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G.R. No. 111091 August 21, 1995

ENGINEER CLARO J. PRECLARO,petitioner,vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

On 14 June 1990, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 as

amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information against him read as

follows:

That on or about June 8, 1990, or sometime prior thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Project

Manager/ Consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial Technology Development Institute,

Department of Science and Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute (ITDI for

brevity) which is an agency of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST for brevity), wherein the

Jaime Sta. Maria Construction undertook the construction of the building in Bicutan, Taguig, MetroManila, with a total cost of SEVENTEEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND

PESOS (P17,695,000.00) jointly funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments, and while the said

construction has not yet been finally completed, accused either directly requested and/or demanded for

himself or for another, the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), claimed as part

of the expected profit of FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P460,000.00) in connection

with the construction of that government building wherein the accused had to intervene under the law in his

capacity as Project Manager/Consultant of said constructionsaid offense having been committed in

relation to the performance of his official duties.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

On 20 July 1990, during arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charges against him.

On 30 June 1993, after trial on the merits, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding

petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Claro Preclaro y Jambalos GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,

otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an

indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as the minimum, to TEN (10)

YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as the maximum, perpetual disqualification from public office and to pay the

costs of this action.

SO ORDERED.2

The antecedent facts are largely undisputed.

On 1 October 1989, the Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial Technology Development Institute (ITDI), a

component of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) employed Petitioner under a written contract of

services as Project Manager to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building at the DOST

Compound in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. 3


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The contract was to remain in effect from October 1, 1989 up to the end of the construction period unless sooner

terminated.4Petitioner was to be paid a monthly salary drawn from counter-part funds duly financed by foreign-assisted projects and government funds duly released by the Department of Budget and Management.5

In November 1989, to build the aforementioned CMD Structure, DOST contracted the services of the Jaime Sta.

Maria Construction Company with Engr. Alexander Resoso, as the company's project engineer. 6

How petitioner committed a violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act is narrated in the Comment of the

Solicitor General and amply supported by the records. The material portions are hereunder reproduced:

xxx xxx xxx

3. In the month of May, 1990, Alexander Resoso, Project Engineer of the Sta. Maria Construction

Company, was in the process of evaluating a Change Order for some electricals in the building construction

when petitioner approached him at the project site (p. 11, 25, Ibid.).

4. Unexpectedly, petitioner made some overtures that expenses in the Change Order will be deductive

(meaning, charged to the contractor by deducting from the contract price), instead of additive (meaning,

charged to the owner). Petitioner intimated that he can forget about the deductive provided he gets

P200,000.00, a chunk of the contractor's profit which he roughly estimated to be around P460,000.00 (pp.12-13, 22,Ibid.).

5. Having conveyed the proposal to Jaime Sta. Maria, Sr., the owner of Sta. Maria Construction Company,

Resoso thereafter asked petitioner if he wanted a rendezvous for him to receive the money. Petitioner chose

Wendy's Restaurant, corner E. Delos Santos Avenue and Camias Street, on June 6, 1990 at around 8:00

o'clock in the evening (p. 14,Ibid.).

6. However, Sta. Maria, Sr. asked for two (2) more days or until the 8thof June, perceiving financial

constraints (Ibid.).

7. Petitioner relented, saying "O.K. lang with me because we are not in a hurry." (p. 15, Ibid.) Petitioner

was thereafter asked to bring along the result of the punch list (meaning, the list of defective or correctibleworks to be done by the contractor) (p. 15, Ibid.; p. 10, TSN, 18 Oct. 1991).

8. On 7 June 1990, Sta. Maria, Sr. and Resoso proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to

report the incident (p. 15, 35,Ibid.).

9. The NBI suggested an entrapment plan to which Sta. Maria, Sr. signified his conformity (p. 16, TSN, 12

Oct. 1990). Accordingly, Sta. Maria, Sr. was requested to produce the amount of P50,000.00 in P500.00

denomination to represent the grease money (p. 37, TSN, 6 Sept. 1990).

