Modrak-Forms, Types, And Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics

7/26/2019 Modrak-Forms, Types, And Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics

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Forms, Types, and Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics

Modrak, Deborah K. W.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 17, Number 4, October

1979, pp. 371-381 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0080

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Forms, Types, and Tokens in

A ristotle s

etaphysics

D K M O D R A K

ARE ARISTOTELIAN FORMS uni ver sal s or par tic ula rs? Thi s que sti on has receive d m uc h

att ent ion in recent discussions. ~ Besides being int eres ting in its own right, the an swer

is crucial to the interpretat ion of the central books of the

Metaphysics

given the

interrelatedness of Aris tot le 's not ions of form, s ubstanc e, essence, and defini t ion. If,

for example, the correct answer is that forms are universals, Aristotle may be in diffi-

culty, for he denies that universals are substanc es, an d he identifies subst ance with

form. 2 Thus, Aristotle seems to hold that (1) no uni vers al is a substance an d that (2)

some universals ( i.e. , forms) are substances. If such a contr adict i on is at the heart of

his theory of substance, it would seem to be in trouble. If we seek to avoid this diffi-

cul ty by making forms individuals as Edwin Ha rt ma n does in a recent paper, ~ we

also end up with confl icting doctrines: a thi ng 's su bstanc e or form is ident ical with

its essence, the formul a of which is its def ini tio n. ' If forms are par ticular s, then the

objects of defini t ion would be part iculars , but Aris tot le insis ts that defini t ion is of

the universa l. ~

What is needed, then, is an interpretat ion of forms that al lows them to be the

objects of knowledge and defini t ion (i .e. , universals) and at the same t ime avoids the

contradict ion mentioned above. My proposal is to dis t inguish between substance

types and other universals, which I shall call universalsp, and to identify forms with

substance types. The co ntradi ct ion we generated a bove from the thesis that forms

are un iversals is resolved because 1 asserts that no universalp is a subst ance, a nd 2

asserts that forms are substance types. The object of this paper is to show that this is

Aris tot le 's posi t ion and that consequ ent ly his theory of forms is much more cohere nt

and phi losophical ly sat isfying than is frequent ly real ized. Final ly, I hope to show

James H. Lesher summarizes the contemporary dispute nicely in Aristotle on Form, Substance, and

Universals: A Dilemma,

Phronesis

16 (1971): 169-78.

2Aristotle asserts that universals cannot be substances at 1003a7, 1038b7-12, 1038b35, 1060b21, 1087a2,

alOft, 1087a10ft., and thal what is common cannot be a substance at 1040b23. He identifiessubstance with

form at 1028a28, 1032bl-2, 1033b17, 1035b14ff., 1037a27ff., 1047a27, 1041b6, and 1050b2. If a solution is

not found, we may have to concur with Geach's assertion that 'there is hardly a statement about form in

the

Metaphysics

that is not (at least verbally) contradicted by some other statement (G. E. M. Anscombe

and P. T. Geach,

Three Philosophers

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 75.

Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence,

Philosophical Review

85 (1976):545-66.

' The relation of essence, or definition, to substance is discussed at 1029b20; 1030b5; 1031al, 10,18;

1031b32; and 1039a20. The relation of form to definition and essence is discussed at 1035a21, 1029bl-3,

1036a29, 1043bl, and 1044a10. (See n. 2 above on the identification of form with substance.)

' 1036a28-20, 1040al-7, 1059b25. Cf. 1018b33. See also 1060b20-23 and 1087a10, which say that the

objects of knowledge are universals.

[371]


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3 7 2

H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

w h y A r i s t o t le ' s o b j e c t i o n s t o P l a t o n i c f o r m s a s s u b s t a nc e s c a n n o t b e t u rn e d a g a i n s t

h is o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f f o rm s .

I . I f , l i ke A r i s t o t l e , w e d i v i d e t h e w o r l d i n t o s u b s t a n c e s a n d a t t r i b u t e s , w e a r e

l i k e ly to a s s o c i a t e t h e f o r m e r w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s a n d t h e l a t t e r w i t h u n i v e r s a l s .

H o w e v e r , w e s h o u l d b e w a r y o f a t t r i b u t i n g t h i s p o s i t i o n to A r i s t o t l e . I n t h e

Cate-

gories,

h e t r e a t s t h e s e a s s e p a r a t e d i s t i n c t i o n s a n d d i v i d e s b o t h t h e s u b s t a n c e c a t e -

g o r y a n d t h e a t t r i b u t e c a t e g o r y , n a m e l y th e c a t e g o r y t h a t i n c l u d e s a n y i t e m th a t i s

p r e s e n t i n a s u b j e c t , i n t o i n d i v id u a l s a n d u n i v e r s a l s . H e d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n

p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c e s , w h i c h a r e c o n c r e t e i n d i v id u a l s ( e . g ., t hi s m a n ) , a n d s e c o n d a r y

s u b s t a n c e s , w h i c h a r e t h e g e n e r a a n d s p e c i e s o f t h e s e i n d i v i d u a ls ( e . g ., m a n ) ;

b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l a t t r i b u t e s ( e . g ., t h i s w h i t e ) a n d u n i v e r s a l a t t r i b u t e s ( e . g ., w h i te ) . 6

T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y s u b s t a n c e s i s n o t f o u n d i n th e Metaphy-

sics, b u t A r i s to t l e c o n t i nu e s t o ho l d th a t th e s p e c i e s - n o w c o n s t r u e d a s t h e f o r m - - o f

t h e c o m p o s i t e i n d i v i d u a l i s a s u b s t a n c e , a s w e ll a s t h e i n d i v i d u a l 3 T h e f o r m , s i n c e i t

i s e x e m p l i f i e d b y a l l t h e m e m b e r s o f th e s a m e s p e c i e s , is a u n i v e r s a l i n th e o r d i n a r y

s e n s e . A r i s t o t l e , h o w e v e r , d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e f o r m , t h a t i s , t h e e s s e n c e o f a

t h i n g , a n d o t h e r u n i v e r s a l s i n th e c e n t r a l b o o k s o f t h e Metaphysics. T h e f o r m e r i s

w h a t a t h i n g i s s a i d t o b e i n i t s e l f (kath'hauto); i t d o e s n o t i m p l y t h e p r e s e n c e o f o n e

t h i n g i n a n o t h e r a s s u b s t r a t u m . T h e l a t t e r i s s a i d o f a n u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t r a t u m

