Modelling Language Development Based on Self Organisation Between Metaphor and Gestalts

8/9/2019 Modelling Language Development Based on Self Organisation Between Metaphor and Gestalts

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A Model of Language Development Based on Self-Organisation ofGestalts and Metaphor

David Rail, MD; FRACP

Neurologist

Campbelltown, Sydney, Australia 2560.

[email protected]

Abstract

Modeling language development has recently seen a shift towards studies of the

interdependence of language and perceptual reality. Cognitive linguistics has revived

the Gestalt approach where things and relations constitute wholes: relations emerge

with the objects through a process of segmentation and transformation. According to

this view the continuous and dynamic form of the external, phenomenal world

motivates sentential semantic structures as an expression of the unity between

perception and language. These structures also represent the progressive self-organisation of image schemata where meaning emerges through metaphor.

Metaphor involves double scope blending where structures emerge from the

interaction between incongruent conceptual frames. That process is recursive leading

to creative structures. Although language development is based on gestalt metaphor

self-organisation no model has concentrated on this fundamental approach. To

produce such a model we conceive metaphor in its rhetorical structural form, as

coordination of the master tropes, or a tropology. We rationalize the role of the

tropology and show how it functions recursively throughout the forebrain. To

understand the recursive form of the tropology we show how it functions in a gestaltmanner and that perception is a tropological process. The latter stems from

perception and the tropology becoming self similar (isomorphic) as the language


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system self organises in ontogeny. To corroborate the isomorphism we show that

the Gestalt principles and the master tropes are homologous. This finding enables us

to determine the structure of perception. We indicate how semantic sentential

structures are generated from self-organisation of the tropology. With self-

organisation tropological function incorporates spatiotemporal scaling (fractal time).

We indicate other important aspects of the model, in particular metalinguisticdevelopment.

Keywords: Brain function; cognitive linguistics; concept formation; double scope

blending; emergence; fractal time; gestalts; gestalt principles; image schemata; irony;

language development; master tropes; metaphor; metastability; microgenesis;

morphogenesis; perception; self organisation; semiotics; topology.

Introduction

Modeling language development has recently seen a shift towards studies of the

interdependence of language and perceptual reality. Cognitive linguistics proposes

that language is a cognitive phenomenon where conceptual structures stem from

perception and embodiment (Hampe, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Taylor, 1989;

Skoldberg, 2002). Language is imaginatively embodied where metaphor is central to

the origins of meaning (Danesi, 2004). Modeling the development of language has

focused on meaning rather than syntax. This leads to the important question: how are

events in the physical world transformed into semantic notions? This question

confronts the aporia or discrepancy between the analog world we live in and the

discrete or digital nature of language in terms of categories and symbols. To

overcome this difficulty Thom proposed that we need to preserve a priori forms ofspace and time by generating dynamic structures or morphologies (Thom, 1972,

1990).

These structures are dynamic, morphological and gestalt based. In this approach

early morphodynamic models from Ren Thom have received wide support, both

from cognitive linguists such as Talmy (2000) and Langacker (1987; 1990), and from

psychology through the study of metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff

(1993). Morphodynamic theories have proposed that there are syntactico-semantic

infrastructures of a topological and dynamic nature, which form universals (seeManjali, 1997 (a) and (b)). These underlie a morphological emergent level of reality

where "surface structures" (gestalts) emerge from physical "deep structures".


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Petitot calls the extraction of semantic structures or invariants in spatiotemporal

transformations the morphogenesis of meaning (Petitot, 1995 and 2003). Based on

this work cognitive linguistics has revived the Gestalt approach calling into

question the traditional roles assigned to perception as a faculty only dealing with

relations between objects. In the Gestalt or mereological conception things andrelations constitute wholes: relations are not given for granted but emerge together

with the objects through a process of segmentation and transformation (Doursat &

Petitot, 2005 (a) and (b)).

Two major examples of the morphogenesis of meaning are found in our

development of spatial (prepositions) and spatiotemporal meaning (verbs).

Understanding prepositions, e.g. in, above, across amounts to the brain

forming morphodynamic transforms, where transforms create a morphology that

evolves temporally (Doursat & Petitot, 2005 (a) and (b)). Transformation routines perform a drastic, yet targeted simplification of the geometric data relating the

relevant items in perception. By erasing details they create virtual structures or

singularities that govern the development of geometric relationships between the

interacting morphologies. For example, what characterises the semantic

development of the concept of in is invariance across all the perceived instances.

