MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, ARMAMENTS DYNAMICS AND DISARMAMENT

Also by Hans Gunter Brauch

In English: DECISIONMAKING FOR ARMS LIMITATION - ASSESSMENTS AND

PROSPECTS (editor with Duncan L. Clarke) ·STAR WARS AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE-IMPLICATIONS FOR

EUROPE: PERCEPTIONS AND ASSESSMENTS (editor) THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY AND WORLD SECURITY (author

with Rip Bulkeley) ALTERNATIVE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE POSTURES IN THE

EUROPEAN THEATER - THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE AND DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS (editor with Robert Kennedy)

• Also from St. Martin's

In German: STRUKTURELLER WANDEL UND ROSTUNGSPOLITIK DER USA

(1940-1950)-ZUR WELTFOHRUNGSROLLE UND IHREN INNENPOLITISCHEN BEDINGUNGEN

ENTWICKLUNGEN UND ERGEBNISSE DER FRIEDENSFORSCHUNG (1969-1978). EINE ZWISCHENBILANZ UND KONKRETE VORSCHLAGE FOR DAS ZWEITE JAHRZEHNT

ABROSTUNGSAMT ODER MINISTERIUM? AUSLANDISCHE MODELLE DER ABROSTUNGSPLANUNG MATERIALIEN UND REFORMVORSCHLAGE

KERNWAFFEN UND ROSTUNGSKONTROLLE-EIN INTERDISZIPLINARES STUDIENBUCH (editor)

CHEMISCHE KRIEGFOHRUNG - CHEMISCHE ABROSTUNG, DOKUMENTE UND KOMMENTARE (editor with Rolf-Dieter Muller)

GIFTGAS IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK - CHEMISCHE UND BIOLOGISCHE W AFFEN (author with Alfred Schremp})

DER CHEMISCHE ALPTRAUM ODER GIBT ES EINEN C-WAFFENKRIEG IN EUROPA?

DIE RAKETEN KOMMEN! YOM NA TO-DOPPELBESCHLUSS BIS ZUR ST A TIONIER UNG

PERSPEKTIVEN EINER EUROPAISCHEN FRIEDENSORDNUNG ANGRIFF AUS DEM ALL. DER ROSTUNGSWETTLAUF 1M WELTRAUM

SICHERHEITSPOLITIK AM ENDE? EINE BEST ANDSAUFNAHME, PERSPEKTIVEN UND NEUE ANSATZE (editor)

VERTRAUENSBILDENDE MASSNAHMEN UND EUROPAISCHE ABROSTUNGSKONFERENZ (editor)

MILITARISCHE NUTZUNG DES WELTRAUMS. EINE BIBLIOGRAPHIE (editor with Rainer Fischbach)

CHEMISCHE KRIEGFOHRUNG-CHEMISCHE ABROSTUNG. Part II: RECHTLICHE UND POLITISCHE, MILITARISCHE, ROSTUNGSKON­TROLLPOLITISCHE UND V6LKERRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE (editor)

Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament ABC Weapons, Military Use of Nuclear Energy and of Outer Space and Implications for International Law

Edited by Hans Giinter Brauch Chairman of the IPRA Study Group on Weapons Technology and Disarmament and of Peace Research and European Security Studies (AFES-PRESSJ, and Lecturer, Institute of Political Science, Heidelberg University

Palgrave Macmillan

© Hans Giinter Brauch, 1989

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1 st edition 1989 978-0-333-46483-0

All rights reserved. For information, write: Scholarly and Reference Division, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

First published in the United States of America in 1989.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Military technology, armaments dynamics, and disarmament / edited by Hans Giinter Brauch. p. em. A sdection of rev. papers originally presented at the Eleventh General Conference of the International Peace Research Association, held at the University of Sussex, April 13-16, 1986. Bibliography: p. Includes index.

I. Disarmament-Congresses. 2. Military policy-Congresses. 3. Munitions-Congresses. I. Brauch, Hans Giinter, 1947- . II. International Peace Research Association. General Conference (11th: 1986 : University of Sussex) JX1974.M49 1989 327.1'74-dc 19

88-7046 CIP

ISBN 978-1-349-10223-5 ISBN 978-1-349-10221-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-10221-1

ISBN 978-0-312-02112-2

ISBN 978-0-312-02112-2: $35.00 (est.)

Contents

List of Figures List of Tables Notes on the Contributors Foreword by Lord Solly Zuckerman Excerptsfrom Lord Zuckerman's Writings Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations

Introduction Hans Gunter Brauch

PART I MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND THEORY OF ARMAMENTS DYNAMICS

Military Technology - Armaments Dynamics - Strategic Stability: Implications for Arms Control and Disarmament

viii

x

xi

xix

xx

xli

xlv

liii

Hans Gunter Brauch 3

2 Military Technology - A Driving Force behind the Arms Race and an Impediment for Arms Control and Disarmament Marek Thee 39

PART II MILITARY TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF ATOMIC, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

3 Third-generation Nuclear Weapons ~~Th~ ~

4 Diplomatic Responses to Changing Assessments of Scientific and Technological Developments to a Disarmament Regime: The Second Review Conference of the 1972 Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons, Geneva 1986 Nicholas A. Sims 92

v

VI Contents

5 Supply, Demand and Assimilation in Chemical-warfare Armament J. P. Perry Robinson 112

PART III MILITARY USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY: THE CASE OF BOMBERS AND OUTER SPACE

6 The Nuclear-propelled bomber - A Faked Arms Race Between the US and the USSR Ulrich Albrecht 127

7 Nuclear Power in Space: A Technology Beyond Control? Rip Bulkeley 165

PART IV MILITARY TECHNOLOGY: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND SOl

8 The Transformation of War: The Real Implications of the SOl Paul Rogers

9 SOl - A Sceptical Assessment by an American Physicist Richard Garwin

10 Star Wars and Strategic Stability Roald Sagdeev

11 SOl: Ten Fundamental Contradictions - The Need For a Real Alternative to the Nuclear Predicament - A View from Nagasaki Seiitsu Tachibana

12 Strategic Defence Initiative or Strategic Defence Response? An Attempt to Interpret the Emergence of the SOl Programme in Terms of Theorems of Armaments Dynamics Hans Gunter Brauch

PART V MILITARY USE OF OUTER SPACE-IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNA TIONAL LAW

13 Arms Limitation in Outer Space for Human Survival

215

228

295

304

352

P. K. Menon 445

Contents

14 The Military Use of Outer Space: Implications for International Law

VII

Pizl Dunay 471 15 The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties and

the Interpretation of the ABM Treaty Horst Fischer 487

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, ARMAMENTS DYNAMICS AND DISARMAMENT: A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 505

Index 539

List of Figures

3.1 The curve of binding energy 72 3.2 Sketch of how the primary of a modern

second-generation nuclear weapon may look 73 3.3 Sketch of how a modern fission-fusion-fission nuclear

weapon may be configured, showing the essential elements 74

3.4 Diagram of an X-ray laser pumped by a nuclear explosive 80

3.5 Partial energy states diagram of an almost fully ionised zinc atom, showing the relevant transitions 81

3.6 Distribution of photons radiated from a 'black body' of temperature 108 K 84

3.7 Diagram of the mechanism of generation of the EMP that accompanies a nuclear detonation on the ground 89

6.1 Schematic diagram from a Soviet technical source on a direct air cycle atomic turbojet 141

6.2 Aviation Week's reporting about a Soviet nuclear-propelled bomber 147

6.3 Myasishchev's jet-powered bomber, which started flight-testing briefly before the report in Aviation Week 147

6.4 Soviet perception of US nuclear powered bomber aircraft in 1984 160

12.1 US defence outlays: long-term trends: 1955-85 377 12.2 Department of Defense - Budget Authority by

Appropriation for Research Development, Test and Evaluation in Billion Current Dollars for Fiscal Years 1976-89 380

12.3 Appropriations and Requests for Department of Defense and Department of Energy's Funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative for Fiscal Years 1985 to 1989 in Billion Current Dollars 381

12.4 Strategic Defence Initiative and predecessor programmes in billions of FY 1986 dollars, according to John E. Pike 383

12.5 Missile defence research: SDI and predecessor programmes in billions of FY 1986 dollars, according to Pike 384

V1l1

List of Figures IX

12.6 John Pike's estimate of projected SDI R&D spending for FY 1984-FY 1993: $70 billion current-year dollars 385

12.7 Strategic Defence Initiative as a percentage of all DoD RDT&E spending according to estimates by John Pike of 10 February 1985 385

12.8 Budgetary pressures for deployment of US ABM systems in the 1960s: the case of Nike-Zeus, Nike-X, Sentinel and Safeguard in constant FY 1986 dollars 386

12.9 SDI Budget future in the 1990s: no deployment - Budget shrinks or deployment decision - Budget grows 387

12.10 SDI contractors by geographic location from March 1983 to March 1987 402

12.11 The Soviet ABMjSpace Defence Programmes as seen by the Pentagon 410

12.12 DoD Support for University R&D (Budget Authority for FY 1956-86) in millions of 1985 dollars 421

List of Tables

1.1 Four approaches in analysing military systems 16 1.2 Contribution of arms-control treaties to enhance

stability and to limit military technology (1959-86) 26 12.1 Department of Defense - Budget Authority by major

mission: 1975 to 1985 379 12.2 Federal Research and Development Funding for

National Defence: 1980 to 1986 382 12.3 SDI Budget for FY 1985 through FY 1989 by major

category ($ in million) 390 12.4 SDI contracts: basic facts and by sector: March

1983-March 1987 394 12.5 Top SDI contractors: corporations, federal laboratories

and universities 396 12.6 Total value of contracts for foreign SDI contracts:

1983-7 397 12.7 The 10 leading SDI States from 1983 to March 1987 403 12.8 Political Action Committee contributions from leading

SDI contractors (ranked according to PAC contributions, 1983-6) 405

12.9 The early ballistic missile defence race 411 12.10 Comparison of US and USSR military satellite

systems longevity 412 12.11 SDI contracts to foreign companies after five years

(March 1983-March 1988) according to John Pike and David G. Bourns (Federation of American Scientists) 430

x

Notes on the Contributors

Ulrich Albrecht (West Germany) is professor for peace and conflict research at the Institute for International Politics and Regional Studies in the section for Political Science at the Free University of Berlin. He graduated as an aeronautical engineer from Stuttgart University where he received his D.Phil. in political science and economics. He has been a research associate with the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, was a Vice-President of the Free University and recently was the dean of the political science faculty. He was chairman of the council of peace researchers of the now dissolved German Society for Peace and Conflict Research (DGFK) and at the suggestion of the Council of the German Protestant Church he has been elected as a member of the German Commission of the Council of Churches for International Affairs.

He is the author of Der Handel mit Waffen (1971); Deutsche Waffen fiir die Dritte Welt (in cooperation with B. Sommer) (1972); PoUlik und Waffengeschiifte (1972); Der Staat und die Steuerung der Wissen­schaft (in cooperation with C. Koch et al.) (1976); Riistung und Unterentwicklung (in cooperation with D. Ernst et al.) (1978); Arbeits­pliitze durch Riistung? Warnung vor falschen Hoffnungen (in co­operation with P. Lock and H. Wulf) (1978); Riistungskonversions­forschung. Eine Literaturstudie mit Forschungsempfehlungen (1979); Die Wiederaufriistung der BRD (2nd edn 1980); Kiindigt den Nachrii­stungsbeschlup (1983); Internationale Polilik. Einfiihrung in das System internationaler Herrschafi (\986).

