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Dr. Marybeth P. Ulrich
U.S. Army War College
Civil-Military Relations and the Professional Officer
Moldovan Military Academy
Postgraduate Course
28 January 2014
1
Overview of Lecture
What is Civil-Military Relations? Key Challenges 3 Sides of Civil-Military Relations Basic Standards of Democratic Civil-
Military Relations Methods of Civilian Control
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What is Civil-Military Relations?
Civil-Military Relations: “refers broadly to the interaction between
the armed force of a state as an institution, and the other sectors of the society in which armed force is embedded.”
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Overview: 5 Questions
Who controls the military and how? What degree of military influence is appropriate? What is the appropriate role of the military in the
polity? (What should it do?) Who serves? What is the link between the military’s
effectiveness and its civil-military relations?
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Key Challenge of Civil-Military Relations
“The civil-military challenge is to reconcile
a military strong enough to do anything the
civilians ask with a military subordinate enough
to do only what civilians authorize. “
-- Dr. Peter Feaver
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Civilian Control of the Military is a vital objective
of the State/Government
“The crucial challenge for politicians is to ensure the unconditional obedience of the military while at the same time allowing it sufficient autonomy to successfully discharge its functions and execute its missions. The army must be strong enough to prevail in war but conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy the society it is intended to protect. Moreover, the military should use society’s resources only to the extent justified by the threat confronting the state and must not extract state assets merely to increase its own strength.”
-- Zoltan Barany6
3 Sides of the Civil-Military Relations Triangle
State
Society Military
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Huntington’s Imperatives and the Inevitable Tension within
Civil-Military Relations
Functional imperative:
Military must be competent in performing its function of defending the state and protecting its national interests.
Societal imperative:
Pursuit of national security affected by national values, national character, and ideology of the state. 8
Focus on Interaction of Civilian and Military Spheres
No interaction of military and civilian spheres
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Civilian
State and Society
Military
Civilian world could include:
MOD, Parliament, President, Press, Public Opinion, Media, NGOs
Collaborative Civil-Military Relations
Civilian and Military Spheres Overlap
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CivilianMilitary
State Institutions Consist Of
Chief Executive (President and or Prime Minister)
Cabinet and Various Government Ministries
Agencies of the Executive branch that deal with Defense and Security matters
Parliament and Specialized Committees
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Military-President Relationship
President’s Role as Commander in Chief.
Both President and military must manage the relationship.
President’s control mainly conducted through “principal agents” (such as the Minister of Defense).
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Military-MOD Relationshp
MOD-General Staff interaction is needed – To communicate policy guidance of
government and needs of military– To use resources most efficiently– To ensure that dialogue occurs
between military and political leadership
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Military-Parliament (legislative)Relationship
Role of Prime Minister as governmental leader– Key Committees: Shinseki
– http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_xchyIeCQw
Important to educate MPs and their staffs.
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Parliament
MilitaryParliament
Military
Societal Side Consists Of
Public Opinion Societal Agents: Media and Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs)
– Odierno– http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUFkTNrUZnc
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Armed Forces Side Consists Of
Primary focus is on the officer corps– Most likely to speak for the armed forces– Most likely to interact with political side
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What are some examples of Military and Civilian Spheres Interacting?
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Advantages of Collaboration
Decision makers have best information– Can draw upon military expertise
Important for accountability Build trust between civilian and military
actors Better national security outcomes
– Poor civil-military relations will have negative strategic consequences
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Collaboration and Interaction Requires Development of National Security Experts
Manages the civil-military gap. Can help ensure that policy drives strategy. Helps to keep ends, ways, and means in
balance.
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1. Who Controls the Military and How?
Subjective Civilian Control
Opposite of objective control: state does not trust the officer corps to “mind its own business”
Military is interested in political power; state tries to co-opt it so that it won’t act on its interests; assumption is a less professional and therefore less competent military
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Civil-Military Relations
Focuses on the relationship between the state society and the military established to protect it.
Especially focuses on the relationship between civilian political authorities and the military leadership – military role in political process.
Military’s relationships with executive, legislature, society at-large, and media are most important.
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Basic Standards of Democratic Civil-Military Relations
#1: Civilian Control– Shared by Executive and Legislative Branches
Clear Chain of Command– Civilian at the top, clear, respected by all
Use of Armed Forces Defined in Law Shared Budgetary Oversight
– Executive proposes through MOD and Parliament approves; budget should be detailed; no independent access to funds
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Civilian Control of the Military is Major Component of Military Professionalism
“Civilian control of the armed forces is the most fundamental principle of military politics in democracies; without it, democratization cannot succeed.”
-- Zoltan Barany Compliance with norms of civilian control or
democratic political control is both a professional norm and expectation of the political leadership and society.
