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MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

LEGAL SECTOR REFORM PROGRAMME (LSRP)

ZERO DRAFT

Unblocking the Road to Timely Justice for All: First Annual Review of the Legal Sector Reform Programme of the United Republic of Tanzania

19th May, 2008

Unblocking the Road to Timely Justice for All: Review of the Legal Sector Reform Programme – May, 2008

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents 2

Abbreviations 3

PART 1: Background to the Legal Sector Reform Programme 6

PART 2: Summary of Approach and Key Findings 12

PART 3: General Findings 13

Non-State Actors in the Legal Sector Reform Programme 21

Mainstreaming Gender in Legal Sector Reform Programme 25

Planning, Budgeting, Procurement and Other Financial Matters 27

Programme Co-ordination, Monitoring and Evaluation 41

PART FOUR: Key Conclusions and Recommendations 48

NSA Participation in the LSRP 57

Gender Mainstreaming 60

Financial Management Manual 62

Programme Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation 63

GBS Performance Indicators to Foster Government Ownership and

Leadership 67

APPENDIX I: Progress Made in Each Key Result Area (KRA) 69

APPENDIX II: Terms of Reference for the Legal Sector Reform Programme

Annual Review – 2008 76

APPENDIX III: Literature, Documents and Legislation Available to

the Review Team 81

APPENDIX IV: List of Interviewees who Talked to the Review Team 84

APPENDIX V: Participants at the Stakeholder’s Annual Review Workshop

– Dar es Salaam, 12th May, 2008 92

APPENDIX VI: KRA Progress to Date Reported Against MTS (April, 2008) 95


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ABBREVIATIONS

ASDP Agricultural Sector Development Programme BEST Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania BOT Bank of Tanzania BRC Belgian Technical Cooperation BRELA Business Registration and Licensing Agency BRU Better Regulation Unit CAG Controller and Auditor General Cap Chapter of the Laws CBA Canadian Bar Association CCBRT Comprehensive Community Based Rehabilitation in Tanzania CDR Commercial Dispute Resolution CHRGG Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CLE Council for Legal Education CQS Consultants’ Qualification Selection CSOs Civil Society Organisations DCI Director of Criminal Investigation DFID Department for International Development DPP Director of Public Prosecutions DPs Development Partners FY Financial Year GBS General Budget Support GTZ German Technical Cooperation IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IC Individual Consultant ICB International Competitive Bidding ICB International Competitive Bidding IDA International Development Association IJA Institute of Judicial Administration - Lushoto IMTC Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee ISA International Auditing Standards on Auditing JPIRC Joint Programme Implementation and Review Committee KRA Key Result Area LCS Least Cost Selection LGRP Local Government Reform Programme LHRC Legal and Human Rights Centre LRC Law Reform Commission LSRP Legal Sector Reform Programme LST Law School of Tanzania


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LSWG Legal Sector Working Group M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MCA Millennium Challenge Account MDA Ministries, Departments and Agencies MoFEA Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs MoHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare MoJCA Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs MoU Memorandum of Understanding MTEF Medium Term Expenditure Framework MTS Medium Term Strategy MUCCoBS Moshi University College of Cooperative and Business Studies NCB National Competitive Bidding NGOs Non Governmental Organisations NOLA National Organisation for Legal Assistance NPS National Prosecution Service NSAs Non-State Actors OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Developement OUT Open University of Tanzania PCCB Prevention and Combat of Corruption Bureau PCO Programme Coordination Office PFMRP Public Financial Management Reform Programme PIU Project Implementation Unit PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PRSs Poverty Reduction Strategies PSRP Public Sector Reform Programme PSs Permanent Secretaries QBS Quality Based Selection QCBS Quality and Cost Based Selection QSP Quick Start Project REDMA Resource Development and Management Associates RITA Registration, Insolvency & Trusteeship Agency RUCO Ruaha University College SSS Single Source Selection TASAF Tanzania Social Action Fund TAWLA Tanzania Women Lawyers Association TCC Technical Coordination Committee TEA Tanzania Education Authority TGNP Tanzania Gender Networking Programme TLS Tanganyika Law Society TORs Terms of Reference TShs Tanzania Shillings UDSM University of Dar es Salaam


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UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund URT Govt United Republic of Tanzania Government US $ United States Dollar USAID United States Aid WLAC Women Legal Aid Centre


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UNBLOCKING THE ROAD TO TIMELY JUSTICE FOR ALL: FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW

OF THE LEGAL SECTOR REFORM PROGRAMME OF TANZANIA

PART 1: BACKGROUND TO THE LEGAL SECTOR REFORM PROGRAMME

1. A Look back into History: Since independence there has been a felt need to

reform part or all of the legal sector in Tanzania. In the immediate post-independence

period, the court system1 was integrated through the Magistrates Court Act, 19632 which

ended the racially segregated colonial era court system. A decade later, in 1974, the Msekwa

Commission took a detailed look at the judicial system.3 But the Commission’s narrow

mandate left the wider legal sector unaddressed and proposed only changes to the courts.

Nonetheless, the government accepted some of the recommendations of the Commission

and subsequently enacted the Criminal Procedure Act, 19854 to replace the Criminal

Procedure Code (Cap. 20). Yet this interstitial law-making left the broader need for

comprehensive review of the legal sector unmet. The opportunity to take a broader view

came about in 1993 when the government appointed a high-level task force headed by Mr.

Mark Bomani5 former Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania. The Task

Force finished its work in 1996. Its report was an in-depth diagnostic assessment of the

challenges and problems afflicting the legal sector backed by a wide-ranging menu of

remedial measures. The Report’s core findings- which are relevant today as they were then-

were: -

a. Inordinate delays in resolving disputes and dispensing justice;

1 See COTRAN, Eugene, "Integration of Courts and Application of Customary Law in Tanganyika," Volume 1

East Africa Law Journal, 1965, p. 113; and CASTELNUOVO, Shirley, Legal and Judicial Integration in Tanzania: A Study of Law and Political and Social Change, Ph.D Dissertation University of California at Los Angeles, 1969.

2 See Magistrates' Court Act, 1963 (Act No. 55 of 1963 and Chapter 537 of the Revised Laws of Tanzania Mainland); and Magistrates' Court Act, 1984, (Act No. 2 of 1984).

3 See GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Judicial System Review Commission of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1977.

4 Act No. 9 of 1985. 5 UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Financial and Legal Management Upgrading Project (FILMUP) – Legal

Sector Report, Dar es Salaam: The Legal Task Force, 1996.


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b. Limited access to justice and legal services for the majority of the people; c. Corruption and other unethical conduct and practices in the legal system; d. Outdated systems and lack of responsiveness to emerging social, political,

economic and technological developments; e. Low levels of public trust in the legal system; f. Low levels competence and poor morale amongst public sector legal personnel; g. Inadequate numbers of professionally trained personnel; and; h. Poor provision and maintenance of the work environment for most public

institutions in the legal sector.

2. The problems and challenges of the legal sector were then congealed by the Bomani

Task Force into a comprehensive programme of reform which was subsequently adopted by

the government of the United Republic of Tanzania.

3. The Bomani Report morphs into the Medium Term Strategy (MTS): The

Bomani Report covered the whole legal sector which entailed an extensive as well as

expensive reform programme. The initial estimates were that to implement the Task Force

reform programme on both the Mainland and Zanzibar would cost a total of US $ 266

million. This substantial budget led to a rethink of the appropriate approach: The

government decided to identify priority areas around which a small, more cost-effective

programme would be designed. This marked the birth of the Medium Term Strategy (MTS)

and its Action Plan, both drawing sustenance from the recommendations of the Task Force

Report. The MTS, estimated to cost US $ 41,430,663, or just over 15% of the initial cost

estimate was launched in December 1999.

4. The aspiration and vision of the Medium Term Strategy was “Timely Justice for

All” built around the core characteristics of: i) Speedy dispensation of justice; ii) affordability

and access to justice for all social groups; iii) integrity and professionalism of legal officers;

iv) independence of the judiciary; and v) a legal framework and jurisprudence of high

standards responsive to social, political, economic and technological trends at both national

and international levels.6 The shared mission of institutions in the sector was understood to

be “the achievement of social justice and equality and rule of law through quality and

accessible legal services.” This mission would be driven by the shared values of fairness,

6 See MAPUNDA, Benedict Thomas, “Legal Sector Reform in Tanzania: An Examination of Development

and Status,” in NASSALI, Maria (ed.), Reforming Justice in East Africa: A Comparative Review of Legal Sector Processes, 2008, p. 99.


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basic human rights, equality and social justice; rule of law and integrity of legal professionals.

The guiding principles would be: the inalienability of basic human rights; equality before the

law; separation of powers; protection of public interest; ethical conduct of legal officers;

accessibility and affordability of legal services for all citizens; timely resolution of disputes;

efficiency in the discharge of functions; and transparency and accountability in dispensing

justice.7

5. The dearth of resources sapped the implementation of MTS in the early phase.

Other policy developments moved apace. Over time, it became necessary to revise the MTS

to take account of the changing policy environment. It was revised twice. First, in 2003 to

situate the objectives of the MTS within the framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy

and to introduce activities from the Ministry of Home Affairs (Police and Prisons) that had

been left out of the earlier proposals. Second, in 2004 to incorporate the suggestions of a

government of the United Republic of Tanzania and Development Partners joint appraisal

team and take on board the views of stakeholders.

6. The Quick Start Programme: To kick-start the MTS, it was felt that it was

necessary to foreground the larger programme with a smaller programme of quick-wins,

named the Quick-Start Programme. This would create a favourable climate for the successful

launch and implementation of the MTS. A Memorandum of Understanding between the

Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and Development Partners was signed in

May 2001 and the Quick Start Project (QSP) itself was thus launched in October 2000. It

was intended that it should last only 20 months but later it was extended and eventually

ended on 31st December, 2004.

7. The Quick Start Project had six components mirroring its six objectives. These were:

i. A New Legal Framework for the Legal Sector Institutions: This component was meant to update and harmonize the legal framework for the legal sector institutions in order to match this with the reforms and the social and economic developments of the country.

ii. Enhancing Administrative Support, Division of Work and Supervision Mechanism: This component was to ease the workload of judicial officers by relieving them of administrative duties.

7 See UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Legal Sector Reform Programme: Medium Term Strategy for Years

2005/06 – 2007/08 (Volume I), December, 2004, p. 8.


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iii. Enhancing Delegated Authority (Retention Schemes): This was intended to identify inadequacies in the existing retention schemes and to identify measures that would lead to improvements.

iv. Training Needs Assessment for the Public Legal Institutions: This component would identify the training needs in public legal sector institutions as a prelude to development of a relevant training program.

v. Strengthening Juvenile Justice: This component would identify and address the priority issues to strengthen juvenile justice. Indicative steps included building juvenile courts and training of magistrates to handle juvenile cases.

vi. District Based Support to the Judiciary: A pilot scheme in Arusha and Manyara Regions. Needs had already been identified and nature of support profiled.

8. Notwithstanding its ambitious intentions, the QSP achieved meagre results. Though

the project succeeded in conducting a number of preliminary studies on the national legal

framework under its first component, it also had some disappointing outcomes. The most

poignant case unearthed in the course of review concerned local communities in Arusha and

Manyara regions. These communities were mobilised to contribute materials for the

construction of courthouses on the understanding that the project would cost-share with

them the expenses of construction. The project funds never came through and the Review

Team understands that the materials contributed by the communities are still lying unused at

the proposed construction sites.

9. From Quick-start to the MTS: The inauspicious start and end of the Quick-Start

Project meant that it did not provide the intended buttress and energy for the

implementation of the Medium Term Strategy. Nonetheless, in April 2006, the Government

of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Development Partners signed a Memorandum

of Understanding “Concerning Implementation of the Legal Sector Reform Programme.”

The MTS has six strategic objectives, also referred to as Key Result Areas (KRAs). These

are:

i. National Legal Framework: This component has four outcomes namely; a) improved

legal environment for enhanced social justice, safety and economic development; b)

enhanced independence of the legal sector institutions; c) streamlined and

strengthened prosecution and investigative systems; and d) strengthened capacity for

research of the national legal institutions.

ii. Access to Justice for the Poor and the Disadvantaged: This component also has four

outcomes, namely, a) improved access to justice for persons in remand homes and


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prisons; b) enhanced legal aid for disadvantaged and poor persons and dissemination

of legal information; c) improved access to justice in rural areas; and d) improved

custodial and court facilities for juvenile offenders.

iii. Human Rights and Administration of Justice: Target outcomes for this component include

a) law enforcement agencies observe human rights; b) strengthened Commission for

Human Rights and Good Governance; c) transparency and reduced corrupt practices

in the legal institutions; and d) coordinated and organized administrative justice

system.

iv. Knowledge and Skills of Legal Professionals: Key outcomes for the component are: a) legal

education and training institutions poised to deliver quality legal training; b)

improved practical training skills for law graduates and c) improved capacity of legal

training institutions to offer continuing legal education for lawyers.

v. Service Delivery Capacity in Key Legal Sector Institutions: Key target results include: a)

enhanced management and coordination in the sector institutions; b) enhanced

competence, motivation and integrity of personnel; c) enhanced autonomy in the

recruitment of judicial officials and other legal professionals; and d) improved

working environment for key legal sector institutions namely the judiciary, Ministry

of justice and Constitutional Affairs, legal registries, police and prisons.

vi. Program Management, Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation: This component aims at

ensuring: a) effective implementation of reforms by key legal sector institutions; b)

ensuring effective coordination, monitoring and evaluation; c) enhancement of policy

and strategic leadership in the legal sector institutions; enhancement of information,

communication and education on the legal sector reforms and developments, and d)

enhancement of capacities for change management in the legal sector institutions.

10. Link between the Legal Sector Reform Program and Poverty Alleviation:

Though the MTS is focussed on the legal sector, it is conceptually and organically linked to

the constitution, laws, policies and other reform programmes of the Government of the

United Republic of Tanzania. To begin with, it is grounded in the Constitution of the United

Republic of Tanzania of 1977 which protects the rights of all and affirms their equality

before the law. However, it is important to recognise that rights cannot be secured or


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equality protected where the judiciary is not independent; leaders do not respect the rule of

law; the law enforcement agencies are incapacitated by lack of skills and equipment and the

poor have no access to justice or to legal aid to enforce their rights. The reforms proposed in

the MTS may be seen as the operational and programmatic elements to achieve the

constitutional promise of full rights for all.

11. In addition, Amartya Sen has demonstrated the empirical link between freedom and

development and thereby given support to the idea that strengthening the rule of law and

basic freedoms supports economic development. In this regard the MTS can be shown to

have linkages with both the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of October 20008 and

with National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, 2005. The PRSP also noted the

relationship between poverty and poor access to justice noting that the well-being of the

poor is dependent on personal security afforded by the state. Anticipating the 2006 version

of MTS, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania committed itself in the PRSP

to strengthening the justice system. In particular it undertook to a) speed up the settlement

of cases in primary courts by, among others, reducing the estimated shortage of magistrates

by one half; b) promote community-based security arrangements; c) rehabilitate buildings

and other facilities in the Primary Courts; d) combat corruption in legal sector institutions; e)

speed up court decisions and f) increase the sessions of the Court of Appeal. These themes

are also broadly echoed in the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, 2005.

12. Civil Society Participation in the LSRP: Though Gender and Civil Society were

not given discrete treatment in the MTS, the government recognised their centrality to the

achievement of each of the outcomes. Civil society is included among implementers under

KRAs 2 and 3 in the MTS. Key Result Area 2 covers Access to Justice for the Poor and

Disadvantaged whilst KRA 3 is Human Rights and Administration of Justice. On legal aid

the MTS provides a framework for integrating coalitions of Civil Society Organisations

(CSOs) such as the Human Rights and Legal Aid Network into the implementation of the

LSRP. This brings a diversity of actors into the reform process at both the planning as well

as implementation level. The idea is that these civic institutions should be supported to

provide legal aid and deliver legal literacy programs, train paralegals and strengthen juvenile

8 UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), Dar es

Salaam: Vice President’s Office, June, 2005.


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justice mechanisms. In terms of the administration of justice, the MTS envisaged that CSOs

would provide monitoring and oversight services to improve access to justice for persons in

remand homes and prisons; enhance legal aid for disadvantaged and poor persons and

disseminate legal information and improve access to justice in rural areas and to juvenile

offenders.

13. Gender: The relative position of men and women; their equal access to productive

resources and positions of influence are considered integral to improving development

outcomes and deepening access to justice. The Government of the United Republic of

Tanzania has developed a Gender policy with system-wide mandates for all government

agencies and departments to create a more equal society. In addition, gender is one of three

cross-cutting issues that are meant to be incorporated in the planning of activities under each

of the outcome areas.

PART 2: SUMMARY OF APPROACH AND KEY FINDINGS

14. Methodology: The six-member Review Team conducted over 50 interviews,

comprising more 100 individuals with representatives of Development Partners,

implementing agencies and NGOs over a two a half-week period starting on the 21st April,

2008. The interview covered both institutions involved in the Legal Sector Reform

Programme as well those outside the programme. In terms of geographical coverage, most

interviews were conducted in Dar-es-Salaam where an overwhelming majority of agencies

involved in the LSRP are based. Supplemental information was gleaned from off-site

interviews in Iringa and Morogoro. Information gathered from the early interviews was used

to frame questions for over 40 link officers who made time within their annual planning

workshop to talk to the Review Team. The interviews were conducted through open

questions and followed a discussion format. Information collected from these interviews was

coupled with detailed document review and background material on the Tanzania legal

system. In addition, presentation of the team’s preliminary findings and following discussion

at a stakeholder workshop brought valuable feedback.

15. For the interviews with the implementing agencies the team sought answers to five

thematic questions around which supplementary questions were built: a) What activities had

the implementing agency undertaken in the period under review and which of those activities


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had been funded by the legal sector reform programme?; b) What challenges, if any, had the

agencies faced in planning for, accessing, utilizing and accounting for LRSP funds?; c) What

changes, if any, would need to be made to the programme –across all its elements- to

improve its overall performance?; d) How was gender integrated into the agencies’

programmes? and e) did the agency have other general observations on any aspect of the

LSRP? The interviews were strongly diagnostic driven by the objective to tease out the

underlying reasons for the programme’s slow start as well as factors hindering

implementation of activities even where funds had been made available. This chapter

summarizes the key findings from the exercise.

16. The conduct of the review exercise was slightly hobbled by a number of factors that

ought to be taken on board in the design of future reviews. First, the days set aside for

interviews were too few leading to a situation where the Review Team concentrated its

activities to Dar-es-Salaam. Secondly, the time available for reflection, design and writing up

of the findings was severely limited by a tight deadline. A number of days should be set aside

for this in future assessments. Thirdly, the Review Team was assembled rather late, meaning

that review activities conflicted with other activities for some of the consultants.

PART 3: GENERAL FINDINGS

17. Overall assessment: Even though the LSRP has had a very slow start coupled

with management and coordination challenges, such success as it has had has been

impressive: Judged in terms of completion of activities set out in the Medium Term

Strategy and in the overall absorption of committed funds (See figures below), the Legal

Sector Reform Programme (LSRP) has made little progress. But it is important to keep

matters in perspective in assessing such progress as there is. The LSRP is no different from

other sector wide programmes in other countries such as Kenya and Uganda. Programmes

that involve a) multiple agencies; b) overlapping and often conflicting mandates; and c) new

and complex changes usually have a slow start. The complexity of such programmes means

that the reforms they propose often lack a constituency in support of reform; their multiple

agencies with their multiple mandates usually produce intricate co-ordination problems and

turf conflicts and new reforms often threaten settled bureaucratic practices and interests.

Given such initial difficulties, the little progress made by the LSRP has been impressive. (The


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full progress report for individual KRAs is summarized in Annex ?) This finding highlights

the programme’s singular successes. Under KRA 1’s goal of “improving the legal

environment and streamlining the prosecution service” a new law has been enacted and a

number of reports and studies on other laws impeding access to justice prepared. The new

law is the National Prosecution Service Act (NPS Act) that received presidential assent in

January this year. Contemporaneous with the enactment of the law, a National Prosecution

Service has been established; 157 new attorneys recruited and deployed to the regions after

induction training and amendments made to another 21 laws to bring them into harmony

with the new NPS Act. Other reform activities under this result area have moved apace.

Laws that impede justice to disadvantaged groups have been identified and pre-legislative

studies and discussion papers have been completed on i) local customary laws; ii) the death

penalty, corporal punishment and long term sentences; and iii) persons with disabilities in

Tanzania.

18. In addition, there has been a review of the Business Names (Registration) Ordinance

and study tours and a range of training events have been organised for the police and link

officers and programme managers. Under KRA 2 the LSRP has provided support for the

Tanganyika Law Society, and TLS Legal Aid Day. The promotional and informational

activities for the day resulted in actual legal aid being given to over 300 people. Under KRA

4 on “Knowledge and Skills for legal Professionals” the founding legislation for the Tanzania

Law School has been enacted; the Law School has been established and it has already

admitted the first cohort of 274 students. Under KRA 2 the LSRP has now disbursed funds

to rehabilitate or construct seven primary courts in Moshi; Tabora; Iramba; Tukuyu; Iringa;

Kondoa and Basuto – Kateshi. In addition, under KRA 5, construction of a new High Court

in Shinyanga with Government of the United Republic of Tanzania funds and land for

construction of a building for the Court of Appeal, in Dar- es -Salaam, has been acquired.

We now turn to a summarized analysis of the key findings arising from the document

review as well as the interviews conducted with stakeholders.

19. Lack of common agreement and understanding amongst stakeholders of core

concepts used in the LSRP: One somewhat surprising conclusion arising from the

assessment is the widespread lack of common understanding on the key concepts and terms

that are routinely used in the LSRP. The Review Team found that though terms such as


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ownership, mainstreaming, capacity and reform were the common currency for debating the

LSRP, they did not in fact mean the same thing to the key stakeholders. In our view, this

lack of common understanding and agreement on such key concepts underlines the overall

communication failures (discussed elsewhere in this report) that characterize the LSRP.

20. There is only partial national ownership of the LSRP: Though interviewees

consider national ownership of the LSRP essential to its success, there is a considerable

divergence of opinion as to what this term actually means and, therefore, a widespread lack

of consensus whether in fact the LSRP is nationally owned. All DPs, except one, said that

the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania owned the LSRP programme. Their

meaning seemed to rest on the fact that the MTS was written by the Government of the

United Republic of Tanzania, albeit with Development Partner support. One Development

Partner noted that it might be useful to differentiate the question of who owns the

programme from that of who drives it. On their part, none of the implementing agencies say

outright that the Development Partners own the programme but an overwhelming majority

says that it is donor driven. At the Stakeholders validation workshop, one agency pointed out

that whilst individuals in government may have been originally involved in the development

of the MTS, the MTS itself was not subsequently legitimized and institutionalized within the

implementing agencies.

21. Our conclusion is that there are three factors that may be contributing to a sense of

weak national ownership of the LSRP. One, there seems to have been insufficient

consultation in the development of MTS. Even though the leadership of implementing

agencies appear to have been involved in the development of the strategy, that involvement

did not extend to the agencies themselves with the result that when agency leadership has

changed over the strategy period there has been no one to carry the vision of the MTS. Two,

the activities under the MTS are not integrated into implementing agencies work-flow.

Finally, the lack of a government policy to anchor the MTS weakens ownership in two ways:

it means lack of an official mandate for the agencies to implement the MTS and the absence

of a framework for funding the LSRP since there is nothing on the basis of which parliament

can be asked to provide resources to the programme. To be sure, a draft policy has been

developed but it does not seem to have progressed since it was first discussed at a

stakeholders’ meeting in Dar-es-Salaam on the 29th June 2007. The intention is for the


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revised version of the draft policy to be tabled before a meeting of Permanent Secretaries

before it is presented before a wider stakeholders’ workshop for final comments. The

Review Team has not seen a copy of the draft policy. Depending on its content, the Policy

could facilitate the implementation of LSRP by providing legal sector institutions with a clear

mandate for the implementation of reforms as well a strategic vision for the future of the

sector.

22. The LSRP programme aims to be- but it is not – mainstreamed: As with the

term ‘ownership’, the term ‘mainstreaming’ is ambiguous. DPs appear to use the term as a

short-hand label for the fact that, as designed if not as implemented, the LSRP was meant to

be fully integrated into the operations of the government. The implementing agencies say, on

the other hand, that the realities of LSRP implementation do not match the hopes of its

designers. Our assessment is that the LSRP not mainstreamed. There are three reasons for

this conclusion: Under LSRP: a) there is a separate planning process for the budgets and

activities under LSRP from the regular MTEF planning and budgeting framework; b) staff

performance of LSRP activities does not form part of annual staff appraisal; and c) LSRP

funds are not in the hands of vote-holder. As a result of points a) and b) activities under the

LSRP is perceived to impose extra work on the staff of the implementing agencies. This is a

matter of some concern. The Paris Declaration requires donor-funded programmes to align

with “national development strategies (including PRSs) that have clear strategic priorities

linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets.”9 There

are practical questions that arise from this finding. For one, the lack of mainstreaming

indicates that the programme has the format of a project with the Programme Coordination

Office (PCO) being the analogue of a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) albeit with neither

the resources nor the authority of a PIU. This undermines the DPs and Government of the

United Republic of Tanzania declared intention to mainstream all five reform programmes.

More important, the lack of mainstreaming is closely connected with the question of staff

remuneration and motivation.

23. There seems to be no uniform understanding of what the term “reform”

actually entails: Our assessment is that the perception that there is weak reform

9 See Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual

Accountability of 2nd March, 2005.


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commitment may arise from the fact that there is significant lack of clarity about what

exactly is entailed by reform. Reform is not doing the same old things with more efficiency

and resources. In the context of the LSRP doing the right things means doing them within the

goal of providing timely justice for Tanzanians. This perspective focuses on how activities

promote the realization of the goal of timely justice. Improvements in operational efficiency

in an otherwise unreformed agency merely strengthens its ability to do harm. Though some

training has been provided in change management, this would appear to have been ad hoc.

There is little recognition that reform entails changing systems, practices and behaviours to

achieve new goals or improve performance. Fundamental change questions have not been

broached at all. These include: a) What are we changing to?; b) Why are we changing? For

example, what is the case for change? and c) How are we changing?

24. There is lack of common understanding of “Capacity” and so of “Capacity-

Building” or “Capacity-Development”: The DPs and the implementing agencies are not

generally talking about the same thing when they refer to capacity and when they talk of

capacity-building. In general terms, the understanding implied by implementing agencies saw

capacity as ‘buildings computers, cars and other hardware’; whereas as the meaning implied

by donors was ‘individual and organizational skills and knowledge’. Our interviews

established that both types of capacities might be lacking across the sector. However, neither

understanding is an adequate understanding of these concepts. A simple definition recently

developed by the OECD defines ‘capacity’ as the “ability of people, organizations and

society as whole to manage their affairs successfully”. The importance of capacity is its link

with the performance of country systems to ‘deliver basic goods and services, and provide a

suitable policy and regulatory environment for development to take place’. ‘Capacity

development’ then is ‘the process whereby people, organizations and the society as a whole

unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time.’10 The differences

between institutions in terms of capacity endowments are such that that it wouldn’t be

prudent to adopt a uniform, one-size-fits-all capacity-building programme.