(kath

hupokeimenou) ,

e i t h e r i n c i d e n t a l ly

(ka ta sumbebekos)

o r t h r o u g h a s h a r e d a t t r i b u t e

(kattl metochen).*

I n B o o k Z e t a , A r i s t o t l e a s s o c i a t e s f o r m s a n d e s s e n c e s w i t h u n i v e r s a l s w h e n h e

t a l k s a b o u t d e f i n i t i o n a n d d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e m w h e n h e a s k s w h e t h e r u n i v e r -

s a l s a r e s u b s t a n c e s . * I n a n s w e r i n g t h e l a t t e r q u e s t i o n A r i s t o t l e i s c o n c e r n e d t o b u i l d a

c a s e a g a i n s t t h o s e w h o s a y t h a t t h e I d e a s a r e s u b s t a n c e s ( 1 03 9 a 25 ) . A s A r i s t o t l e

u n d e r s t a n d s t h e i r ( t h e P l a t o n i s t s ' s ) p o s i t i o n , u n i v e r s a ls a r e n e c e s s a r i l y c o m m o n

p r o p e r t i e s t h a t p r e s u p p o s e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f in d i v i d u a l s , f o r a u n i v e r s a l i s t r u l y p r e d i -

c a t e d o f a n i n d i v i d u a l j u s t i n ca s e th e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a t e s i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e f o r m .

F o r e x a m p l e , a n i n d i v i d u a l i s a n a n i m a l j u s t i n c a s e t h a t i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a t e s i n

t h e f o r m o f A n i m a l - I t s e l f , a n d t h i s i n d i v id u a l w i ll s h a r e t h i s p r o p e r t y w i t h a n y o t h e r

i n d i v i d u a l w h o i s a l s o a n a n i m a l a s w e l l a s w i t h a l l t h e s p e c i e s o f a n i m a l s . A c c o r d i n g -

l y , u n i v e r s a l s a r e d e s c r i b e d a s t h i n g s b e l o n g i n g u n i v e r s a l l y (ton katholou hupar-

chonton) a n d a s t h i n g s p r e d i c a t e d i n c o m m o n (ton koine kategoroumenon). ,o

A r i s t o tl e t a k e s t h e P l a t o n i c c o n c e p t i o n o f a u n iv e r s al a s a c o m m o n p r o p e r t y a n d

s h o w s t h a t s o c o n s t r u e d u n i v e r s a l s c a n n o t b e s u b s t a n c e s . Z e t a 1 3 s e ts o u t t h e d if -

f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n s u b s t a n c e s a n d u n i v e r s a l s : ( 1) A s u b s t a n c e d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o m a n y

9 l a 2 0 - b 9 . F o r o u r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , i t is n o t n e c e s s a r y t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e o b j e c t s i n t h e n o n -

s u b s t a n c e c a t e g o r y t h a t A r i s t o t l e d e s c r ib e s a s p r e s e n t i n a s u b j e c t b u t n o t s a i d o f a s u b j e c t a r e in d i v i d u a l s ,

s J . L . A c k r i l l a r g u e s (Ar is to t le 's 'Categor ies and " ' D e Interpretatione' [ O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i ty

P r e s s , 1 9 6 3 ], p p . 7 4 - 7 6 ) , o r w h e t h e r t h e y a r e u n i v e r s a l s , as G . E . L . O w e n a r g u e s ( " I n h e r e n c e , "

Phronesis

1 0 [ 1 9 5 5 l : 9 7 - 1 0 5 ) .

' T h e lo c u t i o n " p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c e "

(pro te ousia)

i s f o u n d i n t h e

Metaphysics

( 1 0 3 2 b 3 , 1 0 3 7 a 3 ,

1037a38, 10 37b3-5), b ut it is not u sed as in the Categories for the concrete individual (cf. 1037a5-bT).

i 1029b14, 1030a14, 1032a5, 1035628, 103763-4, 1038b13-1039al.

9 See 1032634 a nd 1036a28 on for ms as objec ts of definitio n and univ ersal s. See 1028b34ff. and 103862-8

for the treatment of the universal to katholou) as a distinct candidate for substance.

~0 1038b35, 1038b11, 1039al.


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A R I S T O T L E ' S M E T A P H Y S I C S 3 7 3

t h i n g s ; a u n i v e r s a l d o e s . ( 2 ) A s u b s t a n c e i s n o t s a i d o f a s u b s t r a t u m ; a u n i v e r s a l i s .

( S i nc e A r i s t o t l e a l l o w s m a t t e r t o b e t he s u b s t r a t u m o f s u b s ta n c e , t h e i m p o r t o f t h e

p h r a s e k a t h h u p o k e i m e n o u h e r e m f l s t b e o f a s u b s t r a t u m o f p r o p e r t i e s . ) ~' ( 3) A

s u b s t a n c e i s a t h i s ( t o d e t O; a u n i v e r s a l i s a s u c h ( t o i o n d e ) . ) 2 A r i s t o t l e a l s o a r g u e s

t h a t w e r e t h e u n i v e r s a l a s u b s t a n c e , t h e n q u a l i t y ( p o i o n ) o r a t t r i b u t e s ( p a t h S ) w o u l d

b e p r i o r t o s u b s t a n c e ( 1 0 3 8 b 2 5 - 2 8 ) . T h e u s e o f p o i o n , p a t h S , a n d t o i o n d e m a k e s i t

c l e a r t h a t t h e u n i v e r s a l u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n i s t a k e n t o b e a n a t t r i b u t e . ,3

T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l i n Z e t a 1 3 i s g i v e n b y t h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f 1, 2 , a n d 3 .

A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s t h a t P l a t o i s c o m m i t t e d t o t h is c o n c e p t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l a n d u s e s it

t o a r g u e a g a i n s t h i m . S i n c e th i s i s a s p e c i al s e n se o f u n i v e r s a l , A r i s t o t l e ' s a r g u m e n t s

a g a i n s t i d e n t i f y i n g ( P l a t o n i c ) u n i v e r s a l s w i t h s u b s t a n c e s d o n o t r u l e o u t t h e p o s s i -

b i l it y o f th e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s u b s t a n c e w i t h a n o n - P l a t o n i c u n i v e r s a l t h a t i s n o t a

p r o p e r t y . W e n e e d n o t t a k e A r i s t o t l e ' s p o i n t t o b e t h a t o n l y c o n c r e t e i n d i v id u a l s a r e

s u b s t a n c e s .

