info@eGenEDC.org

www.eGenEDC.org

eGeneration Economic Development Corporation

eGenera&onEconomicDevelopmentCorpora&onisa501(c)4Non-profitorganiza&onContribu&onstotheeGenera&onEconomicDevelopmentCorpora&onarenotdeduc&bleforfederalincometaxpurposes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Pages 2-4

Executive Summary Pages 5-7

Section 1: Medical Isotope Shortages Pages 8-22

Introduction: Ceding Nuclear Leadership to China, Russia, and India Page 8

Medical Isotope Production: A Catalyst for Change Page 10

The Importance of Molybdenum-99 and Technetium-99m Page 11

Technetium-99m Production Page 12

The Domestic Molybdenum-99 Supply Chain Page 13

Cost Effective HEU vs Costly LEU Page 17

Free Market Molybdenum-99 Page 18

Table of Potential Irradiators in the United States Page 20

The Challenges of HEU-Free Mo-99 Production Page 21

Preferential Treatment of HEU-Free Mo-99 Page 22

Section 2: Another Isotope Crisis: Plutonium-238 Pages 24-27

Section 3: Advanced Technology Manufacturing Crisis Pages 27-29

Section 4: Nuclear Innovation Crisis Pages 30-32

Section 5: Conclusions Pages 34-36

Section 6: Appendix Pages 37-42

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PREFACE

Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactor (LCMSR) technology was first developed, tested, and proven at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) between the 1950’s and the early 1970’s. The technology was proven to be extremely safe and reliable in producing carbon-free energy. After more than a billion dollars and two decades of research, the technology was poised to become commercialized for the civilian nuclear power industry. The shortsightedness of Congress and the economic and political turmoil of the 1970’s combined to shelve the great potential of ORNL’s Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactor program. The technology was classified and became largely forgotten, except to those who studied it and knew details of the program.

However in 1994, under the Clinton administration, America declassified an unprecedented amount of previously classified documents and technologies developed during World War II and the Cold War era. Among these were the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) files. Once declassified, the files began to enter the public domain, especially after internet use spread around the world.

With LCMSR technologies, we could consume present day stockpiles of high-level nuclear waste (spent nuclear fuel assemblies that are still rich with Uranium but can no longer fission in today’s reactors). LCMSR technology can consume 97% of these stockpiles and the 3% remaining waste is only radioactive for 300 years, as opposed to 30,000 years under current standards.. Typically, these spent fuel assemblies would have to be sequestered from humans in a place such as the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository facility in Nevada.

LCMSR technologies, as you will learn in this document, can produce commercial quantities of critically needed medical isotopes for not only the domestic American market, but for the entire Western hemisphere. These medical isotopes are used in thousands of life-saving procedures each day in America and they add greatly to the quality and cost effectiveness of healthcare.

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In addition to medical isotopes, LCMSRs also produce isotopes desperately needed for deep space exploration. The Plutonium-238 isotope used to power deep space probes was a byproduct of producing nuclear weapons. When the Cold War ended, so did so did production of Plutonium-238.

Interestingly, the LCMSR is also speculated by some researchers to be a prime candidate to power manned deep space missions and for powering extra-terrestrial space bases on the Moon and Mars.

Most exciting of all are the long-term consequences of LCMSR commercialization. Several reactor design companies and nuclear industry professionals estimate that LCMSRs will be able to produce energy at half the cost of fossil fuel technologies. Energy provided at this low cost would make it economically advantageous to use well established coal to liquid fuel technologies to produce ultra-clean synthetic diesel fuel, jet fuel, and gasoline. Letting market forces gradually transition fossil fuel production of electricity to transportation fuels can provide America with energy independence and energy security from OPEC nations that harbor or support terrorism.

If Molten Salt Reactors are so great, why are’t we using them now?

There are many people in the United States who would be supportive of commercializing this technology, but unfortunately the regulatory environment currently revolves around the technologies commercialized in the 1970’s. An opportunity to re-prove the technology, allow for regulatory agencies to study and create specifications for development and licensing, and for the production of critical medical isotopes exists if a research reactor facility could be built soon.

The eGeneration Economic Development Corporation proposes the creation of an advanced Molten Salt Research Reactor facility and commercial isotope production facility that would not only help pave the way for true American energy independence and economic security, but would

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spark new domestic industries and create thousands of family sustaining jobs through the research and commercialization stages. Very few technologies can produce a viable business plan through their research and development phases, and even fewer cases are even remotely viable in the nuclear industry. Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactor offer both.

This LCMSR development concept offers an unprecedented and unique opportunity to the region, state, and country that commits to develop and profit from the commercialization of this technology.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

America faces four crises that can be averted without taxpayer funds by just changing U.S. policy:

❖ A medical isotope crisis

❖ A deep space exploration crisis

❖ A manufacturing advanced technology crisis

❖ A nuclear technology innovation crisis

Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) is used to produce Technetium-99m (Tc-99m) which is the most widely used medical isotope in the world (320,000 medical procedures per week in

the United States alone).

With the imminent closure of aging reactors and foreign production facilities that

supply the United States with Mo-99, America faces an inevitable shortage of isotopes for lifesaving diagnostic tests and medical treatments that utilize Tc-99m.

In response to this looming crisis, Congress passed the 2013 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310)) that approved the AMIPA (American Medical

Isotopes Production Act) of 2011. AMIPA provided incentives for the development of a reliable domestic supply of Mo-99. Unfortunately, the 2013 NDAA also closed certain

security loopholes regarding the export and civilian domestic use of HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) from the U.S that foreign producers use to make Mo-99.

The AMIPA directs the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) to carry out a technology neutral program to evaluate and support projects that produce commercial

quantities of Mo-99 for the United States without the use of HEU. Pursuant to the legislation, the DOE shall provide assistance for the development of fuels, targets, and processes for

domestic Molybdenum-99 production that does not utilize HEU.

The focus by the DOE, to the detriment and expense of lifesaving medical isotope production, has been on exiting the HEU derived medical isotope market before suitable, reliable, and free market-ready replacements have been found.

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While there are a number of different technologies that can produce non-HEU derived medical isotopes, there are very few that can produce isotopes more efficiently

and more cost effectively than the LCMSR. If the United States is to have domestic producers of medical isotopes compete in the world marketplace against HEU derived

medical isotope producers, we must domestically produce isotopes at least as efficiently and cost effectively as HEU providers. America will be forced to artificially inflate the

costs of foreign HEU derived isotopes or subsidize uncompetitive technologies that are currently proposed by U.S. medical isotope providers to compete in the world

marketplace.

LCMSR (Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactor) technology can produce non-HEU

derived medical isotopes more cost effectively and efficiently than HEU derived Mo-99 producers. Production of isotopes from these reactors would not require the U.S.

government to continuously subsidize domestic Molybdenum-99 production (which hurts taxpayers) or continuously penalize foreign HEU producers of medical isotopes with a tax

(a tax would hurt Americans consumers by inflating healthcare costs).

Many Americans received their first introduction to Rare Earth Elements (REEs) in

2010, when the previously obscure commodities became the subjects of front-page headlines. Policymakers and industry executives voiced concern over the many high-tech

products reliant on REEs—ranging from U.S. defense systems to green technologies such as wind turbines, solar panels, and electric car batteries. Average citizens want REE

products to make their cell phones vibrate, their headphones sound perfect, and their gasoline a little cheaper. REEs are wonder materials used to create many advanced

technologies. The central problem in 2010 was that China had cornered the supply.

If ever China were looking for natural resources that its political leaders could use

to extract high profits and geopolitical leverage, rare earths were a near-perfect candidate. At the time of the alleged 2010 embargo, Chinese firms accounted for 97

percent of rare-earth oxide production and a large fraction of the processing business that turns REE into rare earth metals, alloys, and products like magnets. This near-monopoly is

in a market with surging demand and intense political resonance in consuming countries. And the most dependent countries—primarily Japan and the United States, but also

several European states—happened to be those over which China most wanted influence. Panicked policymakers in the United States and elsewhere began to consider

extraordinary measures to protect their countries from potential Chinese leverage.

REEs are referred to as “rare” because although relatively abundant in total

quantity, they appear in low concentrations in the earth’s crust and extraction and processing is both difficult and costly.