25. The LSRP lacks overall Strategic Leadership: Strategic leadership to the LSRP

has two components- overall managerial direction and political leadership. Sector wide

10 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working

Towards Good Practice 2006, p.12


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reform programmes usually do not have a ministry- save the cabinet office or the

presidency- that could provide overall managerial direction. However, such programmes can

be moved along under the “political authority” exercised collectively by the Steering

Committee. The interviews revealed that there is a misconception amongst some agencies

that the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs has the overall obligation to provide

managerial direction. But as the ministry itself underlined in its interviews with the Review

Team, it has no executive function over LSRP reforms and its function is limited to

coordination. The executive function rests with individual Permanent Secretaries (PSs) in the

line ministries. In the absence of an institution to provide overall managerial direction, the

political leadership role of the Steering Committee becomes even more pressing. The gap in

strategic leadership over the LSRP arises from the fact that this body has met only once in

the two years that the MTS has been operational.

26. A comparison with the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), points to

the places where the “leadership gaps” within the LSRP may exist. The second medium term

strategy of the LGRP was fore-grounded by an authoritative directive from the President

requiring the country to implement decentralization by devolution. In addition, the local

government reform programme is under the Prime Minister, the office that is also

responsible for regional administration. PSs involved in the programme meet every six

months and each ministry has a departmental task force on local government reform. This

union of responsibility with authority to act has certainly helped the local government

reform programme move. However, it is important to point out that the lack of a central

source of responsibility and authority does not of itself erode performance so long as other

MTS leaders in the LSRP institutions can function. At the moment, they are not operating at

an optimal level. Even those that have been meeting such as the TCC and the JPIRC have

not been fully effective. The former has met three times and the latter only two times. The

only organ of the LSRP that has been meeting is the informally established Legal Sector

Working Group (LSWG) the coalition of DPs funding the LSRP. The LSWG meets every

month but no matter how effective it cannot- and should not- provide leadership to the

LSRP.

27. The inconsistency across the five core reform programmes could have a

deleterious impact on LSRP: The Review Team found that inconsistencies between the


19

resources earmarked for other core reform programmes as well the substantial differences in

the conditions of service and salaries across these programmes has the potential to

demoralize the staff working on the LSRP, particularly within the PCO. This is especially so

because insufficient mainstreaming of the LSRP has in fact foisted an additional workload

on staff across the 17 implementing agencies. The interviews yielded conflicting positions

stated with differing degrees of intensity. On the DPs side, the position is relatively settled,

the LSRP is different from the other programmes to which it is being compared because

those programmes reflect the old way of doing business which did not entail mainstreaming.

They also see the question of salaries as public service-wide issue that is firmly under the

aegis of the government within GBS. The implementing agencies see double standards: why,

they ask can’t all the core reforms be mainstreamed together? The settled position is that

from September this year, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania will start

measures to mainstream all the core reforms. Though this may appear to settle the question,

it leaves open a number of issues. The most pressing one is the fact that we established that

there seems to be a decision to postpone the mainstreaming of the BEST programme until

2011 and perhaps even later. The consequence of a staggered timetable for mainstreaming

the core reforms will continue to hobble motivation in the LSRP; give credence to charges

of double standards and erode the spirit of the Paris Declaration.

28. Is the MTS still relevant today?: The question was raised by a number of

stakeholders whether the Medium Term Strategy was still relevant and if not, whether it

should be revised. One view was that new agencies have emerged within the legal sector

after the MTS was developed, therefore they have not been included. This means that the

strategy has incomplete coverage of the sector. Some of the agencies that were mentioned in

this connection are the Local Government’s Auxiliary Police and the Immigration and

Community Service Departments of the Ministry of Home Affairs. A more substantive

argument was that a number of activities were either outdated or had already been

implemented using the government’s MTEF funds. Finally, one agency also told us that the

question of looking at the MTS to determine whether there were things that needed to be

changed was also raised at the Steering Committee meeting of March 18th 2008. However,

the draft minutes of the Steering Committee’s meeting does not record this. In response to

these issues, the Review Team’s immediate concern was that a finding that the MTS needed

revision may be used to ground a decision to further slow down implementation whilst


20

revisions are undertaken. A related question was what in fact had become outdated. In the

Review Team’s view, activities may become irrelevant or outdated but many, if not all, of the

outcomes remain legitimate and relevant. The question then is whether it would be prudent

or sensible to embark on a review of the MTS merely to add fresh activities within the same

results framework.

29. The Lead Agencies have no financial support to co-ordinate the

implementing agencies under their Result Area: Though the MTS envisions that the

lead agencies will coordinate all Implementing Agencies within the KRA, this has financial

and workload issues that the programme has not addressed even though the MTS appears to

have made provision for supporting this role. The result is that lead agencies have a) no

budget; b) no staff and c) no authority. Implementing Agencies under KRA 4, to give one

example, are spread across Tanzania. Without a budget to support travel to and from Dar-

es-Salaam, meetings between the agencies and the lead agency would have to be exclusively

electronic. To compound the issues of budget are issues of staff. Link officers of the lead

agencies have other regular duties. If the LSRP were running at a full clip, the link officers

would be overwhelmed. Finally, lead agencies don’t always have authority over the agencies

for which they have co-ordination duties. Without the support of the Implementing

Agencies’ managers, there is no direct way of holding the agencies accountable for their

outputs. The lack of coordination support has particular salience to Non-State Actors

(NSAs) where there are more organizations to coordinate and more time commitments

needed. The National Organization of Legal Assistance (NOLA) noted the difficulties that

lack of support had on their ability to properly consult with or provide feedback to the other

NGOs/CSOs.

30. The PCO does not have sufficient capacity to fulfil its dual function of

supporting the implementing agencies and acting as secretariat to the programme’s

executive committees: The dearth of skills at the Programme Co-ordination Office has

compromised its ability to provide support to the implementing agencies. It is unable to

service the agencies’ needs in terms of development of work-plans. Even basic functions like

providing information to stakeholders or communicating the LSRP to the general public are

not effectively carried out. The problem seems to be lack sufficient capacity -in appropriate

numbers and expertise in the PCO. In addition, the PCO’s internal weaknesses have also


21

impacted its ability to act as the secretariat to LSRP implementing committees. The skills

needed to effectively discharge this function include: a) effective preparation for meetings; b)

efficient and rapid preparation of minutes; c) timely provision of information to all. The lack

of this capacity has meant that minutes of the committees are not prepared or distributed in

a timely manner.

31. Many implementing agencies feel that the MTS is not flexible: There was a

widespread belief that the MTS is very inflexible. Yet at the same time a number of agencies

pointed out that some of the activities that the MTS sets for them are either irrelevant or not

core to their mandate. One agency quipped that the “MTS is not a bible and the priorities of

2005 are not the priorities for today.” Probing flexibility it would seem that implementing

agencies have three things in mind: one, the ability to negotiate new activities within the

same outcome if the pre-planned activity is, for some reason, inappropriate or it has been

overtaken by events; two, the ability of agencies to add activities to the MTS if they have- as

a few agencies have- implemented activities in the MTS and three, the flexibility to support

costs that are incidental to the achievement of specific objectives. For instance, willingness

to fund activities to start implementation of a law that has been enacted under the LSRP

programme.

32. The lack of some link with Parliament, even if only at the conceptual level is

an important missing link in the MTS: Most of the KRAs depend on enactment of laws

to achieve crucial outcomes. This requires Parliament to act. For the time being, government

has control of the legislative agenda and has been able to bring LSRP legislation to the

House in a timely manner. However, this could be a substantial risk factor if parliament

grows more independent of the executive. There are two factors to consider in the future;

one, the fact that if the legislative workload of parliament increases, it may become

progressively harder to prioritize LSRP legislation. Two, that even if parliament is not

formally incorporated into the LSRP, informational links with key committees could

improve members’ disposition towards the LSRP.

NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE LSRP

33. Overall rationale for Non State Actors (NSAs) engagement: There are

compelling arguments for NSAs involvement in the LSRP. The standard case for this

engagement includes the fact that:


22

a) Increased engagement of NSAs in the LSRP will ensure that reforms are demand

driven and therefore responsive to public needs. They have a “ground - up” view

and “on the ground” knowledge of the barriers to justice that ordinary Tanzanians

face on a daily basis; and they often operate at a level that government currently does

not occupy; they have perspectives and specialized expertise that can valuably inform

government’s reform initiatives. In particular, NSAs which work with or service

vulnerable groups, such as poor women, children, people with disabilities, prisoners,

refugees, must be engaged to ensure that the rights of these vulnerable groups are

protected and their interests are considered.

b) By promoting civic vigilance, NSAs play a critical role in ensuring transparency and

accountability of government. NSAs can act as a countervailing force against official

excesses if appropriately and meaningfully involved in the reform programme.

34. The centrality of the NSA role to effective reform suggests that they have a

role across KRAs: The possible roles that NSAs can assist with under the various KRAs are

as follows: Under KRA 1, NSAs have a critical role to play in assisting with the development

of the legal framework to ensure that it is responsive to the needs of the public of Tanzania.

Under KRA 2, the role they are already playing in providing legal aid should be broadened

and expanded. In KRA3, NSAs can assist with monitoring and reporting on human rights

violations as well as assisting with training. Under KRA4, the specialised knowledge of NSAs

can be deployed to strengthen outcomes and such bodies as the TLS could be key providers

of continuing legal education for advocates, state attorneys and others. In KRA5, NSAs can

assist in identifying service delivery gaps and cooperatively develop appropriate solutions

with government. The Review Team recognises that NSAs may be able to seek direct donor

support for their capacity development. Whilst it is important that should not be duplicated,

it is important that provision be made for strengthening the capacity of NSAs under the

LSRP. Finally, under KRA 6, NSAs can assist in monitoring the implementation of the

LSRP and should contribute to the development of the legal sector policy and IEC. Under

this, the involvement of the media should be given high priority.

35. The levels of awareness of the MTS within legal aid CSOs is generally high:

Though there were some NSAs with low levels of knowledge and information about the

LSRP, the Review Team found that a number of NSA representatives were extremely


23

knowledgeable about the MTS specifically and the LSRP more generally, even when the

organisations they led were not involved in the programme. Such knowledge evinces a

commitment that could greatly contribute to advancing progress under the LSRP if

harnessed. Of more concern though is that whole segments of the non-state sectors such as

private sector associations, trade unions, community based organizations and the media have

not been engaged at all, almost as if there was no recognition of the role that these other

NSAs could play within the LSRP.

36. Current Participation of NSAs in LSRP is somewhat limited and ad hoc:

Several NSAs are recognized in the MTS in specific areas. Those recognized include

Tanganyika Law Society (TLS) a professional body established by statute; the law faculties at

universities and NGOs providing legal aid. However the recognition of NSAs is perfunctory

and involvement is rather limited in both scope and breadth. Engagement across NSAs so

far has been limited. The example of TLS is instructive. TLS has a statutory mandate which

would seem to indicate a role across all KRAs yet in the original MTS it was not even

recognized in KRA2: Access to Justice. In terms of the traditional role of NSA- monitoring

and oversight, the NSAs’ role is even more marginal. They are not involved at all in the

management of the LSRP and whilst some NGO/CSO representatives are regularly invited

to certain LSRP activities, the decision as to who gets invited appears to be ad hoc and not

done in consultation with NSAs themselves. Table 1 below table summarizes NSA

recognition in the MTS.

Type of NSA Recognition in MTS LSRP management

NGOs/CSOs KRA1 identification of laws & research KRA2 legal aid and literacy network, paralegal training, juvenile justice IEC KRA3 training, prison & police visits KRA4 ethics promotion

Legal aid NGO representative, NOLA, attending JPIRC; Selected representatives invited to specific activities (i.e. Planning workshops)

TLS KRA1 identification of laws KRA4 law school, MIS KRA5 modernise & equip law libraries

Steering Committee JPIRC

TCCIA KRA1 identification of laws Steering Committee (?) Law Faculty of Universities KRA4 national legal training UDSM: Steering


24

curriculum, training institution plans

Committee, JPIRC, TCC; Selected representatives of other universities invited to specific activities (i.e. Planning workshops)

Table 1: Recognition of NSAs within MTS activities and LSRP management

37. There is a positive albeit recent trend towards recognizing a large role of NSA:

Recent developments in the LSRP would indicate that there is a burgeoning recognition of

the positive role that NSAs can play if more actively involved. A number of recent decisions

indicate that NSAs may play a more ample role in LSRP now than they have before. These

include:

1. In the Law School board there will be a representative of “Legal Aid Schemes”,

the TLS president and another TLS representative, the Dean of the University of

Dar-es-Salaam Faculty of Law. This representation will cascade to the school’s

Examination Committee where one member of TLS and both public and private

university will be represented11;

2. In Legal aid network recognition has been expanded to include the TLS, UDSM

and Moshi University College of Cooperative and Business Studies (MUCCoBS).

This decision was made at the Steering Committee meeting of March 18, 2008;

and

3. CSOs will be recognized in KRA3 pursuant to agreement reached at the planning

workshop held in April 2008.

38. Coordination of NSAs under KRA 2, needs to be strengthened: The network of

NGOs providing legal aid under the LSRP are represented in the programme by NOLA.

Though NOLA was elected coordinator at a 2005 meeting convened by the lead agency, in

this case the Judiciary, the Review Team finds that there are significant issues with the

execution of this coordination role. There is a lack of communication between NOLA on

one hand and with the Lead Agency and the PCO, on the other. Moreover, the overall

weaknesses in communication within the programme have meant that there is neither

11 The Law School of Tanzania Act, 2007, No. 18, ss. 9 and 15


25

sufficient nor timely information to allow proper consultation by NOLA with the other

NGO/CSOs.

MAINSTREAMING GENDER IN THE LSRP

39. Though gender is ostensibly a cross-cutting issue in the LSRP, the meaning

and practical applications of cross-cutting approaches is either neglected or not

understood: The typical response to The Review Team’s questions on gender was an

enumeration of how many women were on staff or had participated in the implementing

agencies training workshops. The team is of the view that there is a lack of clear

understanding of key concepts and of the meaning of mainstreaming approaches across all

the implementing agencies. In particular, it became clear that when gender is mainstreamed,

no one takes overall responsibility for ensuring appropriate outcomes. There is urgent need

for clarity on such core terms as gender analysis; gender mainstreaming and gender equity

within and across agencies.

40. Though there exists a national machinery for implementing gender goals in

Tanzania that is based on a mainstreaming logic, its hard to assess its overall

effectiveness: The policy framework for gender in Tanzania is the “Women and Gender

Development Policy” of 2000 which was a successor to the 1992 policy paper on “Women

in Development Policy.” The institutional machinery for policy formulation, coordination

and monitoring is the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children. The

main objective of the current policy is “to provide guidelines that will ensure plans, strategies

and operations in leadership and developmental activities in all sectors and institutions

observe gender balance”. This machinery is supported by gender officers in the ministries

and agencies and, in theory, this framework should anchor the strategy of mainstreaming. In

addition, the Tanzanian Government requires all government institutions to appoint a focal

point mainstreaming gender. But whilst this is very positive, the focal points are generally not

aware of their Terms of Reference on how to fulfil their mandate. Moreover, as the Review

Team found out, in the absence of specific indicators, the strategy to mainstream gender,

that is, to incorporate a gender equality perspective in all activities and interventions, makes

it impossible to monitor and assess whether this has actually happened. Where gender

relevant data exists, the data is either not disaggregated or if gender disaggregated, it is not

analysed.


26

41. Only two KRAs mention gender and to find whether there is mainstreaming

one would have to scrutinize individual activities: The MTS is a general document both

at the level of text and that of the work plans and cost estimates. It only mentions gender

under KRA 1,-the National Legal Framework -and KRA 2- Access to Justice for the Poor

and Disadvantaged. There is no mention of gender in any of the other KRAs. One can,

therefore, only assess whether gender is being taken into consideration by looking more

specifically at the discrete activities under the KRAs. Under KRA 1, for instance, the Law

Reform Commission has done some gender analysis and also given salience to gender in the

revision of some important laws such as the Local Customary Law, and Inheritance and

marriage laws. It is less clear whether gender has been taken into consideration in the

recruitment and training of the new state attorneys and in the definition of laws that enable

growth of the business sector. It less clear whether activities under KRA 2: Access to justice

for the poor and disadvantaged and KRA 3: Human Rights and Administrative Justice - have

attempted to mainstream gender. KRA 4 does not take on gender as an issue that needs to

be included in the development of curricula, recruitment or staff development.

42. Overall, though institutions think that gender is important, little appears to

have been done to take it on board: The Review Team found a general awareness in most

institutions that gender is important and that something should be done about it. However,

it was also clear that very little has happened with respect to gender in the various KRAs.

This is surprising given the fact that there are some obvious arenas to take gender on board.

These would include the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance which

employs a number of very senior judges. The Commission indicates that it would welcome

the opportunity to do gender training country-wide. The Tanzania Female Police Network is

a countrywide network established in 2006 with its own constitution and a strategic plan. A

number of dedicated female police officers in the Network work with the community and

work towards increasing the number of women in the police. Registration, Insolvency &

Trusteeship Agency (RITA), which deals with civil registration, is very keen to receive gender

training but has been unsuccessful in obtaining funds from the LSRP as such an initiative is

not included in the MTS. These are only a few examples of possible sites of engagement.

However, they are not included in the current MTS and it is unclear whether they can be

brought on under specific activities in the future.


27

PLANNING BUDGETING, PROCUREMENT AND OTHER FINANCIAL

MATTERS

43. The LSRP planning and budgeting process is lengthy, burdensome and

truncated from the MTEF budgeting and planning process: LSRP financial

management and procurement for the financial year starts in April with the planning and

budgeting cycle based on the Medium Term Strategy’s Work Plans and Cost Estimates12. At

the meeting, planning officers (with their accountants and procurement officers) from the

implementing agencies are given financial ceilings to work with. Each link officer then plans

for the individual agency and comes up with a costed plan, a procurement plan and cash-

flow projections for the year. These are submitted to PCO for consolidation: the costed

work-plans by the planning specialist and the cash flow statements -by the accountant and

administrator. They are then submitted to the Development Partners who review; approve

or suggest improvements. These planning events are completely truncated from the Medium

Term Expenditure Framework, MTEF, planning cycle. Over the last three planning cycles,

that is, FY 2006/07; 2007/08 and FY 2008/09, the planning and budgeting for LSRP

activities occurred well after the MTEF budgeting and planning process. Ideally, the LSRP

planning process should precede MTEF planning and budgeting process so that the

appropriate ceilings available- under the development component- for each agency are

known in time. Currently, all LSRP funds are planned under the Ministry of Justice and

Constitutional Affairs, MoJCA’s MTEF and not the MTEF process of implementing

agencies. This gives the erroneous perception that there are more funds available to MOJCA

than there really are.

44. The approvals of work-plans and disbursement of funds are taking too long:

The problems of planning dovetail with those of late approvals of work-plans. Over the last

two planning cycles, approvals have been made more than six months into the financial year.

As expected, disbursements of funds are contingent upon approval of work-plans. When

work-plans, procurement plans and cash flow projections have been approved, funds should

in theory, be released. However, this process too has had glitches and the Review Team

established that there were long delays in depositing funds to the Holding Account at Bank

of Tanzania (BOT). For the FY 2006/07 the funds were deposited in early May, 2007

12 The manual refers to this process as updating of the Prioritized Annual Plans.


28

leaving only two months to the end of the financial year for implementation of the annual

plan. In FY 2007/08, disbursements took place in March, 2008, leaving roughly three

months for implementation. One lead agency gave us an example of the difficulties it had

experienced with the approvals for FY 2006/2007. The Agency’s initial plan for 2006/2007

was submitted on time at the beginning of the financial year. In December 2006, with a half

year gone it was no longer possible to go by the original plan. In January 2007, the Agency

was now asked to re-plan and re-programme the previous activities and budget for the 6

months now remaining in the financial year. The re-programmed budgets and activities were

then approved in April 2007 but the funds were not released until the last week of June

2007. Even feedback on fund requests can take so long as to impair programme

performance. In January 2008, the same agency told us, it requested for funds but was not

told until April, that in fact they had made the request on the wrong form.

45. Such delays are not only disruptive in that implementing agencies go through long

lean months followed by two or three months of glut but they also influence the types of

activities that agencies eventually choose to undertake given the short implementation

period. In theory, funds can and have been rolled over but we found that this process too

was difficult in that agencies had to seek the approval of Treasury which could take some

time. It was also noted that the rolled over amounts had to be included in the new work-

plans which then had to be approved by DPs and this again took time. Part of the process

specified in the Manual seems to be followed except that funds do not go to the vote of the

implementing agency. Instead all funds are transferred to vote 41 of the MoJCA which then

issues cheques to the agencies. When the implementing agencies receive the cheques they

confirm this by issuing receipts to MoJCA. The result is that monies transferred from

MoJCA are reflected spent even though no programme activities may have been

implemented. A number of agencies argue that using the MoJCA as a conduit for their funds

introduces further delays since they have to write to MoJCA to request for funds. Depending

on the situation, the actual transfer may take some time.

46. Trying to establish the underlying reasons for the delays described above proved an

elusive quest. There were significant differences of opinion between the development

partners and the implementing agencies on what exactly were the causes of delays. For the

implementing agencies, the delays are a source of angst, complaints and frustration. They say

that the depth of detail demanded by the DPs is too onerous. DPs attribute delays to the fact


29

that implementing agencies are submitting very weak work-plans which are filled with

mistakes. The implementing agencies say that even if this were so, it could not, surely, be

true of all of them and that there are other reasons for delay. The two most frequently cited

reasons were: a) the requirement of a “No Objection” response from the World Bank for

procurement (see the section of procurement below on diagnosis of whether indeed this is so) and for pre-

approval of Terms of Reference (TORs) for Consultants; b) delays arising from the fact that

weaknesses in work-plans were not communicated to Implementing Agencies quickly.

47. A number of supplementary issues were pressed regarding the overall approval

system. These were a) Why were there no specified time-lines for each discrete stage of the

approval process?; b) is it possible to give the implementing agencies an easy to use work-

plan check-list?; c) if the agencies are persistently sending in weak work-plans, does this not

foreshadow a deep-seated capacity weakness in that agency and should the remedial measure

not be technical support rather than total rejection of work-plans? In some cases work-plans

have not been approved because of failure to articulate clearly how an activity contributes to

the MTS outcome. But why not, where possible, sever the inappropriate activity and approve

the work-plan on a partial basis if the other activities can stand on their own?

48. Weaknesses in the quality of work-plans also point to other systemic weaknesses

within the LSRP. One is the fact that as currently constituted, the Programme Coordination

Office, PCO, is not able to do any real quality control both at the stage of preparing the

work-plans at the agency level and in reviewing them when they are finally submitted for

approval in order to make sure that they are technically sound. Secondly, the training so far

offered to agencies to bridge the capacity gaps evident in their abilities to prepare work-plans

has focused solely on the one or two link officers in each of the implementing agencies.

Whilst this may minimally improve the capacity of such an officer to assist the agency to

produce a better work-plan, a better plan is not merely a question of better writing. A plan

depends on implementability and a department’s commitment to planning as management

and performance tool. On this broader view, it is not adequate to give training on work-plan

development to only one or two individuals in an implementing agency.

49. Assessing these processes, the review Team concludes that all of the three critical

stages of the LSRP, to wit, planning, approval and disbursement are hobbled by substantial

and unacceptable delays if the programme is to move forward. The effect is that


30

implementation levels are very low even though the LSRP is shown to have used funds (see

use of funds table below).

50. Cumulative approvals at the KRA level punish the faster implementing

agencies and reward the slow implementing agencies: Though cumulative approvals

have an appropriate fit with the LSRP results framework, their overall utility needs to be

considered in the context of the deleterious effect they may be having on the pace of the

programme. One agency pointed out that it needed vehicles for its staff in the regions but

the cars couldn’t be procured when needed precisely because of the cumulative process.

According to the agency this process fails to follow the rule that “a teacher should not slow

the intelligent students for the slow ones.” It noted that “If you move at the pace of the slow

you discourage the fast ones, if you move at the pace of the fast you encourage the slow.”

One compelling argument against cumulative approvals is that the practice has not even

applied consistently. This has almost certainly played a role in the ability of the school to

rapidly undertake activities.

51. Unlike other core reform programmes, the LSRP is missing from the latest

Government of the United Republic of Tanzania budget guidelines: Both the

Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the LSRP Development Partners have

undertaken to contribute funds to the LSRP basket under the terms of the Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) signed in April 2006. The government was to contribute US$15

million and to employ or deploy adequate personnel to implement the programme. This

commitment evinces both a policy commitment as well as an actual financial contribution.

However, a quick look at the Plan and Budget Guidelines for 2008/9-2010/11 released by

the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, MoFEA, in March 2008 shows that the

LSRP is not mentioned even though activities under the programme have been included. In

contrast other reform programmes: ASDP, LGRP, PFMRP, PSRP and BEST are

mentioned. Might this oversight be read to indicate official neglect of the LSRP? Even

though interviews with different stakeholders in Government suggest that the government is

committed to the LSRP, this omission may be perceived negatively especially in the context

of low levels of LSRP performance.

52. Parties to the MOU: Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the

DPs have not fully honoured their commitments: Since the MOU was signed in 2006 up


31

to 31st March, 2008, a total of TShs 21.5 billion has been budgeted for the reform

programme by both the government of the Tanzania and DPs to the LSRP Basket.

However, of these funds, only Tshs 8.75 billion has actually been deposited in the holding

account. On this account, parties to the Basket have failed to honour their commitments by

59% (see table 1). However, the total amounts available for implementing LSRP for the

period under review do change to TShs, 9.5 billion if this figure is combined with the Tsh

751.3 million inherited from the Quick Start Project. Table 2 provides some interesting

comparatives: It shows that more funds were actually paid into the deposit account for the

nine months of FY 2007/08 than were deposited in the whole of the FY 2006/07. But given

the fact that plans were approved only in January 2008 and actual deposits made in March

2008, it is unlikely that these funds can be used by the end of financial year. To compound

matters, agencies may feel the pressure- real or expected- to use the money before the year

ends with the attendant risk that programme quality if compromised or funds invested in

high consumption activities such as workshops, conferences, and expensive short-term

training.

FY2006/07 FY2007/08 Total to 31st March Budget 11,894.10 9,611.55 21,505.65 Actual 4,159.10 4,588.53 8,747.63 Actual as % of budget 35% 48% 41%

Table 2: Total Financial Resources (Figures in TShs ‘000,000’) Source: LSRP Annual Audited report for 2006/07 and Quarterly financial report, March, 2008 and Consultants’ computations

53. Though contributions in cash-terms by the Government of the United

Republic of Tanzania are low, it is putting funds into the LSRP in other ways: By the

end of March 2008, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania had contributed a

total of TShs 780.25 million, or 4.3% of the original pledge. On their part, Development

Partners had contributed approximately TShs 8 billion or about 7.8% of their original

pledge. However, the Review Team noted from the interviews that the government’s

contribution goes beyond cash contributions to the basket. The government provided funds

to construct new courts and rehabilitate old ones. Under the general budget, it also funded

some MTS activities for the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance


32

(CHRGG), and recently, it made a significant contribution in kind to the Law School of

Tanzania by purchasing 23 acres for the construction of the school’s campus.