I n t h e l o g i c a l t re a t i s e s, A r i s t o t l e u s e s u n i v e r s a l

( k a t h o l o u )

a s t h e c o m p l e m e n t o f

i n d i v i d u a l ( k a t h h e k a s t o n ) . I n D e I n t e r p re t a t io n e 7 , h e s a y s , O f t h i n g s s o m e a r e

u n i v e r s a l , o t h e r s i n d i v i d u a l ( I c a l l u n i v e r s a l t h a t w h i c h i s b y it s n a t u r e p r e d i c a t e d o f

a n u m b e r o f t h i n g s , a n d i n d i v i d u a l t h a t w h i c h i s n o t ; f o r e x a m p l e , m a n i s a u n i v e r -

s a l, C a l l ia s a n i n d i v i d u a l ) ( 1 7 a 38 - 4 1 ). A r i s t o t l e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l h e r e is

s u c h t h a t w e c o u l d r e v i s e h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l t o r e a d : t h e u n i v e r s a l i s o f s u c h a

n a t u r e a s to b e e x e m p l i f i e d b y m a n y t h i n g s . S i n c e t h e r e v i s e d d e f i n i t i o n s e e m s t o f i t

t h e s t a n d a r d c o n c e p t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l s , I s h a l l u s e u n i v e r s a l f o r a n y t h i n g t h a t sa t is -

f i e s i t . I n t h e M e t a p h y s i c s , A r i s t o t l e r e t a in s t h e b r o a d n o t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l in d i sc u s -

s i o n s o f k n o w l e d g e a n d d e f i n i t i o n b u t a l s o in t r o d u c e s , i n a n t i - P l a t o n i s t d i s c u s s i o n s ,

a n a r r o w e r c o n c e p t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a u n i v e r s a l is t h a t w h i c h i s

s a i d o f s o m e t h i n g e l s e a n d i s a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f a s u b s t r a t u m . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f a

u n i v e r s a l , w h i c h f i ts t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f s u b s t a n c e s b e s t , I s h a l l l a b e l u n i v e r s a l p . '~

1038b15; cf . 1029a23, 1049a26. M. J . W oods makes a s im i lar argum ent in h is insigh t fu l paper

P r o b l e m s i n Metaphysics Z, C h a p t e r 1 3 , i n J . M . E . M o ra v c sk i , e d . , Aristotle (No t re Da me : Un i v e r -

s i ty of Not re D ame Press, 1967). He d iffers from me in ho ld ing tha t in Zeta 13, Aristotle distinguishes

e tween ta katholou,

which inc lude Aris to te l ian forms, and

ta katholou legomena,

which do not , whereas

I th ink tha t Aris to t le s imply uses a rest r ic ted no t ion of un iversa l in arguing against the Pla ton ic

concept ion of substance .

There i s one passage in Zeta (1033621-26) where Aris to t le speaks of the form as a such , bu t the

fo rm that i s so characterized is no t the substan t ia l fo rm but the form as a concept ion in the art i san ' s

mi n d o r a s t r a n smi t t e d b y the sperm. In these cases the f o r m can be looked upon as a po ten t ia l qual i f i -

ca t ion of the art i san ' s m ateria l s o r o f an ovum . In the case of sperm, A ris to t le mak es th is same poin t e l se-

where by say ing tha t the form is po ten t ia l ly in the sperm (1034a35, 1049a13).

,1 C f . Pse u d o -A l e x a n d e r ' s p a ra p h ra se : h o t i o u d e n t o n k o i n e i k a t e g o ro u me n o n se ma i n ei t o to d e t i a l i a

t o i o n d e k a i p o i o n (In Aristotelis M etaphysica Comm entaria, ed. M . H ayd uck [Berlin, 1891], 494.22).

See a l so 1049alS-b l w here Aris to t le says tha t the m at ter o f a th ing i s no t a th i s bu t a tha t

(ekeininon)

to

cal l a t ten t ion to the mat ter o f a th ing being l ike an a t t r ibu te in being demarcated by the th ing i t con-

st i tu tes , as , fo r instance , the wood of th is casket (cf . 1033a7).

A t 1060b19-21, Aris to t le seems to use

katholou

in bo th senses . H ow ever , th i s passage , l ike the c losing

passage of

Zeta

13, i s designed to ra i se a puzzle about the in te l l ig ib i l i ty of substance: Ho w can substance

be know i f i t i s a th i s and the ob jec t o f know ledge i s a un iversal and a such? Aris to t le ' s answer tu rns on

making the d is t inc t ion between universa l and universa lp , bu t he explo i t s the amb igui ty of h is use of un i -

versa l in formula t ing the puzzle .

'~ Cf. Cat. 3b10-23. In The Theory of Universals(Oxford ; Oxford U nivers i ty Press , 1952), R. 1 . Aa ron

argues for a d is t inc t ion between universa ls tha t a re substances and unive rsa ls tha t a re qual i t ies . He seems

to be unaware tha t Aris to t le made a s imi lar d is t inc t ion (see pp . 217-19).


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3 74 H IST O R Y O F PH IL O S O PH Y

Aristot le 's claim that no universal is a substan ce turns out to be the claim that no

universalp is a substance. '~ This would be co mpatib le with forms being universals

and the subs tance of ind iv iduals .

I . Aris tot le takes the form of a thing to be i ts s t ructure or organi zat ion and its

matter to be that in which the structure is manifested: the matter of a house is the

materials of which i t is composed; i ts form, the a rra ngem ent of these materials such

that it is a house. The m atter of a syllable is its letters; the form, the a rra nge men t of

these such t hat it is a syllable. '7 Alt houg h Arist otle fre quent ly uses artifacts, such as

bronz e spheres and houses, to i l lustrate the matte r-for m dist inct ion, he expresses

unce rtai nty as to whether the forms of art i facts are ca pable of separate exis tence as

full-fledged substan ces. '~ He decides th at they ar e not . ,9 The par adi gm cases of sen-

sible substances are na tural things. ~ The forms of these are said to be capable of

separate exis tence, ungener ated and i ndest ruct i ble." The form of a l iving creature is

the orga nizat i on of i ts mat ter such that i t is capable of such vi tal funct ions as nutri -

t ion and repr oduct ion. When the animal ceases to be capable of such funct ions it is

no longer the same subs tance. Aris tot le insis ts that a dea d man is not a ma n and for

this reason rejects the ident i f icat ion of form with conf igurat io n. 2 ' He opts instead for

the ident i f ica t ion of form with the soul as the complex of vi tal capa ci t ie s ."

The form of any in divid ual living thing is typical of its species; that is, the func-

t ional org aniza t ion as such of any two memb ers of the sa me species wil l be the same.

Socrates and Cal l ias are the same by form, Aris tot le says." His point seems to be

this : i f we look at the funct ional organi zat ion of Socrates or of Cal l ias as these are in

themselves, there wil l be no concept ual ground s on which to dis t inguish between

them.