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There is little to no rare earth mine production in the United States. U.S.-based Molycorp operates a separation plant at Mountain Pass, CA, and sells the rare earth

concentrates and refined products from previously mined above-ground stocks. Neodymium, praseodymium, and lanthanum oxides are produced for further processing

but these materials are not turned into rare earth metal in the United States.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, the United States was the leader in global REE

production. Since the 1980’s, when America’s policy on the element thorium changed, production has shifted almost entirely to China,due to lower environmental standards.

The International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) placed monazite in the category of radioactive source material in 1984 and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

followed suit in 1985. This classification meant that Thorium (commonly found with REEs) would be heavily regulated with very costly regulations. This made REE’s un-economical

to produce in the U.S. compared to China, that chose to ignore the radioactive classification of Thorium and the expenses associated with it.

There is a close relationship between thorium and rare earths; they often come together. In fact, monazite, was originally mined to produce thorium rather than REEs. In

the 19th century, thorium was used to make gas mantles. Later, with the development of technology that required rare earths to function, monazite started to be mined for

elements other than thorium.

The development of the LCMSR for commercial medical isotope production would

not only solve the medical isotope crisis, but would eliminate America’s problems sourcing Plutonium-238 (desperately needed for deep space missions), could consume

nuclear waste and thereby eliminate the need to store high level nuclear waste for thousands of years, and could eliminate the mining industry’s problem of what to do with

thorium tailings in producing rare earth elements used in advanced technologies.

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INTRODUCTION: SURRENDERING NUCLEAR LEADERSHIP TO CHINA, RUSSIA, AND INDIA

Even though LCMSR technology was developed in the Untied States, it remained classified information until 1994. Since then, several foreign countries (e.g. China, India, Russia)

have raced to commercialize new generation nuclear technologies, while the American regulatory environment has not moved beyond the early rules for nuclear development.

Many claim that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) cost recovery structure and the Department Of Energy’s (DOE) lack of focus and budget for developing new nuclear

technologies has hindered the opportunity to allow America to be the benefactors of this game-changing technology.

The regulatory environment alone has not been the sole impediment to progress in developing new nuclear

technologies. How we fund our regulatory environment is a major problem as well.

Unfortunately, for the development of new nuclear technologies, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 mandated the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) become

a 90% cost recovery entity. Expensive regulation development costs imposed by the NRC are now borne by the first private industry mover seeking to develop new reactor

technologies. Typically, as in other countries the costs would be borne by the taxpayer who would benefit from the licensed technology, and the costs could be recouped by

spreading the costs through licensing fees or taxation of the technology.

Since the first movers in developing new nuclear technologies bear the full

expense in developing new safety regulations, and the cost to develop regulations is cheaper in other countries because it is spread across the entire industry or taxpayer,

there have been no first-movers (innovators) in the nuclear industry within the United States. As a consequence, America has fallen behind other nations in developing new

nuclear technologies and in creating a steady medical isotope supply to meet a growing demand.

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Key Points:

❖ There is a worldwide medical isotope production/supply crisis looming in the

very near future, and the development of LCMSR technology could solve this crisis while providing massive economic activity surrounding a commercial

medical isotope production facility. Currently, the NNSA (National Nuclear Security Administration) efforts to establish a domestic medical isotope

industry with current technologies will require permanent subsidization of domestic production or a tax on foreign HEU derived Mo-99 producers to

compete globally.

❖ Molten Salt Reactor technologies have the potential to revolutionize electricity

production and enhance the environment by working with the fossil fuel industry, recycling industry, and renewable energy industries to make their

technologies cleaner, less carbon emitting, and more cost effective.

❖ America has ceded its preeminence in nuclear technologies to foreign

countries like China, Russia, and India due to the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990.

❖ Reforms are needed domestically for funding the creation of NRC regulations for new reactor licensing if America is to regain it leadership in new nuclear

technology.

❖ America is almost wholly dependent upon China for rare earth elements

necessary to the defense of our nation. Rare earth elements are not mined in America because the process produces Thorium which is an expensive waste

product. Thorium can be used as a nuclear fuel in LCMSRs and thereby convert this mining waste stream into a salable product in the marketplace.

❖ Some designs can also consume sold waste as a fuel, greatly expanding our ability to recycle and sustain our environment.

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MEDICAL ISOTOPE PRODUCTION: A CATALYST FOR CHANGE

Every year more than 30 million procedures using the medical isotope 1

Technetium-99m (Tc-99m) are carried out worldwide, over half of these are conducted in the United States. Tc-99m is injected into the human body to assess the presence and 2

progress of ailments such as heart disease and cancer. At the hospital, Tc-99m is derived from special generators that incorporate its parent, Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99). Due to

Mo-99 having a relatively short half-life of 66 hours, these generators cannot be 3

stockpiled and must be replaced on a weekly basis.

The United States does not produce commercial quantities of Mo-99. Most of 4

the Mo-99 supplied to the domestic market is produced abroad using highly-enriched 5

uranium (HEU) in a handful of research and test reactors. “These foreign reactors (or 6

irradiators) irradiate dozens of kilograms of HEU targets acquired from either the United

States or Russia.” The facilities that process the targets after irradiation in order to extract Mo-99 (or processors) also house waste containing HEU materials.

U.S. policy is aimed at minimizing the use of HEU in the civilian sphere because of perceived terrorism concerns. The U.S. government’s NNSA (National Nuclear Safety

Administration) has worked to convert international research reactors from HEU to low 7

enriched uranium (LEU), shut down foreign and domestic HEU-powered facilities, and

has worked to secure HEU during transport, processing, and storage.

Between 2005 and 2010, lengthy irradiator outages and several other incidents

caused severe shortages of Mo-99 for medical procedures worldwide, demonstrating the fragility of the radioisotope's supply chain. Moreover, a Canadian and a European reactor

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Non-Power-Nuclear-Applications/Radioisotopes/Radioisotopes-in-Medicine/1

www.world-nuclear.org/info/Non-Power-Nuclear-Applications/Radioisotopes/Radioisotopes-in-Medicine/2

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZqBYICtonI3

www.nti.org/country-profiles/united-states/4

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enriched_uranium#Highly_enriched_uranium_.28HEU.295

www.world-nuclear.org/info/Non-Power-Nuclear-Applications/Radioisotopes/Research-Reactors/6

www.nti.org/glossary/low-enriched-uranium-leu/7

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that produce the bulk of the medical isotopes used in America are scheduled for shut down within the next decade. The European reactor is scheduled for replacement. The

Canadian reactor was scheduled to be shutdown and begin decommissioning this year (2015), but its life has been extended to 2018 because of a lack of medical isotope supply

in America. Meanwhile, the global demand for Mo-99 for medical procedures is projected to steadily rise.

THE IMPORTANCE OF MO-99 AND TC-99M

Discovered by two scientists at Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory in 1938, the

use of Technetium-99 medical isotope (Tc-99m) is projected to rise steadily through 8

2030.

The use of Tc-99m became widespread in the 1960s, and initially, research and 9

test reactors at U.S. national laboratories and universities provided enough Mo-99 to

satisfy domestic demand. The Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor of the Department of Energy (DOE), produced Mo-99 at Brookhaven and Oak Ridge National

Laboratories. The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) produced Mo-99 10 11

on a smaller scale starting in 1967. When demand outstripped supply, private industry

stepped in to both produce and distribute Mo-99.

Private industry was the first to use HEU for Mo-99 production; earlier producers

had relied on neutron absorption in molybdenum targets. In 1980, Cintichem, Inc. 12 13 14

began to produce the medical isotope through neutron-induced fission reactions with HEU targets. This process allowed for more efficient recovery of Mo-99 than the

http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/trs466_web.pdf8

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Non-Power-Nuclear-Applications/Radioisotopes/Radioisotopes-in-Medicine/9

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-US-Canadian-partnership-for-isotopes-2302154.html10

http://science.energy.gov/~/media/np/pdf/research/idpra/University%20of%20Missouri%20and%20MU11

%20Research%20Reactor%20Center.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutron_capture12

www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR33/pdfs/S12-P9_Salikhbaev.pdf13

https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Technical-Areas/RRS/documents/mo99/14

WORKINGMATERIALSmo99CM.pdf

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previous techniques. However, the Cintichem, Inc. reactor in Tuxedo, New York was forced to shut down in 1989 due to tritium contamination concerns, ending all U.S. Mo-99

production.