10. The next day, or on 8 June 1990, Resoso delivered the money to the NBI. Thereafter, the money was

dusted with flourescent powder and placed inside an attache case (pp. 16-17,Ibid.). Resoso got the attache

case and was instructed not to open it. Similarly, he was advised to proceed at the Wendy's Restaurant

earlier than the designated time where a group of NBI men awaited him and his companion, Sta. Maria, Jr.(pp. 17-18,Ibid.).

11. Hence, from the NBI, Resoso passed by the Jade Valley Restaurant in Timog, Quezon City, to fetch

Sta. Maria, Jr. (Ibid.).

12. At around 7:35 p.m., Resoso and Sta. Maria, Jr. arrived at the Wendy's Restaurant. They were led by

the NBI men to a table previously reserved by them which was similarly adjacent to a table occupied by

them (pp. 18-19,Ibid.).


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13. Twenty minutes later, petitioner arrived. Supposedly, the following conversation took place, to wit:

JUSTICE BALAJADIA:

q. When Dave Preclaro arrived, what did he do?

a. We asked him his order and we talked about the punch list.

q. What was his comment about the punch list?

a. He told us that it is harder to produce small items than big ones.

q. How long did you converse with Engr. Claro Preclaro?

a. I think thirty minutes or so.

q. Was Preclaro alone when he came?

a. Yes, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. CAOILI:

q. When you talk[ed] about his punch list, did you talk about anything

else?

a. Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr., they were conversing with Dave Preclaro

and he told [him], "O, paano na."

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

q. Who said "Paano na?"

a. Engineer Sta. Maria, [Jr.]. And then Preclaro told [him], "Paano,

How will the money be arranged and can I bring it?" he said.

And then Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. told him it was arranged on two

bundles on two envelopes.

And then Dave Preclaro told, "Puede" and he asked Jimmy Sta. Maria,

Jr. if there is express teller and could he deposit during night time but

Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr. told him, "I do not have any knowledge or I do

not have any express teller you can deposit. I only know credit card."

PROS. CAOILI:

q. When Engr. Sta. Maria intervened and interviewed him that way,

was there anything that happened?

a. Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. handed two envelopes to Preclaro.


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q. Did Claro Preclaro receive these two envelopes from Engineer Sta.

Maria?

a. Yes, sir. (pp. 19-21,Ibid., See alsopp. 13-14, TSN, 29 Oct. 1990.)

14. From the moment petitioner received the two envelopes with his right hand, thereafter placing them

under his left armpit, he was accosted by the NBI men (p. 22, TSN, 12 Oct. 1990).

15. A camera flashed to record the event. Petitioner instinctively docked to avoid the taking of pictures. In

such manner, the two envelopes fell (p. 23,Ibid.).

16. The NBI men directed petitioner to pick up the two envelopes. Petitioner refused. Hence, one of the

NBI men picked up the envelopes and placed them inside a big brown envelope (p. 27, Ibid.)

17. Petitioner was thenceforth brought to the NBI for examination (p. 28;Ibid.).

18. At the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section, petitioner's right palmar hand was tested positive of flourescent

powder. The same flourescent powder, however, cannot be detected in petitioner's T-shirt and pants (p. 5,

TSN, 29 Oct. 1990).7

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, as brought out at the outset, an information was filed against petitioner which, after due hearing, resulted in

his conviction by the Sandiganbayan. Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner instituted the present petition for

review, ascribing to the Sandiganbayan the following errors:

1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE, INSTEAD OF

DISMISSING IT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, THE [PETITIONER] NOT BEING A PUBLIC

OFFICER; and

2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE

OFFENSE CHARGED HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND/ORTHAT THE GUILT OF THE [PETITIONER] HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT.