The f orm as a type of funct ional organi zat i on is exemplified by a num ber of indiv-

iduals and as such is a universal . Forms, however, are not common propert ies or

universalsp, because forms are n ot predicated of indivi duals . 2' Were forms

predicated of individuals , they, like at t r ibutes , would presuppose ind ividuat ion.

" Woods ("Problems in

M e t a p h y s i c s Z )

recognizes that Aristotle employs a restricted notion of

universal in Z e t a 13. This is an important first step, but a more detailed account o f the grounds of the dis-

tinct ion between forms and other universals is needed. Aristotle distinguishes between these cases,

because he takes the predication of properties of substances (as indicated by k a t h o l o u l e g o m e n o n , k o i n e

k a t e g o ro u m e n o n , k o i n o n

and

k a t h o l o u h u p a r c h o n t o n , le g o m e n o n k a t h h u p o l e i m e n o u

and sometimes

k a t h o l o u )

and the classification of individuals according to their forms (as indicated by

l e g o m e n o n k a t h

h a u t o a n d i e g o m e n o n h o s k a t h o l o u ) to be two distinct operations.

" 1041b12-34, 1043a30-b23. My characterization of forms is stated for forms of particular substances

containing matter. If the prime mover of Boo k Lambda is a pure form--which I am inclined to

do ub t- my characterization would have to be modified to fit this case.

" Aristotle uses artifacts to illustrate the distinction between matter and form at 1033a13-blS,

1036a21-28, 1041a26, 1043a7-20, and 1043b7-9. He expresses reservations about the ontological status of

these forms at 1033b20.

" 1043b21, 1060b27, 1070a15, 999bl6-20.

~0 1032al8-20, 1034a2-8, 1043623-24, De

A n .

412al2-16; cf. 1070a20-21.

2, 1043b17. Aristotle also makes this claim at 1033b17 n a discussion of artifacts, but since he questions

the separate existence of artifact forms at b20, it seems reasonable to read b17 as a remark about sub-

stantial forms that applies to artifact forms only if they are substantial forms.

~ P a r t . A n . 640635--641a17. Cf. 1035b25, 1036b30-32.

2~ 1035b15, 1037a5; De An . 4 1 2 a 2 0 ; Pa r t . An . 641a17-20, 645b14-20,

2, 1033b31, 1034a7, G e n . A n . 730635. The distinction between numerical and specific sameness is also

stated at

T o p .

103all,

G en . C o r r .

338bl3, and 1016b32.

2~ 1049a34-36. Aristotle's denial that forms are predicated of individuals seems to conflict with our

claim that forms are universals in the De l n t e r p r e t a t i o n e sense, since Aristotle also describes universals as


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A R I S T O T L E ' S

M E T A P H Y S I C S

375

However, the form individuates in that the form const i tutes the individu al . The form

is the sub stanc e of the in divid ual; it makes it the k ind of thing it is. 2~ In the one

passage where Aris tot le speaks of the predica t ion of forms, he makes ma tter the sub-

stratum. 2 ' Elsewhere he dis t inguishes between being a s ubstr atum for at t r ibutes

( p a t h S )

and being a substratum for an actual i ty

( e n t e l e c h e i a )

(1038b4-6). The form

as substance is not said of a substratum

( m e k a t h h u p o k e i m e n o u ) . 2s

Since form is

predicated of matter and matter as sheer potent ial i ty is unindividu ated , forms are

not predicated of individuals and hence c annot be universalsp. For s imilar reasons,

the form is not a such, because i t const i tutes the individua l and hence is ontological ly

prior to the individual ' s at t r ibutes .

Forms are universals but not universalsp. For this reason, the relat ionship between

a thing and the form that const i tutes i t i s not the same as the relat ionship between a

thing and i ts propert ies , for Aris tot le. The type of funct iona l organ izat io n an indiv-

idual exhibi ts accounts for i ts having certain propert ies in common with other

membe rs of the same species , but i ts orga nizat ion is not a c omm on property. 29

Aristot le frequent ly compares the arra ngeme nt of the let ters of a syl lable to the form

of a thing. This suggests that the relat ionship between an A ris totel ian form as a type

of funct ional organiza t ion and the individuals that are so organized is l ike the rela-

tionship between a word and its occurrences; that is, i t is like the relationship

between type and token, which we might want to t reat as a special case of the rela-

t ionship between universal and part icula r. 3~ Aris tot le does not talk a bout types and

tokens. He ma kes the same dis t inct ion by dis t inguishing between the form ula of the

essence in matter

( l o g o s s y n t e i h y l e t )

and the formula in i tself

( l o g o s h a p l o s ) .

3, The

former is a part icular, organized b ody, for example, Socrates; the lat ter is the type of

organiz at ion exemplified by this body.

Aris tot le says that the let ters are parts of the formula of a syl lable, but pa rt icular

waxen let ters or part icular movements in air are not parts of the formula

(1035a10-15). That is,

c a t ,

as the arrangement of the letters c, a, t , is the simple for-

predicated of many there. This di~culty is resolvable on the recognition that Aristotle uses predicated

of as equivalent to exemplified by in the De

lnterpretatione.

In the

Metaphysics

where Aristotle is

concerned with the ontological implications of predication, he distinguishes between the predication of

universalsp of many distinct things and the predication of forms of matter (cf. 1038b4-6).

26 1032bl-2, 1033b17, 1037a27-32, 104163-9, 1050b2.

~' 1049a34-36. Aristotle says the form is predicated of material substance

(ousia hylikt),

so one might

think that

ousia hylik~

means substance containing matter. There are good reasons for rejecting this view:

(l)

ousia hylik~

is not used elsewhere for the composite of matter and form; (2) Aristotle distinguishes

between matter as substratum and the composite as substratum elsewhere (1029a2-5, 1029a23-24,

1038b4-6); and (3)

ousia hylik~

seems well suited to express Aristotle's view that matter is substance

(1042a32).

zs 1029a23, 1043a6, 1049a34-36. Cf. 1037b3-4.

~' For an interesting treatment of form as functional organization, see Joan Kung's paper, Two Uses

of 'That-for-the-Sake-of-Which' in Aristotle's Biology, delivered at the APA Western Division, 75th

Annual Meeting. Cf. Wilfrid Sellar's argument that the form for which the common name stands deter-

mines the common attributes of species members but is not identical to these attributes ( Substance

and Form in Aristotle,

Journal of Philosophy 54

[1957] 688-99).

~~The relationship between type and token would seem to be a special case because the instantiation of

the universal is constitutive of the individual in a very strong sense. Cf.

An. Post .