Original Commitment Up 31 st March As % of original DPs 102,000.00 7,967.38 7.8% URT Gvt. 18,000.00 780.25 4.3% 120,000.00 8,747.63 7.3%

Table 3: Assessment of Contributions by contributor category; Exchange rare used: 1US$= Tshs, 1200

54. For the period under review significant budget performance was evident: In terms of

the annual budget even though the government’s contribution was, in absolute terms, lower

than that of DPs, it was able to honour its budgeted contribution in FY 2006/07 and to

surpass it in the nine months of FY 2007/08. This reinforces the implementing agencies

view that though government resources in the Basket were meager, it was still a reliable

source of programme funds, and in some cases, even had positive surprises: actual

contributions in a year could exceed annual budgets. As regards the DPs, they honored 32%

of their commitment in FY 2006/07 and 46% in the nine months of FY 2007/08. Thus a

significant improvement is also noticeable here even the questions of delay discussed

elsewhere in this report.

55. Table 4 below shows that the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania

planned to contribute 4% to the basket whilst DPs were to contribute the balance (96%) for

the FY 2006/07. The respective relative proportions for FY 2007/08 were 3% and 97%. But

actual contributions were 11% and 89% for FY 2006/07 and 7% and 93% for FY

2007/2008.

FY 2006/07 FY 2007/08 (9 months) Basket Contributors Budget Actual As % of Budget Budget Actual

As % of Budget

URT Govt. 466 466 100% 282.75 314.25 111%

Dev. Partners 11,428.10 3,693 32% 9,328.80

4,274.28 46%

Total 11,894.10 4,159 35% 9,611.55

4,588.53 48%

% Contributions URT Govt. 4% 11%

3% 7%


33

DPs 96% 89% 97% 93% Total 100% 100% 100% 100%

Table 4. Contributions (new injections) into Holding A/C (in Tshs ‘000,000’); Source: LSRP Annual Audited report for 2006/07 and Quarterly financial report, March, 2008 and Consultants computations

56. There is very low utilization of the actual funds available by implementing

agencies in the LSRP: Though funds are a necessary condition for attainment of set objectives,

they are not a sufficient condition for success. Whether they are useful in meeting set objectives

depends on whether they are used in the first place. Funds utilisation in the LSRP is low: of

the total available resources over the period under review, that is, the Tshs 9.5 billion

available only about Tshs 5.8 billion- only 61% -had been by March 2008. If funds rolled

over from the quick start project are excluded, the LSRP spent only 66% of the funds

available. The disconcerting message from Table 5 is that for the review period, the LSRP

programme has not been able to use the resources that were actually made available.

Source of funds/FY FY2006/07 FY2007/08 (9months) Overall

Quick start/Bal. BF 751.35 782.22 751.35 New injections 4,159.10 4,588.53 8,747.63

Total available resources 4,910.44 5,370.75 9,498.97 Actual expenditure 4,128.2 1,623.1 5,751.32

Actual expenditure as % of available resources 84% 30% 61% Table 5: overall use of resources available; Source: LSRP Annual Audited report for 2006/07 and Quarterly financial report, March 2008 and Consultants computations

57. Many factors contributed to the agencies’ inability to use funds but all of the factors

already mentioned- delays in approval of plans, delays in disbursements, slow procurement

processes- have played a part.

58. There is very significant variation in funds use between KRAs: As shown in

Table 5 above, 84% of the total funds available were used in FY 2006/07 notwithstanding

the fact that the money was released just a month to the end of the Financial Year. In the

nine months of FY 2007/08, only 30% of the funds have been used. An analysis by key

result areas indicates that in fact one could track KRA progress by resource use. There are

considerable disparities in resource use between KRAs. Table 7 read together with Figure 1


34

shows that there is significant fund utilisation in some KRAs. For instance, agencies under

KRA 5 which aims to improve “service delivery capacity in key legal sector institutions”- in

terms of efficiency and effectiveness- used up 49% of their budget in FY 2006.

Unfortunately, the absorption of funds by this KRA has dipped to 12% of the budgeted

money by end of March 2008. KRA 2 and 3 did not have budgets for FY 2006/07 and have

not yet been able to use any of the budgeted money for the current year. See details in Table

7 and Figure 1.

06/07- Budget

06/07 Actual

Actual as % of budget

07/08- Budget

07/08 Actual

Actual as % of budget

Coordination (PCO)

4,045.9

458.3 11%

1,136.4

508.0 45%

KRA1 933.0

450.3 48%

1,694.9

95.9 6%

KRA2 -

- -

1,510.9

33.1 2%

KRA3 -

- -

670.0

11.6 2%

KRA4 559.0

127.4 23%

1,015.8

535.9 53%

KRA5 6,356.2

3,092.3 49%

3,583.4

438.6 12%

Total 11,894.1

4,128.2 35%

9,611.4

1,623.1 17%

Table 7: Which KRAs are being implemented? Figures in ‘000,000’ Tshs


35

-

1,000.0

2,000.0

3,000.0

4,000.0

5,000.0

6,000.0

7,000.0

PCO

KRA1

KRA2

KRA3

KRA4

KRA5

Key Result Areas

Mill

ion

Tshs

06/07- Budget

06/07 Actual

07/08- Budget

07/08 Actual

Figure 1: Expenditure by KRA and PCO

59. Though procurement and financial management are governed by the LSRP

Financial Management and Procurement Manual,13 2006, this manual has gaps and is

not in general use by agencies: Our interviews with the intended end-users revealed low

levels of usage and a number of critical inadequacies. One, the manual does not specify the

financial powers of the different officers charged with financial management. What are the

respective levels of payments that can be approved by the Programme Coordinator of the

PCO? How about the accountant? Two, the procurement section is too brief and too general

to provide useful guidance to staff in procurement. Three, there are financial management

and procurement roles that need to be clearly stipulated but which have not been specified.

13 The manual is meant to guide staff in the sector on effective resource management, record keeping and

accounting. Its objectives are; a) To promote effective budget preparation and associated monitoring approaches; b) To mitigate fiduciary risks by detailing the standard procedures and incorporating internal controls for all financial management and procurement processes and c) To ensure that the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania can be fully accountable to the Tanzania public, development partners and other stakeholders. The manual is based on the Public Finance Act, 2001 and the Public Procurement Act, 2004 and the associated regulations and, though not explicitly stated, it has also drawn from World Bank Procurement Guidelines 2004 as amended in 2006.13 The manual divided into nine sections, each of which addresses a particular aspect of financial management in LSRP. The designers envisioned the manual as a living document that would be continuously updated based on the experience of those using it. Indeed, it has provision for users submit comments to improve it to the PCO for consolidation and onward transmission to TCC. However, at the time of this review no comments had been submitted and the manual was not in widespread use.


36

For example, the roles of different officers14 within PCO (except the Coordinator) are not

explicitly stated. Three, certain responsibilities have not been adequately addressed. These

include: i) the financial responsibilities of link officers, accountants, and procurement

specialists in the lead agencies and implementing agencies as well as the roles of internal

auditors of these agencies and of those at MOJCA; ii) Basic internal controls such as

provisions on cheque signatories and for handling of stolen and state cheques are altogether

missing and iii) the role of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), especially Accountant General’s

Department -responsible for managing the Holding Account and for preparing monthly

reconciliations- is altogether missing. In contrast, the financial management and

procurement of other core reform programmes such as the PSRP and BEST are more

elaborate, reader-friendly and, on the whole, provide clear guidance on most issues.

60. Most accountants and procurement officers interviewed said that they did not

understand the manual well and have not seen its relevance in practice. This is of concern

given the fact that the manual was introduced 1 and 1/2 years ago and its users have already

been through capacity building workshops carried out in 2006. Some interviews say that the

low levels of disbursements, caused partly by late approvals of work-plan have denied staff

opportunities to use the manual and therefore bred the low levels of understanding found by

the Review Team .

61. Indeed our finding is that the use of the manual is generally limited to its function as

a guide on the minimum thresholds to be observed for the different methods of

procurement under the National Procurement Act and the World Bank Procurement

Guidelines. Staff only appears to draw from it when they need information on the amounts

and methods for which prior review is required.

62. The standard forms set out in the manual have either suffered the same benign

neglect or are generally inappropriate. There are also forms included in the appendix which

are not mentioned anywhere else in the manual. They include: the Community Contribution

Form, forms meant to be filled by Regions, District Councils, LPO to cite a few.

63. There are many procurement delays and widespread lack of understanding of

the LSRP procurement process: Though procurement management is thought to be a key

14 To wit: the Accountant cum administrator, the M& E specialist, Planning and Budgeting specialist.


37

area for successful implementation of the LSRP, virtually all implementing agencies blame a

significant part of the delay for rapid implementation of activities on what they see as

“complexities of the procurement process.” They see the process as long, ambiguous as to

applicable procedures resulting in uncertainty and frustrating speedy action. At issue is the

role of World Bank Guidelines vis-a-vis the national law. Though “No objection” requirement

was described as the real villain in tardy procurement, an interrogation of this claim revealed

instead that there was widespread lack of knowledge about the procurement guidelines -

whether these are from the World Bank or under the Public Procurement Act, 2004. More

surprisingly, even where people understood the applicable guidelines they still hesitated to

follow them. Overall, there is an over-reliance on the World Bank Procedures, even when

these have not necessarily kicked in. World Bank procedures are only required for items that

call for International Competitive Bidding (ICB) procurement methods and for consultancy

services. More pertinently, the Financial Management and Procurement Manual is explicit on

when the applicability of the World Bank Guidelines should apply. Table 8 provides the

appropriate thresholds.

Description Contract Value Threshold (US$ thousands)

Procurement Method

Contracts Subject to Prior Review (US$ thousands)

>500 ICB All >250 but <500 NCB All

<250 NCB None (Post review) <50 Shopping None (Post review)

Works

All values Direct Contracting

All

>200 ICB All <200 NCB None (Post review)

<50 Shopping None (Post review)

Goods

All values Direct Contracting

All

>100 QCBS All >100 LCS All >100 QBS All

Services Firms <100 CQS None (Post Review)


38

<100 LCS None (Post Review)

All values SSS All

>50 IC All <50 IC None (Post Review)

Individual All values SSS All

Table 8 Thresholds for procurement methods and prior review Source: Financial management and Procurement manual for the LSRP Basket Key: ICB - International Competitive Bidding; NCB - National Competitive Bidding; QCBS - Quality and

Cost Based Selection; LCS - Least Cost Selection; QBS- Quality Based Selection; CQS - Consultants’ Qualification Selection; SSS - Single Source Selection; IC - Individual Consultant

64. In addition to over-reliance on the World Bank Procurement Guidelines, there

is uncertainty about the role of key Government procurement organs: As Table 8

shows, there is sufficient room for procurement under the Public Procurement Act, 2004.

However, the agencies have tended to drift towards use of World Bank Guidelines. This

over-reliance coupled with lack of clear understanding of those guidelines has generated

confusion and frustration regarding procurement delays and, further, concern over the role

and authority of bodies such as the Ministerial Tender Boards in procuring for the LSRP.

For example, the Review Team was told that sometimes procurement documents such as

TORs inviting bids are approved by Tender Boards but rejected by World Bank. A practice

has thereby evolved where Tender Boards are merely rubber-stamping procurement

decisions. Implementing agencies say that when they want to procure, they are asked to

specify their needs which are then aggregated with those of others. Unfortunately, even

though this aggregation may seem to make economic sense through economies of scale

arising from bulk purchases it has the downside that the aggregate figures do then raise the

procurement threshold to the ICB level. The WB procedures then become applicable. Were

agencies to procure on the basis of their discrete needs the amounts would be too low to

invite World Bank Procedures. In this, there is a trade-off: faster procurement leading to

faster programme implementation or slower procurement leading to lower cost per unit of

procured goods.

65. Do the Tender Boards still have authority?: There is considerable confusion over

the role of the Ministerial Tender Boards when procurement requests are consolidated.


39

Among the key issues is who actually enters into a contract? And who finally pays the bill for

the jointly procured goods given that funds have usually already been transferred to each

implementing agency in line with its work plan and procurement plan?

66. There is uncertainty about who has authority to advertise tenders?: One

question raised during the review is whether the PCO has powers to advertise. The review

Team was told that some advertisements are made by PCO without even the knowledge of

the Tender Board Secretariat. This is a potential source of embarrassment given that it is

mandate of the Tender Board secretariat to call the Tender Board for meetings to open the

bids and, also to pay for the evaluation.

67. Even with the recruitment of a qualified Procurement Specialist, there is very

limited procurement capacity at the PCO as well as in the Implementing Agencies:

Though the PCO has a Procurement Specialist15 it is very short-handed in terms of

procurement personnel and support staff. Within its limited capacity, the procurement staff

has a range of duties including: i) preparing procurement plans; ii) consolidating

procurement plans submitted by the implementing agencies; iii) supporting the agencies to

prepare their procurement plans and procurement documents (including such as terms of

reference, expressions of interest, tender documents etc) and iv) preparing various

procurement reports. This is besides the additional ministerial assignments that the PCO

undertakes. The heavy workload coupled with the low capacity just described translates into

poor procurement plans and low levels of support to the implementing agencies. The

problem is compounded by a lack of mainstreaming. Were the programme mainstreamed,

the heavy workload at the PCO would be distributed more evenly among procurement staff

at MOJCA and within other implementing agencies. Within the implementing agencies there

is a dearth of skills in specific skill areas such as procuring consultancy services. Most

agencies said that they had knowledge and skills for procurement of goods but not for

services and works. The reason may be, at least in part historical. Personnel involved in

procurement in Government traditionally limited themselves to the purchase of goods and

the handling stores. This finding has implications for the procurement curriculum of NBMM

and other training institutions such universities and colleges.

15 He holds an MBA and CSP (T); CSP is the highest professional qualification in procurement in Tanzania


40

68. The Review Team findings in this regard reinforce two earlier findings: one, the

independent assessment of financial and administrative capacity of the implementing

agencies carried out for the ‘quick-start project and, two the 2003 Government/DPs joint

appraisal which concluded that the legal sector institutions generally lacked the capacity to

effectively administer new public procurement system.

69. Does use of the World Bank procurement rules introduce legal conflicts with

the national law?: There was a question raised by procurement specialists whether use of

the World Bank Guidelines is in conflict with the Public Procurement Act, 2004. Section

4(1) of the Procurement Act, 2004 states that if the Act conflicts with an obligation of the

United Republic arising out of:

a) any treaty or other form of agreement to which the United republic is a party with

one or more other states, or political sub-division of such states; or

b) any grant agreement entered into by the United Republic with inter-governmental or

international financing institution in which the United Republic is the beneficiary,

the requirements of such treaty or agreement shall prevail but in all other respects, the

procurement shall be governed by this Act.

70. Clearly, part (b) of article 4 of the Act covers grants and is silent on loan or credit

agreements of the type that the World Bank enters into. Read this way, the Procurement Act

would seem to take precedence. The Procurement Guidelines under IBRD loans and IDA

Credits (of 2004 amended in 2006) state in paragraph 1.5 that ‘the procedures outlined in

these guidelines apply to all contracts for goods and works financed in whole or in part from

Bank Loans. For Procurement of those contracts for goods and works not financed from a

Bank loan, the Borrower may adopt other procedures’. Thus while the Act subordinates

itself to the Bank Guidelines as related to procurements under a grant, it does not seem to

do so on procurements under loans. Whether there is a conflict or not depends on the status

of the World Bank Guidelines. If they don’t have the status of a treaty or binding

international agreement then clearly there is a legal issue here to be sorted out.

71. There are many financial reports mandated by the Manual which are probably

unnecessary or irrelevant: The manual makes it mandatory to submit a number of standard

reports from the different people involved in the LSRP including the office of Accountant


41

General, Accountants from implementing agencies, and the PCO. These designated reports

include flash reports, exchequer release and output monitoring reports among others. The

Review Team discovered that these reports are either not submitted or else they are

submitted late. The interviews also revealed that many people were either not aware of the

requirements or, if they did, they did not know who the users of the reports were. This was

the case as regards flash reports and exchequer releases. Annex 2 provides a list of reports

which should be provided according to the current financial management and procurement

manual.

72. Implementing agencies are not submitting their Internal Audit Reports to the

PCO: Under the financial management manual, the internal audit function lies with the

internal audit departments of implementing agencies. These units are required to assist

accounting officers of the agencies to prepare internal audit reports which would be

submitted to the PCO for consolidation. The internal audit unit of MOJCA assists the PCO

in the consolidation exercise before these are tabled at TCC. The PCO told the Review

Team, that so far no reports have been submitted to it for consolidation. It is unclear

whether the internal auditors are aware of the PCO’s role.

73. Even though the external audit gave a clean bill of health to the LSRP, the

CAG recommendations should be implemented: External audits to the LSRP are done

by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) who is mandated to audit receipts and

payments of the implementing agencies according to the International Auditing Standards on

Auditing (ISA) and Government accounting policies and standards. The financial statements

(receipts and payments) for the year, 2006/07 were confirmed to have complied with ISA;

the Public Finance Act, 2001; Public Procurement Act, 2004 and relevant regulations

thereunder. The CAG issued an unqualified opinion on the financial statements of the LSRP

indicating that the PCO accounts were in order. However, even though a favourable opinion

was given, the CAG raised issues which need to be addressed. These include the filing of

documents (receipts and other source documents). This suggests the need to strengthen the

filing systems at both PCO and at implementing agency levels.

PROGRAMME COORDINATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION

74. Overview: The coordination, management and monitoring and evaluation

arrangements under KRA 6 are considered critical to the success of the LSRP. In reviewing


42

these arrangements the Review Team drew upon the original eight principles embedded in

the MTS, which remain valid and critical. One, the need for close collaboration among the

implementation agencies. Two, the need to decentralise the management of the

implementation process to agencies. Three, the mainstreaming of implementation

responsibilities within the existing administrative structures. Four, the designation of the

Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs as the crucial link to the wider Government

system. Five, the effective participation of all the stakeholders and not only those formally

involved in the programme but all Tanzanians. Six, the flexibility in the organization and

operation of the structures and mechanisms for coordinating the implementation of the

programme. Seven, the government leadership in the coordination of the development

partners’ support. Our overall conclusion is that there are critical gaps in capacity and in the

performance of the institutions given overall co-ordination responsibility within the

programme. This section details our findings on these gaps.

75. Though capacity gaps were identified in the Redma Report in 2005, these

have not been plugged: Though the management capacity needs of sector institutions and

the PCO were identified in the ‘Redma Report’ in 2005, no capacity-building programme

following on those recommendations has been instituted. We found that some training has

been provided to the sector institutions in core management areas of procurement, planning

and monitoring and evaluation but this has mainly been delivered to link officers rather than

to the relevant designated officers across the institutions (eg. MDA procurement officers

were left out of the procurement training). Moreover, the training delivered has not been

followed up with support in the work-place nor has it been evaluated, thereby raising

questions about its effectiveness. Although capacity across the agencies is uneven, there

remains a general weakness in procurement, management, planning and M&E.

76. The MTS makes provision for two basket funded programme management

staff for each Lead Agency, but this has not been implemented: Link Officers in

several of the Lead Agencies say that the demands of their regular work inhibited their ability

to manage and co-ordinate their KRA activities. But this is a needless gap: The MTS makes

provision for the Lead Agencies to recruit two Programme Management staff (to be paid

from the basket). The pressure experienced by link officers stem from the fact that this

provision has been neglected. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that some of the


43

appointed link officers do not posses the necessary expertise to perform planning, budgeting

and procurement functions since they don’t have the requisite professional background. (For

instance, there are several lawyers).

77. Lead agencies are neither leading nor co-ordinating the implementing

agencies under their result area: It would seem that most lead agencies have struggled to

perform their roles as coordinating bodies for KRA activities. Few Inter-Agency Committee

Meetings have been held. For example, there have only been two coordinating meetings for

KRA 2. There has been few, if any, monitoring of the activities being undertaken by the

Implementing agencies. Lead agencies have tended to focus on managing and monitoring

their own activities limiting most of their communication with the PCO to such activities. In

some cases, there is better will and capacity to act in the implementing agencies than in the

lead agency. In such cases, implementing agencies have felt stifled by the requirement to

work through the lead agencies and most then by-pass the lead agencies to communicate

directly with the PCO on issues of concern to them. Understandably, such agencies also

express frustration at being held back by poorly performing sister agencies through

cumulative approvals and procurement. For example, when the World Bank sends requests

for further revisions to procurement notices to implementing agencies, some are able to

respond more quickly than others.

78. The building blocks for the Programme Coordination Office are in place but

it still faces a number of daunting challenges: The PCO has the basic infrastructure to

function at a sub-optimal level. It has been slowed down by many factors. One, the

recruitment of staff has taken long and some positions such as the Monitoring and

Evaluation Specialist have only been filled this year. The Management Information Systems

Specialist position is still vacant. Two, the office does not have management authority over

any of the lead or implementing agencies. Overall, stakeholders were felt poorly served by

the PCO. Their comments covered a variety of issues. They said that the PCO: a) does not

communicate with them about LSRP progress, particularly approvals of Annual Work plans;

and b) does not possess enough staff to undertake its proper role in the LSRP. The source of

this frustration seems to lie, at least in part, in the fact that the limited capacity in sector

institutions leads them to place greater demands for support on the PCO than was

anticipated in the MTS. The Review Team concludes that the PCO does not have the


44

capacity in terms of numbers of staff and breadth of skills to perform its role in coordinating

the sector and providing technical support and quality assurance on: the development of

work-plans, provision of financial and progress reporting and monitoring evaluation,

communication and policy development.

79. However, it was also apparent to the Review Team that the effectiveness of the PCO

has been adversely affected by a range of internal management issues, including:

a) At an institutional level, there are blurred lines of accountability between the PCO and MoJCA:

This has been created by the fact that the PCO is located under the Department of

Policy and Planning in MoJCA but the Programme Coordinator (PC) reports directly

to the PS. The result is that heads of other MDAs do not recognize the status of the

PC (as the position is seen to be under the Department of Policy and Planning) but,

at the same time, the Department of Policy and Planning sees the PCO as a separate

entity and seems reluctant to provide institutional support.

b) At a team level, lines of accountability within the PCO have also become blurred: All PCO staff

are on civil service contracts except the Programme Coordinator who is on contract

from the private sector. According to the ToRs of all PCO staff, the Programme

Coordinator is their manager but it is difficult for the Programme Coordinator to

perform this function when he does not clearly have the authority, as a contractor, to

sanction (eg. to hire or fire) his staff. Some PCO staff said they did not recognize the

Programme Coordinator as their manager. Rather they saw themselves as responsible

to Director of Policy and Planning, MoJCA. Conversely, the Programme

Coordinator said that he did not feel he had the authority to compel performance of

his staff under the government’s OPRA system.

c) Low morale of PCO staff: The Review Team confirmed the observation of the recent

JPIRC report that the morale of PCO staff is very low. Some stakeholders

commented that the PCO does not function well as a team and working

relationships are ‘not smooth’. The blurred lines of accountability discussed above

would seem to be one part of the problem. However, a larger issue is the low levels

of pay as well as the great disparity in salary between the PCO staff and the

Coordinator. The staff say that in the LSRP they are being required to do much more

difficult work than would be typically expected in the civil service. Other reform


45

programmes have recognised the challenging nature of such work by providing

salaries above civil service rates (ie. ‘market rates’ or ‘top-ups’). The source of their

deep grievance is the perceived inequity in the approach of Government and DPs on

this issue, notwithstanding arguments by the latter about LSRP being the first

‘mainstreamed’ programme. Though the Review Team understands that the issue has

been drawn to the attention of DPs, the Steering Committee, the Chief Secretary and

to the division responsible for remuneration policies within PO-PSM, our finding is

that this issue will continue to fester until an appropriate solution is found.

d) Administrative Systems: There is a need to strengthen the PCO in a range of areas

including general filing.

80. Though oversight - in terms of Monitoring, Evaluation and Coordination of

the Programme- vests in the LSRP Management Committees, these are meeting too

infrequent to be effective: Oversight over LSRP is designed to be secured, in the first

place, by the meetings of management committees; secondly, these are reinforced by

meetings of central government bodies holding the Steering Committee to account; thirdly,

by establishment and institutionalisation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to

provide information to management and finally, by annual reviews. However, the LSRP

management committees have met infrequently; been dogged by poor attendance and even

when well attended, the top leadership of the designated agencies have not turned up.

81. Particularly problematic from a political standpoint, the Steering Committee has met

only once out of a total of five or six meetings it should have held since the LSRP started

two years ago. The JPIRC has met only twice instead of four times per year and eight in two

years that it should have had. Finally, the Technical Coordination Committee has met only

three times instead of four times per year initially planned. The responsibility for calling and

organizing meetings rests with the PCO. When the Review Team asked the PCO why more

meetings of the Steering Committee had not been organized, the reason was that ‘there had

not been much implementation and so little to report’. Even when meetings have finally

been called, we discovered that they have tended to focus on activities and to be reactive

rather than forward looking. For example, a major focus of all JPIRC and TCC meetings to

date has been the quality of Work Plans with DPs requiring substantial revisions before

approving them. Part of the reason for the activity focus may also be that some agencies


46

have sent junior representatives to the meetings, such as Link Officers, rather than senior

executives with decision-making power.

82. The shrunken role of the Steering Committee in the LSRP has bolstered the

visibility and role of donors through the LSWG: Our conclusion is that ownership of the

LSRP among some senior executives in the agencies is weak. Conversely some senior

executives said they felt excluded from the management of LSRP and that because of the

demands placed on their Link Officers by the PCO, their authority over their own staff had

been undermined. But the unintended consequence lack of ownership at the senior

government level and of few management meetings is to leave a void in terms of significant

and visible Government’s leadership of the LSRP Programme. In tandem with diminishing

top leadership visibility in the LSRP, the DPs have formed and institutionalised the Legal

Sector Working Group, LSWG, to coordinate their support for and dialogue with the

Government. In contrast, the LSWG meets monthly, has a functioning secretariat which

circulates agendas and minutes and discusses key issues in the implementation of LSRP. As a

result the LSWG has come to assume a strong identity among the agencies as an alternative

source of power to the Government’s generally absent Steering Committee.

83. The MTS mechanism for fostering accountability of the LSRP to the central

government does not work: The Review Team found little evidence that central

government agencies are actively involved in monitoring LSRP and thereby holding the legal

sector to account. The main mechanism in the MTS for achieving this is the requirement

that the LSRP submit Quarterly Reports to the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (a

meeting of Permanent Secretaries chaired by the Chief Secretary). The most recent progress

report advises that reports have been submitted to IMTC ‘as required’.

84. The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework is weak: The MTS provides for the

engagement of consultants to develop a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) mechanism. This

consultancy assignment was delayed and then postponed pending the outcome of this

Annual Review. The activities in the MTS include performance indicators but there are no

indicators above this at the outcome level. Recently the LSRP reporting template (in the

PLANREP software) was adapted to include two extra columns for capturing progress

against activity indicators. Currently, the LSRP reporting framework has focused on

expenditure, reflecting the way agencies have met the Government’s MTEF reporting


47

requirements in the past. There is currently no analytical approach for reporting how LSRP

activities deliver outputs which contribute to short, medium and long term outcomes. The

DPs have raised concerns about the need for higher level indicators to be developed and the

activities, outputs and outcomes in the MTS to be placed in logical framework matrix or

results chain to highlight and strengthen the programme logic and provide a mechanism for

ensuring LSRP is making progress. During the period of the Review, M&E specialists from

the World Bank worked with members of the PCO to workshop how to place the MTS into

a results chain.