The relationships that emerge with the transformations represent structural

invariance across an infinite range of real world instances or topologies. What

remains invariant is the Gestalt, the preservation of similar structural relationships

that have developed dynamically.

For verbs (Thom, 1972 and 1990) geometrico-topological analysis associates

combinatorial invariants with spatio-temporal process in the physical world. This

primordial schematism governs the linguistic organisation of our Gestaltic vision of

the world, where these invariants form the basis for verbal process. Actantial graphs

encompass Tesnieres concepts of little dramas (Manjali, 1997 (a) and (b)) where

the verb organises or structures sentential meaning, binding objects and situations to

form dynamic gestalts. These gestalts are organic and binding principles of brain

organisation.

Based on these ideas understanding language development centers on how

topological and dynamic information (morphodynamics) provided by perception

can be iconically encoded in image schemata and processed by the semantics of

natural language (Nuessel, 1996; Petitot, 1995, 2003). Schemata capture the

structural contours of sensorimotor experience integrating information from

multiple modalities (Grady, 2005; Hampe, 2005; Rohrer, 2005). Image schemata

organise knowledge and reasoning about the world. They function somewhat like

the abstract structure of an image, and thereby connect up a vast range of different

experiences that manifest this same recurring structure (Johnson, 1987). Byrepeatedly activating a set of properties in a particular way individuals form top-

down frames for organising different aspects of perception via metaphor.


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Metaphor preserves the topological contours of perceptual experience (Invariance

principle) (Lakoff, 1993), where perception is structured by the Gestalt principles:

emergence, reification, invariance and multistability (Lehar, 2003).

Image schemata are condensed redescriptions of perceptual experience for the purpose of mapping spatial structure on to conceptual structure. Therefore

modeling language development in terms of image schemata function must respect

the view that has emerged in cognitive linguistics that the continuous and dynamic

form of the external, phenomenal world motivates sentential semantic structures

(Manjali, 1997 (a) and (b)). The continuous plane of content has its source in

perception, as it is through perception that the human organism establishes contact

with the world. The elements of the perceptually rooted linguistic schemas produce

a 'dynamic gestalt' by means of which semantic comprehension of sentences can

take place.

Modeling language development

Based on the above we propose that modeling language development can be based

on the idea that the continuous and dynamic form of the external, phenomenal

world motivates dynamic Gestalts. These sentential semantic structures are an

expression of the unity between perception and language. These structures are a

product of the self-organisation of image schemata in ontogeny, where gestalts

acquire meaning via metaphor.

Metaphor needs to be considered in terms of the many space conceptual integration

model that is based on double-scope blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2003,

2008). Blending is dynamic where we construct meaning by actively reinterpreting

the unknown (percepts, ideas) in terms of the known or idealised concepts. It

involves the complex interaction between the contingencies of the source (unknown)

considered in terms of the preconceived ideals of the known (target). The dynamics

give rise to emergent properties representing reality from a certain perspective.Double-scope blending creates vast conceptual networks with elaborate relations

running across the networkrelations of time, space, cause-effect, representation,

analogy and disanalogy, change, identity, uniqueness, and so on. Despite the vast

scales involved nonetheless concepts are anchored in scenes that are at human scale.

Integration networks consisting of conventional parts, conventionally structured

parts, and novel mappings and compressions represent reality from a certain

perspective.

Blending is recursive: packed, human-scale blends become inputs to new networks(Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2003, 2008). Emergent structures can be incorporated

into more complex ones. Human scale blends contained in the network provide a


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platform, a scaffold, a cognitively congenial basis from which to reach out, manage,

manipulate, transform, develop, and handle the network. Human thought anchoring

vast network scales in human scale enables us to bring the distant past and future

together in the here-and-now. The individual can become aware of identity and

existence in subjective time that extends from the past through the present to the

future. Blending involves a major personal and emotional input so that the semanticproduct is highly personal and unpredictable. It also accommodates the central role

of the ego as being both the agent and also changed in the blending process. It

countenances paradox and anomalies.

Despite the importance of self-organisation between gestalt and metaphor in language

development no model has concentrated on this fundamental approach. We contend

that such a model needs to incorporate a number of aspects or constraints on its form.

These are as follows: rhetorical, where language stems from a continual questioningof the nature of perception and thought; microgenetic (Brown, 1988, 1998), where

language is an actualisation (Aktualgenese)of a cognition over "layers" in mind and

brain that retrace growth patterns in phyloontogeny. In this way of thinking, the

momentary actualisation of the organism, its becoming, is the fundamental note from

which the melody of development is composed; ontological, where the conceptual

units underlying the dynamics can interpret reality; ontogenic, in that the units should

recognise the maturational sequence that characterises ontogeny; structural, where the

units self organise into a structure that transforms dynamic gestalt structures into

sentential semantic structures; recursivity, where the same dynamic should be evidentat all levels of the neuraxis, from perception to frontal planning; gestaltic, the

dynamics should reflect the gestalt basis of language development; incorporate

double scope blending concepts of emergence, metaphor as anchoring,

spatiotemporal scaling, compression, completion, paradox resolution and ego

formation; and finally self-organisation, which incorporates notions of metastability,

metalinguistic development, fractal time and contextual dissociation.

Metaphor as coordination of the master tropes

In order to incorporate all these constraints into our model we propose that we need

to consider metaphor in terms of its constituent structure, coordination of the master

tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony). To trope means to change

meaning. Of what? Of words? Yes, but more specifically they are the source of

changing what or how we mean. Each trope represents the stages consciousness must

pass on the way to abstract thought (D'Angelo, 1987). Metaphor presents perceptual

equivalence, representing an intuitive grasp of the whole, a primordial functionalunity of sensory, affective, imagistic and linguistic elements. Metonymy

differentiates into parts, transductively leading over the mind from one thing to


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another. Synecdoche is an inductive movement where a part is put for the whole, and

vice versa. Irony is a self-conscious process that interprets the whole process.

The coordinated function of the four tropes as a system is considered essential for our

conceptual adaptation. From the 17th

Century when Vico (Danesi, 2003; Vico, 1944)

first recognised the master tropes until the early 1980s the tropology waschampioned as a primitive semiotic unit (Burke, 1969; DAngelo, 1992; Kellner,

1981; Oswick et al, 2004). Since then the tropology has been relatively neglected as

interest has focused on metaphor and conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier &

Turner, 1998, 2003, 2008; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff, (1993); Lakoff & Johnson, 1980;

Taylor, 1989).

We propose that a tropological approach offers fresh insights into language

development. We will now rationalize use of the tropology in terms of the

constraints we iterated above.

Considering the rhetorical constraint, metaphor is a cybernetic, homeostatic

process that continually questions the nature of perceived events and

simultaneously our attempt to represent these events through language. Metaphor

formation involves a top-down approach organising perception, synthesising

information into a suitably conceptualisable form. The tropology constitutes the

rhetorical basis for concept formation.

Concerning the next three constraints, microgenetic, ontological and ontogenic we

note that the master tropes were originally considered to be merely figures of

speech, but we now realise that their function is more fundamental (Burke, 1969;

DAngelo, 1987 and 1992; Kellner, 1981; Oswick et al, 2004). The development

of language stems from images and tropes. The tropes represent the capacity of

man for direct sensation and imaginative perception (D'Angelo, 1987; Danesi,

2004). They underlie creative process based on the use of analogical reasoning.

They are considered the basis for much of our understanding in everyday life

(Culler, 1981). Tropes constitute a system by which the mind comes to grasp the

world conceptually in language. They reflect our fundamentally relationalunderstanding of reality, a reality framed within systems of analogy (Chandler,

2002). Analogy is a reflection of our sensitivity to ontological form, which is

rooted in the perception of patterned resonance in the world (Zwicky, 2003).

Tropes shape thought so enabling our minds to echo our world.

Tropes are ontological concepts essential for our interpretation of reality. They

symbolise relationships within phenomena, where each trope represents a specific

strategy for presenting the perceived experience (White, 1985). They are modelsof the different directions thought might take to offer meaning to areas of

experience not cognitively secured. Functioning together the tropological approach


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reflects ontogeny. The order of the master tropes is not ad hoc but reflects

cognitive and semantic development (Kellner, 1981; DAngelo, 1992). The order

is strictly and logically entailed. The tropology represents a form of knowing, of

grasping a concept. The tropology accords, whether loosely or strictly, with many

theoretical systems of knowing or coming to be known, as in Vico, Kant, Hegel,

Marx and Goethe (Kellner, 1981; also see Burke, 1969). The tropology alsorepresents the stages of cognitive development which encompass both the

phylogeny and ontogeny of cognitive systems (DAngelo, 1992; Kellner, 1981;

Werner, 1944; Piaget, 1969; Vygotsky, 1962). Foucoult (1970) and Vico (1944)

have shown that the logic of the tropology (poetic logic) underlies the general

stages of development of Western thought.