100al5-bl where

Aristotle says that although we perceive the individual, perception is of the universal, e.g., of man. Hav-

ing arrived at this interpretation independently, I was pleased to f ind that M. J. Woods also says that a

form is like a word (type) in his suggestive paper Substance and Essence in Aristot le,

P.A .S .

75

(1974-75):167-80. Unfortunately, he does not develop this important insight.

J~ I039621-23; cf. 1033al--4; 1035a22-23. Aristotle makes it clear that

Iogos syn tei hylei

refers to a con-

crete substance at 1039b21 and not to a universal t'fiat mentions matter by saying that substance as

Iogos

sun tei hylei

is subject to generation and destruction.


7/12

3 /6 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

m u l a ; a s t h e a r r a n g e m e n t o f t h e l e t te r s c , a , t , w h i c h a r e i n k m a r k s o n t h i s p a g e , i t i s

t h e f o r m u l a i n m a t t e r . S i m i l a r l y , t h e f o r m u l a o f t h e e ss e n c e o f a l iv i n g t h i n g a l s o

c o n t a i n s a r e f e r e n c e t o s o m e m a t t e r , w h i c h i s s o o r g a n i z e d , b u t n o t t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r

m a t t e r . 32 K n o w l e d g e p e r t a i n s t o t h e s i m p l e f o r m u l a , b e c a u s e i t s o b j e c t s m u s t a l w a y s

r e m a i n t h e s a m e , a n d l i vi n g t h i n g s a re s u b j e c t to g e n e r a t i o n a n d c o r r u p t i o n a s ar e

w o r d - t o k e n s . 33

S i n ce m e m b e r s o f t he s a m e s p e c i e s e x h i bi t t h e s a m e t y p e o f f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a -

t i o n , t h a t i s, a r e t h e s a m e b y f o r m e i d e r S , A r i s t o t l e n e ed s s o m e g r o u n d s f o r d is -

t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l s o f t h e s a m e s p e c i e s . H e s a y s t h a t t h e y d i ff e r i n

m a t t e r , e ' I t is n o t i m m e d i a t e l y o b v i o u s w h y A r i s t o t l e h o l d s t h i s v i e w . I n t h e f ir st

p l a c e, i f t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e t w o i n d i v i d u a l s ar e t h e s a m e b y f o r m m e a n s t h a t t h e y

e x h i bi t t h e s a m e t y p e o f f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e n s i n ce t h e y a r e m a d e u p o f th e

s a m e t y p e o f m a t t e r , o n e c o u l d s a y t h a t t h e y a r e t h e s a m e b y m a t t e r a s w e l l. 35

S e c o n d l y , t h e f o r m i n d i v i d u a t e s i n t h e s e n s e th a t i t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e t h i n g ' s

e x i s t i n g a s a n i n d i v i d u a l . A r i s t o t l e ' s r e a s o n f o r s a y i n g t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s d i f fe r b y

m a t t e r s e e m s t o b e t h i s : th o s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s b y w h i c h w e d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n i n d i v -

i d u a ls o f th e s a m e t y p e a r e c h a ra c t e r is t i c s t h a t d e p e n d u p o n t h e ir h a v i n g m a t t e r , t h a t

i s , s p a t i a l - t e m p o r a l l o c a t i o n , m a g n i t u d e , s h a p e , d e n s i t y , a n d s o o n . S i n c e a t le a s t

s o m e o f t h es e c h a r a c t e r i s t ic s s e e m t o b e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e m a t t e r o f th e i n d i v i d u a l ,

t h e y c o u l d p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r s a y i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t m y m a t t e r d i f f e r s f r o m y o u r s

o r t h a t y o u a n d I d i ff e r i n m a t t e r . T h e r e a r e n o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h m y

f o r m a s s u c h t h a t w o u l d a l l o w u s t o d i s t i n g u i s h m y f o r m f r o m y o u r s .

T o w h a t e v e r e x t e n t i t m a k e s s e n s e t o s p e a k o f o u r h a v i n g d i f f e r e n t f o r m s , i t i s i n

v i r t u e o f o u r m a t t e r . M y f o r m d i f fe r s f r o m y o u r s i n b e i n g t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a d if f e r-

e n t h u m a n b o d y . T h e r e a r e n o c h a r a c t e r is t i c s b e l o n g i n g t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a s s u c h

t h a t w o u l d a l l o w u s t o d i s ti n g u i s h m y f u n c t io n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n f r o m y o u r s , a l t h o u g h

w e c an d i s t i n g u i s h b e tw e e n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f h u m a n b o d i e s a n d o f b o v i n e b o d i e s

o n t h e b a s i s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s a l s o e x p l a in s w h y A r i s t o t l e d i s ti n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n

t h e s p e c i e s a n d g e n e r a o f l iv i n g th i n g s ; o n c e w e a r r i v e a t t h e s p e c i e s w e c a n d r a w n o

f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n s i n t e r m s o f t h e f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . '~

S i n c e , i f f o r m s a r e i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e y c a n n o t b e i d e n t i fi e d w i t h t h e f u n c t i o n a l

o r g a n i z a t i o n o f l iv i n g t h i n g s , w e s h o u l d c o n s i d e r t h o s e p a s s a g e s t h a t s e e m t o s u g g e s t

t h a t f o r m s a r e i n d i v i d u a l s . T h e l e a s t a m b i g u o u s o f th e s e p a s s a g e s is f o u n d a t

1 0 7 1 a 2 7 - 2 8 :

A n d o f t h i n g s i n t h e s a m e s p e c i e s , th e s e a r e d i f fe r e n t n o t b y s p e c i e s [eider] b u t b e c a u s e t h e

[ c au s e] o f o n e i n d i v i d u a l d if f er s f r o m t h a t o f a n o t h e r , a s y o u r m a t t e r a n d t h e f o r m a n d t h e

m o v i n g p r i n ci p l e a n d m y m a t t e r .

1035b27, 1036b3-5.

1036a6, 1036a29, 1040al-7, 1059b25, 999a26-29.

1, 1034a6, 1035b31.

~ ' Unlike artifacts , biolog ical individuals share their type of ma terial as well as their type of orga niza-

tion with the other m embers of their species. However, A ristotle ma y think that any being that was

organized as a h uma n being would be a human irrespective of the type of materia l that was so organized

(see 1036b3-5).

~' 1018b5, 1038a26.

Reading

al lou a l lo

for

al lo w i t h R o s s . H o w e v e r , h i s t r a n s la t i o n o f h e s e h y l e k ai to

eidos kai to

kinesan and he em e as you r matter and form and moving cause being different from mine is

m i s -

l e a d i n g .