We find the petition unmeritorious.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that he is not a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt

Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019 as amended), because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office. Rather,

petitioner maintains that he is merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular

project and for a specified period 8as evidenced by the contract of services 9he entered into with the ITDI.Petitioner, to further support his "theory," alleged that he was not issued any appointment paper separate from the

abovementioned contract. He was not required to use the bundy clock to record his hours of work and neither did he

take an oath of office. 10

We are not convinced by petitioner's arguments.

Petitioner miscontrues the definition of "public officer" in R.A. No. 3019 which, according to Sec. 2(b) thereof

"includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or

unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. . . ."

The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The

terms "classified, unclassified or exemption service" were the old categories of positions in the civil service which


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have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service 11by PD 807 providing for the organization ofthe Civil Service Commission 12and by the Administrative Code of 1987. 13

Non-career service in particular is characterized by

(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career

service;and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of theappointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project

for which purpose employment was made.

The Non-Career Service shall include:

(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President

and their personal or confidential staff(s);

(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or

confidential staff;

(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special

contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the

employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year,

and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of

direction and supervision from the hiring agency;and

(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. (Emphasis ours.) 14

From the foregoing classification, it is quite evident that petitioner falls under the non-career service category

(formerly termed the unclassified or exemption service) of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined

by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).

The fact that petitioner is not required to record his working hours by means of a bundy clock or did not take an oath

of office became unessential considerations in view of the above-mentioned provision of law clearly including

petitioner within the definition of a public officer.

Similarly, petitioner's averment that he could not be prosecuted under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act

because his intervention "was not required by law but in the performance of a contract of services entered into by

him as a private individual contractor," 15is erroneous. As discussed above, petitioner falls within the definition of apublic officer and as such, his duties delineated in Annex "B" of the contract of services 16are subsumed under thephrase "wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law." 17Petitioner's allegation, toborrow a cliche, is nothing but a mere splitting of hairs.

Among petitioner's duties as project manager is to evaluate the contractor's accomplishment reports/billings 18hence,

as correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan he has the "privilege and authority to make a favorable recommendationand act favorably in behalf of the government," signing acceptance papers and approving deductives and additives

are some examples. 19All of the elements of Sec. 3(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act are, therefore,present.

Anent the second issue, we likewise find Petitioner's allegations completely bereft of merit.

Petitioner insists that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the charges

against him should be rejected for being improbable, unbelievable and contrary to human nature.


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We disagree.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that which produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is

required or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." 20We have extensivelyreviewed the records of this case and we find no reason to overturn the findings of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner enumerates the alleged improbabilities and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.We shall examine the testimonies referred to with meticulousness.

Petitioner asserts that it was improbable for him to have demanded P200,000.00 from Engr. Resoso, when he could

have just talked directly to the contractor himself. It is quite irrelevant from whom petitioner demanded his

percentage share of P200,000.00 whether from the contractor's project engineer, Engr. Alexander Resoso or directly

from the contractor himself Engr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. That petitioner made such a demand is all that is required by

Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and this element has been sufficiently established by the testimony of Engr. Resoso,

thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said when you were computing your Change Order Mr. Preclaro or Dave Preclaro

whom you identified approached you, what did you talk about?

A He mentioned to me that we are deductive in our Change Order three and four so after

our conversation I told this conversation to my boss that we are deductible in the Change

Order three and four and then my boss told me to ask why it is deductive.

Q Did you ask the accused here, Dave Preclaro why it is considered deductive?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was his answer if any?

A I asked him that my boss is asking me to ask you how come it became deductive whenmy computation is additive and he told me that I have done so much for your company

already and then he picked up cement bag paper bag and computed our alleged profit

amounting to One Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos and then he told me that he used to use

some percentage in projects maximum and minimum and in our case he would use a

minimum percentage and multiply to 60 and . . .

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Q What is 460?

A P460,000.00 and he said take of the butal and get two Hundred Thousand Pesos.

JUSTICE BALAJADIA:

What is the translation now?

WITNESS:

AAnd he said disregard the excess and I will just get the P200,000.00. (Emphasis ours.)