Hans Gunter Brauch (West Germany) is chairman of the Study Group on Weapons Technology and Disarmament of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA); since the winter semester 1987-8 he has been a lecturer for international relations and a research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Heidelberg University. He has been elected as the first chairman of the international scientific society Arbeitsgruppe Friedensforschung und Europiiische Sicherheits­politik - Peace Research and European Security Studies (AFES­PRESS) that succeeded the former Study Group (AFES) at the Institute of Political Science at Stuttgart University where he lectured on international relations and was in charge of a research project on weapons technologies. He was a student of political science, modern

xi

xii Notes on the Contributors

history, international law and English language and literature at Heidelberg and London Universities (University College) and he holds a D.Phil. from Heidelberg University (1976). He has been a research associate at Heidelberg, Harvard, Stanford and Stuttgart Universities, and has taught international relations at the Universities of Darmstadt, Tiibingen, Stuttgart and Heidelberg. He has written and edited numerous books in German and English on arms control, defence policy and international security and he has contributed articles for readers in the United States, Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, South Korea and West Germany, and for scientific and political journals.

He is the author of Struktureller Wandel und Riistungspolitik der USA (1940-1950) (1977); Entwicklungen und Ergebnisse der Friedens­forschung (1969-1978) (1979); Abriistungsamt oder Ministerium (1981); Giftgas in der Bundesrepublik (in cooperation with Alfred Schrempf) (1982); Der chemische Alptraum oder gibt es einen C­Waffenkrieg in Europa? (1982); Perspektiven einer europiiischen Frie­densordnung (1983); Die Raketen kommen! Yom N A TO-Doppel­beschlup bis zur Stationierung (1983); Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation (co-editor with D. L. Clarke) (1983); Angriff aus dem All. Der Riistungswettlaufim Weltraum, (1983); Kernwaffen und Riistungs­kontrolle (editor) (1984); Sicherheitspolitik am Ende? (editor) (1984); Chemische Kriegfiihrung - chemische Abriistung (co-editor with R. D. Miiller) (1985); Vertrauensbildende Mapnahmen und Europiiische Abriistungskonferenz (editor) (1987); Star Wars and European Defence, Implications for Europe (1987); The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and World Security (with Rip Bulkeley) (1988); Alternative Conventional Defense Postures in the European Theater - The Future of the Military Balance and Domestic Constraints (co-editor with Robert Kennedy, forthcoming in 1989).

Rip Bulkeley (Great Britain) has been a doctoral candidate in the Department of War Studies, Kings College in London. He has received a BA in Classics from Adelaide (Australia), a BA in History and Psychology from Oxford, a Diploma in History and Philosophy of Science from Oxford and an MA in Peace Studies from Bradford University. In his doctoral thesis he is working on the early history of the US space programme. He has been an active member in Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA), in CND and END through the 1980s and he is a member of the IPRA Study Group on Weapons Tech­nology and Disarmament.

Notes on the Contributors xiii

He is the author of The ABM Treaty 1972-1983 (1983); Space Weapons. Deterrence or Delusion? (in cooperation with Graham Spinardi) (1986); 'The Effects of SOlon Disarmament', in E. P. Thompson (ed.), Star Wars (1985), pp. 68-92; Star Wars- Are the Russians Winning? (1986); 'RAF Fylingdales and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty', background paper accompanying European Aspects of the Strategic Defence Initiative, unpublished evidence submitted to the House of Commons Select Committee on National Defence, November 1985 (published 1986); The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and World Security (with Hause Gunter Brauch) (\ 988). He has contributed articles to the AD1U Report, Bulletin of Peace Proposals and Current Research on Peace and Violence.

Pal Dunay (Hungary) is deputy chairman of the IPRA Study Group on Weapons Technology and Disarmament. He is an associate professor of International Law at E6tv6s University, Budapest. After receiving his doctoral degree from the faculty of law of E6tv6s in 1982, he did postgraduate studies at the International Law Depart­ment there (1982--4), before becoming an assistant professor (1984-6) and an associate professor in 1987. In 1986 he was an international fellow with the Hamburg Institute on Peace Research and Security Policy and in 1987 he received a six-month scholarship from Oslo University. His major research fields are international legal questions and nuclear arms control agreements.

He edited Studies on Peace Research (Budapest, to which he contributed, 1986) 'On the impacts of the Strategic Defense Initia­tive'; 'The Role of the Middle Powers in International Security', in Nisbet Heather and Jane Williams, eds, Science. Education and Social Change (1986).

Horst Fischer (West Germany) is an assistant professor of internat­ionallaw at the Ruhr-University in Bochum. For many years he has been the Secretary-General of the German Pugwash Group.

He is the author of Der Einsatz von Nuklearwaffen nach Art. 51 des 1. Zusatzprotokolls zu den Genfer Konventionen von 1949 - V olkerrecht zwischen humanitiirem Anspruch und militiirpolitischer Notwendigkeit, Schriften zum V6lkerrecht, vol. 82 (\ 985); 'European Security in the '80s - A New Approach to Sovereignty', in Proceedings of the Thirty­Second Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs (\983); 'V6lkerrechtliche Normenbildung und sicherheitspolitische Konzep­tionen, Aktuelle Rechtsquellenprobleme und die Implementation

xiv Notes on the Contributors

Gemeinsamer Sicherheit', in Hamburger Beitriige zur Friedens­forschung und Sicherheitspolitik, no. 15 (1987); 'The Military Use of Outer Space and the International Legal System', in John Holdren and Joseph Rotblat, eds, Strategic Defences and the Future of the Arms Race (1987).

Richard L. Garwin (United States) is at present a Fellow with the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center and an Adjunct Professor of Physics at Columbia University. He received a BSc. in Physics from Case Institute of Technology (1947) and a Ph.D in Physics from the University of Chicago in 1949. After three years on the faculty of the University of Chicago, he joined the IBM Corporation in 1952, where he has been Director of the IBM Watson Laboratory, Director of Applied Research at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center and a member of the IBM Corporate Technical Committee. He has also been Professor of Public Policy in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is at present also an adjunct Research Fellow in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; and Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large, at Cornell University. He is a consultant to the US government on matters of military technology, arms control, etc. Doctor Garwin has been a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee (1962-5) and (1969-72), and of the Defense Science Board (1966-9). He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine, the National Academy of Engineering, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the American Philosophical Society. In 1983 he was awarded the Wright Prize for interdisciplinary scientific achievement. From 1977 to 1985 he was on the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), and during 1978 he was Chairman of the Panel on Public Affairs of the American Physical Society. He was a member of the council of the National Academy of Sciences (1984-6).

He has made contributions in the design of nuclear weapons, in the instruments and electronics for research in nuclear and low-tempera­ture physics, in the establishment of the nonconservation of parity and the demonstration of some of its striking consequences, in computer elements and systems including superconducting devices in communication systems, in the behaviour of solid helium, in the detection of gravitational radiation, and in military technology. He has been granted 35 US patents. His work for the government has

Notes on the Contributors xv

included studies on anti-submarine warfare, new technologies in health care, sensor systems, military and civil aircraft, and satellite and strategic systems, from the point of view of improving such systems as well as assessing existing capabilities.

Doctor Garwin has published more than 200 papers and he has testified to many Congressional committees on matters of national security, transportation, energy policy and technology. He is co­author of many books, among them Nuclear Weapons and World Politics (1977); Nuclear Power Issues and Choices (1977); Energy: The Next Twenty Years (1979); and Science Advice to the President (1980).

P. K. Menon (Barbados, West Indies) is Professor of Law and Director of the International Law Programme of the Faculty of Law, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, Barbados. He received his B.Com degree from Madras, his LL.B. from Bombay, LL.M. (Air and Space Law) from McGill, LL.M. (International Law) and J.S.D. from New York University. He served in the Diplomatic Service of India in New Delhi, in Pakistan and in the United States from 1956 to 1967. From 1968 to 1972, Professor Menon was a staff member and expert consultant to the United Nations Secretariat and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research in New York. He joined the University of the West Indies in 1973.

Professor Menon has published more than 60 articles in scholarly international law journals throughout the world and co-edited Com­monwealth Caribbean Legal Essays.

Julian P. Perry Robinson (Great Britain) is a Senior Fellow of the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex University in Brighton. A chemist and a lawyer by training, he was a member of the research staff of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) during 1968-71, and has since held research appointments at the Harvard University Center for International Affairs and the Free University of Berlin. He has served as a consultant to the World Health Organisation, the United Nations Secretariat, the Internation­al Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Environment Programme. He is the principal co-author of SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare (6 vols) (1971-5), he was Series Editor of SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies (1985-1987) and he has been author of numerous contributions to readers and journals on chemical warfare in all parts of the world.

xvi Notes on the Contributors

Paul Rogers (Great Britain) is Senior Lecturer in Peace Studies at Bradford University and since 1983 he has been chairman of the UK Alternative Defence Commission. He received a BSc and a PhD from the University of London and an ARCS and DIC from Imperial College in London. From 1968 to 1970 he was a Senior Scientific Officer with the East African Community; from 1971 to 1978 he was Lecturer, Senior Lecturer and Principal Lecturer in Human Ecology at the Huddersfield Polytechnic. He is the editor of Future Resources and World Development (1976) and author of The Death of Deterrence (1983) and Guide to Nuclear Weapons (1984-5).

Roald Sagdeev (Soviet Union) has been the Director of the Institute of Outer Space Research of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR since 1973. Born in 1932 he completed his studies at the Lomonossow University in Moscow in 1955. From 1956 to 1961 he was working at the Institute of Atomic Energy and from 1961 to 1970 he was director of a laboratory of the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; from 1970 to 1973 he directed a laboratory of the Institute of High Energy Physics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. In 1968 he was elected as a member to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. His main scientific publications are on Plasma Physics. Acad. Sagdeev was awarded a Lenin Prize in 1984 and he is a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. With Y. Velikhov and A. Kokoshin he is a co-editor of Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security (1986).

Nicholas A. Sims (Great Britain) is a Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, which he joined as a university teacher in 1968. He has specialised in teaching and research on disarmament and arms control diplomacy, and on international organisation in the Commonwealth and on the United Nations. He was appointed to the British Delegation at the first review conference (Geneva 1980) of the 1972 Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons. He has served as a chairman of the United Nations Committee of the Quaker Peace Service and he has been working closely in colloquia with delegates to the Conference on Disarmament organised by the Quaker UN Office at Geneva.

He is the author of Approaches to Disarmament (1974 and 1979); The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force 1975-1985 (1988); 'The Arms Control and Disarmament Pro­cess in Britain', in Hans Giinter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke, eds,

Notes on the Contributors XVII

Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation: Assessments and Prospects (1983); British Writings on Disarmament from 1914 to 1978 (with Lorna Lloyd (1979); Chemical Weapons: Control or Chaos?, Faraday Discussion Paper No. 1 (1984); Biological and Toxin Weapons: Issues in the 1986 Review, Faraday Discussion Paper No.7 (1986).

Seiitsu Tachibana (Japan) is Professor at the Nagasaki Institute of Applied Science (NIAS) and member of the Nagasaki Institute of Peace Culture in the NIAS. He has studied sociology and internation­al relations. A major area of his study is the evolution of US nuclear weapons policy since its formulation under the Manhattan Project during the Second World War.

Marek Thee (Norway) is a Senior Research Fellow, International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, and he has been the founder and editor of the Bulletin of Peace Proposals. He holds an MA in journalism, a PhD in political science and a D. Habil, in contempor­ary history. He is the 1982 recipient of the Lentz International Peace Research Award and was Hubert H. Humphrey Visiting Professor of International Studies at the Macalester College, St Paul, MN, USA in 1984.

He is the author of Military Technology, Military Strategy and the Arms Race (1986). He has been the editor of the following readers: Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace (1987); Arms and Disarma­ment: SIPRI Findings (1986); Armaments, Arms Control and Disarma­ment: A UNESCO Reader for Disarmament Education (1981); Nuclear Disengagement in Europe (with Sverre Lodgaard) (1983); Armament and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age (1976).

Kosta Tsipis (United States) is Director of the Program in Science and Technology for International Security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass. A native of Greece, he received his PhD in high-energy particle physics from Columbia University. He is on the Board of Advisers of the Bulletin of the A tomic Scientists, and he has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Councilfor a Livable World and of SANE.

