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8/7/2019 modern notes lieb lock

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Talk about this for Leibniz

Leibnizs classification of knowledge

We know x when we can differentiate it from everything else

When we know x without being able to list its characteristic properties, we

possess confusedknowledge of x

When we can list xs characteristic properties, our knowledge is distinct

We know what gold is if we know its atomic number, our knowledge is

distinct, if we do not, our knowledge is confused

When our knowledge of all of xs characteristic properties is distinct, this

knowledge is adequate, when we dont, our knowledge issupportive

If I know what it means for an element to have an atomic number of 79, then

my knowledge of gold is adequate, if I do not, it is supportive

Empiricists wrongly think that our ideas are conveyed to our minds from

external objects:

...we have a bad habit of thinking of our soul as if it received certain

species as messengers and as if it has doors and windows.

Nothing could be further from the truth, since external objects do not

impinge on us at all

All of the ideas that we have now, and will ever have, have existed in us

since our creation

We can go from knowing x confusedly to knowing it distinctly, but we

cannotgo from not knowing x to knowing x


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Platos slave

And all our ideas bear the mark of their creator, God:

Thus we have ideas of everything in our soul only by virtue of Gods

continual action on us, that is to say, because every effect expresses its

cause, and thus the essence of our soul is a certain expression, imitation or

image of the divine essence, thought, and will, and of all the ideas comprised

in it. It can then be said that God is our immediate external object and that

we see all things by him.

The mind-body problem: how can our physical bodies interact with our non-physical minds?

Leibnizs answer: they dont interactany more than we interact with

external objects

Pre-establishedharmony: the mind and the body are in sync because God

designed them to unfold in that way

Imagine two pendulums that beat in time

What difference is there between minds and other substances?

Minds are capable ofreflection both on the world and on themselves

What differentiates one mind from another?

Substances are differentiated in terms of their properties

Minds are differentiated in terms of theirmemories

But the intelligent soul, knowing what it is having the ability to utter the

word I, a word so full of meaning does not merely remain and subsist


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metaphysically, which it does to a greater degree than the others, but also

remains the same morally and constitutes the same person. For it is memory

or the knowledge of this self that renders it capable of punishment or

reward.

If you suddenly lost all your memories, you would become an entirely

different person, and it would be inappropriate to punish or praise the new

you for what the old you had done

Every substance is a reflection of the universe, and thus a reflection of it

creator, God this is the purpose of every existent thing

And because we (minds, souls) realize our purpose, and can reflecton Godand the universe, we are privileged

Since God himself is the greatest and wisest of all minds, it is easy to judge

that the being with whom he can, so to speak, enter into conversation, and

even into a society by communicating to them his views and will in a

particular manner and in such a way that they can know and love their

benefactor must be infinitely nearer to him than all other things, which can

only pass for the instruments of minds.

Insofar as we are minds, we are made in Gods image, and we are special

because we have an image of God

LOCKE

Philosophy 2202F:Early Modern Philosophy

Lecture #10: LockesEssay, Book 2

All ideas are arrived at through experience

Some ideas are complex, while others aresimple


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A complex idea is composed of two or more constituent ideas

The idea ofsnow contains the ideas cold, wet, white

The ideas cold, wet, and white aresimple, i.e., they are not further reducible

to a set of constituent ideas

The mind can manipulate simple ideas iterate, compare, unite them to

form complex ideas

But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding,

by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simpleidea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned [sensation and

reflection]. Nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are

there.

Simple ideas cannot be created nor destroyed by the mind

Can you imagine a taste youve never tasted or a sound youve never heard

before?

Persons who are blind from birth cannot imagine what shapes and colours

look like

Can you imagine what it would be like to have ideas conveyed to your mind

via a sixth sense, say an electric sense?

Simple ideas originate insensation cold, wet, white and reflection

perceiving, remembering, willing

Other simple ideas originate in both sensation and reflection, eg: pain,

pleasure, existence, unity, power, and succession


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Lockes challenge to the nativist: name a single idea simple or complex

that is not received through sensation and reflection

All of our knowledge can be accounted for on the basis of ideas that we

receive through experience we dont need to appeal to innate ideas

Why make things more complicated than they have to be?

What are we perceivingwhen ideas are conveyed to us through the senses?

We are perceiving the qualities that exist in objects

Qualities have thepowerto produce ideas in our minds

Not all of our ideas resemble the qualities that produced them

Primary qualities solidity, extension, figure, number, and mobility

essentially belong to the objects we perceive, regardless of the changes they

undergo

...take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has stillsolidity,

extension,figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same

qualities; and so divide it on until the parts become insensible, they must

retain still each of them all those qualities.