In the 1990s, private industry in the United States "was not willing to assume the

financial costs in developing regulations associated with building and operating a new type reactor facility for producing Mo-99.” This was due to the Omnibus Reconciliation Act

of 1990 which made the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a 90% cost recovery entity and burdened reactor builders with the full cost of new nuclear reactor regulation

development. Cintichem, Inc. instead arranged for a Canadian company, Nordion, to supply Tc-99m generators to the U.S. market. The Mo-99 used for the Tc-99m generators

was produced at the Chalk River facility's NRU reactor that utilized HEU for both fuel (through 1993, when it converted to LEU fuel) and targets.

In response to security of supply concerns for the Tc-99m isotope for the American market, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) purchased the Cintichem, Inc., technology.

The DOE then initiated studies of several potential Mo-99 irradiators, including reactors at Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. In 1999, despite taxpayer dollars being

used to convert a facility at Sandia to produce Mo-99, the domestic production of Mo-99 produced in a fission reactor was never initiated. The DOE also briefly funded a joint U.S.-

Russian study on Mo-99 production that envisioned that U.S.-based company Technology Commercialization International (TCI) Medical would cooperate with Russia's Kurchatov

Institute on developing an alternative production method using an aqueous homogenous reactor (AHR) fueled with Uranyl Nitrate for Mo-99 production. Despite all of these efforts,

by the end of the 1990s the United States firmly relied on foreign producers, all using HEU, to supply its domestic Mo-99 needs.

TECHNETIUM 99 PRODUCTION The weekly delivery of Tc-99m/Mo-99 generators to hospitals hinges on the

continuous operation of irradiators and processors, and a complex supply chain that relies on express shipments of radioactive cargo across borders. The shipments to, and within, 15

the United States are carried out by passenger and cargo aircraft (and less frequently by trucks). All aspects of these deliveries, from packaging to the carrier's transport routes,

are guided by national and international regulations.

http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/source-management/rfid01267-phase-ii-final-report.pdf15

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The Mo-99 production process begins with the advance supply of HEU fuel and targets to the irradiators (and target manufacturers) abroad. The United States and, less

frequently, Russia, have been the major suppliers of this HEU. Annually, approximately 45 16

kilograms of HEU are expended in Mo-99 production.

� Mo-99 production process

Source: TRIUMF, inspired by graphics from Nordion

A research or test reactor irradiates the targets for approximately seven days. The

neutrons in the reactor bombard the targets, causing the split of U-235 atoms. The irradiated targets are then cooled and rushed to a processing facility. In hot cells at this

facility, the targets are dissolved and the Mo-99 is recovered, then purified and made into a bulk Mo-99 solution. This processing takes up to a day to complete.

Because of the targets’ relatively short irradiation time, more than 90% of the HEU remains in the target waste after the completion of Mo-99 production. This waste is not

considered to be "self-protecting" after a certain cooling period, which means that a would-be thief could handle it without risking immediate incapacitation. Target waste

could also be converted into HEU metal to produce a gun-type nuclear explosive device. Because of this "proliferation-sensitivity," the International Atomic Energy Agency 17

(IAEA) outlines secure storage procedures for this waste. All the more reason for

www.nti.org/analysis/articles/civilian-heu-united-states/16

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1183_prn.pdf17

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America to bring the manufacture of Mo-99 in house and produce this isotope domestically. Why risk sending HEU overseas where we have no control of it?

After processing, the bulk Mo-99 is sent to companies that manufacture the Tc-99m/Mo-99 generators. The generators are shielded containers containing Mo-99 solution

adsorbed into an alumina column. These generators are then rushed to nuclear pharmacies and hospitals. This urgency is necessary because the activity of Mo-99 begins

to decline from the point at which irradiated targets are removed from a reactor, and continues to decrease through processing.

Upon receiving the generator, a hospital or nuclear pharmacy can extract Tc-99m from the generator for about a week by passing a proprietary saline solution through the

alumina column.

Like any complex network, the production, processing, and delivery of Mo-99 may

fail to work as planned. Between 2005 and 2010, a product recall at a major generator producer and lengthy reactor outages caused severe shortages of Mo-99 for medical

procedures in the United States and elsewhere. These outages had a dramatic impact 18

on the Mo-99 supply chain and spurred the U.S. government and the international

community into action.

THE DOMESTIC MOLYBDENUM-99 SUPPLY CHAIN

Through 2014, the U.S. supply chain's peculiar structure included five major reactors, four major processors, and two generator manufacturers. The irradiators, all

using HEU targets and some also using HEU fuel, were spread across three different continents. They included Canada's NRU, Belgium's BR-2, France's OSIRIS, the 19 20 21

http://mo99.ne.anl.gov/2014/pdfs/papers/S5P1%20Paper%20Peykov.pdf18

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chalk_River_Laboratories19

http://www.euronuclear.org/e-news/e-news-28/sck-cen.htm20

http://www-cadarache.cea.fr/rjh/Add-On/osiris_gb.pdf21

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HFR in the Netherlands, and South Africa's SAFARI. The processors included 22 23

Canada's Nordion (now a subsidiary of Sterigenics), Belgium's IRE, Mallinckrodt 24 25

(formerly Covidien) in Missouri and the Netherlands, Lantheus (a Bristol, Meyers, Squibb company) in Massachusetts, and South Africa's NTP (Nuclear Technology Products). 26

The international companies Mallinckrodt and Lantheus manufactured the Tc-99m/27

Mo-99 generators and supplied them to hospitals.

The failures in the U.S. supply chain began in 2005. That year, Mallinckrodt halted its production of generators due to a product recall, triggering a shortage that lasted through

April 2006. In November 2007, the NRU shut down for over a month and the HFR followed with an extensive outage between August 2008 and February 2009. During this time, an

IRE processing facility was also shut down briefly because of an industrial accident. The worst of theoutages, however, began when Canada's NRU shut down in January 2009. 28

This shutdown took place through August 2010 and coincided with maintenance of the Petten HFR. (Both facilities combine to provide 75% of the American domestic 29

market for medical isotopes)

Combined, these events triggered massive supply disruptions, initially forcing

hospitals to ration care and cancel procedures. Hospitals often had to alter scheduling procedures, reduce patient doses of Tc-99m, and increase the use of alternative imaging

modalities such as PET (Positron Emission Tomography)scans.

http://www.emtr.eu/hfr.html22

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAFARI-123

http://www.nordion.com24

http://rad4med.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/IRE-Cooperation-bewteen-South-Africa-and-Belgium.pdf25

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Nuclear_Energy_Corporation26

http://www2.mallinckrodt.com/Nuclear_Imaging/Global_Mo-99_Supply_Chain_Manufacturers.aspx27

www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/11/22/shutdown_of_chalk_river_reactor_triggers_isotope_shortage.html28

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Date_set_for_Petten_reactor_s_return_1510081.html29

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� Current U.S. Mo-99 supply chain

Producers also began to better coordinate supplies. For example, when one reactor shut down for maintenance, others filled its orders. Additional irradiator capacity also

came online. Of the eight large-scale irradiators currently online, three are newcomers: Poland's MARIA reactor (currently converted to LEU and utilizing HEU targets 30

processed by Mallinckrodt); the LVR-15 reactor in the Czech Republic (recently 31

converted to LEU fuel and using HEU targets also processed by Mallinckrodt); and

Australia's OPAL (using LEU for both fuel and targets, and relying on target 32

processing provided by ANSTO).

However, these new irradiators offer only a short-term solution. The NRU and the OSIRIS reactors are expected to shut down within the next five years. The need to deal

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Non-proliferation_milestone_for_Polish_reactor-2709127.html30

http://www-naweb.iaea.org/napc/physics/meetings/TM34779/Papers%20PDF/Burian-Czeck.pdf31

http://www.ansto.gov.au/cs/groups/corporate/documents/document/mdaw/mde5/~edisp/acs046215.pdf32

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with the possible supply fallout of these pending closures and secure domestic production has forced the United States to actively support less efficient technologies

largely due to the funding structure to develop regulations for new type nuclear reactors that would efficiently produce Mo-99.

COST EFFECTIVE HEU VERSUS

COSTLY LEU Since 1978, the United States has worked to minimize the amount of HEU in 33

civilian use. These efforts have included the conversion of HEU-powered research and

test reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU), the repatriation of fresh HEU fuel and 34

irradiated HEU in waste, the consolidation of HEU at fewer sites, and security

improvements to facilities housing these materials.