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PROS. CAOILI:

Q What does he mean by that if you know?

A I do not know sir.

He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and tell it to your boss. (Emphasis ours.)

JUSTICE BALAJADIA:

Q What is P200,000.00?

A It is Two Hundred Thousand Pesos.

PROS. CAOILI:

Q What did you answer him when he told you that?

A He told me to forget the deductive and electrical and after that I told my boss what hetold me.

Q Who is your boss?

A Santa Maria Sr.

Q What was the reaction of your boss when you relayed the message to Mr. Preclaro?

A The next day he told me to ask Dave where and when to pick up the money so the next

day I asked Dave "Where do you intend to get the money, the Boss wanted to know."

Q What was the answer of Dave?

A And he told me, Wendy's Restaurant at 3:00 o'clock.

Q When?

A June 6 Wednesday.

Q When he told you that did you comply with June 6 appointment?

A I told my boss what he told me again that the meeting will take place at Wendy's

Restaurant corner Edsa and Camias Street at around 8:00 o'clock p.m. June 6,

Wednesday.

Q What did your boss tell you?

A The next day he told me to ask Dave.

Q What did your boss tell you?


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A My boss told me to ask Dave to postpone the meeting on June 6 to be postponed on

June 8 at the same place and same time because my boss is having financial problem.

Q Did you relay the postponement to Dave Preclaro?

A Yes sir. I told what my boss told me.

Q What was his reaction?

A Dave told me "O.K. lang with me" because we are not in a hurry. Any way we are the

ones to sign the acceptance papers and my boss instructed me that on Friday to ask Dave

to bring along the result of the punch list and if possible also to bring along the

acceptance papers to be signed by Dave, Lydia Mejia and Dr. Lirag the director.

Q What happened next after meeting with Preclaro to relay the postponement if any?

A Nothing happened. The next day, Thursday the boss instructed me to go with him to

the NBI to give a statement.

Q Did you go to the NBI and report to the incident to the NBI?

A Yes sir.

Q Did you give a statement before any of the agents of the of the NBI?

A Yes sir. 21

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, petitioner's alleged refusal to see Mr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. when the latter tried to arrange meetings with

him regarding his demand 22does not weaken the cause against petitioner. It does not at all prove that petitioner didnot ask for money. Conceivably petitioner did not muster enough courage to ask money directly from the contractor

himself. Getting the amount through the project engineer would be safer because if Mr. Sta. Maria, Sr. had refused

to give money, petitioner could always deny having made the demand.

Petitioner contends that the percentage demanded in the amount of P200,000.00 is too high considering that the

estimated profit of the contractor from the CMD project is only P460,000.00. In petitioner's words, this would "scare

the goose that lays the golden egg." 23We reject this argument. The aforementioned contractor's profit is petitioner'sown computation as testified to by Engr. Resoso:

xxx xxx xxx

A I asked him that my boss is asking me to ask you how come it became deductive when

my computation is additive and he told me that I have done so much for your companyalreadyand then he picked up cement bag paper bag and computed our alleged profit

amounting to One Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos and then he told me that he used to use

some percentage in projects maximum and minimum and in our case he would use a

minimum percentage and multiply to 460 and . . .(Emphasis ours.)

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Q What is 460?


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AP460,000.00 and it ended to P215 thousand or P20,000.00 and he said take of the

butal and get the Two Hundred Thousand Pesos. (Emphasis ours.)

JUSTICE BALAJADIA:

What is the translation now?

WITNESS:

A And he said disregard the excess and I will just get the P200,000.00.

PROS. CAOILI:

Q What does he mean by that if you know?

A I do not know sir.

He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and tell it to your boss. 24

xxx xxx xxx

The records, however, do not show the true and actual amount that the Sta. Maria Construction will earn as profit.

There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner's contention as the actual profit may be lower or higher than his

estimation.