He is the author of Arsenal. Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age (\983); co-editor, with David W. Hafemeister and Penny Janeway, of Arms Control Verification. The Technologies That Make It Possible (1986); co-editor with Penny Janeway, Review of us Military Research and Development 1984 (1984). He has contributed

xviii Notes on the Contributors

many articles to scientific journals, e.g. Scientific American, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Lord Solly Zuckerman (Great Britain) was created a Life Peer in 1971. He was born in Cape Town in 1904 and educated at the University of Cape Town and University College Hospital, London. Between 1943 and 1968 he was Professor of Anatomy at the University of Birm­ingham, and is now Professor Emeritus of the Universities of Birm­ingham and East Anglia. During the Second World War he pioneered a study of wound ballistics and was responsible for the analysis of the causes of casualties in air-raids. In 1942 he was Scientific Adviser to Lord Mountbatten of Burma in Combined Operations, and in 1943 became Strategic Planning Adviser to Air Marshal Tedder and General Eisenhower. At the end of the war he was appointed Scientific Director of the British Bombing Survey Unit.

In 1960 he became Chief Scientific Adviser to the Secretary of State for Defence, and in 1964 to Her Majesty's Government as a whole. He was a Member of the Agricultural Research Council from 1949 to 1964; Member of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution - which he was instrumental in setting up - from 1970 to 1974, and advised on the establishment of the Department of the Environment. He was a Member of the World Health Organisation's Advisory Committee on Medical Research from 1973 to 1977. He has chaired or served on numerous British governmental committees. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1943, a Foreign Member of the American Philosophical Society in 1965 and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1970. He was Secretary of the Zoological Society from 1955 to 1977, and President from 1977 until 1984. He was President of the Fauna Society from 1974 to 1981.

Lord Zuckerman has lectured and written extensively both on zoological subjects as well as on military affairs. On the subject of this book he has published the following books: Scientists and War. The Impact of Science on Military and Civil Affairs (1966); Beyond the Ivory Tower (1970); Advice and Responsibility - The Romanes Lecture (1975); From Apes to Warlords (1978); Nuclear Illusion and Reality (1982); Star Wars in a Nuclear World (1986); Monkeys, Men and Missiles (1988). In 1987 Lord Zuckerman published three long articles on SOl in: New York Review of Books, on: 'Reagan's Highest Folly' (9 April); 'What Price Star Wars?' (23 April); 'Nuclear Opening' (7 May).

Foreword Lord Zuckerman

Although the generalisation that science exerts a vital influence on political and social relations has a long and venerable history, it did not become popular currency until the Second World War, when Pandora's box opened to reveal to the world the richest store of technological wonders it had ever seen. Not surprisingly, the claim that science is the major transforming force of our times is now heard more insistently in the military world than anywhere else. Atom bombs, radar, supersonic aircraft, ballistic missiles, with the kaleidoscopic effects they have had on international affairs, are reflections of only the most conspicuous facet of the story of the relation of science to military power.

The decisions which we make today in fields of science and technology determine the tactics, then the strategy, and finally the politics of tomorrow. In the military field, we have only to think of nuclear weapons, and in the civil sphere television, to realise the force of this simple, almost platitudinous, generalisation.

The first of these two passages is taken from the opening chapter and the second from the Preface of my Scientists and War, a book that was published in 1966. Both were selected by Hans Giinter Brauch, more than twenty years later, as appropriate to the introduction of a volume in which a number of authors from the West, East and South representing a variety of disciplines in the natural and social sciences, as well as in international law, have addressed themselves to the general topic of the impact that nuclear, biological and chemical weapon developments have had on international politics and law during the past three decades.

Hans Giinter Brauch has done me the further honour of selecting other sections of my Scientists and War, as well as passages from different writings of mine, which he feels are relevant to the book that he has edited. The choice was his own, as was the responsibility of assembling and arranging this brief anthology of my writings both as quotations and paraphrases that he has master-minded.

SOLLY ZUCKERMAN

xix

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings Selected by Hans Gunter Brauch*

In 1966, in the introduction to his book Scientists and War: The Impact of Science on Military and Civil Affairs, Lord Zuckerman articulated a theme which he then believed and still does today to be basic to any consideration of the impact of science on war and on the apparatus of war. That theme is of special relevance for this book.

The excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's writings on the role of military technology have been arranged in ten sections in order to address the highly complex interrelationship between science, strategy and politics with a special emphasis on nuclear weapons and on the Strategic Defence Initiative, or 'Star Wars'.

I THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND WARFARE AND BETWEEN SCIENTISTS AND THE MILITARY PRIOR, DURING, AND AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

From the times of the Greeks and Romans up to the Industrial Revolution, in the view of Lord Zuckerman:

the apparatus and tactics of armed conflict seem always to have taken full advantage of whatever fruits of science craft-industry could exploit. ... The age of specialization ... ended all this [and]

·Editor's note: The excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's writings are based on the following three books:

I. Scientists and War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966). II. Nuclear Illusion and Reality (London: Collins; New York: Viking, 1982). III. Star Wars in a Nuclear World (London: William Kimber, 1986).

All direct quotes appear as extracts with the source in brackets where the Roman letters refer to the book and the Arabic letters to the pages. The pages of the book II. Nuclear Illusion and Reality refer to the edition by Vintage Books, New York, April 1983. The remaining text and the subheadings have been written by the editor who has also added emphasis to selected portions of Lord Zuckerman's writings.

xx

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings XXI

from the time of the Battle of Waterloo until the outbreak of the First World War a kind of divorce seems to have taken place between the scientist and the soldier, and between science and military affairs .... During this long period the military grew into an increasingly potent, prominent and professional social force, at the same time as scientists started to develop as a race apart interested ... only in new discoveries and new explanations .... A real dichotomy of outlook developed between the fighting soldier on the one hand and his technical colleagues on the other. This dichotomy led to a strange obtuseness about technical matters on the part of the 'general service officer'. (I, pp. 6-7)

For these developments Lord Zuckerman saw two explanations:

Thefirst is that the unsteady state which science, and the exploita­tion of science through technology, has always implied, and will always imply, is not compatible with military organization. Nothing is enduring in the scientific world; nothing is sacred .... The situation is totally different on the military front. ... The essence of any military institution is law and order. ... Where it is the habit of the scientist to question it is that of the soldier to obey . . . . This world of faith and belief, of service loyalty and discipline, is the very antithesis of the one in which science thrives. (I, pp. 8-9)

My second explanation ... [for these different worlds] relates to the isolated professionalism of the Services and ... to a pervasive social attitude about the place of science and technology. (I, pp. 9-10)

For these reasons until the I 940s the military man was suspicious of the changes provoked by technological advance - and correspond­ingly suspicious of scientists. For Lord Zuckerman:

The First World War was the period of transition in the relation of the world of science to the military hierarchy. ... It saw the emergence of submarine warfare, of aircraft, and of tanks, and of a vast range of new medical problems .... The transition ... was also powerfully influenced by the intrusion into the military machine of the outside scientist and engineer, [in Great Britain, for example] men like Tizard and Lindemann. (I, p. 13)

In the twenties, the involvement of scientists in the defence effort dwindled, but in the thirties, as the signs of an impending European

XXlI Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings

clash became obvious, a countercurrent developed, most particularly as a result of the development of the radar.

During the Second World War, civilian scientists were responsible for countless technical developments, including, to mention only three, sonar ... , navigational devices, and electronic counter­measures. And of course there was 'the bomb'. Another consider­able scientific contribution ... was the development of operational research ... [which] transformed the technical and the tactical, and even on occasion, the strategic scene .... Until the end of the World War II, there was little difficulty in accommodating new technical ideas and weaponry within accepted tactical and strategic military doctrine. The new developments did not conflict with traditional views about the value of surprise and of preemptive attack, or about the need to be able to outflank or outmanoeuvre the enemy, to outgun and silence his guns, to slow down his reinforcements, to cut his lines of communications, and to protect one's own. When they first appeared, even nuclear weapons seemed compatible with normal doctrine. During the four to five years when atom bombs were only in US hands, they were usually regarded as merely representing additional, even if remarkably excessive, fire-power. Ballistic missiles, with good guidance systems and range, were also accepted into conventional armouries without any strain on current military doctrine.

This state of innocence lasted no longer than the few years that it took the USSR to reveal that it too had the bomb, that it too had ballistic missiles. But it has taken many more for either side even to begin to come to terms with the reality that no military doctrine can be sufficiently transformed to accommodate nuclear weapons - in particular, no acceptable doctrine, as it applies to a potential land­war, exists between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Powers. The world has become progressively more dangerous during the time the two sides have shut their eyes to this basic fact - despite the efforts of a small number of perceptive military men, who im­mediately recognised that once the USSR had the capability to retaliate in kind to a nuclear attack, the bomb ceased to be a military weapon. It could be likened to a pistol which fires backwards as well as forwards when the trigger is squeezed. Unfortunately there were too few realists around to stem the enthusiasm of the civilian nuclear warriors who were only too ready to provide eager military buyers with new destructive wares. (III, pp. 30-32)

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings XXlll

The technological developments that have emerged since the Second World War:

have been associated with the emergence of new scientific processes of management ... whose purpose is to help the commander to control the apparatus of which he now disposes. But a question which becomes increasingly urgent in our age of nuclear deterrence, and one which grows in importance as more and more technology becomes harnessed to the demands of defence, is whether these new measures of control extend or curtail the possibilities of human, as opposed to machine, judgment. (I, pp. 101-2)

In a contribution that Lord Zuckerman made to a symposium on 'Science and warfare in the 1970s', held at Supreme Allied Head­quarters Europe on 23 May 1961 under the joint direction of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma and General Lauris Norstad, USAF, the then SACEUR, he offered one observable fact and three generalisations that are still relevant in the late 1980s:

The observable fact is that the component of military experience in modern weapon systems, and particularly complex strategic sys­tems, is declining rapidly, with a complementary increase in the technical input provided by the non-military man. This change is associated with the increasing specialization of single-purpose weapon systems ....

My first major generalization therefore is that the more modern technology one puts into weapon systems, and the more automated they become, the less they constitute the fruits of military thinking, and the less flexible they become in use.

My second proposition is this: However much importance one attaches to fire-power, battles and wars are not necessarily won by matching unit-powers of destruction, or by having a few more potential units of destruction than one's enemy .... Neither battles nor wars are uniquely determined by matching units of destructive power. ...

My third proposition is so obvious that it hardly bears mention­ing. It is that the more vast, the more heterogeneous, the more scattered any organization becomes, and the more complicated its component parts, ... the more difficult it is to control and to concert its multitudinous activities to a single common purpose. The difficulty is an ultimate limitation on the practical uses of good judgment. (I, pp. 102-4)

XXIV Excerptsfrom Lord Zuckerman's Writings

Lord Zuckerman illustrated these general propositions in the context of what he then called set-piece warfare, of the tactical nuclear baUle, and of the complexity of control. With respect to the first he argued that the more complex the weapons systems become the more they limit freedom of choice and action. He then stressed that the very presence of tactical nuclear weapons is the most urgent challenge to military judgment and control.

II THE TECHNOLOGICAL ARMS RACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

If nuclear weapons have no specific military purpose beyond deterring aggression, what have been the determinants that have driven the arms race in the nuclear age?

From the mid-thirties onwards, there has been an unceasing technological race between the great powers in every field of armaments, in the effort to increase the range, speed, accuracy and payload of aircraft; in developing a variegated family of missiles; in improving the fire-power, armour, speed and manoeuvrability of tanks; in improving small arms; in developing night-sighting tech­niques; and in exploiting radar and laser technology ....

The pace of the arms race has probably been faster since the end of the Second World War than it has ever been in all human history. So too has its scale and cost. ...

