimination and oppression. In its IV Congress (November 1984),the party accepted Marxism as a method of analysis and as a tool for thetransformation of reality. It also accepted all the contributions madethroughout history, and from different schools of thought, with the aim ofoverthrowing the capitalist system. The key elements that characterize themodel of society advocated by the PSC

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are essentially based on the eradication of class differences; the social-ization of the means of production, distribution and exchange; theestablishment of full democracy and equality in the relations among indi-viduals and between peoples.108

The collapse of Soviet communism, which began with the fall of the BerlinWall (1989), had a considerable impact on European socialism and commun-ism. In the framework paper of its VII Congress (1994), the PSC echoed thisgeneral feeling among the left:

The balance of the communist regimes, beyond the totalitarian tragedies,is truly pathetic: it shows no advantage in relation to the results obtainedby the European social states, either in the field of economic produc-tivity or in the field of social justice; quite the opposite.109

This position signalled the disappearance of the term ‘Marxism’ from PSCdocuments. In 1994, the socialists already defined full democracy as theirmain objective, and recognized ‘the need for a profound renewal of the trans-formation project of the left’, while rejecting both the ‘old model of the left’and the emerging neo-liberalism.110

The IX Congress (June 2000) identified the party’s objectives for politicalaction as ‘social justice, equality of rights and the strengthening of theCatalan national situation, thus consolidating its plural identity within Spainin the context of a changing world’.111 The method aimed at fulfilling theseobjectives should mainly focus on four points: (1) widening democracy, self-government and federalism; (2) favouring economic progress for everyone,by promoting new opportunities within a general framework of sustain-ability; (3) strengthening social cohesion and the welfare state; and (4) thewill to boost global progress for the whole of humanity.112

The main objectives of the Catalan Socialists are the promotion of theCatalan nation, understood as a merger of historical Catalan culture with theculture of the immigrant population, and the consolidation of the demo-cratic Spanish state with the support of all of its nationalities and regions.In the political declaration of the VI Congress, Article 4 (October 1990)refers directly to the relations between Catalonia and Spain:

As followers of the socialist movement and of progressive Catalanism, the Catalan Socialists regard the struggle for socialism and national free-dom for Catalonia as inseparable objectives of our political project. We carry out this fight as a sovereign party, federally united with thePSOE, convinced that the construction of socialism in Catalonia and the construction of Catalonia as a nation cannot be isolated from the con-struction of socialism in the general sphere and from the construction ofa democratic Spain, as a federal community of peoples.113

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In the documents defining the ideology of the Catalan Socialists there isan explicit absence of references to the right to self-determination. Thisderives from their gradualist and federalizing idea of the AutonomousCommunities System; however, the document Per Catalunya. Ara un nou feder-alisme (For Catalonia. Now a new federalism) refers to the people of Catalonia’sdesire for self-government as a central element of political Catalanism.114

Even so, it is not the same to aspire to self-determination, that is to the rightof a nation to decide on how it wants to rule itself, as to aspire to self-govern-ment, which means that a nation wishes to be ruled by its own people, astatement which does not necessarily involve the right to decide on ‘how’and by which institutions a nation should be ruled.

The PSC (PSC-PSOE) originated from the unification of the PSC (C)(Congress), the FSC (PSOE) (Federació Socialista de Catalunya, or SocialistFederation of Catalonia) and the PSC (R) (Regrouping). The process for theunification of the three parties took place in the Unification Congress or IPSC (PSC-PSOE) Congress on 16 July 1978, after holding the respectivePSC (C), PSC (R) and FSC (PSOE) dissolution congresses the previous day.

The differences existing at the time of unification are clearly illustratedby the ‘Unity Protocols’ of each party. For instance, on the question of sover-eignty, the PSC (R) considered the new PSC to be a sovereign party withits own representation in the Socialist International. In the final document,the new party only maintained sovereignty in the sphere of Catalonia andfrom then on the PSOE would be the only representative in internationalorganizations.115 Indeed, in its point 4, the Unity Protocol (the foundationaldocument of the new party) explains:

The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC-PSOE) will have full sover-eignty in those domains that the socialists of Catalonia require for thepolitical organization of our country, in accordance with the constitu-tional framework approved in its programme by the socialists of thewhole state.

There were tense moments during the unification process, both in JoanReventós’s PSC (C) and in Josep Pallach’s PSC (R). In the PSC (C), thetensions were mainly due to the so-called ‘II Congress tendency’, which wasmore pro-Catalan and which expressed differences of opinion concerning thesurrender of sovereignty by the new party to the PSOE. Further tension arosefrom the relationship with the PSOE and from trade union options. The PSC(R)’s decision to merge with the PSC (C) and the FSC (PSOE) caused aninternal split in this party; one sector joined CDC, and another ERC. Thesharp tension experienced in the PSC (R) Congress on 8 January 1977 culmin-ated in the death, on 11 January, of Josep Pallach, its indisputable leader.116

The PSC (R) was the party that lost most members in the process of creatingthe PSC (PSC-PSOE), and this was reflected in the representation it obtainedwithin the executive committee of the new party, within which the PSC (C),

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led by Joan Reventós, and the FSC (PSOE), led by Josep Maria Triginer, hadeleven members, while the PSC (R), under Josep Verde i Aldea, who hadreplaced Pallach, only had three.

Two divergent ideas of socialism came together in the PSC. On the onehand, the tradition originating from the PSC (C)

finds its historical roots in Catalanism, anarcho-syndicalism and the co-operative movement; it is anti-centralist, anti-state and self-governing,with strong influences from social Christianity.

On the other hand, the PSOE’s socialism represents a state, secular socialismof working-class tradition. It could be argued that ‘within the generalframework of socialism, the socialist tradition of the PSOE stems from a“statist” conception; while that of the PSC (C), on the contrary, arises froma “societal” conception’.117 These two traditions have somehow survived atthe heart of the PSC and have been responsible for some discrepancies withinthe party.

Since its constitution, two internal crises have threatened the stability ofthe PSC. The first took place at the II Congress of the party (Barcelona,1980), following the defeat suffered in the first election to the Catalan Parlia-ment and the discrepancies on preparing the lists of candidates, in whichthose in favour of maintaining separate representatives for each party (asagreed on merging) came up against Raimon Obiols’ ‘unitarian’ stream. This prompted a confrontation between the working-class sector from theFSC (PSOE), led by Carlos Cigarràn and convinced that socialism is notnationalist; the ‘unitarians’ led by Obiols who attributed their electoral defeatto the PSC’s inability to present itself as a progressive, pro-Catalan party;and the ‘critics’, a minority sector in favour of positioning the party furtherto the left, and who ended up giving their support to the sector led by Obiolsregarding national and internal organization matters. The party managed toovercome the crisis after the PSOE’s intervention. Joan Reventós endeav-oured, although unsuccessfully (the working-class sector refused), toreconstruct the lost unity. Obiols, with the support of Josep M. Sala, wasentrusted with re-structuring and re-organizing the party from the execu-tive. In any case, the II PSC Congress led to the complete abandonment ofseparate representation of the founding parties through quotas.

The second internal crisis took place after the attempted coup d’état inFebruary 1981, and was caused by the agreement between UCD and thePSOE on the regulation of autonomous communities and the subsequentsanctioning of the LOAPA, as mentioned above. Years later, Joan Reventósreflected on these events during his intervention in a course organized bythe Centre for International Historical Studies at the University of Barcelona.He said:

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I believe that the agreement with the PSOE was positive, but too oftenwe, the Catalan Socialists, have had to swallow tough things that thePSOE has done and that we did not like. [. . .] At one time we wereabout to split up because of the LOAPA. And I was responsible for thePSC, united with the PSOE and absorbed in the Catalan PSOE, not split-ting, because I thought that, despite everything, it was better to swallowthe unpleasant LOAPA, than to break what had taken so much toachieve, that was the unity of Catalan socialism.118

This crisis caused by the LOAPA was mitigated by the PSOE victory in the28 October 1982 general election. The presence of PSC ministers in thecentral government (Narcís Serra, Ernest Lluch and, subsequently, Joan Majóand Jordi Solé Tura) and the consolidation of the socialists as the leadingpolitical party in Spain, with a further election victory in 1986 and the victo-ries in the local elections of 1983 and 1987, contributed to stabilizing theparty, now led by Raimon Obiols, General Secretary between 1983 and 1996.Narcís Serra became General Secretary in the VIII Congress (1996) andPasqual Maragall was the PSC’s candidate to the presidency of the Generalitatof Catalonia in the 1999 and the 2003 autonomous election.

Catalan identity

Isidre Molas, a key socialist ideologist, asserts the historical character of the nation, as the social basis of the state, and refuses to conceive it as astatic, immutable entity.119 In his view, the social classes coexisting withinthe same nationality offer different national projects. The Catalan Socialistsunderstand Catalonia as a ‘nation to be remade, reconstructed, invigorated’120

and which ‘should be respected’.121 Joan Reventós refers to Catalonia as a‘single national community – “a single people”, as proclaimed recently in a different tone – not just because of its history and specific features, butalso, and above all, because we accept the historical need for a national pro-ject for the working people’.122 The PSC Manifesto (1999) propounds federalCatalanism as a model through which Catalonia can have its specificity recognized:

Catalonia expresses its national character through its history, language,culture, law and politics. The indispensable recognition of its distinc-tiveness should also mean that the citizens of Catalonia can fully exercisethe rights that arise from it.123

In the document Per Catalunya. Ara un nou federalisme, Catalonia is definedas a nation, in line with Ernest Renan’s well-known idea that the nation isthe result of a daily plebiscite:

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We are a nation because here and now we the citizens of Catalonia wantto be and this leads to our aspiration to self-government through ourown institutions. This means having the ambition to expand as far aspossible our capacity to decide for ourselves in the different fields of public activity and to strengthen the identification of the people ofCatalonia with its institutions of self-government.124

The same document recognizes that:

The nation is self-government, the collective will to be; but it is also aset of intangible symbols and elements with which we identify to agreater or lesser degree [. . .]. And there is no people, country, or nation,without signs of national identity that unite them, draw them together,give them an overview, allow them to be strong in the world, to beworth something and to be something. [. . .] What we must do is toprevent them from being elements of exclusion and segregation and to convert them into factors of synthesis and of aggregation.125

From this perspective, the PSC encourages all segments of society to partic-ipate in the process of devoting themselves, with no regrets, to the recreationof the collective identity of Catalonia, to ‘the reactivation of the old Catalanmelting pot’, which should have as its basic prerequisites

the guarantee that the process is truly open to diversity, without restric-tions, including linguistic diversity and freedom as a present and futurevalue and, moreover, the guarantee that Catalan, the language proper to the country, will be saved, will become a common cause for allcitizens.126

In the 1999 autonomous election, the PSC ran with the new independentplatform, CpC, established in 1998 and promoted by Pasqual Maragall. CpC, chaired by Josep Maria Vallés, former vice-chancellor of the Auton-omous University of Barcelona, sought an alternative form of politics, outsideconventional party political structures. CpC was created as a civic movementin support of Maragall’s candidature to the presidency of the Generalitat. Itsobjectives were determined by its will to bring politics closer to the citizensand to add prestige to public life; the struggle against all kinds of socialexclusion; and a defence of a progressive, caring and integrative Catalan-ism that promotes self-government and contributes, from Catalonia, to theconstruction of a federal Spain.127 In the 1999 election, CpC obtained 15seats in the Catalan Parliament, forming part of the PSC-CpC parliamentarygroup.

In their Programa de govern (Manifesto) for the 1999 autonomous election,the PSC and CpC undertook to promote a linguistic policy based on a wide

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social consensus, involving a positive perception of Catalan by all citizensand extending its social use, while avoiding regulatory and unilateralactions.128 The Catalan Socialists sought to promote

a common policy for the Catalan linguistic domain, either through amultilateral consensus of the autonomous communities, or through theSpanish government, acting as a driving force.129

They also undertook to establish a platform for the international promotionof Catalan language and culture. The PSC and CpC consider ‘Castilian to bean expression of the cultural wealth of Catalonia and, therefore, also as acommon legacy of the Catalans’.130

Catalan nationalism/Catalanism

The socialists of Catalonia identify a predominantly democratic and progres-sive, reforming and modernizing component in the conservative Catalanismof Enric Prat de la Riba and the left-wing Catalanism represented by FrancescMacià and Lluís Companys. The PSC considers itself to be

heir to the federal movement, to Josep Rovira and Josep Pallach’s Frontde la Llibertat, or Freedom Front, to the democratic movement and tothe working-class movement. Catalanism as a mass movement was histor-ically born from the struggle against the dictatorship and from theworking-class, the national and cultural resistance of the MSC, the FOC[Front Obrer de Catalunya] and the historical FC-PSOE [Federació Catalanadel PSOE].131

Molas argues that Catalan nationalism is the common heritage of allCatalan political parties.132 This idea is echoed in the PSC’s documents, whichstate that ‘Political Catalanism has been a plural movement just as Cataloniahas been and remains plural’.133 One of the most important challenges facedby the PSC consists of combining national and social interests. Solé Turaargues that ‘the left cannot be nationalist, but must be profoundly national’,while González Casanova endeavours to synthesize the components of whathe calls ‘left-wing Catalan nationalism’.

According to Solé Tura, the left cannot succumb to the ambiguities ofnationalism in relation to the current Spanish state model, and should notcultivate the dichotomy between ‘us’, Catalonia, and ‘them’, Spain. He alsoinsists, however, that the left cannot neglect the ‘national question’ or becomea simple instrument for the implementation of the central government’sdecisions. He maintains that ‘the left should be profoundly national and atthe same time show considerable solidarity with all the nationalities andregions of Spain’.134 But ‘the left should have deep roots in the community,

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express the sentiments and the aspirations of all popular sectors, and reflect the concerns and expectations of the majority of the population’.135

Solé Tura condemns the tendency of some Catalan and Basque nationaliststo promote ‘particularisms’ and to raise sporting, cultural or political rivalries up to the category of symbols that define the essence of the nation,the overall result being a relationship with the ‘central power’ in whichconflict precedes negotiation and agreement, and stands up above all otherissues.136

Solé Tura maintains that ‘officially Spain is not and cannot be a federalstate unless the Constitution is modified’. Even so, he argues that ‘what isimportant is not the name but the object. What is important is that in theend the Spanish state operates as a federal state’, adding that ‘this is perfectlypossible within the current constitutional text’.137 According to Solé Tura, the left should perform an integrative and unifying function withineach nationality or region, without succumbing to isolation due to victim-ization, and should work towards the construction of a true AutonomousCommunities System.

For Josep Antoni González Casanova, the Spanish federalism of FrancescPi i Margall and the Marxism of the first Catalan communists constitute the historical roots of Catalan nationalism. In his view, the two core ideasguiding left-wing nationalist strategy are the conviction that the Catalannationalist cause is closely connected to the democratization of Spain, andthat the struggle for Catalan self-government can only prosper if Catalanworkers play a more prominent role and receive support and solidarity fromother Spanish workers.138 He argues that a reciprocal integration of thecultures that coexist in Catalonia, free from confrontation, hegemonies anddiscrimination, would contribute to the construction of a Spanish stateincluding different ‘political nations’ and, for Gonzalez Casanova, thepromising task of building up the state must necessarily involve theautonomous communities.139

Antoni Castells is concerned with the left’s political commitment toCatalan society, and argues that the left’s political project will not be fulfilledif credibility and initiative regarding the ‘Catalan question’ are not recov-ered. In his view the left should express ‘with adequate clarity the reasonablefears relative to the fact that the Autonomous Communities System, as it isbeing built, will not resolve Catalonia’s historical dispute with the Spanishstate’.140

According to Pasqual Maragall, President of the PSC, nationalism is a

generic position [. . .] which in most countries of the world is identifiedwith chauvinism and conservatism. It is a heterogeneous tendency, madeup of very diverse ingredients, the sole shared point consisting of beingor feeling as victims of an external force.

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In contrast:

Catalanism represents adherence to the identity of a specific homeland,this one, my own. Nationalism and Catalanism are two different formu-lations, although historically they have overlapped and been usedlegitimately in an indiscriminate or equivalent manner. [. . .] We shouldspeak decidedly on behalf of a Catalonia that goes beyond classical nation-alism, understood as mere survival and mere defence.141

Point 2 of the Resolució sobre catalanisme i municipalisme (Resolution onCatalanism and municipalism), approved by the VII PSC Congress (1994), spec-ifies the ‘basic characteristics of a strategic reorientation of Catalanism’, whichwould have to include the following points: (1) development of a strategywith great creative freedom, with big spaces for social prominence, withinwhich the appeal to civil society is not a rhetorical figure; a strategy withfew rules, but binding; (2) coexistence and social cohesion; (3) competitive-ness; (4) an appropriate territorial strategy; and (5) the open and generousimplementation of the principle of subsidiarity, in addition to the gradualfederalization of the institutional organizational model, both withinCatalonia and at state level, and also as regards the European federalpyramid.142

When discussing social cohesion, the Resolució sobre catalanisme i munici-palisme mentions culture and language. According to point 2.10,

the main danger for Catalan culture is not Castilian or Anglo-Saxonculture as some may argue. We should make sure that we get the rightenemy; the true danger is decadence; internal decadence or the deca-dence of the European project. In a decadent Catalonia, without cohesion,without a national will arising from the plural nature of the people,Catalan would have no future. Only within a blooming Catalonia, againa pioneer of the best causes, will the Catalan language become a factorof unity, in short, a common cause.

The text goes on to highlight the fundamental importance of the Catalanlanguage in protecting the country’s identity and stands for ‘the full recoveryof the language until it is transformed into Catalonia’s proper language’.143

A constant aspect of the socialist discourse is the insistence on the needto protect and develop the welfare state. At his ESADE (Escola Superiord’Aministració d’Empreses) business school speech (28 May 2001), Maragallreaffirmed the need to maintain the welfare state by increasing contribu-tions in order to make the system sustainable, and spoke against reducingservices and benefits: ‘For us social cohesion is a basic value to be preserved;moreover, it is essential to guarantee the competitiveness and the sustainedgrowth of any territory.’144 Three pillars support the policy of equity and

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social cohesion proposed by Maragall: ‘Priority for education, the develop-ment of social services to help families and dignifying the districts of our cities.’145

Immigration

A further recurrent theme in the discourse of the Catalan Socialists concernsthe emphasis on the need to involve immigrants in the creation of a unitedCatalan society.146 Isidre Molas argues that the historical success ofCatalanism depends on avoiding having citizens who do not feel Catalan.147

For Raimon Obiols, ‘the unity and equality of all the citizens of Catalonia’are the basic ideas of the socialist discourse.148 The following paragraphclearly spells out the PSC and CpC’s position regarding the model ofCatalonia that they want to promote more than twenty years after the re-establishment of the Generalitat:

A Catalanism based only on linguistic and cultural aspects runs the riskof excluding from its approach a considerable part of Catalan society,whose first language is not Catalan. To say that to be a Catalanist it isnecessary to express oneself in Catalan and to be immersed in Catalanculture means, at present, to exclude 50 per cent of the population.Hence, it is to weaken the cause that it is intended to defend. Our self-government will be strengthened when the citizens of Catalonia, whodo not express themselves in Catalan but who see self-government as away to exercise their rights and to defend their interests, are in favourof it and see it as theirs (and therefore participate in electoral processes).For this reason, it is important to underline two aspects of the closeconnection between Catalanism and self-government. On the one hand,self-government allows the interests of all Catalans to be defended, irre-spective of their cultural origin. On the other, it offers the possibilityto develop a common project for the country, in which cultural identityis constructed day by day, as a result of social dynamics and ambition,and has the will to guarantee the continuity of the linguistic and culturalelements that history has bequeathed us.149

The PSC and CpC are in favour of respectful exchanges with neighbouring,and even distant, cultures from the standpoint of a Catalan cultural space.150

In this context, the Catalan Socialists undertake to defend the civic and socialrights of all Catalans and also to contribute to defending their cultural rights,which include ‘the right to an identity which does not reject difference’.They state that ‘all culture created and produced in Catalonia will form apart of Catalan culture’.151

In his talk, Immigració. Oportunitat i repte per a Catalunya (Immigration.Opportunity and challenge for Catalonia), given at the Auditorium of the

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Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona on 4 April 2001, Maragall inter-preted the rising number of foreigners coming to Catalonia as a greatopportunity to reconsider Catalan identity. Maragall declared that:

I think that as a people with an open and progressive mentality weshould believe and argue that multiculturalism is possible. And work tomake it viable. Not a multiculturalism based on a relativism implyingthat everything is the same, or that nothing is worth defending. Ofcourse we recognize that we have our own, millennial culture, but it hasbeen formed gradually and enriched through contact with external influ-ences. Culture cannot be something static, or sacred, which is recordedand remains forever more. Culture is created by the people who form acountry, who live and work in it, who know and respect the legacy oftheir ancestors, but who know how to transform it through their ownlife. Culture is dynamic, and the more dynamic it is, the more plural,lively and the more democratic it will be.152

Catalonia and Spain

Spain is defined in the 1999 Manifesto as a ‘culturally plural reality withfour languages and four basic cultures: Castilian, Catalan, Galician andBasque’; added is the statement that ‘Spain must recognize and assume thisplurality’.153 The PSC proposes a federal deployment of the Constitution,permitting the current transformation of the Autonomous CommunitiesSystem and the process of European unity to be deepened. According to thepolitical paper 5.1 of the IX Congress (June 2000):

Catalonia has to lead the process of transformation of Spain. Cataloniais stronger when its arguments are understood and shared by the otherpeoples of Spain, and we advance together in the same direction.

In their V Congress (1987), the Catalan Socialists had already argued infavour of making progress with the federal formulation of the AutonomousCommunities System through the accomplishment of the federalist poten-tial contained in the Constitution.154 In their opinion,

the Autonomous Communities System has not completely solved theproblem of the historical nationalities, and has even created new prob-lems arising from the overlapping of different administrative models. Inaddition, while the Autonomous Communities System was being created,a parallel historical revision of the concept of Spain, clearly expressingits plurinational composition, was not undertaken.155

This fact, according to the Catalan Socialists, has generated serious misun-derstanding and mistrust between the state and the historical autonomous

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communities. For the socialists, the federalization of the state would solvesuch problems through the construction of a ‘real Spain of nationalities inopposition to both a uniform Spain and a Spain of cantonalism’.156

The PSC’s federalist proposal involves five points:

1 Federalism as a mechanism to distribute powers between the state andthe autonomous communities.

2 In-depth reform of the state administration affecting both central andperipheral services.

3 In-depth reform of the Senate to transform it into a chamber of territor-ial representation reflecting the multinational character of Spain.

4 A new autonomous funding model based on the principles of autonomyand financial sufficiency, joint fiscal responsibility and inter-regionalsolidarity.

5 Strengthening the role of local corporations in the new structure ofterritorial power.157

Raimon Obiols defends the federalist proposal of the PSC, but at the sametime recognizes that within Spanish socialism there is a tension between fed-eralist and centralist tendencies, and that the latter is greatly influenced bythe Jacobin and statist ethics impregnating the culture of the French left.158

In this respect, the PSC’s federalist proposal prompted hostile reactionsfrom some PSOE members. Alfonso Guerra, former Deputy Prime Ministerof Spain and PSOE Vice-secretary, stated that ‘the 1978 Constitution doesnot favour the configuration of Spain as a federal state’.159 Gregorio PecesBarba, one of the most outstanding figures of the PSOE elite, stressed that‘federalism assumes the prior existence of sovereign states which decide tounite in order to create a single state. This is not the case in Spain given theabsence of these prior sovereign states.’160

Some further objections originated from those arguing that to turn Spaininto a federation would require a reform of the Constitution. A further sectorof opposition to the federalist project emerged from Catalan nationalistformations, such as CiU, which argue that federalism would place all theautonomous communities on the same footing. In line with such arguments,Juan José Laborda, former Speaker of the Senate, indicated that the Catalanand Basque nationalisms were reluctant to accept federalism because theywant to have an exclusive bilateral relationship with the state.161

On assessing the possible obstacles to the federal project, Jordi Solé Turamentions the technocratic neocentralism of the Spanish state and the politicalhegemony of nationalism in the autonomous communities. He argues thatboth elements reflect the persistence of the conflict defining the relationshipbetween the state and the nationalities and regions, as well as the perpetu-ation of a certain ambiguity when outlining the concept of the nation andthe territorial framework of the state.162

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As Miquel Caminal argues, ‘just as it is difficult to find the term “self-determination” in PSC texts and when found it is almost always awkwardlyused, so “asymmetry” is an inconvenient concept’.163 The PSC does not accept this term as such, but rather subsumes it in the expression ‘differen-tial federalism’. According to Caminal,

all the federalisms of the PSC (democratic, dual, cooperative, autono-mist, municipalist, differential) end up coming together in the cooperativemethod which essentially identifies it, but which needs to complementit with the principle of subsidiarity on facing centralizing tendencies, andwith the differential aspect when facing standardizing tendencies.164

The Catalan Socialists offer a positive assessment of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy.165 As Eduardo Martín Toval wrote during the referendumcampaign on the 1979 Statute, ‘it may not be the ideal Statute’, but whatreally matters is its capacity to attain the political objectives that the Catalansare pursuing in this specific period.166 Joan Reventós indicated, in declara-tions to El País, that the 1979 Statute was an element capable of contributingto the consolidation of democracy in Spain.167 Raimon Obiols consideredboth the 1978 Constitution and the 1979 Statute of Autonomy to be ‘satis-factory’,168 but, during the commemoration in the Catalan Parliament of thetenth anniversary of the Statute, he concluded that the autonomous processhad not been completed and that it required ‘a new impulse to further self-government’. He also acknowledged the existence of ‘centralizing tenden-cies’ within the central administration – a clear reference to his counterpartsin the PSOE.169 It should be recalled that, to solve the national question,the socialists of the PSOE had suggested granting ‘autonomous community’status to all Spanish regions, and not just to the ‘historical’ nationalities.170

The PSC and CpC 1999 Manifesto assesses the transition to democracy,during which

Catalonia was generous and yielded more than it demanded, because weall knew that the consolidation of democracy in Spain was the priority.The outcome was the calculated ambiguity of the 1978 Constitution,which did not dare to define which languages are spoken in Spain andshould be accepted by the state as their own. After twenty years, it isfair to expect explicit recognition as a nation, resulting in a categoricalacceptance of the historical nationalities, in the drafting and applicationof basic laws, in the modus operandi of the democratic state, in majorstrategic options and in the decisive assumption of linguistic and culturaldiversity.171

On presenting his assessment of the devolution process in a talk given atthe Club Siglo XXI in Madrid, Pasqual Maragall argued that:

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It could be said that sacrificing the expression of difference and of thenational plurality of Spain was the price paid by Catalonia and the BasqueCountry to permit the construction and the consolidation of Spanishdemocracy.