Besides, as related by Engr. Resoso, petitioner considers the P200,000.00 percentage proper compensation since he

has allegedly done so much for the Sta. Maria construction company. 25

Petitioner also argues that:

According to STA. MARIA, SR., they were deductive by P280,000.00 (Id., pp. 34-35).

If STA. MARIA CONSTRUCTION was deductive in the amount of P280,000.00, why would the

petitioner still demand P200,000.00 which would increase the contractor's loss to P480,000.00!

It might have been different if the changes were additive where STA. MARIA CONSTRUCTION would

have earned more, thereby providing motive for the petitioner to ask for a percentage! 26

But this is precisely what petitioner was bargaining for P200,000.00 in exchange for forgetting about the

deductive 27and thus prevent the Sta. Maria Construction from incurring losses.

Petitioner's contention that it was impossible for him to make any demands because the final decision regarding

accomplishments and billing lies with the DOST technical committee is unacceptable. Petitioner is part of the

abovementioned technical committee as the ITDI representative consultant. This is part of his duties under the

contract of services in connection with which he was employed by the ITDI. Even, assuming arguendothat

petitioner does not make the final decision, as supervisor/consultant, his recommendations will necessarily carry

much weight. Engr. Resoso testified thus:

PROS. CAOILI:

Q As a Project Engineer to whom do you present your billing papers accomplishment

report or purchase order?


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A The billing paper was being taken cared of by the, of our office. I personally do my job

as supervision in the construction.

QDo you have any counterpart to supervise the project from the government side?

AYes, we have.

Yes, the DOST have a technical Committee Infra-Structure Committee and also the ITDI

as its own representative.

Q Who composed the Technical Committee of the DOST?

AA certain Engineer Velasco, Engineer Sande Banez and Engineer Mejia.

QHow about the ITDI?

A The ITDI representative composed of Dave Preclaro.

Q Who is this Dave Preclaro?

AHe is the consultant of ITDI. (Emphasis ours.)

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CAOILI:

Q As Project Engineer do you consult to any body regarding your job?

A First if there is any problem in the site I consult my boss.

PROS. CAOILI:

Q How about with the other consultants representing the ITDI and DOST?

A In the construction site we have meeting every Monday to discuss any problem.

Q With whom do you discuss this problem?

A The Infra-structure Committee of DOST and the Infra-structure Committee of ITDI,

the architect and the contractor. We had weekly meetings.

Q What matters if any do you consult with Mr. Claro Preclaro?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

No basis.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

They met on problems on Mondays.


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ATTY. JIMENEZ:

But there is no mention of Preclaro specifically.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

With the representative of DOST and Preclaro

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Does that also mean that Preclaro is also among the representatives he is going to consult

with?

Well any way. . .

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Witness may answer the question.

Read back the question.

COURT STENOGRAPHER:

Reading back the question as ordered by the Court.

WITNESS:

AEvery Monday meeting we tackle with accomplishment report the billing

papers. 28(Emphasis ours.)

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner also claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the entrapment itself are

conflicting, doubtful or improbable:

(aaa) according to RESOSO, only FOUR (4) P500 bills were dusted with flourescent powder and used in

the alleged entrapment.

ContradictingRESOSO, STA. MARIA, SR. said that he gave fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos in P500

denomination to the NBI. 29

There is no such inconsistency. Said witnesses were testifying on two different subjects. Engr. Sta. Maria, Sr.'s

testimony touched on the amount he gave the NBI for use in the entrapment while Engr. Resoso's declaration

referred only to the number of bills dusted with flourescent powder.

Petitioner, likewise, misappreciated the following testimony of Resoso:

PROS. CAOILI:

Q What did he do with the two envelopes upon receiving the same?