The enormous volume of resources that is now devoted to military R&D is a function not only of the scale of the effort, but also of the rising cost of the increasingly complex technological devices that it is hoped to incorporate in new armaments. Increas­ing complexity imposes its penalties. One immediate consequence is that the cost of the R&D which goes into the making of any major item of modern military equipment can be enormous, and is frequently so great in relation to the likely sums that would be demanded for production that the project has to be abandoned before completion ....

[More than] forty years ago, that is to say during the Second World War, the arms race was still to a large extent a race for quantity, even though in some cases radical qualitative improve­ments ... had a great impact on operations. In recent decades the arms race has been a race for quality, at whatever point the race has been entered, even though equipment that is most advanced techni-

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings xxv

cally has not necessarily proved to be the most useful in the wars in which nations have been engaged over the past two decades. High technology certainly did not payoff in Vietnam. (II, pp. 90, 92, 93, 95)

In the Lees Knowles Lectures which Lord Zuckerman delivered in Cambridge in 1965, he spelled out some general lessons on the arms race which he reiterated in 1982:

The first is that efforts to incorporate into new weapon systems technical knowledge that has not yet been established or perfected inevitably proves very expensive and often fails.

A second is that, with few exceptions, each new generation within classes of equipment costs much more per unit weapon than the one it replaces ....

A third consequence of the technological arms race [is] that each new generation of equipment makes greater demands than its predecessor for skilled supporting personnel. The situation has since worsened ....

Because of the increasing complexity and cost of weapons, there is a trend which I likened to an 'inexorable law' that affects the cost of defence R&D .... If a country wishes its forces to live up to the standards set by the arms race between the super-powers, it needs to re-equip them at frequent intervals with weapons that are more sophisticated, and therefore much more expensive, than previous equipment. At this point considerations of the absolute size of the economy come into play. The cost of developing a weapon system of a given degree of sophistication is much the same in all advanced industrialised countries. But the greater the 'buy' over which the costs can be spread, the lower the unit cost. For this reason alone, the United States and the Soviet Union by their very size can always expect to produce sophisticated weapons systems more cheaply than we can in Britain. (II, pp. 95-7)

This had direct consequences for the procurement policies of the United Kingdom:

In theory the UK has been forced to choose between altering its tasks so as to avoid the need to introduce some of the most expensive weapon systems, or of making its forces smaller. In fact the UK has been driven to a combination of both measures. The United Kingdom has had to reduce its commitments worldwide. It

xxvi Excerpts/rom Lord Zuckerman's Writings

has withdrawn from the Far East, from the Gulf, and from the Middle East. And it is still overstretched. (II, pp. 99-100)

According to Lord Zuckerman, this lesson does not only apply to the UK.

The arms race can also bankrupt the super-powers without adding anything to their respective military strengths. Deterrent systems today cost tens of times more than they did twenty years ago, when the political state of deterrence was just as operative as it is today. From the point of view of political/strategic vaiue, nothing has been gained.

In view ofthe enormously far-reaching but unwarranted political and economic consequences of the technological arms race, conse­quences which do not accord with the assumed aims of the race, it is all but impossible to believe that the process of defence R&D is under rational control. Ideal systems can be set out on paper whereby operation requirements are first defined in relation to clear military needs, and then translated into technological projects which are formulated against the background of all available scientific knowledge ....

Theory and practice in military Rand D are, however, remote from each other. Numbers of major and very costly projects have been started in the US and then, ... cancelled before completion; for example, because of redundancy, the escalation of costs, or because the system simply did not work. I doubt indeed if military Rand D is any more effectively controlled in the United States than it is in the United Kingdom, where the formal machinery to define operational requirements and to control projects goes on being 'reformed' year after year in the light of bitter experience. (II, pp. 101-2)

III THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPULSE AND THE ROLE OF THE SCIENTIST

It is Lord Zuckerman's view,

derived from many years of experience, that the basic reason for the irrationality of the whole process is the fact that ideas for a weapon system derive in the first place, not from the military, but from

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings XXVll

different groups of scientists and technologists who are concerned to replace or improve old weapon systems ... or by reducing weight/yield ratios of nuclear warheads .... At base, the momen­tum of the arms race is undoubtedly fuelled by the technicians in governmental laboratories and in the industries which produce the armaments. (emphasis added by the editor, HGB; II, p. 103)

Leading nuclear scientists - e.g. Oppenheimer, Peierls, Fermi and Szilard whose work had a major impact in making the nuclear weapon - contributed to the development of new weapons systems since the 1940s:

These men, and numbers of others who were working at the frontiers of scientific and engineering knowledge, produced new devices when it was barely possible to perceive their relation to the military operations that were then in progress. This process applies not only to nuclear projects .... In the nuclear world of today, military chiefs, who by convention are a country's official advisers on national security, as a rule merely serve as the channel through which the men in the laboratories transmit their views. For it is the man in the laboratory, not the soldier or sailor or airman, who at the start proposes that for this or that reason it would be useful to improve an old or devise a new nuclear warhead; and if a new warhead, then a new missile; and, given a new missile, a new system within which it has to fit. It is he, the technician, not the commander in the field, who starts the process of formulating the so-called military need (emphasis added by the editor, HGB). It is he who has succeeded over the years in equating, and so confusing, nuclear destructive power with military strength, as though the former were the single and a sufficient condition for military success. The men in the nuclear weapons laboratories of both sides have succeeded in creating a world with an irrational foundation, on which a new set of political realities has in turn had to be built. They have become the alchemists of our times, working in secret ways that cannot be divulged, casting spells which embrace us all. They may never have been in battle, they may never have experienced the devastation of war; but they know how to devise the means of destruction. And the more destructive power there is, so, one must assume they imagine the greater the chance of military success. (II, pp. 105-7)

This picture of the way events evolve is illustrated by the fact that

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before any decision had been taken by the British Government to replace Polaris with Trident, long before the need for any such decision had been put to Ministers, the men in the British nuclear weapons laboratory had pre-empted the situation. They had not only started to design a warhead for a MIRVed Trident missile; they had also, with American help, conducted underground tests of their designs. Presumably there were a few in the British military establishment who knew and understood what was afoot. A more important current illustration of the way men in the Rand D laboratories pre-empt strategic decisions - and therefore add rigi­dity to political discussion - is the cruise missile .... The nuclear world of today has come about because basic scientific enquiries into the nature of matter led to an understanding of atomic structure, and so to the demonstration that the atom could be split with the release of vast amounts of energy. From that moment technology assumed command. A new future with its anxieties was shaped by technologists, not because they were concerned with any visionary picture of how the world should evolve, but because they were merely doing what they saw to be their job. (II, pp. 107-8)

IV SEVEN REASONS WHY THE ARMS RACE CONTINUES

'The arms race is a race without a finishing post. There never can be an ultimate military weapon. What there can be is an ultimate destructive agent.' Why then does the race go on? ... In his book Star Wars in a Nuclear World Lord Zuckerman gave these seven reasons:

FIRST: The American and British air forces ended the Second World War mesmerised by the idea that the more destruction they wreaked the better, and that the more the destruction that could be caused by a single bomb, still better. Here, now was the answer: the atom bomb. It would dispose of all doubts that a country could be defeated in war by destroying its homeland .... SECOND: During the brief period when only the USA had the bomb, a powerful sense was engendered that its very possession implied unchallengeable superiority. This sense has never faded .... THIRD: In 1946 the United States Congress ruled that the respon­sibility for producing nuclear warheads was one for the civilian authority, not the military. For reasons of security, the scientists

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings XXIX

and engineers who design the nuclear warheads live in little communities cut off from the rest of the scientific world by dense veils of secrecy .... Their outlook, even their scientific outlook, usually strays little further than the confines of the kind of science, mathematics and engineering that is needed to design a bomb or a ballistic missile. In the days when the Atomic Energy Commission was responsible for the work of the two weapons laboratories only a few of the handful of scientists who were involved were aware of what was going on in the political world outside the USA .... FOURTH: As the years have passed, it has become more and more difficult for those full-time professionals who are involved in the design of new weapons to lift their heads above the nuclear mound they have created, and to cast their eyes over the political and military scene of which they are so small but dangerous a part. FIFTH: There is always the fear that the Soviets might be on to something novel in the nuclear field. This acts as a spur to our own warhead zealots. Technology moves fast. SIXTH: Interservice rivalry spurs the arms-race. It led the United States to develop a triad of nuclear forces .... SEVENTH: Few of our political and military leaders, who in the end are responsible for providing the resources for the pursuit of the nuclear trail, have time to reflect deeply about nuclear issues. They are conditioned into thinking that numbers of warheads matter, even when they acknowledge that we already have too many. They accept what they are told about the need to keep the nuclear deterrent 'credible', without realising that what matters is not what they think about the credibility of their own nuclear arsenals, but what they believe about the credibility of Soviet nuclear weapons ... [and of course vice versa]

Nuclear states opposed to each other cannot be expected to lower their guards. But nuclear technology, impelled by its own momen­tum, is no longer helping to increase, or even to safeguard, national security.

V NUCLEAR DETERRENCE VERSUS W ARFIGHTING: ILLUSION AND REALITY

For the past three decades - both in his Lees Knowles Lectures on Science and Military Affairs in Cambridge in October and November 1965 and in his later publications of the 1980s - Lord Zuckerman has

xxx Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings

been consistent in his criticism of tactical nuclear weapons and sceptical of the notion of tactical nuclear war. In 1961, he pointed out that the battlefield use of anyone of the weapons then in the Western nuclear armoury - and presumably also in that of the Russians -

would mean the instantaneous and total destruction or elimination of an area varying in size between say, a large village and a large town. (I, p. 66--7)

He went on to argue that

an actual nuclear land battIe could hardly lead to anything but total chaos. (I, p. 67)

and illustrated the point by reference to a study which had been carried out in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For Lord Zuckerman nuclear weapons have always been weapons of deterrence, not weapons with which battles could be fought.

There is no area in western Europe where a nuclear battle could be fought without causing considerable damage to non-military tar­gets .... The very existence of tactical nuclear weapons is thus the most urgent challenge that has ever been presented to military judgement and control. (I, pp. 108-9)

Alain Enthoven, an adviser to the former US Secretary of Defence McNamara, wrote in the 1960s that in no scenario would the use of nuclear weapons make any sense. General Collins has argued likewise in the 1970s, as have General Maxwell Taylor and Helmut Schmidt in the 1950s and 1960s.

Yet despite all the authoritative evidence and opinion indicating the extreme improbability that a tactical or theatre nuclear war could be contained, NATO has never renounced the publicly-declared doctrine of 'first use' .... It is argued that this is not a counsel of despair, but a reasonable response to Soviet military doctrine that a field war in which nuclear weapons are used can not only be fought but can also be won. (II, p. 72)

In 1979, the Carter Administration announced a change in US nuclear doctrine in Presidential Directive 59 (PO 59). However, in the

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings XXXI

view of Lord Zuckerman this change in declared nuclear policy has not changed the simple basic facts of our nuclear age:

First, nuclear weapons exist and cannot be brushed aside ... Second, the two super-powers have shown by their actions that while they recognise the extreme danger which these weapons imply to themselves as well as to their enemies, neither is prepared to take any step which they think might give the other a potential advan­tage in the nuclear field, so long as there is no settlement of the political differences which separate the Western from the Eastern bloc of nations .... There is no reason to suppose that any further elaboration of nuclear weapons could significantly improve the military security or strength of either of the two super-powers. (II, pp.57-8).

Mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains a valid and inescapable concept. Nor has the concept of deterrence changed as the numbers of nuclear weapons have multiplied.

We are still encouraged to believe that a nuclear war could be fought. But the reification of the concept of so-called 'flexible response' as it applies to a European battlefield implies no real gap between conventional and nuclear arms. (III, p. 210)

'Modernization' of nuclear weapons will not enhance the credibility of the deterrent effect of existing weapon systems. The credibility of NATO's conventional forces is a vital factor in the defence of Western Europe.