85. The key to a successful M&E approach is management demand for the information

it can provide. M&E is a management tool so managers needs to be integrally involved in

determining what information they need to know. Reflecting trends across Government, this

concept of M&E does not appear to be well understood by legal sector institutions and there

is little demand for M&E. With the emphasis that DPs are placing on the need for

performance indicators, there is also a risk that M&E is being seen as something that DPs

demand.

86. There are serious communication failures within the LSRP and these are

impairing the performance of the programme: Successful change management requires

clear, timely and effective communication. Communication is a key weakness in the LSRP.

Agencies say that they do not receive timely communication from the PCO on most issues

including feedback on work-plans. Communication from the PCO follows the bureaucratic

protocols of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. But other failures of

communication also exist. For instance, communication between the agencies and DPs is

poor leading to misunderstandings about each other’s expectations, roles and responsibilities,

particularly around the issue of work-plans. As described earlier in the report, concepts such

as capacity development, ownership, reform and mainstreaming have different meanings to

the agencies and DPs. This poor communication has been an abiding source of tension in

the LSRP. In addition to the communication problems between the main LSRP participants,

it would seem there is a general lack of awareness of the programme both inside and outside

the sector in the broader Tanzanian Government and society.

87. The IEC Specialist in the PCO is responsible for coordinating IEC across the legal

sector. It was intended that a consultant would be engaged to develop an IEC strategy. This


48

has not been undertaken yet, although Terms of Reference have been developed for review

by the World Bank. Clearly, the LSRP has suffered from lack of such a strategy.

PART 4: KEY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

88. Though many recommendations are implicit in the foregoing findings and

conclusions, this section spells out the specific areas for action. It concentrates on the

general actions that cut across the Key Result Areas. Specific recommendations of discrete

items such as gender, non-state actors, institutional arrangements, finance and procurement

as well as monitoring and evaluation are set out in subsequent parts of this report.

89. Strengthening national ownership of the LSRP programme: It is urgent to

deepen national ownership of the Medium Term Strategy. There are both immediate and

medium-term measures that can help achieve this. First, it is necessary that the government

of the United Republic of Tanzania complete the Legal Sector Policy. Once adopted the

policy will deepen ownership in at least three ways: a) it will create departmental mandates

for all the implementing agencies to implement the LSRP; b) if presented to parliament in

some form, the policy would give democratic imprimatur to the MTS and provide LSRP

with the link to parliament that it has so far been lacking and c) launching the policy would

oblige government working through parliament to consider appropriating funds for

implementing activities under the LSRP. Secondly, it is clear that the though the MTS was

prepared by the government, the agencies tasked to implement it do not feel that they own.

It is probably too late to embark on agency-wide measures to deepen ownership given the

fact that the current MTS is now coming to an end. In the medium-term, when the current

MTS comes to an end, it will be necessary to involve implementing agencies in the design

and planning of next phase of the LSRP. This could be done by establishing internal

mechanisms with the agencies for collecting views on appropriate priorities, relevant

activities and effective strategies. Thirdly, the mainstreaming activities proposed in the next

section would also enhance ownership.

90. Actions to mainstream the LSRP programme: Mainstreaming should result in the

normalization and routinization of LSRP activities so that they flow and have a seamless fit

with both the mandates and workflow of the daily operations in the implementing agencies.

To achieve this, three steps are necessary. One, the LSRP planning process must be


49

integrated with the MTEF planning process. Implementing agencies should plan and budget

only once a year and the plans themselves should be fully integrated. The only difference

between MTEF and LSRP should be in the “Source of Funds” column of the Annual Plan.

In this column, the implementing agencies would indicate what activities are funded by

which funds: MTEF or LSRP basket? Everything else: accounting for funds, indicators and

reporting would be the same. Two, the integration of planning and budgeting should then

result in a uniform appraisal system for staff in implementing agencies. The current system

where staff are evaluated for their other work but not for LSRP activities for the annual

performance appraisal enhances the sense of staff disconnection from the LSRP, erodes

ownership and underlines the LSRP separateness from regular government operations.

Three, both the Development Partners and the Government of the United Republic of

Tanzania should immediately embark on a rapid development of a simple mainstreaming

implementation plan which would aim to achieve the proposal made in this

recommendation. We don’t envision this as a complicated assignment that entails the use of

additional consultants. In the second phase of the MTS, the idea should be that LSRP funds

should go directly to the vote-holder rather than the current situation where these funds go

through the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. Our interviews with the ministry

indicate that it has no objection to this method of financing.

91. Developing a common understanding of “reform”: The LSRP’s intense focus on

outputs may have blind-sided stakeholders to the raison d’etre of the MTS, which is, to achieve

outcomes that deliver timely justice to Tanzanians. This may also be contributing to the lack

of understanding of -and the perception that there is a weak commitment to- reform. Two

changes are needed to strengthen understanding of and commitment to reform. One,

identify and support reform champions. Indicative activities to support champions could

include: a) communicating success stories to the wider public; b) increasing funding

according to performance and c) honouring - by an annual award, for example- of the

agency that has done most to deliver on its outcome. Two, it is somewhat unrealistic to

expect that those who have worked long in the institutions and structures that are set to be

changed under the LSRP could themselves lead the effort to carry through those changes.

Given this, the LSRP support for reforms must include equipping staff, through training and

technical support, with new skills and attitudes to under-gird their involvement in the reform

programme.


50

92. At the managerial level, the top leadership of the government need to develop a

strong vision of what the Sector will look like in the future to animate the reform impetus.

This could be done at the level of the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee, that is, the

meeting of Permanent Secretaries chaired by the Chief Secretary. If clear direction came

from that level, the agencies would get a clear case for change and would stop equating

activities under the LSRP with routine activities.

93. Strengthening “Capacity”: Even though there is a focus on different -though both

relevant - aspects of capacity between DPs and the implementing agencies, this should not

detract from the recognition that lack of sufficient capacity is an abiding problem of the legal

sector in Tanzania. Indeed, the capacity issues identified in the Bomani Report; the Ngirwa

Report and more specifically, the Redma Report remain relevant today. Comparative

experiences may provide a lesson on how to go about developing capacities in Tanzania. In

Kenya, for instance, the equivalent of the LSRP programme – the Governance, Justice, Law

and Order Sector programme, GJLOS- was preceded by a Short-Term Priorities

Programme, STPP, whose purpose was to identify capacity gaps and fast-track the

development of the capacities in the agencies that would implement the programme. The

LSRP did not have such foregrounding. This means that there is need for a rapid scale-up of

current capacity development programmes to bridge the gaps already identified. What would

be the practical measures to do this? One, there is need to immediately consolidate into one

capacity building plan all the previous diagnostic work already done. This is not a proposal

for a new study, rather it’s a merely a distillation of existing capacity building studies into an

action plan. This would clarify the depth and nature of capacity gaps already identified in the

implementing agencies. This would form the basis for developing capacities in the next

phase of LSRP. Two, there is need to target the bulk of any new efforts at building capacity

at the implementing agencies rather than primarily strengthening the ability of the PCO16 to

support these agencies. Understandably, it is easy to be discouraged by capacity-building

programmes in the implementing agencies. For a start, capacity developed within the

implementing agencies is often rapidly denuded when staff are transferred or promoted.

However, the risk can be mitigated by developing institutionalized capacity-building

16 This is not to say that the PCO does not itself need support. The point is not to lose sight of why the PCO is being strengthened in the first place; it is to service the implementing agencies. The target beneficiaries of all capacity building are the implementing agencies.


51

mechanisms. This could include: a) compulsory induction training for all new staff in skill

areas relevant to the LSRP and b) LSRP-relevant in-service courses that are linked to staff

appraisals and promotions.

94. But the interviews conducted by the review team also revealed that there is a cautionary

tale to remember. A number of people pointed out that capacity building should not be used

as an excuse to parachute into the country a large number of foreign consultants as technical

experts. A good faith effort should be made to find qualified Tanzanians and foreign experts

should be considered a supplemental resource.

95. In this connection, the Review Team supports, in-principle, the approach recently

approved by DPs and government of providing long-term technical support for each Lead

Agency in planning and budgeting, monitoring and evaluation and procurement.17 However,

the capacity development should be rigorously to mitigate the risk that technical cooperation

may not be well received by agencies at first and may in fact result in stripping away existing

capacity if not carefully managed. The key is for the Government to hold technical

cooperation accountable to them.

96. Ensuring reform integrity by eliminating inconsistencies across the five core

reform programmes: The inconsistencies in the terms of service between the core reform

programmes weakens arguments for mainstreaming LSRP and undermines the integrity of

reform more generally by introducing distortions where there should be none. There are two

alternatives out of a potential quandary: mainstream all core reform programmes or treat all

core reform programmes similarly. The first alternative - which is strongly supported by DPs

- would require the immediate development of a mainstreaming plan coupled with an in-

built timetable for simultaneous integration of all core reform programmes into the

government machinery. The second alternative- which, not unreasonably, is supported by

the staff of agencies within the LSRP- is to treat the LSRP like other programmes by having

the same conditions and terms of service. If the core reform programmes are not

mainstreamed, there is no principled answer to the agencies argument. Moreover, no matter

how justified the current positions on both the donor and the government seem to each, the

17 As contained in the ‘Proposal for a Capacity Development Concept for the Implementation of the Legal Sector Reform Program, Mid Term Strategy’. We also suggest that the number and qualification of TA required needs further analysis.


52

question of terms of conditions of service will not go away. In our view it will continue to

fester and burn under the surface, constantly sapping and undermining the performance of

the legal sector reform programme. We believe that it is urgent for both the Government of

the United Republic of Tanzania and Development Partners to decide soon which one of

the two proposals made here they will adopt.

97. The general level of salaries in the public service in Tanzania needs to be

urgently addressed: The question of reform integrity is intimately linked, though not equal

to that of salaries and compensation. There are two issues: the first is salary equivalence

across reform programmes which has been broached under the reform integrity

recommendation in the preceding paragraph. The second issue is the need to address the

depressed wages in the Tanzania public service. The point is that even if all reform

programmes were mainstreamed, the depressed salaries in the Tanzania public service will

almost certainly erode long-term legal sector performance. For instance, we heard from the

DPP’s office that though the directorate had recruited 157 attorneys and deployed them to

the regions, it could not be sure how long it could hold onto them given the salaries and

conditions of service in the government. The point of this example is that what has been

counted a major success of the LSRP programme- the institutionalization of the National

Prosecution Service- could well be undone if salaries and conditions of service are not

reviewed. Though it is not strictly speaking with the mandate of the review team to speak

generally on conditions of service in the Tanzanian public service, we recommend that

Development Partners and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania urgently

take up the issue of salaries and compensation with discussions of general budget support.

98. The identity of PCO needs to be clarified and internal inconsistencies in

compensation addressed: Implicit in the issues of consistency across the core reform

programmes is the comparison made between the PCO and PIUs in those other

programmes. Our assessment is that the standard response that the PCO is merely a co-

ordination unit belies the approach taken towards establishment and strengthening of the

PCO. The technical assistance programme envisioned for the PCO reveals that in perception

if not in intention, it is a PIU that DPs have in mind. Indeed our view is that is urgent and

necessary to remove the ambiguity about the PCOs identify. There are specific measures that

would help this process. One, though it is important to build the capacity of the PCO it is


53

important not to create a PIU in the process if the DPs and the government do in fact

intend that the LSRP should be a mainstreamed programme. Rather the bulk of capacity

building should, as already proposed, be directed at the implementing agencies. Two, the

current salaries and compensation arrangements within the PCO whereby the coordinator

and his senior staff are on wildly different salary scales are, in the words of one donor

agency, “indefensible.” Some method to address the asymmetric salaries and emoluments

must be urgently devised.

99. Engagement at the political level with ambassadors and ministers: Reviewing

the challenges confronting the LSRP the review team kept tracking back to the question of

political leadership to the reform programme. Many of the problems that presented

themselves symptomatically as technical problems could, in our view, be diagnosed as being

related directly to lack of political direction engendered by few steering committee meetings

and weak accountability of the LSRP to the central government inter-ministerial technical

committee. This problem can be solved through more frequent meeting of the Steering

Committee (see below) and from the DPs’ side more engagement with the government at

the heads of mission level. Ambassadors and heads of missions could play an important role

in unlocking political obstacles. This could be done through a variety of ways: one possibility

is biannual high-level forum between ministers responsible for the implementing agencies in

the LSRP and the heads of missions representing the basket DPs.

100. Implement the MTS even though some activities may be considered

Irrelevant or outdated: Though the arguments for revising the MTS are sound, the Review

Team does not recommend that it be revised. In our view, activities may have become

irrelevant but the outcomes have not. By focusing on the outcomes and being flexible on the

identification and design of alternative activities that achieve the outcomes, stakeholders in

the LSRP can avoid the need for a wholesale revision of the MTS. Of course, the MTS will

soon be up for revision. But that revision should be driven by the fact that the MTS period

has come to an end not by the need to respond to this annual review. The flexibility that

would be needed would include: a) the ability of the Implementing Agencies to negotiate

new activities within the same outcome if the pre-planned activity is, for some reason,

inappropriate or it has been overtaken by events; b) the ability of agencies to add activities to

the MTS if they have- as a few agencies have- implemented activities in the MTS and c) the


54

flexibility to support costs that are incidental to the achievement of specific objectives, such

as those associated with the implementation of a law that has been enacted under the LSRP

programme.

101. Provide support to the Lead Agencies to enable them co-ordinate the

implementing agencies under their Result Area: The capacity of Lead Agencies to lead

the charge for attainment of KRAs for which they are responsible needs to be urgently

bolstered. There are three measures that will achieve this. First, co-ordination money should

be made available, automatically, to all the Lead Agencies once the work-plans are approved.

Once co-ordination activities are spelt out, no detailed requests for the funds should be

required. The funds available for a lead agency should be linked to the discrete needs of the

individual agency given the number and geographical location of the implementing agencies

that it has to co-ordinate. Thus an agency that has to co-ordinate stakeholders that are all

over the country should have more resources for co-ordination than one that has to co-

ordinate those that are concentrated in Dar-es-Salaam. Secondly, each lead agency should

have a full time “Results Co-ordinator” to lighten the burden currently placed on the lead

agencies link officers. If not, then the provisions of the MTS allowing Lead Agencies to

recruit two Programme Management staff to be paid from the basket should be

implemented immediately. Finally, because lead agencies have no authority over the agencies

for which they have co-ordination duties, the Steering Committee should provide that

authority through its decisions. One way of doing this is to have a permanent agenda item in

the Steering Committee meetings where lead agencies give a “coordination activities”

identifying challenges and decisions that they need to effectively discharge their mandate.

Decisions of the Steering Committees would then be communicated to the individual

implementing agencies and reported on at the subsequent meeting of the Steering

Committee.

102. Integrating MTEF and LSRP work-plans would speed up the approval

process: It is anticipated that once the planning and budgeting processes of MTEF and the

LSRP are integrated, the approval process would ease. Nonetheless there are important

work-plan related recommendations because we anticipate that a) mainstreaming may take

time to achieve and b) there are still a lot of work-plans in the pipeline, including those for

Financial Year 2007/2008. These work-plans will, no doubt be processed under existing


55

procedures. However there are a number of ways to lessen the hardship experience by the

agencies over the medium term. First, implementing agencies need a lot of technical support

during the preparation of the work-plans. This may be done by assigning a number of

technical staff to work with each of the KRAs on the development and finalisation of the

work-plans. This would assist agencies to eliminate the formal weaknesses that DPs say run

through the plans and also align plans more robustly with MTS outcomes. Once plans are

developed, the approval of the plans- which should be in a reasonably complete form by

now- should happen within a designated period, ideally no more than one month from the

time they are submitted. Secondly, other sources of delay, such as the use of World Bank

Procurement Rules need urgent attention. There are a number of issues: a) to begin with, it is

clear that there is widespread lack of knowledge of the Financial Management and

Procurement Manual and especially of the appropriate threshold for the application of

World Bank Guidelines; b) it is evident that there is deep misunderstanding of the World

bank procedures and a training programme on using the rule is urgently needed across

agencies. Thirdly, we recommend that there be specified time-lines for each discrete stage of

the approval process. The time-lines should indicate how long it takes for a first review and

also provide a checklist for work-plan design. Finally, it is time to consider partial approvals.

If an agency’s overall work-plan is sound but that a number of activities are considered

inappropriate or loosely tied to outcomes, it should be possible to sever the inappropriate

activity and approve the work-plan on a partial basis.

103. But the medium-term measures proposed here to speed up approvals should move

in tandem with other actions to strengthen the ability of the Programme Coordination

Office (see the section on the PCO elsewhere in the report) to support the implementing

agencies and do quality control of the work-plans. This would mean implementing the

staffing proposal made elsewhere in these recommendations. Efforts to strengthen the PCO

must go hand in hand with a more general training effort that targeted at the implementing

agencies to bridge the capacity gaps as proposed earlier. The perspective in this report is that

the implementability of work-plans depends on the extent to which a department embraces

the planning ethos. Departments will not develop this ethos if the planning seen as

something for link officers to do.


56

104. Singularize approvals by implementing agencies rather than do them

cumulatively at the KRA level: As the example of the Law School shows, the ability of

agency to get its plans approved individually can considerably speed up the execution of

activities and so the achievement of outcomes. Even though there is a sound case for

cumulative approvals, we recommend a more flexible approach that encourages the faster

agencies to get on with their activities. A few rules of thumb may help guide the decision

process. If the agencies work-plans do not include heavy procurements which may benefit

from economies of scale is accumulated, there would be a case for singularizing the

approval. If the procurement activities can be easily de-linked from other activities, then this

would make a case for both a singularized as well as partial approval as discussed above.

105. The SCC should meet more frequently to provide overall Strategic Leadership

to LSRP: The fact that there is no institution with overall managerial authority to the LSRP

only underlines the central role of the Steering Committee which has overall “political

leadership” over the programme. Political leadership refers to the authority that the steering

committee can mobilise- by virtue of its stature and standing- behind its decisions so as to

compel compliance even if the committee has no direct executive decision-making power

over specific agencies. Leaders of agencies are more likely than not to treat the decisions of

the steering committee as binding. Decisions of the committee would re-inforce the

executive function of individual PSs in the line ministries. To ensure that meetings of the

steering committee take place regularly, they should be standardized and mandated to take

place periodically as initially required under the MTS. However, not only should the Steering

Committee meet more often, it is as important that the right people- in terms of the top

leadership- should actually attend. Agencies which send junior staff undermine the

effectiveness of the steering committee in that such staff does not have authority to make

decisions. Naturally, whether the current unsatisfactory situation continues will depend both

on the effectiveness of the other committees and on the role that the PCO plays in servicing

these committees. For the PCO to service the implementing committees it needs to get

support to find additional skills in such areas as: a) effective prep for meetings; b) efficient

and rapid prep of minutes; c) timely provision of information to all.

106. Develop a link with Parliament, even if only at the conceptual level: As already

noted, many outcomes under the KRAs require laws to be enacted. Developing links with


57

parliament would be essential to smoothing out any legislative difficulties that may arise in

the future. The easiest route to developing this link is for the Government to finalize the

Legal Sector Policy and to present it to parliament as soon as possible. A policy adopted or

approved by parliament would have two advantages. One would be that it would give

democratic legitimacy to the legal sector reform programme and so deepen national

ownership. Two, this would also be, potentially, one way to ensure long-term sustainability

of the legal sector reform programme. By adopting and approving the legal sector reform

policy, parliament would also be committing to appropriate funds for it, now or later. Three,

by presenting the policy to Parliament, the Government would be prioritizing to parliament

the legislative agenda contained in the legal sector policy.

NSA PARTICIPATION IN THE LSRP

107. Overall: The recommendations of the Ngirwa Report still remain relevant and we

adopt them as part of the recommendations of this annual assessment. In addition though,

we recommend that the following decisions be taken to strengthen the role of the NSA in

the LSRP:

1. NGOs should be represented on the Programme Steering Committee.

2. The PMSU should identify and design working agreements with NGOs

based in and outside of Dar es Salaam on their roles and responsibilities in

the implementation of the LSRP. The agreements should define clearly the

roles and responsibilities of both parties.

3. Provide adequate information to NGOs on the objectives of the programme

so that they can identify areas where their participation and expertise could

contribute to the programme’s success.

4. Organize participatory planning and discussion fora for programme activities

where NGOs can be invited to participate. Examples of fora of this kind

include meetings of CEOs and LAs/IAs.18

5. Ensure more effective NSA representation in the design of the next phase of

the Legal Sector Reform Programme.

18 Ngwira, pp. 14-15


58

108. Expand the participation of NSAs across all KRAs and involve them in the

management structure: We believe that the current structure whereby NSAs involvement

is formally limited to two KRAs undervalues the invaluable contribution they can make to

LSRP success. Non-State Actors, NSAs should be integrated throughout the LSRP under all

the KRAs. It should be up to the NSAs collectively to determine who their designated

representatives or coordinators for each KRA would be. Perhaps they could be encouraged

to develop some selection criteria which could include the NSA area of mandate and

specialisation; its experience; its standing in the eyes of other NSAs and its capacity to

mobilise others. An initial NSA forum would be an appropriate starting point for

development of such criteria and for a more broader discussion of their role in the LSRP.

109. Increased invitations to appropriate NSAs to participate in activities within

LSRP: Separate from the issue of increased participation of NSAs across KRAs is the need

to increase invitations for appropriate NSAs to participate in specific activities within the

LSRP. This would include increased invitations to different officers in the same organization,

such as program staff, planning staff and accountants. In particular, this could include

increased NSA participation in training activities. Where consultations would deepen

ownership and ensure effectiveness, such invitations would be invaluable. This would be so

in all cases where the potential impact of an activity might be very broad or where a NSA’s

expertise could be of particular value.

110. Improved Communication: Communication between NSAs and LA and PCO

must be improved. Communication by PCO or LA to NSAs must provide sufficient time

and information for designated NSA representatives to inform and consult other NSAs. The

PCO and government should “market” the LSRP to NSAs, and the citizens of Tanzania, so

that more NSAs understand the LSRP and can consider where and how to be engaged. The

LA should hold regular coordination meetings for each KRA and appropriate NSAs should

be invited to participate in those meetings.

111. Support for discussion forums for NSAs involved in the LSRP: Within the

LSRP, there ought to be resources for NSA coordination and for regular forums to share

ideas, share information and discuss progress under the various KRAs. Such resources

should be provided flexibly recognising that sometimes it may be beneficial for all NSAs to


59

meet as a group whilst at other time but it may be beneficial that select NSAs meet in

relation to specific KRAs.

112. Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities of KRA2 Coordinator: The role and

responsibilities of the coordinator for NGOs/CSOs for the Legal Aid Network under

KRA2 should be clearly defined, perhaps even to the point of developing appropriate TORs.

If the proposal for inclusion of NSA under all KRA above were adopted, it would be

necessary to develop TORs for each NSA coordinator under each KRA.

113. Provide Financial Support to NSAs from LSRP when they are acting as

implementing agencies: How NSAs access funds from the LSRP should be a function of

the specific role they are playing within the programme. Where the NSA is providing

services, such as in legal aid or training of paralegals, they are standing in for the

government. In other words, in providing service they are performing a function that the

government is not able or is unwilling to perform even though it should. In such cases, the

NSAs should receive funding from the LSRP in a manner no different from other

implementing agencies.19 In addition, when NSAs are undertaking these types of activities,

they should coordinate closely with the government to maximize benefit to the people of

Tanzania. Thus, by way of example, legal literacy efforts by government and legal literacy

efforts by NSAs should work in harmony.

114. Modality of Funding NSAs’ Advocacy and Monitoring Activities: The matter is

different if NSAs want to monitor programme implementation or advocate changes in

implementation. The team recognises that monitoring and advocacy activities can be a

source of friction between government and NSAs and it is important that funding for such

activities be consistent with the independence and autonomy of NSAs. The Review Team

recommends that modalities of funding such activities outside of the LSRP be considered.

This is a critical matter of principle: when NSAs are monitoring implementation, they are

effectively holding the government to account. If funding is provided from LSRP, it could

lead to official reluctance with the government feeling that it is being asked to agree to fund

NSAs as a check on itself. More perniciously, NSAs may feel that they have to be restrained

19 Some NSAs currently access funding directly from DPs or other sources for activities which fall under the LSRP, such as legal aid service provision. This should continue to occur but additional funds should be made available under the LSRP as there are other NSAs which could assist in activities under the LSRP, like legal aid provision, but have unable to access funding directly from DPs.


60

in their monitoring to continue receiving funds from LSRP. Either of these results would be

a serious incursion into the autonomy and operational freedom of the NSAs.

115. There are three possible methods of funding for NSAs’ advocacy and monitoring

activities. Which one to adopt is a function of the environment and the specific

configuration of the NSA sector in the country. These are:

a) The PCO may be designated as the administrator of the funds earmarked earmarked

advocacy and monitoring funds. The PCO would manage a separate account for this

purpose but the actual decision on funding could be made by the LSWG. If

implemented this proposal would require the development of specific, task-relevant

capacities within the PCO.

b) Alternatively, DPs could provide a simple and direct avenue for accessing funding by

designating one donor agency to manage an NSA fund or simply to act as a

clearinghouse for applications. Once approved, the application would then be

funded directly by individual DPs.

c) Establish a mechanism, say a local organization or an INGO through which funding

could be provided. Other countries have used INGOs but this has not always

worked as smoothly. A decision as to whether this is appropriate is necessary in

Tanzania will need to be made.

MAINSTREAMING GENDER

116. Overall: The efforts to mainstream gender in the legal sector reform programme

need to be fore-grounded by clarity about the key terms. The team offers the following as

appropriate definitions of the applicable terms.

a) Gender analysis: is the study of differences in conditions, needs, participation rates,

access to resources, control of assets and decision-making powers between men and

women in their assigned roles.

b) Gender mainstreaming: is the incorporation of a gender equality (meaning that

human beings are free to develop their personal abilities and make choices without

the limitations set in gender roles) perspective in all development policies, strategies,


61

and interventions at all levels and at all stages by the actors normally involved

therein.

c) Gender equity: means fairness and justice in the distribution of benefits and

responsibilities between men and women.

117. Provide funds to support mainstreaming activities: At the moment, gender has

“disappeared” or has “hidden” under the concept of mainstreaming. In the teams view

mainstreaming will not serve the gender question and may, in fact be counter productive, if

there is little or no awareness on gender issues or if there is awareness and ideas, but no

funding is earmarked and available to carry out mainstreaming activities. In order to ensure

that the Government’s gender policy is actually being implemented, preferential treatment by

way of specially planned and targeted activities should be mandated in order to ensure that

there is, in fact, gender equity. This should be done in tandem with activities to give greater

visibility to gender within planning activities and by ensuring that these activities once

planned are funded and, particularly important, reported on. Moreover, the team believes

that there may be, within agencies, good and valid proposals which would contribute to

access to justice for all whilst improving gender outcomes but that such activities may not be

pursued since they not seen as being within the MTS. It is important that development

partners take a flexible stand and keep their eye on the objectives of the programme rather

than on the coherence and elegance of individual plans.

118. Mandate the keeping of gender disaggregated data: The invisibility of gender in

the LSRP is compounded by the lack of information to verify any of the statements made by

the implementing agencies on the extent to which they have taken gender issues on board.

To correct for this deficiency all implementing agencies should maintain specific gender

disaggregated data. In addition, there should be gender indicators developed across the

LSRP to facilitate proper and easy monitoring of the progress. It is proposed that these

indicators should cover both numbers and impact.

119. Hire a gender advisor for the PCO: As findings elsewhere in this report indicate,

the PCO has been severely understaffed and has faced deep-seated challenges trying to

service the large number of institutions and activities within its purview. This capacity strain

has no doubt impacted negatively on gender. In order to give gender the attention that it

deserves and to ensure proper implementation of the government’s gender policy, we


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propose that the PCO recruit a full-time, locally hired gender adviser to work directly with

the institutions and make links to plans and funding possibilities.

120. Risk factors: The proposals made here face three potential risks that are worth

underling. These are: a) the government may resist giving particular focus to discrete

gender activities given its mainstreaming strategy; b) specific gender activities may be pushed

aside and not prioritised within the competition amongst the many other needs in the sector

and c) the programme may retain its current inflexibility and stick firmly to the current MTS

plans and activities.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT MANUAL

121. Overall: Our review of the Manual shows that though it provides broad guidelines

on important aspects of financial management and procurement, it is also clear that its needs

improvements in order to be useful to end-users.

122. The manual should be updated and simplified: The immediate task goal should

to supply the missing elements, rationalise the forms and address other weaknesses identified

above. But the process of revision should closely involve both the users of the manual as

well as consumers of the accounting information produced through the accounting process.

The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, MoJCA and the Programme Co-

ordination Office, PCO should take a lead in the review process.

123. Application and Dissemination of the Manual: Once the manual is updated, the

team proposes that the manual be widely disseminated among the intended users with the

dual purpose of a) ensuring that they understand and ii) that they can apply it as a useful

guide. One of the major shortcomings of the manual is that it has actually not been tested

through practical application. Encourage the users to apply the manual in the discharging

their financial responsibilities.

124. General financial matters: There are three important general recommendations to

be made with reference to the LSRP financial procedures, to wit, the need to: a) identify and

agree on useful reports to be prepared and submitted under the manual; b) communicate

effectively with the implementing agencies the responsibility of their internal auditors and

especially, their duty to submit internal audit reports; and c) address the filing issues for

security of documents and easy retrieval


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PROGRAMME CO-ORDINATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION

125. Enhance the role of the Inter-ministerial Technical Coordination Committee

over the LSRP: The Government’s Inter-Ministerial Technical Coordination Committee the

appropriate high-level forum to hold the steering committee to account. The Committee

prepares papers for submission to cabinet. To enhance the role of this committee over the

LSRP, the steering committee, should on behalf of the LSRP, should report to it on a

quarterly basis as envisaged in the MTS.

126. Proposals on shifting the site of coordination of LSRP from MoJCA are

premature: We suggest that proposals that have been variously made that responsibility for

implementation of LSRP should be moved to a higher authority within Government, such as

that of the Prime Minister, are premature. The existing structure need to be given a chance

to demonstrate that it can work. Any move to the PMO needs to be carefully designed to

protect the issues of independence surrounding the Judiciary as the third arm of

government.

127. Increase the Capacity of the Programme Coordination Office: Throughout the

review it was clear that the lack of capacity within the PCO was a significant bottleneck in

the implementation of LSRP. The PCO has a critical role in supporting the achievement of

results in all KRAs through provision of technical support and quality assurance.

128. Equally important is the role, already referred to earlier, that the PCO has as the

Secretariat to the management committees. To the enable the PCO fulfil both roles better

we propose that the responsibility of some of the current personnel be adjusted and

additional staff be engaged. Specifically:

a) Revise the role of the Programme Coordinator to focus on promoting coordination

and communication across the Sector and acting as a Secretariat to the Management

Committees.

b) Build the capacity of the Planning Specialist to take over from the PC the role he is

currently performing in supporting agencies in the development and quality

assurance of work plans. In the Stakeholder Workshop we suggested that an

additional Project Manager be engaged to perform this function, but this additional


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should not be necessary if the Technical Cooperation based in the Lead Agencies are

doing their job.

c) A new position of Learning/Training Specialist be created to advise agencies on the

design of training and other activities in accordance with sound capacity

development principles.

d) Build the capacity of the position of the Procurement Specialist to be able to provide

better support to the agencies. In the Stakeholder Workshop, we proposed the

engagement of additional specialist but these should not be required if Technical

Cooperation is effective at the Sector institutions.

e) Create a long-term Technical Cooperation position of M&E Specialist to be based in

the PCO

f) Create position of Gender Adviser to be filled locally as already proposed elsewhere

in this report.

129. Strengthen lines of accountability within the PCO: The separation of the

Attorney General’s Department from MoJCA that was recently announced by the President

and currently being implemented, offers an opportunity to clarify and strengthen the lines of

accountability both between the PCO and MoJCA and within the PCO. We suggest that the

PCO be placed directly under the Permanent Secretary of MoJCA to remove the perception

that it is subordinate to MoJCA’s Department of Policy and Planning. At an institutional

level, this will heighten the profile and authority of the PCO to coordinate agencies across

the sector. For the PCO team, it will remove the confusion about whether they are

responsible to the Director of the Department of Policy and Planning. The Permanent

Secretary should reinforce to the PCO team that they are responsible to him through the

Programme Coordinator. The PS would then hold the Programme Coordinator accountable

for performance management of PCO staff.

130. Change Management and Communication: The vision of LSRP as a change

programme needs to be developed further in a participatory process with the Sector and the

Tanzanian community led by the Steering Committee. Depending on its contents, the Draft

Legal Sector Policy could provide an appropriate platform in which to develop and present

this future vision. The development of an IEC Strategy, which is scheduled to proceed in the


65

current Work Plan, needs to incorporate how to support the Sector to develop this LSRP

vision as well promote clear communication between stakeholders and raise the profile of

the LSRP with the broader Tanzania community. Strategies for engagement of the

electronic, print and radio media could also be considered. It undertaking the development

of the IEC Strategy capacity for implementation needs to be emphasized.

131. Attention needs to be given to finding the right person (or persons) to be the public

champions of change for LSRP. On the LGRP and PSRP, the Prime Minister’s Office has

fulfilled this role whereas on BEST it has been the PS of Ministry of Planning. For the next

phase of the Public Financial Management Reform Programme, the Ministry of Finance has

created the new position of Deputy Permanent Secretary-Reform to be devoted full-time to

PFMRP and other reforms being implemented in the Ministry. As mentioned earlier, we

believe it is premature to relocate the LSRP to the PMO and would suggest further thought

be given to identifying champions with distinct ‘legal’ identities.

132. Monitoring and Evaluation: Through the PSRP, the Government is improving

medium term strategic plans, annual work plans and the MTEF budget framework to bring

about a results-based focus and link with reporting on the MKUKUTA. As part of this

process the current budget guidelines now require MDAs to produce annual performance

reports, as well as quarterly target reports and 3-year outcome reports (The first Annual

Performance Reports are due in August 2008). These new reporting requirements are

ambitious and MDAs will require significant capacity development to meet them. LSRP

support in M&E should therefore be targeted at the Sector Institutions to help them

understand and use the Government’s new Medium Term Strategic Planning and Budgeting

Manual (October 2007) in order to be able to meet these requirements. This Manual includes

best practice approach to M&E.

133. The specific recommendation in the short-term is that the ToR for the consultancy

in M&E (which is currently in the MTS) be reviewed to ensure that the focus is on:

a) Promoting awareness and comfort with M&E as a management tool for

b) Promoting institutional learning

c) Encouraging internal and external accountability


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d) Establishing performance indicators that describe expected achievements, and focus

people on generating concrete results

e) Working with the executives in the agencies to establish what they are hoping to

achieve from MTS activities and what information they need in order to judge

whether they are heading in the right direction to achieve outcomes.

134. Through this process agree agencies need to agree on the kind of information that

needs to be collected to establish a baseline and monitor progress. The emphasis should be

on setting up a very simple M&E framework that mirrors the structure of the MTS; where

information is simple and easy to collect. It is important that the process setting indicators

be done with the executives in the agencies in order to emphasize the role of M and E as a

management tool.

135. For the longer-term, we propose that a long-term M&E Adviser be engaged to be

based in the PCO working alongside the PCO’s M&E Specialist to develop capacity

throughout the Sector. The focus will be on:

a) Building capacity in M&E at the institutional level i.e. on the M&E of the

institutions’ own annual work plans, MTEF etc and not just on MTS/LSRP activities

alone.

b) Creating more awareness and ownership of the Government new reporting

requirements; and creating demand for reports and results and reviewing and

strengthening existing capabilities.

136. Other recommended strategies for the M&E Adviser could include:

a) Formation of an M&E network from Specialists across the agencies – aim is to build

peer support for M&E; learn about what is being done in other sectors; engage with

the initiatives being undertaken in other Sectors and requirements of central agencies

such as the PMO and NAO and MKUKUTA reporting.

b) Support the M&E network to conduct two evaluations per year which would involve

selecting one or two MTS activities (such as DPP and Law School); working with the

relevant PS to determine the kinds of evaluation questions that they would like to be

investigated i.e. Why do I really need to know this? The incentive for the institutions


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would be more in-depth information to better manage their activities and to feed

into Annual Performance Reports. The incentive for LSRP is to demonstrate to the

rest of the Sector the value of Evaluations and provide in-depth information in a

specific area on progress toward the goal of ‘Justice for All’.

c) Building capacity of the Sector’s M&E specialist in the development of ToRs.

d) When a Legal Sector Policy is developed, the M&E Adviser would work alongside

the M&E network to develop an M&E framework (in close consultation with

executives) which would feed into Institutional Strategic Plans and MTEF.

137 Strengthening Capacity in Legal Sector Reform: For any organization that is

trying to change the way they do things, it is helpful to have assistance from expertise

outside of the organisation. The Review Team believes the leadership of the LSRP would

benefit from the experience of a high level executive from another legal jurisdiction who has

successfully achieved legal sector reform. The role of this position would be to advise the

Steering Committee and the PS of MoJCA on how to tackle issues such as resistance to

reform. This kind of expertise does exist in the international market but the Government

would need to develop a strong recruitment strategy to ensure the person with the right mix

of technical and interpersonal skills was engaged.

GBS PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TO FOSTER GOVERNMENT

OWNERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP

138. The Review Team would like to recommend that the next performance indicators

for General Budget Support be designed to foster Government ownership and leadership.

Examples of the types of indicators that could be considered include:

• Steering Committee finalizes Legal Sector Policy.

• Parliament approves Legal Sector Policy

• Steering Committee meets regularly and makes decisions on the strategic direction of

the LSRP

• LSRP objectives integrated into the Sector Institutions Strategic Plans, MTEF and

annual work plans and progress is monitored against indicators.


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139. In the spirit of mutual accountability and building a stronger working relationship

between Government and DPs, the Review Team would also like to recommend that

performance indicators be determined for DPs. These indicators could reinforce the role

DPs could play in promoting Government ownership and leadership. For example:

• DPs provide constructive and timely comments on Agency Workplans (which are

consistent with the guidelines in the Governments Medium Term Strategic Planning

and Budgeting Manual).

• DPs provide timely information to the Government on their financial contributions

to the Basket.

140. Finally we suggest the development of performance for which the responsibility is

shared between Government and DPs and which is designed to clarify roles and

responsibilities and promote a stronger partnership. For instance:

• DPs and Government, together, communicate to all levels of the legal sector

programme what their boundaries and constraints are around key reform issues i.e.

salary issues; procurement etc

• DPs and Government, together, develop and implement a communication and

relationship improvement strategy.


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APPENDIX I

Progress Made in Each Key Result Area (KRA)

KRA 1: National Legal Framework

Much has been accomplished toward development of the National Legal Framework,

although a lot of this has been done using funds from government or other donors (such as

BEST) and not through LSRP funding. In respect to the MTS, the Law Reform Commission

(LRCT) has produced position papers or studies on the following laws: Business Names

Registration Ordinance; local customary laws (patrilineal); death penalty, corporal

punishment and long term sentences laws; the law on persons with disabilities; civil justice

system review; court of appeal rules; Khadis courts. LRCT is currently working on the

Advocates Act and legal aid laws. This work of the LRCT is commendable but unless

legislative processing agencies20 are strengthened and parliament is engaged through

parliamentary committees, the risk is that real results in relation to development of the

national legal framework will not be realized.

The civilianization of the prosecutorial services is an area of particularly impressive progress,

which has mainly been funded under LSRP. In a relatively short implementation period the

DPP has: facilitated the development and passing of a legislative framework for

establishment of the National Prosecution Service under the DPP; conducted study tours to

the prosecution services in other countries; recruited and trained 157 state attorneys and

then posted them to six pilot regions; and procured necessary office equipment to allow

them to commence operations. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) has made an

important contribution too, providing training of the state attorneys. While the DPP, like

other MDAs, has been grappling with the planning and procurement process under LSRP,

the speed of progress has been impressive. When asked how they explained such progress,

the response was: “The situation of the DPP was really very, very bad before. Something had

to be done. It was the right climate for change and there was political will within the DPP to

do it.”

20 Outcome 3, Output 3 under KRA1.


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The DPP noted that the MTS does not consider the implications of civilianization such as

training of new and old attorneys and the need to establish offices across the country. The

DPP sees meeting such needs as important for achieving the outcome of ‘streamlined and

strengthened prosecution and investigation system’ and would like interpretation of the MTS

to be flexible enough to enable LSRP funding in these areas.

The Tanzania Police has also made progress on the modernization of investigation systems.

With Government funds, a pilot needs assessment has been carried in Dar es Salaam 195

police officers and other investigators have received training.

KRA 2: Access to Justice for Poor and Disadvantaged

There have been limited progress on KRA 2. This KRA has the potential to have the most

immediate impact on assisting the citizens of Tanzania, particularly outside of Dar es Salaam.

The reality for people with respect to accessing justice in Dar es Salaam is different to the

reality in the rest of Tanzania. Although not a proper survey, the Review Team included two

field visits outside of Dar es Salaam, to Iringa and Morogoro which were informative. In

these two areas, which are not truly rural, individuals engaged in assisting with the delivery of

legal services were not aware the role their own institutions had within the LSRP or even the

existence of the LSRP. However, there is reported progress in two areas under this KRA

solely with government funds: the purchase of vehicles for transportation of remandees by

the Prisons and the construction or rehabilitation of primary courts by the Judiciary.

Additionally, it should be noted that the Judiciary is hiring more magistrates to meet the

needs of Tanzania. TLS organized and held a country-wide Legal Aid Day in November

2007 at which over 1000 people received legal advice and following which TLS members are

assisting with 300 legal aid cases. The profile of TLS as a legal aid provider was raised and

TLS Council passed resolution that Legal Aid Day be conducted annually every 2nd week of

November through out the country. The LSRP provided financial support to the TLS Legal

Aid Day although not originally an activity included in the MTS. This is an excellent example

of the flexibility that the Review Team suggests be taken to the MTS.

The Review Team notes that there has been no progress for a number of activities provided

for under the MTS. Many of these activities do not even appear in the workplans of 2006-07

and 2007-08. Some of these may have the potential of providing more immediate assistance


71

to the people of Tanzania in accessing justice and results with respect to achieving the

outcomes intended. For example, although the construction and rehabilitation of remand

homes and approved schools are necessary, it is not clear whether the government is

considering and exploring alternatives to placing juveniles in remand homes and approved

schools. Although the MoHSW indicated that diversion methods are being used, the extent

to which these methods are accepted and being employed throughout the country is not

clear. Additionally, the range of diversion options considered, drawing in the communities

and CSOs to assist with diversion options or supervision is not strongly evident. More

“restorative justice” methodologies could be adopted. The Review Team notes that these

issues could be addressed within the MTS framework under several of the activities not

being implemented.21

Importance of Coordination of Reforms: The NGOs/CSOs’ role in providing legal aid

and improving the knowledge of citizens on their rights and the legal system is recognized in

KRA2 with respect to the legal aid network. This recognizes the vital role that NGOs/CSOs

have been playing in assisting the poor. Access to independent legal advice is critical to the

proper functioning of the legal system. The legal system in Tanzania employs an adversarial

process. In such a system, the rights of the individual cannot properly be protected where

one party does not have access to legal assistance. It is vital that the availability of legal

assistance in the form of paralegals, lawyers and advocates, be increased to keep pace with

the increasing number of civilian and police prosecutors, and magistrates. Legal aid

NGOs/CSOs also have a vital role to play in development of an expanded paralegal system

which would truly assist in providing access to justice to the citizens of Tanzania.

The review team understands that the MCA Threshold Programme has developed a

programme for the legal aid and literacy network that overlaps with activities in MTS.

Implementation of relevant MTS activities has stalled while this possible overlap is

investigated.

With respect to access to justice it must be remembered that ensuring the public has

adequate legal assistance, particularly in criminal matters, is the responsibility of the

21 See MTS, KRA2: Outcome 4, Output 4: correctional policies/criminal justice policies and legal framework

reviewed to address key issues for juvenile justice; Output 5: comprehensive juvenile justice information education and communication juvenile rights and obligations defined and implemented; and Outcome 1, Output 4: guidelines for handling of cases of disadvantaged groups for all justice administrators issued.


72

government. Although NGOs/CSOs are designated to establish the legal aid network and

develop the code of ethics, the government is ultimately responsible for ensuring accessible

competent legal assistance. The Review Team has been advised that the government intends

to split MoJCA, dividing the role of Attorney-General, in essence legal counsel for the

government, from the role of Ministry of Justice, ensuring proper administration of justice.

The intent of the government is to establish “Advisory Services” under the Ministry of

Justice to provide legal assistance to the poor. The Review Team commends the government

for taking this matter up. Ensuring the independence from government of the staff

providing legal advice to the public through these offices is essential and the Review Team

recommends that the government carefully consider various models for the structure and

modalities of operation of these offices to ensure this independence.

KRA 3: Human Rights and Administrative Justice

When measured in terms of expenditure, progress within this KRA has been minimal.

However, in discussions with the Lead Agency, the Commission for Human Rights and

Good Governance (CHRAGG), it was apparent that they have expended much effort trying

to understand and meet the new planning and procurement requirements under LSRP and

are frustrated that they have not been able to access more funds to advance MTS activities.

They remain strongly committed to implementing the KRA activities, which they still see as

highly relevant. The Review Team agrees that the MTS outcome areas and activities under

this KRA remain relevant and are important toward achievement of LSRP’s goal of Justice

for All.

To date, only Tsh55m has been accessed under this KRA. This is for the development of

guidelines for lodging complaints against misuse of powers and unethical conducts (Output

3; Outcome 3). However, as the activity involves the engagement of consultants, LSRP

regulations require ‘no objections’ from the World Bank at several stages of the procurement

process which prolongs the lead time before implementation. The good news is that this

process is near the end, the Terms of Reference have been approved and the consultancy

assignment has been advertised.

While CHRAGG has found LSRP funding difficult to access, they have continued to

implement activities, from their recurrent budget, that are in the MTS, such as human rights


73

monitoring of police stations and running public education campaigns. As a Lead Agency,

the CHRAGG makes a useful comment about the difficulty of performing their

coordination role without ready access to funds for matters such as organizing KRA

meetings and paying for sittings of the Ministerial Tender Committee.

KRA 4 Service Delivery Capacity in Key Sector Institutions

The main activities that have commenced under this KRA are: development of the national

curriculum for legal education, and the development of the Law School. In relation to the

former, the representatives of legal educational institutions attended a meeting organized by

the Law Faculty of the University of Dar es Salaam (as the Lead Agency) and have drafted a

National Curriculum Framework for Legal Studies. They have also developed Terms of

Reference for the engagement of consultants to finalise this framework.

Compared with other activities in the MTS, the Law School is at an advanced stage of

implementation. Progress includes: passing of the Law School of Tanzania Act, 2007 (Act

No. 5 of 2007); appointment of the Ag. Principal on secondment from the Judiciary;

establishment of the Board; development of staffing documents and their submission to

Treasury with an initial request for 34 staff (although, the School will continue to be

dependent for several years on the services of practicing advocates); and the development of

a curriculum for the Postgraduate Diploma in Law. The result is that Law School was able to

accept its first intake of 274 students at the beginning of 2008. The School is currently being

housed under the auspices of the Faculty of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam while

construction of their own facility takes place. The government has allocated a 23-acre plot of

land in Dar es Salaam for the Law School. One outstanding issue that does not seem to have

been considered is how students will finance their studies as Law School students are not

currently eligible for loans under the Higher Learning Loan Board.

The review team received many comments from stakeholders that the activities under this

KRA did not reflect their real needs. For examples, the legal educational institutions argued

that they require more opportunities to develop the skills of their staff, especially through

post-graduate degrees, rather than short-term training. Other gaps include support for the

Council of Legal education to offer refresher programmes for lawyers and advocates and for

the Tanganyika Law Society to offer legal education.


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KRA 5 Service Delivery Capacity in Key Sector Institutions

In order to secure an effective service delivery of the legal sector institutions the programme

seeks to address a number of fundamental issues such as physical facilities, skills training,

equipment and management systems. An overview of the progress report for 06/07 shows

that the majority of the activities proposed did not take place and were deferred to the

following year 07/08 for various reasons. However, the report from the first 9 months of

07/08 indicates that implementation has picked up as soon as the budget for this financial

year was approved. Many of the activities have required pre-planning and tenders such as

construction and rehabilitation of courts, offices, and purchase of equipment.

Key Result Area 6: Programme Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation

Progress in this KRA has improved significantly since the commencement of LSRP. The

slow start was partly a result of personnel changes in the PCO and delays in the recruitment

of some positions (eg. the incumbent Programme Coordinator commenced in December

2006; the M&E Specialist only commenced at beginning of 2008; and the MIS position is

still vacant).

Progress has included: greater communication and coordination between institutions across

the Sector; training for Link Officers in procurement, planning and monitoring and

evaluation; and development at a sector level of Work Plans and Financial and Progress

Reports. The quality of the latter has been an issue raising questions about the level of

technical support and quality assurance provided by the PCO (discussed elsewhere in the

report).

Similar to other KRAs the procurement process has represented a bottleneck with

consultancy assignments delayed in the critical areas of: development of an M&E mechanism

and an Information, Education and Communication Strategy. Another activity on which

progress has stalled is the development of the Legal Sector Policy. This does not seem to

have moved forward since a stakeholder meeting was held in Dar es Salaam on 29th June

2007 to review and comment on the draft Legal Sector Policy.

Another area of recent improvement in this KRA is that management meetings are now

being convened. The second Joint Programme Implementation and Review Committee


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Meeting was held in February 2008 and the first Steering Committee was held in March

2008. However, secretariat support for these meeting needs to be further strengthened, as

evidenced by the slow rate at which the minutes from these meetings have been circulated.


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APPENDIX II

Terms of Reference for the Legal Sector Reform Programme Annual Review - 2008

1. Background

In December 2005, the Government launched the LSRP: Medium Term Strategy and Action Plan 2005-2008. This MTS aims at enhancing timely and accessible justice for all through support to the development of social justice, equality and rule of law through quality and accessible legal services. The MTS is composed of the following components:

1. National Legal Framework 2. Access to Justice for the Poor and Disadvantage 3. Human Rights and Administrative Justice 4. Knowledge and Skills of Legal Professionals 5. Service Delivery Capacity in Key Legal Sector Institutions 6. Program Management, Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation

The total budget for the Reform is estimated at USD 100 million for a period of three-years. After the Launch of the Medium Term Strategy, the Government developed detailed implementation arrangements, action plans and cost estimates, which were approved by the Steering Committee and presented at a Donors Forum.

The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania in consultation with the Governments of Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and the World Bank approved the Basket Financial Management Manual and signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the 20th of June 2006.

1.1 Legal Sector Reform and the Poverty Reduction Nexus

The Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) (2005-2010), better known by its Kiswahili acronym as MKUKUTA, has officially confirmed the linkages between poverty and poor access to justice. The MKUKUTA states that; “for broad-based growth and improvement of quality of life and social wellbeing to take place, good governance has to prevail”. The respect for Human Rights, a fair and accessible justice system, and continuous efforts to fight corruption are all key elements of third Cluster of the MKUKUTA (Governance and Accountability)

2. Objectives

The overall objective of the Annual Review is to assess the progress of the implementation of the LSRP from the beginning of the calendar year 2005 up to 31st of December 2007.

The specific objectives are:


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1. To evaluate the implementation progress made over this period in the Key Result Areas with regards to the achievement of access to Justice For All on the basis of the individual detailed work and action plans of:

a. National Legal Framework b. Access to Justice for the Poor and the Disadvantaged c. Human Rights and Administrative Justice d. Knowledge and Skills of Legal Professionals e. Service Delivery Capacity in Key Legal Sector Institutions f. Program Management, Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation,

Preparations of recommendations to improve future organizational and implementation arrangements

2. Review and assess the monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system, incl. indicators and gender disaggregated data. This will include selecting a key set of benchmark/milestones that will form the basis for assessing satisfactory implementation progress of the LSRP in the context of the GBS Annual Review.

3. Conduct a Gender Analysis (GA) of key LSRP KRAs and recommend actions to strengthen gender mainstreaming and to ensure that the reform contributes to gender equity

4. Assessment of the participation of non state actors in the various processes of the implementation cycles of the LSRP in regard to strengthening transparency and accountability.

5. Assess the Government’s adherence to its fiduciary responsibilities under the LSRP.

For every objective listed above, recommendations will be made for improvement of identified key issues.

3. Scope of the work for the Independent review

The Review will be jointly financed by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and its Development Partners, using LSRP Basket Funds, under the Joint Program Implementation Review Committee. There will be one independent Team of Consultants, consisting of highly competent international and Tanzanian experts, tasked with carrying out an independent progress report of the LSRP as per the Objectives listed above. The Team of Consultants will be constituted by a Lead Consultant whose ToRs will be jointly agreed by Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and Development Partners.

The Team of Consultants is expected to use its general expertise and competence in reform/ change programs, organizational assessment, impact assessment and its specific knowledge of legal sector reforms in sub Saharan Africa to establish other key issues requiring attention at the inception of the Annual Review Report.

The Team of Consultants shall focus on:

1). Program Stakeholders:


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- The level of influence of internal and external stakeholders on the implementation of the reform to be complying with principles of accountability and transparency.

- Suggestion of possible areas and activities to strengthen the inclusion of NGOs and NSAs.

2). Key Result Areas:

- The contribution of the activities in each KRA to the achievement of access to justice for all.

- The contribution of the activities to the realization of the outcome of each KRA.

- The adequacy of existing and planned activities to achieve the MTS objectives.

3). Institutional arrangements:

- Strengths and weaknesses of the institutional arrangements for efficient implementation of the LSRP Linkages to other ongoing reforms and programs, such as the question of Salaries and Recruitment issues in the PSRP, the legal component of the LGRP and the CDR Component of the BEST programme.