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A Then he asked Jaime Sta. Maria, Jr. if there is bank teller express, if he could deposit

the money but Mr. Sta. Maria said, "I do not have, I only have credit cards." 30

Petitioner intended to deposit the money in his own account not that of Mr. Sta. Maria, Jr. He was merely inquiring

from the latter if there was an express teller nearby where he could make the deposit. Mr. Sta. Maria Jr. himself

testified as follows:

A He asked me if there was express teller. I told him I do not know then he asked me

whether it is possible to deposit at the Express Teller at that time. I told him I don't know

because I have no express teller card and he asked me how am I going to arrange, how

was it arranged if I will bring it, can I bring it. Then I told him that it was placed in two

envelopes consisting of 500 Peso bills and then he said "Okay na yan." 31

The failure of the NBI to take photographs of the actual turn-over of the money to petitioner is not fatal to the

People's cause. The transaction was witnessed by several people, among whom were Engr. Resoso, Mr. Sta. Maria

Jr. and the NBI agents whose testimonies on the circumstances before, during and after the turn-over are consistent,

logical and credible.

According to NBI Agent Francisco Balanban Sr., they purposely took no photographs of the actual turn-over so as

not to alert and scare off the petitioner. During cross-examination Agent Balanban Jr. stated:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, of course, this entrapment operation, you made certain preparation to make sure

that you would be able to gather evidence in support of the entrapment?

A Yes sir.

Q As a matter of fact you even brought photographer for the purpose?

A That is right sir.

Q And that photographer was precisely brought along to record the entrapment?

A Yes sir.

Q From the beginning to the end, that was the purpose?

A At the time of the arrest sir.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

From the time of the handing over of the envelopes until the entrapment would have been

terminated?

ANo sir we plan to take the photograph only during the arrest because if we take

photographs he would be alerted during the handingof the envelopes. (Emphasis ours.)

Q So you did not intend to take photographs of the act of handing of the envelopes to the

suspect?


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A We intended but during that time we cannot take photographs at the time of the

handling because the flash will alert the suspect. (Emphasis ours.)

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Why did you not position the photographer to a far distance place with camera with

telescopic lens?

A We did not Your Honor.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

So was it your intention to take photographs only at the time that he is already being

arrested?

A Yes sir. 32

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner insists that when his hands were placed under ultra-violet light, both were found negative for flourescent

powder. This is petitioner's own conclusion which is not supported by evidence. Such self-serving statement will not

prevail over the clear and competent testimony and the report 33submitted by the forensic expert of the NBI Ms.Demelen R. dela Cruz, who was the one who conducted the test and found petitioner's right palmar hand positive for

flourescent powder, the same hand he used, according to witnesses Resoso and Sta. Maria Jr., to get the money from

the latter.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Mrs. dela Cruz since when have you been a Forensic Chemist at NBI?

A Since 1981 sir.

Q JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Q By the way, is the defense willing to admit that the witness is a competent as . . . .

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Admitted Your Honor.

PROS. CAOILI:

Madam Witness did you conduct a forensic examination in the person of one Dave

Preclaro y Jambalos?

A Yes sir.

Q If that person whom you examined is here in court would you be able to recognize

him?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:


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We admit that the accused is the one examined by the witness.

ATTY. CAOILI:

Did you prepare the result of the examination in writing?

A Yes sir.

PROS. CAOILI:

Showing to you Physic Examination No. 90-961 which for purposes of identification has

already been marked as Exh. H what relation has this have with the report that you

mentioned a while ago?

A This is the same report that I prepared sir.

Q How did you conduct such flourescent examination?

A The left and right hands of the accused were placed under the ultra violet lamp sir.

Q What was the result?

A It gave a . . . under the ultra violent lamp the palmer hands of the suspect gave positive

result for the presence of flourescent powder.

Q What palmar hands?

A Right hand sir.

Q What other examination did you conduct?

A And also the clothing, consisting of the t-shirts and the pants were examined. Under

the ultra violet lamp the presence of the flourescent powder of the t-shirts and pants

cannot be seen or distinguished because the fibers or the material of the cloth under the

ultra violet lamp was flouresce.

Q Please tell the Court why the t-shirts and pants under the ultra violent lamp was

flouresce?