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A R I S T O T L E ' S M E T A P H Y S I C S 377

This passage is not decisive. It may suggest that your form and moving principle are

different from mine, but it definitely emphasiz es the pecul iarity of our bodies by

using possessive pronouns with matter

( h y l e )

only. j~ In a noth er passage, Aristotle

uses the phrase, part icular formula

( h o d e h o l o g o s ) ,

for the form of an individual . '9

In these passages, Aris tot le is concerned with part icular individuals; s ince the analy-

sis of a concre te indivi dual yields a form an d some mat ter , A ristotl e uses adjectives

like i d i o n and h o d e to indicate that he is talking about the organizat ion of this

indiv idua l or of that i ndivi dual . This does not indica te that the form is a particu lar. ~176

Anot her passage, which is ci ted by pr opon ents of individual forms, is 1039b25,

where Aris totle says that it is not (a) the bein g of house ( t o o i k i a i e i n a O that is gener-

ated, but (b) the being of this house

( t o t e i d e t e i o i k i a i [ e i n a t] ) .

The cons truct ion used

here,

t o e i n a i

with the dative, is frequently used by Aristotle for essence, so it is not

unre ason able to take b to mean the essence of a part icular house as dis t inguished

from a the universal essence. However, s ince Aris tot le says that b is ge ne ra ted -a

point which he makes about the composi te of matter and form in the immediately

preceding l ines and e lse whe re -he might mean by b not the essence of a part icular

house but simply its being an object in the world. Even if we take b to assert the

existence of a particular essence of an artifact, we cannot generalize from b to an

argum ent for individual forms since the essences of art i facts are not substances

(I043b23). One might speculate that Aris tot le 's reservat ions abo ut the metaphysical

status of the forms of artifacts may in part turn on his recognition that the essence of

an art i fact-type, for example, a house, underdetermines the organizat ion of i ts

tokens so that there may be some basis for dis t inguishing between the organ izat ion

of this house and the organizat ion of that house.

Perhaps the s t rongest argum ent against forms as individuals is Aris tot le 's insis-

tence upon dis t inguishing between the actual i ty, or subst ance, of a composi te and

the compo site itself. For example, he distin guishes between the circle as the actualit y

of a bronze circle and the bronze circle and between "be ing a ma n" and " ma n. ' ' '~

The ind iv iduat ion of forms would requi re tha t they conta in mat t er , as Har tma n

recognizes, b u t then the dis t inct ion between the form and the composi te is

threatened. "2 The composi te, l ike the form, need not cont ain an y part ic ular bi t of

~' It might be argued that the identification of form with soul, which makes it the principle of motion of

a living thing, supports the view that the form of a living thing is peculiar to it. Against this, one should

notice that the form is the principle of motion qua the principle of organization of an organism that is

capable of nutrition, growth, self-movement, and so on.

)' 1035b27-30. Aristotle uses idion eidos (particular form) at 1071a14, but here it clearly refers to the

species-form. This is obvious from his describing the matter of a human being as fire and earth; he would

not take the particular matter of a person to be fire and earth.

,a To argue on the basis of these passages that Aristotelian forms are particulars confuses the fact that

Aristotle sometimes finds it convenient to talk about the form of this thing with the position that the form

is thereby particular. This is equally true of the significanceof the phrases to ti en einai K alliai ( 022a27),

to so i einai (1029b14-15), and Sokralei einai (1032a8). The first is part of a definition of kath hauto, the

second occurs in a preliminary discussion of essence, and the third is mentioned in connection with a

sophistical objection. Given their contexts, all at'e neutral with respect to whether essences are peculiar to

individuals. (I think this is also the correct analysis of the distinction Aristotle makes between the being of

the circle and of this circle at Cael . 278a7-11.) Nor need we agree with Hartman that since Aristotle

identifies a thing's form with its substance, he is thereby committed to particular forms. For the form is

the substance of a thing because the form as a principle of organization makes it the kind of tiling it is,

even though the same organization is exemplified by all the other members of its species.

" 1036al-7, 1043b2.

,2 Aristotelian substance has properties such as indivisibility and indestructibility that the composite


9/12

3 78 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

m a t t e r o v e r ti m e . O n e m i g h t d i st i n g u i s h b e t w e e n c o m p o s i t e a n d i n d i v i d u a l f o r m b y

s a y i n g t h a t t h e f o r m e r , a n d n o t t h e la t t e r , m u s t c o n t a i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r b i t o f m a t t e r i t

c o n t a i n s a t a n y g i v e n m o m e n t . H o w e v e r , t o m a i n t a i n t h e d i st i n c t i o n i n t h is w a y

w o u l d b e p r o b l e m a t i c f o r t h e p r o p o n e n t o f i n d iv i d u al f o r m s , b e c a u s e t h e

i n d i v i d u a ti o n o f f o rm s b y m a t t e r w o u l d s e e m t o r e q u ir e t h a t t h e f o r m a l s o c o n t a i n

m a t t e r t h a t i s p e c u l i a r t o i t a t a n y g i v e n m o m e n t .

M o r e o v e r , w e n e e d n o t p o s i t in d i v i d u a l f o r m s t o a v o i d a cl a s h b e t w e e n t h e d o c -

t r in e t h a t s u b s t a n c e i s p e c u l i a r t o t h a t o f w h i c h i t i s t h e s u b s t a n c e a n d t h e d o c t r i n e

t h a t f o r m s a r e s u b s t a n c e s . ~ T h e f o r m e r d o c t r i n e s h o u l d n o t b e i n t e rp r e t e d a s a c l a i m

a b o u t s u b s t a n c e - t o k e n s ; r a t h e r , i t i s t h e c l a i m t h a t s u b s t a n c e - t y p e s a r e p e c u l ia r t o

p a r t i c u l a r s p e c ie s . A s s u c h , i t is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t f o r m s a r e

s u b s t a n c e s .

I i i . H a v i n g c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n f o r m a n d i ts r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e t h i n g

o f w h i c h i t is th e f o r m , i t i s n o w t i m e t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e r e l a t i o n o f th e p r e d i c a t e s s u c h

a s m a n - - w h i c h s e e m to r e fe r t o f o r m s - - t o t h e su b j e ct s o f w h i c h th e y a r e p r e d i-

c a t e d - w h i c h n a m e i n d iv i d u a ls . T h e n a m e s b o t h o f s p ec ie s a n d o f c o m m o n p r o p e r -

t ie s a r e p r e d i c a t e d o f i n d i v id u a l s ; s p e c i e s - f o r m s a r e n o t p r e d i c a t e d o f in d i v i d u a l s ,

b u t c o m m o n p r o p e r t ie s a re . T h u s , w e n e e d s o m e a n a l ys i s o f s t a t em e n t s o f th e f o r m

S o c r a t e s is a m a n t h a t d i s t in g u i s h e s t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s f r o m o t h e r s ta t e m e n t s

h a v i n g t h e s a m e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m , w h i c h p r e d ic a t e c o m m o n p r o p e r t i es , o r g e n e r a ,

o f i n d i v i d u a l s .