4). Mainstreaming of the Legal Sector Reform Programme

- The extent to which LSRP activities have been mainstreamed and the capacities of the lead agencies to effectively plan, manage and implement activities in the ongoing reform.

5). Financing and Procurement Arrangements:

- Assess the procurement activities carried out so far, effectiveness of procurement staff in supporting the LSRP implementation including processing of procurement contracts, contract management and the filing of procurement records.

- The financial accounting and reporting activities of the program.

- The existing financing arrangements for disbursements from the basket, especially for those institutions without either MTEF or without own votes.

- Prepare proposals to streamline the existing disbursement arrangement for a more efficient service to all implementing agencies,

6). Assessment of the implementation of the 2005/06 PER recommendations.

4. Methodology and timing of the Independent Review

The Team of Consultants will commence work during the last week of January 2008 and complete the assignment within a 4-week period. The Leader of the Team of Consultant and his Deputy Consultant will be required to carry out some preparatory work before the arrival of the full team.

The MoJCA/PCO and the Development Partners will present a list of consultants, and will jointly select the consultants through selective tendering. The team of consultants will carry out the progress report as basis for the annual review of the LSRP


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The PCO/MoJCA will take the lead on behalf of Government, and provide the Team of Consultants with the necessary broad guidance. In addition, the PCO together with the lead donor will provide more detailed guidance and advice to the Review Team.

The MoJCA, assisted by the PCO, will compile a set of the key documents relevant for the Team of Consultants, together with implementation progress report to date, and any other relevant studies, data sets and reports for the Team of Consultants. These will be provided to the team on arrival, or electronically prior to arrival where possible.

The Team of Consultants will be expected to consult with Government, Development Partners, Lead and implementing agencies, recipients of judicial services (clients), Civil Society Organisations and other stakeholders to the reform, comprising an appropriate gender balance. The PCO will facilitate this process through introductions, briefings, and assisting with arrangements for meetings and interviews.

Assessment of the jointly organized field trips, especially the purpose and value of the trips.

The proposed timeframe should be, in broad terms, as follows:

• 1 Day: Briefing with Government, Development Partners and available experts/ consultants

• 12 Days: Mission work in DSM: Meetings with sector institutions, relevant government departments, CSOs and donor partners..

• 1 Day: Workshop with stakeholders and first presentation of findings • 1 Day: Debriefing • Within 2 weeks of the workshop the Review Team will submit its final report to

the PCO. • The PS of MJCA calls for the JPIRC to discuss, for a duration of not more than 2

days, the findings, recommendations and then map out the way forward. The PS of MJCA will chair the event and act as a moderator while being assisted by a facilitator and supported by a secretariat.

5. Team Composition

The Team of Consultants will consist of highly qualified Tanzanian and international consultants.

The team will be composed of professionals with expertise in the following areas:

- Legal sector and Judicial reform programmes in Sub Saharan Africa, previous experience in the implementation of governance reform programs

- Management including planning, programming (results-based) and monitoring / evaluation

- Financial management and procurement - Gender Equality Specialist - Organizational Assessment / Change management - Inclusions of NSAs in Legal Sector related programmes, project and reforms in

Tanzania or in sub-Saharan Africa.


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Annual Review

The annual review will use the independent consultancy report to

(a). Assess satisfactory progress in implementing the LSRP; (b). Form the basis for basket funding development partners to decide on their level of

support for 2008/09; (c). Setting indicators for measuring progress in 2008/09.

Annex 1: Key documents to be reviewed (to be updated as required)

- Memorandum of Understanding - Financial Basket Management Manual - Medium Term Strategy vol. I, II and III - Report on field trips - Public expenditure Review 2005 - REDMA Report - Ngirwa Report - Final Report Quick Start Project - Appraisal 2003 - Annual workplans and budgets for FY 2005/06 and 2006/07 - Procurement plans for FY 2005/06 and 2006/07


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APPENDIX III

Literature, Documents and Legislation Available to the Review Team

Literature and Documents

CCBRT, Strategy 2008-2012, Dar es Salaam: Comprehensive Community Based Rehabilitation in Tanzania, 2008.

EASTERLY, William, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

ELLIS, Amanda; Mark Blackden, Jozefina Cutura; Fiona MacCulloch; and Holger Seebens, Gender and Economic Growth in Tanzania: Creating Opportunities for Women, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007.

INGELSTAM, Anders and Cecilia Karlste, Guidelines for Civil Society Support, Final Draft, Dar es Salaam, May 2007.

INGELSTAM, Anders and Cecilia Karlste, Position Paper Guidelines for Civil Society Support, Final Draft, Dar es Salaam, May 2007.

INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION – LUSHOTO, Prospectus for 2007/2008. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, Annual Report for 2004/2005. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, Commission’s Report on the Road Traffic

Law, (Year?). LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, Criminal Law as a Vehicle for the Protection

of the Rights to Personal Integrity, Dignity and Liberty of Women, November, 1998. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, Final Report on Designated Legislation in the

Nyalali Commission Report, April, 1996. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, Report of the Commission on the Problems of

Congestion in Prisons, April, 1994. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, Report on Exchange Control Ordinance (Cap.

294), April, 1994. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, Report on Private Legal Practice, (Year?). LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, Report on the Impact of Criminal Justice

System in Combating Thefts/Embezzlement in Government Institutions and Public Corporations, April, 1994.

LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, Report on the Labour Laws, June, 2001. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, The Law Reformer Journal, June, 2007. LAW REFORM OF TANZANIA, NGOs, Establishment of Paralegals in Tanzania: NGOs

Position Paper on Scheme for Provision of Legal Services by Paralegal Paper by Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, May 2004.

LAW SCHOOL OF TANZANIA, Training Curriculum for Postgraduate Diploma in Legal Practice, 2008.


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LEGAL SECTOR WORKING GROUP, Terms of Reference for Legal Sector Working Group, Dar es Salaam, July 28, 2007.

MAPUNDA, Benedict Thomas, “Legal Sector Reform in Tanzania: An Examination of Development and Status,” in NASSALI, Maria (ed.), Reforming Justice in East Africa: A Comparative Review of Legal Sector Processes, 2008, p. 99.

MUSHI, Samuel S. and Bernadeta Killian, The Tanzania Civil Society: Assessment of Strength and Capacity Gaps, Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, December 2002.

MZUMBE UNIVERSITY, Prospectus 2007/2008. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES (REDMA),

Training Needs Assessment in Legal Sector Institutions (Final Report Volumes I & II), Dar es Salaam, December, 2004.

RUAHA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE – IRINGA, Prospectus 2007 – 2008. TANGANYIKA LAW SOCIETY, Annual Reports 2006 and 2007. TANZANIA PRISONS SERVICE, Sauti ya Magereza: Journal of the Tanzania Prisons Service

(Issue No. 1), October – December, 2007. TUMAINI UNIVERSITY – IRINGA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, Academic Prospectus

2007/2008 & 2008/2009. TWAIB, Fauz, The Legal Profession in Tanzania: The Law and Practice, Bayreuth and Dar es Salaam:

African Studies Series and Dar es Salaam University Press, 1997. UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Agreed Government of the United Republic of Tanzania

and Development Partners PAF Matrix for GBS Annual Review, 2008. UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Financial and Legal Management Upgrading Project

(FILMUP) – Legal Sector Report, Dar es Salaam: The Legal Task Force, 1996. UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Financial Management and Procurement Manual for the

Basket Fund, May, 2006. UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Joint Legal Sector/ Partners Appraisal of the Legal Sector

Reform Programme, June, 2003. UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Legal Sector Reform Programme, Annual Progress Report

for the Implementation of the Legal Sector Reform (LSRP) for the Period July, 2006 to June, 2007.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Legal Sector Reform Programme, Terms of Reference for the Annual Review – Legal Sector Reform Programme, 2008.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Legal Sector Reform Programme: Medium Term Strategy for Years 2005/06 – 2007/08 (Volumes I, II & III), December, 2004.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Medium Term Strategy: Detailed Costed Work Plans, 2005.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Basket Funding Development Partners Concerning Implementation of the Legal Sector Reform Programme: Medium Term Strategy, Workplans and Cost Estimates, April, 2006.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), Dar es Salaam: Vice President’s Office, June, 2005.


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UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, Quick Start Project: Implementation Completion Report, June, 2005.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, The Report of the Judicial System Review Commission, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1977.

VOICE OF HAKI: Newsletter of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, June, 2007.

WOMEN LEGAL AID CENTRE, Tanzania Paralegal Profile, Dar es Salaam: WLAC (for Tanzania Paralegal Forum), August 2005.

WOMEN LEGAL AID CENTRE, Women’s Legal Aid Centre (WLAC) Annual Report 2006, Dar es Salaam: WLAC, June 2007.

WORLD BANK, Implementation Completion Report (IDA-24130) on a Credit in the Amount of SDRs 14.6 Million to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for a Financial and Legal Management Upgrading Project, January, 2001.

Legislation Examined by the Review Team

Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (Amendment) Act, 2001 (Act No. 16 of 2001).

Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (Appointments Procedure for Commissioners) Regulations, 2001 (Government Notice No. 89 of 11/05/2001).

Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (Complaints Handling Procedure) Regulations, 2001 (Government Notice No. 144 of 23/05/2003).

Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (Enquiries Procedure) Regulations, 2001 (Government Notice No. 145 of 23/05/2003).

Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act, 2001 (Act No. 7 of 2001). Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. Institute of Judicial Administration Lushoto Act, 1998 (Act No. 3 of 1998) [Cap 405 RE

2002]. Land Act, 1999 (Act No. 4 of 1999). Land Regulations, 2001 (Government Notice No. 71 of 04/05/2001). Law Reform Commission of Tanzania Act, 1980 (Act No. 11 of 1980) [Cap 171 RE 2002]. Law School of Tanzania Act, 2007 (Act No. 18 of 2007). Public Leadership Code of Ethics, 1995 (Act No. 13 of 1995). Village Land Act, 1999 (Act No. 5 of 1999).


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APPENDIX IV

List of Interviewees who Talked to the Review Team

Better Regulation Unit – BEST

LYIMO, Mr. Beda, Chief Executive Officer, Better Regulation Unit (BRU), Ministry of Planning, Economy & Empowerment, United Republic of Tanzania – 30th April, 2008.

RAJAB, Mr. Rajab H., Principal Legal Officer, Better Regulation Unit – BEST, Ministry of Planning, Economy & Empowerment, United Republic of Tanzania – 30th April, 2008.

Business Registration and Licensing Agency (BRELA)

MAHINGILA, Mr. Esteriano Emmanuel, Chief Executive Officer, Business Registration and Licensing Agency (BRELA), Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing, Dar es Salaam – 2nd May, 2008.

MASSAWE, Mr. Thomas A., Licensing Manager – Business Registration and Licensing Agency (BRELA), Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing, Dar es Salaam – 2nd May, 2008.

Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance

JAIRO, Ms. Rosemary, LSRP Link Officer, Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, United Republic of Tanzania – 29th April, 2008.

MSUYA, Ms. Upendo H., Executive Secretary, Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, United Republic of Tanzania –

Developing Partners

AGYEMAN-DUAH, Baffour Dr., Senior Governance Advisor, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 30th April, 2008.

BISEKO, Mr. Denis, Senior Public Sector Specialist, The World Bank, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 6th May, 2008.

DOERKEN, Axel, GTZ, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 21st April, 2008. JØRGENSEN, Mr. Nils Hedgard, Royal Danish Embassy, Dar es Salaam – 22nd April, 2008. KARNELL, Mr. Aron P, USAID, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 21st April, 2008. KARSTENSEN, Christian, Royal Danish Embassy, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 22nd April,

2008.


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KIERS, Mr. Gerald, Technical Adviser, Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC), Dar es Salaam – 28th April, 2008.

LANG, Ms. Ulrika, First Secretary (Governance & Human Rights), Embassy of Sweden, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 29th April, 2008.

LE BLANC, Mr. Olivier, Legal Sector Working Group Coordinator, Canadian Cooperation Office, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 21st April, 2008.

MNENEY, Mr. Donald, Procurement Specialist, World Bank, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 21st April, 2008.

MWALIMU, Ms. Ummy, Royal Danish Embassy, Dar es Salaam – 22nd April, 2008. MWENDA, Ms. Edith, World Bank, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 6th May, 2008. PENDAELI, Ms. Nora, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United

Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 21st April, 2008. REINHOLD, Ms. Mette, Royal Danish Embassy, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 22nd April,

2008. ROBERTS, Valery, DFID, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 21st April, 2008. RUGAMBWA, Ms. Margaret, Gender Equality Advisor, Canadian Cooperation Office, Dar

es Salaam, Tanzania – 21st April, 2008. RUTTA, Mr. Audax, Team Leader - Governance, Acting Assistant Resident Representative,

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 30th April, 2008.

SHAPIRO, Mr. Ian Shapiro, Senior Governance Advisor, DFID, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 21st April, 2008.

SIRRS, Mr. Reid, Chief of Cooperation, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 21st April, 2008. SWALES, Ms. Diana, Chief, Child Protection and Participation, UNICEF, Dar es Salaam,

Tanzania – 21st April, 2008. TJASSING, Ms. Mirjam, Second Secretary (Economic Affairs), Embassy of the Kingdom of

the Netherlands, Dar es Salaam – 30th April, 2008. TOUCHETTE, Mr. Jean, First Secretary (Development) and Governance Team Leader,

Canada High Commission, Dar es Salaam – 21st April, 2008.

Director of Public Prosecutions’ Office

FELESHI, Mr. Eliezer Mbuki, Director of Public Prosecutions, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 29th April, 2008.

KADURI, Mr. Lawrence, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 29th April, 2008.

KOROSSO, Ms. Winnie, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 29th April, 2008.


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MUNISI, Ms. Ama, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 29th April, 2008.

TIBASANA, Mr. Laurian, Consultant, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 29th April, 2008.

Faculty of Law - Mzumbe University

LUBENGO, Mr. Hillary, LSRP Link Officer, Faculty of Law, Mzumbe University, Mzumbe, Morogoro – 27th April, 2008.

Faculty of Law - Open University of Tanzania

KIHWELO, Mr. Paul F., Dean, Faculty of Law, Open University of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 2nd May, 2008.

KOLIMBA, Ms. Susan, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Open University of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 2nd May, 2008.

Faculty of Law - Ruaha University College

HAULE, Dr. Romuald, Lecturer, Ruaha University College (RUCO), Iringa – 26th April, 2008.

MGIMWA, Rev. Dr. Cephas, Principal, Ruaha University College (RUCO) – 26th April, 2008.

MWAIKASU, Hon. Mr. Justice (Retired) Raymond, Senior Lecturer, Ruaha University College (RUCO), Iringa – 26th April, 2008.

Faculty of Law - Tumaini University College

CHATURUEDI, Dr. Saurabh, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Tumaini University College – Iringa – 26th April, 2008.

KOHI, Mr. Mugendi F., Assistant Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Tumaini University College – Iringa – 26th April, 2008.

MWALKANGALI, Ms. Mpoki, Tutorial Assistant, Faculty of Law, Tumaini University College – Iringa – 26th April, 2008.

VISHWANADHAN, Mr. Lellala, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Tumaini University College – Iringa – 26th April, 2008.

Faculty of Law - University of Dar es Salaam

KIWENGE, Mr. Edmund, Accountant, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, University Main Campus – 2nd May, 2008.


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LYIMO, Ms. Consolata, Administrative Officer, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, University Main Campus – 2nd May, 2008.

MAPUNDA, Dr. Benedict T., LSRP Link Officer, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, University Main Campus – 2nd May, 2008.

MCHOME, Prof. Sifuni Ernest, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, University Main Campus – 2nd May, 2008.

TAIRO, Mr. Makarious, LSRP Link Officer, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, University Main Campus – 2nd May, 2008.

Judiciary of the United Republic of Tanzania

LUKUMAY, Mr. Zakayo N., Chief Training, Research & Statistics Officer, The Judiciary of the United Republic of Tanzania, Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 28th April, 2008.

MASATI, Hon. Mr. Justice Salum, the Principal Judge, High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam – 7th May, 2008.

MASSENGI, Mrs. Fatuma, Director of Primary Courts, Judiciary of the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam -

MBISE, Ms. Eliamani, Registrar, High Court of Tanzania, Commercial Court Division, Dar es Salaam – 28th April, 2008.

MHINI, Mr. Geofrey, Resident Magistrate, Iringa – 26th April, 2008. MOSHI, Ms. Judiciary- 28th April, 2008. MSUMI, Hon. Amir, Resident Magistrate, Morogoro – 26th April, 2008. MUSHI, Hon. Mr. Justice Emilian M.E., Justice of the High Court of Tanzania and

Principal, Institute of Judicial Administration, Lushoto - RAMADHANI, Hon. Mr. Justice Augustino S.L., the Chief Justice of the United Republic

of Tanzania, Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 14th May, 2008. RWAKIBARILA, Hon. G.K., Secretary, Council for Legal Education, High Court of

Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 22nd April, 2008. SHILLINDE, Mr. Wilbert – High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 22nd April, 2008. WAMBURA, Ms. Sophia, Registrar, Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 28th

April, 2008.

Law Reform Commission of Tanzania

JUMA, Prof. Ibrahim H., Chairman, Law Reform Commission, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 28th April, 2008.

MAKURU, Mrs. Crecencia, Executive Secretary, Law Reform Commission, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 28th April, 2008.

MDUNDO, Hon. William J.M., Commissioner, Law Reform Commission, United Republic of Tanzania – 28th April, 2008.

NALINGIGWA, Ms. Andisya A., State Attorney and LSRP Link Officer, Law Reform Commission, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 28th April, 2008.


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TINDWA, Mr. Halfani R., Accountant, Law Reform Commission, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 28th April, 2008.

Law School of Tanzania

NDIKA, Dr. Gerald A.M., Ag. Principal, Law School of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 2nd May, 2008.

Local Government Reform Programme

RAJPAR, Ms. Janne, Legal Advisor, Support to Local Government, German Technical Cooperation, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania -

SHAYO, Mr. Abraham, Manager, Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) – 23rd April, 2008.

LSRP – Programme Co-ordination Office (PCO)

LEIST, Mr. Ulrich, Chief Technical Adviser, Legal Sector Reform Programme, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 21st April, 2008.

MAYOGU, Mr. Benas, Procurement Specialist, Legal Sector Reform Programme Co-ordinator, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam –

MOTETE, Mr. Juvenalis, Legal Sector Reform Programme Co-ordinator, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 21st April, 2008.

PESSA, Mr. Anastasius, Accountant and Administrator, Legal Sector Reform Programme, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam –

Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs

AMANI, Mrs. Kulthum Mrs., Policy & Planning Specialist, Legal Sector Reform Programme Co-ordinator, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam –

MAKANI, Deodatha, Principal Administrative Officer (and LSRP Link Officer), Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Dar es Salaam – 7th May, 2008.

NGOLE, Mr. Omega, Communication Specialist, Legal Sector Reform Programme Co-ordinator, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam –

SALULA, Mr. Sazi, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Dar es Salaam – 29th April, 2008.

Ministry of Home Affairs


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MUSHI, Mr. F.W.P., Principal State Attorney and Registrar of Societies, Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar es Salaam – 29th April, 2008.

Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements

SINDA, Ms. Subira, Ag. Registrar of Titles, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development, Dar es Salaam – 30th April, 2008.

Non State Actors (NGOs)

KIJO-BISIMBA, Ms. Helen, Executive Director, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), Dar es Salaam – 24th April, 2008.

LEMA, Ms. Lois, Executive Director, Envirocare, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – 30th April, 2008.

MASHAMBA, Mr. J. Clement, National Organisation for Legal Assistance (NOLA), Dar es Salaam – 23rd April, 2008.

MMBANDO, Dismas, Representative, NOLA, Iringa, 26th April, 2008. NKONYA, Mr. Charles, National Organisation for Legal Assistance (NOLA), Dar es

Salaam – 23rd April, 2008.

President’s Office - Ethics Secretariat

IHEMA, Hon. Mr. Justice Steven, Chairman, The Ethics Secretariat, Office of the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 22nd April, 2008.

Prevention and Combat of Corruption Bureau (PCCB)

BARULO, Mr. Ernest K, Principal Investigator, Prevention and Combat of Corruption Bureau, President’s Office, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 5th May, 2008.

HOSEAH, Edward, Director General, Prevention and Combat of Corruption Bureau, President’s Office, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam – 5th May, 2008.

NKUKU, Mr. Elias M., Commissioner (Finance and Administration), Tanzania Prisons Service, Dar es Salaam – 5th May, 2008.

Registration, Insolvency & Trusteeship Agency (RITA)

HUDSON, Ms. Emmy K., Director of Legal Rights Protection, Registration, Insolvency & Trusteeship Agency (RITA), Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Dar es Salaam – 23rd April, 2008.

SALIBOKO, Mr. Phillip G., Ag. Chief Executive Officer, Registration, Insolvency & Trusteeship Agency (RITA), Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Dar es Salaam – 23rd April, 2008.

Tanganyika Law Society (TLS)


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MZIRAY, Ms. Cheggy C., Executive Secretary, Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), Dar es Salaam – 25th April, 2008.

RWECHUNGURA, Charles, Council Member, Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), Dar es Salaam – 25th April, 2008.

SAKIRA, Geoffrey, Continuing Education Director, Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), Dar es Salaam – 25th April, 2008.

TWAIB, Dr. Fauz, President, Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), Dar es Salaam – 25th April, 2008.

Tanzania Police Force

KIMARIO, Mr. J.C., Office of the Director of Criminal Investigation (DCI), Tanzania Police Force, Police Headquarters, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania – 29th April, 2008.

MAPUNDA, Ms. Elice A., Assistant Commissioner of Police and Commandant of Police College, Dar es Salaam – 13th May, 2008.

MKUMBO, Mr. G., INSP, SWAP Accountant, Tanzania Police Force, Police Headquarters, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania – 29th April, 2008.

MSANGI, Mr. Incharge of Prosecution, Morogoro – 26th April, 2008. MTWEVE, Mr. Clodwig M., Commissioner of Police (Administration and Finance),

Tanzania Police Force, Police Headquarters, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania – 29th April, 2008.

MUHUME, Mr. G., SSP, LSRP Link Officer – GD Co-ordinator, Tanzania Police Force, Police Headquarters, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania – 29th April, 2008.

NGASSA, Mr. Leonard B., ASP, Link Officer, Tanzania Police Force, Police Headquarters, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania – 29th April, 2008.

NGONYANI, Mr. P.M., Public Prosecutor, Tanzania Police Force, Morogoro Town – 26th April, 2008.

NYAMUHANGA, Mr. Albert, SSP, LSRP Link Officer – Planning and M & E, Tanzania Police Force, Police Headquarters, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania – 29th April, 2008.

Tanzania Prisons Service

CHAMBUSO, Dr. Salum A., Deputy Commissioner (Medical), Tanzania Prisons Service, Dar es Salaam – 5th May, 2008.

CHAMULESILE, Mr. Dionece L., Deputy Commissioner (Construction), Tanzania Prisons Service, Dar es Salaam – 5th May, 2008.

GULAKA, Mr. John M., Senior Assistant Commissioner (Planning), Tanzania Prisons Service, Dar es Salaam – 5th May, 2008.

MINJA, Mr. John C., Deputy Commissioner of Prisons and Head of Prisons Security and Legal Matters, Prisons Headquarters Dar es Salaam – 2nd May, 2008.


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NANYARO, Mr. Augustino N., Principal Commissioner, Tanzania Prisons Service, Dar es Salaam – 5th May, 2008.


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APPENDIX V

Participants at the Stakeholder’s Annual Review Workshop – Dar es Salaam, 12th

May, 2008

S/N NAME INSTITUTION

1. AGREMAN-DUAH, Baffor UNDP, Dar es Salaam 2. ALOYCE, Vistus Uhuru na Mzalendo Newspapers, Dar es Salaam 3. AMANI, Kulthum LSRP, Dar es Salaam 4. BILABAYE, Paul NBMM, Dar es Salaam 5. CHAMBUA, Geoffrey TGNP, Dar es Salaam 6. DE MELLO, Joaquinne Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), Dar es Salaam 7. HOSSEA, Ephraim TASAF, Dar es Salaam 8. HUDSON, Emmy K. RITA, Dar es Salaam 9 JACOBSGAARD, Mette LSRP – Review Team – Member

10. JAIRO, Rosemary Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, Dar es Salaam

11. JOHN, Moses Radio Tumaini, Dar es Salaam 12. JORGENSEN, Nils Hedegard Embassy of Denmark, Dar es Salaam 13. JUMA, Ibrahim H. Law Reform Commission, Dar es Salaam 14. JUSTO, Dotto NOLA, Dar es Salaam 15. KARNELL, Mr. Aron P, USAID, Dar es Salaam 16. KARSTENSEN, Christian Embassy of Denmark, Dar es Salaam 17. KATO, Genoveva TAWLA, Dar es Salaam 18. KESSY, Mgonela Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Dar es Salaam 19 KHOR, Jennifer LSRP – Review Team – Member

20. KIERS, Gerald Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC), Dar es Salaam 21. KIGENDI, Maige Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Dar es Salaam 22 KIHWELO, Paul F. Open University of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 23. KITAMBI, Rehema BRELA, Dar es Salaam 24. LACHA, Sebastian P. Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar es Salaam 25. LANG, Ulrika Embassy of Sweden, Dar es Salaam 26. LAURENT, Joel Tanzania Education Authority (TEA), Dar es Salaam 27. LeBLANC, Olivier Legal Sector Working Group (LSWG) 28. LUBENGO, Hilary Faculty of Law, Mzumbe University, Morogoro 29. LUBINZA, Joseph Mtanzania Daima, Newspapers, Dar es Salaam 30. LYIMO, Catherine ENVIROCARE, Dar es Salaam 31. MADATA, Singi R. State House, Dar es Salaam


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32 MAINA, Wachira LSRP – Review Team – Deputy Leader 33. MANENTO, A.R. Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, Dar

es Salaam 34. MASSENGI, Fatuma Judiciary, Dar es Salaam 35. MATERU, Reginald Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), Dar es Salaam 36. MAWALLA, Haika CCBRT, Dar es Salaam 37. MAYAO, Vickness MCDGC, Dar es Salaam 38. MAYEJI, Emmanuel H. LSRP, Dar es Salaam 39. MAYOGU, B.S. Legal Sector Reform Programme – Coordination Office, Dar

es Salaam 40. MBISE, Eliamani Judiciary, Dar es Salaam 41 MELYOKI, Lemayon

Lemilia LSRP – Review Team – Member

42. MFUNDO, Epiphania Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, Dar es Salaam

43. MLAWI, Susan P. Cabinet Secretariat, Dar es Salaam 44. MLAY, African CIDA, Dar es Salaam 45. MOSHI, Sekela Judiciary, Dar es Salaam 46. MOTETE, Juvenalis LSRP Coordination Office, Dar es Salaam 48. MSUYA, Upendo Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, Dar

es Salaam 49. MUNISI, Ama Director of Public Prosecutions’ Office 50. MWAIMU, Mathew Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Dar es Salaam 51. MWALIMU, Ummy Embassy of Denmark, Dar es Salaam 52. MWANYIKA, Johnson P.M. Attorney General’s Chambers, Dar es Salaam 53. NDIKA, Gerald A.M. Law School of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 54. NGOLE, Omega LSRP Coordination Office, Dar es Salaam 55. NJELEKELA, K.P. Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam 56. NYONI, A.M. Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar es Salaam 57. PESSA, Anastasius LSRP Coordination Office (PCO) 58. PETER, Chris Maina LSRP – Review Team – Team Leader 59. RAJAB, Rajab H. BRU, Dar es Salaam 60. REINHOLDT, Mette Embassy of Denmark, Dar es Salaam 61. REVOKATI, Katrina Commercial Court, Dar es Salaam 62. ROBERTS, Valerie DFID, Dar es Salaam 63. RUGAMBWA, Margaret CIDA, Dar es Salaam 64. RUSS, Hagar DFID, Dar es Salaam 65. RWAKIBARILA, Gabriel K. Judiciary, Dar es Salaam 66. RWECHUNGURA, Charles Tanganyika Law Society, Dar es Salaam 67. SALULA, Sazi Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Dar es Salaam 68. SAMBULE, Gella RITA, Dar es Salaam 69. SAYI, Christina Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Dar es Salaam


94

70. SEKA, John Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), Dar es Salaam 71. SHAMUMEZO, Habraham LSRP 72. SHAPIRO, Ian DFID, Dar es Salaam 73. SHONGA, William M.J. Judiciary, Dar es Salaam 74. SIMBANO, Hamidu J. BRU, Dar es Salaam 75. SUKA, Lucas President’s Office – Ethics Secretariat, Dar es Salaam 76. SWALES, Diane UNICEF, Dar es Salaam 77. TOUCHETTE, Jean Canadian High Commission/ CIDA, Dar es Salaam 78. TWAIB. Fauz Tanganyika Law Society, Dar es Salaam 79. WAMBALI, Ferdinand Judiciary, Dar es Salaam 80. WARD, Michael LSRP – Review Team – Member

APPENDIX VI

KRA Progress to Date Reported Against MTS (April, 2008

KRA1: National Legal Framework Progress to Date Outcome 1: Improved Legal Environment for Enhanced Social Justice, Safety and Economic Development Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities

Performance Indicators

Sub - Activities Responsible Agency

REVIEW TEAM FINDINGS

Priority legislation and action plan approved by 31st January 2005.

A: 1.1 Identify, prioritize and develop an action plan for harmonizing and updating business related legislation

LRCT,MJCA,LEGAL REGISTRIES/ CTI, TCCIA, PO- RALG/LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS/JUDICIARY/NGO

Output 1: Priority legislation enabling growth of business Sector in Tanzania Identified and defined, reviewed, updated and harmonised

A: 1 Define and harmonize priority laws that enable growth of business sector

Number of amendments/Acts gazetted by 31st December 2007

A:1.2 Draft and adopt amendments/new legislation

LRCT/CABINET SECRETARIET,MJCA,LEGAL REGISTRIES/ CTI, TCCIA, PO- RALG/LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS/JUDICIARY/NGO

Some activities under BEST Business Names Registration Ordinance reviewed (Tsh 7,966,000 used for stakeholder meeting)

Output 2 A: 2. List of laws and A: 2.1 Identify LRCT/NGOs/POL Laws have been identified and an action


96

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




laws, and define an action plan for review of the laws that impede justice to disadvantaged groups.

ICE/MJCA/CABINET SECRETARIET/PRISONS/JUDICIARY/MLYSD-SWD/LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

Laws impeding justice to disadvantaged groups identified reviewed and amended

Identify laws, review and Amend laws that improve justice to the disadvantaged

action plan approved by 31st March, 2005. Amendments of Penal Laws and Procedures Gazetted by 30/06/07

A:2.2 Review and harmonize the laws

LRCT/NGOs/POLICE/MJCA/CABINET SECRETARIET/PRISONS/JUDICIARY/MLYSD-SWD/LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

plan has been developed. Studies and discussion papers: i) Local Customary Laws reviewed (although only patrilineal covered need to also look at matrilineal) Planned stakeholders consultation will be funded by government not under LSRP ii) Death penalty, corporal punishment and long term sentences laws iii) Final report on the law on persons with disabilities in Tanzania (no funds from LSRP) iv) Position paper on civil justice system review developed and disseminated under BEST, consultations have been held v) Court of appeal rules position paper developed vi) Khadis courts research undertaken as reference from AG’s office Tsh 41 million government funds plus 39.9 million from LSRP


97

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




LSRP funds provided in June 2007, advised could not rollover, used for retreat to finalize report and stakeholder workshop vii) Advocates Act and legal aid laws are being examined

Output 3 Penal Laws and systems updated

A:3 Update the penal law and systems

Amendment of laws and procedures Gazetted by 30th June 2007

A: 3.1. Identify, prioritise, and develop action plan for harmonizing and updating Penal Laws

LRCT/NGOs/POLICE/MJCA/CABINET SECRETARIET/PRISONS/JUDICIARY/MLYSD-SWD/LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

No progress to report

Outcome 2: Streamlined and strengthened prosecution and investigation system Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




A:1.1 Define a harmonised unified and civilianised national prosecution system for the country

MJCA Done Study tours to various jurisdictions informed development of DPP to Uganda, Zanzibar, South Africa and United Kingdom (LRSP funds)

Output 1: Harmonised unified and civilianised national prosecution system

A:1 Harmonise, unify and civilianise the national prosecution system

A harmonized unified and civilianised national prosecution system for the country defined A: 1.2 Draft and MJCA/CAB Enactment of the National Prosecution


98

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




by 30/09/05

enact legislative amendments or new laws for enabling a harmonised unified and civilianised national prosecution system

INET SECRETARIET

Service Act (NPSA) 30 January 2008 Consequential amendments to 21 other laws arising from the enactment of NPSA

National Prosecution authority established by 30/06/07

established

Action plan implemented from July 07

A:2.3 Establish a national prosecution Authority and implement action plan

MJCA Done, action plan being implemented Recruitment and training of 157 new attorneys funded by MCA not LSRP Office equipment purchased under LSRP for 6 pilot regions (Dar es Salaam, Shinyanga, Mwanza, Arusha, Tanga, Songea) Vehicles identified for procurement (4 minibuses and 5 cars) not yet procured under LSRP as bundled

Output 2 Investigation system modernised and strengthened

A:2. Strengthen and modernise investigation system

50% of all investigators trained by 30th

A:2.1 Define Training Programme

POLICE/TEAM, PCB, TRA, CHRAGG

Needs assessment conducted in Dar es Salaam by Police as pilot study, funded by government (Tsh 50 or 80 million?) Training provided for 195 police officers and other investigators (Tsh 29 million) Investigators from other investigating


99

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




agencies also benefited from this training Confirm with police report Peter has hardcopy

2.2.2 Identify investigation tools to be modernised

POLICE/PCB/TRA

Initial agreement with UNDP to provide for this but upon review determined could not support. Therefore returned to LSRP basket for implementation. Tsh 152 million for purchase of video cameras: not yet completed Confirm with police report Peter has hardcopy

30% of investigation tools modernized

All procedures governing investigations harmonised to Gender, HIV Human Rights and other social developments

A: 2.3 Revised laws governing investigations procedures and harmonize with Gender, HIV, Human Rights and other social development

POLICE. MJCA/CABINET SECRETARIAT

No progress reported

Outcome 3: Strengthened capacity for legal research and studies/review on the national legal framework Targeted Outputs Main/Key

Activities Performance Indicators




100

Targeted Outputs Main/Key Activities




At least 5 legal research reports each year

A: 1.1 Conduct legal research/ studies

LRCT

At least 5 persons trained per annum

A: 1.2 Implement training programme

LRCT

Implementation of Phase reviewed by 30/09/06

A:1.3 Review implementation of phase II

LRCT

Phase III designed adopted by 31/12/06

A:1.4 Design and adopt phase III of LRCT project

LRCT

Output 1: Phase III of the capacity building project for the LRCT implemented

A:1 Prepare and implement Phase III

Phase III implemented from Jan 07

A:1.5 Implement phase III from July 2006

LRCT


Output 2. Work plan for legal research and studies on the National Legal Framework adopted and implemented

A:2. Develop, adopt and implement a work plan for review of national legal framework

Work plan adopted and implemented

A: 1.1 Develop work plans for review of national legal framework

MJCA/TEAM, LRCT/LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS/OTHER MDAS

Being implemented

Output 3 Programme for strengthening legislative processing

A:3 Design, adopt and implement a capacity building programme for

Programme designed and adopted by 30/06/06

A:3.1 Design a capacity building programme for legislative

MJCA Agreed training to be provided outside Tanzania, no other progress to report


101





processing agencies

agencies designed and implemented

legislative processing agencies A: 3.2

Implement programme

MJCA/CABINET SECRETARIAT/OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER/ GOT, PRINTERS


Key Result Area 2: Access to Justice for Poor and Disadvantaged Progress to Date Outcome 1: Improve Access to Justice for persons in remand homes and prisons Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




A: 1.1Complile a list all pending long term cases screened

JUDICIARY


Output 1 Cases Screened by magistrates in Remand Homes and Prisons

A:1 Screen cases of Accused Persons and Prisoners in Remand Homes and Prisons

At least 30% pending cases screened each year A:1.2 Visit remand

homes and prisons conduct interviews, prepare and submit inquiry report on long term pending cases

JUDICIARY


Output 2 Custodian limits reviewed

A: 2. Review of custodian limits laws

Legislative amendment gazetted by 30th June 07

A:2.1 Review Custodian laws, adopt and gazette new custodial Limit

JUDICIARY, PRISONS, MJCA, POLICE, SOCIAL WELFARE, CHRAGG, MLYSD, NGO


Output 3 Available transport facilities for prisons, remand homes

A: 3. Procure transport facilities

At least 5 Vehicles purchased and distributed per year

A: 3.1 Assess and prioritize needs for transport in remand homes, prisons, and approved schools

PRISONS, MLYSD

Transportation needs assessment done by Prisons with government funds not under LSRP


103

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




and approved schools

A:3 .2 Procure and distribute at least 5 motor vehicles/institution annually

PRISONS, MLYSD


Output 4 Guidelines for handling of cases of disadvantaged groups for all justice administrators issued

A:4 Prepare and issue Guidelines for handling cases for disadvantaged groups for all justice administrators

Circular by Chief Justice issued and circulated by 31st March 06

A:4.1 Prepare, adopt and guidelines

JUDICIARY Transport for remandees (prisons) not under LSRP, govt is proceeding with own transportation purchases (Tsh 1 billion 2006-07, launch May08) MoHSW requested a vehicle for the Mbeya School more than a year ago (procurement issues/bundled)

Approved Training program by 31st July 06

A:5.1 Design training program

JUDICIARY /EXPERTS


Output 5 Justice Administrators trained on the speedy dispensation of justice for the poor and unrepresented

A:5 Train Justice Administrators in speedy dispensation of justice for the poor and unrepresented

2. At least 30% of justice administrators trained annually

A:5.2 Conduct at least 2 training sessions annually

JUDICIARY,MJCA, MLYSD-SWD, POLICE, PRISONS, &TRAINING INSTITUTIONS



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Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




Primary Courts the case flow management committees established

A:6 .1 Establish Primary Courts the case flow management committees

JUDICIARY No progress reported

Output 6 Flow management committee for primary court established and reactivated Case at the District Court and higher levels

A:6 Establish Primary Courts Case Flow Management Committees and reactivate the District and higher levels

Case Flow Management Committees at the District courts and higher levels reactivated

A:6.2 Reactivate Case Flow Management Committees at the District courts and higher levels

JUDICIARY, AGC, PRISONS & POLICE

Judiciary reported Committees are there

A:7.1 Prepare training Manual and program

JUDICIARY Output 7 Case flow management capacities strengthened

A:7 Training case flow management committee members

At least 300 trained in management committees

A :7.2 Train at least 100 case flow management committee members (annually)

JUDICIARY, MJCA, PRISONS, POLICE


Output 8 Streamlined and interlinked cases flow management system

A:8 Establish, interlink and stream line Case tracking mechanism

Streamlined, interlinked case tracking mechanism established by 30/06/08

A:8.1. Define streamlined, interlinked case tracking mechanism

JUDICIARY Not happening under LSRP, although PCO and judiciary attempting to coordinate with Investment Climate Facility (ICF) which is interested in providing computers/assist with modernization of judiciary (signed agreement May 12, 2008). Dar es Salaam will be a pilot project


105

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




TORs on case management, IT needs, ADR, commercial training issued under BEST in 2006 in various stages of procurement

A:8.2. Adopt and disseminate

JUDICIARY No progress reported

A:8.3. Institutionalize streamlined interlinked case monitoring mechanism

JUDICIARY, AGC, PRISONS & POLICE


Outcome 2: Enhanced legal aid and dissemination of legal information Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




Output 1: Efficacy for establishing the legal aid literacy network assessed and modalities defined

A:1 Assess the Efficacy for Establishing legal aid literacy network

Modalities established by 30th June 06

A: 1.1 Assess the efficacy for establishing legal aid/ literacy network and develop modalities

JUDICIARY

No progress reported: Lack of clarity regarding when it was determined that network under WILDAF (MC funds) was not overlapping with this activity may have affected implementation. Coordinator, NOLA, indicated had never been advised regarding approval of workplan to proceed with this activity.


106

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




A: 1.2 Adopt Modalities

JUDICIARY/EXPERTS/NGO

No progress reported per above

A:1.3 Establish legal aid/literacy network

JUDICIARY/EXPERTS,NGOS


A:2.1 Procure office equipment s

NGOS No progress reported per above Output 2 Equipped and staffed legal aid secretariat

A:2 Equip and recruit staff for the Legal Aid Network Secretariat

Number of staff recruited and equipment for the secretariat by 30th June 06

A:2.2 Recruitment staff

NGO No progress reported per above

A:3.1 Prepare code of conduct and procedures and manual

LEGAL AID SECRETARIAT/TEAM


A: 3.2 Adopt code of conduct and Legal Aid/ Literacy Manual



Output 3 Code of conduct for members of the network and procedures for legal aid and literary issued

A:3 Prepare, adopt and disseminate code of conduct for network members

Approved code of conduct and Legal Aid/ Literacy Manual 30th June 06

A:3.3 Print and Distribute 1,000 copies of approved code of conduct and 4,000 Legal Aid/ Literacy Manuals

NGO AND JUDICIARY/TEAM/SUPPLIERS


Output 4 Legal aid fund Launched

A:4 Establish and launch legal aid fund

Legal aid fund established and launched 31st Dec 07

A:4.1 Establish and launch a legal aid fund

LEGAL AID SECRETARIET

No progress reported per above BUT NGOs/CSOs and TLS continue to provide legal aid as normal activities


107

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




(no support from LSRP) TLS Legal Aid Day: 10 November 2007 Held in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Tabora, Mwanza, Arusha and Kilimanjaro over 1000 people provided legal advice, approximately 300 legal aid cases taken on by TLS members from that day, increased profile of TLS to public in providing legal aid (LSRP supported, not originally in MTS, Tsh 21 million) TLS Council passed resolution that Legal Aid Day be conducted annually every 2nd week of November through out the country

A:5.1. Assess needs for establishing regional and district ward legal aid groups and centres

LEGAL AID SECRETARIET


A:5. 2 Secure office premises and equipment

LEGAL AID SECRETARIAT & NGOS


Output 5 Legal aid groups and centres established at regional district and ward

A:5.1.Establish regional, district and ward legal aid groups and centres and train trainers of paralegals

At 30% of the legal aid groups and centres established with trained trainers of paralegals annually

A:5.3 Recruit staff LEGAL No progress reported per above


108

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




for the legal aid groups and canters

AID SECRETARIAT & NGOS

A: 5. 4 Train trainers of paralegals for at least the 30% centres established annually

LEGAL AID SECRETARIAT & NGOS


A:6.1 Develop legal literacy packages for literacy groups

LEGAL AID SECRETARIAT

No progress reported per above Output 6 Legal IEC packages for legal literacy groups developed

A:6.1. Develop and distribute legal IEC materials

Legal IEC packages for legal literacy groups identified and disseminated by 31 Dec,07

A:6.2 Print and disseminate 10 different Legal IEC packages

LEGAL AID SECRETARIAT/SUPPLIERS


A:7.1. Asses the efficacy for introducing basic human rights subjects in civics syllabus

MJCA MOEC/TEAM


Output 7: Efficacy for introducing basic human right aspect in the civics syllabus assessed and training or educating institutions

A:7 Assess the efficacy and introduce basic human right subjects in civics syllabus and inoculate training and educating institutions

Basic human rights subject identified by 30th Sept 05

A:7.2. Adopt modalities for introduction of basic human rights subjects in civics

MJCA MOEC/TEAM



109

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




syllabus inoculated A: 7.3. Introduce basic human right subjects in civics syllabus

MJCA/ MOEC


Output 8: Revised syllabus and curriculum of teachers training college s and schools

A:8. Revise and prepare the syllabus and the curriculum for teachers, training colleges

Revised Syllabus and curriculum for teachers training colleges by 30th June 07

A: 8.1 Profile the nature and scope of work done by NGO in training paralegal and dissemination of information

LEGAL AID SECRETARIAT & NGO/TEAM


550,0000 copies of translated basic statutes printed and distributed annually

A:9.1 Identify basic statutes translation of basic statute into simple Swahili language and Braille

MJCA/EXPERT


Output 9 Basic Statutes and Legal Information identified and translated and distributed

A:9. Translate basic statutes and legal information

A:9.2 Print and distribute translated statutes and Legal Information

MJCA/SUPPLIERS


Output 10 Training program,

A:10 Train paralegals and publish paralegal

Training programs , manuals and

A: 10.1. prepare training programs , manuals and

JUDICIARY, MJCA/TEA



110

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




module prepared by 30th June 07

module M

Paralegal Training Fund established 100 Paralegal trainers trained by 30th June 06

A:10.2 Establish Training fund for grants to NGO for training paralegals


manual and modules for paralegals

activities through the media.

Paralegal activities published through media by 30th June 08

A:10.3 Publicize paralegal activities through media

NGO, JUDICIARY & TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

Outcome 3: Improved access to justice in the rural areas Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




A:1.1. Define a programme of assistance for Ward Tribunals

JUDICIARY/PO-RALG

A:1.2.Adopt the programme

JUDICIARY/PORLG

Output 1: Programme of assistance for enhancing efficiency of ward tribunals in administering justice defined and implemented

A:1 Define and implement Programme of assistance for enhancing efficiency of ward tribunals in administering justice

Programme assistance adopted by 31/03/06 and implemented from July 06

A:1.3.Implement the Programme

JUDICIARY/PORLG

No reported progress

Output 2: A:2. Construct Construct 15 in A:2.1. JUDICIAR No funds used under LSRP yet


111

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




rehabilitate and equip selected primary courts

Arusha and Manyara 31 primary courts in other Regions constructed and equipped by 30th June, 08

Construct at least 10 primary courts annually

Y /LGA Selected primary courts Constructed/rehabilitated, equipped

Rehabilitate 19 primary courts rehabilitated by June 08

A:2.2 Rehabilitation of 6primary courts annually

JUDICIARY /LGA

However, judiciary has been proceeding with activities under this output with government funds 28 Primary Courts Constructed & 14 in construction by Govt Funds 82 Primary Courts Rehabilitated & 6 being rehabilitated by Govt Funds 7 Primary Courts Constructed & 10 being Constructed through Community Effort 2007-08 LSRP plans: 3 Primary Courts identified for construction 4 Primary Courts identified for rehabilitation

Outcome 4: Improved Custodian and Court Facilities for Juvenile Offenders Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities


Sub - Activities Action By REVIEW TEAM FINDINGS


112

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities



Output 1: Mbeya approved schools rehabilitated, expanded

A:1 rehabilitate expand and equip Mbeya approved schools

Mbeya approved schools rehabilitated, expanded and equipped by 30th June 06

A:1.1 Rehabilitate and equip Mbeya Approved School

MLYSD – SWD MoHSW have received Tsh140m(on 22/06/07) for the rehabilitation of Mbeya School for Juvenile offenders Notified by PCO not to spend, then advised could spend Tender documents prepared and submitted to the Ministerial Tender Board for Review

A:2.1 Construct and equip at least 1 remand homes for each zone in 5 Zones

MLYSD – SWD No progress reported MoHSW: Estimate that there are some 720 juveniles currently in remand along with adults.

Output 2: Remand homes at zonal level constructed/ rehabilitated and equipped

A:2 Construct 5 remand homes at Zonal Levels and rehabilitate 6 and equip

5 remand homes at Zonal Levels constructed and 6 rehabilitated and equipped

A:2.2 Rehabilitate 2 and equip 2 remand homes per year

MLYSD As above

Output 3: Facilities of juvenile offender in police stations

A:3 Provide facilities for Juveniles in police stations

At least 30% of police custodies with facilities for juvenile offenders by 30/06/08

A: 3.1. Provide facilities for Juveniles in at least 10% of police stations annually

POLICE FORCE TORs for consultant re needs assessment drafted


113

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities



Output 4: Correctional policies/criminal justice policies and legal framework reviewed to address key issues for juvenile justices

A:4.1 Profile Juvenile justice administration in Correctional and criminal justice policies and legal framework

Juvenile Justice profiled in Correctional and criminal justice policies and legal framework

A:4.1 Profile Juvenile justice administration in Correctional and criminal justice policies and legal framework

MJCA,MLYSD, MOHA


A:5.1 Identify scope and nature of IEC programmes available and define a mechanism to provide accessible community outreach programme

MLYD/LGA /NGO

No progress reported Output 5: Comprehensive juvenile justice information education and communication Juvenile Rights and Obligations defined and implemented

A:5.1 Define and implement comprehensive juvenile justice information education and communication Juvenile Rights and Obligations

Comprehensive juvenile justice information education and communication Juvenile Rights and Obligations defined by 30/06/06 and implemented from July 06

A:5.2 Adopt and implement the IEC programmes

MLYD/LGA /NGO



114

Key Result Area 3: Human Rights and Administrative Justice Progress to Date Outcome 1: Law Enforcement Agencies Observe Human Rights



Sub - Activities Responsible Agency REVIEW TEAM FINDINGS

A: 1.1 Prepare guidelines on observance of human rights

CHRAGG, JUDICIARY, POLICE, PRISONS AND MJCA


Guidelines adopted and issued

A: 1.2 Adopt and issue


Output 1: Guidelines on observance of human rights by law enforcement officers issued

A:1 Prepare and issue guidelines on observance of human rights by law enforcement officers

50, 000 copies of Guidelines disseminated

A:1.3 Print and disseminate 50,000 copies of guidelines



A: 2.1 Prepare, simplified English booklets of procedures of law enforcement agencies



50,000Simplified English booklets printed and disseminated A:2.2 Print and disseminate

500,000 copies


Outputs 2: Simplified booklets of procedures of Law enforcement officers agencies printed and disseminated

A: 1 Prepare, print and disseminate simplified booklets of procedures of law enforcement agencies

500,000 Swahili booklets disseminated

A:2.3 Translate simplified English booklets into Kiswahili language




115




A:2.4 Print and disseminate 500,000 copies of simplified Kiswahili booklets


A:3.1 Design a training programme on observance of human rights by law enforcement officers

CHRAGG From their recurrent budget, CHRAGG is conducting human rights monitoring of police stations No funding provided by LSRP

Training Programme designed and adopted by 30/06/07

A:3.2 Adopt training programme on observance of human rights by law enforcement officers

CHRAGG/EXPERTS


Output3: Training programme on observance of human rights by law enforcement officers designed, adopted and implemented

A:3. Prepare, adopt and implement a training and implement programme on observance of human rights

Train at least 100 law enforcement officer trained in ach year from July 07

A:3.3 Train at least 100 law enforcement officers trained in ach year from Jan 07



A:4.1 Establish a comprehensive national information education and communication on basic Human Rights awareness

CHRAGG From their recurrent budget, CHRAGG is conducting human is running public education campaigns.

Outputs 4: Comprehensive national education and communication on basic Human Rights awareness established and implemented

A:4 Establish and implement comprehensive national information education and communication on basic Human Rights

Human Rights awareness designed and adopted by 30/06/06

A:4.2 Adopt information education and communication on basic

CHRAGG



116




Human Rights awareness

TV/Redio programmes, newsletters, and booklets on Human Rights

A:4.3 Prepare and disseminate Human Rights awareness TV, Radio Programmes and booklets

CHRAGG No progress reported

Outcome 2: Strengthened Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance

Targeted Outputs

Key Activities Performance Indicators

Sub - Activities Responsible Agency(ies)


Output 1: Report writing skilled staff for CHRAGG and NGOs

A:1 Train 50 CHRAGG and NGOs’ staff in report writing skills each year

50 Staff trained in report writing skills each year by June 07

A:1.1 Train 50 CHRAGG and NGO staff in report writing skills

CHRAGG, NGOS No progress reported

At least 25% prisons and police custodial visited per year

A:2.1. Visit at least 25% prisons and police custodies annually

CHRAGG, NGOS No progress reported

Outputs: 2: Human Rights observance by law enforcement agencies monitored

A: 2 Monitor human rights observance by law enforcement officers

100 Annual Prisons and Police Custodial Reports published and distributed

A: 2.2 Publish and distribute 100 annual Prisons, Police Custodial reports


Outputs 3: Dispute Resolution Skills for Commissioners and Assistant

A: 3 Train Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners of CHRAGG in dispute

7 Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners trained

A:3.1 Train 7 Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners on dispute resolution skills



117

Targeted Outputs




Commissioners resolution skills A:4.1 Design a computerized complaints management mechanism

CHRAGG

A:4.2 Adopt a computerized complaints management mechanism

CHRAGG

Output4: Computerized Complaints Management System designed and installed

A:4 Design and install Computerized Complaints Management System

Computerized Complaints Management System installed by 30/07/08

A:4.3 Install and launch a computerised complaints management mechanism

CHRAGG


A: 5.1 Conduct Service Delivery Survey

CHRAGG/ No progress reported

A:5.2 Review MTS Plan and Client Service Charter for CHRAGG


Outputs5: Medium Term Strategic Plan and client service charter reviewed

A: 5 Review MTS Plan and Client Service Charter for CHRAGG

MTS Plan 2008-2010, Client Service Charters for 2008 developed and adopted and 1,000,000 copies Clients Service Charters

A:5.3 Adopt MTS Plan and Client Service Charter for CHRAGG and disseminate 1,000,000Client Service Charter for CHRAGG


Outcome 3: Enhanced Good Governance in Administration of Justice

Targeted Outputs

Key Activities




Output 1: A: 1. Simplify Simplified A:1.1 Prepare simplified ALL SECTOR No progress reported


118

Targeted Outputs

Key Activities




procedures for sector institutions

INSTITUTIONS procedures adopted and published by 30/06/07

A:1.2 Adopt simplified procedures for sector institutions

ALL SECTOR INSTITUTIONS

Procedures for legal sector institution simplified, translated into Kiswahili/simple languages and disseminated

sector institution procedures simplified, translated into Kiswahili/simple languages

Simplified Procedures translated and disseminated by 30/06/07

A:1.3 Translate into Kiswahili simplified procedures for sector institutions



Output 2: Posters and suggestion boxes installed in all legal sector institutions

A:2 Prepare and install posters and suggestion boxes in legal sector institutions

At least 50,000 Installed posters and suggestion boxes

A:2.1 Install at least 50,000 posters and suggestion boxes in legal sector institutions



Output 3: Guidelines for lodging complaints against misuse of powers and unethical conducts by institutions personnel issued and disseminated

A:3 Prepare, issue and disseminate guidelines for lodging complaints misuse of powers and unethical conducts

Guidelines for Lodging complaints issued and disseminated by 30/06/06

A:3.1 Prepare guidelines for lodging complaints


Terms of reference for obtaining a Consultant have been prepared by CHRGG and submitted to the World Bank for a no objection. A no objection was thereafter obtained and the next step was to place in the papers a call for expressions of interests. (JPIRC Progress Report, February 2008)


119

Targeted Outputs

Key Activities




A:3.2 Adopt and disseminate the guidelines


Output 4: Client Service Charter aligned with simplified procedure

A:4.Review and align Client Service Charters with simplified procedures

At least 30% per annum Client Service Charters for Sector Institutions aligned to simplified Procedures aligned and

A:4.1 Align at least 30% Client Service Charters with simplified procedures per annum



Output 5: Media announcements on the simplified procedures and service by the legal sector institutions in place

A:5 Announce simplified procedures and services by legal sector institutions in the media

At least 30% institutions with Radio/TV Programmes and newspaper announcements

A:5.1 Prepare and air Radio/TV programmes and announce in newspapers



Outcome 4: Coordinated and Organized Administrative Justice System

Targeted Outputs





120

Targeted Outputs




A:1.I Prepare a basic set of procedures and guidelines for administrative Tribunal operations

MJCA Procedures prepared and adopted

A:1.2 Gazette basic set of procedures

MJCA


Basic set of procedures gazetted

Output 1: Basic Set of Procedures and Guidelines for Administrative Tribunals operations prepared, adopted and disseminated

A:1 Prepare, adopt and disseminate basic set of procedures and guidelines for administrative tribunal operations

Disseminate 200 copies of basic sets of procedures

A:1.3 Disseminate 200 copies of basic set of procedures.

MJCA

Programme of Assistance adopted and launched by 30/06/06

A:2.1 Design and adopt a programme of assistance for strengthening administrative tribunals

MJCA / No progress reported

Programme of Assistance institutionally mainstreamed by 31st March 2007

A:2.2 Mainstream the Programme to relevant agencies and institutions

MJCA/ ADMISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS

Output 2: Programme of Assistance for strengthening administrative Tribunals designed and implemented

A:2 Design and implement a programme of assistance for strengthening administrative tribunals

Programme of Assistance implemented from July 2007

A:2.3 Implement the Programme

ALL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS


121

Key Result Area 4: Knowledge and Skills for Legal Professionals Progress to Date Outcome 1: Legal Education and Training Institutions Poised to Deliver Quality Legal Training

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities


Sub-Activities Responsible Agencies


Amendment of Advocates Act gazetted

A: 1.1 Amend Advocates Act to establish CLE Permanent Secretariat

MJCA/JUDICIARY/CLE

Permanent Secretariat for CLE established

A: 1.2 Establish CLE Permanent Secretariat

MJCA/CLE

No. of Equipment and facilities Procured

A: 1.3 Secure and furnish office accommodation

JUDICIARY/CLE

No of Staff Recruited

A: 1.4 Procure and install necessary equipment and facilities

JUDICIARY/CLE

LRCT indicated was reviewing Advocates Act (TLS has previously submitted recommendations for revision of Advocates Act before LSRP no progress to report) With respect to Council of Legal Education Permanent Secretariat: No progress reported

Output 1: CLE Permanent Secretariat established, equipped and staffed

A: 1 Establish, equip and staff Permanent Secretariat for CLE

Office accommodation secured

A:1.5 Recruit Staff for the Permanent Secretariat

JUDICIARY/CLE

A: 2.1 Develop programme for capacity building

JUDICIARY, CLE

No progress reported Output 2: Programme for strengthening capacity of CLE Permanent Secretariat developed

A: 2 Develop Programme for strengthening capacity of CLE Permanent Secretariat

Programme adopted by 31/03/07 and implemented from July 2007 A: 2.2 Adopt and

implement capacity building programme

JUDICIARY, CLE


122

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




A: 3.1 Develop a national legal training curriculum(non degree and degree ) programmes

CLE/LFUDSM Two meetings of representatives of university law faculties: defined scope of work and qualifications of persons to be involved; prepared Draft National Framework Curriculum: minimum, and identified similarities and differences between (Tshs. 22,294,965 LSRP)

A: 3.2 Adopt the national legal training curriculum

CLE/LFUDSM No progress reported

A: 3.3 Approve, publish and disseminate national legal training curriculum

CLE, HEAC AND NACTE


National legal training curriculum developed and approved

A: 3.4 Review and update institutional curriculum and syllabi as per national curriculum

ALL LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS


Output 3: National legal (degree and non-degree) training curriculum developed and continuous updating mechanism institutionalized

A: 3 Develop national legal training curriculum and institutionalize mechanism for continuous updating curriculum

Continuous updating by 31/03/06 and institutionalized by July 06

A: 3.5 Institutionalize mechanism for continuous updating of curriculum

CLE No progress reported


123

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




Output 4: Sixty (60) academic staff trained in specialized areas

A: 4 Train at least sixty (60) academic staff in specialized areas each year

At least sixty (60) academic staff trained in specialized areas each year

A: 4.1 Train at least sixty (20) academic staff in specialized areas annually

ALL LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS


A: 5.1 Determine optimum levels for each training institution and develop action plan

MJCA/LFUDSM


A: 5.2 Adopt optimum levels and action plan for each legal training institution

MJCA/LFUDSM


Output 5: Optimum levels of operation and action plan for each training institution determined and funded

A:5 Determine optimum levels, develop action plan and identify funding for each training institution

Optimum levels and action plan for each training institution adopted and funded

A: 5.3 Incorporate action plan in institutional strategic plans, MTEF and annual operation budgets and implement

LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTION/MSTHE


Outcome 2: Improved Practical Skills Training for Law Graduates


124

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities


Sub-Activities Responsible Agency


Law School Establishment Act gazetted by 30-06-06

A: 1.1 Advocate and mobilise for the support for establishment of the Law School

MJCA,TLS

A: 1.2 Provide enabling legal framework

MJCA

A: 1.3 Appoint the members of the key positions (Director of Continued Legal Education, Council, Interim and Permanent Principal etc)

MJCA/CLE

Service contract by 31-03-06 Curriculum adopted by 30/06/06

A: 1.4 Adopt and disseminate Law School Curriculum

LAW SCHOOL COUNCIL

A: 1.5 Provide and equip temporary and permanent premise for

MJCA

Output 1: Law School established by law, equipped, staffed and operationalized

A: 1 Establish by law, equip, staff and operationalize Law School

Buildings for Law School by 30-06-08 No. and type of Temporary premises identified and furnished by

A: 1.6 Develop detailed institutional designs and quality assurance

MJCA/CLE/NGOS

Law School of Tanzania has established by the Law School of Tanzania Act, 2007 Board of Law School operating since June 2007 plot of land acquired for Law School, transfer and registration of title to be finalized (Government contribution) Law School’s Curriculum and Regulations/Rules have been developed, adopted and gazetted (5 sets of rules) Organization structure developed and analysis of staff requirements done Initial Personnel Establishment complement of 34 submitted to Treasury for approval Office of Principal temporarily at the 2nd Floor, Sukari House relocating to Ubungo Plaza in 2008 MOU signed between MoJCA and UDSM in February 2008 for temporary hosting and running practical legal training programme for the year 2008/09 First cohort of 174 students started training on 25th March 2008 second cohort of 300 students planned for mid-June 2008 Teaching is conducted by part-time lecturers, mostly professionals with extensive practical experience sourced from reputable law firms and universities in Dar es Salaam TORs for consultant for design and construction of the Law School developed and approved by the World


125

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities


Sub-Activities Responsible Agency


30-09/06equipment

mechanisms Bank. Advertisement for Invitation of Expression of Interest for this consultancy has been prepared and submitted to the World Bank for a no objection Procurement of four motor vehicles for the School in process (bundled)

Outcome 3: Improved Capacity to Offer Continuing Legal Education



Sub-Activities Responsible Agency REVIEW TEAM FINDINGS

Output 1: Capacity of legal training institutions to offer short courses for lawyers and non-lawyers strengthened

A: 1 Strengthen capacity of legal training institutions to offer short courses for lawyers and non-lawyers

Capacity building measures implemented

A: 1.1 Implement capacity building measures as defined under the training needs assessment for legal training institutions

MJCA,/JUDICIARY/CHRAGG/LRC/LEGAL REGISTRIES/TRAINING INSTITUTIONS


A: 2.1 Develop programme of assistance

MOHA, POLICE AND PRISONS

Programme of assistance developed

A: 2.2 Adopt proposed programme

MOHA, POLICE AND PRISONS

Output 2: Programme of assistance to support Police and Prisons Academies designed and implemented

A: 2 Develop programme of assistance to support Police and Prisons Academies

MTEF Budgets for 2006/07 and 2007/08

A: 2.3 Implement adopted programme

MOHA, POLICE AND PRISONS/TEAM



126

KRA 5: Service Delivery Capacity in Key Sector Institutions Progress to Date Outcome 1: Enhanced Management and Coordination in the Sector Institutions

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




A:1.1 Define an effective coordination mechanism for the Sector

MJCA An overall coordination mechanism for the sector has not been established for the longer term. The PCO and the Link Officers are currently taking this role at the programme planning and implementation level.

A:1.2 Adopt the coordination mechanism for the Sector

MJCA/TEAM

Output 1: An effective Coordination mechanism Established

A:1 Define, adopt and establish an effective coordination mechanism in the Sector Institutions

Coordination mechanism in place by 30/06/06

A:1.3 Establish coordination mechanism for the Sector

MJCA/TEAM

Output 2: Integrated Management information System (MIS) for the Sector Institutions launched.

A:2 Establish an Integrated Management Information System (MIS) for the Sector Institutions

Integrated MIS launched by 30/06/06

A:2.1 Launch and institutionalize and implement the measures for establishment of Integrated MIS

MJCA, POLICE, PRISONS, JUDICIARY, BRELA, RITA, RT AND ROS, CHRAGG, LRCT, LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTIO

The MIS system is pending the establishment of a coordination mechanism (ref Output 1)


127

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




NS, TLS

Output 3: 100 Top & Middle level Executives trained in Specialized Management skills

A:3 Conduct training of 100 top & middle level Executives in specialized Management skills

100 top & middle level Executives trained annually for first two years and 50 for the third year

A:3.1 Train 100 top and middle Executive training programme(s) annually

MJCA, JUDICIARY, BRELA, RITA, RT AND ROS

A total of seventy (20) employees were trained in specialized management skills, whereby Seventeen (17) of them have been trained in project planning and management, three (3) have been trained in Leadership, development and management skills

Output 4: Measures for strengthening administrative support systems implemented

A:4 Implement Measures for strengthening administrative support systems

At least 30% of administrative support systems in sector institutions improved annually

A:4.1 Strengthen at least 30% of administrative support systems in sector institutions annually

MJCA, JUDICIARY, BRELA, RITA, RT AND ROS


Output 5: Measures for strengthening Supervision and division of work in Legal Sector

A:5 Implement Measures for strengthening Supervision and division of work

At least 30% of supervision and division of work mechanisms improved annually

A:5.1 Improve at least 30% of supervision and division of work mechanisms in institutions

MJCA – PCO, ALL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS



128

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




Institutions implemented

in Legal Sector Institutions

annually

Output 6: Measures for strengthening Retention Schemes implemented

A:6 Strengthen Retention Schemes the Sector Institution

At least 25% Retention schemes strengthened annually

A: 6.1 Strengthen at least 25% retention schemes strengthened annually

MJCA/MOF/POLICE ALL LEGAL REGISTRIES/TRAINING INSTITUTIONS/POLICE AND PRISONS


Outcome 2: Enhanced Competence, Motivation and Integrity of Personnel

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




Meritocratic based recruitment in all sector institutions by 30/06/06

A: 1.1 Establish meritocracy recruitment in Sector Institutions according to the Public Service recruitment policy

ALL IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES


A: 1.2 Revise and update Service Commission procedures

POLICE, PRISONS & JUDICIARY


Output 1: Meritocratic Personnel Management System for Sector Institutions established

A: 1 Establish meritocratic Personnel management system for the sector institutions and reform service commissions

Service Commissions adopt and apply meritocracy procedures by 30/06/06

A: 1.3 Adopt and apply revised procedures

POLICE, PRISONS & JUDICIARY


129

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




A: 2.1 Review and Update remuneration packages

ALL INSTITUTIONS & PO- PSM

A:2.2 Adopt new remuneration packages

INSTITUTIONS


Output 2: New Remuneration Packages for Sector Institutions

A: 2 Review remuneration packages

New Remuneration packages adopted and by30/06/07

A:2.3 Apply new remuneration packages

INSTITUTIONS

At least 20 from each legal institution trained annually

A:3.1 Train at least 20 from each legal institutions in specialized skills

ALL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

Eleven (11) Link officers and one (1) staff at PCO have been trained as follows:- Four Officers (1 Police, 1 Prisons, 1 RoS and 1 PCO staff) were trained in M & E. Two Police officers were trained in Advanced Public and Financial Management. Two prisons officers have been trained in Basic Executive Assistant Management course. One (1) Prisons officer and three (3) staff from the Registrar of Societies have been trained in Project management Course.

Output 3 Legal Sector Institution Personnel trained in Specialist Skills

A:3 Train Legal Sector Personnel in Specialised skills courses

Training programme for Police and Prisons adopted by

A:3.2 Design and adopt training programme for police, social welfare officer

MOHA – POLICE AND PRISONS/MLYSD-SWD



130

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




30/06/06 and prisons

Training programme for Police and Prisons implemented from July 07

A:3.3 Implement training programme for Police, social welfare officers and Prisons


A:4.1 Define accommodation and transport framework

MJCA, PCO, JUDICIARY, MOHA- POLICE AND PRISONS/MLYSD-SWD

A:4.2 Adopt accommodation and transport framework

TEAM/MJCA/MOHA/MLYSD

Output 4: Framework for secure accommodation for magistrates and state attorneys police& prison officer,

A:4: Define Framework for secure accommodation for Magistrates and State Attorneys Police& Prison Officers

Accommodation and transport Framework adopted & applied by 30/06/07

A:4.3 Implement accommodation and transport framework



Outcome 3: Improved Working Environment

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




Output 1: Non- core

A: 1 Contract

At least 60% non- core services

A: 1.1 Identify non-core services to be

ALL SECTOR



131

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




contracted out INSTITUTIONS

services for Sector Institutions contracted out

out non-core services

contracted out by 30/06/08

A: 1.2 Contract out 20% non-core services annually



A: 2.1 Conduct situational analysis of library services

MJCA(PCO), POLICE, PRISONS, JUDICIARY AND LEGAL REGISTRIES

A: 2.2 Prepare and adopt action plan

MJCA(PCO)

Output 2: Modernized and equipped law libraries

A: 2 Modernizing and equipping law libraries

Modernise and equipped at least 40% of law Libraries in the Sector by 2008

A:2.3 Modernize and equip 20% law libraries annually

MJCA, JUDICIARY, POLICE, TLS AND LEGAL REGISTRIES


Output 3: Mechanism for

A: 3 Reactivate the

Action plan adopted by 30/06/06

A: 3.1 Define an action plan for reactivating the

MJCA/ JUDICIARY AND

Last Publication is Law Reports of 1997 Revised Laws is as at 31st July 2004


132

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




mechanism for continuous updating of Law Reports, Case Digest and Revised Laws.


A: 3.2 Adopt, approve and institutionalize the action plan

JUDICIARY/ MJCA

continuous updating of Law Reports, Case Digest and Revised Laws re

mechanism for continuous updating of Law Reports, Case Digest and Revised Laws Revised and updated

Laws Law Reports and Case Digest updated to 31/12/08

A: 3.3 Revise and update Laws, Law Reports and Case Digest

MJCA

Law Reporting supported under BEST

2 District Courts Rehabilitated and 8 Constructed &Equipped in Manyara & Arusha Region by 30/06/08

A: 4.1 Rehabilitate 2 and construct 8 & equip District Courts in Manyara & Arusha Regions

MJCA/ JUDICIARY/ LGAs

Output 4: Priority District, RM, High Court centres Court of Appeal buildings Rehabilitated/Constructed and equipped 22

A: 4 Rehabilitate/ construct and equip priority Court District, RM, High Court centres Court of

57 District & 9 RM Courts in 11 regions rehabilitated/constructed & equipped by 30/06/08

A: 4.2 rehabilitate 17 District and 7 RM Courts and Construct 40 District Courts and equip

MJCA/ JUDICIARY/

A new high Court centre is being constructed in Shinyanga region using Government budget. The structure is at advanced stage. Land offer for construction of a building for the Court of Appeal, in Dar Es Salaam, has been acquired, efforts to clear the site the

22 Priority Courts as itemized in the Infrastructure Development Programme designed as part of Preparation of Proposed ATIP


133

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




4 High Court Centres Constructed and 9 equipped by 30/06/08

A: 4.3 Construct 4 High Court Centres and Equip 9 by 2008

MJCA/JUDICIARY/

Appeal buildings

Court of Appeal Constructed & equipped by 30/06/07

A: 4.4 Construct and equip Court of Appeal

MJCA

construction is in progress

MJCA HQ Constructed and equipped by 30/06/08.

A:5.1 Construct and Equip MJCA HQ

MJCA A plot of land for MoJCA HQ has been acquired. Survey, and the process to procure a consultant to review and design drawings will commence in May, 2008.

Output 5: Office space and equipment for MJCA HQ and Zonal Offices of AGC specified

A: 5 Rehabilitate/Construct and equip MJCA HQ and Zonal Offices

11 Zonal Offices of AGC Rehabilitated/Constructed and equipped by 30/06/08

A: 5.2 Assess Needs and define an action plan for rehabilitation/equipping AGC Zonal Office

MJCA Tender for rehabilitation of five (5) zonal offices, namely, Songea, Tanga, Dar es Salaam, Tabora and Shinyanga have been awarded. Rehabilitation is expected to be completed in mid May, 2008. Office rent and furniture to the following zonal offices, Tabora, Tanga, Mwanza and Musoma have been provided. Tender for procurement of eight (8) motor vehicles for the Attorney General’s zone has been advertised. Awarding of the tender shall be made by the end of May, 2008. The supply is


134

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




expected to take place in June, 2008, whereby five of the procured vehicles will be FWD, which will be supplied to Tabora, Dodoma, Songea and Sumbawanga, whereas three (3) will be mini buses for Arusha, Mwanza and Dar es Salaam.

A: 5.3 Mainstream and implement Action Plan

MJCA

A: 6.1. Identify needs and develop an action plan for rehabilitation and construct offices for legal registries.

BRELA, RITA, ROS , RT

Needs assessment have been done and the action plan for rehabilitation and construction at the Registrar of Societies (ROS) is in place. To this effect, RoS received TShs. 314,954,000/- in June 2007.

A:6.2 Adopt Action Plan


Action Plan adopted and incorporated in MTEF budgets by 30/06/06

A: 6.3 Mainstream action plan in MTEF budgets



Output 6: Action plan for alterations or rehabilitation or construction and equipping offices of the Legal Registries developed, adopted and implemented

A:6 Alter or Rehabilitate or Construct and Equip offices of the Legal Registries

At least 3 key legal registries Altered or Rehabilitated or Constructed and Equipped by 30/06/08

A: 6.4 Alter or Rehabilitate or Construct and equip Offices at least 3 key Legal Registries


Renovation/Rehabilitation work of the ROS main office building is completed at TShs. 137,388,776 and electrical installation works is still in progress.


135

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




Programme and action plan adopted 30/06/06

A: 7.1 Assess Needs prioritise and Prepare Adopt Action Plan

POLICE, PRISONS & MOHA

a. The Police Force has developed a programme and an action plan for Construction, Rehabilitation, and Equipping Police Custodies, Offices and Houses and .received TShs. 250,000,000 in June 2007. A draft Contract between the Tanzania Police Force and Western Engineers Ltd (Contractor) for proposed construction of staff houses at Katubuka Barracks in Kigoma has been forwarded to the Attorney General’s Office for Legal Advice. Construction work for 8 house units is planned to start in June 2008. b. The Prisons Department developed its Programme and Action Plan in the financial year 2006-07. It received Tshs.250,000,000/ in June 2007 for the construction of 8 house units at Ukonga prison staff College under LSRP. Tender financial evaluation was completed on 18th April 2008 and is now waiting for the ministerial tender board approval.

Output 7: Prioritised Infrastructure development programme, action plan and Cost estimates for Police Force and Prisons custodies, prisons designed adopted and institutionally mainstreamed

A:7 Prioritise and develop a programme, action plan and for Construction, Rehabilitation and Equipping Police custodies, prisons, offices and houses

At least 20% of the most dilapidated infrastructures improved by 2008

A: 7.2 Improve at least !0% of the most dilapidated Police and Prisons infrastructure per annum

POLICE, PRISONS & MOHA



136

KRA 6: Programme Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation Progress to Date Outcome 1: Effective Implementation of LSRP in the legal Sector Institutions Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




120 staff trained in Short term courses annually

A:1.1: Train 120 LSI staff in Short term courses annually

MJCA/PCO/ ALL IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES

Advised that training has been conducted in Procurement, Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation. Information on numbers trained and content of training unavailable. Information on changes in behaviour of trainees unavailable No follow-up training in the workplace

2 programme mgt staff recruited for each lead agency

A:1.2 Recruit 2 programme mgt staff for each lead agency

MJCA/JUDICIARY/LRCT/CHRAGG/LFUDSM


Output 1: Capacity Building Measures for Programme Implementation Implemented in the Sector Institutions

A:1 Implement Capacity Building Measures for Programme Implementation in the Sector Institutions

One set (lap top, pc & printer) procured and installed for each implementing agency

A:1.3 Procure and install one set (lap top, pc & printer) for each implementing agency

MJCA/PCO Completed

Office Accommodation

Completed

Staff Recruited Some staff still to be recruited

Output 2: Programme Coordinator’s Office Equipped and Staffed

A:2 Secure, Equip and Staff Programme Coordinator’s Office

6 sets (lap top, pc & printer) procured and installed

A: 2.1 Secure, equip and staff Programme Coordinator’s office

MJCA/PCO

Completed

Outcome 2: Effective Monitoring, Evaluation and Coordination of the Programme


137

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




3 meetings of the SC in a year

A:1.1: Convene at least 3 meetings of the Steering Committee annually

MJCA 1 meeting held in March 2008 since commencement of programme

At least 4 meetings of TCC in a year

A:1.2: Convene at least 4 meetings of TCC annually

MJCA 3 meetings held since commencement of programme

At Least 4meeting of the JPIRC in a year

A: 1.3 Convene at Least JPIRC annually

MJCA 2 meetings held since commencement of programme

Output 1: Meetings of the SC, TCC, Donors/Govt. joint Forum and IATCs

A:1 Convene Meetings of the SC, TCC, Donors/Govt . joint Forums and IATCs

At Least 1 IATCs meeting in a month

A:1.4 Convene at Least 1 IATCs meeting in a month

MJCA/LRCT, JUDICIARY, CHRAGG, LFUDSM &

Meetings held much less frequently. E.g. For KRA 2, only 2 meetings have been held

Quarterly reports prepared and presented to the DAG/PS

A:2.1 Convene at least 3 meetings of the Steering Committee in a year

MJCA PCO No information on whether quarterly reports have been prepared

Output 2: Programme Progress and Achievements presented at IMTC on a quarterly basis

A:2 Table progress Reports and achievement reports to IMTC

4 LSRP progress and achievement reports tabled at IMTC

A:2.2 Table LSRP Progress and Achievement Reports at IMTC

MJCA No information on whether progress reports have been prepared.


138

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




A:3.1 Develop M&E mechanism

MJCA-PCO M&E Mechanism being developed NB: unclear what is implied by an ‘M&E’ mechanism

A:3.2 Monitor ona quarterly basis

MJCA-PCO Only monitoring reports developed have been reporting against budget expenditure

M& E mechanism developed, adopted and disseminated by 30/06/06

At least 4 Monitoring reports each year

Output 3: Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism Established

A:3 Develop & Establish LSRP Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism at all Levels

At least 1 evaluation report after every 2years

A:3.3 Conduct LSRP Evaluation after every two years

MJCA No evaluation has taken place.

Annual Review in March every year

A:4.1 Conduct annual review in March every year

MJCA/PCO ALL IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES

First Review being conducted now (April/May 2008)

Output 4: Annual Review Conducted & Long term Programme for the Sector Developed

A:4 Conduct Annual Review and Develop long term Programme for the Sector Long term

Programme adopted by 30/06/08

A: 4.2 Develop a long term Programme for the sector

MJCA-PCO No progress reported

Outcome 3: Enhanced Policy Management and Strategic Leadership Targeted Outputs Main/Key

Activities Performance Indicators

Sub - Activities

Responsible Agency



139



Sub - Activities

Responsible Agency


Policy document formulated by 30/06/06

At least 3 Consultative Forums by 30/06/06

Output 1: Legal Sector Policy Formulated, adopted, disseminated and launched

A:1Formulate, adopt, disseminate and launch Legal Sector Policy

Legal Sector Policy launched by 30/06/07

A:1.1: Formulate, adopt, disseminate and launch Sector Policy

MJCA Policy document has not been developed although stakeholder workshop held in 2007 to assist in developing policy Has been scheduled for implementation in the current Financial Year NB: This is critical to the development of the Legal Sector but will require (1) high level buy-in and (2) technical assistance support

Action Plan adopted by 30/06/06

No progress reported Output 2: Measures for Capacity Building in Policy formulation, management analysis and research methodology implemented

A:2 Implement measures for Capacity Building in Policy formulation, management analysis and research methodology

Capacity building measures implemented from July06

A:2.1 Develop, adopt, disseminate and implement an action plan for capacity building

MJCA


Outcome 4: Enhanced Information, Education and Communication on the Legal Sector Developments & Reforms Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




Output 1: Strategy for Information, Education

A:1 Design and Implement a Strategy for Information,

IEC strategy documented by 31/03/06

A:1.1: Design a Strategy for Information, Education and Communication (IEC)

MJCA/PCO/TEAM

IEC Strategy has not been developed


140

Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




and Communication (IEC)

Education and Communication (IEC)

IEC strategy implemented from April 06

A:1.2 Implement the IEC strategy

PCO No progress reported

Outcome 5: Enhanced Institutional Capacities in Change Management Targeted Outputs

Main/Key Activities




Action Plan for change management adopted by 31/03/07

A:1.1: Train key staff in change management

MJCA –PCO/ALL SECTOR INSTITUTIONS

Some ad hoc training has been provided No coordinated and comprehensive action plan developed

Action Plan for change management from April 07

A:1.2 Design and adopt an Action Plan for change management


As above

Output 1: Capacity Building Measures in Change Management implemented by Sector Institutions

A:1 Design and Implement an action plan for capacity building for change management in Sector Institutions A:1.3 Implement the

Action Plan for change management


As above