A The materials or the fibers of the clothings it could have been dyed with flourescent

dyes sir.34

xxx xxx xxx

What we find improbable and contrary to human experience is petitioner's claim that he was set up by Engr. Sta.

Maria Sr. and Engr. Resoso for no other purpose but revenge on account, for petitioner's failure to recommend the

Sta. Maria Construction to perform the extra electrical works. 35

The Sandiganbayan has aptly ruled on this matter, thus:

For another, the claim of accused that there was ill-will on the part of the construction company is hardly

plausible. It is highly improbable for the company to embark on a malicious prosecution of an innocent


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person for the simple reason that such person had recommended the services of another construction firm.

And it is extremely impossible for such company to enlist the cooperation and employ the services of the

government's chief investigative agency for such an anomalous undertaking. It is more in accord with

reason and logic to presuppose that there was some sort of a mischievous demand made by the accused in

exchange for certain favorable considerations, such as, favorable recommendation on the completeness of

the project, hassle-free release of funds, erasure of deductives, etc. Indeed, the rationale for the occurrence

of the meeting and the demand for money is infinite and boundless. 36

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Engr. Sta. Maria Sr., who was then engaged in the construction of

another DOST building, would not risk his business or livelihood just to exact revenge which is neither profitable

nor logical. As we aptly stated inMaleg v. Sandiganbayan: 37

It is hard to believe that the complainant who is a contractor would jeopardize and prejudice his business

interests and risk being blacklisted in government infrastructure projects, knowing that with the institution

of the case, he may find it no longer advisable nor profitable to continue in his construction ventures. It is

hardly probable that the complainant would weave out of the blue a serious accusation just to retaliate and

take revenge on the accused.

From the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that on the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence

presented during the trial, the guilt of petitioner has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, G.R. No. 162059Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,

Chairperson,

- versus -AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,*

NACHURA, and

REYES,JJ.

SANDIGANBAYAN and Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents. January 22, 2008x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar**accused, along with her brother, of swindling

government funds?
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MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwapinararatangan ng estafang pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorariassailing the Resolutions[1]of the

Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for

reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a

state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada

on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending

on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex

in UP Diliman.[2]On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and

Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).[3]

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex .[4]President Estrada gave Fifteen

Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of thefunds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.[5]The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare

Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of

student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and

Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.[6]

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her

brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.[7]The

Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby

accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime ofEstafa,defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended

committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,

Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named

accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student

Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of

her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her

position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private

individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by

falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the

renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed

as President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall, and for which purpose accused HANNAHEUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),

Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said

false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.

91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),

which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and

misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the

accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the

damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
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CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any

jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the

crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.[8]It has no jurisdiction over the crime

of estafa.[9]It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by

Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).Estafafalling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes

Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she

received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.[10]

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was

not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions

in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with

the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions

or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same isbeyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11]

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12]It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential

Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch-all phrase in relation to office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has

jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the

money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial .[13]

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, was a public officer. As a member of the BOR,

she had the general powers of administration and exercised the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems

definition of a public office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is

erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted

to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.[14]

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit .[15]It

ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2,

Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly

pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also

has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to

their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the

offense of estafacommitted by a public official in relation to his office.

Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, shewas never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under

Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act

No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all

cases involving:

(A) x x x
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(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,

otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act

of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),specifically including:

x x x x

(g)Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive

jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of

their salary grades,because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the

nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the

Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of

administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to

the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the university;

2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the government of the universitysuch general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of

the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University,

professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation,

hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in

its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions

of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and

hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of

directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or

trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines isperforming functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This

draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly

falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive

jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27

or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million was

received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a

defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.[16]

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[17]The motion was denied with

finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.[18]

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACKAND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT

QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO

JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.[19]

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction

over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense
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charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President

Estrada, not from the government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Prelimi nari ly, the denial of a motion to

quash i s not corr ectible by certi orari .