F i r s t, l et u s c o n s i d e r W o o d s ' s c l a i m t h a t s t a t e m e n t s p r e d i c a t i n g s p e c i e s m e m b e r -

s h i p o f in d i v i d u a l s a r e i d e n t i t y s t a t e m e n t s . '5 O n t h e s t a n d a r d a n a l y s i s , a n i d e n t i t y

s t a t e m e n t o f th e f o r m A = B i s t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f A a n d B d e n o t e t h e s a m e e n t i t y .

S o c r a t e s i s t h e h u s b a n d o f X a n t i p p e is t r u e b e c a u s e t h e p r o p e r n a m e S o c r a t e s

a n d t h e d e fi n it e d e s c r ip t i o n t h e h u s b a n d o f X a n t i p p e p i c k o u t t h e s a m e e n ti t y.

T h i s c o n d i t i o n is a l s o s a ti s fi e d b y t h e s t a t e m e n t S o c r a t e s i s t h is m a n i f t h i s m a n

p i c k s o u t S o c r a t e s . I t i s n o t s at i sf i ed b y t h e s t a t e m e n t S o c r a t e s i s a m a n b e c a u s e

t h e i n d e f i n it e d e s c r i p t i o n a m a n d o e s n o t p i c k o u t a u n i q u e in d i v i d u a l . F o r t h i s

r e a s o n , t r e a t i n g s t a t e m e n t s o f t h is f o r m a s i d e n t it y s t a t e m e n t s a n d t r e a t i n g i d e n t i t y

i n t h e u s u a l w a y a s a s y m m e t r i c a l a n d t r a n s i t i v e r e l a t i o n w o u l d h a v e p a r a d o x i c a l

r e s ul t s; f o r e x a m p l e , t h e t r u e s t a t e m e n t s S o c r a t e s is a m a n a n d C a l l i a s is a m a n

w o u l d e n t a i l t h e s t a t e m e n t S o c r a t e s is i d e n t i c a l t o C a l l i a s , w h i c h is f a ls e .

F r o m W o o d s ' s s k e t c h y r e m a r k s , i t a p p e a r s t h a t h e t h i n k s t he re , is s o m e s e n s e i n

w h i c h t h e l a t te r s t a t e m e n t - - t h a t S o c r a t e s is i d e n t ic a l to C a l l i a s - i s t r u e f o r A r i s -

t o t le . W e m i g h t r e c o n s t r u c t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A r i s t o t l e ' s p o s i t i o n a s f o l lo w s :

S o c r a t e s p i c k s o u t t h e f o r m t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s th e c o n c r e t e i n d i v i d u a l S o c r a t e s , b u t

does not have. In addition, an account o f the relationship between the form as composite and the form as

object of knowledge, and d efinition, i.e., as universal, is then needed; but Hartm an fails to provide it.

Charlton also identifies the form with the com posite and consequently face s similar dififlculties in his

commentary on the

Physics

~ See n. 2 above.

T o facilitate the following d i s c u s s i o n , I shall use the phrase predication of species-membership for

the predication o f the name o f a species of the nam e of an individual. This usage should not be understood

as a retraction of the claim that forms are not predicated o f individuals.

,5 Substance and Essence.


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3 80 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

O n e m i g h t o b j e c t t o a s s i g n i n g a s p e c i a l f u n c t i o n t o s t a t e m e n t s p r e d i c a t i n g s p e c i e s -

m e m b e r s h i p . I t m i g h t b e a r g u e d t h a t s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e f o r m S o c r a t e s is w h i t e o r

o f t h e f o r m S o c r a t e s i s a n a n i m a l c o u l d al s o b e a n a l y z e d o n a t y p e - t o k e n m o d e l .

L e t us f ir st c o n s i d e r S o c r a t e s i s w h i t e : o n th e s u g g e s te d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , S o c -

r a t e s p i c k s o u t a w h i t e t h i n g , w h i c h i s a t o k e n o f t h e p r o p e r t y w h i t e . S e v e r a l c o n -

s i d e r a t i o n s c o u n t a g a i n s t t h i s r e a d i n g . F i r s t , S o c r a t e s , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , r e f e rs t o

a p a r t i c u l a r b o d y o r g a n i z e d i n a c e r t a i n w a y . S i n c e t hi s b o d y i s a w h i t e t h i n g , i t i s

t r u e t o s a y S o c r a t e s is w h i t e , b u t t h i s d o e s n o t m a k e t h e r e f e rr e n t o f S o c r a t e s a

p a r t i c u l a r w h i t e t h i n g e x c e p t i n c i d e n t a l ly

k a t a s u m b e b e k o s ) . 52

S e c o n d , A r i s t o t l e

m a k e s t h e d i s t i n c t io n b e t w e e n s u b s t a n c e a n d p r o p e r t y f u n d a m e n t a l i n h is m e t a -

p h y s i c s , w h i c h l e a d s h i m t o i n s i st u p o n t h e d i f fe r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e r e l a t i o n o f a s u b -

s t a n c e to k e n a n d i ts t y p e an d t h e r e l a ti o n o f a n i n d i v i d u a l t o it s p r o p e r t i e s : F o r

t h e s e [ s p e c i es ] a r e t h o u g h t t o i m p l y n o t m e r e l y t h a t t h e s u b j e c t p a r t i c i p a t e s i n t h e

a t t r i b u t e a n d h a s i t a s a n a f f e c ti o n , o r h a s it b y a c c i d e n t ( 1 0 30 a 1 3- 1 4 ).

T h e p r e d i c a t i o n o f s p e c i e s - m e m b e r s h i p a l s o d if fe rs fr o m t h e p r e d i c a t i o n o f a g en u s

o f e i t h e r a sp e c ie s o r a n i n d i v i d u a l . T h e s t a te m e n t S o c r a t e s i s a n a n i m a l c a n n o t b e

a n a l y z e d o n t h e t y p e - t o k e n m o d e l , b e c a u s e a n i m a l d o e s n o t f u l ly i n d i c a t e t h e t y p e

o f f u n c t io n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t d e t e r m i n e s S o c r a t e s ' b e i n g; r a t h e r , i t p o i n t s t o c e r -

t a i n c o m m o n f e a t u re s o f d i ff e re n t t y p e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n . S i n ce t h e n a m e s o f g e n e r a

a r e p r e d i c a t e d o n t h e b a s i s o f c o m m o n a t t r i b u t e s , A r i s t o t l e c l a s si f ie s g e n e r a w i t h

u n i v e r s a l t e r m s . 2 ' T h a t i s , S o c r a t e s a n d B u c e p h a l u s a r e b o t h c a l l e d a n i m a l s i n v i r tu e

o f h a v in g c e r t a i n c o m m o n a t t r i b u t e s , b u t S o c r a t e s is s a id t o b e a m a n a n d B u c e p h a -

l u s a h o r s e i n v i r t u e o f w h a t e a c h i s .