The next constraint is structural. We have previously raised the question underlying

the cognitive linguistic approach to language formation: how is the physical world

transformed into semantic notions? The answer was a structuralist approach, wherestructures are dynamic, morphological and gestalt based. The major tropes provide a

dynamic, structural basis for concept formation.

The next section will develop the recursive form of the tropology that is also central

to the microgenic approach (Brown, 1988) where language formation consists of a

cascade of whole/part shifts over evolutionary growth planes in the brain leading

from a core in upper brainstem through limbic formations to the neocortical rim.

Then in the following two sections weindicate the gestalt form of the tropology that

is the foundation of the model. We show first how the tropology functions in a

gestalt manner and then how perception functions tropologically. We propose that

the latter is based on self-organisation in ontogeny where perception and the

tropology become self similar (isomorphic). To corroborate the isomorphism we

demonstrate homologies between the Gestalt principles and the master tropes. These

findings reveal our recursive model of language development as inherently

tropological and gestaltic. In the next stage we discuss metalinguistic development

as the tropology self organises in ontogeny to function in fractal time. The

synchronic form of the tropology collapses past present and future into one

expression. These findings reflect on the nature of double scope blending in terms

outlined above.

The extension of the tropology through the forebrain

The recursive pattern of the tropology is expressed in different ways through variouslevels of the forebrain. We will first briefly outline the extent in neurological terms

(Brown, 1988) and then develop the tropological core. In neurological terms


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language can be conceived as levels in a "vertical" structure, not as centers in a two-

dimensional network. These levels constitute a stratified system of phyletic growth

planes. Language maps onto this structure. Language is the outcome of a multitiered

system distributed over levels in the evolution of brain and behavior. The structure as

a whole develops out of medial and paraventricular formations through several

growth planes of limbic and paralimbic (transitional) cortex to a stage of generalized("association," "integration") cortex.

Perceptual semantic transformation originates from linking polymodal sensorimotor

circuits. At the most primitive level of language perceptual data is organised by the

Gestalt principles. These dynamics involve the coordination of the sensorimotor

activity with the right temporoparietal lobes. These early stages of language

formulation integrate incoming topological information as Gestaltic primitives, e.g.

as preverbal and prepositional structures. They define the morphemes, the most

primitive semantic units. The right and left temporoparietal regions combine toreinterpret the morphemes and formulate speech production. Finally at the highest

level of integration frontal lobe planning continually modulates the lower levels.

In tropological terms language development stems from the slow maturation and

eventually full coordination of the tropes. The tropes mature in the fixed order:

metaphor; metonymy; synecdoche and finally, irony. The expression of the tropology

differs from perception through to frontal planning (also see Kellner, 1981 for the

following). Metalinguistic function ensues when ironic self-awareness develops

leading to narrativity and the development of fluent speech.

As the tropes gradually mature in function they unfold upon themselves. In their

most primitive form, perception is interpreted in terms of a simple double binary

system of categories, defining same - other (metaphor / metonymy) and part whole

(synecdoche). This matrix forms bisociations that are the most thorough way of

encompassing the diversity among the things that make up reality (States, 1998).

With the development of ironic awareness the tropology becomes complete and

functions in a cyclical manner. Maturation beyond the categorical level leads to

projection upon a syntagmatic axis that represents self-explanation through speech.This is the second level of tropological explication, leading the tropes conceptually

through the stages of linguistic cooperation above the morpheme. The lexical process

of creating whole-whole correspondences to the concepts and words that are thus

joined is a metaphoric transfer. The reductive categorisation of these words governed

by grammatical rules of combination creates cause-effect entailments, which is

metonymic. Synecdochal organisation at this level refers to the organic status of

sentences, where the rules of syntax are the cohesive force. Finally, irony provides

meaning from above the level of the sentence.


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The highest level of tropological expansion is the level of thought and language

planning in the frontal regions. The intentional state establishes an obligatory,

recurrent and unidirectional configuration on the percept / thought interpretation

process. Intentionality involves the selection of broad semantic units from the

meaning potential, the equivalent of the paradigmatic or metaphoric axis of language.

These selections invoke specific structural relationships depending on the contextualdemands needed for expression. The necessary entailments broadly select for the

specificities of syntactic structure that will be realised in syntagms. These expressions

underlie metonymy at this level. Synecdoche concerns the formulation of symbolic

relationships needed to match the coevolving paradigmatic / syntagmatic aspect of

expression. Symbols are selected relative to idealised relations and contexts in

worlds of the same type, or possibly any imaginable type.

Finally, the ironic stance overviews the planning processes. Irony represents a self-

conscious process of interpretation of the process so that it foregrounds theinadequacy of words to things, of appearance to essence. Irony signals dissatisfaction

with representation as such and motivates recourse to the tropological lexicon from

which a new and more responsive formulation may be sought. Full tropological

process leads to restructuring, an explication of the implicate order, momentary

adaptation via a Darwinian based exploration of the fabric of embodiment.

Tropology function in gestalt terms

The gestalt function of the tropology is as follows. Metaphor is an emergent process

where the individual creates a new perspective or meaning. To do that intentional

needs highlight specific relationships within the emerging whole, the metaphoric

representation of the real world or perceptual scene. Metonymy determines the

contingent aspects of that specific intentional state. The representation of figural

relationships emerges from the whole in context. Metonymy differentiates or reducesthe overall situation in a figure ground manner (see Koch, 1999; Talmy, 1988), where

contiguity is the salient relation that exists between the sub frame elements of a

conceptual frame or between the frame as a whole and its elements. That is, the

salient links between elements of a given frame as constituting a prototypical

conceptual gestalt are contiguity relations. From a Gestalt perspective perceptual

saliency of stimuli critically depends on the surrounding context. Metonymy

preserves the perceived relationships in contextual form as a contingent structure.

Simultaneously, synecdoche compares and contrasts the developing contingencies

with previously determined idealised structural relationships, representations of a

general kind. For example, see Doursat & Petitot, 2005 (a) and (b) model and


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discussion of the development of simple spatial concepts such as in. In other words

intelligence constructs a world first by turning outwards to objectise itself through

metonymy only to turn inside, to come to know self in the image via synecdoche.

Here the part-whole relationship is inverted; the part is broadly reinterpreted in terms

of what remains invariant despite the contingencies of the real world. Synecdoche

evolves to represent a higher level of interpretation, of the actual within the many possible worlds available to the imagination. Synecdoche recontextualises the

specific within the personal.

The tropology reconciles or blends the contrasting worlds so that the contingency of

metonymy forms a best fit with the ideal or invariant one developed through

synecdoche. With synecdoche the specificities of the moment may be placed in a

broader context. Irony feeds back on both the actual and the ideal demands for

expression. Irony questions the reality value of metonymy and of representation in

general i.e. using words to express the essence of things. The metastable systemcontinually cycles through the tropes as it adapts to the moment. With each turn of

the cycle the emergent metaphoric level of resolution leads to a novel perspective.

Metaphor represents the now as an attempt to resolve the dynamics concerning:

present contingencies (metonymy); past idealised contentions (synecdoche); and the

future via irony.

The tropological function of perception

We have proposed that our language development model is based on the progressive

self-organisation of the percept / metaphor interaction in ontogeny. Image schemata

form top-down frames for organising perception via tropological function. We

conclude that in ontogeny when the language system self-organises to criticality the

function of both the tropology and perception becomes self similar, 1/f or isomorphic

(Anderson & Mandell, (1996); Kello &.Van Orden (2009). We postulate that with

self-organisation the perceptual system functions in a tropological manner where the

components of the tropology and perception are homologous.

We now propose and substantiate these homologies between each major trope and

Gestalt principal: emergence, reification, invariance and multistability (Lehar, 2003).

Metaphor is the analog of emergence. The unifying function of metaphoric

resemblance accounts for the emergence of new meaning in language. It involves an

act of perceptual and semantic restructuring where a sense of imagination operates to

draw meaning from the comparison made (Ricoeur, 1975; 1991). The process

includes an iconic moment or image that acts as a gathering of emergent meanings

that underlies our ability to see reality other than that received. This is rooted in the

imagination to construct an image from many diverse semantic fields.


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In Gestalt theory, emergence refers to the formation of the macro structure, the

Gestalt or meaningful form. The whole is greater than the parts. Emergence is

unpredictable as the total structure remains beyond the sum of the instances. The

dynamic aspect of emergence is reflected in the fact that the final global state is not

computed in a single pass, but continuously, like a relaxation to equilibrium in a

dynamic system model.

Secondly, metonymy is analogous to reification. As indicated above metonymy is a

figureground effect (see Koch, 1999; Talmy, 1988) where from a Gestalt

perspective perceptual saliency of stimuli critically depends on the surrounding

context. Metonymy conveys some incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the

corporeal or tangible. It conserves perception of the worlds of objects, reflects their

quiddity, their particular precisions (Hejinian, 1996). Metonymy underlies the

gappy nature of thought, where looking through the gaps between the disparate

contiguous parts imagines meaning. The gaps (relationships) point to a missingwhole, a structure that unites the parts.

Reification refers to the perceptual state where specific virtual structures or

singularities emerge in context. The gestalt is created through a constructive or

generative process so that the part reified is defined by its contingent context. With

reification more explicit information develops than is immediately obvious or present

in the specific scene. As with metonymy meaning arises by looking through the

gaps between the disparate contiguous parts.

Synecdoche is equivalent to invariance. Synecdoche creates an explicit hierarchy by

situating one thing as part of another. It is holistic and imagistic, presupposing some

constitutive quality that can unify its relation to the world and symbolise this unity.

Synecdoche underlies the categorical tendency that is the psychological (but not

strictly formal) sense of invariance.

Invariance is of great importance in Gestalt perception (Hochberg & McAllister,

1953; Hoffman, 1992). The preferred interpretation of a stimulus is the one with the

simplest code. That is a code that enables a reconstruction of the stimulus using a

minimum number of descriptive parameters. Such a code is obtained by capturing amaximum amount of regularity and yields a hierarchical organization of the stimulus

in terms of wholes and parts. Simplicity is often based on symmetry criteria. The

gestalt is of great importance for the semantic development of the concept. The

gestalt, is what remains invariant across all percepts, the preservation of similar

structural relationships that have developed dynamically.

Irony is analogous to multistability. Irony foregrounds the inadequacy of words to

things, of appearance to essence. Irony underlines the discontinuity between what is

said and what is meant, what is planned and what occurs. It takes the dialecticbetween external reality and language to a new level that is essential for resolution of

the paradox.


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Multistability indicates the tendency of ambiguous experiences to oscillate unstably

between alternative interpretations. Interpretation of scenes can vary form moment to

moment merely depending on what constitutes figure and context. Multistability

underlies symmetry breaking and phase transformation in self-organisation. For

example, with embedded figures metastability and phase transitions arise in the self-organising decisional process (Kelso and Tognoli, 2007). In general, symmetry

breaking in cognition requires a creative answer to overcome the paradox.

Language development based on dynamics within the tropology

We have sought to establish the recursive nature of the tropology underlying

language development through all levels of the forebrain. To do that we first showed

that the tropology functions in a gestalt manner. Then we proposed that when the

tropology and perception self-organise perception is governed by a tropological

sequence: emergence, reification, invariance and multistability.

Based on these findings we will now look at the model from two perspectives. In

general terms we see language development as a progressive increase in the ability to

extract, consolidate and manipulate gestalts within the extended forebrain system.Gestalts are the invariant structures determined by realising the universality aspects

of each specific percept; that is, despite the differences between the infinite number

of scenes the child meets (see Doursat & Petitot, 2005(a); Breidbach, & Jost, 2006).

The dialectical tension between the specific and universal governs the development.

Gestalts are formed through reification and then given initial significance through

invariance, where they are correlated with preconceived transformations of a similar

type. In ontogeny gestalts become more and more integrated as they are consolidated

within the micro (perceptual level) and macro (extending to the forebrain) systems.

The tropology stabilises and reinterprets the Gestalt through the interaction between

metonymy and synecdoche. The process becomes one of progressive embedding

through transformations. Objects and situations embed in verbs or morphogenic

transformations. These are in turn further embedded through metonymy and

synecdochal blending. From recursive tropological extension the gestalts become

sentential semantic structures. They gain an increasing sense of meaning and

permanence as they become consolidated (embedded) in the process. We see the

primary function of the language system is to consolidate meaning potential through

gestalt metaphor self organisation. The development and further use or the semantic

sentential structures enables in to adapt from moment to moment. Within each

moment as it updates it restructures self to best represent what we mean. Thisbecomes and is the essence of Pragnanz, our meaning as self-realisation.


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In more specific terms language development is based on the gradual development of

the ability to recognise objects and realise their meaning through contextual

relationships. In the earliest development of perception the child differentiates

aspects of the whole, experiencing objects apart from self. The semantic task is to

stabilise perception. That is performed by transforming percepts into gestalts ofincreasing stability by increasing the state space of synecdochal or invariant forms.

Stability is also conferred by more widely distributing the gestalt, making it a

function of widespread coordinated forebrain activity.

Language development is characterised by an increasing ability to manipulate gestalts

by recontextualising them through tropal interaction. The gestalt is defined and

structured by its context. Tropal dynamics modify gestalts so that the figure-ground

relationship in perception becomes reinterpreted through the interaction or blending

between metonymy and synecdoche and irony. In this blending manner the primitive perceptual syntagms become sentential semantic structures, the basic units of

language.

Metalinguistic development through self-organisation of the

language system

The development of the language system is based on increasing coordination of

patterns through all levels of the forebrain. The embodied, situated nature of

cognition is founded on the ability of these patterns spanning multiple time scales to

organize in space and time (Kello & Van Orden, 2009; Kelso & Tognoli, 2007).

Systems self organise to metastability (Bressler & Kelso, 2001; Kelso, 2002) which

produces a range of brain behaviours where numerous patterns of activity co-exist as

latent potentials (Kello et al., 2008). Systems become more flexible and metastable

as their capacity to concurrently hold many distinct latent patterns increases.

Fractal dynamics or 1/f scaling behaviour is pervasive throughout the nervous

system. Fractal time means that the extended tropological processes become

coordinated vertically (Anderson & Mandell, 1996). In systems at criticality

behaviour becomes correlated across levels. In our model we propose that the three

different temporal processes within the tropology become synchronous: irony relates

to future time of planning; metonymy to the contingency of the present; synecdoche

reflects the past, invariance gained through experience. Metaphor is emergent

leading to the formation of new structural relations as each cycle of the tropology

tries to resolve the particular intention. Thought and language stem from recurrent

metaphoric anchoring of vast network scales in the human scale. This processbrings the past and future together in the here-and-now (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008).

The synchronic coordination of the tropology is the basis for language. Language is a


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diachronic transformation and via self-reference feeds back to the planning and

perceptual centers.

As mentioned semantic growth is characterised by the increasing ability to

recontextualise. In the early stages of development the child is governed by

ambience so figure-ground (context or structure) are inseparable. The child cannotdissociate the figure from its context and language remains literal (mimetic, gestural).

However, through self-organisation and developing ironic awareness the tropology

turns back on itself. Self-awareness leads to major changes in the dynamics of the

gestalt / tropology relationship. The development of self-reference means that

reference to self means self and other, or subject and object. Self now becomes the

structure within which the gestaltic object coevolves through self-reference.

However, the self / object relation where self is context and object is figure are of

different logical types. Now the object is dissociated from the self; figure can also be

separated from its ground. This leads to the increasing autonomy of language and thedevelopment of metalanguage.

The ability to dissociate figure from ground, or context, is essential for conceptual

fluidity, metaphor and language development. The individual realises that figure and

ground can be interchanged, or even changed completely. Recontextualisation occurs

at will. The ability to realise figures in different contexts underlies the growth of

imagination and meaning. All meaning refers back to self-interpretation so that

eventually we can say and even become anything we wish.

Further semantic aspects of the model

We have proposed that self-organisation between gestalts and the tropology can serve

as a basis to model semantic development. We conclude by further justifying the

importance of a tropological approach. The first is what Piaget called significant

implication (Scholnook & Cookson, 1994). Meaning is the understanding of how anaction changes (transforms) the world. Significant implication constructs the action-

result regularities that image schemata represent. In order to understand the logic of

action, the child must first build contingencies based on the inference that certain

actions rather than others produce specific results. The tropology is an analog of

Piagets schemata depicting the general stages of cognitive development (DAngelo,

1992). The tropology provides a basis for the logic inherent in action perception

schemata. This same logic can now be seen to pervade the coordinated activity

necessary for language development.

Second, we have seen that narrativity develops as the tropology matures to form

recursive cyclical activity. Narrativity is of great psychological importance because


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it organises the structure of human experience. Narrativity typifies the child after 3

or 4 where they begin to remember their autobiographical experience (Young &

Saver, 2001). Narrativity constructs our notion of reality and asserts that the

experience of life takes on meaning through allegorical inflation.

Thirdly, tropological process leads to development of the sense of continuity of self.This process is characterised by transitions between stable and unstable phase

synchronisation as seen in metastability. The tropes of transition and closure

underlie the instability (see Grossman, 1998). Metaphor and synecdoche are the

brakes of the tropological machine; metonymy and irony are its engines. Metaphor

and synecdoche represent the identity of versions of self differing over time.

Metaphor affirms the identity between things and their inner meaning. Synecdoche

represents the sublation of difference in the perceived homogeneity of subject and

object. Metonymy and irony on the other hand represent transitions in the search for

identity. Metonymy denies identity. However, with irony there is a simultaneous

negation and preservation of identity that advances the dialectic to a new phase. The

tropology oscillates between cycles of tension and resolution, where the

confrontation of the tropes informs the progress of internal narrative innovation that

underlies identity as continuity within change.