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is

the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for

petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to

quash.[20]Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often

dismissed.[21] The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.[22]

InNewsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23]the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule

and the exceptions, thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and

cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). Theordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision

is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order

denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal

lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to

dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion, then certiorarior prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the

defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction

over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion

to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and

capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and

adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

InDe Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorariand

prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

InLopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on

lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined

the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.

InEnriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on

improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judgefrom taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.

InManalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on

bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorariand directed the respondent

judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy(105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based

on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorariand dismissed the amended

complaint.
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In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorariafter

the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to

desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.

InPeople v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on

prescription was set aside on certiorariand the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.[24]

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jur isdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by

R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section

4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to

Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the

Sandiganbayan.[25]She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari[26]and in her memorandum of

authorities.[27]

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that

petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.[28]

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that

determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the

Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President

Ferdinand E. Marcos onJune 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of

public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest

degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people .[29]

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10,

1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[30]

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan

jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which

was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases

involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised

Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in

the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commissionof the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,

otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act

of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of thesangguniang panlalawigan, and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
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(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of thesangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,

engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director

and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office

of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,

state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the

Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of

the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation

and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed

by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their

office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.

1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or

higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned

above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court,

metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,

pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,

resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original

jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the

writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writsand processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo

warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order

Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall

not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the

Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for

review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the

Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the


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Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the

People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-

A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public

officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,

they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall

exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and

the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be

simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the

Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to

necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil

action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the

civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been

rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court,

said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may

be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil

action shall be deemed abandoned.

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses

certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead

thereto.[31]Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed

with the Sandiganbayan.[32]

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has

jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:

Section 4.Prohibition on private individuals.(a) It shall be unlawful for any person

having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take

advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving

any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business,transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has

to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in

the third civil degree. The word close personal relation shall include close personal friendship,

social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which

assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to

commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their

penalties.

Sandiganbayan has ju ri sdicti on over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of

Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to

avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.[33]Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens
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et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be

adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to

arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.[34]The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the

whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.[35]In other words, petitioners interpretation

lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best

interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.[36]Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas aymarapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam nainterpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed

by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their

office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their

office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafaas one of the offenses included in Section 4(B) of

P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafais one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twinrequirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D.

No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

InPerlas, Jr. v. People,[37]the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an

indictment for estafaversus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government

instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive

Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other

national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks

Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs.Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman

respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,

Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued

pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of

the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular

government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and

operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafawas reiterated with greater firmness inBondoc v.

Sandiganbayan.[38]Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial

Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As

already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases

and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the

nature of the offenses charged, as estafathru falsification punishable by penalties higher

thanprision correccionalor imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by

government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are

within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken
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cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so

transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public off icer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as

a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public

officer. InKhan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public

officer.[39]The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and

concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

InAparri v. Court of Appeals,[40]the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which

for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an

individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be

exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,]Sec. 1). The

right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists,

when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and

conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in anoffice, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for

special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an

office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

InLaurel v. Desierto,[41]the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,

for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an

individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be

exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.[42]

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-

paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other

officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,[43]We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)

covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other

executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of

law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she

is placed there by express provision of law.[44]

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,

directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational

institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR

performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.[45]By express mandate of law,

petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.[46]At most, it is

merely incidental to the public office.[47]

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some

portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one

a public officer.[48]

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP

performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the
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sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training.[49]Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government

and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.[50]

The offense charged was commi tted

in r elation to public off ice, according

to the I nformation.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have

jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds

there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that

her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private

capacity and not in relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.[51]More than that, jurisdiction is

not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a

motion to quash.[52]Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant

or respondent.[53]

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a studentregent of U.P., while in the performance of her official functions,committing the offense in relation to her office and

taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private

individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x. (Underscoring

supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the

information based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that shoul d

be raised duri ng tr ial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from the government

coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then

occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that petitioner requested the

amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the

latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land

Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense

that should be ventilated during the trial on the

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