I V . P r e s u m a b l y , A r i s t o t l e d o e s n o t t h i n k t h a t h is c o n c e p t i o n o f f o r m s is v u l n e r -

a b l e t o th e o b j e c t i o n s h e r a i s es a g a in s t P l a t o n i c f o r m s . H o w e v e r , o n s o m e r e a d i n g s

o f t h e M e t a p h y s i c s , t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s c a n b e u s e d a g a i n s t h i s o w n a c c o u n t . A q u i c k

e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e s e in l ig h t o f t h e p r e s e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l s h o w t h a t A r i s t o t l e i s

n o t i n di f fi c u lt y h e r e . A l t h o u g h h e r a is e s a n u m b e r o f o b j e c t i o n s t o P l a t o n i s m , t h e s e

s e e m t o r e d u c e to t w o s e r i o u s p r o b l e m s . (1 ) T h e T h i r d M a n A r g u m e n t s h o w s t h a t i f

t h e p r e d i c a t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l o f a p a r t i c u l a r r e q u i r e s th e s e p a r a t e e x i s t e n c e o f a n

i d e a l e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s u n i v e r s a l , t h e n a n i n f in i t e r e g r e s s w i ll r e s u l t . ( 2 ) A

s e c o n d a r g u m e n t s h o w s t h a t i f e a c h u n i v e r s a l , w h i c h a n i n d i v i d u a l i n s t a n t i a t e s , i s a

s u b s t a n c e , t h e n i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l b e m a d e u p o f a n u m b e r o f d i f f e r e n t s u b s t a n c e s :

S o c r a t e s w i ll b e s e v e r a l a n i m a l s - - h i m s e l f a n d m a n a n d a n i m a l ( 10 0 3a 10 ). 56 T h e

,2 103(Ya2-6, 1030b20; 1031a20. On e passage (1031b25) suggests that Ar isto tle thinks th at the r elat ion-

ship of the white of a pa rticular object to the prop erty white f its the type-toke n pattern.

Th e impo rtance of the distinction between substance an d prope rty is clear from A ristot le 's discussion

of essence and definition. E ssence belongs prim aril y to substance (1030a29 ), and definitions of things in

the nonsubstance categories are inferior because they require an addition al determinant (1031al-4).

Species names are p redicated not on the basis of comm on attr ibutes but o n the basis of the kind of

thing the object is . A ristotle typically groups genera w ith comm on pred icates (402b8, 1014b9-15,

1038b16-34, 1042a21 . Cf. Part. An. 639b7. The pred ication of a genus name of an ind ividual serves to

classify i t according to some o f i ts essential prop erties; in this respect the pred ication of a genus n ame

resembles the p redication of a species name and differs from the pre dication of an incidental proper ty l ike

whiteness.

For a c lea r s tatemen t o f the Th i rd M an A rgument , see P la to ,

Parm.

132a-e. Aristotle mentions the

T M A a t 990bl7, 1039a2, 1059b8, and 1079a13. An argument along similar lines is given at 1031b28.

s, Cf. 1038h29ff., 1039a30-33.


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A R I S T O T L E ' S M E T P H Y S I C S 381

A r i s t o t e l i a n d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s u b s t a n c e - t y p e s a n d - t o k e n s b l o c k s t h e r e g r e s s o f

t h e T h i r d M a n A r g u m e n t . F o r m s a s s u b s t a n c e - t y p e s a r e d i s t in c t f r o m c o n c r e t e in d i -

v i d u a l s , o r s u b s t a n c e - t o k e n s , b u t s u b s t a n c e - t y p e s c a n n o t b e m e a n i n g f u l l y c l a ss i fi e d

a s t o k e n s o f s u b s t a n c e - t y p e s . ~' S o c r a t e s i s n o t t w o s u b s t a n c e s - - a c o n c r e t e i n d i v i d u a l

a n d a s p e c ie s f o r m . H e i s a s u b s t a n c e - t o k e n t h a t e x e m p l i f i e s a s u b s t a n c e - t y p e .

V . T o s u m u p , t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n f o r m i s a u n i v e r s a l i n t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h a w o r d -

t y p e i s a u n i v e r s a l . A r i s t o t l e d i s ti n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e r e l a t i o n t h a t o b t a i n s b e t w e e n

s u b s t a n c e - t y p e s a n d s u b s t a n c e - t o k e n s a n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t o b t a i n s b e t w e e n

p r o p e r t i e s o f s u b s t a n c e s , t h a t i s , u n i ve r s a ls p a n d s u b s t a n c e s . S i m i l a r l y , h e d is -

t i n g u is h e s b e t w e e n t h e p r e d i c a t i o n o f s p e c i e s - n a m e s o f i n d i v i d u a l s , w h i c h c l a s s i f y

s u b s t a n c e t o k e n s u n d e r t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e t y p e s , a n d t h e p r e d i c a t i o n o f un i v e rs a l p

t e r m s o f i n d i v i d u a ls , w h i c h a t t r i b u t e p r o p e r t i e s t o t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s . T h i s p o s i t i o n s

q u i t e c o h e r e n t , g i v e n t h e s h a r p d i s t i n c t io n A r i s t o t l e d r a w s b e t w e e n s u b s t a n c e a n d

p r o p e r t y a n d h is b e l i e f i n n a t u r a l k i n d s. T o w h a t e v e r e x t e n t i t i n v o lv e s c o n c e p t u a l

d i f f t c u l t i e s , I s u s p e c t t h e s e a r e r o o t e d i n t h e l a t t e r d o c t r i n e s , b u t t o e x p l o r e t h i s i s s u e

w o u l d t a k e a n o t h e r p a p e r . '~

Rice University

s, Cf. 1040b32-34.

~* I would lik e to express my gratitude to Joan Kung, Bill Tait, Man ley Thom pson, Rob M cKay,

Richard Kraut, A. W . H. A dkins, John Cooper, lan Mueller and A lan Code for their helpful comm ents

on earlier drafts of this paper.

Documents

Modrak-Forms, Types, And Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics