Military Review March 1969

7/27/2019 Military Review March 1969

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ilitaryeVlew

In This Issue

+ Missile Gap+ Defector Operations+ Army Nuclear Doctrine

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UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMMANDANTMajor General John H. Hay, Jr.

DEPUTY COMMANDANTBrigadier General David S. Henderson

The Military Review is published by the United States Anny Command and GeneralStaff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides aforum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, nationalsecurity affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.


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Military Review Professional Journal of the US Army

Army Nuclear Doctrine . . . . . . COL Melvin D. Clark, USA, Ret 3 LTC Richard C. Orphan, USA, Ret

Service Testing Belongs to the User . . . LTC Dan H. Williamson, Jr., USA 5&

Insurgency in Latin America . GEN Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, Peruvian Army 10 Operational Efficiency of Soviet Staffs . . . COL Truman R. Boman, USA 21 Antarctic Treaty in Operation . . . . . Raymond J. Barrett 28 Armor: Soviet Arm of Decision? COL Charles G. FitzGerald, USA 35 US Political-Strategic Interests in Middle East . . . Ralph H. Magnus 47

Megatonnage and Missile Gaps MAJ Edgar O'Baliance, British Army, Ret 65 Defector Operations . . . . . . . . LTC John Ozaki, USA 71 Future Security Arrangements . . . . Donald E. Nuechterlein 79 Mao's Thoughts . . COL John B. McKinney, USA 84 Reader Forum 94 Military Notes 96 Military Books 107

The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of theUS Army or the Command and General Staff College.


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EdHor in CblefCOL Donald J. Delaney

Associate EdHorCOL Jobn B. B. Trussell; Jr.Army War College

Assistant EditorLTC A. leroy Covey

Features EdHorLTC Robert G. Main

Production EditorHelen M. HallSpanlsbAmerican Editor

MAl Juan HortaMerlyBrazilian Editors

LTC Samuel T. T. PrimoLTC Romero Lepesqueur

Publication OfticerMAl Donald E. TumanArt and DesignCharles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Publlshed monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, In English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of this publication hasbeen approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 25 July 1968.Second-class postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rates: $4.00 rus currency) ayear in the United States, United States military post offites, and thosa counUies wbich are members otthe Pall-American Postal Union "ncluding Spainh $5.00 a year In all other countries; single copy price50 cents. Address subscription mail to the Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.


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.tItlttnry ittritlU Awnrb Artttit

The Military Review announces the selection of the following articlefrom the January 1969 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTI-CLE:"Streamlining the Joint Chiefs of Staff"Major John F. McMahon, Jr., United States Air ForceMajor McMahon writes that the present Joint Chiefs of Staff must devotetheir time and energy simultaneously to two full-time jobs. I t is inevitablethat some service-oriented views are championed, thereby needlesslyfragmenting military thinking. He suggests that all command relationships with the parent service be severed and the Joint Chiefs be concernedsolely with national military matters. This would enhance their abilityto function as national military representatives, and national militarypolicy would be their sole concern.

* * *COMING:William R. Tracey, in "Politico-Military Involvement-a Functional Imperative," writes of the enlargement of the role of the senior officer and its extenlion into areas heretofore regarded as the exclusive province of political leadersmd diplomats. He feels that national security demands the thoughtful partici!IlItion of these officers in matters of foreign and domestic policy, but warns that;hese officers must be aware of the limitations on their role and should exercise

~ e s p o n s i b i l i t y with great discretion.~ i e u t e n a n t Colonel Dennis J. Harron, United States Army, in "A SeparateiJranch for Army Aviation," examines the problem of meeting Vietnam requirenents, the growth of Army aviation, and the present Army Aviation Program:0 determine whether aviation should be a separate branch of the Army. He:oncludes that the current program should remain in effect since it produces

~ v i a t o r s responsive to the supported ground commander and these aviators havehe potential for the highest levels of staff and command.


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ArmyNuclearDoctrine

Is it out of date?Colonel Melvin D. Clark, United Stalea Armg, Retired, andLieutenant Colonel Richard C. Orphan, United Statea Armg, Retired

Is A nuclear land war possible? I f nuclear weapons are used, howwill ground combat have to be modified? Will the level of de-struction make senseless the present methods of land battle?In advance of the first combat use of nuclear weapons, the an-swers to these and similar queries will remain unproved. Never-theless, a large part of the US defense posture rests upon the Armynuclear capability now fielded and deployed.The Army has a real challenge to make the most of its nu-clear arsenal and, within the broad guidelines of national strategy,to deploy its nuclear arms and school current forces in their use.Doctrine provides the direction for these matters. The nucleardoctrine of the Army consists of the policies, plans, procedures, andtechniques by which land forces would fight a nuclear war if calledupon today or tomorrow. The details of the doctrine can be tracedin a great number and variety of manuals and instructional mate-rials. But this doctrine can be expressed more concisely in terms

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NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

of certain major concepts and corollaries to facilitate analysis.These are broad beliefs that arewidely accepted. The concepts are notfacts in themselves, but are under

standings upon which doctrine isfounded. These major concepts form abasis for subsidiary corollaries whichhave to do with procedures or techniques. These corollaries are also important beliefs on which' the Armynuclear doctrine rests.The first concept is: Nuclear waris only one of many kinds of war the

Army may be called upon to fight.Land forces have shown great flex-: ibility in the past and have that promise for the future. Future conflictsinvolving land forces may range fromgeneral nuclear wars to limited conventional skirmishes and the manyvariations in between. The threat tothe United States may arise from ahighly advanced great power or one of

Colonel Melvin D. Clark, US Army,Retired, has been with the Universityof California, Lawrence RadiationLaboratory, L.ivermore, California,since 1967. A longtime research anddevelopment specialist, he received hisM.S. from the Jlniversity of Rochester; is a graduate of the Air War Col-lege; served as Commanding Officer,Kwajalein Test Site; and, at the timeof his retirement in 1966, was a member of the faculty of the US ArmyWar College.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard C. Orphan, US Army, Retired, was graduated from the US Military Aeademyin 1949. A career nuclear energy specialist since 1948, he has also servedin various infantry and ordnance assignments. Since his retirement in1969, he has been with the Universityof California, Lawrence RadiationLaboratory, Livermore, California.

the emerging nations or any intermediate, and the weapons may vary inlethality from that of the megaton nuclear weapon to the almost primitivetools meant for individual engagements.Meeting any scale of aggressionwith a suitable response based upon

the circumstances current at the timeis fundamental to the current US national strategy. The Army sees itselfas capable of contributing to the national defense at any scale of conflict.Corollaries to this concept are: Weapon systems must be multicapable. To implement this concept,

the Army has formulated a multicapable force unspecialized in anygiven type of warfare. Multicapabilitymeans utility in many environments.The military tasks have not changed,only the means for accomplishingthem. This has resulted in a mobileconventional force, with fire supportsystems capable of shooting eitherconventional or nuclear ammunitionwherever practical. This is to permitthe greatest flexibility and peacetimeeconomy.

Nuclear fire must be integratedwith conventional fire. The Armyseeks to acquire firepower systemswhich will be influential in all levelsof conflict. I t is believed that, even inconventional war, nuclear use mayhover as a threat; and in nuclear war,conventional fire would be required tohandle small, close, or extremely vulnerable targets.

Nuclear weapons are primarilyfor high-intensity wars. High-intensity wars are those in which the entirespectrum of modern sophisticatedweapons is used. The consequences ofa major attack upon Europe by theUSSR is conceived as such a situation.

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NUCWR DOCTRINEWhile nuclear weapons-the capstoneof modern sophisticated weapons-arenot excluded from use in small-scale,tightly controlled situations, Armydoctrine, tactics, and equipment appear polarized for either conventionalconflicts or high-intensity warfare.The second concept holds that: N'/boclear weapons ezt61ld the level ()f vi0lence ()f land war.The casualty rate will reach propor

casualty rate will cause a dispersionbetween units which will, in turn, affect the areas of responsibility. Rapidmovements and concentrations for limited time periods will be the rule.Decentralized, mission-type operationsrequiring a high degree of initiativewill be required. Decentralized procecW,res for use()f nuclear weapons will be necessary.Under current law, initial use of nu-

US ArmFirst-generation tactical nuelear systems were large and unwieldy. The travel weight

of this 280-millimeter gun was 83 tons.tions not experienced before in landcombat. Engagements will be characterized by brevity, but with an intensity beyond that now known. Ob-jectives and the scope of the battle willbe deeper than ever.Corollaries are: Both operations and organiza,.tioM for cmnbat will be mooijied. The

clear weapons is a decision made bycivil leadership. Once made, it is likelythat authority to fire a nuclear weaponwill be delegated to a command levelJsponsive to the military need. Withina theater of operations, it is plannedthat a system of allocations will operate to achieve optimum distribution ofnuclear fire support. These plans rep


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NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

resent a style of combat in which thenuclear weapons would be employedunder various degrees of local control. A nuclear fire dominancy will besought to reduce the level of casualties.While survival of the forces will be theinitial prime concern in a nuclear exchange, both combatants will seek anuclear fire dominancy. This is a condition like fire superiority where even aslight advantage in firepower tends tofeed upon itself. Until this occurs, anuclear dueling will be the primarymilitary action.

The third concept is: Combat powerconsists of both fire and maneuver.Fire and maneuver are the two classical ingredients of tactics for landwar. The emphasis between these twoelements is altered with the use oftactical nuclear weapons. However,doctrine continues to describe the firepower as support for maneuver forces,and this view is apparently fundamental to the Army concepts of nuclearwarfare.

Corollaries include: The enemy nuclear capability isthe priority target. In recognition ofthe unprecedented destructive potential of nuclear weapons, counteractionagainst the enemy nuclear capabilitieswill be afforded priority. This includesthe enemy's nuclear weapon systems,as well as the communications andlogistic facilities crucial to his employment of nuclear weapons. Againstsuch capabilities, counterbattery activity is more important than ever. Asin the past, the target priority dependsdirectly on the target worth in theover-all operation. Nuclear fire dominancy is an important premise onwhich maneuver proceeds.

Fire supports the maneuver ele-ments. In land warfare in the past,fire support was subordinated to the

needs of the maneuver elements. Nuclear doctrine acknowledges the counternuclear role as being dominantinitially, but emphasizes the continuedobligation for fire support of the decisive combat element-namely maneuver. The criteria for resumption ofclassical operations are achieved assoon as the level of nuclear effects subsides to the point that maneuver canbe employed decisively by the combatforces. This can be contrasted to theannounced Soviet doctrine in whichmobile forces exploit the results ofmassive nuclear strikes-that is, maneuver supports firepower.

The fourth concept is: Nuclearweapons are powerful but costly.Each nuclear weapon is consideredan important element of combat power,to be committed one by one by a responsible command leve!. While nuclear weapons are considered the decisive element on the future battlefield,the doctrine seems to impute a highcost and a relative short supply uponnuclear weapon systems. In fact, costand availability are relative quantitiesand are subject to change.Its corollaries are: Discrete targets will be engaged.Discrete targets are those which can

be considered separate from any other.Doctrine is specific that individualtargets be engaged on the basis of ascomplete target intelligence as possible. This presumes adequate targetlocation sensors working effectively inthe nuclear environment. Pattern orarea fire is obviated when this necessity for discrete targeting exists

A high IJ8surance of effectivenessis required. The Army's apparent viewthat nuclear weapons are costly andin limited supply is reflected in thetargeting rules. Nuclear targets normally require an effectiveness assur-

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NUCWR DOCTRINEance level of 90 percent. Such a level isremarkably high in comparison withthe use of other military resourcessuch as conventional bombs or artillery-and results in many special considerations for the nuclear fire planningand can be contrasted with engagement criteria for conventional artil

evokes political and moral reasons, aswell as military reasons, for limitingeffects to the target area.Corollaries are: Troop safety limits must be re-spected. Friendly troop safety--especially near the line of contact with theenemy-is a prime concern. The im

Artilkf'JI Trmda

Part of the NATO defense is the survival and protection of a densely populated, industrial societylery characteristic of modern conventional war.The final concept states: Unneces-sary destruction is to be avoided.The destruction achievable with tactical nuclear weapons approaches thatwhich could occur in a massive strategic exchange. Land forces, althoughequipped with nuclear weapons, existsolely to attain objectives short of thedevastation patently achievable in amassive strategic exchange. Therefore,the tactical nuclear weapon capabilityMilch 1969

pact of changes in the level of nucleareffects on present and future operations must be considered. The delayedcasualty-producing potential of nuclear weapons on military forces wouldbe a unique and often dominant factorin the decision to use or not to usesuch weapons. Nuclear effects will be limited tomilitary targets. In the environmentof defending the North AtlanticTreaty Organization, the collateraldamage which may be incurred by the

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friendly civilian population is a primeconcern. The military target must bediscriminated from the civilian, andrestraint must be used in the application of nuclear fires whenever a nonmilitary society is to be protected.This limita the use of effecta whichmight otherwise be of military advantage. The announced Soviet tactical

sidered to be composed largely of overwhelming conventional military landpower supplemented by a nuclearcapability. The United States soughtways of responding to this and otheraggression by means other than massive nuclear retaliation for all provocations.Tactical nuclear weapons were pro-

D e J ) Q r l ~ t of D e f e ' l ! 8 ~ConOiets may range from nuclear war to limited conventional skirmishesnuclear doctrine does not include restrictions of this nature.Army nuclear doctrine has its histOl'ical origins rooted in the mixtureof the first-generation weapons andthe necessity to cope with a threat inEurope. The assimilation of the nuclear weapon to ground combat usewas more evolutionary than revolutionary in its impact upon the conceptsfor conducting land warfare.A decade ago, our dominant interestwas the defense of Europe against aSoviet invasion. This threat was con-

posed in public and allied councils as apractical means of retaining NATOinitiative in responding to conflictsituations w/lile confining the destructive effects to military targets. Thisprovided the preferred alternative ofusing a strong US technological advantage against the massive conventionalwarfare threat to NATO.Although strategic nuclear weaponswere accumulating in the Soviet arsenal, it was believed that the UnitedStates could deter the Soviet strengthand that NATO would retain a deci-

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sive edge in mobile tactical nuclearweapons for some time. Nuclear weapons responsive to the needs of NATOland forces were adopted as a practicalmeans of retaining NATO initiativein responding' decisively to conflictsituations while limiting the destructive effects on the lives and propertyof friendly alIies.

At that time, the specific nature ofthe ground to be defended-NATOwas a friendly, densely populated, industrial society. An important part ofthe NATO defense was the survivaland protection of that society alongwith preventing the capture of theland area.The techniques such as discrete target engagement, discrimination byyield selection, decentralized authorityfor use, and minimizing damage totowns and civilians were established tofit these circumstances and influences.The manuals and instructional material were written accordingly.Perhaps of no less impact was thestate of technology for the early nuclear weapon systems when design ofnuclear weapons was a fledgling art. I tis hardly surprising that the first generation of nuclear delivery systemswas large and unwieldy. For example,the travel weight of the 280-millimetergun was 83 tons, and each Corporalmissile weighed almost six tons apiece.

For rapid movement and response ina nuclear environment, the weaponswere woefuIly inadequate. Both weresoon replaced. The nuclear warheadswere initiaIly characterized by complexity, high cost, and relative scarcity. The strategic requirements fornuclear weapons were paramount, andthe tactical needs were fiIled second.These characteristics affected theArmy rules for employment.Many changes have occurred in the

NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

world in 10 years. For various reasons,it appears that our NATO defense nolonger necessarily rests on nuclearadvantage. "Wars of liberation" withCommunist confrontation by proxyseem the likely style of war facing theUnited States now and in the future.There is the possibility of a world inthe future where nuclear weapons arebroadcast amongna larger number ofnations and where some of the smallernations of the world will be able toindulge in nuclear diplomacy.

Indeed, how the strong nuclearpowers respond to the small nonnuclear threats is a demanding question.No longer is a US response to all provocations in Europe committed to thetactical nuclear weapons; in fact,there is a distinct preference for lessthan nuclear means of combat. Thereis even a rejection of conventionalwarhead missiles in the Vietnam experience.The theory of avoidance of nuclearwar on any scale has wide support inthe political establishment; multipleoptions and escalated response are theorder of the day; and strong centralcontrol by political authorities is akeystone. The threat is now moreformidable, the national strategy haschanged, and the technology of warfare has become more sophisticated.How, then, does the Army plan touse nuclear weapons? Much like it hasplanned to do in the past-a conclusionthat today may be cause for some concern. I t seems that the Army nuclearconcepts and philosophy of employment had their genesis about 15 yearsago and reflect the conditions whichexisted at that time. A crucial questiondoes exist as to whether the currentArmy nuclear doctrine is sufficientlyflexible to accommodate all of the newcircumstances today and in the future.