The technological skills that go to nuclear weapons could be used to increase the Rand D that is devoted to conventional armaments. Such a move would do far more to add to the real military options open to NATO ... than could ever be done in increasing the number of weapons in the Western nuclear armoury .... The concept of nuclear deterrence, of nuclear parity, has no reality unless it is backed with adequate conventional forces. (II, p. 145)

Lord Zuckerman in his writings has repeatedly emphasised:

Armies are not raised in order to initiate a process that within days would destroy most of the advanced countries of the world. It

xxxii Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings

stands to reason that only conventional forces can provide the flexibility that can negate the disastrous rigidity that is implicit in the concept of the automatic and first use of nuclear weapons. Only such forces can increase the number of options open to the NATO command. Equally the concept of 'graduated deterrence' is only a confusing abstraction. (II, pp. 77-8)

The continued growth of nuclear arsenals not only fails to increase, but actually decreases, national security. What was true twenty years ago is even truer today. (II, p. 78)

Only political determination based upon an understanding of what are the immutable facts of destruction can break the deadlock of the nuclear arms race. The arguments of nuclear weapons techni­cians are the natural reaction of men with a vested interest in the pursuit of their patriotic duties. But the concept of nuclear war is nonetheless a nonsense, unless there exist political goals for the United States, or for Western Europe, or for the Warsaw Pact powers of such inestimable value that their attainment justifies the price of annihilation. Of course, there would be some survivors from a nuclear holocaust, but what would they be doing in a destroyed world? ... (II, p. 127)

One might well ask how it is that so many 'top' British military leaders when out of office have expressed views about tactical or theatre nuclear weapons which are so much at variance with the armament programmes and tactical teaching which they presuma­bly endorsed when they were in command? My first answer would be that they were in no position to reverse a trend in the process of development and deployment of nuclear weapons which derives its momentum not from any formulation of well thought-out operatio­nal requirements, but from the minds of enthusiastic technicians plying their trade in the weapons laboratories. (II, p. 75)

To summarise, it is Lord Zuckerman's contention that nuclear war cannot be fought and won. There is no alternative to East and West deploying balanced conventional forces organised for defence - not attack.

A conflict in which nuclear weapons were used would not help solve any of the political disputes that now divide the two superpowers. It would certainly make it impossible for either to help solve the multitude of territorial and racial disputes and problems of social

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings xxxiii

and economic development which now torment the Nations of the world, and in the resolution of many of which both have a common interest. (III, p. 91-2)

VI SOl - THE WRONG WAY OUT OF THE NUCLEAR PREOICAMENT

No attempt to provide technical defences against a nuclear onslaught could be justified in strategic terms. The chances of technical success are remote in the extreme, a situation that was not changed when President Reagan launched his Star Wars vision, on 23 March 1963. SOl has stimulated a global debate, and it remains

a concept that is 'technology led' by the belief that new technologi­cal wonders can be fitted together in order to create an effective operational defence system (III, p. 92)

that was originally supposed to place a nuclear umbrella over Amer­ica, but whose purpose is becoming downgraded to a ground-based defence of critical targets.

Instead of reducing tensions between East and West and 'introduc­ing greater stability into the strategic calculus of both sides', [SDI] has exacerbated the tensions. It has also generated strains in the Western alliance. Even more important, SOl has divided that part of the American scientific community to which the challenge was particularly addressed, but with respect both to its technological implications and to its strategic desirability - a part of the debate in which the politicians, military people, and ordinary citizens have also engaged. (III, p. 64)

In some respects the debate is a re-run of the controversies that culminated in the 1972 ABM Treaty .... But this time it was not a case of an American President trying to persuade the political head of the USSR to desist from pursuing a fruitless search for security. (III, p. 64)

This time Mr Gorbachev ... tried to persuade Reagan ... in three summit meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik and in Washington that his SOl is a dangerous dream.

The Treaty did not debar development work which improved the

xxxiv Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings

radars, computers and defensive missiles deployed within the two sites [allowed] .... That was the moment when SOl really began. For, not surprisingly, the American and Soviet scientists and engineers who had been working on lasers and particle beams as possible Ballistic Missile Defence weapons did not cease their experimental inquiries when the 1972 treaty was signed .... The military chiefs on both sides, who had anyhow been dubious about the wisdom of the ABM Treaty, were only too ready to encourage them to continue .... Most of the scientists and engineers needed little urging. After all, it was their jobs that were on line. (III, pp.64-5).

[Edward Teller] 'became the chosen scientific mouthpiece of the "hard-line right", a term that Europeans have come to identify with those Americans who are intrinsically against arms control, who uncritically assume that more destructive nuclear power than what already exists means more military and political strength.' (III, pp. 65).

In addition to many individual scientists who have expressed their critical views about SOl, many scientific organisations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Federation of American Scientists and even the prestigious American Physical Society have done the same.

Many of the most influential and ardent proponents of SOl are politicians and officials ... who have so far displayed surprisingly little critical understanding of the difficulties that the R&D pro­gramme entails. It is surely absurd that matters which obviously first need to be strictly judged on their scientific and technological merits, should be pronounced upon by laymen lacking either a scientific background and any experience in the management of major R&D projects - or both ... (III, p. 80--81)

While America's European al\ies recognise the coherence of NATO is critically dependent upon the United States, whose policies they wish to support wherever possible, there is considerable scepticism in Europe about the SOl programme, and worry about the threat that it poses to the ABM Treaty.

Were some demonstration test of a novel BMO component by either side to result in a unilateral breach of the strict interpretation

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings xxxv

of that Treaty, it would be but a short step to the abrogation of the few other treaties that have been so painfully negotiated in order to try to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. (III, p. 91)

VII THE POLITICAL CONTEXT - CONSTRAINING FACTORS FOR POLICYMAKERS

The two superpowers continue to behave as though they do not believe their own proclamations, that one could outbid the other in a nuclear contest, that there is meaning to the terms which characterise the nuclear debate, terms such as nuclear superiority or inferiority, of nuclear balance, or parity, or imbalance .... The nuclear arms-race started in an atmosphere of hostility and suspi­cion, and it continues in suspicion .... Weapons have military utility only so long as their effects can be predicted and, if used, when their consequences can be controlled. As weapons of war, nuclear weapons comply with neither condition ... (III, p. 47)

The nuclear arms-race has not only brought about a nuclear stale­mate. (emphasis added by the editor, HGB) It has also forced both East and West into a mutual strategic vacuum, with the military commanders of neither side knowing how nuclear weapons could be used, and with their political masters fearful lest they are ever used. The vacuum has not been filled ... by armchair strategists or by the directors of weapons laboratories .... Their business is to find ways of improving existing weapons systems, and to generate ideas for new ones. (III, p. 51)

Of vital importance for Europeans

is the fact that the armed camps of East and West confront each other across a line which now divides the German nation into two, with mutual fear leading to the continuous build-up of armaments on both sides. The pace of the nuclear arms-race between the two sides has not yet been materially affected by the disarmament talks and negotiations that have been going on more or less uninterrup­tedly since the mid-fifties. (III, p. 46)

The world's leaders, be they Presidents, Prime Ministers or Party Leaders

xxxvi Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings

have declared that they want to see an end to the nuclear arms race. That this has not happened is due to the fact that the leadership in the USA and the USSR is fearful of taking action because the defence scientists and 'intelligence' experts who are at the heart of the race are always able to generate alarm about what the other side is doing, or may be doing. But this may not go on forever. (II, p. 129)

The policymakers have been constrained in their activities on matters of nuclear armament, strategy and arms control both by the political context at the international level which has also been referred to as the Cold War between competing social systems and military alliances and by domestic factors, which President Eisenhower in his Farewell Address described as the 'Military-Industrial Complex'.

[Prime Minister] Harold Macmillan once observed that politicians have to run hard to catch up with the scientists. But if their goal is peace, then politicians are in the wrong race. The scientists who work in the defence departments of governments, or in defence industries are not apostles of peace. Political and military leaders should cease seeking shelter behind the backs of those 'experts' who take what is usually called the harder line. In the twenty-five years since the first major effort was made to bring the nuclear arms race to an end, masses of water have flowed under the bridge. If the bridge itself is not to become submerged, the politicians will have to take charge of the technical men. This will not be easy. (II, p. 131)

VIII THE ROLE OF THE SCIENCE ADVISERS IN CURIDNG THE ARMS RACE

Why then does the nuclear arms race continue? Why is it that the scientists at the top. men who had all relevant information at their disposal. have failed to get their views accepted? (emphasis by the editor, HGB) ... (III, p. 205)

I doubt very much whether in the post-war period decisions which have spurred the nuclear arms-race would have been significantly different from what they have been had any of the top advisers concerned enjoyed a closer relationship than they did with the Presidents and Secretaries of Defense whom they served. The problem

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings xxxvii

was certainly not one which involved personal relationships. (III, pp. 205-6)

When it comes to the technicalities of the arms-race, the science adviser is on different territory, on territory where the experts rule. (III, p. 206)

While the technicians well understand the way nuclear illusions were and still are generated, chief scientific advisers have proved to be no match for the laboratory technicians and the other participants in the nuclear arms-race. (III, p. 209)

The process of the nuclear arms-race clearly has no logic. It seems all but incredible that the battle which the Presidential Science Advisers have waged with those who participated technically in the race at operational levels below their own seems to have been a lost cause from the start. ... Their opponents knew how to respond to the mood of the country, how to capture the attention of the media, how to stir the hearts of the generals. They have been adept at taking the short­term view and in creating the climate within which political chiefs have to operate. The longer term view of the top advisers - that the arms-race feeds itself, that there is no technical solution to the problem of defence against nuclear weapons - that view is too difficult to put across, because it is too simple and too logical, and because the basic facts have become submerged in a sea of acronyms and numbers, a sea of MIRVs, of particle beams, of 'throw-weights', and so on. (III, p. 212)

Basically the reason for the failure of the top scientific advisers to have any significant effect on the arms-race is that authority in the Western democracies has become too diffused, that the power of presidents and prime ministers - even of dictators - is far less absolute than is generally supposed by the people at whose head they stand .... I do not doubt that those of our political leaders who have been involved over the years in the build-up of nuclear arsenals were forced by political circumstances to take the decisions which they took, decisions which have encouraged other nations to follow their ex­ample, so still further endangering the peace of the world. They were driven to do as they did because they lacked the power to do otherwise, and consequently the power to delegate to their chief scientific advisers the authority which would have permitted them to impose their views on those of their subordinates by whom they had been ignored. (III, p. 213)

xxxviii Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings

The advisers recognised that there was no technical road to victory in an arms-race. Both sides were, and still are, bound to lose such a race. Once a state of mutual deterrence had been reached, nuclear competi­tion had nothing to contribute to the resolution of the political differences between West and East. The advisers cannot expect to disregard the political constraints which delimit the freedom of action of their masters. The story of the nuclear arms-race makes this only too plain. It is not isolation at the top that is the problem; it is the fact that no consensus can be expected among scientists who are involved in issues dominated by sectional vested interests, particularly those where the views of government scientists at lower levels are supported by powerful constituencies such as the military and certain sections of industry. (III, pp. 213-214)

IX MAJOR FUTURE CHALLENGES AND POLITICAL TASKS AND THE ROLE OF THE SCIENTISTS

It will take years before the great powers start living in peace. They never will unless several other things happen first. Above all, the nuclear threat must be reduced, and for that to come about the goal should be a halt to all R&D designed to elaborate new nuclear warheads and new means of delivery. Correspondingly, an effort should be made to end all work, vain as it is, to devise ABM defences. Even if such systems could never prove significant in the reduction of 'unacceptable' destruction, suspicion is generated by the fact that R&D to devise such systems (and counter-systems) continues. As a result the nuclear balance becomes 'destabilised'. (italics added by the editor, HGB; II, p. 132)

It should be recognised that ending R&D in the field of nuclear weapons would make no difference whatever to the capabilities of nations to fight wars. Were anything material to result from any R&D or any R&D in progress, it would merely create grounds for political argument ten years hence. (II, p. 132)

Neither the ABM issue nor that of the theatre nuclear weapons would have arisen if the test ban talks of the early sixties had ended in a comprehensive test ban rather than one limited to only two 'environ­ments'. (II, pp. 132-3)

However, the men who were designing bombs wanted the right to

Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings xxxix

pursue the course that was dictated by the technology. They did not regard it as their business to ask how relevant testing was to national security. Still eager for ever more destructive power, their military clients and supporters were only too ready to back the experts. (III. p. 57). Therefore, a Limited Test Ban Treaty was the most that could be achieved in 1963.