In 1992, Congress passed the Schumer Amendment to curb U.S. HEU exports 35

to foreign research reactors, including those for Mo-99 production. This amendment mandated producers of Mo-99 for the American market use less efficient and more costly

LEU. But supply concerns precipitated a shift in Congressional priorities. In 2005, Congress passed the Burr Amendment exempting Canadian and European 36

irradiators from Schumer's legislation and calling for a National Academy of Sciences study to de-conflict the two goals.

In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) finally released the report requested under the Burr Amendment. This study concluded that, there were "no 37

technical reasons that adequate quantities cannot be produced from LEU targets in the future" and that LEU target use was technically feasible with an acceptable cost

increase. This report did not address the market feasibility of producing medical isotopes with inefficient and more costly LEU. The report did recommend that the

http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/te_1452_web.pdf33

https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/safe-return34

http://www.rertr.anl.gov/REFDOCS/EPACT92.html35

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Policy_Act_of_200536

www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12569&page=737

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Mo-99 producers, the DOE, the Department of State, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the U.S. Congress actively move toward the conversion of Mo-99 production

with LEU.

The NAS report fit well with President Barack Obama's 2009 call to secure all of the

world's vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. The NNSA accelerated its nuclear security efforts and adopted a two-track strategy for Mo-99 production. The first track

promoted the development of sufficient HEU-free indigenous production to supply the U.S. market by 2016, helping to finance the research and development (R&D) stage of four

domestic private industry Mo-99 projects (without regard to competition by foreign producers of medical isotopes derived from HEU). The second track aimed to boost

foreign HEU-free Mo-99 production and to promote the goal of eliminating HEU-based Mo-99 production through cooperation with international organizations and high-level

diplomatic meetings, such as the Nuclear Security Summit. 38

FREE MARKET MOLYBDENUM-99 The official policy of the U.S. government seeks to "end subsidies and

establish an economically-sound domestic Mo-99 industry." The eGeneration Economic Development Corporation contends this is only possible if Mo-99 is produced as economically or more economically than HEU derived Mo-99 - or – Foreign HEU derived Mo-99 is taxed sufficiently so LEU derived Mo-99 can compete. The latter instance necessarily means higher healthcare costs for Americans.

Since 2009, the NNSA has supported the development of four private industry projects utilizing a variety of technologies that will produce Mo-99 that is more costly than

HEU derived Mo-99. The financial support for each varies, but is limited to $25 million per project, and involves a 50/50 cost-sharing agreement with the DOE as well as technical

assistance from the U.S. national laboratories.

The NNSA has concluded cooperative agreements with General Electric-39

Hitachi (GEH); Babcock and Wilcox (B&W); NorthStar Medical Radioisotopes, LLC; and SHINE/Morgridge Institute for Research (MIR), with two of the projects currently underway. In February 2012 GEH suspended its medical isotope reactor project due to concerns about market conditions and regulation development costs, but

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Nuclear_Security_Summit38

http://science.energy.gov/~/media/np/nsac/pdf/20140424/Seestrom_MO99mfor_NSAC_v3.pdf39

Economic Development | !18

also noted that it may reevaluate this decision. Later in 2012 B&W announced their 40

plans to discontinue their pursuit of medical isotope production with Covidien (now Mallinkrodt). Both these decisions were largely due to the NRC regulation development costs and time frames for developing and licensing a new type of nuclear reactor.

Northstar Medical Isotopes and SHINE methods are both accelerator driven

production methods for producing medical isotopes and are much less efficient and less cost effective than HEU reactor methods.

Two projects outside the NNSA cooperative agreements, by Coqui 41

RadioPharmaceuticals Corp, a reactor based solution, and Advanced Medical 42

Isotope Corporation (AMIC), an accelerator based solution, are seeking investors and expect to go through the regulatory approval process. (See the following table of

domestic producers.). Eden Radioisotopes, a Sandia National Laboratory technology spin off is another reactor based solution that shows promise but still uses LEU targets and fuel.

 

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-US-firms-target-revival-in-domestic-Mo-99-production-01051501.html40

http://www.coquipharma.com/wordpress1/41

http://www.isotopeworld.com42

Economic Development | !19

TABLE OF POTENTIAL IRRADIATORS IN THE UNITED STATES

�

The future of all of these irradiator projects remains uncertain. Each will need to acquire and sustain funding as its technology and product undergoes the approval

processes of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Food and Drug Administration. Because the projects do not turn a profit until they begin supplying customers with Mo-99,

Economic Development | !20

U.S. government support for market entry has been critical. There are, however, grave medium-term and long-term uncertainties about any of these projects' competitive

viability after government subsidies end without a tax on foreign HEU derived isotopes because these methods are not competitive in of themselves with HEU derived medical

isotopes.

CHALLENGES OF HEU-FREE MO-99 PRODUCTION

Established HEU-based producers have argued that conversion to the use of LEU targets is uneconomical given existing technologies and could also "leave them at a competitive disadvantage relative to producers who refuse to convert." If LEU were simply substituted for HEU in existing HEU target designs, the process would

produce less Mo-99 per target. Therefore, producers who converted to LEU have generally had to irradiate and process a much greater number of targets and cope with a much

greater volume of nuclear waste.

The difficulties faced by established producers pale in comparison, however, with

the economic challenges faced by new producers. Established producers use facilities and equipment constructed and purchased by their governments decades ago.

Government subsidies for costs related to capital replacement and waste disposition, among others, have enabled established producers to undervalue irradiation services

and pass subsidy-derived cost savings along to consumers.

A more problematic layer of competition involves new market entrants that intend

to use HEU, notably in Russia, India, and China. The introduction of these actors to the 43

market—before established producers complete conversion and before new market

entrants begin production—has the very likely potential to doom the emerging HEU-free Mo-99 - subsidy free - industry.

http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/152_hansell_nuclear_medicine.pdf43

Economic Development | !21

PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF HEU-FREE MO-99

Faced with the looming shutdown of its Chalk River NRU reactor and lacking

alternative irradiation capacity in Canada, Nordion has turned to a cooperative venture with Russia's RIAR in order to retain its market share in the United States. This venture,

JSC Isotope, plans to utilize HEU fuel and targets for Mo-99 production at the RIAR 44

reactors in Dimitrovgrad. The Russian facility initiated production in 2013 and more than

doubled it by 2015.

In May 2011, U.S. representatives Edward Markey and Jeff Fortenberry expressed

concerns in a letter to the DOE regarding the use by Nordion of Russia's HEU to produce Mo-99 for the U.S. market, but these concerns were not followed up with legislative action

at that time.

A January 2012 letter to these lawmakers signed by public health and nuclear

experts called on Congress to enact a "preferential procurement" clause that would include provisions to "halt the import of HEU-based versions of these isotopes when a sufficient supply of the alternatives are available," a "requirement for U.S. health authorities to terminate authorization for use of HEU- based versions when a

sufficient supply of the alternatives is available," and the "imposition of a tax on

HEU-based versions of these isotopes, channeling any resulting revenue to support production without HEU."

A tax on isotopes necessarily means higher overall healthcare costs and a reduced quality of healthcare as higher costs can delay accurate diagnosis in favor of cheaper and

lower-cost diagnostic tests. Nordion has been completing quality tests of the Russian-sourced Mo-99. In order to enter the U.S. market, this radioisotope must be certified by the

U.S. FDA (Food and Drug Administration). Recently, Russian officials have noted the possibility of converting to LEU targets but they have not committed to converting the

targets or the RIAR reactors to LEU or using "full cost recovery."

The U.S. government says it is working to make "preferential procurement" a reality. In June 2012, the White House announced that it was committed to eliminating the use of HEU in medical isotopes while assuring the reliability of supply. In order to achieve these goals, official U.S. policy would encourage the

www.isotop.ru/en/production/medical/426/428/44

Economic Development | !22

purchase of HEU-free Mo-99 at home and abroad, phase out HEU exports when sufficient quantities of non-HEU Mo-99 became available, and continue to support domestic production and foreign producers' conversions.

Washington also called on industry to develop labeling that would allow users to distinguish between LEU- and HEU-based Mo-99 and unveiled other incentives aimed at isotope users. In July 2012, the White House proposed a new Health and Human Services department regulation that would incentivize medical facilities to use HEU-free Mo-99 by paying an additional $10 for each procedure performed on Medicare and Medicaid patients using HEU-freeMo-99.

Subsidization of the domestic medical isotope industry, contrary to stated objectives, is already transpiring.