Secondary qualities colour, taste, sound, heat do not belong to the

objects we perceive

Such qualities are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce

various sensations in us by their primary qualities

Heat does not exist in objects, but is the result of the rapid motions of

particles


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When standing at a distance from a fire, we perceive in it the quality of

warmth; if we get too close, we perceive the quality of pain

We freely admit that the quality of pain does not exist in the fire, why would

we not think likewise about the quality of warmth?

We can alter the secondary qualities of a body by altering its primary

qualities

Pound an almond, and the clear white color will be altered into a dirty one

and the sweet taste into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating of

the pestle make in any body but an alteration of the texture of it?

The mind is entirelypassive in the reception ofsimple ideas

The mind takes an active role in the formation ofcomplex ideas in the

following ways:

(1) It combines several simple ideas to form a complex idea the simple

ideas liquid, brown, hot, bitterget combined to form the idea ofcoffee

(2) It summons two or more ideas and compares them to yield relations

one cup of coffee is hotterthan another

(3) It separates the defining features of complex ideas from the particular

ideas that accompany them via abstraction what is essential to coffee is

that it is a brown, bitter liquid, and not that it is traditionally served in mugs,

served by coffee shops, etc.

Using these mental operations, we can create an indefinite number of

complex ideas out of simple ones, but we cannot create simple ideas

Sensation and reflection impart to us the building blocks of knowledge; we

have control over the structures that are built with these materials


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Complex ideas fall into the following categories:

Modes: complex ideas that do not contain in them the supposition of

subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on or affections

of substances, such as are the ideas signified by the words triangle,gratitude, murder, etc.

Substances: such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent

distinct particular things subsisting by themselves, in which the supposed or

confused ideas of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus

if to substance is joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish color, with

certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility, we have the

idea ofleadand a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure withthe powers of motion.

Relations: a complex idea which consists in the consideration and

comparing one idea with another

One of the most basic ideas we have is thesimple idea ofspace

We do not possess the idea of space innately; rather we receive this idea

fromsightand touch

Descartes had thought that space and body (solidity) the disposition to

prevent other bodies from occupying the same space are one and the same

thing, but this cannot be correct

I can conceive of space and body separately, and therefore, by Descartess

own criterion of identity (recall his argument for dualism), they must be

distinct things

I cannot conceive of body without conceiving of the space that it takes up,

but I can conceive of space as being distinct from body


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Bodies offerresistance to the motion of other bodies; indeed, this is just

what it means to be a body space offers no such resistance (see the

principle of inertia)

The parts of space are inseparable from one another you cannot remove apart of space and put it somewhere else

The parts of a body can be separated from one another

Space is immovable again, you cannot move one space somewhere else

Bodies are movable

A possible objection:

Space without body is empty space

Is empty space a substance or a mode?

If space is a substance, then it is not empty; if it is a mode, then it is a mode

of a substance, and therefore, is not empty

If it is demanded (as usually it is) whether thisspace void ofbody is

substance oraccident, I shall readily answer I do not know; nor shall be

ashamed to own my ignorance, until they who ask show me a clear distinct

idea ofsubstance.

What is so unclear about the idea of substance?

Most thinkers claim that God, souls, and corporeal bodies are made of

different kinds of substance, and yet, no one seems able to explain what

makes them distinct

Why must qualities inhere in anything?


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Why need substance not inhere in something else?

The philosopher who relies on the idea of substance is like the Indian

philosopher who claims that the world rests on an elephants back, and the

elephant rests on the back of a tortoise, and so on

Those who talk about accidents inhering in substance dont know what

theyre talking about

Thus, any objection to the existence of empty space that relies on the idea of

substance is similarly confused

If we think that the universe remains the same size, and that bodies can beannihilated by God, for example then we must admit the existence of

empty space (a vacuum)

For I desire anyone so to divide a solid body of any dimension he pleases as

to make it possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way

within the bounds of that surface, if there is not left in it a void space as big

as the least part into which he has divided the said solid body.

What does this mean?

If there were no empty space, there would be no motion

Imagine a drum completely full of concrete the concrete cannot move in

the drum

Crush the concrete and put it back in the drum the bits of concrete move

when the drum is shaken

Why?