If governments go on behaving as though they were the servants of those technical and military advisers who have a vested interest in seeing that there should be no test ban treaty, there will never be a treaty. (II, p. 133)

The successful achievement of SALT I is an indication of what could be done, given the political will, backed by more of the simple kind of question that President Johnson posed about ABMs - will it or will it not work. (II, p. 135)

[But] it will not be easy to devise adequate machinery to assure the goal of halting R&D on nuclear weapons .... Admittedly, the efforts that have so far been made to slow down the nuclear arms race have proved all but fruitless. If future attempts are to succeed, there will have to be a general recognition that from the point of view of deterrence nothing would be lost if the size of the nuclear arsenals of both sides were significantly reduced. (II, p. 135)

Why then is it necessary for the Russians and Americans to maintain nuclear forces that are fifty to a hundred times bigger? ...

There is another set of considerations which seems strangely illogical. The state of mutual nuclear deterrence which prevails between the Warsaw Pact and NATO powers may well have helped keep the peace in Europe these past thirty years, but the best military opinion now concedes that, were any nuclear weapons ever to be used in a 'theatre context', that is to say, used in, or in support of, field warfare, the likelihood is overwhelming that the conflict would rapidly escalate to an all-out nuclear exchange. (II, p. 136-7)

Any new round of negotiations [after the INF has been ratified] should begin by focusing, not on those weapon systems that can strike directly at the United States or the USSR, but on the nuclear warheads, whether designated tactical or battlefield, which are deployed by the Warsaw Pact and NATO powers [primarily in Europe,] and whose use would be likely to trigger an all-out exchange. (II, p. 138)

xl Excerpts from Lord Zuckerman's Writings

X POLICY CONCLUSIONS OUT OF THE DILEMMAS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE

We need far more open and informed public discussion of the immediate 'causes' that have turned today's advanced industrial societies into the armed camps which they now are. These 'causes' are only remotely related to those which underlie the essential political and economic problems that will have to be solved in the decades ahead, even in the centuries ahead, if our world is to become sufficiently peaceful to assure the continuity of our species. As York and Kistiakowsky have emphasised, to expose these problems to public gaze we need far less of the secrecy that is the environment in which the nuclear arms-race pursues its irrational course. (III, p. 215)

The problems of the nuclear arms-race will never be resolved except through the encouragement of open discussion of matters where the rules of official secrecy are exploited, not because of the need for security, but to promote partisan policies. (III, p. 216)

I sometimes like to play the scenario backwards and ask myself what the world would have been like if, in the early sixties, the views of the Killians, the Wiesners, the Kistiakowskys, and the Yorks had prevailed, rather that those that proved dominant and which were born out of a matrix stirred by diverse political pressures .... There would have been more than enough major issues for the chief advisers to deal with, for example, agreeing the best energy policy, or how to control genetic engineering or population growth, or how to provide technological aid to Third World countries. These may not be so urgent, but they are far more important issues than the arms-race which now consumes so much of the scarcest of our national resources - informed experience and wise judgment. (III, p. 216)

Acknowledgements

The concept for this book grew out of a commission on 'Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics, Arms Control and Disarma­ment' at the eleventh General Conference of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) that was held at the University of Sussex, 13-16 April 1986. During its five lively sessions, considerable discussion and debate was sparked by 32 presentations from col­leagues from all parts of the globe: from the West, the East and the South. I Only a few of these oral contributions and written papers could be incorporated in this reader in revised and most often completely rewritten chapters.

My gratitude goes to those whose valuable contributions did not fit in the more narrow focus of this book and to those eight participants and paper-givers at the Sussex conference as well as to the six additional authors who subsequently agreed to contribute to this volume. Paul Hoag has ably documented the variety of themes presented at the Sussex conference. A few additional papers have been incorporated in the proceedings of the II th General Conference of IPRA,2 or had previously or subsequently been published elsewhere.3

Of the six authors who contributed chapters commissioned specific­ally for this volume only one has been associated with the Internation­al Peace Research Association before.

The editor appreciates the financial support provided by the Berghof Foundation for Peace and Conflict Research for two research projects on 'Destabilising strategic weapons technologies - Their im­plications on deterrence, arms control and on the policy for peace and security in Europe' (1983-1986) and on 'Armaments Dynamics and East-West-Conflict in the Atomic Age' (since August 1987) which have been conducted by the editor at the Institute for Political Science at Stuttgart University (till December 1987) and at Heidelberg University (since January 1988). Additional financial support was provided by the former Secretary-General of IPRA, Chadwick F. Alger, and by a grant from the International Social Science Council on behalf of UNESCO.4 The editor is grateful for both the encourage­ment and the suggestions from the members and participants of the Study Group on Peace Research and European Security Policy (AFES) who provided an intellectual framework for the discussion of weapons technologies and their evaluations in terms of stability.s

xli

xlii Acknowledgements

The editor is grateful to Lord Zuckerman for granting permission to publish extensive excerpts from the following three books: Solly Zuckerman, Scientists and War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966); Solly Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusion and Reality (London: Collins, 1982 and New York: Viking, 1983); Solly Zuckerman, Star Wars in a Nuclear World (London: William Kimber, 1986).

The editor appreciates the permission of SIPRI and of Taylor & Francis Publishers to use extracts and figures from the chapter by Kosta Tsipis that was originally published as 'Third-generation nuclear weapons' in the SIPRI Yearbook 1985 - World Armaments and Disarmament (London and Philadelphia, Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 83-106. The chapter was revised and updated by the author in April 1987. The Copyright Office of Aviation Week and Space Technology in New York granted permission to use the diagrams in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 in Ulrich Albrecht's chapter on 'The Nuclear­propelled Bomber'.

Rip Bulkeley would like to thank Jiirgen Altmann, Gary Goldstein and Jack Paton for valuable suggestions and criticisms of the earlier drafts of his chapter 'Nuclear Power in Space: A Technology Beyond Control?' (Chapter 7).

Richard Garwin's chapter 'SOl - A Sceptical Assessment by an American Physicist' (Chapter 9) is either partly adapted from or draws on the following writings by the author that have previously been published with the following titles:

Richard L. Garwin and John Pike, 'History and current debate', Bulletin of the A tomic Scientists, Vol. 40, no. 5 (May 1984), pp. 2S-9S. Richard L. Garwin, 'Space Defence - The Impossible Dream', NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol. 31, no. 2 (April 1986), pp. 22-7. Richard L. Garwin, 'The Soviet Response: New Missiles and Countermeasures', in John Tirman (ed.), Empty Promise. The Growing Case Against Star Wars - The Union of Concerned Scien­tists (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986), pp. 129-46. Hans Bethe and Richard L. Garwin, 'Appendix A: New BMD Technologies', Daedalus Summer 1985, Vol. II: Weapons in Space, Implications for Security, pp. 331-68. Richard L. Garwin, 'Countermeasures', Arms Control Today, Vol. 1, no. 5 (May 1985), pp. 2-3. Richard L. Garwin, 'Enforcing BMD against a determined adver­sary', in Bhupendra Jasani (ed.), Space Weapons and International Security (Oxford-New York-Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 71-84.

Acknowledgements xliii

Richard L. Garwin, 'Boost-Phase Intercept Revisited', in W. Tho­mas Wander, Richard A. Scribner, and Kenneth N. Luongo (eds), Science and Security: The Future of Arms Control (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1986), pp. 53-7.

All the publishers have granted the permission to use the material specified free of charge.

In my own chapter on 'Strategic Defence Initiative or Strategic Defence Response' (Chapter 12) I have used figures and tables originally published by two organisations in the United States: the Federation of American Scientists and the Council on Economic Priorities. Most specifically I would like to thank John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists to use Figures 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12.8 and 12.9 as well as Tables 12.4, 12.5, 12.6 and 12.10, originally published by Pike as 'FAS Staff Study: The SOl: Budget and Programs 10 February 1985' and 'FAS Contractor Study', FAS Newsletter, Vol. 38, No.4 (April 1987) as well as Table 12.10 that is based on John Pike and David G. Bourns, SDI Contracts after Five Years (Washington DC: Federation of American Scientists, 15 March 1988). I am also grateful to John Holdren and F. Bailey Green to use Figure 12.13, originally published as 'Military Spending, the SOl, and Government support of Research and Development: Effects on the Economy and the Health of American Science', FAS Public Interest Report, Vol. 39, no. 7 (September 1986), p. 12.

From the Council on Economic Priorities in New York I used the work by Rosy Nimroody, Eric Stubbs, William Hartung and Scott London: more specifically Table 12.8 was taken from Nimroodyj London, 'Star Wars PACs', CEP Newsletter, August 1986, p.l; Table 12.9 was taken from an article by Eric Stubbs, 'Soviet strategic defense technology', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 43, no. 4 (April 1987), p. 14; and Table 12.10, was adapted from Nimroody and Stubbs, 'Soviet Nuclear Buildup: The Restraints to SOl?, CEP Newsletter, N86-10 (October 1986), p. 3.

For any student of weapons technology in general and US defence policy in particular, these two organisations provide invaluable background information in their newsletters to members and inter­national associates and in their staff studies. The editor is grateful to these two institutions and to its authors for the permission to use their empirical results in his interpretation of the SOl in terms of theorems of armaments dynamics.

Not least, I am grateful to my assistant, Thomas Bast, the archivist

xliv Acknowledgements

of the Study Group on Peace Research and European Security Policy, who helped me in locating many of the sources used in my own two chapters and who compiled the index.

Heidelberg University May 1988 HANS GUNTER BRAUCH

Notes

I. Paul Hoag, rapporteur, 'Commission on Military Technology, Armaments Dyna­mics, Arms Control and Disarmament, International Peace Research Newsletter, The Eleventh General Conference Issue, Vol. XXIV, no. 3, 1986, July 1986, pp. 14-17.

2. Chadwick, F. Alger (ed.), Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association Eleventh Conference. Brighton. Sussex. England. Boulder: Westview, 1988 (forthcoming).

3. Several contributions have been published in Alternatives. The Bulletin of Peace Proposals. The Journal of Peace Research.

4. Hans Gunter Brauch, Survey of research already carried out or in progress in the Social and Human Sciences by Non-Governmental Social Science Organizations to investigate activities undertaken in the field of disarmament. Contract study for the International Social Council at the request of UNESCO, UNESCO Yearbook 1987 (forthcoming).

5. This work has culminated in the fourth joint conference of the Study Group on Peace Research and European Security Policy (AFES) with the Landeszentrale fur Politische Bildung Baden-Wurttemberg on 'Weapons Technology - Strategic Stability-European Security' on 7-9 September 1987 in Mosbach-Neckarelz, West Germany. The major papers of this conference will be published by Hans Gunter Brauch (ed.), Waffentechnik - Strategische Stabilitiit- Europiiische Sicherhei( (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1989).