Economic Development | !23

ANOTHER ISOTOPE CRISIS: PLUTONIUM-238

In 1977, The Voyager 1 spacecraft left Earth on a five-year mission to explore 45

Jupiter and Saturn. Thirty-six years later, the car-size probe is still exploring, still sending its findings home. It has now put more than 19 billion kilometers between itself and the

sun. Voyager 1 has become the first man-made object to reach interstellar space 46

and has increased our understanding of the universe.

None of this would be possible without the spacecraft’s three batteries ( Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators) filled with Plutonium-238. (This is not the 47

material used to make bombs. That is plutonium-239). In fact, most of what humanity knows about the outer planets came back to Earth on Plutonium power. The

characteristics of this metal’s radioactive decay make it a super-fuel. Most importantly, there is no other viable power option for deep space probes. Solar power is too weak at

those vast distances from the Sun, chemical batteries don’t last, nuclear fission systems are too heavy. So, we depend on Plutonium-238, a fuel largely acquired as byproduct of

making nuclear weapons. And therein lies the problem.

We have may have just enough Plutonium-238 to last to the end of this 48

decade. There is no more. And it’s not just the U.S. reserves that are in jeopardy. The entire planet’s stores of Plutonium-238 are nearly depleted.

The country’s scientific stockpile of Plutonium-238 has dwindled to around 36 pounds. To put that in perspective, the battery that powers NASA’s Curiosity rover, which

is studying the surface of Mars, contains roughly 10 pounds of Plutonium-238, and what’s left in our stockpile has already been spoken for, and then some. The implications for

space exploration are dire: No more Plutonium-238 means not exploring perhaps 99 percent of the solar system. In effect, much of NASA’s $1.5 billion-a-year (and

http://voyager.jpl.nasa.gov/where/45

http://www.space.com/22752-voyager-1-goes-interstellar-solar-system-boundary-passed-video.html46

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTB6Su4ciNc47

http://www.wired.com/2013/09/plutonium-238-problem/48

Economic Development | !24

shrinking) planetary science program is running out of fuel and time. This nuclear 49

crisis is so bad that affected researchers know it simply as “The Problem.”

U.S. production of Plutonium-238 came primarily from two nuclear laboratories as a byproduct of making bomb-grade Plutonium-239. The Hanford Site in Washington state

left the Plutonium-238 mixed into a cocktail of nuclear wastes. The Savannah River Site in South Carolina, however, extracted and refined more than 360 pounds during the Cold

War to power espionage tools, spy satellites, and dozens of NASA’s pluckiest spacecraft. 50

By 1988, with the fall of the Soviet Union only three years in the future, the U.S. and

Russia began to dismantle wartime nuclear facilities. Hanford and Savannah River no longer produced any Plutonium-238. But Russia continued to harvest the material by

processing nuclear reactor fuel at a nuclear industrial complex called Mayak. The 51

Russians sold their first batch, weighing 36 pounds, to the U.S. in 1993 for more than

$45,000 per ounce. Russia had become the planet’s sole supplier, but it soon fell behind on orders. In 2009, it reneged on a deal to sell 22 pounds to the U.S. 52

Whether or not Russia has any material left or can still create some is uncertain. What we do know is that they are not willing to sell it.

By 2005, according to a Department of Energy report , the U.S. government 53

owned 87 pounds, of which roughly two-thirds was designated for national security

projects, likely to power deep-sea espionage hardware. The DOE will not disclose what is left today, but scientists close to the issue say just 36 pounds remain earmarked for NASA.

That’s enough for the space agency to launch a few small deep-space missions 54

before 2020. A twin of the Curiosity rover is planned to lift off for Mars in 2020 and will

require nearly a third of the stockpile. After that, NASA’s interstellar exploration program is left staring into a void — especially for high-profile, Plutonium-hungry missions, like the

www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/02/presidents-2013-budget/49

vimeo.com/868158950

goo.gl/maps/dQEd51

www.spacenews.com/civil/091211-russia-withholding-plutonium-needed-nasa.html52

www.wired.com/images_blogs/wiredscience/2013/09/final72005faqs.pdf53

discovery.nasa.gov/program.cfml54

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proposed Jupiter Europa Orbiter. To seek signs of life around Jupiter’s icy moon 55

Europa, such a spacecraft could require more than 47 pounds of Plutonium.

Many of the eight deep-space robotic missions that NASA had envisioned over the next 15 years have already been delayed or canceled. Even more missions — some not

yet even formally proposed — are silent casualties of NASA’s Plutonium-238 poverty. Since 1994, scientists have pleaded with lawmakers for the money to restart production. The

DOE believes a relatively modest $10 to 20 million in funding each year through 2020 could yield an operation capable of making between 3.3 and 11 pounds of Plutonium-238

annually — plenty to keep a steady stream of spacecraft in business.

In 2012, a line item in NASA’s $17-billion budget fed $10 million in funding toward

an experiment to create a tiny amount of Plutonium-238. The goals: gauge how much could be made, estimate full-scale production costs, and simply prove the U.S. could pull it off

again. It was half of the money requested by NASA and the DOE, the space agency’s partner in the endeavor (the Atomic Energy Act forbids NASA to manufacture

Plutonium-238). The experiment may last seven more years and cost between $85 and $125 million.

A fully reconstituted Plutonium program described in the DOE’s latest plan, 56

would also utilize a second reactor west of Idaho Falls, called the Advanced Test 57

Reactor. Like the Mo-99 isotope used in medical procedures and treatments, Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactors can produce Plutonium-238 as a by-product of energy production and fulfill this critical requirement for NASA’s deep space needs.

opfm.jpl.nasa.gov/europajupitersystemmissionejsm/jupitereuropaorbiterconcept/55

energy.gov/nepa/downloads/eis-0310-sa-02-supplement-analysis56

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Test_Reactor57

Economic Development | !26

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURING CRISIS

Rare earth elements are a series of chemical elements found in the Earth’s crust that are vital to many modern technologies, including consumer electronics, computers and networks, communications, clean energy, advanced transportation, health care, environmental mitigation, national defense, and many others.

Because of their unique magnetic, luminescent, and electrochemical properties, these elements help make many technologies perform with reduced weight, reduced emissions, and energy consumption; or give them greater efficiency, performance, miniaturization, speed, durability, and thermal stability.

Rare earth-enabled products and technologies help fuel global economic growth, maintain high standards of living, and even save lives.

There are 17 rare earth elements (REEs), 15 within the chemical group called 58

Lanthanides, plus Yttrium and Scandium. The lanthanides consist of the following:

Lanthanum, Cerium, Praseodymium, Neodymium, Promethium, Samarium, Europium, Gadolinium, Terbium, Dysprosium, Holmium, Erbium, Thulium, Ytterbium, and Lutetium.

Rare earths are moderately abundant in the earth’s crust, some even more abundant than Copper, Lead, Gold, and Platinum. While some are more abundant than many other

minerals, most REEs are not concentrated enough to make them easily exploitable economically.

The United States was once self-reliant in domestically produced REEs, but 59

over the past 15 years has become 100% reliant on imports, primarily from China, due to lower-cost operations. The lanthanides are often broken into two groups: Light Rare Earth Elements (LREEs)—lanthanum through europium (atomic numbers 57-63) and

the heavier rare earth elements (HREEs)—gadolinium through lutetium (atomic numbers 64-71). Yttrium is typically classified as a heavy element.

There is a close relationship between thorium (a potential fuel for Molten 60

Salt Reactors) and rare earths; they often come together in nature. In fact, monazite

http://www.rareelementresources.com/rare-earth-elements#.VenaI1zSabA58

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/rare-earth-elements-china-monopoly-60-minutes-lesley-stahl/59

http://mragheb.com/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engineering/Thorium60

%20Resources%20in%20%20Rare%20Earth%20Elements.pdf

Economic Development | !27

was first mined to produce Thorium rather than rare earths. In the 19th century, Thorium was used to make gas mantles. Later, with the development of technology that required

rare earths to function, monazite started to be mined for elements other than Thorium.

During monazite, or other type mining that produces rare earths, Thorium

separates easily, through gravity and at almost no cost, such that Thorium can be produced practically free of charge.

The United States was the leading supplier of monazite, which was the main source of Rare Earths in the first decades of the rare earths industry (the post WW2 period). Brazil

was also an important supplier, and China, ironically, tried to become a world supplier but failed to meet Western standards and “so they weren’t able to pursue it.” However, in the

1980’s, international and domestic classification changes concerning Thorium changed the way the market saw monazite.

The International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) placed monazite in the 61

category of source material. After representing the major source for the world’s rare

earth supply, nobody in America wanted to deal with monazite any longer, wondering what to do with the residual Thorium (which now had to be treated like a low level nuclear

waste due to classification, an expensive process). China stepped in and took advantage, deciding that it would dominate the rare earth industry, which was understood to be

critically important to the development of aerospace and the electronics industry. Western companies that had mined monazite until that point, abandon the industry through

competition.

Under pressure from environmental agencies and groups, mines were shut 62

down simply for having Thorium discharges in their tailings. Such is the context in which companies like Molycorp in the USA or Lynas Corp in Australia have put the West

back into the contest for rare earth production; and what a costly contest it is proving to be, especially because neither one of these two companies has been able to produce

even moderate quantities of the high-demand Heavy Rare Earth Elements (HREE) . The fact that REEs are found mixed with Thorium has hampered the growth of REE mining in

USA and Europe as REE miners seek to avoid ores that are Thorium rich to make the process cost competitive. In the meanwhile, China has grown a large REE industry and is a

virtual monopoly dominating the international market today.

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1326_web.pdf61

http://web.mit.edu/12.000/www/m2016/finalwebsite/solutions/greenmining.html62

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Seventy percent of China’s rare earths come from the by-product production 63

of an iron ore mine. The Chinese focuses on the high value elements, which suggests

that if the West is really going to compete, it will have to refocus its efforts on developing low-cost byproduct resources. In many cases these have high Thorium content and, “In the

United States alone, current Thorium-bearing rare earth phosphates and other Thorium-bearing mineralization could easily meet 50% percent of world demand for rare earths.”

Currently, the dominant end uses for rare earth elements in the United States are for renewable energy generation in wind turbines and solar photovoltaics, automobile

catalysts and petroleum refining catalysts, use in phosphors in color television and flat panel displays (cell phones, portable DVDs, and laptops), permanent magnets and

rechargeable batteries for hybrid and electric vehicles, and numerous medical devices. There are critically important defense applications such as jet fighter engines, 64

missile guidance systems, antimissile defense, and satellite and communication systems. Permanent magnets containing neodymium, gadolinium, dysprosium, 65

and terbium (NdFeB magnets) are used in numerous electrical and electronic components and new-generation generators for wind turbines.

If you ever wondered why so many electronics are produced in China and not in the United Sates, a strong factor in determining China’s dominance in the electronic industry

is due to America’s treatment of the element Thorium as a low-level nuclear waste in the mining industry.

If there were a market for Thorium as a fuel for LCMSRs, it is very likely that America would once again re-engage China in competition for the electronics market. This could mean the return of many jobs in the high tech sector in the United States.

http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150402-the-worst-place-on-earth63

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41744.pdf64

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf65

Economic Development | !29

NUCLEAR INNOVATION CRISIS America has the gold standard of nuclear safety due to the admirable performance

of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This safety though, comes at a substantial cost and this cost inhibits innovation by the private sector. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990

made the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a 90% cost recovery entity. Due to the high cost of nuclear safety (premium safety begets a premium cost) there are very few

companies that, by themselves, can afford the burden of developing rules for new types of nuclear reactors. Expensive regulation development costs imposed by the NRC are

currently borne by the first movers in private industry seeking to develop new reactor technologies. Before1990, these costs would have been borne by the taxpayer who would

have of benefitted from the licensed technology (through low-cost clean energy produced by the technology) and these cost could have been recouped by spreading the costs

through licensing fees or taxation of the energy and products these new type reactors would produce.

Since the first movers in developing new nuclear technologies bear the full weight of the costs of developing new safety regulations, and regulations have become cheaper

to develop in other countries, there have been no first-movers (innovators) in the industry within the United States. As a consequence, America has fallen behind Russia, India, and

China in developing new nuclear technologies. New liquid core HEU-free reactor solutions are safer and cheaper than the solutions most advocated by the U.S. government.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 is a United States federal law which established a comprehensive national program for the safe, permanent disposal of highly

radioactive wastes. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act created a timetable and procedure for establishing a permanent, underground repository for high-level radioactive waste by the

mid-1990s, and provided for some temporary federal storage of waste, including spent fuel from civilian nuclear reactors. State governments were authorized to veto a national

government decision to place a waste repository within their borders, and the veto would stand unless both houses of Congress voted to override it. The Act also called for

developing plans by 1985 to build monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facilities, where wastes could be kept for 50 to 100 years or more and then be removed for permanent

disposal or for reprocessing.

Congress assigned responsibility to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to site,

construct, operate, and close a repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

Economic Development | !30

In December 1987, Congress amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to designate Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the only site to be characterized as a permanent repository

for all of the nation's nuclear waste. The American ratepayer has already footed over 66

$15 billion for the unfinished project that has been defunded by the Obama administration and is opposed by nearly all Nevadan politicians. Yucca Mountain is expected to cost just a little less than $27 billion when completed and is expected to 67

cost taxpayers just short of $100 billion in operational costs when the site is 68

decommissioned in 2133. There is approximately $39.8 billion currently held in the 69

Nuclear Waste Management fund plus the $15 billion already spent on Yucca Mountain has meant that rate payers were able to accrue close to $45 billion since 1982. Over a 33

year period the fund has accrued $1.36 billion per year. Using the simplest of calculations, if the nuclear waste management fund were to resume collections in 2016 (they were

stopped in 2013 by court order) over the next 117 years the fund would net nearly $160 billion dollars. $60 billion more than needed to operate Yucca Mountain (not counting the

existing $39.8 billion). An even more conservative number of just using the interest the fund is currently accruing is about $750 million per year would garner $88 billion over the

next 117 years along with the existing $39.8 billion would still give the fund in excess of $27 billion above and beyond what is needed for the operation of Yucca Mountain.

The long-term strategy in 1982 only considered storage of nuclear waste and did not take into account any other technologies developed between then and now. Many people are now questioning the merits of that decision in light of technologies that could consume nuclear waste and produce carbon-free electricity.

The nuclear waste management fund is, in essence, a nuclear waste “only” repository fund. If you were to poll John Q public today on the merits of sequestering

nuclear waste for 30,000 years from humans in a Yucca Mountain repository for $100 billion -or- use just 20% of the current fund to develop LCMSR technology that could

consume more than 95% of our nuclear waste stockpiles while producing abundant amounts of cheap, clean, and carbon-free electricity and reducing the remaining waste to

being sequestered for only 300 years, it is easy to guess which way the public would lean.

http://abcnews.go.com/Business/yucca-mountain-reprieve-nuclear-waste-storage-site/story?id=1996136766

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=13078&LangType=205767

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/WR-68

Yucca_Mountain_cost_estimate_rises_to_96_billion_dollars-0608085.html

http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/12/f19/OAS-FS-15-03.pdf69

Economic Development | !31

The Nuclear Waste Management fund, if it were repurposed to truly manage our waste, could employ technologies that benefit future generations of Americans through

new nuclear technology development.

Economic Development | !32

CONCLUSIONS A single research facility, containing just six-small, desktop size reactors, can

produce all of the medical isotopes for the Western Hemisphere with a very high degree of reliability, from a single research facility based in America. LCMSRRs can produce

Molybdenum-99 much more efficiently and cost effectively than HEU and LEU derived methods. Such a medical isotope production facility could create more than 8,000 direct

permanent jobs. Additionally, such research reactors could pave the way for the development and commercialization of a full-scale power reactor that one day could

replace our light water reactor fleet as legacy light water reactors are retired.

In the short term, within 5 years, America could be home to a highly reliable

medical isotope production, distribution, and processing facility that could supply all of the Western Hemisphere with Molybdenum-99 and Technetium-99m.

Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have suspended 70

rules that would otherwise prohibit a test or research reactor from making a profit by allowing such a reactor to produce medical isotopes (Molybdenum-99), in part because the federal government has recognized an impending Molybdenum-99 shortage crisis.

Six research sized LCMSRs constructed for the purposes of research and materials

testing, and for the simultaneous production of medical isotopes is a business opportunity America cannot afford to lose. We must take advantage of this opportunity to regain the

lead in Nuclear Reactor Technology.