Because there is now some empty space in the drum, which makes it

possible to displace the bits of concrete


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Like our idea of space, our idea of time is not innate

Unlike our idea of space, however, our idea of time does not arise through

sensation

Instead, it arises as a result of ourreflection on the succession of our ideas

Descartes also thinks that we become aware of different kinds of substance

by coming to understand the innate ideas we have of their essences the

piece of wax argument

A more plausible explanation:

...we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting

such combinations of simple ideas as are by experience and observations of

mens senses, taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to

flow from the particular internal constitution or unknown essence of that

substance.

We do not, in fact, have an idea of substances shorn of every attribute or of

their unknown essences; our complex ideas of substances are composed of

the observable qualities that they manifest

This applies to both corporeal and spiritual substances:

And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and

power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception

and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material.

Since our complex ideas include only the observable qualities manifested by

their objects, we cannothave an idea of substance itself, given that

substance by itself possesses no qualities

Our complex idea of God is not innate, but arrived at through reflection:


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...having, from what we experiment in ourselves, gotten the ideas of

existence and duration, of knowledge and power, of pleasure and happiness,

and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to

be without. When we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to thesupreme being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity, and

so putting them together make our complex idea of God.

Finally, even my idea of myselfis apprehended through reflection

What is it about me that makes me who I am?

What accounts for my stablepersonal identity?

A more general question: what is essentialto somethings identity?

It depends on what kindof thing it is

In the case ofinanimate objects, theirmaterial composition is essential to

their identity

An object retains its identity as long as it is made of the same stuff

The moment you add or subtract a single atom from an object, it becomes

something else

Livingthings must be treated differently

You may cut branches off an oak tree, and yet it remains the same tree; how

is that?

Because what is essential to living things is not their material composition,

but theirorganization


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The oak remains the same despite the loss of its branches because its

principal life systems continue to function as they did before, e.g., its leaves

continue to absorb sunlight to produce sugar

These systems maintain the same life over time the identity of living thingsremains the same over time as long as they are living

What makes a living thing a person?

What is essential topersonalidentity?

It cannot be a persons body (materialism)

Human bodies are constantly changing, e.g., just this morning I drank two

cups of coffee, does that mean that I am a different person now than I was

when I woke up?

What about an immaterialsoul(mentalism)?

My soul is distinct from every other human soul and it makes me what I am

How can we be sure that we have thesame soul for our entire lives?

How can I be sure that my soul didnt also belong to Napoleon Bonaparte?

The soul is unobservable I cannot check my soul to make sure that it

hasnt changed and that it did not once belong to Napoleon

But I know that I am the same person that I was yesterday, and I am quite

certain that I am not Napoleon Bonaparte

The immaterial soul, therefore, cannot constitute personal identity


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This is not to say that persons do not have bodies or souls; Locke is simply

pointing out that the issue ofpersonal identity is a different one from the

issue of what sort of stuff persons are made of

I can imagine a scenario in which I was made of completely different stuff

Kafkas Metamorphosis

What is it that remains the same in the scenario in which I wake up a

cockroach?

Lockes answer: it is my conscious awareness that remains the same

My thoughts, aptitudes, memories, desires, tastes, and pet-peeves do not

change

I have a uniquestream of consciousness that makes me the person that I am

What is essential to a rivers identity is not the water molecules that it

contains, nor the objects and living things that can be found in the river, nor

even the path of the river (rivers are diverted and damned all the time), butits history

Similarly, what is crucial to a persons identity is the series of their

conscious states

For it is by consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is

selfto itselfnow, and so will be the sameself, as far as the same

consciousness can extend to actions past or to come, and would be bydistance of time, or change of substance, no more twopersons than a man is

two men by wearing other clothes today than he did yesterday, with a long

or a short sleep between. The same consciousness uniting those distant

actions into the sameperson, whatever substances contributed to their

production.


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When you lose a finger (lets say it has been severed), though it remains

your finger, it is no longer part of yourself; why is that?

Because you are no longerconscious of what is happening to your finger:you would not have a sensation of cold if it were put into a bucket of ice, nor

would you have a sensation of pain if it were pricked with a pin

If, in some kind of science fiction scenario, you were conscious only of what

was happening to your finger and not the rest of your body, then we would

say that your body is no longer part of your self

If, in some other weird scenario, all of the ideas and memories that occur toyou, simultaneously occur to some other mind, then we would have to say

that you have two minds

Once again, the point of these far-fetched scenarios is to convince us of the

point that the material or immaterial medium in which your ideas occur is

not essential to your personal identity, but yourawareness them is

In short, we say that two persons are distinct, not because they have different

bodies or different minds, but because they are conscious of different ideas,

that is, different thoughts, memories, perceptions, etc.