List of Abbreviations

ABC ABM ACDA ADIU

AEC

AFES

AFES-PRESS AIDS AL ALCM ANP ARPA

ASAT ASE ASFC ASW ATB ATBM ATM AVCO AWACS AW&ST B-IB B-52 BAS BM/C3

BMD BPI BSTS BW BWC C

atomic, biological, chemical (weapons) antiballistic missiles Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Armament & Disarmament Information Unit (at Sussex University, UK) Atomic Energy Commission (in the United States) Study Group on Peace Research and European Security Policy Peace Research and European Security Studies disease of the immune system Alabama air-launched cruise missile nuclear aircraft programme Advanced Research Projects Agency, cf. DARPA (in US Department of Defense) anti-satellite system amplified spontaneous emission American Space Frontiers Committee anti-submarine warfare advanced technology bombers anti-tactical ballistic missile anti-tactical missile US SDI contracting firm airborne warning and control system Aviation Week and Space Technology a modern US bomber an old US nuclear bomber Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists battle-management/command, control, communication ballistic missile defence boost-phase interception boost surveillance and tracking system biological warfare Biological Warfare Convention of 1972 Celsius

xlv

xlvi

CA CBR CBW C3I

CD CON CEP I44Ce CIA

CIWS 242Cm 244CM CN CND COCOM

COM Conf. CONUS COPUOS

COSPAR

137Cs CSP CTB CW 0-5

o DARPA DC DEW DGFK

DIPS DMSP

List of Abbreviations

California chemical, biological radiological chemical biological warfare command, control, communication and intelligence Conference on Disarmament in Geneva Canadian circular error probability cerium-144 (nuclear isotope) Central Intelligence Agency (in the United States) Close inboard Weapon System curium-242 (nuclear isotope) curium-244 (nuclear isotope) Connecticut Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Consultative Group Coordinating Committee (for multilateral export controls for trade with socialist countries) Soviet communication satellite Conference Continental United States UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Committee on Space Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions caesium-137 Canadian publisher Comprehensive Test Ban chemical warfare Trident missile for US nuclear submarine Trident deuterium Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency District of Columbia directed-energy weapons German Society for Peace and Conflict Research dynamic isotope power system defense meteorological support program (in United States)

DNA Doc. DoD DoE DSBTF

DSCS

DTST EG&G EGK ELINT ELW EMP END ENMOD

EORSAT ERDA

ERIS

EW F-15 FAS FBB FEC FEL FFRDCS FL FLTSATCOM FOBS FRG FSSS FSST FY GCMI GDR GE GE GEO

List of Abbreviations

desoxyribonucleic acid document Department of Defence Department of Energy

xlvii

Defense Science Board Task Force (in United States) Defense Satellite Communication System (in United States) Defense Technology Study Team US defence contractor electro-generating channel electronic intelligence German SDI contractor electromagnetic pulse European Nuclear Disarmament Environmental Modification Convention signed in 1977 electronic ocean reconnaissance satellite Energy Research and Development Administration (in the United States) exoatmospheric re-entry vehicle interception system electronic warfare US fighter aircraft Federation of American Scientists fast-burn booster Federal Election Commission free-electron laser Defence Communication System Florida fleet satellite communication fractional orbital bombardment system Federal Republic of Germany Future Security Strategy Study Future Security Strategy Study Team fiscal year George C. Marshall Institute German Democratic Republic genetic engineering (in Chapter 4) General Electric (in Chapter 6) geosynchronous orbit

xlviii

GLCM GTE H He HEDI

HF HIRES I

HKV HSFK

hp HTRE-I IAEA IBM ICBM ICRP

IFSH

IHT IIA INF IPRA IR IRBM Isp

J kCi KeV KEW KH-9 KH-II KKV KKW KT KW LEO LiD

List of Abbreviations

ground-launched cruise missile US defence contractor hydrogen helium high exoatmospheric defence interceptor (US SOl research project) hydrogen fluoride high resolution photo intelligence satellite of USSR homing kill vehicle Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konflikt­forschung (Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt) horsepower an experimental reactor International Atomic Energy Authority International Business Machines intercontinental ballistic missile International Commission on Radiological Protection Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg International Herald Tribune Institute for International Affairs in Rome intermediate-range nuclear forces International Peace Research Association infrared intermediate-range ballistic missile specific impulse joule kilocurie kilo-electron-volt kinetic energy weapon Keyhole No.9 - US reconnaissance satellite Keyhole No. II - US reconnaissance satellite kinetic kill vehicle Kernkraftwerk - nuclear reactor kiloton kilowatts low earth orbit lithium deuteride

LoADS LSE

LTU M-50 m MA MAD MARISAT MBB MBFR

MD MED Res.

MeV MHW MIC MIG-25 MIRV

MIT MJ MLF MOLNIYA MRBM MRV Mt MW MX N N* NASA NATO NAVSTAR NB NB-36H NEC NEPA

NERVA

List of Abbreviations

low-altitude defence system London School of Economics and Political Science German defence contractor a Soviet bomber metre M assach usetts mutually-assured destruction Marine communication satellite Messerschmitt Boelkow Blohm

xlix

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna Maryland medium resolution photo intelligence satellite of the USSR mega-electron-volt multi-hundred watt military-industrial complex Soviet fighter aircraft multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle Massachusetts Institute of Technology mega-joule multilateral force Soviet sa telli te medium-range ballistic missile multiple-reentry vehicle megaton megawatt missile experimental (new US ICBM) neutron population inversion density National Aeronautics and Space Administration North Atlantic Treaty Organisation US navigation satellite system nuclear bomber prototype US nuclear bomber Japanese company Nuclear Energy Propulsion for Aircraft project Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Applications

NORAD

NOVA NM NPS NPSO NRX NSC NSC-68

NSDD NY OTA

PA PAC PD 59 PGM 147Pm

2lOpO

PPPUS

Pu-U 238pU

psi QPS R&D RAND RDT&E

rem

RHYOLITE Rorsat RTG RV SA-5

Sa-IO

List of Abbreviations

North American Aerospace Defense Command navigation satellite of the US New Mexico Nuclear power source/system Nuclear-powered Space Object Nuclear Reactor - Experimental National Security Council National Security Council document No. 68 of 1950 National Security Decision Directive New York Office of Technology Assessment of the US Congress Pennsylvania Political Action Committee Presidential Directive No. 59 precision-guided munition promethium-147 (nuclear isotope) polonium-210 (nuclear isotope) Public Papers of the President of the United States plutonium-uranium plutonium-238 (nuclear isotope) pounds per square inch Quaker Peace Service research and development US Think Tank research, development, testing and engineering unit of effective absorbed dose of ionising radiation in human tissue, equivalent to one roentgen of X-rays electronic intelligence satellite of the US Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite radioisotope thermoelectric generator reentry vehicle Soviet surface-air-missile (for air defence) No.5 Soviet surface-air-missile (for air defence) No. to

List of Abbreviations Ii

SA-X-12 Soviet surface-air-missile (for air defence) No. 12 in experimental status

SALT I Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (US-Soviet Treaty of 1972)

SALT II US-Soviet treaty of 1979 (not ratified) SANA Scientists Against Nuclear Arms SANE Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy SATKA surveillance, acquisition, tracking, and kill

assessment SCiBM system concepts/battle management SCC Standing Consultative Commission (in the

SALT context) SDI Strategic Defense Initiative SDTI Strategic Defense Initiative Institute SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative Organisation SDIO/IST Strategic Defense Initiative Organisation

programme invite, see and test SDIP Strategic Defense Initiative Programme SDR Strategic Defence Response SDS communication satellite of the US. SEL Standard Electric Lorenz SERT Space Electric Rocket Test Programme shp shaft horsepower SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute SLBM sea-launched ballistic missile SLCM sea-launched cruise missile SLKT survivability, lethality, and key technologies SNAP systems of nuclear auxiliary power SP-lOO research project to develop a nuclear reactor

for use in space SPAR space power advanced reactors 90SR Strontium-90 SRI Stanford Research Institute SS-IS Soviet strategic surface-surface missile No. IS SSBN ballistic missile submarine, nuclear-powered SSN attack submarine, nuclear-powered SSTS space surveillance and tracking system T-20 a Soviet bomber T tritium TNT trinitrotoluene

Iii

TRW Tx 235U 238U UCS UK UN UNESCO

USSR UV V VA V-bomber VCLT W WA WS-125A

WTO X-ray Zn

List of Abbreviations

US armament company and SDI contractor Texas uranium 235 uranium 238 Union of Concerned Scientists United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organisation Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ultraviolet chemical nerve gas agent Virginia Vulcan bomber of the United Kingdom Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties watt Washington code name for US weapon-system 125-A (nuclear-powered bomber) Warsaw Treaty Oranisation electromagnetic radiation of short wavelength zinc

Introduction Hans Gunter Brauch

This book focuses on the interrelationship between military tech­nology as one of several driving forces of the arms race, armaments dynamics, a set of theorems and hypotheses to interprete and to explain both the national and the international determinants of the armament process and of arms competition, and disarmament, a political goal or strategy aimed at containing, stabilising or overcom­ing the bilateral, regional or global arms race. Military technology may be interpreted both as a major stimulus to the arms race and as an impediment to the arms-control and disarmament processes.

Lord Solly Zuckerman, for many years Chief Science Adviser to the British government, wrote on the linkage between science, strategy and politics:

The decisions which we make today in the fields of science and technology determine the tactics, then the strategy, and finally the politics of tomorrow.

Today we can analyse the impact three major developments in military technology had on the tactics and the military strategy of both superpowers and of the two military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (that still absorb more than two-thirds of all military expenditure), as well as on the politics between them: the emergence of the first (nuclear fission bomb) and the second (H­bomb) generation of nuclear weapons that for the first time made a man-made Armageddon possible, the construction of strategic deli­very systems (land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as ground-, sea- and air-launched strategic cruise missiles) and the exploitation of outer space for military purposes by using satellites to observe, communicate, navigate (passive use) or to intercept and destroy the space vehicles of the adversary (active use, e.g. by ASAT systems). These three developments of the 1940s and 1950s have changed the strategies of the I 960s and 1970s as well as the policies of the I 970s and 1980s.

Leslie Gelb, a former director of the Bureau on Political Military

liii

liv Introduction

Affairs in the US State Department during the Carter Administration, warned in 1984:

The nuclear peace of the last 40 years could be transformed into a nuclear nightmare. What is in the offing is not simply another weapons system or two, not just another phase of the old arms race, but a package of technological breakthroughs that could revolu­tionize strategic capabilities and thinking.

That 'package of technological breakthroughs' that may materialise from the enormous sums of scarce scientific resources that are devoted today to the development of more efficient, controllable and destructive weapons may 'determine the tactics, then the strategy, and finally the politics of tomorrow'.

Our understanding of the interrelationship between scientific deve­lopment, technological applications in new weapons systems, opera­tive tactical concepts and strategic rationales, as well as political decisions for the nuclear age, is still rudimentary, with different levels in sophistication, being somewhat better for the United States and other Western countries and being hardly developed at all for the Soviet Union and many Socialist countries due to the excessive secrecy surrounding all military matters. The different degree of openness with respect to military affairs in the United States and the Soviet Union - glasnost has not yet touched the Soviet military bureaucracy and its decision-making process - make all scientific interpretations tentative and all scientific explanations strictu sensu impossible.

There is both an analytical need to understand better the interrela­tionship between military technology, strategic rationales, economic and bureaucratic interests and political decisions as well as a political requirement to draw practical conclusions from the limited success of political efforts to stabilise, control, limit and reduce the armaments process. Theorems of armament dynamics should have a dual pur­pose: (a) to stimulate empirical research with the aim to enhance our knowledge, and (b) to contribute to policies that contain the determi­nants of the weapons-innovation process, that select and procure weapons systems with respect to their impact on diplomatic and strategic stability and to control and to manage superpower competi­tion.