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Methods of Civilian Control
Samuel P. Huntington in The Soldier and the State (1957) defined civilian control:
Insert book graphic
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Objective Civilian Control
Military professionalism includes subordination to civilian control– “Bargain” between the state and the military:
state will respect the military as a professional institution if the military will be subordinate to civilian political leadership
– State trusts the military to “mind its own business” and stay out of politics
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Professionalism/Effectiveness and Politics Incompatible
Clausewitz (not a democrat) argued that officers should stay focused on their military expertise; getting involved in politics undermines professionalism and distracts them from primary duties – to provide national security.
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Objective Civilian Control in a Democracy
A “democratic army” does not support one
political party or another, but the principle of democratic governance.
Officers understand that civilian control is main principle of maintaining democratic system.
This means “civilians have the right to be wrong”; who makes the decision is more important than the decision itself. 27
2. What Degree of Military Influence is Appropriate?
Civilians frame policy debate and make the final decisions
May solicit professional expertise from military
Keep in mind different roles and responsibilities of civilian leadership and military leadership
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Professional Norms Limit Military Participation in Politics
Spectrum of Military Participation in Politics
Influence Advocacy Makes Policy Governs (expertise) (policy veto) (limited arenas)
Civilian CC undermined Limited MilitaryControl (CC) Military Control Rule
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3. What Should the Military Do?
Civilian leadership decides as agents of society
Military is a tool of the government to pursue the national interest
Military should not have separate institutional interests that conflict with the national interest
Servant of the state (people) with primary obligation to preserve state’s democratic nature.
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4. Who Serves?
Is military service an obligation of citizenship?
How are officers accessed and promoted? Conscription or volunteers? Cross-section of society or favored ethnic
groups?
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5. What is the link between the military’s effectiveness and its civil-military relations?
Militaries that follow basic standards of democratic civil-military relations advance democratization and strengthen democratic institutions– #1 Way: Respect Civilian Control– Gives institutions chance to develop and
mature
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Civil-Military Interaction Optimizes National Security
National security is optimized when the political leadership and military leadership participate in ways that exploit their respective competencies and responsibilities.
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Key Questions
What are the key trade-offs to consider in civil-military relations?
What constitutes “good” or “healthy” civil-military relations?
What constitutes “bad” civil-military relations?
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Back Up Slides
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2 Lenses
Institutional: – “By institutional, I mean a theory that focuses
on the interaction of political actors played out in the specific institutional setting of government.”
Sociological/Cultural:– “The chief focus of the sociological approach
is the relationship of the military to civilian society.”
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Scope of the Field
Key relationships in the national security process.
Norms: Concept of civilian supremacy – “Advise and Dissent”– Partisanship/politicization
Comparative Civil-Military Relations – Variations across political systems– Spectrum of military participation
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Military Behaviors to Inspire Trust
Make establishment and maintenance of trust priority
Give unvarnished advice: “speak up, but not out”
Remain neutral servant of state – can’t prevent mistakes
Lead way for institutional change
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Civilian Behaviors to Inspire Trust
Understand the military Recognize military’s premium on loyalty Treat military members and institution
with respect Advocate for military Hold military accountable Be accountable Exercise power gracefully
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Influences on Civil-Military Relations
History and Culture– Precedent– National values and national character
Regime type/political institutions/Constitution Individual services/CJCS Threat environment Technology Character of conflict Changing concept of “soldier-hood” Societal forces and trends
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Civil-Military Relations
Focuses on the relationship between the state, society and the military established to protect it.
Especially focuses on the relationship between civilian political authorities and the military leadership – military role in political process.
Important to understand the proper degree of military influence and participation in policymaking and the political process.
Important to understand the proper degree of military influence and participation in policymaking and the political process. 41
Civil-Military Relations in Transitioning States
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Democracy’s Impact on Political Relationships
Institutional Capacity– Capacity for oversight still lacking– Expertise will grow over time (Central
European cases are good examples)
Governmental Accountability– Corruption still present– Will increase with more transparency
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Democracy’s Impact on Professionalism
Transition from 100% conscription Leadership style Shift in ideological orientation in education
system Adapting to new political role Adapting relationship with society
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Professional Normative Foundations Include:
Awareness of Constitutional, statutory, and moral foundations of officership and national service in key civil-military relationships
Familiarity with scope of civil-military competencies expected of members of the Profession of Arms
Understanding roles and responsibilities in civil-military partnership
Recognizing role of profession’s leaders to improve strategy and policy through more effective civil-military relationships 45
Civilian Supremacy as Supreme Norm
APA: “…civilian leaders, Executive and Congressional, have full authority over the military, and upon considering the advice of military leaders, are empowered by the American public to have ultimate authority over the military and its conduct.” p. 32
Key CMR Principle: In democratic states, designated political agents must control designated military agents.