Referring to the future, he added that:

Nowadays, the core of the new constitutional agreement would have tomean that the historical nationalities – Catalonia, the Basque Countryand Galicia – accept the generalization of autonomous communities,equality of powers and a balanced model, in exchange for the othercommunities recognizing the plurinational, pluricultural and pluri-linguistic diversity of Spain and, consequently, the political expressionsof its differential aspects.172

In his talk at ESADE (28 May 2001), Maragall stated that:

Catalonia should offer Spain a new agreement: federalism andsubsidiarity are the political concepts that should encourage us toadvance in a joint venture with the peoples of Spain and improveCatalonia’s leadership capacity.173

Catalonia and the European Union

The PSC defines itself as ‘a party with a European vocation’,174 committed toboosting its integration in Europe and to promoting the European debate.The PSC’s objective is for ‘Catalonia to be perfectly integrated in Europeanpolitics, economics, society and culture with a guarantee for its identity. [. . .] We must be aware that our future is Europe.’175 Maragall observes that:

We need to find a balance between growth and equality, betweencompetitiveness and cohesion. In our Europe, only a strong, unitedsociety is in a position to achieve continuous, stable growth, and onlywith stable and continuous growth will we be in a position to imple-ment the necessary welfare policies.176

The Declaration of the Party of European Socialists (The Hague, November1992) exhibits the commitment of European socialists and social democratsto the process of European integration. In the framework paper of the VIICongress, the socialists stand in favour of the organization of Europe as a market, but also as a political power. In their view, ‘Europe can only be perceived as a plurinational political reality.’177 The Catalan Socialistsemphasize the importance of two fundamental criteria when consideringEuropean integration – federalism and the principle of subsidiarity. Federal-ism is defined as a criterion for social and political organization. The principle

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of subsidiarity, from a federalist perspective, incorporates both the prin-ciple of the majority and civil freedom, and the principle of the diffusionand the balance of powers. This principle, understood as political decentral-ization, should allow regions and municipalities to develop policies with the aim of improving the daily quality of life of their citizens. Subsidiarity,in conjunction with the federal principle, is at the core of the PSC’s Europeanproject, which defines the European dimension as the space where Cataloniacan develop all its potential:

The autonomous governments should take an active part in the Europeanconstruction process and should be present in European decision-makingbodies, especially in so far as these bodies intervene in areas whose respon-sibility has been devolved to the autonomous communities.178

The document Per Catalunya. Ara, un nou federalisme recalls that ‘Spain is,due to its influence, a magnificent gateway to Europe. We must know howto take advantage of this but, above all, we must want to take advantage ofit.’ However, on analysing the means through which Catalonia should beintegrated in the European Union, it mentions ‘the indirect relations offeredby the state – and the direct relations already provided, although only in anincipient manner, by the institutionalized European regional movement’.179

A later document produced by the main political parties of the Catalan left,PSC (PSC-PSOE)-CpC, ICV and ERC, demands that Catalonia should begranted the right to have an institutional presence within the EU, by at leastenjoying the status of EU electoral constituency;180 a point subscribed bythe PSC and included in its draft programme for the 2003 Catalan election.It should be noted, however, that, in the Spanish Parliament on 13 May2003, the PSOE, with which the PSC is federated, together with the PP andIU, rejected the proposal for Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia tobe considered as electoral constituencies in the forthcoming EU election.181

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6 Images of Catalonia IICDC and UDC

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I analyse theideological content of CDC, along the same lines as the other political partiesconsidered so far. The second section looks at the ideological content of UDC.And in the third section I examine the nationalist thinking of Jordi Pujol,President of the Generalitat since 1980. I have decided to distinguishbetween the official position of CDC and the specific ideology of its leader,expressed in his extensive written work, because it would be difficult to incor-porate his nationalist theory in full into the corpus of a political party. Idevote a section to Pujolism in view of the extremely influential role playedby Jordi Pujol as President of the Generalitat of Catalonia for more thantwenty years, encompassing the whole transition to democracy.

Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC)

CDC defines itself as a Catalan nationalist (non-secessionist), democratic,humanist and progressive party, with a political philosophy resulting froma synthesis or ‘convergence’ of social democrat, progressive, liberal andChristian democrat thinking, mainly aimed at the service and welfare of thepeople. It refers to itself as a profoundly pro-European political formation.1

CDC rejects both neoliberal and uniformist ideas2 and seeks ‘to occupy thecentre-left space more clearly and with greater determination’,3 although, as Miquel Caminal writes, a mobile centrism in relation to left and right,which shifted to the right in the 1980s and 1990s, affecting all other polit-ical forces of the liberal parliamentary spectrum, is the definition that bestdescribes CDC’s political action.4

CDC was created in the 1960s as a political movement in line with theCatalan Catholic tradition. CDC’s objective was the reconstruction ofCatalonia (‘to make a country’). It was formally established in November1974 under the leadership of Jordi Pujol and supported by UDC.5 Pujol’saim was to create a party that would achieve the social integration of all thepeople of Catalonia, although from the outset the struggle remained betweenprioritizing national consciousness above class consciousness. When UDCbroke off and some social democrat sectors left to join the PSC (R), the

composition of CDC was reduced to two main sectors led by Jordi Pujol andMiquel Roca, respectively. CDC became a political party on 28 March 1976,with Jordi Pujol as General Secretary and Miquel Roca as Deputy GeneralSecretary. Defined as a centre-left pro-Catalan formation, CDC stood for thefirst democratic election in 1977 as a member of the coalition Pacte Democràticper Catalunya, or Democratic Pact for Catalonia, together with EDC (EsquerraDemocràtica de Catalunya, or Democratic Left of Catalonia), PSC (R) and FNC.The results were not very satisfactory (16.8 per cent of the vote) and CDCinitiated a period of reflection that would culminate in the V Congress (April 1978), in which CDC declared itself to be a social democrat, Catalan,nationalist and progressive party, indisputably led by Jordi Pujol.

The first step towards the formation of what was initially conceived as the Partit Nacionalista Català, or Catalan Nationalist Party, as the sole partyof the centre left, was taken on 27 June 1978 when CDC merged with EDC, and its leader Ramón Trias Fargas became the new President of CDC.Trias Fargas brought a liberal democrat tradition to CDC, which he describedas ‘humanist left-wing social liberalism’.6 The desire to create a CatalanNationalist Party was frustrated by the foundation of the PSC, by ERC’srefusal to enter into a coalition with CDC and by the formation of CC (Centristes de Catalunya, or Catalan Moderates)-UCD. It was also in thesummer of 1978 (19 September) that UDC and CDC signed a stable electoral agreement for government, in order to express ‘the will to organizeand organically integrate the Catalan centre left’, thus forming the coalitionCiU.7

In the months prior to the first election to the re-established CatalanParliament, a victory of the left was expected. In the words of Joan B. Culla,such expectations responded ‘not only to the political and cultural hege-monies of the end of Francoism and the first transition to democracy, butalso to the results of the constituent, general and municipal elections heldbetween June 1977 and April 1979’.8 However, the election results causedgreat surprise on granting a relative majority to CiU. Pujol himself confessedthat ‘we have obtained 43 seats when we were expecting 25’.9 After the rejec-tion by the Catalan Socialists, still shocked by their unexpected electoraldefeat, of Pujol’s offer to join a CiU-PSC (PSC-PSOE) coalition government,CiU ended up forming a minority government with the support of ERC andthe CC-UCD. In turn UCD, led by Adolfo Suárez, then Prime Minister ofSpain, which did not hold the absolute majority in the Spanish Parliamenteither, benefited from the support of CiU in Madrid.

Over the next four years, Pujol consolidated his leadership and CDC didnot evolve towards the creation of a Catalan Nationalist Party, as initiallyplanned, but instead became the leader of a social movement going beyondthe limits of the party itself. As mentioned in Chapter 4, CiU’s rejection ofthe LOAPA, sanctioned with the votes of UCD and PSOE, contributed toan increasing identification between CiU and the Generalitat, but was alsoexploited to emphasize the dependency of the PSC on the PSOE.

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The victory of the PSOE in the 28 October 1982 general election, accom-panied by the major triumph of the PSC in Catalonia, radically transformedthe Spanish political scenario. Even so, CiU managed to increase its numberof seats in the Spanish Parliament, from eight obtained in 1979 to twelvein 1982. Two years later, CiU obtained an overwhelming victory in the 29April 1984 Catalan election (46.6 per cent of the vote). These resultsconfirmed the consolidation of Pujolism as a hegemonic force in Catalonia,where over the years it managed to develop a polyhedral image, allowing it,depending on the moment and the audience, to emphasize its character asnationalist, confessional, conservative in economics and progressive in someof its social policies. It should also be mentioned that these results, as indi-cated by Joaquim Colomines, confirmed the beginning of two major patternsin the electoral behaviour of the Catalans – dual voting and differentialabstention – which signalled the beginning of a new stage in Catalan polit-ical life.10 Joan B. Culla refers to the decade 1984–1993 as ‘the years ofplenitude’ for CiU and for its leader Jordi Pujol. It is worth taking intoaccount that the consolidation of CiU took place within a political frame-work defined by the weakness of ERC, the crisis of the PSUC, thedisappearance of CC-UCD and the pre-eminence of the PSOE at state level,which determined the political strategy of the dependent PSC.

In 1984, during the interval between the election day in which CiUobtained a landslide victory and the re-appointment of Jordi Pujol asPresident, the Catalan political climate turned very sour when Pujol and afurther twenty-four former board members of Banca Catalana were chargedfor presumed financial irregularities, of which they would all be subsequentlyacquitted, Pujol in 1986 and the rest of those charged in 1988. Pujol inter-preted the lawsuit as a contemptible action of revenge by the PSOE and thecentral government, and it was easy for him to present it as an attack onCatalonia.

In 1986, CDC sponsored the so-called ‘Reformist Operation’, which placedMiquel Roca i Junyent at the head of what would become a state-wide partyaiming to challenge both the PSOE and the AP (Alianza Popular, or PopularAlliance). Roca himself wrote, in 1982: ‘The proposals formulated frompolitical Catalanism can achieve greater acceptance within Spanish society.’He added:

Despite all the difficulties always involved in the struggle, from a posi-tion of reason, against the demagogy and the visceral arousal ofanti-Catalanism, the historical line of political Catalanism should bemaintained. That is, to extend its action to the whole of Spanish politics,with the will to transform, change and reform the structures that preventthe full deployment of the creative freedom of society. It must be possibleto obtain the agreement of different, heterogeneous sectors of Spanishpolitical life in a proposal of this kind.11

122 Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC

Roca wrote: ‘To be viable, the autonomy of Catalonia requires a profoundreform of the state; it requires the transformation of the state to define andachieve a modern Spain.’12 He recognized, in a perverse way announcing hisown failure as the head of the Reformist Operation, that ‘political Catalanismhas almost always, if not always, failed on this path’.13 Pujol, with whomMiquel Roca maintained a conflictive relationship based on discrepanciesconcerning both ideological and political strategy, in his introduction toRoca’s book Per què no? . . . , wrote:

And in this respect Roca’s book has another, what we could call, incon-venience. And this is that Catalanist proposals for the whole of Spaingenerate fear. They frighten important sectors of the Spanish establish-ment. Because they are proposals for change. While we remain in theCatalan fold, uninterested in Spain’s problems, we are easy to fightagainst, and, in any case, we raise issues that can be limited and brandedas particularist or even lacking in solidarity. But when politicalCatalanism demands not just the vindication of real autonomy and fullrecognition of our personality as a people, but also all those measuresaimed at transforming Spain into a modern state and administration,how can they be confronted? They can only be confronted with silenceand distortion.14

Despite Miquel Roca’s pertinent ideas to modernize and democratize Spain, its institutions and society, integrating it within the European frame-work, it proved a mammoth task for the General Secretary of a Catalannationalist party acting as leader of a state-wide political party such as thePRD (Partido Reformista Democrático, or Democratic Reformist Party) to aspireto transform the Spanish centre right. It was even more difficult to expecthim to win the trust of voters, many of whom perceived, and still perceive,Catalanism as a threat to the unity of the state that Roca legitimately aspired to transform. The failure of the Reformist Operation was spectac-ular, but served to grant credibility to the autonomous, non-secessionist,ambitions of CiU, which improved its results in the June 1986 and October1989 general elections.

Jordi Pujol’s second term in office (1984–1988) consolidated and empha-sized a presidential style based on his personal charisma, his political skillsand a constant and intense work-pattern, which, among other things,involved systematic weekend visits to all corners of Catalonia. This wascomplemented by a remarkable international presence, aimed at contributingto the external promotion of Catalonia, an idea that has always been highlyvalued by Pujol in determining the priorities of his long political career.

In his third term in office (1988–1992), within the framework of the VIIICongress (27–29 January 1989), Pujol resigned from the position of GeneralSecretary and Miquel Roca took over CDC’s presidency. At the end of theyear, under the influence of the dismemberment of the USSR and of the

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Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC 123

transformation of some former Soviet republics into independent nation-states, the nationalist declarations of CiU were accentuated. The CatalanParliament passed a resolution, supported by CiU, stating that ‘respect forthe current institutional framework [. . .] does not imply the relinquishmentof the right to self-determination by the Catalan people’.15 During thisperiod, more radical nationalist declarations alternated with moderate, pactistdeclarations, in which Pujol himself rejected independence and also thereform of the Constitution and of the Statute. Amidst such a political climate,Miquel Sellarés, a historical and heterodox member of CiU, voiced strongcriticism against the ‘shift to the right’ and the ‘exhaustion’ of Pujolism.Sellarés was expelled from CDC in January 1990, having influenced a signifi-cant sector of the party.16

The divergences between Pujol and Roca became more acute from 1990.While Roca favoured a potential participation in a coalition government withthe PSOE at state level, Pujol displayed a much more cautious and reluc-tant attitude. At the same time, Roca considered his future as the successorof Pujol, who was still too young and in too good form to be replaced. Roca’srefusal to run as CiU’s candidate for Mayor of Barcelona (1991) againstPasqual Maragall, and the differences with UDC, opened an even deeper gulf between Roca and Pujol, which led the latter to regain leadership respon-sibilities within CDC.

CiU won its fourth term at the Generalitat (1992–1995) with excellentresults obtained in the March 1992 election, when Barcelona, and the wholeof Catalonia, was preparing to hold the Olympic Games, which transformedthe city, brought excitement to the citizens and favoured the charismaticMayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall.

In the IX CDC Congress (October 1992), differences arose regardingCDC’s alliance policy and direct intervention in Spanish politics. Threedifferent sectors emerged. The first, led by Miquel Roca, was in favour ofintervention or influence in Spanish politics, in line with some formula-tions of classical Catalanism. The second sector, led by Jordi Pujol, was infavour of signing agreements with other parties to contribute to the govern-ability of the state, but was careful to preserve the independence of CiU’sleader to decide its timetable, terms and conditions. And the third sector,led by Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, President of UDC’s steering committee,defended the Christian democrat identity of its political formation, for whichit demanded greater prominence at the heart of a coalition until then domi-nated by CDC.

The divergences regarding the degree of CiU’s involvement with an even-tual state government returned to the fore when the PSOE lost its absolutemajority in the 6 June 1993 general election. This took place at a time whenCiU’s good results placed it in an ideal position to become the political allyof the PSOE, in need of CiU’s seventeen seats to obtain an absolute majorityin the Madrid Parliament. Pujol finally agreed to contribute to the govern-ability of Spain by supporting the PSOE, but decided not to enter the new

124 Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC

socialist government. For Roca, this was a perfect occasion to gain access tothe state government and to influence the modernization and transformationof Spain, for which he was so eager and which he saw as the objective ofpolitical Catalanism, but Pujol’s option prevailed. It should be added thatCiU’s support of the PSOE government took effect within a climate fraughtwith various economic scandals, corruption and state terrorism, which finally eroded PSOE’s support and led to its defeat in the March 1996 earlyelection.

Roca remained as CDC’s General Secretary, although his candidature forMayor of Barcelona in 1995 led him to abandon his parliamentary tasks inMadrid, where Joaquim Molins replaced him. Two new Deputy GeneralSecretaries, Ramon Camp and Pere Esteve, were appointed in this period.Roca’s new defeat, this time as candidate for Mayor of Barcelona, togetherwith new tensions arising with UDC, induced him to resign as CDC’sGeneral Secretary on 17 December 1995. Pere Esteve took over as GeneralSecretary and was confirmed in his position in the X Congress (November1996), as were Jordi Pujol in the presidency of the party and Felip Puig asOrganization Secretary.

CiU lost its absolute majority in the 1995 Catalan election and began itsfifth term in office with a minority government, in an atmosphere taintedby the PSOE crisis. This crisis resulted in an increase in the number of votesobtained by the conservative PP, which succeeded in winning the 1996general election, although without obtaining an absolute majority. Despitethe reservations of important sectors of CiU, the coalition offered its supportto the PP. CiU’s votes were once again crucial in Madrid, undoubtedlyincreasing its bargaining capacity.

In 1997, the high price of the agreement with the PP and the discrepan-cies with UDC led to tensions at the heart of the coalition. Such tensionswere aggravated by the process culminating in the enactment of a new lawon linguistic policy by the Generalitat. Partly to counteract the effects of theagreement with the PP, Pere Esteve, as CDC’s General Secretary, promoteda debate on the document Towards a new horizon for Catalonia, which defended‘shared sovereignty’ within the framework of the Spanish state. It wasprecisely this new, resolute approach in favour of the recognition of the plural nature of the state and the establishment of a confederal model thatbrought CDC (and also UDC), the PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, or BasqueNationalist Party) and the BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, or GalicianNationalist Coalition) closer together. Esteve promoted a so-called pro-sovereignty stream that culminated in the signing of the Barcelona Declara-tion of 16 July 1998. The Declaration requested a re-definition of Spain asa multicultural, multinational and multilingual nation, and the recognitionof Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia as nations. Both the PSOE andthe PP rejected the Barcelona Declaration.

CiU suffered a significant setback in the 1999 municipal election. InOctober of the same year, CDC won the Catalan election by a slim margin.

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Pasqual Maragall, leader of PSC-CpC, obtained the largest number of votes,but Pujol won more seats. CiU’s sixth term in office (from 1999) has beendefined by a loss of influence in the state government prompted by the PP’soverwhelming majority achieved in the 12 March 2000 general election.CiU, which had again formed a minority government in the CatalanParliament following the October 1999 election, chose to pact with the PP,which was now powerful and in a position to impose conditions instead ofaccepting them.

The debate on the renewal of CiU, the tension between its pro-sovereigntyand its pro-autonomy streams, with more moderate objectives, and thereplacement of Jordi Pujol, who announced that he would not stand in the2003 election, led to the appointment of Artur Mas, until then Minister ofFinance, as Chief Minister and future candidate to the Presidency of theGeneralitat.

In the XI Congress (10–12 November 2001), Artur Mas was appointedGeneral Secretary of CDC, replacing Pere Esteve. Felip Puig, formerOrganization Secretary, had joined the Catalan government a few monthsearlier as Minister of the Environment, and Lluís M. Corominas i Díaz becameOrganization Secretary. The process to establish the future succession of JordiPujol added an additional strain to the relations with UDC and its leader,Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, who also aspired to take over from Pujol.Differences between the two parties have been, at least temporarily, put asidewith the decision to form a federation between CDC and UDC, aimed atsealing their commitment to collaborate in the future and to replace thelong-lasting coalition between the two parties. The protocol containing theconditions for the federation of CiU was agreed in March 2001, the officialfunction being held in Castelldefels on 17 July of the same year.

Catalan identity

Catalonia is defined as a nation with its own cultural, historical, linguistic,symbolic and institutional background, which has to be reconciled with the changes generated by globalization and the technological revolution in order to become a functional and valuable legacy for future generations. Theidentity of the Catalan people should be framed within the common culturaland linguistic area formed by the Països Catalans.17 The Report by the firstnationalist strategy commission on the future of the self-government ofCatalonia (VIII Congress CDC, 1989) declares:

Catalonia, as a nation, is fundamentally a will to exist, rooted in itslanguage, in its culture, in its history and in its institutions. There is adifferential aspect that defines us as a nation.18

The future of Catalonia as a nation involves

126 Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC

a political action free from non-Catalan determining factors, the insti-tutional development of autonomy, the efficiency of its governing bodies,economic renewal, social equilibrium, the commitment to modernityand progress, the capacity to influence the world that surrounds us and,above all, it involves the linguistic normalization and the consolidationof a single national culture.19

Catalan nationalism/Catalanism

‘Nationalism is freedom. Freedom for Catalonia; freedom to act as a nation,to attain national plenitude.’ This is how CDC defined nationalism in 1989.Pujol, in the paper ‘La hora del diálogo sin reservas’ (‘The time for dialoguewithout reservations’), presented on 21 October 1996 at the Real Alcázar inSeville, asked: ‘What does it mean to be a Catalan nationalist? It meansconsidering Catalonia to be a nation and Spain to be plurinational.’20

CDC seeks to give nationalism a new boost as the political expression ofCatalonia’s secular will to exist and of the dynamism of Catalan society. CDCunderstands its nationalism as the safest way to guarantee the national, polit-ical, economic, social, cultural and civic progress of the Catalans.21 As MiquelCaminal writes: ‘CDC’s convergence does not originate in the past, but ratherin the future, it does not stem from a specific political ideology or option,but from convergence in democracy and Catalanism.’22

The personalist nationalism of CDC

brings together the political inheritance founded by the precursors ofCatalanism in the mid-nineteenth century, established by Prat de la Riba at the beginning of the twentieth century in the texts and actionsof the government of the Mancomunitat, extended and implemented byPresidents Macià and Companys during the Republican period, main-tained institutionally by the Presidents in exile, Irla and Tarradellas, andcurrently developed, modernized and implemented by President Pujol.23

CDC defines this Catalan nationalist legacy, which it places at the centre of the political project for nationalist reconstruction, as profoundly demo-cratic and progressive. In this context, progress is defined as innovation andmodernity, but also as social and territorial equilibrium, social welfare andprotection of the environment.