This volume is the first result of the IPRA Study Group on

Hans Gunter Brauch Iv

Weapons Technology and Disarmament that was established after the Eleventh General Conference of the International Peace Research Association, a global scientific organisation associated with the International Social Science Council and supported by UNESCO. Eight of the fourteen authors had participated in a Commission on 'Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics, Arms Control and Disarmament' that was organised and chaired by the editor during that conference in Brighton in April 1986. Six authors have subse­quently been invited to contribute specifically commissioned papers for this volume: Ulrich Albrecht (Free University of Berlin), Horst Fischer (Ruhr University in Bochum), Richard L. Garwin (IBM Watson Research Center in the USA), Roald Sagdeev (Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union), Nicholas Sims (London School of Economics and Political Science, UK) and Kosta Tsipis (Massachu­setts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., USA). Only Ulrich Albrecht has previously been associated with IPRA. All authors present their own views and assessments which are neither those of the institutions with which they are associated with nor those of the IPRA Study Group on Weapons Technology and Disarmament.

The fourteen contributors to this book come from different geogra­phical regions and from competing social systems: eight come from Western Europe - from the United Kingdom: Rip Bulkeley, Julian P. Perry Robinson, Paul Rogers and Nicholas Sims, from the Federal Republic of Germany: Ulrich Albrecht, Hans Gunter Brauch and Horst Fischer and one from Norway: Marek Thee, from the United States: Richard L. Garwin and Kosta Tsipis and from Japan: Seiitsu Tachibana; while two come from member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation: Roald Sagdeev (Soviet Union) and Pal Dunay (Hungary); and P. K. Menon, a former Indian diplomat who teaches in Barbados (West Indies), represents the Third World.

The fourteen authors come from different scientific disciplines: four have been educated and trained as physicists: Richard Garwin, Paul Rogers, Roald Sagdeev and Kosta Tsipis; one as an aerospace engineer: Ulrich Albrecht; in chemistry and law: Julian P. Perry Robinson; three as international lawyers: Pal Dunay, Horst Fischer and P. K. Menon; and six as historians and social scientists: Ulrich Albrecht, Hans Gunter Brauch, Rip Bulkeley, Nicholas Sims, Seiitsu Tachibana and Marek Thee. Seven of the fourteen authors are, or consider themselves to be, associated with peace research institutions: Ulrich Albrecht, who has a chair on Peace and Conflict Research at the Free University of Berlin; Hans Gunter Brauch, who has been a

Ivi Introduction

fellow supported by the Berghof Foundation on Conflict and Peace Research for several years; Rip Bulkeley, who moved from the Bradford School of Peace Studies to the Department of War Studies at King's College in London; Pal Dunay, who is associated with the Centre for Peace Research Coordination of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest; Julian P. Perry Robinson, who has been associated with and has been a contributor to the Stockholm Internat­ional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); Paul Rogers, who is senior lecturer in peace studies at Bradford University; Seiitsu Tachibana, who is a member of the Nagasaki Institute of Peace Culture; and Marek Thee, who is a senior research fellow with the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO).

The book is organised into five parts: the first develops the context for the analysis of military technology in terms of theoretical notions of armaments dynamics. The second part offers three case studies for military technological developments on weapons of mass destruction - on the third generation of nuclear weapons, on the diplomatic efforts to cope with new scientific challenges in biotechnology and genetic engineering in the framework of the second review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, and on the different driving forces of chemical armaments: supply, demand and assimilation into military doctrine. Part III deals with the military use of nuclear energy for bombers that never materialised - a case of a faked arms race -and in outer space for propulsion, on-board electricity generation and for directed-energy weapons. In the fourth part three physicists and two social scientists analyse different aspects of the ballistic missile defence problem, with a specific emphasis on the Strategic Defence Initiative by offering a sceptical assessment with respect to its feasibi­lity and affordability, its implications on the transformation of war and on strategic stability. On the level of declaratory politics, ten fundamental contradictions in the rhetoric of the Reagan Administra­tion are discussed and the US programme is interpreted in terms of theorems of armament dynamics developed in the introductory chapter. In the fifth part, three international lawyers, representing three different geographical and political regions, discuss the impli­cations of the military use of outer space on international law by focusing on the development of international legal norms in the framework ofthe United Nations, on the two major treaties that may constrain BMD and SOl: the multilateral Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972, interpreted in the final chapter,

Hans Gunter Brauch lvii

in the light of the rules provided by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties of 1969.

In Chapter I, Hans Gunter Brauch sets the stage with a brief analysis of (I) the emergence, growth and institutionalisation of military technology in the United States and in the Soviet Union since 1945, (2) technological momentum as a major determinant of arma­ments dynamics and of strategic arms competition between the superpowers, (3) the relationship between military technology and strategic stability and (4) arms control as the relatively unsuccessful effort to control and steer the weapons-innovation process in terms of stability considerations. In Chapter 2, Marek Thee concentrates on the dual function of military technology both as a driving force behind the arms race and as an impediment to arms control and disarmament. Thee specifies the operational imperatives of military R&D, such as its long-lead times, follow-on imperatives and the worst-case analysis and planning, and he analyses with respect to MIRV the emergence ofa new weapons system and its impact on the qualitative arms race. After a brief survey of its impeding influence on arms control, Thee develops as major tasks for future efforts the restraining of military technology and a shift from military to human development.

Kosta Tsipis opens Part II with a technical survey of the third generation of nuclear weapons, designed to maximise certain of their technologies while suppressing others. Three such 'special-effects' nuclear weapons are discussed in detail: the neutron bomb, the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser ABM weapon and the EMP weapon. In Chapter 4, Nicholas Sims discusses the diplomatic responses to changing assessments of scientific and technological developments that are relevant for the biological weapons disarmament regime based on the negotiations at the second review conference on the BW convention in September 1986. Sims suggests that a minor institu­tional investment, including a Scientific Advisory Panel of eminent persons 'would match up better to "the fundamentally dynamic character" of the treaty regime and its "need to continually adapt to relevant technological developments". In Chapter 5, Julian P. Perry Robinson analyses with respect to chemical warfare armaments the influence of technology and technical change, the demand-side factors developed by the military and the supply-side factors provided by the chemical industry. If an extension of the BW regime to include CW armament should fail, Robinson fears that a rapid integration of

Iviii Introduction

CW armaments into the forces of nuclear alliances would stimulate a more general proliferation of these weapons into regions where they may develop much greater military significance than in their current deployment countries.

Part III is devoted to the analysis of the role the military use of nuclear energy has played in the case of the nuclear-propelled bomber in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s and is already playing­and may even more so in the future - with respect to outer space. In Chapter 6, Ulrich Albrecht reviews a case of a faked arms race: how alarmist and leaked intelligence information about assumed Soviet projects, has been used in the United States to legitimise the expendi­ture of more than 100 million dollars for the project of a nuclear­propelled bomber and to undermine fundamental ethical consider­ations. Chapter 7 by Rip Bulkeley provides a survey as to how nuclear power might be used in outer space in order to overcome the existing constraints of the low level of spacecraft power supplies. As nuclear technologies for space, Bulkeley discusses

(a) the different propulsion systems, e.g. thermodynamic nuclear rockets, nuclear 'pulse' propulsion, nuclear electric propulsion and Project Daedalus,

(b) directed-energy weapons, (c) electricity generation by, for instance, radioisotope thermo­

electric generators and by reactors in space.

Bulkeley also analyses the known nuclear accidents in space with radioisotope thermal generators and with reactors before he moves to a discussion of the military dimension and the efforts of international control in the framework of the United Nations "ystem. Bulkeley concludes with some general reflections on what has or has not been achieved so far towards the development of a more effective regime for controlling the use of nuclear technology in space.

In Chapters 8-12 Rogers, Garwin, Sagdeev, Tachibana and Brauch discuss technical features, legitimation strategies and political ratio­nales for ballistic missile defence with the special focus on the Strategic Defence Initiative programme of the Reagan Administra­tion. Part IV opens with Chapter 8 by Paul Rogers, who argues that real implications of the SOl may be seen in a transformation of war not towards the defensive as is generally stated by SOl proponents but towards the offensive, e.g. against military and economic targets on the earth. 'A country able to mount such offensive systems',

Hans Gunter Brauch lix

Rogers concludes, 'would be in a position of inescapable military superiority without any risk to its own personnel' (p. 225). In Chapter 9, Richard Garwin discusses the conflicting goals of the SDI pro­gramme and offers a detailed technical overview of the BMD techno­logies that are to achieve these goals, such as directed-energy weapons, alternative DEWs and their basing modes, homing kill kinetic energy vehicles, and surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment (SATKA) systems. Garwin critiques a proposal of the George C. Marshall Institute for an early deployment of a space­based kinetic kill system and he surveys the many possible counter­measures to SDI the Soviet Union may undertake to undermine such a system, e.g. by fast-burn boosters, hardening of the missiles, modified trajectories, space mines, decoys and interactive discrimina­tion. In his conclusions Garwin pleads for a strengthening of the ABM treaty regime, for a drastic reduction of all nuclear weapons and launchers. In Chapter 10, Roald Sagdeev analyses the potential implications of Star Wars on strategic stability. Sagdeev concludes his brief essay with the remark that the SDI programme implies both an assurance of the own nation and a nuclear threat to the adversary, goals that could never be achieved by both sides simultaneously. In order to avoid a deadlock as the most likely outcome of this strategy, the author suggests instead political solutions through disarmament.

The last two chapters of Part IV, by Tachibana and Brauch, focus on the analysis of the contradictory rhetoric of the Reagan Admini­stration with respect to SDI and on an interpretation of the political process that brought President Reagan's Star Wars speech about. Starting out from the original statement in President Reagan's Star Wars speech, Tachibana discusses ten myths and contradictions that have evolved since then in the political rationale, the strategic objectives, the technological feasibility and in its moral justification. In a second part he reviews the Japanese debate on SDI, the official position and the roles of business and of the scientists, before he offers a real alternative to both nuclear deterrence and SDI through the elimination of all nuclear weapons. In Chapter 12, Hans Gunter Brauch moves from the analysis of declaratory politics to an attempt to reconstruct the decision-making process and to interpret it in terms of competitive theorems of armaments dynamics: the technological momentum, strategic rationales and economic considerations. Brauch concludes that President Reagan's Star Wars speech was an expres­sion of a top-down leadership by President Reagan that was stimu­lated by the advice he has received from retired scientists like Edward

Ix Introduction

Teller, military men like Oaniel Graham and his kitchen cabinet of well-to-do businessmen in their 70s and 80s. SOl cannot be inter­preted as a direct or mechanistic reaction to the Soviet BMO programmes, but rather as a macro-reaction that was brought about by the change in the foreign and security-making elite with the incoming Reagan administration.

Part V discusses, from three different perspectives, the implications of the military use of outer space for international law and the efforts to control it by several international treaties. In Chapter 13, P. K. Menon reviews the evolving legal regime in the United Nations context since the late 1950s, the early disputes on the 'peaceful', 'non­military' or 'non-aggressive' use of outer space and the acomplish­ments: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the convention on Environmental Modification of 1977 and the Moon Treaty of 1979, as well as the bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972 and the SALT II Treaty of 1979. Pill Dunay, in Chapter 14, starting out from two challenges to this treaty regime: ASAT and space-based BMO (SOl), discusses the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and their constraining impact on both ASA T and BMO as well as the inherent tensions between a space-based BMO system and the ABM Treaty. In Chapter 15, Horst Fischer applies the interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties to the ABM Treaty. Fischer concludes that ABM systems based on 'other physical principles' fall under the provisions of the treaty while research does not. However, with respect to 'field-tests' the provisions of the treaty do apply.

The two theoretically orientated chapters at the beginning and the three legal ones at the end, as well as the ten case studies on different weapons technologies, do not attempt to provide a synthesis or ajoint assessment, nor do they pretend to have the political answers as to how military technology could be contained in order to avoid the situation that Gelb and Zuckerman warn us against and predict. Written by fourteen experts from eight· countries, representing six different scientific disciplines, this volume is addressed to the students of international relations, defence studies and peace research alike.