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Who Controls the Military?
Principle of Civilian Control:– designated political agents must control
designated military agents
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• Civil-military problematique:
“The civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize. “ Feaver
• “Unequal Dialogue” “Civilians have the right to be wrong.”
• “Profession” and “Professionalism”
• Roles and Responsibilities
KEY CONCEPTS IN DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
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Fostering Effective Civil-Military Partnerships in an “Unequal Dialogue”
Effective Civil-Military Relations Depends On:
Understanding roles and responsibilities across the relationships – Elected political leadership decides the
national interest
Balancing professional competencies with professional responsibilities
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Selected Issue Areasfor Civil-Military Norms
Policymaking Process
Civil-Military Norms Vis-à-Vis Dissent
Civil-Military Norms and Partisan Politics
Civil-Military Norms and Retired Officers
The Military and News Media Relations
Balancing the Functional and Societal Imperatives
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Recommended Norms I: The Role of Military Professionals in the
Policymaking Process
Understand that each position in the national security community requires unique competencies and responsibilities.
Poor policy outcomes may result when competencies and responsibilities are not in balance.
First obligation is to do no harm to state’s democratic institutions.
Show all the rocks.
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Recommended Norm
The military profession’s first obligation is to do no harm to the state’s democratic institutions and the democratic policy-making processes that they establish. The civilian political leadership sets political objectives that the military supports in good faith. The military leadership should apply its expertise without “shirking” or taking actions that, in effect, have a self-interested effect on policy outcomes. Civil-military relations in a democracy require military professionals to fulfill constitutional obligations to both the executive and the legislature. A clear sense of the distinction between national security competency and the responsibility to exercise such competency through distinct roles in the national security policy-making process must be developed as the officer’s career advances.
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Recommended Norms II: Civil-Military Norms and Dissent
Civilians should foster environment where military professionals offer best advice.
Policy advocacy limited to bounds of collaborative policy making process.
Preserve collaborative decision-making environment.
Resignation may at times be problematic too.
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Recommended Norm
Military participants in the national security policy-making process should expect a decision-making climate that encourages a full exchange of expertise across the military and civilian spheres. Military professionals, furthermore, should have the expectation that their professional judgment will be heard in policy deliberations. However, military participants must develop the professional judgment to recognize when the bounds of the policy-making process might be breached. When acts of dissent take them beyond representation and advice to outright advocacy or public dissent, military leaders must acknowledge that they have gone beyond the limits of their roles and have begun behaviors that directly challenge the role of political leaders with the responsibility to make policy.
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Recommended Norms III: Civil-Military Norms and Partisan Politics
Military should be able to serve any party in a principled fashion.
Balancing rights with unique obligation to serve society of a democratic state.
Develop capacity to distinguish between individual, institutional, and greater national interest.
Avoid appearance of institution “taking sides” in the political process.
Recognize acts that are inappropriately “political.” 55
Recommended Norm
Principled officership requires adherence to an ethic of nonpartisanship. Military professionals must feel capable of serving objectively any political party that prevails in the democratic political process. The demands of principled officership must carry the day, even if they entail voluntary limitations on officers’ liberties as citizens. Officers should consider the impact that their public profession of political beliefs has on their subordinates and on the servant relationship of the profession to society at large. Association by the military profession or by an unrepresentative number of its members with any single political party undercuts the legitimacy upon which the military depends to relate to the society it serves.
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Recommended Norms V: Military and Media Relations
Free press key tool to ensure accountability of government
Tension between military desire for information security and press’ interest in reporting the story
Evolution of embed system Influence of technology
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Recommended Civil-Military Norm
The effectiveness and legitimacy of military professions serving democratic societies depends on their healthy interaction with the news media. The military institution must focus on winning the nation’s wars and employing military power to achieve national interests. But the press has a responsibility to inform the American people so that they may hold all government institutions and the political leadership accountable for their actions. Within reasonable parameters of operational security, military professionals must seize the opportunities that occur to facilitate the press’s function in a democratic society. At a minimum, military professionals should not engage in actions that undermine or harm the Fourth Estate’s role in the American political system. The military as an institution, furthermore, should seek opportunities to educate the press in military affairs and educate its professional soldiers in media-military relations.
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Relevancy of Civil-Military Relations Concepts for National Security
Balanced civil-military relationships key determinant of national security policy.
Strategy for shaping international environment includes world-wide engagement plans that facilitate democratic patterns of civil-military relations.
Can better understand non-democratic competitors’ policy outputs.
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