On referring to Catalonia, CDC states that ‘this nation exists, [and] is notsubordinated to anything or to anyone, and in any case it should be treatedrespecting and recognizing that it is the nation of the Catalan people, ourinalienable reality’.24 In the words of Pujol:

It should first be said that all peoples are entitled to self-determination.And that a majority demand for independence may legitimately arisefrom self-determination. The legitimacy of a democratic secessionist

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approach is therefore clear. But there is also a brand of nationalism thatdoes not renounce the right to self-determination but which has chosento work towards a progressive increase in political power and institu-tional recognition within the framework of the Spanish state and theEuropean Union.25

CDC defines being Catalan in accordance with cultural, rather than ethniccharacteristics. It involves the will to be considered Catalan: ‘a Catalan isanyone who lives and works in Catalonia and who wants to be Catalan’. Inthis respect, CDC argues that it has always fought for everyone who livesand works in Catalonia, irrespective of their origin and condition, to feelthat this is their country. CiU therefore proposes

promoting the teaching of Catalan language and culture, and of its tradi-tions and history, providing specific support for invigorating culturalgroups, associations, organizations, etc., engaged in the promotion of ourculture everywhere. Catalan identity belongs to all those of us who live,work and feel attached to and rooted in Catalonia.26

CDC specifically seeks ‘to generate a common consciousness’ among the citi-zens of Catalonia, ‘not just of thought but also of action: we want the citizensof Catalonia not only to be convinced that this is a nation but also that itis worth mobilizing themselves to defend it’.27

The nationalism of CIU declares that it is capable of accepting differenceswithout losing its own roots and principles, ‘offering our culture, customs,freedoms and lifestyle in order to achieve a politically viable country, civic-ally, nationally and economically strong, to transform Catalonia into aninternationally recognized country, with a presence in Europe and in theworld’.28

An immediate objective of CDC is therefore the defence, protection andstrengthening of the national identity of Catalonia, obtaining the highestpossible degree of political freedom and of self-government by means of a democratic, modernizing nationalism with a will to regenerate Spain. CDC claims responsibility for having increased the ‘distinct aspect’ ( fet difer-encial) of the country’s most political dimension, providing it with a strongmajority of exclusively Catalan roots, free from alien interests and groups.In the words of Jordi Pujol, CDC postulates the nationalization of Cataloniaand, according to him, in this process,

language is a crucial element because it is the soul of the nation. Butour defence of the language is insufficient. We could also defend it whilerespecting all the rules of coexistence that we need to safeguard in thiscountry. Coexistence is even more important than language – I havealways said so –, but we could achieve this perfectly well, if we weremore consistent.29

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Other basic elements of Catalan identity, crucial to the theoretical formu-lation of Pujol’s nationalism and adopted by CDC are: history, culture,heritage, the feeling of a homeland – ‘Without the feeling of a homeland,without loving the Country, rationally and even sensually, no country in theworld has made any progress’ –, the psychological stability of the country –‘We therefore need this balance, this stability; to strengthen the reality, theinterests and the important sentiments in the country, and everything thatunites people’ –, and sensitivity or social justice.

CDC acknowledges the dynamic nature of its own nationalism in order toadapt it to a changing environment. It is CDC’s aim to offer Catalonia thenecessary tools to position itself in Europe and in the world beyond the strictframework of the Spanish state which, in its opinion, represents an insuffi-cient vantage point from which to guarantee the development of Catalansociety.

On defining the territory of the Catalan nation, CDC reiterates that ‘thePaïsos Catalans shape the common cultural and linguistic sphere which framesour identity as a people’. It should be recalled that the CDC’s 1974 foundingcommuniqué already referred to the Països Catalans and supported the restora-tion of their cultural and symbolic dimension and also the recovery of aframework of political and institutional relations between them.30

Immigration

CDC offers a national project including all the citizens of Catalonia and itsobjective is to integrate immigrants:

While reaffirming our identity and respecting the differences of thosewho want to be among us, we will work for the insertion of immigrantsinto our society’s socio-economic and labour system.31

CDC accepts, as an important challenge for democratic nationalisms with acivic base such as that of Catalan nationalism, ‘the need to express thegrowing internal plurality of any nation like Catalonia in an increasinglypermeable world, while protecting its own identity’. The following state-ment underlines this point: ‘For Catalonia, a non-integrative nationalism iseither a suicide or an irresponsibility. The final recipients of our project areand have to be all the citizens of Catalonia.’32

CDC believes that the devolution of all powers concerning immigrationis crucial for the stable development of Catalan society, so that the Generalitatcan establish immigration quotas. CDC believes that it is necessary for immi-grants to enjoy the same rights and obligations that the Constitutionrecognizes for foreigners, and is in favour of

creating the necessary conditions for immigrants to integrate, withoutlosing their roots, to respect the laws, culture and traditions of the host

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country and to respect its social framework regarding individual andgroup rights and obligations.33

CDC also recognizes that Catalan society is the result of a permanent andprodigious process of integration of people from different origins, but insteadof emphasizing the character of Catalonia as a ‘melting pot’, as the socialistsdo, CDC highlights the process of integration of newcomers rather than theirdifferent contributions:

Catalonia is historically the result of the integration of people from verydifferent origins. If this capacity was lost, Catalonia would release a verysignificant part of its strength as a nation. This means that we must bepro-active concerning integration, as a value in itself, as a part of thecountry’s identity, so that people from other cultures can be included inour society.34

Yet, CDC stresses that it is necessary ‘to be patient and allow sufficient timefor the new generations to become fully integrated’.35 CDC, like the rest ofthe political parties studied in this book, rejects all the different forms of racism and xenophobia, in order to foster pluralism and cultural diversityas the main principles of a democratic open society.

Catalonia and Spain

CDC stands in line with the Catalan tradition expressing a desire to partic-ipate actively in politics at state level. In 1982, Miquel Roca i Junyent wrote:

We should make the reform of the state and the political expression ofCatalanism inseparable. We should explain that, at present, only theforces that truly question the continuity of a centralist, interventionist,controlling, welfare and corporatist state, can be involved in an in-depthreform of this state. If until now we have sent a message explaining ourdefence of the national personality of Catalonia, we now need to explainpolitical Catalanism’s overall proposal for Spain. The acceptance of thisproposal should allow for a peaceful, stable redistribution of the state’s powerand, at the same time, this redistribution should render the action of Catalanself-government more efficient. Two approaches to the same problem.36

Despite this, Pujol’s decision not to enter formally into any coalition govern-ment at state level has determined CDC’s degree of influence in Spanishpolitics and has limited the impact of some of its most distinguished politi-cians, such as Miquel Roca. The gradualist and pragmatic Catalanism of JordiPujol has concentrated its efforts on the construction of the country. Thenation-building strategy promoted by the quasi-state represented by theGeneralitat of Catalonia has been CDC’s main task. In this respect, CDC has

130 Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC

consolidated its efforts on becoming a pal de paller. This is a very diverse andvery open, but also very ambiguous, political force, willing to attract peoplefrom a broad political spectrum who are united by their support forCatalanism and democracy. CDC wishes to become more than a conventionalpolitical party and act as a social movement able to mobilize democraticCatalanism.

CDC’s nationalist discourse has become more radical since 1996, this beingreflected in the paper ‘El nacionalisme català als inicis del segle XXI’ (‘Catalannationalism at the beginning of the twenty-first century’) presented at theX Congress (8–10 November 1996). This paper referred to the need to turna new leaf in the national reconstruction of Catalonia, the new stage beingdefined by a recognition of the Catalan nation endowed with its own sover-eignty. This paper proposed a ‘state agreement’ recognizing Catalonia as anation and Spain as a plurinational state. The agreement defended an increasein the political power of Catalonia by means of extending its self-govern-ment, that is, granting Catalonia a real legislative capacity and financialautonomy. As already mentioned, the nationalist radicalization of CDC, farfrom the pragmatism characteristic of the stage in which Miquel Roca wasGeneral Secretary of the party, culminated in the Barcelona Declaration. The Declaration proposed going beyond the autonomous formula establishedby the Constitution and based on the definition of Spain as a single nation,and stated that:

The Spanish state is, at the same time, the institution that denies thesovereignty that belongs to us as nations and the political space withinwhich to conquer national freedom, by means of a joint action to forma plurinational, confederal state.37

Jordi Pujol’s talk at ESADE (1 March 1999), ‘Poder polític de Catalunya:un instrument al servei dels ciutadans’ (‘Catalonia’s political power: an instru-ment in the service of the citizens’), redresses and clarifies CDC’s view andthe future political orientation of the CiU government. In this talk, Pujolrecalls that Section Eight of the Constitution, which refers to the autonomiesand to the structure of the state, was intended to respond to the specificnational demands of Catalonia and the Basque Country, and denounces theunsatisfactory nature of the institutional framework within which Cataloniais forced to evolve:

This framework does not respond sufficiently to either the nature or theintensity of our identity, or to the needs and the challenges of a societylike ours [. . .]; it does not permit the development of Catalonia’s fullpotential and poses a threat to the brilliant present of our country.38

Pujol denounces that in Spain there is a widespread attitude against therecognition of the specific character of Catalonia and the political conse-quences deriving from it. In his view,

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the dominant idea in Spain is usually, and I repeat usually, a homoge-nizing idea, at times by means of blatant centralism, on other occasionsby means of a federalism which, in practice, is unifying and homo-genizing.39

In this talk, Pujol warned that backing a reform of the Constitution couldbe ‘inefficient and frustrating’, although it should not be renounced forever,and that ‘more realistic and acceptable’ proposals should be made.40 Pujolstands in favour of an ‘institutional agreement for self-government’ destinedto increase Catalonia’s political power and autonomous funding. The firststep would include a rereading of both the Constitution and the Statute,which could lead, in a second step, to a reform of the Statute of Autonomy.However, he added: ‘I am aware of one thing that prevents me from makinga categorical statement, and this is that reforming the Statute requires nottotal consensus, but very broad and diversified social and political support,plus the votes of more that two thirds of the Parliament of Catalonia. Itrequires time and dialogue.’41

One of the novelties of this talk was the demand for ‘strong and wide-spread political will and consensus in Catalonia’, with the aim of giving

our claim a consistent foundation so that it could generate politicalstrength and moral authority, to raise this issue with the political forcesand the whole of Spanish society.42

Within the framework of its XI Congress (10–12 November 2001), CDChighlighted its contribution to the governability and modernization of theSpanish state and demanded, once again, Spain’s re-definition as a pluri-national and plurilingual country. Within the new European framework,CDC seeks to attain ‘the appropriate level of self-government to which it isentitled by way of its historical rights and which becomes indispensible if we are to be present in the European Union as an equal partner’.43 Tomake progress with these demands, CDC defends a set of initial measures to be implemented in various spheres: symbolic, linguistic and cultural, institutional, devolved powers and funding, concerning both state and inter-national levels.

CDC is committed to using the framework of the Constitution and theStatute as an instrument to further the self-government of Catalonia.Notwithstanding this, it also clearly states:

On the assumption that the state-wide political formations continue todeny Catalonia the right to attain the self-government to which it isentitled as a nation, CDC will promote a review of the Constitution anda new Statute of Autonomy, with the support of the majority of thepeople of Catalonia, and with the intention of overcoming the failingsof the current legal system.44

132 Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC

CDC’s VIII Congress (1989) already held that ‘[t]he Generalitat is part ofthe state, and its condition as such is denied when it is treated with mistrustand suspicion. Loyalty to the Constitution and the Statute is a two-wayprocess. This loyalty cannot be demanded just from the Generalitat and itsgovernment, but should also be expected from the central government.’45

Catalonia and the European Union

CDC considers Europe as ‘the natural political framework of the Catalannation’.46 Catalonia’s European dimension and its desire to participateactively in the construction of the EU require

Catalonia to have its own, direct representatives, without intermediaries,in the European Parliament. [. . .] Such representatives symbolize thespecific personality and the political identity of Catalonia and shouldgive rise to a subsequent greater participation and interrelation betweenCatalan institutions and the European institutions.47

CDC’s electoral programmes and congresses always demand the recognitionof Catalonia as a European electoral constituency. CDC stands in favour ofthe consolidation and enlargement of the EU, and defends the principle of unity in diversity, also believing that it is essential for Catalonia to elim-inate its current tax deficit with the EU.

CDC supports the idea of a Europe of nations resulting in a greater pres-ence of Catalonia, and of all other European regions and nations withoutstates, at the highest-level decision-making bodies of the EU. In CDC’s view,Catalan government representatives should have a say whenever the Spanishstate is to take any decisions destined to implement EU legislation in areaswhich have already been devolved to the autonomous government. It alsosuggests that Catalan authorities should maintain direct official relations withEU institutions concerning information on all those subjects that might affectCatalonia, and ensure that Catalonia participates in all community policiesand projects.48 Back in 1989, CDC already stood for the promotion of a posi-tive feeling towards European citizenship and for such a feeling to be fosteredamong the Catalan population.49

In addition, in paper 1 of the XI Congress (March 2001), CDC declaredthat ‘Catalonia will work, through the European institutions framework, tostop the identity of the territories of North Catalonia from being eroded andfor them to recover the national freedom they had once lost’.50

Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC)

Nationalism, personalist humanism and social justice are the central ideas ofUDC, a Christian democrat party, which, like ERC, was founded in 1931and which during Francoism contributed decisively to the construction,

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configuration and activity of various unitary democratic platforms, particu-larly the Consell de Forces Polítiques (Council of Political Forces, 1969) andthe Assemblea de Catalunya (Assembly of Catalonia, 1971). UDC is definedas a nationalist party, which considers Catalonia as its natural framework ofaction and its raison d’être. UDC’s objective is for Catalonia to be able to fullyexercise its sovereignty.

According to Hilari Raguer, the creation of UDC

is rather the end of a process of evolution of Catalan Catholicism which,for some time, had been seeking to free itself from intellectually reac-tionary influences by moving towards modernization, and by distancingitself from the monarchist and pro-Spanish parties that until then wereregarded as the compulsory choice for all good Catholics.51

UDC received its ideology (leaving to one side the very remote precedentof Jaume Balmes) from Josep Torras i Bages and, above all, Joan Maragall,to whom Raguer attributes a profound religious nature, not at all conven-tional, acting as a powerful dissolvent of entrenched traditionalism.52 UDCwas ideologically influenced by the theories of Gilbert K. Chesterton, JacquesMaritain and Emmanuel Mounier, and also by the thinking of Enric Prat dela Riba and the social doctrine of the Catholic church.53

The manifesto that gave rise to UDC, drafted by Josep Cirera i Soler andincluding contributions by the canons Dr Carles Cardó and Dr Josep MariaLlovera, was published in the newspaper El Matí, on 7 November 1931. Thisdocument positioned nationalism, a reaffirmation of spiritual values, democ-racy and social justice as the distinguishing features of the new politicalparty. The central triumvirate of the founders of UDC was formed by LluísVila d’Abadal, Joan B. Roca i Caball and Pau Romeva i Ferrer. Pau Romeva,in his speech at the official launch of the party, argued, distancing himselffrom both the Catalan and Spanish right:

UDC is not a Catholic political association, but rather an associationformed by Catholics; it does not want to link its Catholicism to itssupport of the Republic, but it does not want to work with those wholink its Catholicism to another form of government either.54

UDC brought together people from Catalan Carlism (Joan B. Roca i Caball,Josep Cirera i Soler and Josep M. Trias Peitx) and from Catholic Catalanismwithout previous membership of any political party (Pau Romeva andMaurici Serrahima), in addition to various leaders from Acció CatalanaRepublicana, or Republican Catalan Action (Manuel Carrasco i Formigueraand Miquel Coll i Alentorn), and even some important figures from ERC(Félix Duran i Canyameres). The leader of UDC until the Civil War wasManuel Carrasco i Formiguera, executed in Burgos by the Francoists inFebruary 1939.

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The members of UDC remained (critically) loyal to the Republic and tothe Generalitat in the face of the National Uprising (1936), and tried tomitigate the religious persecution. From 1937, they worked with the BasqueNationalist Party to achieve a reconciliation between the Republican regimeand the Catholic church. These activities and the various attempts to obtaina negotiated outcome to the Civil War led to the banning and condemna-tion of UDC in the Franco regime’s Law on Political Responsibilities. Duringthe first stage of Francoism, the members of UDC acted in secrecy undercircumstantial names, such as Creus de Sang, or Crosses of Blood (1940), orsupported broader platforms, such as the FUC (1944–1948), the GrupsNacionals de Resistència, or National Resistance Groups (1945–1947), or theJoventut Catalana Democràtica, or Democratic Catalan Youth (1943–1946),achieving a notable presence in the universities, where they managed toattract new activists, such as Anton Canyellas and Joan Sansa.55

Before 1960 UDC, then led by Miquel Coll i Alentorn, Joan B. Roca iCaball and Pau Romeva, decided to revitalize the party and resume activi-ties which included producing clandestine publications such as Diàleg(1962–1967), Testimoniatge (1963–1964), Determini (1966–1968 and 1972–1974) and Força Nova (1965–1967). On the international stage, UDC devel-oped contacts with the French, Italian and Chilean Christian democrats,among others, and in 1950 applied for admission to the NEI (Nouvelles ÉquipesInternationales, or New International Groups), which from 1965 to 1966became Unió Europea Demòcrata Cristiana, or Christian Democrat EuropeanUnion. As a prerequisite to obtaining this international recognition, UDChad to be integrated within a sort of federation of parties called EquipDemòcrata Cristià de l’Estat Espanyol, or Christian Democrat Group of theSpanish State, including other Spanish Christian democrat parties.56

In 1976,57 UDC held its V Congress in Barcelona, in which the teamformed by Antón Canyellas, Josep Miró i Ardèvol and Albert Vila strength-ened its control over the party. Under the leadership of this new triumvirate,UDC moved towards more conservative positions and reiterated its commit-ment to the Equip Demòcrata Cristià de l’Estat Espanyol (formed by UDC,PNV, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez’s Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana, or ChristianDemocrat Left, and José María Gil-Robles’ Democracia Social Cristiana, orChristian Social Democracy).

UDC was shocked by the weak support it received in the 15 June 1977election, in which the party ran as a member of the coalition Unió del Centrei la Democràcia Cristiana de Catalunya, or Union of the Centre and ChristianDemocracy of Catalonia. Such electoral poor results, together with the fail-ure of the Spanish Christian democracy lead by Gil-Robles and Ruiz Giménez,prompted UDC to rethink its strategy and choose between joining AdolfoSuárez’s UCD, more pro-Spanish and right-wing, and Jordi Pujol’s national-ist CDC, which defined itself as centre left. The majority of the party decidedto form a coalition with CDC. In October 1977 just a few leaders (Miró iArdèvol, Albert Vila and Simeó Miquel) chose to split and join Suárez’s UCD.

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As already mentioned, UDC and CDC formed the coalition CiU in 1978.The relations between the two parties have not, however, always been easy.Indeed, the document Political strategy of UDC mentions the difficulties thatthe party experienced when CiU was first created, and when UDC ‘was almostin a subordinate position within the coalition’.58

Once CiU was established, and especially from 1980, differences arose atthe heart of UDC between a sector closer to CDC, committed to the coali-tion government and to the UDC-CDC agreement (Joan Rigol, JoaquimXicoy, Agustí Bassols, Llibert Cuatrecases and Joaquim Pibernat), andanother sector, which defended the independence and the Christian demo-crat nature of the party and which, in spite of being critical of the coalition,did not wish to abandon it ( Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, Concepció Ferrerand Josep Ignasi Thió).

The tension between them was resolved with the agreement between thesectors led by Joan Rigol and Josep A. Duran i Lleida within the frameworkof the XVI Congress (November 1987). Rigol took over the presidency ofthe party, and Duran i Lleida the presidency of the executive committee.From then on, Duran i Lleida led a renewal of the party which saw it growand open up to new, not necessarily Christian democrat, sectors of society,something that generated some uneasiness at the heart of the party. Durani Lleida’s main objective was to redefine UDC’s personality and to differen-tiate it from CDC without breaking the agreement. Indeed, UDC’s Politicalstrategy document explains that the party,

although having reasons which could justify a review of some aspects ofthe Coalition, continues to consider it as a valid and effective instrumentto shape a nationalist, open and centre political space, and to continueholding the responsibilities of government and of representation grantedby our electors.59

In addition, UDC increased its presence in business spheres through thecreation or inspiration of specific structures such as the FECEA (FundacióEmpresa, Catalunya, Europa i América, or Foundation for Business in Catalonia,Europe and America).

Catalan identity

UDC’s nationalism has a cultural and community character. From this pointof view, language is considered to be the main element of expression ofCatalan society and the one that has given it historical continuity. For thisreason, UDC proposes the defence, protection and promotion of the elementsthat make up the Catalan nation and, in particular, emphasizes the need tonormalize its language, that is, to spread its use in society. Joan Rigol, UDCPresident, in his talk ‘Criteris per a una política cultural’ (‘Criteria for acultural policy’) (16 March 1999), said:

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Anyone who lives or works here and wants to be identified as a Catalan,and has things to say on Culture, forms a part of our culture. TheCastilian language is also a form of expression and of projection of oursociety.60

UDC proclaims the unity of all variants of the Catalan language, ‘fromSalses to Guardamar and from Fraga to Maó’.61 It describes the territory ofthe Països Catalans as a linguistic and cultural unity, with a shared history,organized politically in institutions of a confederal type. UDC respects thecollective will of the Catalan-speaking peoples and proposes working toreform the current Article 145.1 of the Constitution, which preventsautonomous communities with historical, cultural or linguistic links fromforming a federation.

The personalism that defines UDC’s nationalism understands the nationas a ‘natural’ political community par excellence, forming the ideal envi-ronment within which individuals can achieve their complete human andsocial growth. UCD’s approach considers the defence of the Catalan languageand culture as equivalent to the defence of the dignity of individuals, allowingthe identities of others to be understood, respected and defended.62 JoanRigol writes:

Our fundamental political model is ‘bottom up’. We must come closerwith respect, but with a desire to construct a community, to all thatexemplifies the creativity of the individual regarding its most immediate,most genuine environment. Let’s focus on the trio already mentioned:family–work–culture.63

UDC admits the dynamic nature of both the nation and nationalism, and considers that global cultural uniformity and the existence of variouscultural minorities in each territory are producing, and will continue to produce, a situation of progressive dissolution of the classical factors ofcultural identity. UDC considers that political nationalism should promote,‘on the basis of its foundations, and starting from that diversity and plural-ity, a permanent process of expansion and strengthening of the community’ssentiment of national consciousness’. Such assertions reveal, at least, a certaincontrast with essentialist statements on Catalan identity, such as thoseexpressed in the document La sobirania de Catalunya i l’Estat plurinacional(The sovereignty of Catalonia and the plurinational state) (1997), which arguesthat

our rights as a nation precede any state or political organization, which are contingent and accidental. Our condition as Catalans comes earlier: it is a spontaneous and natural declaration. We are Catalans bynature.64

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Catalan nationalism/Catalanism

UDC stands in favour of an ‘open and integrative, plural and evolving[nationalism], in the image of Catalonia, our national community’,65

while emphasizing that Catalan nationalism represents an attitude of defencein the face of ‘another expansionist and unifying nationalism – Spanishnationalism – which has the power of the state’.66

According to UDC, the Catalan national project requires an exemplaryperformance from the Catalan authorities. This, together with its own polit-ical representation mechanisms, with an electoral system that encouragesmore participation and a greater identification between the people and thebodies representing them, should stimulate citizens to feel proud of theircountry and increase their national consciousness.