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-Insurgency in Latin America

-Its Impact on Politicaland Military Strategy

General Edgardo Mercado Jarrfn, Peruvian Arm"

BASICALLY three types of LatinAmerican countries exist-thosesuch as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexicowho have achieved a level of development which, without arriving at maturity, has raised them above theconditions of poverty in which therural and working masses of otherAmerican countries live.A second group is comprised ofChile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, andUruguay where, in spite of the existence of internal contradictions, an

encouraging peaceful revolution hasbeen initiated and where there alsoexists the hope of achieving betterlevels of living soon.The last group is composed ofBolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and theCentral American countries where theliving conditions of the masses aredistressing, and these countries donot have sufficient means of escapingthis underdeveloped state in a reasonable pedod of time.In this situation, Communist insur-

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gents have been able to act with greatflexibility, adjusting their strategyand revolutionary tactics to the par-ticular conditions of each country orgroup of countries.Conditions of CountriesIn the first group, since communismhas not been able to foment an armedstruggle, it maintains an open politicalstruggle, legal or semilegal, as inMexico, or it makes use of the legalposition of the leftist parties, as inBrazil or Argentina. In this way, itattempts to achieve power in Chileby means of free elections, controllingor (rying to gain the support of political parties, alliances, and coalitions.In the second group, communismopposes the government in its effortsto achieve socioeconomic development.The pro-Castro Communist in thedivided leftist factions have sowndoubt about opting between legal action or armed struggle. Despite thisdisagreement, the action of the guerrillas can only, as an immediate end,disturb the socioeconomic development.In the third group, communismtakes advantage of the existing conditions, and its propaganda findsfavorable ground to demonstrate theinternal contradictions and the exist-

This article was translated andcondensed from the pamphlet, LAPOLITICA Y LA ESTRATEGIA MILI-TAR EN LA GUERRA CONTRASUBVERSIVA EN AMERICA LATINA,written by General Mercado andpubli8hed in Peru in September1967. Translation by Mr. ByronPalls, Lawrence, Kansas.General Mercado was Com-mandant of the Center of Mili-tary Instruction of Peru in Char-rillos until October 1968 when hebecame the new government'sMini8ter of Foreign Affairs.

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ence of unjust structures. In spiteof the failure of the guerrillas inBolivia, the priority effort of theCommunists is the revolutionary theory of Fidel Castro for Latin America: "Armed insurrection to achieveas an immediate end the capture ofpower."Areas of StrategyBased on these conditions, it is apparent that Communist insurgencystrategy in Latin America will continue to be exercised in four largeareas: In the military field, by meansof a revolutionary armed struggle.Guerrillas, with the active support ofCuba, could achieve the immediateend of disturbing socioeconomic development. In the sociological field, bymeans of a constant effort to indoctrinate the masses, with the activesupport of the Soviets. In the economic field, by way ofa systematic attack on the governments' efforta to achieve socioeconomicdevelopment. In the political field, by legal orsemilegal opposition in combinationwith the legally accepted leftist partiesand with the tolerance of certsin governments.Communist tactics vary fromstrikes and systematic work stoppagesto guerrilla activity encompassing alltypes of terrorism, sabotage, assaultsto obtain funds or arms, pillaging,mass demonstrations, infiltration intostate organisms, and urban or ruralinsurrection. Their activities in thecoming years will be oriented towardan intensification of ideological penetration of. the urban masses, particularly students, and workers and therural population by exploiting thesocial, political, and economic problems by means of agitation and propa

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UTIN AMERICA

ganda. They will continue, at the sametime, to support guerrilla activitiesin isolated regions, particularly inAndean America.An analysis of the situation inLatin America establishes the existence of certain characteristics common to all countries in which a latent

Armed revolutionary in Peru. Guerrillaactivity is a threat'in many Latin-American countries.state of insurgency exists. The firstand most dangerous element is theexistence in every country of a constellation of political organizations ofthe extreme left. These include: A pro-M0860W group. OrthodoxCommunist Parties of the Soviet linewhich answer to Soviet direction andcontrol and which feel that presentconditions are not favorable to guerrilla warfare. Their strategy is toweaken the governments, thus impeding the fulfillment of economicand social reforms and carrying outthe traditional practices of work withthe masses, systematic infiltration, in

surgency agitation, and propaganda,by means of "popular fronts.'; A prO-Peking group. This group'sstrategy is the use of armed struggleas the best means to obtain power.The members receive instructions andeconomic aid from Communist China.As Cuban activities intensify withCuba's desire to enlist in the revolutionary command of Lathi America, agradual weakening is felt in thesegroups. A pro-Castro group. The strategyof this group is the use of armedstruggle as the only means to achievepower. Such groups are developing astrategy independent from Moscowand maintain that it is not necessaryto wait until the conditions mature toinitiate armed revolution.DelinH. NucleusAround every pro-Soviet Communistfaction, there exists a pro-Peking anda pro-Castro group. and vice versa.Each of these organizations has adefinite nucleus, well trained, withan extraordinary belief and fervor,fuUy dedicated to the assimilation ofthe masses and, generally, of an appropriate cultural level. These includethe men who attempt to gain leadingpositions so that they can later capture the power and transform themselves into the leading and governinggroups of the state.The solidarity of communism hassuffered notably as a result of _thenumber of groups, the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking, thedifferences between Fidel Castro andthe orthodox parties of Latin America regarding the tactics to be used,the lack of doctrinal and directionalunity, and the diversity of the support.The proliferation of extreme leftistgroups in Latin America can be interpreted in two ways: as an indication that the Communists are becom-

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Cod6Communist arms and propaganda material captured from guerrillas in Argeutina

ing tired of being forctid to followa common pattern, or as a result ofthe ambition of their leaders, of theappetite for power, and of the existing antagonisms.Certain characteristics favorableto the growth of insurgency are common to all Latin-American countriesin varying degrees. One is the exist-

LATIN AMERICA The unequal distribution of income among the different activitiesand sections of the people. Even incountries such as Mexico, who forseveral decades has carried out intensesocial policies, studies show that lessthan five percent of the populationreceive 33 percent of the nationalincome. In Peru, 1.9 percent of the

ence of areas which are geographically, I!.olitically, and culturally isolated from the rest of the country.An analysis of the development of theguerrillas in Guatemala, Venezuela,Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia showsthat the insurgency centers arose andare active in those isolated areasof the country which are cut offgeographically and where political action of the state and cultural benefitscannot reach.Another common characteristic isthe large number of structural imbalances in the society which frequently provoke tensions of all types.Among these imbalances are:March 1969

population receive 44.2 percent of thenational income. The great social and economicdifferences which exist between thedifferent regions in the countries. InPeru, the existing differences betweenthe coast and the mountains constituteone of the most serious problems inthe country. The income per capitaon the coast is three times as great asthat in the mountains. The problemsof housing, food, employment, andeducation which exist today on thePeruvian coast are caused principallyby the large number of immigrantsfrom the mountains. This situationmay eventually create violence.

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LATIN AMERICA The ever-increasing differencebetween population growth and economic growth. In the majority of Latin-American countries, demographicgrowth is more rapid than economic

development. Only in Peru and Pan-ama does economic growth surpassthe rhythm of demographic evolution.

This discontent is almost alwaysgenerated where large working andrural masses suffer serious problemsof an economic or social nature, orbecause of the timid way in which certain governments achieve reformswhich the present times require.

In general, the process of ideologCommunism is very aware of these ically

A.1INrleGrt UnionMalaria control workman in Colombia. Positive social programs are essential to reduce

the threat of insurgencystructural imbalances. Fidel Castrohas stated: "The decade of 1970 willbe a decade of hunger and thereforea decade of revolution."

A certain degree of popular discontent and the resulting loss of confidence in government is another element which arises as a common denominator in the Latin-Americancountries where a latent state of insurgency exists.

Latin America is being assisted bypostponements in the accomplishmentof promised reforms. The Castro-Communist activities and agitators stresswhat they term "the lack of ability ofthe governments to carry out thesereforms," and they are teaching theworking and rural masses that onlythrough "violent revolution" will theybe able to obtain the order and justicethey desire.

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Finally, another ever-present element is outside support. The Communist movements in the variouscountries of Latin America receivetraining, propaganda, and funds fromthe outside. Early in 1966 at a tri-continental meeting organized byCuba, plans were established to accelerate insurgency and foment armedstruggle by bringing in economic andmaterial aid of all types, includingarms and ammunition.First Conference HeldIn August 1967, the first conferenceof the Organization of Latin American Solidarity met to revise "thepresent procedures of struggle and tooutline a common strategy for all theLatin American revolutionary movements" and in this way to carry armedstrife to the largest number of countries on the continent spreading "coordinated revolutionary violence."

In order to eliminate or at leastneutralize these ever-present "common characteristics," it is necessaryto combat their true causes. To formulate an adequate national policy forcountering insurgency, political objectives should outweigh military considerations.Unfinanced budgets, unfavorableterms of trade, imbalance of payments, constant deterioration of ratesof exchange, and small resources inforeign currency are problems which,among others, render the countries ofLatin America impotent to acceleratethe process of economic and socialdevelopment.Programs of agrarian reform, development of infrastructure, and irrigation are expensive. Governmentswhich start this type of operationin order to diminish discontent andto integrate isolated areas of the country often find that these same effortsgenerate opposition and resistance inMarcb 1969

certain political and economic sectors.The scarcity of resources demands

the establishment of priorities, andmany times these are badly determined, or projects are begun withoutconsideration of their total implications. The resulting fiscal crisis requires tax reforms, and this causesnew discontent and loss of confidencein the government by the more opulentgroups which verbally combat communism, but who often believe thatany reform goes against their interests.Important ObstaclesWhile these weaknesses are found invarying degrees in all the countriesof Latin America, there are also important obstacles to the advance ofcommunism. Fundamentally, these ob-stacles are the initiation of socioeconomic development, the lack of Com-munist support from the rural masses,and the position of the armed forces.

The development process started byLatin America in the 1960's, althoughslow, is the best weapon holding backthe intensification of insurgency inLatin America. For the first time inthe history of Latin America, governments are bringing confidence andhope to the large marginal area ofAmerica. But the governments of LatinAmerica must continue making thenecessary efforts to equip and incorporate the still largely marginal ruralmasses if they really wish to eliminatethe causes of subversion in the "sierramaestra" of the Andean belt.

The armed forces of the hemisphereare fully aware of the Communistdanger, and they will not tolerate itsimplantation on the continent. Butthe anticommunism of the armedforces will not be sufficient to deterinsurgency if the politics of the states15


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Colotul JoA" G. WaggonerA Peruvian Army engineer battalion builds a road through the Andes to provide access

to the isolated eastern region of the countryis not directed toward economic development, without group privileges,and toward effective social justice 'thatwill allow the elimination of existingcontradictions.In the struggle against Communistinsurgency, political considerationsprevail over military considerations.The politicians basically are the oneswho must conceive, plan, and directthe strategy because it is necessaryto fight Communist insurgency byeliminating its root causes.When revolutionary violence erupts,politics is always desirous that publicopinion, external or internal, remainunaware, as long as possible, of theexistence of these armed outbursts.I t tries to avoid at all cost the awareness of these insurgency outbreaks inorder to preserve the image of a stablegovernment and the existence of authority.On the other hand, military strategy

is fundamentally interested in actingas soon as possible with sufficientforce to eliminate insurgent outbreaks in their weakest phase beforethey can attain greater proportions.As a result, the relationship between politics and military strategyis often in antagonistic positions inthe struggle against Communist insurgency creating tensions detrimental to the unity which must exist between the two.The prevention of insurgency, inthe realm of political responsibility,requires the realization of broad programs of political, economic, social,and psychological development. Andhere military strategy cannot remain on the sidelines. The struggleagainst insurgency has widened thescope of relations between politicsand military strategy since the relations between the two are not limitedonly to repressive action when coun-

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LATIN AMERICA

terguerriJIa operations are underway,but exist at all times, before theyarise and after they have been putdown.

Although political decisions are theresponsibility' of the statesman, theycan be wrong if they overlook militaryconsiderations, for today, more thanever, development and security areinterdependent. The manner in whichpolitical, economic, and social problems are resolved in tense areas is ofgreat interest to military commanderswho operate in such areas.The struggle against insurgencyhas imposed upon the armed forcesof Latin America a new function ofassisting national development. In addition to the traditional defense role,the armed forces can contribute toconstruction of communication linesand cooperate in settlement programs.Also, by means of training and instruction given on the military posts,they can help diminish the skilledlabor shortage and assist in creating

the psychological receptivity for a"technical environment" which thecountries need for industrial development.This new function of the armedforces has required them to emergefrom the confinements of their posts,where they had stayed for decades,

to come into ever-increasing contactwith the socioecQnomic problems ofthe country and to direct their attention to the internal front.Within the armed forces, the armyhas the principal responsibility incounterinsurgency warfare throughits mission of territorial control. Infulfilling their mission of maintainingorder and destroying insurgency centers, the armed forces need to identifythe weak points of the socioeconomicreality of the areas where they workand aim for changes.

This requires a reorganization ofmilitary education in order to have,first, the perceptivity to be able tounderstand the grave problems which

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LATIN AMERICA

affect security, and then the ability tosee that the observations and suggestions they deem necessary reach thetop levels of decision making. Officersmust have a clear understsnding ofnational problems, of the fundamentsl

existence of Communist subversionin all the countries, and the threatwhich it constitutes to internal sts-bility and to the existence of thepolitical, social, and economic systemsof democratic countries, have made

Colombian soldiers train in counterguerrilla operations. Helicopters provide essentialmobility and access for strike forces.ideological nature of insurgency warfare, and of those fields in which itdevelops--economic, political, and sociological.

Due to the continentsl scale of Com-munist strategy, directed and supported from outside, through an international organization whose actiongoes beyond the tel'ritorial limits ofnations, it is necessary to centralizeinformation on a regional or at leastsubregional level to provide the exchange information among the different countries in the continent. The

the existing concept of strategic intelligence obsolete.The way in which the guerrillasappear and the need for immediatereaction place new requirements oncombat intelligence. From experiencein Peru and Bolivia, we know that theinsurgents go through a geststionstsge before conducting offensive action. The period of geststion in Peruand Bolivia lasted about two years.This is the most vulnerable stsge, andit has two phases. The first is a "reconnaissance" phase in which the group

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tries to get established, maintainingitself in constant motion and makingsurveys in search of the most appropriate area. In this phase, there isno contact with the people nor withthe outside.The second is an "installation"phase in which the group begins toestablish camps, to construct armsand supply depots, and to establishsecret roads and paths. In this phase,the group begins to create ties withthe people and to make outside contact for support and direction.Vulnerable PhaseSince the "reconnaissance" phaseis the 'most vulnerable, intelligenceoperations should concentrate effortsto detect the insurgents during thisperiod. Since this is basically a clandestine and dynamic phase of movement, intelligence cannot limit itselfto identification. It must penetrate itsobjective and then destroy it becausethe mobile and fleeting nature of theobjective does not permit the arrivalof traditional operating forces.

I t is also necessary in the gestationphase of the insurgency to avoidcreating the image of chaos and instability within the country because public opinion becomes uneasy, the op-position intensifies its attacks on thegovernment, the investment marketfalls off, and the developmental process begins to get snarled, thus playing into the hands of the insurgents.It is necessary to act as they do,clandestinely, to avoid alarming publicopinion or alerting the guerrillas withopen participation of the militaryforces.The intelligence always includes aknowledge of the environment inwhich the enemy is active, and thisenvironment is composed of the ter-rain and the population. A profoundknowledge of the people is funda-

LATIN AMERICA

mental in insurgency warfare, for itis only with their support that therural guerrillas or the urban ter-rorists can elude the governmentforces.In the struggle against insurgency,intelligence is the most importantmeans to success, and it is necessarythat the armed forces have a centralintelligence system. This central intelligence service should be highlyspecialized and dedicated exclusivelyto the collection of information, withhighly qualified personnel and means.I t should not be bogged down withadditional functions which paralyze it.The new strategy of the guerrillasin Latin America contemplates thesimultaneous operations of armedgroups in different areas of a country, with the obvious purpose offorcing the armed forces to dispersetheir efforts. Consequently, the Com-munist political and military organization avoids encounters with thearmed forces until their situationpermits simultaneous action.Internal DefenseTo combat this strategy, two typesof units are necessary for internaldefense operations: units with ter-ritorial responsibility, and units ofsuppression.The units with territorial responsibilities in internal defense act,through civic action and psychologicaloperations, to unite the people and,through their intelligence organizations, maintain control over subversive groups that threaten public order.The units of suppression shouldnot have territorial responsibilities,nor should they be involved in civicaction. They should be highly mobilein the tactical and strategic sense,and trained and equipped to operatein small isolated groups in the mostdifficult terrain. They should be es


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sentially offensive in spirit, and actin close coordination with forwardintelligence elements. In their oper.ations, they should be supported bythe territorial units who know thephysical and human environment inwhich the insurgency is developing.The latent state of insurgencythroughout Latin America calls fornew appraisals of political and military strategy to combat CommunistexPloitation. Political 'considerations

must transcend the military becausethe programs must be primarily directed toward political, economic, andsocial development to correct existingcontradictions and weaknesses thatprovide the environment for insurgency. At the same time, a closerrelationship between military strategy and politics is needed to maintain a climate of stability withoutwhich these programs cannot be carried out.