What makes you the same person over time is the psychological continuity

of your consciousness (thestream of consciousness provides us with a useful

image here) you dont suddenly become aware of a whole new set of ideas

A single mind and body may host more than one person, that is, more than

one stream of consciousness

But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable

consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at

different times make different persons.


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What about persons who are unconscious, should we say that they are

different persons when asleep than they are when awake because they have

two different streams of consciousness?

Yes: If the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the sameconsciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person.

Person, Locke says, is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their

merit, and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and

happiness, and misery.

Why do you fear an event that has not yet happened?

You do not fear the event because it will happen to a particular body or

mind, but because you will be conscious of the unpleasantness of it

When we punish someone, we do not mean to (directly) punish their bodies

or their minds, but rather, we aim to punish theperson who is conscious of

their unethical actions

When we punish a person by torturing or jailing them, our primary intention

is not to damage their body or mind, but to affect theirconsciousness bycausing them misery and preventing happiness

If a criminals punishment does not induce unpleasant ideas, i.e., sensations,

thoughts, fears, etc., then their punishment does not fit their crime

Why do we punish people for what they do when under the influence of

drugs or alcohol?

Couldnt they defend themselves by claiming that they were not themselves

when they committed the crime?

After all, if drugs and alcohol alter your state of consciousness, then they

alter your personality, in effect, making you someone else


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We punish such people because we cannotprove that they were not the same

person when they committed the crime

Philosophy 2202F:Early Modern Philosophy

Lecture #11: LockesEssay, Book 4

Recall that knowledge, for Descartes, is the apprehension of clear and

distinct ideas by the intellect

According to Locke, knowledge is the perception of the agreement ordisagreement of two or more ideas

Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the

connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnance, of any of our

ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge,

and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we

always come short of knowledge.

Insofar as all of our ideas originate in experience i.e. perception and

reflection all of our knowledge originates in experience

Ideas can agree/disagree in four respects:

1. Identity or diversity

2. Relation

3. Coexistence or necessary connection

4. Real existence

Identity/diversity

Every idea is identical to itself; no two ideas are identical


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My idea ofwhite is the same every time I perceive or reflect on it

My idea ofwhite is not identical to my idea ofround

This is so absolutely necessary that without it there could be no knowledge,no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts, at all.

Relation

Two or more ideas stand in relations with respect to one another

Your dog is thesame size as my dog

Your dog is older than my dog

My dog isfriendlier than your dog

Coexistence/necessary connection

Certain ideas are commonly experienced together

Thus, when we pronounce concerninggoldthat it is fixed, our knowledge

of this truth amounts to no more but this that fixedness, or a power to remain

in the fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies, and is joined

with that particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and

solubility in aqua regia, which make our complex ideas, signified by the

wordgold.

The word silver picks out a different set of ideas, as do the words water

and unicorn

Real existence

Gold, silver, and water exist, unicorns dont


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Not all of our ideas agree with reality

It is a legitimate and important aspect of knowledge to know which ones do

and which ones dont

Our knowledge of the agreement/disagreement of our ideas comes in

differing degrees

We have intuitive knowledge when we immediately know that two ideas

agree/disagree, withouthaving to invocate intermediary ideas

White is not black

A circle is not a triangle

Three are more than two

We cannot help but to assent to these statements when we understand them

This part of knowledge is irresistible, and like bright sunshine forces itself

immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that

way, and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind

is presently filled with the clear light of it. It is on this intuition that depends

all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge; this certainty everyone

finds to be so great that he cannot imagine and therefore not require a

greater.

Not all of our ideas can be immediately compared to establish their

agreement/disagreement

Sometimes the agreement/disagreement between our ideas must be

apprehended through one or more intermediary ideas, or what we call

reasoning

This is demonstrative knowledge


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We do not know by intuitive inspection that the three interior angles of a

triangle equal two right angles, for the sums of these angles cannot be

directly compared

Instead, we derive this result from knowledge that is intuitive, i.e., the

definitions, axioms, and postulates of Euclidean geometry

Euclids Axiom #2: If equals be added to equals, the sums are equal

The axioms of geometry are known intuitively, the theorems are known

demonstrably

The axiomatic method ought to be used not only in mathematics, but in the

other sciences as well to arrive at general laws of nature

NewtonsPrincipia

In addition to general laws of nature, we have knowledge of the existence of

particularobjects and properties

There is a coffee cup on the desk

This knowledge is arrived at through neither reflection nor reasoning, but by

way of thesenses for this reason we call itsensitive knowledge

Sensitive knowledge is not nearly as certain as intuitive and demonstrative

knowledge, but we nevertheless have good reason to trust it

But how do we know that we can trust it? After all, I sometimes have ideas

of objects and/qualities when they do not exist mirages, dreams, etc.