UDC stands in favour of obtaining the consensus of all Catalan politicalforces, or at least most of them, in order to find some common denomina-tors capable of defining and boosting a process allowing Catalonia to recoverthe sovereignty that was taken away from it by force. For UDC, Cataloniarequires sovereignty to guarantee its future as a nation:

Without more political and economic power we cannot confront all thechallenges posed by the present and, even more, the future, and ensurethe national identification of the members of our community. Withoutforgetting or leaving in second place the need to strengthen culturalsovereignty, it is imperative to prioritize political sovereignty so that itconfers to the national institutions of Catalonia sufficient political instru-ments and sufficient financial capacity, to implement policies destinedto strengthen their national identification of Catalan citizens.67

Immigration

For UDC, and with the aim of constructing a sentiment of collective loyaltyincluding different groups, it is indispensable to build on diversity andrespect for different lifestyles and cultural traditions, providing channels forintegration and avoiding all kinds of discrimination, while protecting andpromoting the cultural characteristics of Catalonia. Here, a slight differencebetween CDC and UDC can be identified. While the former observes theneed for integration, respect for the cultures of origin and the ‘patience’necessary to allow the integration of immigrants, the latter stresses the needto assimilate ‘those traits of alien cultures which enrich our own and permita better integration’.68 The references to essentialism, with declarations such as ‘we are Catalans by nature’, present in the document La sobirania deCatalunya i l’Estat plurinacional (National Council, 1997), are absent fromthese more recent formulations. UDC clarifies:

No-one can dispute Catalonia’s fundamental and original right to protectits identity. Furthermore, there is a moral and democratic obligation to

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strengthen the social and personal ties that define our community. Thespecific language, customs, tradition and spirit of our people willcontinue to be extremely powerful elements uniting the citizens.Moreover, respect for other cultures does not at all imply a renunciationor limitation of one’s own culture which, faithful to its history, has toform the core element of our evolution. But we must go even further.In an increasingly mobile and plural society, we cannot trust that minori-ties will automatically accept our national specificity if we are not willingto accept that Catalonia is and must be open and dynamic, constantlyevolving in its integration.69

Catalonia and Spain

UDC points out the effort that Catalan nationalism has made in differenthistorical periods to contribute to the governability, modernization,Europeanization and regeneration of Spain, an effort to which this party hasalways subscribed. But it also regrets that such an effort has not beenconducive to a favourable reaction on behalf of the state, as might have beenexpected. In this context, UDC asserts that, once the problem of howCatalonia fits in with the rest of the state has been satisfactorily solved, ‘itwould be willing to consider the possibility of participating in the govern-ment of Spain’.70 But what would be the specific conditions giving the greenlight to UDC’s eventual participation in a Spanish government? It mentionsthe need to share a common programme with the other political party orparties with which it could form a government. Such a programme shoulddefend and respect the ‘plurinational character of the state and the Catalannational distinctiveness, primarily founded upon its culture and language,and never assume an organic subordination in the organizational sphere, oreven in the parliamentary group’.71 According to UDC:

The recognition of plurinationality should come about through dialogueand a subsequent agreement between the nationalists and the state,involving all political parties, both nationalist and state-wide [. . .]. And this recognition should be translated in the sphere of devolvedpowers concerning each territory, in its symbols and in its politicalorganization.72

UDC is against the homogenization that has come about in the developmentof the Autonomous Communities System. In spite of this, it acknowledgesthe higher degree of development of the 1979 Statute when compared withthat in place during the Republican Generalitat. In UDC’s view, it is manda-tory to reconsider the plural nature of Spain through the elaboration of anew ‘state agreement’, which, in time, should be incorporated into theSpanish Constitution. UDC recalls and proclaims the constitutional right toreform the Constitution.73

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The new state agreement proposed by UDC should recognize Catalonia’sright to self-determination and emphasize that ‘it is not sufficient to haverights; it must be possible to exercise them’.74 The basic elements of thestate agreement should be as follows:

1 ‘confederal structure concerning all aspects related to Catalonia’s iden-tity and that of the other nationalities [. . .]. Catalonia, as a nation, shouldbe sovereign and have true exclusive power in the regulation of its ownculture, language and law’;

2 at state level, sovereignty should involve ‘complete and exclusive powers;power to legislate, to develop and execute regulations’;

3 at the international level, sovereignty means ‘that it is not for the centralgovernment but for the Generalitat to defend Catalonia’s positionregarding cultural matters in the European Union and its Council ofMinisters, in UNESCO and in other international organizations whichperform similar activities’;

4 Catalonia should have its own foreign policy; and5 with regards to the economy, UDC defends a federal structure, so that

each territory contributes to the definition of a common policy. Cataloniashould enjoy financial autonomy to exercise its powers.75

UDC’s objective is to achieve a plurinational, pluricultural and plurilin-guistic state, with a Senate acting as a chamber of territorial representation.76

In this context, UDC claims that the nation is the ‘first and original politicalcommunity’, and considers the shared, central state as

a simple instrument justified in so far as it is useful to its members andbeneficial for the general interest of society. Therefore, the structure ofthe state should be shaped according to its national realities and cannotcontinue to be understood as a centralist and unifying power.77

UDC remarks that:

If, despite the declared political will of the Convergència i Unió Coalitionto participate, intervene and ensure governability within the frameworkof the state, this state is not now ruled by a configuration of Spain as agenuinely plurinational, pluricultural and plurilinguistic state recog-nizing the different nations forming it, we would be compelled to changeour political strategy.78

Catalonia and the European Union

UDC stands in favour of a European Union including not just an economic,but also a political, cultural and social union, with respect for diversity, espe-cially cultural diversity, which, in its view, constitutes Europe’s greatest asset.

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The model of a

federal [European Union] made up of peoples and nations and not ofstates, having the principle of subsidiarity as the criterion definingdevolved powers and the exercise of these powers, and forming an organ-ization endowed with a soul equipped with political will and not a meremechanism to organize the economic policies and the production ofmember states79

is at the core of UDC’s view. The constitution of the Committee of theRegions is presented as a first step in regional recognition within the EU.In his Luxembourg speech (7 November 1988) to mark the conclusion ofthe VII Congress of the European parliamentary group European People’sParty (EPP), Duran i Lleida said:

The European project of the Christian democrats should continue to haveman as its centre of gravity. This is why the cultural dimension shouldbe introduced with energy. [. . .] European culture includes all mankind’swork. And it is through a Europe of culture, which respects and protectsthe pluricultural mosaic of its geography, that a feeling of belonging tothe same community can be engendered.80

The nationalist thought of Jordi Pujol

From among the various scholars and politicians who have made significantcontributions to Catalan nationalism during Francoism and the transition todemocracy, including Heribert Barrera, Josep Benet, Joan Raventós, JosepPallach, Raimon Obiols, Rafael Ribó, Miquel Roca i Junyent, Ramón TriasFargas, Jordi Solé Tura, Antoni Gutiérrez Díaz and Pasqual Maragall, amongothers, I have decided to devote a section to the Catalanism of Jordi Pujol, who, as President of the Generalitat for over twenty years, has beenin a privileged position to disseminate his ideas and turn them into polit-ical action. I do not set out to study his work in chronological order, butrather by considering the key themes forming the backbone of his nation-alist discourse.

I begin by analysing three key concepts of his theory: ‘nationalism’, ‘iden-tity’ and ‘history’. I then discuss two features which, in my opinion, definePujolism – the idea of nationalism as a shared project for the future, ‘to buildup Catalonia’, and the defence of what I refer to as ‘welfare nationalism’.Both offer ‘rational arguments’, as defined in Chapter 1, to attract those who,in principle, would not endorse a nationalist option based on essentialismand emotional arguments. Pujolism’s main challenge has been to attract notjust the ‘sentimental’ nationalists, and I do not use this term in a pejorativemanner since I am aware of the strong emotional component present in anynationalism, but also those who may feel enticed to a project seeking to build

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up a country endowed with a generous welfare state, such as that advocatedby Pujol. Finally, I examine Pujol’s ideas on the relationship betweenCatalonia and Spain.

Personalist nationalism

Jordi Pujol defines nationalism as ‘the will to be’, as ‘the will to have one’sown character’ and as ‘the possibility to build up one’s own country’.81

This definition excludes ethnic or racial factors and focuses on a free act of will. In Pujol’s view, nationalism represents a country’s attempt to strengthenits identity, and should be understood as a positive asset, that is, nationalismshould be constructed without excluding others or seeking salvation throughisolation. Competitiveness and social and economic development are the twoelements that nationalism should encourage.82

At the end of the 1960s, aware that the national rights of other peopleshad been recognized, Pujol wrote:

For us, on the other hand, threatened by the loss of a sense of cohesionand of the deep-rooted individual and collective identity, subjected toan alienating situation as a people and, consequently, as individuals, forus it is absolutely essential to be nationalist. Because before anythingelse what is imperative is to be and to have the will to be.83

Pujol defines a people by its mentality and its language, by its sentimentsand its history, and by its spiritual ethnie and its will.

During Francoism, Pujol insisted on the need to build up the country,taking three main ideas as a point of reference: ‘a clear national affirmation,the demand for social and economic justice, and the democratic organizationof the whole of social life’. He urged everyone, regardless of their ideol-ogy, to accept these fundamental objectives and to fight together to attainthem.84

Early Pujolism was influenced by the communitarist personalism ofEmmanuel Mounier, the work of Charles Péguy and Henri Bergson.85 JordiPujol, a former member of the parapolitical group, CC (Crist Catalunya orChrist Catalonia), promoted by Raimon Galí, and initially greatly influencedby French progressive Catholicism, postulates what he calls ‘personalistnationalism’. This type of nationalism emerges from the idea that individualsneed collective frameworks within which to develop. In so doing, he supportsa welfare state in the service of individuals, and defends the sentimentaldimension of personalism. For Pujol, ‘like nationalism and patriotism,personalism should also be a sentiment. The individual to be served hasfeelings, and cannot be served without emotion.’86 Personalist nationalisminvolves the will to create a new socio-economic programme for Catalonia,based upon an open and generous attitude towards immigrants, andcommitted to further promoting the individual. According to Pujol,

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the nation gives man a basic element of his being, a sense of communi-cation with other men, but this is not sufficient: just this would cut manoff. He must be given a possibility for promotion, an opening to moredistant horizons.87

Pujol refers to two constant elements in Catalan nationalism: the demandfor the institutional, political and cultural recognition of Catalonia as adistinctive people, and the reform of the Spanish state, involving both itsmodernization and Europeanization, as well as the creation of an internalpluralist structure.88 Pujol emphasizes the strength of Catalan nationalismon uniting people from different social classes, and to support this argumentwrites:

Pierre Vilar, to whom I refer so often, argues that one of the things thatsurprises him most is that the identity of Catalonia was defended in1873 by anarchic Republicanism, from 1890 to 1917 by a bourgeoisiein search of a state, and later on by a whole set of middle classesconverging, sometimes in a purely tactical or circumstantial manner, butultimately converging with the working-class sectors, with the popularsectors of the country.89

Here we should recall that Pujol never enjoyed the support of influentialpeople from the Catalan economy, with the exception of the few occasionson which Pujolism has favoured the interests of Catalan capital.90 Caminalanalyses this point:

Pujolist patriotism is uncomfortable to businessmen who do not have ahomeland. Business cannot be subjected to nationalism; quite the reverse.This is what they think from a materialist, bourgeois, instrumental andnot at all sentimental idea of nationalism. In short, this is a ‘usefulnationalism’. It is used when convenient and scorned when not ofinterest. This illustrates the past and present position of many of ourbourgeois and their instrumental relationship with Catalonia. They alsoexist in CDC, in the so-called business sector, including some nameswhich have enjoyed great influence in government policies.91

The nationalist discourse always encompasses the idea that the nation hasto be ‘awake’ and become ‘aware’ of its potential. The patriotic and religiousmysticism, present in Pujol’s early works, projects a certain degree of mes-sianism, as pointed out by Colomer.92 In his Escrits de presó (Writings fromprison, 1961–1962), Pujol states that ‘What we demand is a great deed torestore cohesion and the national sentiment [. . .], what we need are truevirtues. What we need are strong individualities’, which ‘will awaken hun-dreds and hundreds of thousands of lethargic men and will make hundredsand hundreds of distrustful and dispersed men rediscover a sense of

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community; [. . .] once again they will make a people out of a group’.93 Hissense of mission is still clearer in a later publication, where he argues that

from time to time there is a generation, even a few men from a gener-ation, who play a particularly important role. [. . .] Our generation willhave to be one of these generations that stand up.94

He goes on to argue that ‘for this political shaping of Catalonia, our youthmust be willing to give up a lot, even their life’.95

As President of the Catalan government, Pujol appeals for mobilization ina very different context to that of the 1960s, when he himself had under-taken to create counter-strategies to oppose the Franco regime. As Catalanswe now have the possibility to construct our nation. Pujol writes that

now it would be really positive for Catalonia to begin a new awareness-raising process which cannot just be carried out from above, or just frompolitics. The political and institutional consolidation of Cataloniarequires this process to be both deep and wide-ranging, involving theminorities and the whole country.96

He requests ‘a collective effort of reflection, definition and a project to helpus to adequately respond to the current challenges’.97

Identity

Pujol’s nationalist discourse revolves around the idea that ‘Catalonia has avery distinctive identity [. . .] based on a particular language and culture,social cohesion, a collective consciousness, a community project and pride inthe country.’98 In his view, it is crucial for Catalonia to maintain and developits specific identity, which goes back to the Middle Ages. He believes thatlanguage is a distinctive element:

Our identity as a country and our desire to be one, our future prospectsdepend on us conserving our language, because it forms an essential partof our identity, and if we lose our identity we will be nothing.99

Pujol writes: ‘I therefore believe that Catalan, although not the usuallanguage of all Catalans, is the heritage of everyone.’100 In his view, the con-tinuity of Catalonia as a nation depends on the possibility to preserve theCatalan language.101 Pujol proposes making it compulsory for people wholive in Catalonia to understand and express themselves in Catalan102 andrequests Castilian-speaking Catalans to make a bigger effort to use Catalansocially. In 1991, Pujol highlighted Catalonia’s positive atmosphere andinsisted that it was up to everyone who lived in Catalonia to protect itspersonality and to strengthen the Catalan language and culture:

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It would be bad if there were Castilian-speaking Catalans who feel setupon. Who really feel it: I do not mean a few anti-Catalans who try tostir things up by claiming that they are set upon. This should be avoidedfor the sake of efficiency, justice and coexistence. And for the sake ofefficiency, justice and coexistence we must also request Castilian speakersto make a greater effort to use Catalan socially.103

Identity

is connected to language, to culture, to the experience of our history andto the collective sentiment of being Catalans. [. . .] It is also connectedto a more or less conscious conviction that Catalonia has a role to play,has something to say in Spain and in Europe.104

For Pujol, European integration and the process of internationalization posea challenge that can only be met if people recognize their need for identity:

The model of country that we want and can offer is linked to our iden-tity. [. . .] It is not, therefore, a question of sacrificing our Catalan-ness,modernity and competitiveness. Indeed, I am convinced that if we wereto lose our collective personality, we would lose in all respects thecapacity and the will for initiative, and therefore competitiveness.105

Identity and progress are closely connected. This is an original statement,absent from the classical formulations of nationalism and worth highlighting.Pujol’s nationalist discourse argues that, if the nation can be restored, byrecovering and strengthening its identity, then individuals will feel moremotivated and their actions will involve greater initiative and achievement.Pujol promotes an image of a prosperous Catalonia, capable of combining‘two very strong trends in the present-day world, one leading to a globallifestyle and the other strengthening one’s own cultural identity’.106 Heargues that ‘our concept of identity intrinsically involves projection.Projection in all senses, [. . .] towards the major intellectual and spiritualtrends of the time.’107 According to Pujol’s nationalism, Catalonia must havea presence in the world with the aim of obtaining a minimal recognition ofits culture, to do business and to learn from other countries.

History

Pujol turns to history to locate the origins of Catalan identity and of itsdifference in relation to the rest of Spain, and also of what he calls Catalonia’s‘European vocation’. He writes: ‘A people is the work of generations, some-thing that is built up gradually’108 and adds that a people ‘cannot exist if itbreaks with tradition’.109 Continuity over time is a key concept of his nation-alist discourse. The role of identity acquires a new dimension when Pujol

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analyses its origins and concludes that it is greatly indebted to historicalevents: ‘Everyone is entitled to see in History not only a few reference pointsor knowledge, but also an explanation of the present and an understandingof their own personality.’110

Pujol examines the historical origins of Catalonia and invokes them tolegitimize the distinction between Catalans and the other peoples of Spain.Hence, in the Middle Ages, Catalonia arose as a southern bastion of theCarolingian empire, the Spanish March. In Pujol’s words, ‘the idea inspiringthe birth of Catalonia is not peninsular, not Hispanic, but rather Carolingian,from the north, and its objective – I repeat – is not the Reconquest; at leastthis is not its main objective or its raison d ’être’.111 Catalonia has a differentorigin from that of the rest of Spain which was occupied by the Moors forseven centuries. In 1985, during a visit to the city of Aachen, the formercapital of the Carolingian empire, Pujol said: ‘For us, coming to Aachen isnot going abroad, it is returning to our origins’ and joining the EuropeanCommunity ‘will be like going home for Catalonia’.112

Back in 1964, Pujol had already written that ‘Catalan nationalism shouldbe a specific form of European nationalism’.113 Pujol’s current discoursestresses Catalonia’s need to modernize itself and to reach the level of otherEuropean Union countries if it wants to participate fully in the process ofEuropean integration.114 Pujol argues that Catalonia’s contribution to Europestems from its ability to ‘offer a new concept of European nation, one basedon culture and quality of life, with a strong sense of identity and, at thesame time, capable of living within a larger political framework’.115 In hisview, elaborating this new concept of the European nation and proving itsviability is one of the most urgent challenges faced by the European Union.

Pujol emphasizes the differences existing between Catalonia and the restof Spain on referring to the positive attitude of seventeenth-century Catalanstowards European ideas – industrialization, agrarian reforms and mercan-tilism – as ideas welcomed in Catalonia, but not widely accepted in otherparts of Spain.116 He also points at the innovation and modernization intro-duced by Charles III in the second half of the eighteenth century. In Pujol’sspeech to commemorate the bicentenary of Charles III, he argued that Spaindid not react positively to the modernizing message of the despot king, and that, after his death, ‘the line of progress only continued in Catalonia’.The main reasons for this can be found in the existence of a civil society, arelatively high level of social cohesion, much higher than in the rest of thestate, and a strong sense of belonging among Catalan people.117 The overallresult was an industrial revolution that prospered in Catalonia and separatedit even further from the rest of the Spanish state.118

On examining the historical roots of Catalonia, Pujol establishes a distinc-tion between what he refers to as the three historical vocations of the Catalans:

The European vocation, with its Carolingian root, at the heart of our mil-lennial history and which we have always kept alive. The Mediterranean

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vocation, more intermittent than the one connecting us to the centralEuropean nucleus, but still very real. And the Hispanic vocation, which weincorporated later than the European one and into which we have notbeen successfully integrated, but which also stands, in all respects, as anundeniable reality.119

A common project: to build up Catalonia

Jordi Pujol’s objective is to achieve a socially coherent Catalan society bymeans of a shared project to build up the country, a project open to theparticipation of all the citizens of Catalonia.120 In his opinion, Catalonia canonly be re-established by collective work and effort, which should lead tothe construction of a country of quality. Once achieved, quality will bringcollective and individual respect, self-esteem and freedom. Quality shouldbe introduced into all spheres.121 Identity, competitiveness, a sense ofcommunity and projection are the four main ideas that Pujol seeks to employin order to build up Catalonia.

Identity, as mentioned above, is essential and, in Pujol’s view, is a priorcondition for the existence of Catalonia as a country, and

it is also linked to the mentality that has been formed over history, espe-cially in the last 300 years. It is also connected to the more or lessconscious conviction that Catalonia has a role to play, has something tosay in Spain and in Europe.122

Competitiveness is imperative if Catalonia wants to continue to be successfuleconomically and to be among the most dynamic regions of Europe. However,Pujol warns that competitiveness can result in an inhuman society if keyvalues are ignored.123 For him, a country needs a spiritual, not necessarilyreligious, definition. What he designates as a spirituality refers

in the broadest sense, to the origins of generosity, a sense of honour, adesire to serve, noble ambition, magnanimity and a recognition that onedoes not constitute a supreme value; rather there are many higher thingsabove oneself.124

He insists on the need to create a collective mystique embracing the socialand the economic spheres.125 Pujol heightens the importance of the individ-ual in the individual–society–nation trilogy.126 He invokes what he definesas ‘the serene, constructive force of Catalonia’, stemming from the Catalan’scollective consciousness and from the peaceful defence, by civil society, ofCatalonia’s rights as a nation.127 He goes on to argue that ‘you cannot climb to the summit without a great deal of initiative, without pleasure fora well-done job, without an open spirit and mentality, without the ability toinnovate, without a constructive pedagogy [. . .] or without love for one’s own country’.128

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The sense of community, the feeling of having ‘our’ own shared identity, iscrucial to any nationalist discourse. The use of images and metaphors witha high pedagogical value have become a distinctive aspect of Jordi Pujol’swritten work and speeches. He is keen to highlight their role in the construc-tion of a shared sense of community. For example, he compares the countrywith a fleet and writes, ‘we must all reach the port’, emphasizing the needfor an overall development of Catalonia that ‘must not abandon the peoplewho cannot keep up’.129

In his early writings, Pujol shows an explicit social concern by pointingat the urgency to encourage the human promotion of the working class,130

and stresses the idea that ‘any national movement, which by definition meansa movement that is intended to embody the yearnings of a whole people,must necessarily be popular and social’.131 He adds that ‘we cannot aspire torebuild Catalonia fully, if the working class does not participate in thisconstruction. [. . .] Of all the sectors that make up Catalonia, the mostdefeated and annihilated after 1939 was the working class’,132 and he evenasserts that ‘Catalonia will not exist fully until the moment when the workingclass comes to power’.133 Later on, Pujol replaced these ideas with moreconservative ones. The explicit references to the working class, present in hiswritings in the late 1960s and early 1970s, reflected a strong Marxist influ-ence, which materialized in his insistence on social cohesion, as a sine quanon to create a prosperous society within which ‘modest people think thatthey can better themselves, because they see that in practice this ispossible’.134 Once again we should recall the great influence of the fall ofcommunism and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union at the end of the1980s, as a factor that has, for the time being, transformed and banished theterminology and ideology associated with different forms of Marxism andsocialism predominant in the 1960s and 1970s.

The projection of Catalonia should occur in all respects: ‘Towards the future,towards all the physical, human, cultural, economic and political geographyof the world, towards the major intellectual and spiritual tendencies of ourtime.’135 The objective of this projection is to turn Catalonia into one of themost dynamic regions of Europe and into an international actor.

Welfare nationalism

Pujol has always admired the ‘Swedish welfare state model’, a subject thatreceives renewed attention in his most recent writings. According to Pujol,maintaining the welfare state, which, in his view, poses a major challenge toall Western governments at the turn of the century,136 is an important toolfor generating feelings of loyalty towards the institutions that are responsi-ble for it. I argue that there is a notion of ‘welfare nationalism’ withinPujolism, aimed at attracting those who are not particularly sensitive to sen-timental, historical or cultural arguments, but who may be sensitive to insti-tutions, to a country or to a nationalism that offers them a good quality of

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life within a democratic and prosperous environment. In my view, it is deci-sive to acknowledge this ‘functional’ component of Pujol’s nationalism, whichaspires to reach the whole Catalan population and seeks to draw it togetherby using a combination of sentimental and rational arguments, such as thosethat I have just set out when discussing the components of Catalan identityand analysing welfare nationalism. According to Pujol, the establishment ofa welfare state managed and designed to respond to the aspirations of Catalansociety requires a further devolution of powers to the Generalitat and ade-quate funding for Catalan autonomy.

In the 15 November 1999 ‘Debate on the programme and vote of confi-dence’, which opened Pujol’s sixth term as President of the Generalitat, heevoked President Francesc Macià’s objective of creating a ‘prosperouscountry’:

A socially just country. A country designed for all of its citizens, basedon fairness and granting priority to people, and therefore with a welfarestate comparable to the most advanced of Europe. A country thatpromotes individuals and grants them equal opportunities. A countrythat integrates and is inclusive, enjoying social cohesion and coexistence.And therefore [a country] with the will and the might to devote a priorityeffort to the creation and consolidation of such a fair society. [. . .] Apolitically free country. A democratic country whose identity is respectedand recognized. A country with its own power, having a final say onfundamental aspects of its personality as a people and also concerningwhat a country is obliged to provide its citizens with for their welfare,their security, their promotion. [. . .] a spiritually glorious country. Thatis, a country of freedom and respect, with a high civic level, self-demanding, generous, educated and sensitive.137

Catalonia and Spain

Even in his early writings, Pujol rejected the idea of Spain as a unitary state and came out in favour of a solution that granted Catalonia a sufficientdegree of autonomy to establish formal relations with the other Catalan-speaking countries.138 In addition, he believes that Catalan parties representCatalonia’s interests far better than their Spanish counterparts, and arguesthat Catalan parties should adopt a positive attitude and contribute to theconstruction of a Spain within which Catalonia could be perfectly accom-modated.139

Pujol condemns the lack of confidence, knowledge and understandingbetween Catalonia and the rest of Spain,140 and attributes this rift to thevarious historical processes followed by both entities.

Some ambivalence is revealed in Pujol’s assessment of how Catalonia fits in within the Autonomous Communities System. He recognizes thatCatalonia has never before enjoyed such a degree of autonomy, but at the

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same time he indicates that, in the initial phases of the transition to democ-racy, the Catalan question was not considered with sufficient convictionbecause of the fragility of the new political scenario and the Catalans’ senseof historical responsibility. From his point of view, a generalized AutonomousCommunities System, which did not respond to the Spanish or to the Catalansituation, was accepted with the aim of preserving a still incipient democ-racy. Furthermore, according to Pujol, ‘the problem of Catalonia remainsunresolved and now we are and we will be forced to continue to demandgreater autonomy when it would appear that the time to do so has passed’.141

He regrets that the level of autonomy attained is well below the levels thathe, his party, and the Catalan people in general envisaged in the initial stagesof the transition to democracy.142

Pujol argues that Catalan self-government has not prospered sufficientlybecause the Autonomous Communities System regulates it employing ahomogenizing logic, which does not establish a distinction between histor-ical communities with national characteristics and the rest. The problembetween Catalonia and the central government cannot be limited to thetensions generated by a slow transfer of powers to the Generalitat. Insufficientfunding for Catalan autonomy is, according to Pujol, one of the most seriousproblems concerning the relationship between Catalonia and the Spanishstate. Pujol accepts that Catalonia has to continue declaring its solidaritywith other communities, by transferring some income to them, but heconsiders that the difference between Catalonia’s contribution to Spanishcoffers and the revenue it receives from them is excessively detrimental toCatalonia. This tax deficit affects the provision of public services and has avery high social cost for the Catalans.

In 1999, in his talk at ESADE, Pujol declared:

It is clear that there is a great lack of autonomous and political sensi-tivity. It leaves a very bad taste in the mouth. And it is also obviousthat the system, as it is now, does not work. This is not to say that ithas not produced any results for years. It has given some. But it will notgive any more.143

And he regrets that ‘There is a very widespread attitude in Spain that doesnot want to truly recognize the distinct aspect of Catalonia’,144 although, inhis view,

no-one has had such a strong sense of state over the last ten, twenty ortwenty-five years as us, as Catalonia, and no-one has taken on as manyrisks or as many responsibilities (in the corresponding sphere, of course)as we have done to make possible the great transformation that Spainhas experienced over recent years, or for Spain to be integrated in Europe,or for the emergence of a new political culture concerning many aspects,obviously including the autonomous one.145

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Jordi Pujol’s speech to the National Council of CDC (23 July 2000) revealssome of the consequences arising from the new Spanish political scenarioprompted by the PP’s landslide victory in the March 2000 election. Pujolemphasizes:

Not only does the PP have a majority in Spain, but also there is a euphoriaand pressure from a unitarianist pro-Spanishness of traditional roots. Ido not mean that this pro-Spanishness is traditional in the sense ofturning its back on modernity, but rather in the sense of being inspiredby the values of the political and ideological tradition dominant in Spainsince the sixteenth century. In this respect, we are experiencing a periodof regression. In addition to this, we are faced with a difficult situationin the Catalan Parliament and we have the prospect of having to resolvethe definitive structure of CiU in the not too distant future.146

Pujol’s nationalism does not foresee the creation of an independent Catalanstate. He argues that Catalonia should collaborate with Spain but, at thesame time, he maintains that:

Spain cannot be built without granting Catalonia the place, the role, thepossibilities, the right to hope, the status and the respect that it deserves.Unless the idea of an incomplete and handicapped Spain is accepted, ofa Spain capable of rejecting a significant part of the numerous and chal-lenging possibilities confronting it at this historical moment.147

The tension between the acceptance of Catalonia as a constituent part ofSpain and the desire for greater autonomy lie at the core of Pujol’s nation-alist discourse. He defines Catalonia as a nation, but he does not questionthe unity of a Spain which he considers to be a multinational state.148

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Conclusion

To conclude I would like to address the questions raised at the beginningof this book, these being: (1) how does globalization affect the strategiesemployed in the construction of national identity; (2) what are the possibil-ities for survival of nations without states; and (3) what should be the aimsof Catalan nationalism at the turn of the century.

Globalization and national identity

National identity is currently one of the most powerful forms of collectiveidentity. National identity is based upon the sentiment of belonging to aspecific nation, endowed with its own symbols, traditions, sacred places, cere-monies, heroes, history, culture and territory. Two major implications derivefrom this. First, a common national identity favours the creation of solidaritybonds among the members of a given community and allows them to imaginethe community they belong to as separate and distinct from others. Second,individuals who enter a culture emotionally charge certain symbols, values,beliefs and customs by internalizing them and conceiving them as part ofthemselves. This emotional charge is crucial because it builds up their iden-tity and facilitates the spread of the nationalist sentiment. There is also apolitical dimension to national identity. It refers to the wish of those sharinga common national identity to have the right and the power to decide uponthe political destiny of the community to which they belong.

Classical nation-states have invariably sought to homogenize their popu-lations and instil in them a sense of common national identity. Whereverthe nation-state encountered resistance to its objective, it did not hesitate to apply tough measures, ranging from forced assimilation to repression,discrimination, or even mass deportations of people and genocide. Its objec-tive was the annihilation of internal cultural difference. Throughout time,varying degrees of state power, access to resources and commitment todifferent political ideologies have determined the success and methodsemployed by different states in their quest for cultural homogenization.Among the main strategies generally implemented by the state in its pursuitof a single national identity capable of uniting its citizens are:

• The construction and dissemination of a certain image of the ‘nation’,often based upon the dominant nation or ethnic group living within thestate’s boundaries and comprising a common history, a shared cultureand a demarcated territory.

• The creation and spread of a set of symbols and rituals charged with themission of reinforcing a sense of community among citizens.

• The advancement of citizenship, involving a well-defined set of civil,legal, political and socio-economic rights and duties. The state, byconferring rights upon its members, favours the rise of sentiments of loyalty towards itself. It also establishes a crucial distinction betweenthose included and those excluded from the community of citizens, thatis, between those entitled to rights of citizenship and those deprived ofthem, despite living within the boundaries of the state.

• The creation of new enemies. The prosecution of war has proven deci-sive to the emergence and consolidation of a sense of community amongcitizens united against an external threat, be it imminent, potential orinvented.

• The progressive consolidation of national education and media systemsas key instruments in the dissemination of a particular ‘image’ of thenation with a clear-cut definition of how a ‘good citizen’ should bedefined.

Significant changes in the context within which these strategies are carriedout have been registered in the last twenty years or so. Most of these changesare closely connected to the intensification of globalization processes and theemergence of the post-traditional state.1 But what are these changes? Howcan we best understand them? What new challenges do they pose to tradi-tional conceptions of national identity? This is an ambitious task whichcannot be fully accomplished within the limited scope of this chapter. Forthis reason, in what follows I am only able to sketch some of the major trans-formations affecting the manner in which national identity is already beingconstructed by the post-traditional nation-state.2

Challenges to a homogeneous national identity

At present, demands for political autonomy or independence are oftengrounded in the principles of popular sovereignty and democracy. Suchclaims hold the potential to seriously subvert the idea of a homogeneousnational identity which generally ignores intra-state diversity. By advancingtheir own distinctive identities, nations without states challenge the state-created myth of a culturally homogeneous people living within its territory,a myth adopted and sought after with varying degrees of intensity and successby different nation-states. It could be argued, however, that social move-ments pressing for the rights of national minorities existed well before the

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era of globalization. Nevertheless, globalization has added very distinctivefeatures to these movements by providing, to those who can afford it, potentmeans to promote their own languages and cultures, denounce unfair situa-tions, create virtual resistance networks and organize political action whereco-presence is not a necessary condition. Globalization has radically trans-formed the fashion in which information and culture can be created anddisseminated.

In addition, globalization has added visibility to the ways in which nation-states conduct politics and deal with their national and ethnic minorities.Visibility contributes to the denunciation of unjust situations but, so far, it has not proved very efficient in halting repression and changing them. The visibility associated with globalization has placed greater pressure upon nation-states to present themselves as democratic by either genuinelydemocratizing their functioning and structure or by skilfully seeking to hidetheir non-democratic practices, something which is becoming increasinglydifficult.

As analysed in this book, the Spanish transition to democracy illustrateshow increasing visibility of the democratic claims for recognition advancedby Catalans and Basques, together with the desire of the Government andof some dominant classes, contributed to the transformation of the Francoregime and to the subsequent acceptance of Spain as a member of Westernsupranational institutions such as the European Union and NATO. Thisprompted a fundamental re-definition of Spain. Such a re-definition involvedchanges in the Spanish state structure and, to some extent, Spanish nationalidentity.

During the Francoist regime, the state imposed an image of Spain definedby centralism, conservatism, Catholicism and the pre-eminence of Castilianculture. The 1978 Constitution transformed the nature of Spain. Democracyforced the Spanish state to recognize the differences that existed within it. Toaccommodate national diversity, the Spanish state decided to confer the statusof autonomous community upon Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galiciain the first instance, and later upon the other autonomous communities (somewith a certain historical basis, others invented), hence proceeding to a radicalmodification of the Spanish model of state. Democratic Catalan nationalism,which became a social movement at the end of the 1960s and throughout the1970s, played a key role in the Spanish transition to democracy. The commonsense and goodwill invested in the drafting of the Constitution, once the Lawfor Political Reform had been passed (15 December 1976) and accepted by abroad spectrum of political actors, enabled a peaceful break with Francoism.At present, respect and recognition of internal diversity appear to have beensomehow abandoned by some influential sectors of the state, which seem toundervalue the wealth of a harmonious and dialogic coexistence among thepeoples of Spain.

In the new democratic Spain, the creative role the state plays in relation

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to nationalism in the interconnection between Catalonia and Spain appliesreflexively. The very definition of Spain is at stake here: by defining itself asa nation, Catalonia challenges the model of a homogeneous Spanish nationalidentity defended not only by Francoism but also by some Conservative right-wing and Jacobin left-wing sectors.

Cultural confrontation, competition and dialogue

Although nation-states are still capable of generating and disseminatingcommon symbols and reproducing rituals destined to enhance a sense ofcommunity among their citizens, they can no longer count on their exclu-sive capacity to exert cultural control over their territories. The newtechnologies associated with globalization have loosened the state’s abilityto impose a single culture upon its population and rendered homogenizationdifficult. Yet, this assertion has to be qualified because, as already mentioned,never before has the nation-state had such potent technology at its disposalto impose a single culture upon all of its population. There is great tensionbetween these two consequences of globalization.

The post-traditional state seeks to present its national symbols and ritualsin isolation from those belonging to other cultures and peoples. But, insteadof cultural isolation, we are witnessing increasing interdependence, whichmanifests itself through cultural confrontation, competition and dialogue.Of course, this is not an even phenomenon which affects all nations equally,but it stands as a constantly expanding feature in the age of globalization.The situation is further complicated on recognizing that not all nation-stateshave the same power and resources to become ‘global actors’, and that neitherall external information nor all cultural flows share the same possibilities toreach the majority of the world’s population.

Nations without states are even more affected by globalization, and gener-ally have fewer resources and less power to become globalizing nuclei. Theyoften act as recipients of global cultural flows, rendering their survival evenmore difficult. It is essential to bear in mind that the status and social classof citizens determine the variety and quality of the information they canaccess. A very high number of citizens are still greatly influenced by thestate-dominated education system and media.

A key question when discussing the impact of globalization on culture is whether we are moving towards a global unitary culture or whether, onthe contrary, globalization will strengthen the power and contribute to theprogress of some cultures to the detriment of others. At the same time global-ization applied to culture acts as a mechanism that favours and limits itsdevelopment. It favours it by generating unforeseen possibilities for thedissemination and reproduction of specific cultures, owing to the develop-ment of new technologies. And it limits it as a result of the undeniabledifferences in the access to resources within the reach of different cultures.

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National identity and citizenship

The whole process of translating the ideas of popular sovereignty intouniversal adult suffrage required a long and hard struggle, during whichEnlightenment ideas began a slow but compelling process and permeated invarying degrees first the educated classes and then the masses of variousEuropean countries. The achievement of citizenship rights was by no meansa smooth process which could be taken for granted, since there is a contrastbetween its defence among certain intellectual circles and the strong resis-tance to it on the part of the more privileged sectors of society.3

Citizenship established a clear-cut distinction between those entitled todirect engagement in governance processes and those excluded from them.In the West, the concession of further rights to citizens grew quickly afterthe Second World War. Since then, and due to the impact of globalizationupon the proliferation of international and supranational institutions, thenation-state’s traditional role as a rights-giver par excellence has been chal-lenged by institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union.For this reason, some scholars argue that a ‘post-national’ type of citizenshipmay be emerging in the EU. At this stage, it is not clear how potent andwidespread this new model will become.

Over the last fifty years, greater emphasis has been placed on HumanRights as defined and, to a certain degree, guaranteed by the United Nations.The definition of specific rights to be conferred upon European Union citizensis much more recent. It represents a major step in so far as it breaks thenation-state’s unique status as rights-guarantor within its territory.

So far, the nation-state’s status as guarantor of its citizens’ rights hascontributed to reinforcing its ability to instil a sense of common nationalidentity among them. However, the progressive supersession of this tradi-tional role of the state and its, so far, partial replacement by supranationalinstitutions holds the potential to weaken its own citizens’ loyalty. If, furtherto this and within the EU, the principle of subsidiarity, understood as amechanism destined to grant more political power to the European ‘regions’,is implemented, we could witness a strengthening of ‘regional’ identity,accompanied by the emergence of a still weak and uncertain Europeanidentity.

Consciousness of forming a group with a shared history, culture and terri-tory plays a fundamental part in the construction of national identity and itis unlikely that such a potent emotional attachment could be easily replacedby membership of larger political institutions, as demonstrated by the per-sistence of well-defined identities in some nations without states. The cruxof the matter resides in the characteristics and methods employed to generateother levels of identity. Resistance to some nation-states’ homogenizingpolicies has, to a large extent, varied according to the nature of the differentmethods employed by the nation-state to achieve cultural and politicaluniformity within its territory. So far, the use of force and coercion has beencommonplace. In this respect, if EU building processes are firmly grounded

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on democracy and respect for diversity, the response of nations without states,but also of nation-states and ethnic minorities, may be a positive one andEU citizens may feel compelled to embrace the development of a Europeanidentity, desired but not imposed.

But this argument should not underestimate the fact that not all citizensfeel with the same intensity the emotional bond which connects them totheir nation-states. In this respect, the intensity of the emotional attachmentof Scots, Welsh, Irish (in Northern Ireland), Catalans, Basques, Flemish,Quebecers, Corsicans and Bretons to their respective nation-states wouldrequire careful attention. For instance, it might be worth considering whethergreater devolution to nations without states such as Catalonia or Scotland,combined with the consolidation of European citizenship, could eventuallycontribute to weakening the nation-state’s capacity to infuse a single nationalidentity among its citizens. Further to this, one could question to what extentthe strengthening of the EU could affect the relationship between differentlevels of local, regional, national and supranational identity.

Finding new common enemies

An essential strategy in the generation of national identity consists of unitingpeople against a common enemy. Since their foundational period, nation-states have been engaged almost continually in the fighting of war.Territorial, religious, ethnic, political and economic arguments have beenemployed to justify fighting against a wide range of external enemies.

Wars have contributed to the dissemination of the idea of the nation as acommunity of fate. Besides, they have generated sentiments of solidaritytowards fellow citizens and loyalty to the nation-state. Yet, while in someparts of the world conventional war continues to operate as a practical toolin dealing with enemies and contributing to the generation of a strong senseof national identity, in the West the absence of war poses some questionsabout how national identity can be constructed in peacetime. A possibleresponse to this question points to the emergence of new kinds of externaland internal enemies. The former include more ‘abstract’ enemies, such as the threat of international terrorism, fundamentalism, organized crime or ecological disasters. The latter may include some national and ethnicminorities, immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers as groups, which, forvarious reasons, represent what is ‘alien’ and ‘different’, and which generallyprompt the reinforcement of the state’s national identity. In selected cases,some of these ‘alien’ groups are portrayed as holding a potential threat tothe stability, order, prosperity and/or well-being of the nation-state.

Some political parties and associations employ this type of argument tojustify their stand against immigrants and refugees, while at the same timedisplaying a negative attitude towards devolution and the decentraliza-tion of the state. Arguments for exclusion grounded in ethnic and nationaldifferences can lead to hostility whenever racist or xenophobic ideas are added

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to them. Whenever these demonstrations of hostility or mistrust towardsimmigrants occur in the territory of a nation without state, they tend to betaken advantage of by the state, which frequently refers to them as ‘evidence’of the discrimination or of the hidden or declared racism repeatedly attrib-uted to minority nationalisms, even if the latter are democratic and openlyin favour of diversity.

Media and education

The role of the media, in general and other types of elections and referenda,has proven decisive in determining the fate of contending political partiesand providing legitimacy to state actions and policies. Even more important,education continues to play a fundamental part in defining the nationalcommunity and supplying a sense of continuity and purpose to the veryexistence of the nation-state. Education, as Ernest Gellner demonstrated,4

equips individuals with the language and culture which will allow them tolive and work within a given society. The importance of controlling thenational curricula becomes apparent when the nation-state decides on suchvital issues as:

• the content of national history;• whether or not to include the languages and cultures of minority nations

and ethnic groups as forming a part of the national culture;• what religions, if any, should be taught to students; and• how other countries, peoples and cultures are to be presented.

Survival and development of nations without states

The question about the survival and development of nations without statesrefers to whether or not they can continue to exist in the age of globaliza-tion, but it also relates to the endurance of national identities lacking theirown state.

Concerns about the survival of particular nations are motivated by theanxiety felt by some individuals troubled by the finite character of their lives.The absence of a future and the idea that their own life will not be tran-scended, either by their heirs, their business, their work or their country,emotionally affects many human beings. This type of anxiety is quite legit-imate in individuals, like us, used to introspection and with a desire foreternity or at least transcendence.

But the question about the survival of nations without states has toconsider the specific transformations and elements which define the present,that is:

• in an increasingly interdependent world, within which cultures are inconstant contact and within which some cultures and languages havebecome dominant;

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• in a world within which powerful countries with a desire to impose theirvalues, lifestyles and language, do not hesitate to sweep the board cultur-ally and linguistically;

• in a new socio-political and economic environment generated by theconsolidation of the EU, created and governed by the states forming it;and

• at a historical moment marked by the profound re-cast of the nation-state as the main political institution and also, at least at present, by theradicalization of a firm state nationalism aiming to impose internalhomogeneity to counterbalance, among other reasons, the cultural andpolitical demands of the national and ethnic minorities that it contains.

What real possibilities exist to argue in favour of, or against, the survivalof nations without states? Before addressing this question, I offer somegeneral reflections on diverse aspects of the context within which nationswithout states evolve in the age of globalization. It should be borne in mind,however, that nations are not eternal and immutable, and that this concernsboth nation-states and nations without states.

1 The dynamism of the democratic nationalist movements that have re-emerged over the past twenty or thirty years in Catalonia, Scotland, Quebec,Flanders, the Basque Country and Wales, to name but a few cases, draws itssupport from the principles of popular sovereignty, democracy and collec-tive rights. This grants them an unprecedented legitimacy and makes itmuch more difficult to disregard their claims. The combination of culturaland political arguments in the democratic nationalism of nations withoutstates consolidates them as social movements, beyond the rigid structures ofpolitical parties.

2 In the setting up of political, academic, business and other types of net-works between different nations without states, some initiatives have alreadybeen taken, especially in Europe, and also in Quebec, which represent adecisive step in the mutual knowledge among nations without states able to contrast their political status and learn from each other’s experiences, thus building up a solid comparative model. Such exchanges could lead tothe formulation of joint demands, crucial on promoting relations both at aninstitutional level and within civil society.

3 The transformation of the nation-state, prompted by the recognition ofits relative weakness in a world where international and multinational organ-izations and transnational institutions, such as the EU, NATO and the UN,proliferate, could force the state to reduce its scope to the dominant nationalgroup in its territory (England in Great Britain, Castile in Spain), or toengage in decentralization processes. The latter would have to foresee therecognition of greater sovereignty than that currently enjoyed by Scotland,

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Catalonia and the Basque Country, while recognizing the divergencesexisting between these three communities, and stop short of secession. Thiswould occur at a time when the sovereignty of the nation-state is also beingredefined. But the state’s capacity to reinvent itself and to maintain its powershould not be underestimated.

4 The extension of the principle of subsidiarity, as foreseen in theMaastricht Treaty, could foster a political scenario within which, for example,Scotland, Wales, England, Catalonia and Castile, among others, could sitdown at the same table and enjoy a similar degree of political autonomy –legitimized by economic prosperity, a shared national identity and a desireto live in peace. In this, up to now, utopian scenario, a large number ofpolicies would be determined by a democratically elected European Parlia-ment within which all EU peoples should feel represented. In my view,nation-states will strongly resist turning a Europe of states into a Europe ofpeoples, and only very powerful economic and political interests couldprompt a change of attitude resulting in greater prominence for nationswithout states in the EU.

5 The extraordinary value granted to difference and to genuine diversitycontrasts with the emergence of a world with a tendency towards linguistichomogenization – a world which has adopted English as the lingua francaand is moving towards the Americanization of culture. In this context, thedanger lies in the temptation to reduce difference to a magnificent, valuablemuseum piece – to a fossil with an astronomical value but which, being afossil, is dead.

6 The human need for emotional closeness to others is expressed bysearching for forms of both individual and collective identity, and throughthe attempt to recreate a sentiment of community. Although the nation-state has not always succeeded in generating this sentiment, a sense ofcommunity has survived in a very important number of nations withoutstates, and it never ceases to surprise us on reappearing in nations thoughtto have disappeared long ago.

The highly competitive and individualist society fostered by capitalismand the social fragmentation of the latest phases of modernity, have encour-aged individuals to identify themselves with the nation, understood as themost important source of identity, one acting as mediator between theautonomous, but relatively weak, individual, and complex, powerful, globalforces. It would appear that, at times when traditional sources of identity,such as class, are receding, national identity seizes an unexpected andpowerful significance.

Nationalist movements in nations without states seek to generate acommon consciousness among the members of the nation and, at the sametime, try to re-establish what they perceive as a threatened sentiment of

160 Conclusion

community. The nation, portrayed as a community that transcends the lifeof single individuals, fosters an emotional link among its members andfavours the emergence of solidarity bonds between them. It is worth notingthat most nationalist movements in Western nations without states, such asCatalonia, advocate modernization, and stand for democracy and the construc-tion of an open society, as the key elements informing their nationalistdiscourses. Only in so far as they are committed to these principles and valuescan they be referred to as new progressive social movements.

7 The transformation of the concept of citizenship to include multiple iden-tities allows for and recognizes the existence of identities corresponding tonational and ethnic minorities sharing a single citizenship. An examplewould be the compatibility between Scottish, English or Welsh identity anda single British citizenship. Another example would concern a European citi-zenship capable of containing a considerable number of national identities,including those of nation-states as well as those of stateless nations and ethnicgroups.

Having mentioned these points, I am now in a position to answer the ques-tion raised at the start of this section regarding the possibilities for survivalof nations without states. In my opinion, it is not feasible to offer a conclu-sive answer, applicable to all cases. What we can assert is that not all nationswithout states will survive. I argue that only those with the capacity to main-tain a firm sense of identity, able to engender social cohesion and enjoyingeconomic viability, will survive. Further to this, for any nationalist move-ment to prosper, it is essential that it attains mass support. A minority eliteis sufficient to initiate a nationalist movement, but to steer it into a socialmovement it is imperative to mobilize a large number of people from a broadsocial spectrum.

Currently, some nations without states are faced with unprecedentedprospects for their unfolding, if the nationalist movements leading themobtain sufficient resources and are skilful and determined enough to defendtheir communities by democratic means. These movements have to acceptthat nations are not immutable and foster attitudes and structures allowingfor the peaceful coexistence of diversity within their own nations.

For a cosmopolitan Catalanism

Catalan nationalism is constituted by a rich legacy accumulated over time,one which includes contributions from various political ideologies rangingfrom liberalism to socialism, social democracy, republicanism, Christiandemocracy and communism, to name but a few. At the beginning of thenew millennium, and taking into account the dramatic transformationsexperienced by Catalonia and by the Catalan nationalist movement duringFrancoism and the transition to democracy, how could Catalan nationalism

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Conclusion 161

be modernized and adapted to the present socio-political scenario? Or, inother words, what should be the objectives of the Catalan nationalist move-ment over the next twenty-five or so years?

I will respond to these questions in two stages. First, I shall identify themain challenges faced by Catalan society and the Catalan nationalism whichaspires to represent it. Second, I shall advance a series of measures destinedto go beyond the present situation and to improve the living conditions ofthe Catalans, while promoting Catalonia as an open, dynamic society.

In my opinion, the most important challenges facing Catalan society are:

1 Insufficient autonomous funding. This is an essential point as itconstrains the Generalitat’s scope for action. It also prevents the full opera-tion of the autonomous institutions and, in so doing, limits the quality oflife and the welfare that all the citizens of Catalonia can enjoy. An additionalproblem arises from the indirect but real incidence of insufficient funding,and therefore of deficient public services, on constructing and strengtheningidentity bonds between the citizens and the institutions representing them.

2 Lack of cultural and political recognition of the Catalan nation. Cataloniais not recognized as a nation, either within Spain or within the EU, andobviously not in the international sphere. Consequently, the cultural, polit-ical, legal and economic rights of Catalonia as a nation are not recognized,although, as we have seen, the main Catalan political parties define it as such.This situation confines Catalan society, condemns it to dependence and, toa certain extent, prevents it from deciding its own future. A further limita-tion arises from the situation of inferiority and of automatic exclusionexperienced by Catalonia, in so far as it lacks a voice in international fora,such as the EU, the UN and NATO.

3 The rapid development of new technologies which systematically neglectthe use of Catalan (and also of Castilian, although to a lesser extent) andwhich require a good level of English. These new technologies are not withinreach of everyone and while, on the one hand, they threaten to contributeto marginalizing minority cultures, on the other, they accentuate social divi-sions as, in general, only a limited number of middle- and upper-class peoplehave access to them.

4 The increasing number of immigrants, legal and illegal, arriving inCatalonia. The lack of economic resources and legal powers of the Catalangovernment to adequately deal with immigration can have negative conse-quences both for the immigrants themselves and for Catalan society. TheGeneralitat does not currently enjoy sufficient resources to welcome theimmigrants, regulate their number and formulate policies destined to favourtheir social and economic integration. For these reasons, the present situa-tion is unsustainable.

162 Conclusion

5 The need to make decisive progress in the development of the Catalanculture and language from a position of respect for difference. Such progressshould foster and invigorate the production of a quality Catalan culturewithin reach of all citizens – a feature which should contribute to theirpersonal and creative development. In this context, special attention shouldbe paid to education; this should involve the curricula as well as the organ-ization of teaching in public and private schools and universities.

The challenges faced by Catalan society are by no means exhausted by thosementioned above, but, in my view, it is important to set up some limits andto prioritize those questions which require more urgent and continuous atten-tion. The proposals to overcome such challenges are also limited, althougheach of them can be divided into different parts and requires a thoroughdevelopment of all the aspects involved.

First, I argue that a cross-party agreement involving the main politicalforces with a Catalanist tradition is essential in promoting a common projectfor Catalonia. In my view, it is immoral for them to place particular partyinterests above the more general interests of the Catalan society they seek torepresent. This cross-party agreement would have to cover at least thefollowing aspects:

• Proposal of a sufficient and fair funding budget for Catalonia.• Recognition of Catalonia’s status as a nation. This should be reflected in

the Spanish Constitution and in the Statute of Autonomy.• Greater devolved powers for Catalonia within the framework of a Spain

that defines itself as plurinational, plurilingual and pluricultural.• Acceptance of Catalonia as a European electoral district, and of the right

and duty of Catalan government representatives to participate in EUdecision-making bodies, whenever matters directly concerning Cataloniaare to be discussed.

• Agreement for the promotion of Catalan culture and language inCatalonia, Spain and the European Union, using all available resourcesto do so at the regional, national and European level.

Second, I propose the construction of what I refer to as a ‘cosmopolitanCatalanism’. It is not a contradiction to speak of cosmopolitan nationalism,however I feel that its meaning should be explained. We should be awarethat cosmopolitanism, that is, world citizenship free from national prejudices,can only emerge under the following conditions:

1 The establishment of democratic constitutions in all nation-states as aguarantee of respect for freedom, equality before the law, and national,ethnic, cultural and gender diversity.

2 The predominance of democracy as the principle governing interna-tional relations, which should involve a relationship of equality between

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Conclusion 163

nations. This would also include the establishment of an ‘InternationalCivic Constitution’ to regulate international relations and disputes,coupled with a democratic ‘International Court of Justice’, which shouldnot remain in the hands of the economically and politically strongestcountries. The key objective of this Court would be to prevent war. Suchan institution would require its own army to enforce its resolutions. Itwould have to be financed by the nation-states, which would contributein proportion to their resources. No state government would have thepower to interrupt or to reduce their contribution to the maintenanceof the ‘International Court of Justice’.

3 The enactment of a ‘cosmopolitan law’, emanating from the InternationalCivic Constitution, which would provide for what Immanuel Kant called‘universal hospitality’, that is, the right of any foreigner – not a citizenof the specific state – to be treated without hostility in the country ofarrival, supposing that he or she behaves peacefully.5

To exercise cosmopolitanism, the above three conditions should be com-plied with, since their fulfilment would be sufficient to eradicate the discrim-ination, repression and attempted annihilation suffered by some nations andethnic groups throughout history. It is not ethically sound to demand froma nation engaged in a struggle for its own cultural and political survival todeclare itself ‘cosmopolitan’ (kosmos polites), simply because to be able to doso this nation should be free, and freedom is not available to it while thereare states that threaten or deny its own right to exist and to form a part ofthis ‘cosmos’. But, what all nation-states and nations without states shouldbe encouraged to do is to contribute to setting up the conditions whichwould favour the emergence of cosmopolitanism, and this is why Catalanismmust become cosmopolitan. Although cosmopolitanism can be brandedutopian, I am convinced that the political agenda for the future of Cataloniashould include not only specific policy aspects, but also the commitment tocosmopolitan ideals and values capable of informing political action.

Democratic nationalism is legitimate. It defends the right of nations to exist and develop while recognizing and respecting internal diversity. It rejects the territorial expansion of nations and shows a commitment toincreasing the morality of the nations’ citizens. Only by being committedto these principles can democratic nationalism become cosmopolitan. Inshort, by taking care of and valuing one’s own homeland, one becomes a citizen of the world. In this respect, Catalan society and, in particular, its institutions, its politicians, its intellectuals and its businessmen andwomen have a moral duty to work towards the construction of a democratic,open country, and to promote the civic values that favour social cohesionand harmony. Catalanism needs to take the country forward and contributeto the social well-being of the citizens through efficiency, responsibility and transparent management, and also by endorsing ethical values promotingthe development of Catalan society as a whole. Catalanism should not be a

164 Conclusion

modus vivendi, an excuse for political inaction, or a reason to maintain orgenerate social inequalities, but rather a progressive ideology, a tool for thesocial integration and the cultural, ethical and political regeneration of the country.

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Conclusion 165

AppendixNational position of the main political parties of Catalan origin

Table A.1 Catalan identity

Position Objectives

ERC – Nations without states are – Recognition of Catalonia condemned to disappear as a nation

– Identity is formed by territory,history, tradition, culture, language,economy, country consciousness andwill

– Optional, not ethnic– The Constitution treats Catalonia as

a linguistic minority

PSUC-ICV – Catalonia has a shared history, – Creation of a society thatculture and language, but as a nation integrates different it is not eternal or immutable cultural contributions

– The nation is constantly changing from all those who live – 40 per cent of the inhabitants of in Catalonia

Catalonia are of non-Catalan origin– Need to reconstruct a common

homeland for all Catalans– Stands for popular culture– Recognizes that the Països

Catalans share a common culture– Catalan identity is plural

PSC – Catalonia as a non-static nation – Self-government of (PSC-PSOE) – ‘We are a nation because the Catalonia

citizens here and now want to beone’

– Collective will to be

CDC – Catalonia, a nation with its own – Development of full cultural, historical, linguistic, national sovereignty and symbolic and institutional heritage promotion of Catalan

– Catalonia, a nation placed within identitythe cultural and linguistic frameworkof the Països Catalans

– The ‘distinct aspect’ definesCatalonia as a nation

UDC – Based on language, customs, – Recognition of Catalonia tradition and territory as a nation and promotion

– Països Catalans defined by their of the Catalan languagelinguistic unity, their history andcultural tradition

– Emphasizes the dynamic nature ofthe nation and nationalism

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Appendix 167

Table A.2 Nationalism

Position Objectives

ERC – In favour of the right of peoples to – Independence of Cataloniaself-determination within the EU to be

– Stands for the Països Catalans achieved by peaceful and democratic means

PSUC-ICV – Existence of various types of – Creation of a unitary Catalan nationalism: conservative strategy to reform the and popular Constitution and achieve

– Proposes integrating workers in a adequate funding forCatalan nationalist project Catalonia

– Defends popular left-wing – Spain to be defined as aCatalanism plurinational, plurilinguistic

and pluricultural state

PSC – Prefers the term ‘Catalanism’ to – Transformation of Spain into (PSC-PSOE) ‘Catalan nationalism’ a federal state

– Catalanism is expressed in bothCatalan and Castilian

– Does not mention the concept ofsovereignty

– In favour of self-government– In favour of diversity and linguistic

freedom in Catalonia– Defends Catalanism as the shared

heritage of all Catalans

CDC – Personalist, democratic and – The nationalization of progressive nationalism Catalonia

– Integrative nationalism free from – Catalonia’s right to self-external dependence determination

– Action to mobilize, educate andraise the national consciousness ofthe Catalan people

UDC – Community nationalism – Reform of the Constitution– Wants Catalonia to be able to allowing the federation of

exercise full sovereignty autonomous communities – Considers language as a key with historical, linguistic and

element and proposes cultural linksnormalizing it and extending its use

– In favour of consensus between all political parties

168 Appendix

Table A.3 Immigration

Position Objectives

ERC – Against xenophobia and racism – Creation of cultural and – Catalonia has insufficient powers to social immigration

tackle immigration policies– Proposes respect for and

recognition of difference– Supports the rights and duties of

immigrants– Immigrants have a duty to

participate in the social life of thehost country

– Establishes a distinction betweenintegration and assimilation

PSUC-ICV – Against xenophobia and racism – Social, legal and socio-– Its main contribution to the national economic integration of

reconstruction of Catalonia has been immigrantsto establish a link betweenCatalanism and the working class, in particular among those sectors ofimmigrant origin

PSC – Against xenophobia and racism – All the citizens of (PSC-PSOE) – All culture created and produced in Catalonia, regardless of

Catalonia is Catalan culture. their origin, should be invited to recreate thecollective identity of Catalonia, the ‘Catalan melting pot’

CDC – Against xenophobia and racism – Integration of immigrants – In favour of the integration of who, without losing their

immigrants into the socio-economic own roots, should respect and labour system the laws, culture and

– Need to articulate plurality while traditions of the host protecting national identity country, in this case

– Need to have immigration powers Cataloniadevolved to the Generalitat

UDC – Against xenophobia and racism – Against the discrimination – Proposes respect for difference of immigrants and in

favour of the preservation and promotion of Catalonia’s cultural traits

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Appendix 169

Table A.4 Catalonia and Spain

Position Objectives

ERC – Catalonia’s main problem is its – Creation of a Federal submission to Spain Republic as a step towards

– Catalonia and Spain have opposing a Catalan Republicnational identities

– Denounces the insufficient fundingreceived by Catalonia

– Questions the legitimacy of theconcept of the Spanish state

PSUC-ICV – Spain is a multinational, – Self-determination for all pluricultural and plurilinguistic the peoples of Spainstate

– Catalonia should contribute todemocratizing Spain

– In favour of transforming Spaininto an asymmetric federal state

PSC – Spain is a culturally plural reality – Creation of a federal state(PSC-PSOE) with four basic languages – Acceptance of the pluri-

– In favour of a federal development cultural, plurilinguistic of the Constitution and plurinational diversity

– Tension between pro-Catalan and of Cataloniapro-Spanish sectors of the PSOE

CDC – Emphasizes its contribution to the – Recognition of the Catalangovernability and modernization national specificity by of Spain Spain

– Spain should recognize its – Greater self-government pluricultural, plurinational and for Cataloniaplurilinguistic character

UDC – Highlights the effort made by – New state agreementCatalan nationalism to contribute acknowledging Catalonia’s to the governability of Spain, to its right to self-determination modernization, Europeanization and also the pluricultural, and regeneration plurilingual and pluri-

– So far, Spain has not responded national nature of Spainpositively to this collaboration byCatalan nationalism

– UDC is willing to participate in thegovernment of Spain if it accepts theplural nature of the state and theCatalan national specificity

170 Appendix

Table A.5 Catalonia and the European Union

Position Objectives

ERC – The EU does not respect the rights – Independent Catalonia of peoples within the EU

– Catalonia should have its own,direct representation in the EU and,as a first step, should become aEuropean electoral constituency

– In favour of proclaiming aEuropean Constitution that respectsindividual and collective rights

PSUC-ICV – In favour of an EU with a federal – European electoral structure constituency for

Catalonia

PSC – In favour of the presence of – Creation of a federal (PSC-PSOE) autonomous governments in Europe based on the

European decision-making bodies principle of subsidiarity– Supports the indirect relations with

the EU through Spain, and directrelations through the Europeanregional movement

CDC – Europe as Catalonia’s natural – European electoral political framework constituency for

– Catalonia should enjoy its own, Cataloniadirect representation in the EU

– In favour of a Europe of thenations

UDC – In favour of the consolidation of – Construction of a Europe the EU of the peoples and the

– Requests the EU to respect its nations, and not of the internal diversity states

– In favour of a federal Europe and ofthe principle of subsidiarity

– Proposes expanding a sentiment ofbeing European together withCatalan national consciousness

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Appendix 171

Notes

Introduction

1 According to Miquel Caminal, ‘the word Catalanism has a great virtue and a possiblepitfall: it expresses an identity and a desire for self-determination without usingthe term nationalism’ (M. Caminal, ‘Els catalanismes i l’Espanya plurinacional’, in N. Bilbeny and À. Pes, El nou catalanisme, Ariel, Barcelona, 2001, p. 141. ForCaminal, ‘Catalanism has been absorbed by nationalism throughout the 20thcentury’ (ibid. p. 143). Agustí Colomines writes that ‘political Catalanism corre-sponds to the name given to the movement defending Catalan national claims, thatis, the nationalist movement’ (A. Colomines, ‘Catalanisme és nacionalisme’, in A. Colomines, Testimoni públic. Política, cultura i nacionalisme, Catarroja/Barcelona/Palma, Afers, 2001, p. 34).

In my opinion, the term nationalism meticulously describes the different polit-ical projects for Catalonia studied in this book. It should be borne in mind thatnationalism, characterized by an impressive flexibility with regard to its definition,is capable of accommodating very different political proposals, some of which areaimed at obtaining cultural recognition, political autonomy, federation and evennational independence. In my view, nationalism expresses the feeling of belongingto a specific nation that demands the right to decide its own political future, whichdoes not always have to be independence. I am aware that these statements goagainst an existing current in Catalonia which avoids using the word ‘nationalism’and prefers using the word ‘Catalanism’, while maintaining that Catalonia is anation. Rather than embarking on endless discussions on this subject, I considerit more practical to acknowledge the complexity of nationalism, and accept itspolysemic nature, as defended by an important and well-documented literature onthis subject. See E. Gellner, Nations and nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983;A.D. Smith, Nationalism and modernism, Routledge, London, 1998; and M.Guibernau, Nationalisms, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996.

2 J. Pemartin, ¿Qué es lo nuevo? Consideraciones sobre el momento español presente, 2nd edn,Cultura Española, Santander, 1938.

3 M. Weber, From Max Weber. Essays in sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. WrightMills, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 78.

4 M. Guibernau, Nationalisms, op. cit., pp. 47–48.5 I. Berlin, The sense of reality. Studies in ideas and their history, Pimlico, London, 1996,

p. 248.6 Ibid., p. 252.7 Ibid., p. 256.8 J. Mayall, Nationalism and international society, Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge, 1992, p. 50.

1 Nationalism and intellectuals in nations without states: theCatalan case

1 A.D. Smith, National identity, Penguin Books, London, 1991, p. 93.2 E. Kedourie, Nationalism, Hutchinson, London, 1986, p. 85.3 See also T. Hodgkin, Nationalism in colonial Africa, Muller, London, 1956;

H. Trevor-Roper, Jewish and other nationalisms, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London,1962; and H. Kohn, The idea of nationalism, Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1967.

4 E. Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1971,p. 84.

5 Ibid., p. 113.6 T. Nairn, The break-up of Britain, NLB, London, 1977, pp. 98–99.7 Ibid., p. 339.8 Ibid., p. 101.9 J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the state, Manchester University Press, Manchester,

1982, p. 3.10 Ibid., p. 332.11 Ibid.12 Ibid., p. 329.13 A.D. Smith, Nationalism and modernism, op. cit., p. 189.14 E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds), The invention of tradition, Cambridge University

Press, Cambridge, 1983.15 A.D. Smith, National identity, op. cit., p. 97.16 E. Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge, 1990.17 A.W. Gouldner, The future of intellectuals and the rise of the new class, Macmillan,

London, 1979.18 J.H. Kautsky, Political change in underdeveloped countries. Nationalism and communism,

Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, New York, 1976.19 M. Pinard and R. Hamilton, ‘The class bases of the Quebec independence move-

ment. Conjecture and evidence’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 17–54.20 J. Casassas (ed.), Els intel.lectuals i el poder a Catalunya (1808–1975), Pòrtic,

Barcelona, 1999.21 J. Benet, Catalunya sota el règim franquista, Edicions Catalanes de París, Paris, 1973.22 From among these writings, Salvador Giner, Lluis Flaquer, Jordi Busquet and Núria

Bultà in their book La cultura catalana: el sagrat i el profà, Edicions 62, Barcelona,1996, highlight the following: 1940, Carles Cardó, La moral de la desfeta; 1941,Carles Pi i Sunyer, Grandesa i misèria del sentiment nacional; 1943, Jordi Arquer, Elfutur de Catalunya i els deures polítics de l’emigració catalana; 1944, Josep FerraterMora, Les formes de la vida catalana; 1944, Joan Comorera, La nació en la nova etapahistòrica; 1944, Domènec Guansé, Cataluña y el imperialismo castellano; 1945, PereBosch Gimpera, La formación de los pueblos de España; 1946, Josep Trueta, The spiritof Catalonia; 1946, Carles Cardó, Histoire spirituelle des Espagnes. Étude historico-psychologique du peuple espagnol ; 1949, Joan Estelrich, La falsa paz; 1954, FrancescMaspons i Anglasell, El dret català; 1954, Jaume Vicens i Vives, Notícia deCatalunya; 1959, Miquel Batllori, Vuit segles de cultura catalana a Europa.

23 J. Vicens i Vives, Notícia de Catalunya, Columna/Proa, Barcelona, 1999 [1954], p. 9.

24 Ibid., p. 20.25 Ibid.26 Ibid., p. 24.27 Ibid., p. 88.28 J. Ferrater Mora, Les formes de la vida catalana, Columna/Proa, Barcelona, 1999

[1944], p. 9.29 Ibid., p. 16.

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Notes 173

30 Ibid., p. 35.31 S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 94.32 J. Ferrater Mora, op. cit., p. 36.33 S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 96.34 J. Ferrater Mora, op. cit., p. 45.35 S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 97.36 J. Ferrater Mora, op. cit., p. 50.37 J. Vicens i Vives, op. cit., pp. 169–171.38 J. Ferrater Mora, op. cit., p. 64.39 Ibid., p. 77.40 Ibid., p. 81.41 Ibid., p. 91.42 Ibid., p. 92.43 S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 102.44 For an excellent, and so far unique, sociological analysis of Catalan society, see S.

Giner (ed.), La societat catalana, Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut d’Estadística deCatalunya, Barcelona, 1998.

45 S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 62.46 À. Castiñeira, Catalunya com a projecte, Proa, Barcelona, 2001, p. 86.47 S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 63.48 See X. Escura i Dalmau, Els sentiments i les raons de les nacions. Reflexions sobre l’an-

ticatalanisme i d’altres sentiments i raons nacionals dins l’actual Estat espanyol, Signament,Barcelona, 2000.

49 J.H. Elliott, The revolt of the Catalans, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1963.

50 A. Balcells, Catalan nationalism, Macmillan, London, 1996, pp. 12–17.51 J. Nogué, Nacionalismo y territorio, Milenio, Lleida, 1998, p. 68.52 Ibid., pp. 87–94.

2 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism

1 P. Preston, Franco, Fontana Press, London, 1994, p. 185.2 Ibid., pp. 185–186.3 Ibid., p. 187.4 S. Giner and E. Sevilla Guzmán differentiate totalitarianism from what they call

‘reactionary despotism’ in the analysis that they carry out of the Franco regime.See S. Giner and E. Sevilla Guzmán, ‘From despotism to parliamentarism. Classdomination and political order in the Spanish state’. Iberian Studies, vol. III, no. 2(autumn 1979), pp. 69–83.

5 P. Preston, Franco, op. cit., p. 197.6 See S.G. Payne, Falange, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1961, p. 190.7 M. Gallo, Historia de la España franquista, Ruedo Ibérico, Paris, 1969, p. 80.8 J. Pemartín, op. cit., pp. 11–16.9 M. Guibernau, Nationalisms, op. cit., Ch. 1.

10 P. Preston, Juan Carlos: el rey de un pueblo, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 2003.11 For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon in Catalonia, see C. Molinero and

P. Ysàs, Els industrials catalans durant el franquisme, Eumo, Vic, 1991. On the samephenomenon in the Basque Country, see J.M. Lorenzo, Dictadura y dividendo. Eldiscreto negocio de la burguesía vasca 1937–1950, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, 1989,and M. González Portilla and J.M. Garmendía, La posguerra en el País Vasco. Política,acumulación, miseria, Kriselu, San Sebastián, 1988.

12 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, ‘El franquisme i la transició democràtica (1939–1988)’,in P. Vilar (ed.), Història de Catalunya, 8 vols, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1989, vol. VII, p. 137.

174 Notes

13 ‘Speech on opening the seventh term of the Spanish parliament’, Madrid, 3 June1961, in F. Franco, Discursos y mensajes del Jefe del Estado 1960–1963, DirecciónGeneral de Información, Publicaciones Españolas, Madrid, 1964, pp. 217–218.

14 M. Gallo, op. cit., p. 75.15 Ibid., p. 76.16 Ibid., p. 169.17 Ibid., p. 179.18 For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon in the Basque Country, see A.

Gurruchaga, El código nacionalista vasco durante el franquismo, Anthropos, Barcelona,1985.

19 P. Preston, ‘Introduction’, in H. Raguer, La pólvora y el incienso. La Iglesia y laGuerra Civil Española (1936–1939), Península, Barcelona, 2001, p. 19.

20 Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, Franco i l’espanyolisme, Curial Edicions Catalanes,Barcelona, 1980, p. 107.

21 R. Morodo, Los orígenes ideológicos del franquismo. Acción Española, Alianza, Madrid,1985, p. 145.

22 Ibid., p. 163.23 J. Pemartín, op. cit., pp. 64–65.24 Ibid., p. 45.25 F. Franco, ‘Speech to the concentration of producers in Madrid, 18 July 1943’.

Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, op. cit., p. 67. (The italics are mine.)26 F. Franco, ‘Speech 1945’. Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, op. cit., p. 128.27 F. Franco, ‘End-of-year message 1958’. Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, op. cit.,

p. 129.28 Raza (Race) is also the title of a novel written by Franco between 1940 and 1941

and signed with the pseudonym ‘Jaime de Andrade’. The novel, later adapted as afilm, has an autobiographical aspect and is a romanticized version of the life of a Galician family which took the Caudillo’s own family as its model.

29 See the description of these events in P. Preston, Franco, op. cit., pp. 191–192.30 A. Gurruchaga, op. cit., p. 154. According to Max Gallo, 7,937 members of reli-

gious orders and priests were executed or assassinated in the Republican zone(including 12 bishops, 283 nuns and 192 monks). M. Gallo, op. cit. pp. 65–66.

31 Cited in M. Gallo, op. cit.32 Ibid., p. 207.33 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 24.34 S.G. Payne, The Franco regime (1936–1975), The University of Wisconsin Press,

Madison, 1987, p. 213.35 See H. Raguer, La pólvora y el incienso. La Iglesia y la Guerra Civil Española

(1936–1939), Península, Barcelona, 2001.36 Franco was addressing foreign correspondents in Salamanca on 4 April 1937. Cited

in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, op. cit., 1980, p. 93.37 Statements by Franco to W.P. Carney, from the New York Times, published on 26

December 1937. F. Franco, ‘Discurs 1945’. Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, op.cit., p. 93.

38 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 83.39 In Terrassa, for example, there were 2,807 political denunciations against people

just in the year 1939. The authorities received so many denunciations, many ofthem invented, that the provincial leadership of the Falange in Barcelona had tosend an order to its activists warning that anyone who made false accusations wouldbe severely penalized (ibid., p. 82).

40 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, ibid., p. 94.41 Ibid., p. 98.42 E.J. Hugues, Report from Spain, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1947, p. 149.43 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 108.

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Notes 175

3 The re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Francoism

1 J. Llobera, ‘Catalan identity. The dialectics of past and present’. Critique ofAnthropology, vol. X, nos. 2 and 3 (winter 1990), p. 16.

2 See J. Benet, Catalunya sota el règim franquista, op. cit.3 D. Díaz Esculíes, El catalanisme polític a l’exili (1939–1959), La Magrana, Barcelona,

1991, p. 30.4 Ibid., p. 38.5 For a detailed version of the activities of the Generalitat in exile illustrated with

key documents from that period, see M. Ferré, La Generalitat de Catalunya a l’exili,Aymà, Barcelona, 1977.

6 D. Díaz Esculíes, El Front Nacional de Catalunya (1939–47), La Magrana, Barcelona,1983, p. 120.

7 C. Molinero and P. Ysàs, L’oposició antifeixista a Catalunya (1939–50), La Magrana,Barcelona, 1981, pp. 161ff.

8 D. Díaz Esculíes, El Front Nacional de Catalunya 1939–1947, op. cit., p. 114.9 D. Díaz Esculíes, El catalanisme polític a l’exili (1939–59), op. cit., pp. 129–135.

10 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 153.11 For a detailed version, see D. Díaz Esculíes, El catalanisme polític a l’exili, op. cit.,

pp. 185ff.12 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 171.13 See I. Riera, Els catalans de Franco, Plaza y Janés, 1998; R. Aracil et al. Empresarios

de la post-guerra. La Comisión de incorporación industrial y mercantil número 2, 1938–1942, Cambra Oficial de Comerç, Indústria i Navegació de Barcelona,Barcelona, 1999 and F. Cabana, 37 anys de franquisme a Catalunya, Pòrtic, Barcelona,2000.

14 See F. Sánchez Agustí, Maquis a Catalunya. De la invasió de la Vall d’Aran a la mortde Caracremada, Pagès, Lleida, 1999.

15 Ibid., pp. 160–165; E. Pons Prades, Guerrillas españolas (1936–1960), Planeta,Barcelona, 1977, and J.M. Solé Sabaté, ‘La lluita armada a la post-guerra’. L’Avenç,no. 3 (Barcelona, June 1977), p. 15.

16 See J. Fabré, J.M. Huertas and A. Ribas, Vint anys de resistència catalana(1939–1959), La Magrana, Barcelona, 1978; J. Colomines, El compromís de viure,Columna, Barcelona, 1999; P. Carbonell, Tres nadals empresonats (1939–1943),Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1999, and H. Raguer,Gaudeamus igitur, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1999. For acomplete bibliography on Francoism, see A. Colomines, ‘Historiar el franquisme’.Afers, no. 23 (January–June 2001), pp. 92–94.

17 During the festivities of exaltation of the Mare de Déu de Montserrat in April1947, a few words were pronounced publicly in Catalan at the monastery ofMontserrat for the first time since 1939, and from the summit known as the ‘gorrofrigi’ an immense Catalan flag was unfurled which the special police forces wereunable to take down during the whole day ( J. Fabré, J.M. Huertas and A. Ribas,op. cit., p. 126).

In July 1951, the warships of the Sixth Fleet of the US Navy arrived atBarcelona’s harbour. It was the first time that the American fleet in theMediterranean had come to Barcelona and, to commemorate the event, the citydecided to dedicate a gala performance at the Liceu to the marines. During theperformance leaflets written in English were thrown from the upper levels. Theydenounced the Spanish regime to the Americans, telling them that Spain was undera dictatorship and not a democracy. (The previous year the United Nations hadcancelled the measures taken against the Franco regime and the United States hadgranted Franco the first loans.) ( J. Fabré, J.M. Huertas and A. Ribas, op. cit., pp.123–124.)

176 Notes

18 For further details, see J. Crexell, Els fets del Palau i el consell de guerra de Jordi Pujol,La Magrana, Barcelona, 1982. Also see X. Muñoz, De dreta a esquerra: memòries polítiques, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1990, pp. 135–144.

19 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 358.20 Some publications were clearly political, such as, for example, L’Espurna (POUM,

1940), Treball (PSUC, 1941), Front de la Llibertat (1941–1944), La Humanitat (ERC,1942), Per Catalunya (FNC, 1945), Endavant (MSC, 1944–1968) and Determini(UDC, 1966–1968). Others were more cultural: Catalunya, Poesia, Ariel, Dau alset, Germinàbit, Serra d’Or, Promos, Presència, etc. Apart from the journals and maga-zines published in Catalonia, Albert Manent has counted 180 Catalan journalspublished in exile between 1939 and 1976. Two thirds of these journals werepublished in France and Mexico: Quaderns de l’exili, La Nostra Revista and Pont Blau,are examples (cited in B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 243).

21 J. Triadú, Una cultura sense llibertat, Aymà, Barcelona, 1978, p. 15.22 J. Torras i Bages, La tradició catalana, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1981.23 J. Casassas, op. cit., p. 303.24 J. Casañas, El progressisme catòlic a Catalunya (1940–1980), La Llar del Llibre,

Barcelona, 1989, pp. 63–79.25 See J. Massot i Muntaner, ‘Cristianisme i catalanisme’, in J. Termes et al.,

Catalanisme. Història, política i cultura, L’Avenç, Barcelona, 1986.26 J. Faulí, ‘Un segle d’edicions montserratines’, Serra d’Or, no. 478, (1999),

pp. 35–39.27 An example of the differences existing between the more social sectors of the church

and those more inclined to defend nationalist positions is the controversy whichbegan in 1966 with the appointment of Marcelo González Martín as archbishopof Barcelona. This triggered a protest campaign which included, in addition topetitions, the slogan ‘We want Catalan bishops’. For the sector of the clergydefending social Catholicism, it was a question of saying ‘we want bishops for thepeople’, and, as Casañas points out, this illustrates ‘the lack of agreement and, at times, the tension, between nationalist Christianity and social Christianity, atthe time both being described as “progressive” in view of the political situation’ (J. Casañas, op. cit., p. 287).

28 H. Johnston, Tales of nationalism. Catalonia (1939–1979), Rutgers University Press,Newark, NJ, 1991, p. 61.

29 X. Muñoz, op. cit., p. 78.30 R. Galí, ‘Problemes de la nostra generació, problemes del nostre temps’, pamphlet,

20 October 1955.31 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, which appeared for the first time in a pamphlet

in 1958; it is now published in J. Pujol, Construir Catalunya, Pòrtic, Barcelona,1980, p. 223.

32 X. Muñoz, op. cit., p. 72.33 J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Els estudiants de Barcelona sota el franquisme, Curial Edicions

Catalanes, Barcelona, 1978, vol. I, p. 57.34 Ibid.35 Ibid. p. 58.36 J. Fabré, J.M. Huertas and A. Ribas, op. cit., p. 251.37 S. Giner, The social structure of Catalonia, The Anglo-Catalan Society, Sheffield, 1980,

p. 59.38 J. Triadú, op. cit., pp. 156–157.39 This section takes its name from the most recent and faithful version of the activ-

ities of the Assembly of Catalonia: A. Batista and J. Playà Maset, La gran conspiració.Crònica de l’Assemblea de Catalunya, Empúries, Barcelona, 1991.

40 For a detailed version, see A. Batista and J. Playà Maset, op. cit. and also J.M.Colomer i Calsina, op. cit. For an assessment of the Assembly of Catalonia on the

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Notes 177

twentieth anniversary of its creation, see Debat Nacionalista, no. 16–17, (December1991–February 1992), Barcelona.

41 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 407.42 Ibid. p. 387.43 J. Benet, Introduction, in A. Batista and J. Playà Maset, op. cit., p. 16.44 A. Balcells, Catalan nationalism, op. cit., p. 181.45 Communiqué of the ‘I Reunió de l’Assemblea de Catalunya’, 7 November 1972.

Included as an appendix in A. Batista and J. Playà Maset, op. cit., pp. 301–302.46 J. Termes, La immigració a Catalunya. Política i cultura, Empúries, Barcelona, 1984.47 In 1975, 79.02 per cent of the Catalan population lived in towns with more than

10,000 inhabitants. B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 183.48 Ibid., p. 337.49 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 20.50 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 340.51 R. Ribó, ‘L’empremta dels mots. El PSUC i la qüestió nacional’. L’Avenç, no. 95

(July–August 1986), p. 29.52 K.A. Woolard, Double talk. Bilingualism and the politics of ethnicity in Catalonia,

Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1989.53 H. Johnston, op. cit. p. 117.

4 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

1 J. Solé Tura, Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España. Autonomías, federalismo, autode-terminación, Alianza, Madrid, 1985, p. 80.

2 J.F. Tezanos, ‘Modernización y cambio social en España’, in J.F. Tezanos, et al.(eds), La transición democrática española, Sistema, Madrid, 1989, p. 106.

3 J.L. Cebrián, ‘La experiencia del período constituyente’, in J.L. Cagigao et al., España(1975–1980). Conflictos y logros de la democracia, José Porrúa Turanzas, Madrid, 1982,pp. 13–24.

4 J. Solé Tura, Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España, op. cit., p. 80.5 Cited in J. Tusell, España, una angustia nacional, Espasa Fórum, Madrid, 1999,

p. 67.6 Ibid.7 J.L. Abellán, ‘La función del pensamiento en la transición política’, in J.L. Cagigao

et al., op. cit., p. 33.8 J. Solé Tura, Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España, op. cit. p. 84.9 E. Fossas and J.L. Pérez Francesch, Lliçons de dret constitucional, Proa, Barcelona,

1994 (Biblioteca Universitària, 24), p. 194.10 Ibid., p. 195.11 J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i catalanisme. La idea de nació en el pensament

polític català (1939–1979), L’Avenç, Barcelona, 1984, p. 351.12 J. Solé Tura, Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España, op. cit., p. 101.13 E. Fossas, ‘Asimetria y plurinacionalidad en el Estado autonómico’ in E. Fossas

and F. Requejo, Asimetria federal y estado plurinacional, Trotta, Madrid, 1999, pp. 282–283.

14 I. Molas, ‘Introduction’, in M. Gerpe Landín et al., Comentaris jurídics a l’Estatutd’Autonomia de Catalunya, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1986, p. 16.

15 J. Reventós, ‘Comunidades Autónomas’, in Perspectivas de una España democrática yconstitucionalizada (lecture series given in the Club Siglo XXI, 1978–1979), UniónEditorial, Madrid, vol. III, p. 53.

16 J.R. Parada, ‘España: ¿una o trina?’ Revista de Administración Pública, no. 141, 1996.Cited in E. Fossas, op. cit., p. 294.

17 R.L. Blanco Valdés, ‘Nacionalidades históricas y regiones sin historia’. Parlamentoy Constitución, no. 1. Cited in E. Fossas, op. cit., p. 295.

178 Notes

18 See E. Fossas, op. cit., p. 288.19 Ibid., p. 280.20 Ibid., p. 286.21 Ibid., p. 292.22 The Statute of Autonomy was approved in Catalonia by popular referendum on 25

October 1979 and ratified by the lower house of Parliament on 29 November andby the Senate on 12 December 1979. King Juan Carlos I sanctioned the Statuteas an organic law of the state in the Palau Reial on 18 December 1979. The textwas published in Catalan in the Diari Oficial de la Generalitat, no. 28, on 31December 1979.

23 L’Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1986, p. 7. (The italics are mine).

24 Ibid., p. 3. (The italics are mine.)25 Ibid., p. 7.26 Ibid. (The italics are mine.)27 Ibid., p. 7.28 See F. Requejo, ‘Democràcia, partits i escenaris de futur’. Idées, no. 6 (April–June,

2000), pp. 108–114.29 Vinyet Panyella identifies Josep Carbonell i Gener as one of the first ideologists to

define the Països Catalans concept. See V. Panyella, Josep Carbonell i Gener (Sitges:1897–1979). Entre les avantguardes i l’humanisme, Edicions 62, (Biografies imemòries, 43), Barcelona, 2000, pp. 216–217.

30 ‘The statutes may foresee the cases, requirements and terms according to which theautonomous communities may come to agreements among themselves in order toaccomplish and provide services particular to them; and they may also foresee thecharacter and the consequences of the corresponding notification to the CortesGenerales. In other cases, cooperation agreements between autonomous commun-ities shall require the sanctioning of the Cortes Generales’, Constitución Española1978, Article 145.2.

31 The italics are mine.32 See M. Guibernau, Nationalisms, op. cit., p. 47.33 The PSC (PSC-PSOE) was second with thirty-three seats and the PSUC third with

twenty-five.34 M. Caminal, ‘El pujolisme i la ideologia nacionalista de CDC’, in J.B. Culla (ed.),

El pal de paller. Convergència democràtica de Catalunya (1974–2000), Pòrtic, Barcelona,2001, p. 142.

35 J. Lorés, La transició a Catalunya (1977–1984). El pujolisme i els altres, Empúries,Barcelona, 1985, p. 186.

36 This study does not include an analysis of the ideology of the Partido Popular, as I concentrate on the parties of Catalan origin even if, as with the PSC which wasfounded in Catalonia, they are federated or associated with Spanish formations.

5 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC

1 Declaració ideològica, ERC, Barcelona, 1993, p. 1.2 E. Monné and Ll. Selga, Història de la Crida a la Solidaritat, La Campana, Barcelona,

1991, p. 18.3 J. Argelaguet et al., República catalana, Llibres de l’Índex, Barcelona, 1992, p. 28.4 Ibid., p. 29.5 Ibid., p. 32.6 Ibid., p. 38.7 Ibid., p. 41.8 Ibid., p. 44.

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Notes 179

9 Ibid., p. 46.10 Ibid.11 ERC, 23rd National Congress, ‘Political paper’, Tarragona, 17–18 March 2001,

p. 12.12 ERC, Framework programme, elections to the lower and upper houses of the Spanish state,

March 2000, p. 64.13 Declaració ideològica, ERC, Barcelona, 1993, p. 13.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 Ibid., p. 14.17 Blueprint for the National Statute of Catalonia, Mediterrània, Barcelona, 2001, p. 29.18 J. Argelaguet et al., op. cit., p. 69.19 Ibid., p. 76.20 Ibid., p. 69.21 Ibid., p. 77.22 J. Ll. Carod-Rovira, Tornar amb la gent. L’esquerra nacional cap al segle XXI,

La Humanitat/Columna, Barcelona, 1997, p. 60.23 Ibid., p. 82.24 Ibid.25 J. Ll. Carod-Rovira, Jubilar la transició, La Humanitat/Columna, Barcelona, 1998,

p. 84.26 ERC, Framework programme, elections to the lower and upper houses of the Spanish state,

March 2000, p. 46.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 J. Argelaguet et al., op. cit., p. 46.30 Ibid., p. 48.31 Ibid., p. 54.32 Ibid.33 Ibid., pp. 54–56.34 Ibid., p. 78.35 J.Ll. Carod-Rovira, Jubilar la transició, op. cit., p. 108.36 Ibid., p. 109.37 J.Ll. Carod-Rovira, Tornar amb la gent, op. cit., p. 106.38 ERC, Framework programme, elections to the lower and upper houses of the Spanish state,

March 2000, p. 7.39 ERC, 23rd National Congress, ‘Political paper’, Tarragona, 17–18 March 2001,

p. 20.40 Ibid., p. 21.41 Ibid., p. 22.42 Ibid.43 H. Barrera, ‘Les etapes cap a la plena sobirania’, in H. Barrera et al., El nacional-

isme català a la fi del segle XX, Fundació Universitat de Vic/Eumo, Vic, 1987, p. 113.

44 Ibid., p. 115.45 E. Vila, Què pensa Heribert Barrera, Proa/Dèria, Barcelona, 2001, p. 54.46 H. Barrera, op. cit., p. 117.47 J. Argelaguet et al., op. cit., p. 10.48 Ibid., pp. 24–25.49 J. Ll. Carod-Rovira, Tornar amb la gent, op. cit., pp. 30–32.50 ERC, 23rd National Congress, ‘Political paper’, Tarragona, 17–18 March 2001,

p. 11.51 J. Ll. Carod-Rovira, Tornar amb la gent, op. cit., p. 74.

180 Notes

52 ERC, Framework programme, elections to the lower and upper houses of the Spanish state,March 2000, p. 76.

53 PSUC, Per un catalanisme popular, Central Committee PSUC, 12 September 1982,p. 5.

54 PSUC, Statutes of the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, approved in the IXCongress, Barcelona, 10 May 1997, p. 6.

55 PSUC, Statutes, op. cit., p. 6.56 ICV, Principles and ideology, http://www.ic-v.org57 El Correo Catalán (Barcelona, 8 March 1984).58 Nous Horitzons (Barcelona, March–April, 1984).59 PSUC V Congress, Central Committee, Draft theory, 1980, p. 27.60 PSUC, Draft programme 1976, pp. 19–20.61 R. Ribó, Sobre el fet nacional. Catalunya, Països Catalans, Estat espanyol, L’Avenç,

Barcelona, 1977, pp. 125–130.62 Ibid., p. 132.63 PSUC V Congress, op. cit., p. 28.64 ICV, Principles and ideology, 5th National Assembly, Barcelona, November 1998,

point 2.3.65 Ibid.66 PSUC, Per un catalanisme popular, op. cit., pp. 4–14.67 PSUC VIII Congress (16–18 December 1988), chapter III, p. 71.68 Ibid.69 Cited in M. Caminal, Nacionalisme i partits nacionals a Catalunya, Empúries,

Barcelona, 1998, p. 188.70 Ibid., p. 190.71 Nous Horitzons, no. 142 (October 1996).72 ICV, Principles and ideology, 5th National Assembly, op. cit., point 2.3.73 Ibid.74 Ibid.75 PSUC, III National conference. Faced with the national reconstruction of Catalonia,

7–9 December 1979, p. 66.76 R. Ribó, Sobre el fet nacional, op. cit., p. 81.77 R. Ribó, Catalunya, nació d’esquerra, La Magrana/Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1988,

p. 70.78 Marx and Engels, ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’, in Basic writings on politics

and philosophy, Feuer, L.S. (ed.), Collins/The Fontana Library, Glasgow, 1976[1959], p. 65.

79 Cited by J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i catalanisme, op. cit., p. 319.80 PSUC III National conference, op. cit., p. 53.81 PSUC V Congress, op. cit., p. 21.82 PSUC III National conference, op. cit., pp. 55–65.83 Ibid., p. 53.84 PSUC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 72.85 PSUC V Congress, op. cit., p. 27.86 Ibid., p. 21.87 Treball, Barcelona, 18 July 1979.88 ICV, General election programme 12 March 2000, p. 72.89 Ibid., p. 73.90 Ibid., p. 72.91 R. Ribó, Sobre el fet nacional, op. cit., p. 19.92 Ibid., p. 27.93 Ibid., p. 30.94 IC, Draft manifesto programme, Second National Assembly, 30 November–

1 December 1990, p. 104.

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Notes 181

95 Treball (Barcelona, 19 September 1979).96 PSUC III National conference, op. cit., p. 19.97 Ibid., p. 51.98 PSUC V Congress, op. cit., p. 27.99 PSUC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 47.

100 IC, Draft manifesto programme, op. cit., p. 43.101 Ibid., p. 103.102 Ibid., p. 104.103 ICV, Principles and ideology, 5th National Assembly, op. cit., point 2.4. See also

ICV, General election programme 12 March 2000, pp. 58–66.104 ICV, Principles and ideology, 5th National Assembly, op. cit., point 2.4.105 ICV, General election programme 12 March 2000, p. 58.106 ICV, Principles and ideology, 5th National Assembly, op. cit., point 2.5.107 PSC-PSOE, Per Catalunya. Ara un nou federalisme, 1999, p. 3.108 PSC (PSC-PSOE) IV Congress, 23–25 November 1984, point 15, p. 14.109 PSC (PSC-PSOE) VII Congress, 4–6 February 1994, ‘Framework paper’, point 1.4,

p. 4.110 Ibid., p. 5.111 PSC (PSC-PSOE) IX Congress, 16–18 June 2000, point 5, p. 53.112 Ibid.113 PSC (PSC-PSOE) VI Congress, 12–14 October 1990, point 4. See also PSC (PSC-

PSOE) II Congress, 4–6 July 1980, points 8.5.1 and 8.5.2.114 PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya, op. cit., p. 11.115 See I. Molas (ed.), Diccionari de partits polítics de Catalunya (segle XX), Enciclopèdia

Catalana, Barcelona, 2000, p. 291.116 See Mossèn J. Dalmau, La crisi del PSOE vista des del conflicte Pallach-Reventós, Pòrtic,

Barcelona, 1979.117 See I. Molas (ed.), Diccionari de partits polítics de Catalunya (segle XX), op. cit.,

p. 236.118 J. Reventós, ‘Participació al col.loqui’, in R. Aracil and A. Segura (eds), Memòria

de la transició a Espanya i a Catalunya, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, 2000,p. 314.

119 Cited by J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i catalanisme, op. cit., p. 316.120 Avui (Barcelona, 22 April 1984).121 L’Opinió Socialista (Barcelona, 3 August 1979).122 Cited by J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i catalanisme, op. cit., p. 215.123 PSC (PSC-PSOE) i CpC, Manifesto, 1999, p. 12.124 PSC-PSOE, Per Catalunya. op. cit., p. 11.125 Ibid., p. 17.126 Ibid., p. 22.127 CpC, Programme bases, http://www.pelcanvi.com128 PSC (PSC-PSOE) i CpC, Manifesto 1999 p. 48.129 Ibid.130 Ibid.131 PSC (PSC-PSOE) VII Congress, op. cit., p. 7, point 1.3.132 I. Molas, ‘Apunts sobre catalanisme’, in Ll. Armet et al., Federalisme i Estat de les

autonomies, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1988, p. 15. See also Avui (Barcelona, 26 April1984).

133 PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya, op. cit., 1999, p. 3.134 J. Solé Tura, ‘Una lectura autonomista i federal del model d’estat constitucional’,

in Ll. Armet et al., op. cit., p. 154.135 Ibid., p. 178.136 Ibid.

182 Notes

137 J. Solé Tura, ‘Una lectura autonomista i federal del model d’Estat constitucional’,op. cit., p. 151. See also I. Molas, ‘Actualitat del federalisme’. Debat, no. 16,(September 1992, pp. 17–36).

138 J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i Catalanisme, op. cit., pp. 340–341.139 Ibid., p. 341.140 A. Castells, ‘Catalunya i l’Estat espanyol en la perspectiva de l’Estat autonòmic’,

in Ll. Armet et al., op. cit., p. 201.141 P. Maragall, ‘Referent Barcelona’ (1986). Cited in L. Maurí and L. Uría, La gota

malaya. Pasqual Maragall, la obstinación y el poder, Bestselia (Booket), Barcelona,1999, p. 447.

142 PSC (PSC-PSOE) VII Congress, op. cit., point 2.143 Ibid.144 P. Maragall, ‘El moment polític a Catalunya’, talk given at ESADE (28 May 2001),

p. 11.145 Ibid.146 L’Opinió Socialista (Barcelona, 31 December 1979).147 I. Molas, ‘Apunts sobre catalanisme’, op. cit., p. 16.148 El Periódico (Barcelona, 27 April 1984).149 PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya, op. cit., 1999, p. 16.150 PSC (PSC-PSOE) i CpC, Manifesto, 1999, p. 47.151 Ibid., 1999, p. 48.152 P. Maragall, ‘Immigració. Oportunitat i repte per a Catalunya’, talk given at the

Auditorium of the Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona (4 April 2001).153 PSC (PSC-PSOE) i CpC, Manifesto, 1999, p. 15.154 PSC (PSC-PSOE) V Congress, 11–13 December 1987.155 PSC (PSC-PSOE) V Congress, 11–13 March 1987, point 1, p. 41.156 Ibid.157 PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya. op. cit., 1999, pp. 34–35.158 La Rosa (Barcelona, November 1991).159 La Vanguardia (14 September 1987).160 El País (Madrid, 30 August 1987).161 El País (Madrid, 6 April 1992).162 J. Solé Tura, Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España, op. cit., p. 15.163 P. Maragall in the paper ‘El nuevo federalismo en España y Europa. La propuesta

catalana para España’, presented on 8 February 2001 at the Club Siglo XXI in Madrid, stressed: ‘ “Asymmetry” is a concept that political scientists can useaccurately, but that as politicians we should only use with great caution.’

164 M. Caminal, Nacionalisme i partits nacionals a Catalunya, op. cit., p. 184.165 L’Opinió Socialista (Barcelona, 3 August 1979).166 Mundo Diario (Madrid, 20 September 1979).167 El País (Madrid, 16 October 1979).168 R. Obiols, ‘El federalisme, una proposta cap el futur’, in Ll. Armet et al., op. cit.,

p. 209.169 Avui (Barcelona, 14 December 1989).170 E. Lluch, ‘La reivindicació nacional’, in Joan Colomines et al., Per una resposta social-

ista, 7×7 Edicions, Barcelona, 1977, pp. 289–313.171 PSC (PSC-PSOE) i CpC, Manifesto, 1999, p. 13.172 P. Maragall, ‘El nuevo federalismo en España y Europa’, op. cit., p. 13.173 P. Maragall, ‘El moment polític a Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 6.174 PSC (PSC-PSOE) IX Congress, op. cit., section 5.1.175 PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya, op. cit., p. 36.176 P. Maragall, ‘El moment polític a Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 10.177 PSC (PSC-PSOE) VII Congress, op. cit., point 3, p. 14.

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Notes 183

178 Ibid., point 6.7, p. 40.179 PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya, op. cit., 1999, p. 36.180 ICV, ERC, PSC-CpC, Comissió d’estudi per a l’aprofundiment de l’autogovern. Proposta

d’Informe, Barcelona, 27 November 2001, point 4.181 See Avui, 14 May 2003.

6 Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC

1 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 1,175.2 Ibid., paper 2, points 370–375.3 Ibid., paper 3, point 1,325.4 M. Caminal, ‘El pujolisme i la ideologia nacionalista de CDC’, op. cit., pp.

127–128.5 For an excellent analysis of CDC, see J.B. Culla (ed.), op. cit.6 See R. Trias Fargas, Nacionalisme i llibertat, Destino, Barcelona, 1979.7 Cited by C. Llorens, ‘CDC en el període constituent (1977–1979)’, in J.B. Culla

(ed.), El pal de paller . . . , op. cit., p.73. Also see J. Marcet, CDC. El partit i el movi-ment polític, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1984.

8 J.B. Culla, ‘De la primera victòria al vintenni en el poder (1980–2000)’, in J.B.Culla (ed.), El pal de paller . . . , op. cit., p. 75.

9 Cited by J.B. Culla, ‘De la primera victòria al vintenni en el poder (1980–2000)’,op. cit., p. 77.

10 J. Colomines i Ferran, ‘L’evolució electoral de CDC (1977–2000)’, in J.B. Culla(ed.), El pal de paller, op. cit., p. 201.

11 M. Roca i Junyent, Per què no? Una proposta catalana per a la modernització de l’estat,Pòrtic, Barcelona, 1982, p. 35.

12 Ibid., p. 36.13 Ibid.14 J. Pujol, ‘Prologue’, in M. Roca i Junyent, op. cit., p. III.15 Official Journal of the Catalan Parliament, 18 December 1989. Cited by J.B. Culla

(ed.), El pal de paller, op. cit., p. 87.16 J.B. Culla (ed.), El pal de paller, op. cit., pp. 87–88.17 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 690.18 CDC VIII Congress, 1 A party for Catalonia in the 1990s, 27–29 January 1989,

p. 48.19 Ibid., p. 183.20 J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat, vol. XXX, January–December 1996,

Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1997, p. 317.21 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 65.22 M. Caminal, ‘El pujolisme i la ideologia nacionalista de CDC’, op. cit., p. 128.23 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 150.24 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 182.25 J. Pujol, Tot compromís comporta un risc, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1977, p. 39.26 CDC XI Congress, paper 2, point 2,044.27 CDC XI Congress, paper 3, point 70.28 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 265.29 CDC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 256.30 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 690.31 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 450.32 CDC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 53.33 CDC XI Congress, paper 2, point 515.34 Ibid., point 530.35 Ibid., point 532.36 M. Roca i Junyent, op. cit., p. 38. (The italics are mine.)

184 Notes

37 Declaració de Barcelona, (16–17 July 1998), p. 6.38 J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat, vol. XXX, January–December 1999,

Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 2000, p. 91.39 Ibid., pp. 91–92.40 Ibid., p. 95.41 Ibid., p. 104.42 Ibid., p. 103.43 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 745.44 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, points 760–765.45 CDC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 51.46 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 1,175.47 CDC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 75.48 Ibid., pp. 67–68.49 Ibid., p. 82.50 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 1,245.51 H. Raguer, La Unió Democràtica de Catalunya i el seu temps (1931–1939),

Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1976, p. 80.52 Ibid., pp. 84–85.53 J.A. Duran i Lleida, Catalunya i l’Espanya plurinacional, Planeta, Barcelona, 1995,

p. 130.54 Cited in H. Raguer, La Unió Democràtica de Catalunya i el seu temps (1931–1939),

op. cit., p. 257.55 See J.B. Culla, ‘Unió Democràtica de Catalunya’, in I. Molas (ed.), Diccionari dels

partits polítics de Catalunya (segle XX), Enciclopèdia Catalana, Barcelona, 2000, p. 320.

56 See J.B. Culla, ‘Unió Democràtica de Catalunya’, op. cit., pp. 319–324.57 For an analysis of the period 1976–1978, see Ò. Barberà, Unió Democràtica de

Catalunya (1976–1978), Mediterrània, Barcelona, 2000.58 UDC, Estragègia política, http://www.uniodemocratica.org, p. 2.59 Ibid., p. 3.60 J. Rigol, Criteris per a una política cultural, UDC, Barcelona, 1999, p. 38.61 UDC, Unitat de la llengua, història comuna i simbols de catalanitat, http://www.

uniodemocratica.org, p. 1.62 Consult the UDC website, Catalunya com a raó d’ésser i marc d’actuació,

http://www.uniodemocratica.org, p. 1.63 J. Rigol, Política i comunitat. El meu nacionalisme, Mediterrània, Barcelona, 1996,

p. 128.64 UDC, La sobirania de Catalunya i l’Estat plurinacional, National Council of UDC,

Sant Cugat, 31 May 1997, p. 33.65 Consult the UDC website, Catalunya com a raó d’ésser i marc d’actuació, op. cit.,

p. 2.66 Ibid., p. 1.67 Ibid., p. 4.68 Ibid., p. 2.69 Ibid., p. 4.70 UDC, Espanya des del catalanisme d’Unió, http://www.uniodemocratica.org, p. 6.71 Ibid., p. 7.72 Ibid.73 Duran i Lleida himself suggests the need for a ‘refoundation of the state’ capable

of guaranteeing its plurinational nature, in J.A. Duran i Lleida, Catalunya i l’Espanyaplurinacional, op. cit., 1995, p. 41.

74 UDC, Espanya des del catalanisme d’Unió, op. cit., p. 8.75 Ibid., pp. 9–10.

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Notes 185

76 UDC, La sobirania de Catalunya i l’Estat plurinacional, op. cit., p. 36.77 UDC, Espanya des del catalanisme d’Unió, op. cit., p. 11.78 Ibid., p. 12.79 UDC, L’objectiu europeu, http://www.uniodemocratica.org, pp. 1 and 3.80 J.A. Duran i Lleida, Voluntat de servei, Timun Mas, Barcelona, 1991, p. 222.81 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 22.82 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, Generalitat de Catalunya,

Barcelona, 1991, p. 22.83 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 277.84 Ibid., p. 271.85 In his Escrits de presó, Pujol also mentions the impact that reading the novel El Crist

de nou crucificat by Nikos Kazandzakis had on him.86 J. Pujol, Speech of the President to the National Council of CDC, 23 July 2000.

Typewritten text, CDC, p. 6.87 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 282.88 J. Pujol, La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya, Generalitat de Catalunya,

Barcelona, 1991, p. 23.89 J. Pujol, Quatre conferències. Analitzar el passat per renovar el projecte, Edicions 62,

Barcelona, 1990, p. 77.90 See J. Antich, El virrei, Planeta, Barcelona, 1994.91 M. Caminal, ‘El pujolisme i la ideologia nacionalista de CDC’, op. cit., p. 159.92 J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i catalanisme, op. cit., p. 255.93 Ibid.94 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 39.95 Ibid., p. 93.96 J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., p. 31.97 Ibid., p. 15.98 J. Pujol, La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 18.99 Ibid., p. 35.

100 J. Pujol, ‘Què representa la llengua a Catalunya?’, Palau de Congressos de Montjuic,22 March 1995, in J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat de Catalunya,1995, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1996, vol. XXVI, p. 175.

101 According to the CIS report of March 2001, 97.3 per cent of the population ofCatalonia understood Catalan, 78.4 per cent spoke it fluently, 85 per cent couldread it and 46.3 per cent could write it correctly. In 1990, 90.3 per cent of thepopulation of Catalonia understood Catalan, and 64 per cent spoke it. J. Colomines,La llengua nacional de Catalunya, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1992, p. 170.

102 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 34.103 Ibid., p. 36.104 Ibid., p. 32.105 Ibid.106 Ibid.107 Ibid., pp. 40–41.108 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 39.109 Ibid., p. 28.110 J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., p. 12.111 J. Pujol, La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 12.112 J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., p. 26.113 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 121.114 J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., pp. 36 and 80.115 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 74.116 J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., p. 37.117 Ibid., p. 18.

186 Notes

118 According to Fontana, in the mid-nineteenth century, 40 per cent of the indus-trialization of Spain was concentrated in Catalonia. J. Fontana, ‘La fi de l’anticrègim i la industrialització (1787–1868)’, in P. Vilar (ed.), Història de Catalunya,8 vols, Edicions 62, Barcelona, vol. V, p. 386.

119 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 42.120 J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat 1999, op. cit., p. 266.121 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 82.122 Ibid., p. 32.123 Ibid., p. 38.124 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 43.125 Ibid., p. 51.126 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 38.127 Ibid., p. 67.128 Ibid., pp. 74–75.129 Ibid., pp. 39–40.130 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 113.131 Ibid., p. 115.132 Ibid., p. 137.133 Ibid., p. 138.134 J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., p. 46.135 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 41.136 J. Pujol, ‘Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya. Què ha estat, què és, què volem

que sigui’ (Teatre Tívoli, Barcelona, 17 June 1996), Secretaria d’organització, CDC,p. 20.

137 J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat 1999, op. cit., pp. 352–353.138 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 91.139 Ibid., pp. 75–77.140 J. Pujol, La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 11.141 Ibid., p. 28.142 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 73.143 J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat de Catalunya 1999, op. cit., p. 108.144 Ibid., p. 99.145 Ibid., pp. 109–110.146 J. Pujol, Speech of the President to the National Council of CDC, op. cit., p. 1.147 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 93.148 La Vanguardia (Barcelona, 7 January 1990).

Conclusion

1 M. Guibernau, ‘Globalization and the nation-state’, in M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson, Understanding nationalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp.242–268.

2 See M. Guibernau, Nations without states, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 150.3 See M. Guibernau, Nationalisms, op. cit., Ch. 2.4 E. Gellner, Nations and nationalism, op. cit.5 See I. Kant, Practical philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996,

p. 329.

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Notes 187

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Acció Catalana 82Acció Catalana Republicana 134Acció Catòlica 42, 59Aguirre y Lekube, José 42Agustí Colomines 172Alfonso XIII, King 38Almirall, Valentí 32Alzamiento Nacional 44, 58Amics de la Poesia 57AP (Alianza Popular) 122Aramon i Serra, Ramon 565Araujo-Costa, Luis de 43Ardiaca i Martín, Pere 81Armengou, Josep 58Arriba 41Assemblea de Catalunya (Assembly of

Catalonia) 124Assemblea Permanent d’Intel.lectuals 66Associació Catalana de la Dona 86Astray, General José Millán 45

Balmes, Jaume 43, 134Banca Catalana 82, 122Barba, Bartolomé 42Barça (Barcelona Football Club) 31–32Barrera, Heribert 82, 93, 141Basque Country 10, 12, 21, 34, 36, 39,

41–42, 44, 47, 49, 50, 70, 72, 73, 74,75–76, 118, 119, 125, 131, 154, 159,160, 174, 175

Bassols, Agustí 136Benèfica Minerva 57Benet, Josep 32, 66, 103, 141Bergson, Henri 142Berlin, Isaiah 11Berlinguer, Enrico 96Bernanos, Georges 58Blanco Valdés, Roberto L. 74BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego) 125Boix, Joaquim 62

Bonet, Carles 82Borbón, Don Juan de 38Borja, Jordi 81, 100Breuilly, John 12, 15, 18–19, 20, 33Busquet, Jordi 25

Calvo Sotelo, Leopoldo 80Caminal, Miquel 80, 100, 117, 120, 127,

143, 172Camp, Ramon 125Candel i Tortajada, Francesc 67Cantonigròs Awards 57 Canyellas, Antón 135Caputxinada 61–62Caputxins de Sarrià 61Carbonell, Jordi 83Cardó, Dr Carles 58, 134, 173Carlism 37, 134Carod-Rovira, Josep Lluís 83, 89, 93,

94Carolingian empire 146Carrasco i Formiguera, Manuel 134Carrero Blanco, Admiral Luis 65Carrillo, Santiago 96Casals, Pau 31Casanovas, Joan 52Casassas, Jordi 21, 58Castells, Antoni 112Castiñeira, Àngel 27Catholic church 24, 34, 36, 39–42, 46,

57–58, 60, 134–135CC (Crist Catalunya) 56, 59–61, 121,

142CC-UCD (Centristes de Catalunya-Unión del

Centro Democrático) 121–122CDC (Convergència Democràtica de

Catalunya) 13, 79, 84, 107, 120–138,143, 151, 184

Cebrián, José Luís 71Centre d’Estudis Francesc Eiximenis 59

Index111123456789101112311145678920111123456789301111234567894011112345111

Centre de Cultura Contemporània deBarcelona 115

Charles III, King 146Chesterton, Gilbert K. 58, 134Ciervo, El 59Cigarràn, Carlos 108Cirera i Soler, Josep 134CiU (Convergència i Unió ) 2, 79–84, 100,

116, 121–126, 128, 131, 136, 151Civil War 24, 33, 38, 40, 45–47, 50, 52,

71–72, 85, 95, 135Claudín, Fernando 68Club Siglo XXI 117CNT (Confederació Nacional de Treballadors)

96Coll i Alentorn, Miquel 134, 135Colom, Àngel 82, 86–89, 91, 93–94Colomines, Agustí 172Colomines, Joaquim 122Comissió Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques de

Catalunya 65Comissió dels Nou 85Comitè de Coordinació Universitària 61Comorera, Joan 95, 173Companys, Lluís 53, 85, 111, 127Confraria de la Mare de Déu de Montserrat

59Congregacions Marianes 59Consejo Superior de Política de Integración 90Consell de Forces Polítiques 134Consell Nacional de Catalunya 53Consell Nacional de Democràcia Catalana 53Constitution of 1978 13, 72–78, 94, 104,

117, 154Corominas i Díaz, Lluis M. 126Corts Catalanes 000CpC (Ciutadans pel Canvi) 81, 110–111,

114, 117, 126Creus de Sang 135Crida (Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de

la Llengua, la Cultura i la NacióCatalana) 82, 86

Cruells, Manuel 67Cuatrecases, Llibert 136Cuixà, Monastery of 31, 58Culla, Joan B. 39, 46, 121, 122, 177,

178

Dalí, Salvador 31Delgado Martínez, Joaquín 47Democracia Social Cristiana 135Determini 135, 177Día de la Hispanidad 45Día de la Raza 45

Diàleg 133Diputació de Barcelona 48Donoso Cortés, Juan 43Duran i Canyameres, Félix 134Duran i Lleida, Josep Antoni 124, 126,

136, 141, 185

EDC (Esquerra Democràtica de Catalunya)121

Edicions de la Negra Nit 57Edicions de la Sirena 57Editorial Estela 59ENE (Entesa dels Nacionalistes d’Esquerra)

82EPP (European People’s Party) 141Equip Demòcrata Cristià de l’Estat Espanyol

135ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya)

13, 53–54, 65, 79, 82–84, 85–96,108, 119, 121, 122

ESADE 113, 118, 131, 150Escarré, Aureli Maria 60españolismo 27, 28essentialism 27, 138, 141Esteve, Pere 125–126Estudi 57ETA 47, 66EU (European Union) 3, 6, 94, 104, 105,

119, 133, 156, 157, 159, 162, 163EUiA (Esquerra Unida i Alternativa) 82

Faceries, Josep Lluís 55FAI (Federación Anarquista Ibérica) 96Falange 34, 36–38, 39, 48, 175FC-PSOE (Federació Catalana del PSOE)

111FECEA (Fundació Empresa, Catalunya,

Europa i América) 136Federació Catalana del PSOE 95Ferrater Mora, Josep 24, 25–27, 173Ferrer, Concepció 136FET y de las JONS (Falange Española

Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de OfensivaNacional-Sindicalista) 37

FJCC 57Flaquer, Lluis 25FNC (Front Nacional de Catalunya) 53, 61,

121, 177FNEC (Federació Nacional d’Estudiants de

Catalunya) 61FOC (Front Obrer de Catalunya) 111Força Nova 135Fossas, Enric 73, 75Fraga Iribarne, Manuel 65

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Index 197

Franciscàlia 59Franco, Carmen Polo de 45Franco, Francisco 35–7, 39–41, 43, 62,

66, 175FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y

Patriótico) 47French Revolution 10Front de la Llibertat 111, 177FSC (PSOE) (Federació Socialista de

Catalunya) 107FUC (Front Universitari de Catalunya)

60–61, 135

Galí, Raimon 60, 142Galinsoga affair 62Galinsoga, Luis Martínez de 62, 63García Morente, Manuel 44Gaudí, Antoni 31Gellner, Ernest 158, 172Gil-Robles, José María 135Giner, Salvador 25, 26, 27, 28, 64, 173,

174Gomà i Tomàs, Isidre 58González Casanova, Josep Lluís 111, 112Gottfried von Herder, Johann 16Gottlieb Fichte, Johann 16Gouldner, Alvin 20Granados Gata, Francisco 47Grimau García, Julià 47Grups Nacionals de Resistència 135Guardia Civil 48Guerra dels Segadors 30Gutiérrez i Díaz, Antoni 81

Hedilla, Manuel 37HOAC (Hermandades Obreras de Acción

Católica) 42, 59Hobsbawm, Eric 20Hortalà i Arau, Joan 82Hroch, Miroslav 18

IC (Iniciativa per Catalunya) 82, 95,96–97, 100, 103, 104

ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds) 82,95, 97, 98–100, 102, 103–105

immigration 13, 33, 50, 67, 68, 69, 85,90, 102, 129, 162

Infantil, L’ 59Institut Catòlic d’Estudis Socials de Barcelona

59Institut d’Estudis Catalans 56Irla, Josep 53, 54, 127IU (Izquierda Unida) 82, 119Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana 135

JOC ( Joventut Obrera Catòlica) 59Joventut Catalana Democràtica 135Juan Carlos I, King 70, 179

Kant, Immanuel 164Kedourie, Elie 12, 15–17, 18, 20,

32

Laborda, Juan José 120Legión 45Lliga Espiritual de la Mare de Déu de

Montserrat 59Llovera, Dr Josep Maria 134Lluch, Ernest 80, 109LOAPA 80, 108–109, 121López i Raimundo, Gregorio 81Lorés, Jaume 59Lubac, Henri de 58

Maastricht Treaty 160Macià, Francesc 34, 85–86Maeztu, Ramiro de 43, 45Majó, Joan 109Mancomunitat 30, 127‘Manifesto of the 229’ 82Manyà, Joan Baptista 58maquis 55Maragall, Joan 26, 56, 134Maragall, Pasqual 80, 109, 110, 112,

117, 124, 126, 141, 183Maritain, Jacques 58, 134Martín Toval, Eduard 80, 117Mas, Artur 126Matí, El 134Mayall, James 12Menéndez Pidal, Ramón 71Menéndez y Pelayo, Marcelino 43Millán Astray, General José 45Millet i Maristany, Fèlix 57Miquel, Simeó 135Miramar 57Miró i Ardèvol, Josep 135Miró, Joan 31Molas, Isidre 74, 109, 111, 114Molins, Joaquim 125Moncloa Pacts 81Montes, Eugenio 43Montjuïc 53Montseny 31Montserrat, Monastery of 31, 42, 58–60,

66Moreres, Fossar de les 31Morodo, Raúl 43Mounier, Emmanuel 58, 134, 142

198 Index

Movimiento Nacional 37MSC (Moviment Socialista de Catalunya) 61,

65, 66, 111Muñoz, Xavier 60

Nacionalistes d’Esquerra 81, 82Nairn, Tom 13, 15, 17–18, 20, 33national Catholicism 13, 34, 42, 44, 49NATO 2, 6, 154, 159, 162NEI (Nouvelles Équipes Internationales)

135NEU (Nova Esquerra Universitària) 61Nit de Santa Llúcia festival 57Norte de Castilla, El 46North Catalonia 31, 133Nova Cançó 64, 65

Obiols, Raimon 108, 109, 114, 116, 117,141

OJE (Organización de Juventudes Españolas)59

Olaechea, Marcelino 46Òmnium Cultural 000Opinió, l’ 85Ortega y Gasset, José 71

Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya 121pactism 25, 27País, El 117Països Catalans 31, 60, 78, 82, 85, 87,

88, 91, 92, 98, 103, 126, 137Palau de la Música Catalana 56Pallach, Josep 107, 108, 111, 114PAM (Publicacions de l’Abadia de

Montserrat) 59Parada, J. Ramón 74Partido del Trabajo de España 86Partit Català Proletari 95Partit Nacionalista Català 121Partit Republicà Català 85PCC (Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya)

81, 95, 96–97PCE (Partido Comunista de Espan̄a) 96,

105PCI (Italian Communist Party) 96Peces Barba, Gregorio 116Péguy, Charles 58, 142Pemartín, José 4, 38, 43Pere III el Cerimoniós 000Perpignan 31Philips, A.V. 46PI (Partit per la Independència) 82Pibernat, Joaquim 136Pi i Margall, Francesc 112

Pi i Sunyer, Carles 53, 173Pla i Deniel, Enric 58PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco) 125,

135Poblet, Monastery of 31, 58POUM (Partit Obrer d’Unificació

Marxista) 96, 177PP (Partido Popular) 2, 4, 5, 6, 83, 119,

125, 126, 151Prat de la Riba, Enric 32, 60, 111, 134Prats Català, Joan 80PRD (Partido Reformista Democrático)

123Premi d’Honor de les Lletres Catalanes 57Preston, Paul 35Primo de Rivera, General Miguel 30,

36–37principio dispositivo 73, 76PSC (PSC-PSOE) 83, 84, 105, 107, 108,

109, 112, 113, 116–19PSC (PSC-PSOE)-CpC 110, 114–15, 117,

119, 126PSC (C) (Congrés) 107, 108PSC (R) (Partit Socialista de Catalunya

(Reagrupament)) 107, 108PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español)

106–9, 116, 119, 121, 122, 124PSUC (Partit Socialista Unificat de

Catalunya) 66, 68, 81–5, 95–105,166–71

Puig, Felip 125, 126Puig Antich, Salvador 47Puigcercós, Joan 83Puig i Cadafalch, Josep 56Pujol, Jordi 13, 32, 60, 66, 67, 79–80,

84, 87, 120–126, 127, 128, 129, 130,131, 132, 141–151, 185, 186

Qüestions de vida cristiana 59Quiroga, Borja de 43

Raguer, Hilari 46, 134Rahola, Pilar 82rauxa 26, 27Raventós, Joan 141Real Madrid 32Renan, Ernest 109Reventós, Joan 74, 107, 108–109, 117Reyes Católicos 43Riber i Campins, Llorenç 58Ribó i Massó, Rafael 81Rigol, Joan 136, 137Ripoll 31Riquer, Borja de 39, 46, 47, 48

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Index 199

Roca i Caball, Joan B. 134, 135Roca i Junyent, Miquel 122, 130, 141Rodríguez, Jaume 82Romeva i Ferrer, Pau 134Rovira, Josep 111Rovira i Virgili, Antoni 32Ruiz Giménez, Joaquín 135

Sabater, ‘Quico’ 55Sala, Josep M. 108Sánchez-Albornoz, Claudio 71Sansa, Joan 135Sant Ildefons 63sardana 26, 31SDEUB (Sindicat Democràtic d’Estudiants de

la Universitat de Barcelona) 60, 61Second Republic 13, 30, 34, 72–73, 82,

85Segadors, Els 50Sellarés, Miquel 124seny 25–26senyera 50Serra d’Or 59, 177Serra, Narcís 109Serrahima, Maurici 134SEU (Sindicato de Estudiantes Universitario)

60–61Smith, Anthony D. 12, 15, 19–20, 33,

172Sobrequés, Jaume 25Solé Tura, Jordi 71, 72, 81, 109,

111–122, 116, 141Solidaritat Catalana 53Solidaritat Universitària 61Statute of Autonomy (1932 and 1979)

13, 30, 52–54, 63, 66, 69, 79, 93–94,97, 103, 116, 132, 163, 179

Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 76Suárez, Adolfo 62, 79–80, 121, 135subsidiarity 113, 117, 118, 119, 141,

156, 160

Tàpies, Antoni 31Tarradellas, Josep 2, 53, 54, 85, 127Tarragó i Ballús, Josep Maria 58Taula Rodona 65Terra Lliure 82Testimoniatge 135Thió, Josep Ignasi 136Torras i Bages, Josep 58, 134

Torras i Bages group 59Treitschke, Heinrich von 38Triadú, Joan 57, 62Trias Fargas, Ramón 121, 141Trias Peitx, Josep M. 134Triginer, Josep Maria 108Tusell, Javier 71Tusquets, Joan 58

UCD (Unión del Centro Democrático) 2, 5,80, 108, 121, 135–136

UDC (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya) 13,65, 79, 84, 120–121, 124–126, 133,134–141

Unamuno, Miguel de 45Unió Catalanista 52Unió de l’Esquerra Catalana 81Unió de Treballadors Cristians de Catalunya

58Unió del Centre i la Democràcia Cristiana de

Catalunya 135Unió Europea Demòcrata Cristiana 135UN (United Nations) 54USC (Unió Socialista de Catalunya) 95

Vallés, Josep Maria 110Vanguardia, La 62–63Verde i Aldea, Josep 108Verds, Els 95, 97Vicens i Vives, Jaume 24Vidal i Barraquer, Francesc 58Vigón, Jorge 43Vila, Albert 135Vila, Ramon ‘Caracremada’ 55Vila d’Abadal, Lluís 134Vilar, Pierre 143Vilar i Costa, Joan 58Virtèlia school 59Vizcarra, Emilio 45Volksgeist 86

War of American Independence 10Weber, Max 7, 25Wilson, Woodrow 11Woolard, Katherine 68Worsley, Peter 18

Xicoy, Joaquim 136

Ya 41

200 Index