The current crop of insurgents in Latin America is dedicated, fanaticaland totally committed to the armed atruggle. They have defied substantial ef forts to e l i m i n a ~ e them, and are prepared for a prolonged and arduous campaign. They are inspired by the Cuban example.

General Robert W. Porter, Jr.

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Colonel Trnman R. Boman, United States Armll

SOVIET military leaders reflectmany of ' t}1e_concerns of theirWestern counterparts .over the prohlems of command and c'ontrol in modern warfare. This concern is reflectedin Soviet military journals which devote a generous share of their spaceto discussions of the functioning ofthe staff and to measures to improveits efficiency, responsiveness, and timeliness. A review of recent militarypress articles illustrates the trend ofcurrent thinking.The Soviets long have recognizedthe importance of tactical nuclearMarch 1969

weapons. They characterize the modern battlefield as wide, deep, and subject to sudden changes in the relativecombat power of the contendingforces. Their motorized rifle and tankdivisions have a capability to conductoperations over great distances inshort periods of time. They see modernwarfare as fast-moving, subject tosudden dramatic change, with an urgent requirement for the developmentof timely and meaningful operationaldecisions.To meet these requirements, the Soviets recognize that the functioning

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of staffs at every echelon must berapid, efficient, and effective. Consequently, they are giving considerable attention to training personnel,streamlining staff procedures, andadopting technology to assist staffs inthe performance of their duties. Thecommander has the responsibility, but

ized training also have been providedwith a well-balanced military and political education that has contributedto their effectiveness.'Staff officers are trained and prepared for their assignments throughout their careers in the various branchand combined-arms schools. At the top

Stall' officers are trsined and prepared for their assignments throughout their careershe is expected to be supported by ahighly qualified and competent staff.According to Soviet reports, over 26percent of the officers in the Sovietforces have received specialized education. As a consequence, the proportion of qualified engineers and officerswith technical training is steadily increasing. These highly qualified offi-cers are spread throughout all echelons of the military services. Theyoccupy key positions in the variousmilitary educational institutions, onstaffs at all levels, and in the Ministryof Defense. Officers with this special-

of the Soviet military school systemis the Military Academy of the General Staff. I t was founded over 30years ago with the mission of preparing highly qualified officers for positions of responsibility on high-levelstaffs and in the Ministry of Defense.Not only does the academy train Soviet officers for high-level commandand staff positions, but, in recentyears, it has trained hundreds of officers from other Communist coun

1 Colonel General P. Lukuhln. "The Selection.Distribution and Training of Jlilitary Pel"8ODnel."'Soviet Military Tramlaticma. Number 88'1. 17 Octo-bel' 1968, P 66.Military Revl2


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tries. Graduates are found throughoutthe armed forces of eastern Europe.'The formal schooling which Sovietofficers receive lays only the foundation for effective staff functioning.The staffs are' developed into efficientteams by practical training exercisesconducted throughout the year. Countyfair-type exercises, command-staff exercises, and war games are used extensively in the training of staffs.Field ExercisesTactical, county fair-type exercisesare conducted under field conditions.In these exercises, the individual staffmember is required to analyze relatively simple situations, make decisions, formulate a course of action,and then simulate passing the actionto the responsible elements or subordinates.Command-staff exercises and wargames are normally conducted undersimulated combat conditions prior totraining exercises or maneuvers in

S Colonels N. Svet1ishin snd P. MochaIov. "ThirtyYears of the BUitary AcademY of th e General StaffReviewed," Soviet Militaf'1l Translations. Number872, 2 March 1967. pp 28-27.3 Colonel General S. Shtemenko. 0' A High Levelof Smooth Functioning and Operational Efficiencyfo r Staffs;' MUita'1l Herald (VoyennJ/Jl Vllestnik),September 1963. pp 14.-20.Colonel Truman R. Boman is withthe Defense Intelligence Agency inWashington. He served in Europe dur_ing World War II, was in Korea during the conflict there, and is a 1956graduate of the Foreign Area Specialist Training Program (Russian). Hewas with the Office of the AssistantChief of Stal! for Intelligence, Department of the Army, prior to his

completion of the Regular Course ofthe US Army Command and GeneralStal! College in 1961. He was assignedto the faculty of the College until196,-, after which he served in Vietnam and with the 16th Artillery atFort Sill, Oklahoma. He is a 1968graduate of the US Army War College.Milch 1969

SOVIET STAFFSwhich troop units are involved. Theyare conducted with realistic situationsand are normally played with the enemy simulated as being strong, aggressive, and active. An effort is made toavoid oversimplification and stereotyped situations. The officers are encouraged to use their initiative andimagination, and to develop independent judgments and decisions. Strictadherence to a preconceived plan orscenario is avoided.The objectives are to develop a positive attitude, skill, confidence, andproficiency in the stsff officer. Duringthese exercises, duties frequently arerotated, perniitting officers to learnthe duties and functions of other staffmembers. This procedure recognizesthat there will be personnel losses orshortages and is designed to insure acontinuing operational capability inwartime.Points EmphasizedThe commanders take a personal anddirect interest in these exercises. Thispractice enables the commander to become familiar with the strength andweaknesses of his staff and also allows the staff to become thoroughly acquainted with the commander's atti-tudes, opinions, and methods of operation. By working together in thismanner, the staff and commander become attuned, and the functioning ofthe staff is improved.During the command-staff exercisesand war games, emphasis is given tothe following:

Rapid identification of essentialelements of information and dissemination of these elements to the commander and to subordinate units. Preparation of clear, concise, andtimely reports to higher, subordinate,and adjacent headquarters.23


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Development of skill in makingrapid, sound decisions. Development of smooth-flowing,coordinated staff procedures. Development of an appreciationfor the requirement to keep abreastof the status of subordinate units.In aU types of training exercises,a concerted effort is made to improve

mIssIons and location of subordinateunits are depicted.The staff is expected to formulateits plan as information becomes available and prepare an outline plan withthe use of a situation map. When thecommander makes his decision, onlya few final adjustments will normallybe necessary.and expedite the of lltaffs. In course of staff training exer-

Time is recognized as the most significant element, and procedures aredirected at this 'critical factor.Upon receipt of the mission, thestaff is expected to initiate prelimi

nary actions. Instructions concerningthe impending operation are immediately forwarded to subordinate units.Current data pertaining to the enemyand the information which will assistin developing the organization forcombat are immediately identified. Theinitial situation is plotted on a situation map. The location of major units,the mission, known enemy locations,direction of the attack, objectives,boundary lines, control points, and the

cises, the follOWing techniques areused to insure responsiveness: The commander makes his decision based on information projectedon a situation map. Fragmentary instructions arepassed verbally to subordinate unitsto be followed later by written instructions. Overlays and graphical techniques are used when appropriate. Tape recorders and photographsare used to replace written documentswhen possible. Blank forms and standardizeddocuments are used extensively.These techniques are used to allow

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the staff members to spend minimumtime in preparing written formal instructions and to permit them to devote more time to direction and control of elements of the command.To insure that the commander isappraised of essential items of information, the staff attempta to categorize i n f o r ~ t i o n coming into the headquarters, identify significant data, andpromptly report it to the commander.Information pertaining to the enemy'snuclear delivery systems, movement ofreserves, concentration of armored elements, and major readjustments inunit locations are typical of information that is considered of prime interest to the commander.Press articles indicate that this isthe type of direction and training Soviet commanders and staff officers arereceiving. To some extent, publishedmaterial that is available to the publicis probably idealistic and overly optimistic. However, it certainly reflectsemphasis on sound procedures and isconsistent with the requirements ofcontemporary warfare.Technological AdvancesNot only are the Soviets attemptingto improve the functioning of theirstaffs by training, but they are usingtechnological advances to improvetheir command and control systems.During World War II, Soviet commanders controlled their units fromforward command and observationsposts and echeloned these control centers forward as the battle progressed.Today. they recognize the requirementfor rapid movement and have giventheir tactical headquarters mobilitythat permits them not only to displacerapidly, but to function effectively ':..while on the move. These facilitiesprovide the commanders and staffsMarcb 1969

SOVIET STAFFSwith the modern communication equipment. Voice, continuous wave, and teletype equipment, which uses multiplechannel transmission means, enablesheadquarters to maintain close andcontinuous communications with subordinate, higher, and adjacent headquarters.'With these capabilities, commandand control can b.e exercised by theheadquarters consistent with requirements of the fast-moving and fluidsituations the Soviets expect to encounter.Special DevicesTo assist the staffs at the variousechelons in meeting the requirementscreated by the introduction of nuclearweapons, some headquarters have developed special devices such as "sliderules and aiming circles," probablyhand-operated graphical devices, forthe computation of data. These innovations have been developed by someunits, but have apparently not beenaccepted by the Ministry of Defense,and, consequently, have not been distributed throughout the armed forces.'Computers are being used by theSoviet armed forces to assist in thesolution of weapons control, training,operational, and administrative problems.The Soviets have recognized thevalue of computers not only to thegeneral staff, but to local officials incompiling information and data usedto coordinate mobilization plans andprocedures. By linking computers ofthe general staff with those at variouspoints throughout the nation, the accuracy and speed required for orderly

4 Ma1"8hal A. I. Leonov. "Role of SIgnal Special.i ,t in Toda,.s Soviet Army Evaluated. .. SOttiet Mili-tary TmnMtiou. Number 834. 13 October 1966.p II Lieutenant General t. TIJ&tenko. "The Staff andTroop Maneuvers." SekcUd SotHet MaiUf'll 7'ns'lUr-lGtm.. Number 22, 16 August 1960. p 6.

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mobilization and for mobilization plan_ning can best be met. Data providedby computers simplifies the process ofselecting the location for the organization of newly formed or activatedunits. Identification of individual specialists, skill levels, and numbers ofpersonnel available for mobilizationcan be done with computers.The structure of the str,ategic air

for vectoring fighter aircraft and missiles on to incoming targets at greatranges.The Soviet armed forces are devoting considerable attention to the development of improved staff techniquesand are making maximum use of modern technology to improve their command and control systems. However,they are not neglecting some of the

weapons and mobiUty of modem vehicles require a fast,smooth-functioning staffThe firepowerdefense forces, the grouping of elements within the air defense force,types of equipment to be employed,solution of the various coordinationproblems, and determination of reliable protection of various installationsare all determined by the use of computers. Optimum force structure, composition of forces, evaluation of aircraft and missile capabilities, and theorganization to effect coordination areproblems the Soviets identify as lending themselves to quantification andsolution by use of computers.Computers are also used in conjunction with other electronic equipment

more mundane problems that have historically afflicted headquarters staffs.The value of staff visits to subordinate headquarters is clearly recognized and encouraged. The purpose ofthese visits is to assist the subordinateunits with the solution of problems,to keep abreast of current activities,and to obtain an accurate picture ofthe status of the units. Soviet militaryleaders believe that the units not onlybenefit from the experience of the staffofficers, but the background, knowledge, and general education of thestaff officer are improved. By periodically visiting units, the staff officers

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keep abreast of the practicalities oftraining and operations and thus avoiddeveloping plans and programs basedon outdated experience or theories.

In spite of their attempts to simplify staff proCedures and minimizeformal documentation, it is apparentthat the Soviet military forces havenot been completely successful. As inmany military organizations, the Soviet staffs have been plagued with paperwork. All too frequently, the staffspends a considerable amount of timegenerating work for itself:In one of the command headquarterswhich is assigned the mission of di-rect troop command, of the number ofdocuments prepared and reproduced inthe typing pool in the course of fourmonths, 16.5 percent were sent out toactive units, 98.5 percent were de-stroyed, and ~ 5 percent were stuffed inthe files of the administrative head-quarters."

The Soviets consider the reductionof correspondence between elementsof the staffs and between headquartersas one of the most critical administrative problems they have at this time.By reducing the frequency of requiredreports, they have been able, in someinstances, to make a little progress.Reports that were previously requiredon a quarterly or monthly basis arenow only required annually or semiannually. This has resulted in reducing the correspondence in some headquarters as much as one-fifth.Headquarters have been encouragedto consolidate reports, particularly inthose instances where staff sectionshave been requiring subordinate unitsto report essentially the same information in more than one document.

e Colonel M. ZabaVllkiy. "At Headquartet'8 andin the Units:" Smcud Soviet Milil4f1/ Tf"dnlfa..tion8. Number 25. 22 September 1960. p 10.

SOVIET STAFfS

Another area in which Soviet staffshave apparently compounded the correspondence problem is that of attempting to delve into extremes ofdetail. Many minor specifics and ob-scure items of trivia have been reportedly included in correspondencegoing to subordinate units. Staffs havebeen enjoined to confine their activities to major problems and conceptsand leave solution of minor problemsand details to the subordinate units.Staffs have been accused of spendingtoo much time with minutiae and notdevoting enough time to creative organizational work.

These complaints or suggested improvements may not represent conditions throughout the Soviet armedforces, but they do indicate that actualstaff procedures, in some instances,are not keeping pace with the doc-trine and guidance being advocatedby senior Soviet commanders and theMinistry of Defense.

In spite of deficiencies that admittedly exist, the Soviet military forcesare cognizsnt of the need for rapiddecision making on the battlefield. Thefirepower of nuclear weapons, the mobility of modern vehicles, and the potential for control with advanced electronic equipment have made fast, effi-cient staff functioning imperative.

The Soviet staff officer is beingthoroughly schooled in his profession,trained to a high degree of proficiency,and imbued with a positive dedicationto duty. He is being provided withprogressive military schooling, modern effective equipment, and practicalexperience in realistic training exercises. With this comprehensive preparation, the Soviets expect to achievetheir goal of operational efficiency instaff performance.

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TheAntarctic Treaty

in Operation

Raymond J. Barrett

T HE Antarctic Treaty has nowbeen in force for over sevenyears, and the lOth anniversary of itssigning is approaching. I t was signedin 1959 and entered into force in June1961. The signatories were Argentina,Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Ja-pan, New Zealand, Norway, South Af-rica, USSR, United Kingdom, andUnited States.Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Neth-erlands, and Poland have also adhered

to the treaty. However, they are notfull participants because they havenot, thus far, conducted the substan-tial scientific research activity in Ant-arctica required to qualify.The treaty was hailed at the timeof its signing as a novel and signifi-cant example of international cooper-ation. I t reserved Antarctica for''peaceful purposes only" and bannedfrom the continent "any measures ofa military nature" and any nuclear

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explosions or the disposal of radioactive waste material. In addition, thevarious claims of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica were frozen forat least 30 years-the minimum validity of the treaty.

In effect, the signatories dedicatedthe continent to scientific research andpledged themselves to cooperate to thegreatest extent feasible and practicable in such research. Perhaps mostnoteworthy was the inclusion in thetreaty of a system of reciprocal openinspection to guarantee the faithfulfulfilIment of those stipulations.Nonmilitary ActivityResearch and other activity underthe treaty are entirely nonmilitary,but the actual experience is of considerable interest to the armed forces.Increased knowledge of polar environments is obviously useful. Also of concern are such matters as meteorology,oceanography, terrestrial magnetism,and global communications, alI ofwhich are affected by research inAntarctica.Experience gained in logistic support of the US program in Antarcticahas provided an opportunity to develop

Raymond J. Barrett is Deputy Chiefof the Program Staff, Office of Inter-na.tiontU Conferences, Department ofState. A US Foreign Service officerformerly a.ssigned to the AmericanEmba.ssy in Madrid, Spain, he ha.sserved at American Emba.ssies in Mex-ico City, Managua., Dublin, and Cairo.He ha.s also served with the Office ofEa.st and Southern African Affairs andwa.s US Secretary of the Perma.nentJoint Boord on Defense-UnitedStates and Canada., in Wa.shington,D. C. A frequent contributor to theMILITARY REVIEW, his latest article,"The United States and Europe," ap-peared in the December 1968 issue.March 1989

ANTARCTIC TREATY

logistic techniques suitable for thisinhospitable environment. In a moregeneral sense, any practical progressin international inspection proceduresis of interest and value to militaryand other officials concerned witb international security problems.Consultative MeetingsThe expectations inspired by theSigning of the Antarctic Treaty havebeen fulIy justified. Its terms are complied with scrupulously, and to datenot one difficulty or complaint has oc-curred. The signatories meet togetherevery two years to examine mattersof common interest pertaining to Antarctica and make recommendations tothe signatory governments designed tocarry out the principles and objectivesof the treaty.

Some 64 such recommendations havebeen made to date, and most of themhave been placed in effect by the treatysignatories. Consultative meetingshave been held in Canberra, BuenosAires, Brussels, Santiago, and themost recent in Paris in November1968. Each nation informs the othersignatories in detail regarding its proposed activities in Antarctica for thecoming year. The exchange of information has been thorough and useful.The scientific research carried outin Antarctica has had a profound impact in many areas of knowledge. I thas, in a short time, made valuablecontributions to such sciences as glaciology, meteorology, oceanography, marine biology, geology, and upper atmosphere physics. Knowledge in tbeseareas is basic to projects of such importance as possible climatic controlof the planet, the multiplication offood resources, and improved meansof communication.During the 1967-68 season, for in

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stance, the US Antarctic ResearchProgram carried out a great varietyof scientific projects. This programis funded by the National ScienceFoundation and headed by the Director, Division of Environmental Sciences, National Science Foundation.Projects were carried out in the fol

pated at one time or another duringthe 1967-68 program. These scientistscame from universities, Governmentagencies, and private research organizations across the United States.

One highlight of the 1967-68 program was the commissioning of permanent facilities to support US re-

lowing disciplines; upper atmospherephysics, meteorology, biology, glaciology, seismology, gravity, magnetism,ocean sciences, geology, infrared surveys, geodesy, and cartography.The United States also exchangedscientists or carried out cooperativeinvestigations with Argentina, Chile,France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,

the United Kingdom, and the USSR.Approximately 200 scientists partici

search in the Antarctic (formerlyPalmer) Peninsula. The station is located at Arthur Harbor on AnversIsland and replaces temporary structures used since 1965. The new facility is designated Palmer Station andwas formally commissioned on 20March 1968.

Another outstanding event was thesuccessful completion of the programto drill through the icecap. This work

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The National Science Foundationalso has a new research ship especiallydesigned for work in the Antarcticarea. The 125-foot sloop-named Heroafter that of Nathaniel B. Palmer whohas been credited with being the firstAmerican to view the Antarctic mainland in 1820-was launched in March1968. I t is a diesel-driven, but sailequipped, wooden. trawler-type ship

mendations made at the Santiagomeeting. The Ross seal and fur seal.in danger of extinction, are to bepreserved wherever they occur.In addition, 15 geographic areashave been defined where maximumprotection is given to colonies ofother birds and animals. Among theseare the emperor penguin, the giantpetrel, the Antarctic petrel, the ful-

The Eisenhower Range at top is separated from Deep Freeze Range by a glacierindicated by arrowwhich will Bupplement the facilities atPalmer Station. The Hero serves asa floating laboratory for both marineand terrestrial investigations. In particular, it provides the first access tomany coastal areas of the AntarcticPeninsula.Impressive progress has also beenmade in protecting the fauna and florain the treaty zone which includes allland and water south of 60 degreessouth latitude. The treaty includedprovision for protecting the livingnatural resources in the Antarcticarea. There were 28 specific recom

mar. and the elephant seal. Also singled out for protection are points ofecological interest where there areconcentrations of the microfauna andflora that are the basis of the Antarctic ecosystem.These measures are of great importance because they are directed towardmaintenance of the biological equilibrium in the Antarctic area. The research of recent years has shown thatthe alteration of natural conditions inthe waters of Antarctica can affect thebiological balance as far away as Ecuador.

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cautioned that states active in Ant-arctica had been cooperative with theUnited States in matters relating tothe continent, and that the US policywas to preserve this cooperative spirit.Although the United States was thefirst to announce intention to makeinspections, New Zealand was the firstactually to do so. Two New Zealandobservers visited the McMurdo Sound,the South Pole, and .Byrd Stations in1963. They reported that everythingappeared to be fully consistent with

the objectives and provisions of theAntarctic Treaty. Australia and theUnited Kingdom each sent one ob-server in December 1963 to three USstations.Two groups of US observers con-ducted inspections in January 1964.One group of three observers visitedtwo Argentine, two Chilean, and twoUnited Kingdom bases located in theAntarctic Peninsula area of West Ant-arctica. This US group was transported by a US Coast Guard' ice-breaker. The other group of four USobservers visited the New ZealandScott Station near McMurdo and twoSoviet Union stations in East Ant-arctica-Mirnyy and Vostok. US aircraft based at McMurdo Station wereused for their transportation. In ad-dition, the US observers carried outaerial photographic and visual obser-vations of the French station, Dumontd'Urville.The exercise of the right of inspec-tion is particularly significant becauseof the territorial claims of several

countries. These countries are Argen-tina, Australia, Chile, France, NewZealand, Norway, and the UnitedKingdom, but neither the Soviet Unionnor the United States recognizes anyof these claims. The right of inspec-tion and its implementation are alsosignificant because of the USSR's gen-eral resistance to inspections. The co-chairman of the Soviet delegation tothe conference in Washington thatdrafted the Antarctic Treaty observedthat the Soviet Union could agree tounlimited inspections in Antarctica''where inspections cannot be usedagainst national security."The inspections have ben carried outwithout prejudice to the spirit of goodwill and cooperation that exists amongexpeditions in Antarctica. The 1966-67 US observer team reported thatthey ''were cordially welcomed at eachstation and full cooperation was ex-tended" and that "the spirit of cor-diality and cooperation, which thetreaty fosters, was evident through-out." In fact, the sense of mutualconfidence has been strengthened bythe inspection results stressing thatno evidence of any violations of thetreaty has been found.The Antarctic Treaty has thus beena success in practice and spirit. I t hasserved as a model for the United Na-tions Outer Space Treaty on the ex-ploration and peaceful uses of outerspace and would seem to be an excel-lent example of cooperation amongnations and a step toward a peacefulworld.

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ARMORSoviet Arm of Decision?

Colonel Charles G. FitzGerald,United Stales Armlt

The striking pOUler of the ground (orees is primarilll insured bll the IJlUltextent to Ulhieh thell are saluraled with tws ESBentitJIl,,, tllllks are one01 the chief meanlf for the rapid exploitation 01 the deep Btrlkelf made bll ourmissUe and air forces and our artiilerll.

T HESE are the words of the pri viets employed armor in World Warmate of the younger Soviet mil II. Recent Soviet writings have delinitary generation now moving onto cen eated the general outlines of their exter stage-Marshal of the Soviet perience in a series of articles pubUnion, Ivan I. Yakubovsky, First Dep lished in the Military History Journal,uty Soviet Minister of Defense and beginning in 1963, and summarizedCommander in Chief of Warsaw Pact herein.forces. Prewar Soviet doctrine on the emInasmuch as Marshal Yakubovsky ployment of the tank in large armoredclearly envisages a prominent role for formations was noteworthy for its conthe tank, the time would seem appro ceptual grasp of the capabilities ofpriate for a fresh look at how the So- this relatively untested weapon. That

this was so .should be no surprise. The-Ivan I. Yakubovsky. Red Star. 21 July 1967.


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ARMORCivil War which followed on the heelsof the revolution of November 1917had been largely a war of movementover the vast steppes of the Ukraine,Siberia, and central Asia. As a consequence, many cavalrymen had cometo the fore in the Red Army of the1930's. They viewed armor as the natural claimant to the long Russian cavalry heritage. .First Mechanized CorpsDuring the late 1930's, the SovietHigh Command approved the conceptof armor organized into large formations. This resulted in the development of the first Soviet mechanizedcorps consisting of two tank divisionsand one motorized infantry divisionwith a total of 1,100 to 1,200 armored vehicles.