Finally, in addition to our comments on irony we further highlight the important role

of irony in modeling language development (Colbrook, 2003; White, 1985). Irony is

essential for developing meaning; how knowledge or gnosis arises from language.

Gnosis is not an algorithmic process but rather a pragmatic need to understand theworld. This process is better understood as diagnosis, literally knowing through, a

knowledge gained through ironic self-awareness, the self-reflective process of the

tropology (Kellner, 1981). Here knowledge comes from non-understanding. That is,

not by man extending his mind and taking the world in. Rather he makes things out

of himself and becomes them by transforming himself into them.

Discussion

We have developed a dynamic model of language development based on a unifying

concept: tropes shape thought so enabling our minds to mould our world. In the

language model the forebrain functions as a complex adaptive system subserved by

the metastable tropology dynamically reconstructing self from moment to moment.

This is a gestalt notion, where the tropes coordinate to generate semantic sentential

structures that can serve as the primary currency of semantic exchange at all levels ofthe neuraxis. These enable us to conceive inputs or ideas in contextual terms and

then recontextualise them so that we can become them. In becoming we are


16/22

restructured through self-explication and ultimately self-explanation.

The thesis provides a systematic link between gestalt and metaphor. We have

asserted many reasons for the continuing relevance of the tropology in language

development. In particular the model reflects the way in which four-dimensional

space-time becomes internalised as fractal space-time. That transformation is the keyto semantics. We see the tropology as central to that conversion because it functions

in a gestalt manner and perception is tropological. We contend that these

groundbreaking ideas are pivotal to understanding the unity of forebrain function.

The model has several other important aspects. It introduces a novel basis for

studying language development in terms of seven self-organising parameters. Four

of these relate to transformations in ontogeny between the gestalt principles and the

tropes: reification and metonymy; invariance and synecdoche; multistability and

irony; and emergence of perception and metaphor. The fifth axis concerns therelationship between local multistability and the global coordinative concept,

metastability. The sixth axis is the development of metalinguistic capability through

to self-organisation. Finally, we provide a fresh way to understand Pragnanz as the

semantic goal of the tropological gestalt system. In ontogeny we come to perceive

objects as a function of the extended tropology. As we perceive with intention we

project downwards (from our past) so that objects are discovered anew. That fresh

outlook stems from each language act where we reinvent objects through the

emergent process based on the recursive process of blending, irony and metaphor.

The object becomes meaningful as we relate to it by extending fractal time into

reflexic fractal space-time. Gestalt production restructures self through Pragnanz.

The model enables us to consider the importance of time constraints in language

development. Communication is governed by conflicting constraints. It must

maximise meaning in minimal time. Gestalts, iconic or imagistic forms have rich

relational semantics but they are ambiguous (Wilden, 1980). On the other hand,

although discursive language has a powerful syntax that makes it unambiguous, it

takes time. The model proposes that the optimal resolution of the conflict between

these two forms of communication lead to development of a gestalt system thatgenerates semantic structures with a sentential form. These semantic sentential

structures are produced from and represent brain function at points of instability, at

criticality and metastability, where brain adaptation is optimised. We propose that

his type of max / min optimizing process leads to Zipfs law where there is a 1/f

relationship between word length and usage. It also helps to understand the

importance of implication in metonymy and gestalt formation through synecdoche

and metaphor.

Furthermore, the brain functions at metastability in order to compress its infiniteoptions to completion (in a semantic sense) in the least time. This mechanism

requires a strong constraining force, limiting language and maximising semantics.


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We propose that irony evolved to subserve that function. Irony resolves the conflict

between the actual and the ideal frames. It also enables us to adopt a metalinguistic

stance. Irony questioning both actualisation (metonymy) and representation

(synecdoche). Irony may acts as an optimiser in the max / min dynamic mentioned

above.

We propose that the model also provides fresh insights into the mechanisms

underlying microgenesis (Brown, 1988, 1998). We will detail the close relationship

between the two models more comprehensively in a later paper. At this stage we

note that microgenesis is couched in terms of neurological process and process

metaphysics. It is concerned with the concept of time, change and the actualisation

(becoming) over phases in the brain in the momentary development of a cognition.

Becoming creates the novelty as well as the duration through which the entity

momentarily exists. Each novel moment is a constituent of an imaginative series over

which the entity endures. Our model is also based on the creation of time (timecollapse, fractal time) and imagination. These issues will serve as a major link

between the two theories.


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Modelling Language Development Based on Self Organisation Between Metaphor and Gestalts