Private industry does not have an incentive by itself to step up to the plate without the help and backing from either a state government or a consortium if the NRC cost recovery model is kept in place. By partnering with a state that has a nuclear industry or the will to form a consortium and enact legislation encouraging the development of LCMSRs, America may well yet be able to take advantage of this opportunity to regain the edge in nuclear reactor development.

One group of three LCMSRRs could produce Molybdenum-99. These reactors

would be heavily outfitted with instrumentation to monitor their internal operational characteristics. These reactors could serve as an information gathering and development

tool depicting the behavior of these reactors in normal operation with a high fidelity, which could provide data for the design of future prototype commercial LCMSRs.

www.wise-intern.org/journal/2013/documents/LMS_WISE_2013paper.pdf70

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In addition to the three LCMSRRs for Molybdenum-99 production, three additional reactors would be built. One will be built to study Uranium Molten Salt fuel, a second

reactor could be built to study Thorium Molten Salt fuel, and a third will be built to study the use of traditional nuclear waste as a fuel to produce energy. Concurrent with testing

and research being conducted, all of America’s Molybdenum-99 needs could be met by this type of medical isotope facility. There will be at a minimum a $5.5 billion and 71

growing medical isotope market by 2017 that could provide a revenue stream for the project.

Abundant and valuable Molybdenum-99 and Plutonium-238 radioisotopes could one day be provided regionally as a consequence of producing electricity regionally with

small multipurpose Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactors (LCMSRs). A fleet of as few as three 1GW(thermal) LCMSRs could produce all needed Plutonium-238 requirements for NASA’s

proposed deep space missions. A fleet of commercial scale utility LCMSRs could also produce the radioisotopes Actinium-225 and Bismuth-213 for large-scale research and

treatment of cancer and HIV AIDS. Both of these isotopes show great promise in treating the most difficult of cancers. Currently, there are not enough of these rare cancer fighting

isotopes in the world for any large-scale research or clinical trials.

A proposed six reactor medical isotope production facility and advanced reactor

development laboratory will meet nonproliferation goals consistent with the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. It would conform to Congressional legislation requiring

domestic, affordable, and proliferation-resistant radioisotope supplies for medical use, as well as meet increasing requirements having national-security and space exploration

applications. Even a single 10-100 MW(th) reactor, based on proven American technology, would fulfill growing deficiencies for isotopes at a profit.

Compared to other reactor types utilizing Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) and accelerators, the Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactor (LCMSR) is demonstrably the most

efficient means of production for Mo-99 and Pu-238: Fuel preparation is minimal; no solid-fuel or target fabrication is required; and nearly a 100% duty cycle is achievable for

irradiation and maximum efficiency in product extraction.

Alternative technologies are much less efficient and much more expensive per

gram of isotope produced. Accelerators and accelerator-driven sub-critical reactors have inherent foil or sample irradiation target-density limitations; nevertheless, alternative

www.molecularimaging.net/topics/molecular-imaging/biomarkers/world-radioisotope-market-projected-55-71

billion-2017

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accelerator based methods do have an indispensable and complementary role in producing other rare isotopes.

The LCMSR would yield two-to-three orders of magnitude higher radioisotope yield, with a smaller fissile loading, minimal cost, rapid production time, high efficiency,

and for each curie of Mo-99 generated in a liquid-fueled reactor, there is less uranium waste ( by a factor of about 100) compared to yields from foil irradiation or solid-fuel 72

reactors. All processes related to fabrication, irradiation, disassembly, and dissolution of solid-target foils are eliminated; therefore, radioactive waste management for the LCMSR

is straightforward and less expensive, with comparatively low capital outlays and operating costs.

A domestically-built LCMSR would offer several other important benefits: 73

high capacity and timely availability (five years or less, if given government priority and siting). It could have comparatively low construction cost, reduce need for government funding for national-security isotopes, and yield net income for the government and the facility operator, while not itself contributing to proliferation concerns.

Methods that do not involve liquid core reactors are necessarily much less efficient and much-more costly per unit of radioisotope produced, even taking into account

amortized costs. Liquid-core reactor systems would minimize or eventually eliminate the need for proliferation-susceptible, highly-enriched fissile targets used in light water

reactors.

Product yields of radioisotopes in solid-fuel reactors are limited by the means by

which fission products can be extracted in a timely manner.

Irradiation of uranium foils or fuel in nuclear-reactors, while the predominant

means currently in use, is highly inefficient because of interim decay (loss of product) during removal and processing cycles.

Accelerator generation is another order-of-magnitude less efficient because 74

of the comparatively weak flux of neutrons. Accelerator-driven sub-critical reactors, lacking continuous processing of circulated solutions, would still have low yield.

http://mo99.ne.anl.gov/2014/pdfs/papers/S9P12%20Paper%20DeVolpi.pdf72

http://mo99.ne.anl.gov/2014/pdfs/papers/S9P12%20Paper%20DeVolpi.pdf73

http://mo99.ne.anl.gov/2014/pdfs/papers/S9P12 Paper DeVolpi.pdf74

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Accelerator-driven solution reactors might be better, but never as productive as the LCMSR.

All alternatives, however, potentially have useful and convenient roles for some specialized rare radioisotope creation.

Economic Development | !36

APPENDIX: HISTORY AND BENEFITS OF THE LIQUID CORE MOLTEN SALT REACTOR

In an attempt to make a nuclear powered aircraft, America began the aircraft 75

reactor experiment to develop a reactor capable of powered flight. The result was a

Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactor (LCMSR). The LCMSR was conceived as the best reactor to power an aircraft because it could be made very small, was relatively lightweight, and

lent itself well to mass assembly. Alvin Weinberg, who was the director of Oak Ridge 76

National Laboratory at the time of LCMSR development, became a strong proponent of

LCMSR technology, seeing it as the future of civilian nuclear power for producing electricity. Weinberg’s interest culminated in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE)

which used the nuclear technology developed to power a military Aircraft and used it to develop an ultra safe technology that had great potential for civilian powered nuclear

reactors.

Interestingly, Alvin Weinberg is listed as one of the inventors on the patent of the

light water reactor (LWR), the predominant type of nuclear power reactor used in the world today. The LWR was originally developed for Naval propulsion but Dr. Weinberg

favored the development of Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactors for commercial power because of its superior characteristics and safety.

The MSRE was a relatively small reactor where the fuel was dissolved in a Molten Salt of Lithium Fluoride and Beryllium Fluoride. The reactor ran for four years from 1965

thru 1969. It generated 7.5 Megawatts of heat energy, allowing the scientists to determine the design parameters and work through system issues to arrive at a design that allows

for the consumption of nuclear fuel in molten salts. The MSRE worked out many of the key issues needed to build a commercialized Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactor for many

applications. The MSRE demonstrated:

❖ The fission of both U-235 as well as U-233 in a carrier salt of LiF-BeF2-ZrF4-UF4

❖ Operation at high temperature (650°C) at full power for more than one year

energyfromthorium.com/msrp/75

www.the-weinberg-foundation.org/learn/alvin-weinberg/76

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❖ Operation at atmospheric pressure

❖ That carrier salts were impervious to radiation damage

❖ The carrier salt chemistry and metals metallurgy to eliminate corrosion

❖ An efficient method of on-line refueling

❖ Largely validated predictions

The Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactor (LCMSR) represents a major departure from all

other reactor designs. The Molten Salt has characteristics that are hugely advantageous for a reactor:

❖ Dissolving the fuel into the molten salt means the fuel is in a liquid form and can be processed in-situ.

❖ Molten salts do not boil until 1,400ºC (2,500ºF).

❖ Molten Salts have these characteristics at atmospheric pressure.

❖ Molten Salts hold many elements dissolved within chemically.

The ramifications of these four properties are far reaching. All fission reactors

generate heat. The heat is then used to do some useful task. Transferring the heat energy out of the reactor efficiently and safely is a major aspect of any reactor design.

Today’s reactors use water to do this. But to do this efficiently the water needs to be much hotter than the 100ºC at which water normally boils. To achieve working

temperatures near 350ºC the water needs to be kept under pressure. Pressures near 2,000 PSI are often used. Water at 350ºC and 2,000 PSI surrounds the core and must be

contained in a large, thick walled, steel vessel. Any breach of this vessel and the water will certainly escape and flash to steam. Such an event would allow the core material to

stop being cooled by the water and result in the core melting. This is the “meltdown” scenario. Much effort is expended to make sure such a breach of the pressure vessel does

not occur. These efforts have worked well, but come at a high cost.

Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactors run at atmospheric pressure. The vessel that

holds the core in this type of reactor is more akin to a “pot” than a “pressure vessel” because it does not operate under pressure. A breach in this “pot” results in core material

leaking out of the reactor and dropping to the floor. Since molten salts freeze at about 350ºC, this material on the floor will eventually solidify. That is, it will freeze. This is the

complete opposite of what happens with today’s reactors. An accident results in the fuel freezing, not melting.

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Why does “melting” or “freezing” even matter? When fission occurs the fissile fuel atoms split in two. The two halves are referred to as fission products and are highly

radioactive. We wish to contain them. That is, we do not want them to escape and get into the environment. Today’s reactors use Uranium Oxide fuel pellets. Because these pellets

are in a solid state, the vast majority of fission products stay within these fuel pellets. If these pellets were to melt (as in a meltdown scenario) the fission products would be

allowed to escape the fuel (one level of containment would be lost) and could eventually get out into the environment.

With a LCMSR, the molten salt is in a liquid state but the chemical properties of the salt keeps most of the fission products contained chemically. The most toxic fission

products remain in the salt, but there are some fission products that escape. These have to be dealt with directly, but this is actually beneficial. Xenon-135 is a noble gas fission

product that does not stay in the salt. However, Xenon-135 compromises reactor operation so its removal has its advantages.

The liquid core brings other advantages too. Salts are materials characterized by ionic bonds which aren’t effected by radiation. This means that the core salt can stay in

the reactor indefinitely. The molten salts have good specific heat properties, making them efficient at transferring heat energy. The salts are used as a liquid which is the ideal form

for processing the material. Chemically separating the fission products or higher actinides is possible without stopping reactor operation. In this way the reactor can

remove fission products and keep higher actinides in the reactor. This results in complete fuel consumption (or burn up) and the production of very little radioactive waste. This

waste is almost all fission product based which doesn’t require the hundreds of thousands of years of sequestration. A few hundred years will suffice. Not all fission products are

“waste”. Some of these radioactive fission products have economic value in their own right. Chief among these is the production of Molybdenum-99. Molybdenum-99 is

produced in about 6% of all fission reactions and is a precursor to Technetium-99m. Technetium-99m is used in some 30 million medical diagnostic procedures annually.

Molybdenum-99 is produced in all fission reactors, but only the LCMSR offers a low cost highly efficient way to extract it for further use in the medical field.

There are a variety of LCMSR designs possible. Each can produce different fission products or other elements readily extractable. In addition to Molybdenum-99, some

reactors can produce Actinium-225 (an alpha emitter which has shown great promise in cancer treatment) or Plutonium-238 (a material used in Radioisotope Thermoelectric

Generators or RTGs, a material with in short supply needed to power NASA deep space probes) among other valuable elements.

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The Liquid Core Molten Salt Reactor has a proven history validating the technology, however, for political and economic reasons it was not pursued with the vigor it

warranted.

LCMSRs produce no long-lived nuclear waste, cannot melt down, are 77

inherently safe, and can most easily be designed for construction on an assembly line. Additionally, these reactors can be designed to consume current nuclear waste 78

stockpiles as a fuel, or use uranium, plutonium, or thorium as a fuel.

According to many studies, LCMSRs will be able to produce electricity at half the

cost of coal (a very conservative estimate). Because of their low production costs and lack of carbon emissions, they will not only improve our environment, they will give us a leg-up

on domestic manufacturing by lowering energy costs and allowing manufacturers to compete better in the world marketplace.

LCMSRs can produce energy cheaply enough to economically transform America’s massive reserves of coal into environmentally friendly synthetic gasoline and synthetic

diesel fuel. LCMSR technology and coal can potentially make America energy independent, and make the OPEC (Oil Producing and Exporting Countries) irrelevant in

determining the price we pay to fill our tanks at the gas pump.

America is helping China develop and commercialize our MSR technology. 79

Many organizations and American startup companies such as Flibe Energy, 80

TransAtomics, and ThorCon are encouraging American legislators to jump back into 81 82

the Molten Salt Reactor race as China, Russia, and India have stepped up their efforts to commercialize this American-developed technology. Terrestrial Energy, a Canadian 83

company is petitioning Canada to join the race as well.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=knofNX7HCbg77

transatomicpower.com78

energyfromthorium.com/2014/03/21/the-molten-salt-reactor-race-will-america-join-the-race/79

flibe-energy.com80

transatomicpower.com81

thorconpower.com82

http://terrestrialenergy.com83

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LCMSRs can be adapted to consume traditional high level nuclear waste. Producing electricity from nuclear waste provides a practical use for nuclear waste

material, a much better solution than storing waste for thousands of years. If the nuclear waste consuming LCMSR is developed nuclear waste will no longer be waste. It will be

fuel. The federal Nuclear Waste Management Fund has in excess of $39 billion and 84

earns $750 million in interest every year. Legislators could properly authorize the use

of a portion of these funds to develop commercial LCMSR technology with the intent to reduce our nuclear waste stockpiles and produce energy and not affect funds used for the

operations of Yucca Mountain.

While Yucca Mountain still remains a good and viable idea, it was an idea that was

conceived in the 1980’s and only attemps to solve one crisis, the nuclear waste management crisis. The development of LCMSRs solve:

❖ A medical isotope crisis

❖ A nuclear waste management crisis

❖ A nuclear technology innovation crisis

❖ A reliance on foreign countries for materials to manufacture advanced electronics and aerospace solutions for national defense crisis

❖ Materials needed for space exploration crisis

Policy makers would be wise re-examine its long-term decision of nuclear waste storage-only policy based upon new technology developments, the ingenuity of the

American people and businesses, and the changing perception of nuclear energy now being embraced by the American public. A lack of flexibility in nuclear waste

management policy over a period of decades is similar to the federal government making decision in transportation, in the late 1800’s, based upon the horse on buggy, only to have

the steam locomotive be developed. Should Congress ignore new technology or should Congress allow itself flexibility when dealing with long-term issues that transpire over

decades and centuries?

The eGeneration Economic Development Corporation (eGenEDC) is proposing

reform to create a sustainable, integrated program for federal government oversight and

According to the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Inspector General’s, AUDIT REPORT – Department of 84

Energy’s Nuclear Waste Fund’s Fiscal Year 2014 Financial Statement Audits (November 2014), at 2, online at: http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/12/f19/OAS-FS-15-03.pdf, “[a]s of September 30, 2014, the U.S. Treasury securities held by the Department related to the NWF had a market value of $39.8 billion.” This necessarily excludes the billions in ratepayer dollars already expended to characterize the Yucca Mountain site.

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industry management of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) high-level radioactive waste that is commercially derived used nuclear fuel from civilian operations. The eGenEDC is

committed to educating citizens and policy leaders on the benefits of revising the federal government’s current high-level radioactive waste management responsibilities. We

believe the following would be advantageous:

❖ A Nuclear Waste Disposal Consortium (NWDC) composed of all high-level civilian radioactive waste producers dedicated solely to executing a high-level radioactive

waste program and empowered with the authority and resources to succeed.

❖ Access unhindered to the annual collections of the Nuclear Waste Management

Fund for their intended purpose (to manage waste), without reliance on the annual appropriations process, and access to the current accrued Nuclear Waste

Management Fund with appropriate Congressional oversight.

❖ Completion of the Yucca Mountain repository and license review although, the way

Yucca Mountain may be utilized may change based upon technologies used to manage and reduce nuclear waste stockpiles.

❖ A consolidated temporary storage facility for used nuclear fuel and DOE high-level radioactive waste in a willing host community and state while making substantial

progress toward developing the Yucca Mountain site and/or a second geologic repository. A consolidated storage facility would enable the Nuclear Waste Disposal

Consortium to move used nuclear fuel from decommissioned plants and operating plants long before a repository or recycling facilities begin operating. Used fuel

from decommissioned commercial reactor sites without an operating reactor should have priority when shipping commercial used fuel to the storage facility.

❖ Research, development and demonstration on improved or advanced fuel cycle technologies, such as the LCMSR, to close the nuclear fuel cycle, thereby reducing

the volume, and longevity of toxicity of byproducts placed in a repository, recognizing that a geologic repository will be required for all fuel cycles. In

addition Congress should direct the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to develop a regulatory framework for the licensing of recycling facilities,

technologies, and laboratories.

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