If anyone says a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be

produced in us without any external objects, he may please to dream that I

make him this answer: 1. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his


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scruple or not; where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of no

use, truth and knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very

manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire and being actually

in it.

Because knowledge consists in our apprehension of the

agreement/disagreement of our ideas, knowledge cannot outstrip our ideas

we cannot have knowledge of something we have not yet experienced in

perception or reflection

Our ideas, however, will always outstrip our knowledge

We have the ideas ofmatterand thinking, but we cannot know whether ornot material things are capable of thought

Is your desk thinking right now?

How would you know if it were?

Knowledge about the identity/diversity and relation of our ideas can be

attained by simply reflecting on our ideas

Knowledge about the nature of substances i.e. the coexistence of ideas

cannot be attained in the same way, as Descartes had supposed (recall the

piece of wax example)

Individual substances, like gold, are complex ideas made up of several

simple ideas: heavy, yellow, malleable, fusible, etc.

But there is no necessary connection between these simple ideas

Furthermore, there is no observable connection between a substances

primary qualities the size, shape, and motion of its particles and its

secondary qualities its color, taste, sound


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In vain therefore shall we endeavour to discover by ourideas (the only true

way of certain and universal knowledge) what otherideas are to be found

constantly joined with that of our complex idea of any substances. [...] Our

knowledge in all these inquiries reaches very little further than our

experience.

What about our knowledge ofreal existence? How do we know that our

ideas correspond to real things?

Simple ideas must be caused by real qualities because they are not caused by

us

If the perceiver is the cause of her simple ideas, then she would have controlover them, but she doesnt

First, the first are simple ideas, which since the mind, as has been shown,

can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product of things

operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing in there those

perceptions which by the wisdom and will of our maker they are ordained

and adapted to.

We do not have the same guarantee in the case of complex ideas, because

our minds are responsible for putting certain simple ideas together to form

complex ideas

But our minds put simple ideas together to form complex ideas of substances

because they find these simple ideas to co-exist in nature

I find that my ideas of a heavy, malleable, yellow metal accompany my idea

of a fusible metal

Insofar as these ideas continue to be found together, we may conclude that

our complex idea of gold corresponds to a real substance


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He who sees a fire may, if he doubts whether it is anything more than a

bare fancy, feel it too, and be convinced by putting his hand in it, which

certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or

phantom, unless the pain is a fancy too. This yet he cannot, when the burn is

well, by raising the idea of it, bring upon himself again.

As to myself, I think God has given me assurance enough of the existence

of things without me, since by their different application I can produce in

myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concern of my present

state.

My belief in the existence of material objects has served me well in my

pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain

Insofar as my beliefs serve this purpose well, they are worthy of assent

beliefs need not be indubitable, but only beneficial

We know only about the existence of the things that we are presently

perceiving

It is highlyprobable that my cat exists, but since I am not perceiving him

right now, I cannot know this to be the case

how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not

capable of it, and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary

to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident as

to surmount every least (I will not say reason, but) pretense of doubting. He

who, in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain

demonstration would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing

quickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him

reason to venture on it.

Can we know thatsouls exist?

We determine what exists on the basis of our perceptions


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Souls are in principle unperceivable

Therefore, we cannot know that souls exist we must take it onfaith

Can we know that God exists?

Though god has given us no innate ideas of himself, though he has stamped

no original characters on our minds in which we may read his being, yet

having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he has

not left himself without witness, since we have sense, perception, and

reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves

about us.

I know that many things exist

I know that you cannot get something from nothing

So, I know that these things must have been brought into existence by

something

And thefirst cause must be an eternalbeing, otherwise it would have had to

have been created by something else, and thus, contrary to our assumption,

would not have been the first cause

The first cause must be morepowerfulthan all of creation, for the power of

all created things must exist first in their creator powers too must come

from something

For the same reason, the creator must also be possess more knowledge than

all of His creation

A wholly ignorant being cannot create knowledgeable beings

There must be an eternal, all powerful, all knowing being this is God


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From what has been said, it is plain to me we have a more certain

knowledge of the existence of a God than of anything our senses have not

immediately discovered to us.

Our knowledge of God is demonstrative (not sensitive), but not innate

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