Thus, early Soviet thinking on thetank went beyond that of the theoreticians of the West, except for thescattered zealots who saw it as aweapon capable of independent operations. The doctrine did not, however,reach the extreme of asserting thatthe tank could operate without infantry support. The tank division retained one mot?rized infantry brigade

Colonel Charles G. FitzGerald iswith the Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs),Washington. He is a graduate of theRussian Institute, Columbia University; the illS Army Command and General Staff College; and the US ArmyWar College. He has served as De'{1UtyChief, US Military Liaison Mission tothe Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany; with the Washington-Moscow "Hot Line," NationalMilitary Command Center, Office ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington;in Moscow as Army Attache; and onthe faculty of the US Army War Col-lege.

to support its three tank brigades.Likewise, the mechanized corps, aspreviously noted, had a motorized infantry division to support its two tankdivisions. This belief in the requirement for infantry to support the largetank unit has continued in the postwar Soviet tank division and tankarmy.Despite the early decision to organize large tank formations, two circumstances dictated that developmentsshould proceed otherwise. The firstwas the Soviet experience in Spain'sCivil War. This led to a reevaluationof the tank's capabilities for farreaching offensive operations. Simultaneously, it became evident that Soviet industry was still unable to respond to the demands posed by thecreation of large armored forces.

Consequently, in 1940, the SovietGeneral Staff returned to the conceptof armor primarily as a supportingarm for infantry. The tank and mechanized infantry brigade became thechief organizational forms for armor.The first months of the war were witness to heavy Red Army losses in materiel-especially tanks-resulting infurther disintegration "of large tankformations. ,Production Increases tDuring 1942, t h ~ t u a t i o n beganto improve. Soviet 1tiink plants, having completed their evacuation to thelands east of the Urals, had begun toproduce tanks in large numbers. Production for 1942 amounted to 24,600tanks and self-propelled artilleryweapons.The high command once again undertook the organization of tank andmechanized units. The first was thetank corps-in essence, tank division-authorized in mid-1942, with three


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tank brigades and one motorized riflebrigade. The new mechanized corps,with its three mechanized infantrybrigades and one tank brigade, followed shortly thereafter.Both corps underwent modificationsuntil they attained their final wartimeconfiguration in mid-1943. The lastchanges provided the tank corps with

six on the Red Army's rolls. All wereretained in general headquarters reserve and attached to the variousfronts where they conducted operations on the more important axes.The tank army executed the fullrange of missions entrusted to thecombined-arms formation, includingthe penetration, envelopment, pursuit,

The Til Soviet tank used in World War IL In 1942, the Soviet High Command againundertook the organization of major tank and mechanized units.three tank brigades of 55 tanks eachand one mechanized infantry brigadewith 42 tanks. The corps also had 63assault guns and a total of 270 armored vehicles. The mechanized corpsconsisted of three mechanized infantry brigades with 42 tanks each andone tank brigade of 57 tanks, plus 63assault guns, for a total of 246 armored vehicles.

In 1943, the Soviet General Staffapproved the organization of the tankarmy. By the war's end, there wereMarch 1969

exploitation, seizure of vital objectives, covering-force operations, themeeting engagement, and massivecounterattacks.The 1943 tables of organization andequipment provided the tank armywith two tank corps and one mechanized corps, plus supporting elementswhich included artillery, antiaircraftartillery, engineer, and signal units.The authorized strength was 47,000men, 620 tanks, and 189 self-propelledartillery weapons-a total of 809 ar

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mored vehicles. Its organic and supporting artillery elements had a totalof 600 mortars and towed artilleryweapons with calibers greater than 76millimeters. Thus, it had the capability of operating independently of thecombined-arms--or infantry-army.In more than one instance, two tank

The Vistula-Oder operation of January 1945 is a forceful illustration ofthe massed employment of such formations. The operation was executedby two fronts-the 1st BelorussianFront, commanded by Marshsl GeorgiK. Zhukov, and the 1st UkrainianFront of Marshal Ivan S. Konev. Be-

Soviet Tank Ann, Rates of Advance

Name ofOperation

Numberof Days Totalin AdvanceName of E"ploi (inDates Formation tation miles)

AverageDailyRate ofAdvance(in miles)Belorussian

Yassy-Kishinev"EastPrussian

Manchurian

June 2d Tank 4 95-100July Army'1944 5th Guards 13 240Tank ArmyAugust 2d Ukrainian 5 120September Front1944 , 3d Ukrainian 5 105FrontJanuary 2d Belo-April russian1945 Front3d BelorussianFront

~ u g u s t 6th Guards1945 Tank Army

6 105-155

8 60-75

10 510

20-2518252118-25

7-9

51

armies were committed in a body tofashion a formidable striking force.Until mid-1944, the tank armies frequently fought below strength as a result of participating in several consecutive operations with only briefpauses. Nevertheless, the massing oftwo tank armies on a single axis gave

the front commander at least 1,000tanks to employ as his exploitationforce. By mid-1944, the tank armieswere generally close to full strength.

tween them, the two commanders controlled more than 6,000 armored vehicles. This gave them the capability ofmassing over 100 tanks and self-propelled artillery weapons along eachmile of frontage where a penetrationwas to be made.Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front hadtwo tank armies, two separate tankcorps, five separate tank brigades, 35tank and self-propelled artillery regiments (16 armored vehicles each), and

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23 self-propelled artillery battalions(12 guns each) for a total of 3,220armored vehicles.Zhukov kept the two tank armiesone-half of all his armored vehicles- a s his exploitation force. He attached a separate tank corps to eachof the two combined-arms armies making the front's main effort. Finally, heplaced all the smaller armored unitain direct support of the first-echelonrifle divisions.Connecting UnkAfter the enemy's tactical defenseshad been crushed, the two tank armieswere committed to the exploitation onthe second day of the operation. Whenthey had moved on through the twogaping holes on the flanks of the German defenses, Zhukov ordered the divisions to release their direct supportarmored units to front and army control. These units formed temporarycombined-arms army pursuit groupswith a total of approximately 1,000tanks. They operated so as to form aconnecting link between the rapidlyadvancing tank armies and the slowermoving infantry armies.

As a consequence of this massed employment of armor, the 1st BelorussianFront advanced from the Vistula tothe Oder-375 to 435 miles-in 16days (16 January to 1 February1945). The average daily rates of advance ranged from 25 to 30 miles, buton several of the days, the tank armiescovered as much as 45 miles.

The chart provides data on the ratesof advance achieved by Soviet tankarmies in exploitation in other WorldWar II operations.Despite the doctrinal preference foremploying the large armored formation in the exploitation role, circumstances sometimes dictated that the

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tank army make the initial penetration, either independently or jointlywith the combined-arms army. Shortages of artillery and direct supporttank units in the latter formationswere the usual factors which prevented the infantry armies from making the rapid penetrations necessaryfor early commitment of the tankarmy as an exploitation force.Whether employed as a penetrationor exploitation force, the tank armywas committed on the first day of anoperation whenever the situation permitted. In the exploitation role, thetank army's main body was committedafter the combined-arms army hadpenetrated the enemy's main line ofresistance to a depth of one to threemiles. In most operations, the tankarmies completed the penetration andadvanced distances of 12 miles byevening of the first day. During thewar's last phase, they occasionallymoved ahead as much as 25 miles onthe first day.Organization for CombatDuring the advance to contact, thetank army employed four routes ofmarch, two for each first-echelon corps.This gave the two lead brigades ofeach corps a separate route alongwhich to advance. The army's zone inthe advance to contact ranged from 20to 25 miles in width.The tank army organized for combat in accordance with its missionpenetration, exploitation, or pursuit.In the majority of cases, the twocorps army deployed in a single echelon while holding a reinforced tankbrigade in army reserve. The standardthree-corps tank army normally deployed in two echelons with two tankcorps abreast and the mechanizedcorps in the second echelon. In mak


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ing a penetration, the mechanized infantry corps usually deployed in thefirst echelon, replacing one of the twotank corps.The tank corps, in its tum, usuallyadopted a two-echelon formation. Twoof its tank brigades formed the first

opment and encirclement operationswere designated as "mobile groups."The infantry army commander normally employed a tank or a mechanized corps as his mobile group whilethe front commander used the tankarmy in this role.echelon while the Either formation in this mobile-

Soviet amphibious tanksand the motorized rille brigade werein the second echelon.The air army, consisting of 1,000to 1,200 planes, assigned to each Soviet front, provided direct air supportfor the tank army. The air army hadthe initial mission of providing general support to the front's formationsin making a rapid penetration to permit commitment of the tank army onthe first day. Subsequently, the airarmy shifted its main effort to insurethe tank army's success in the exploitation.The formations employed in envel

group role had the mission of developing interior and exterior encirclingfronts as the basic maneuver. Twomethods were employed to developthese fronts: to develop the interiorfront initially and then the exterior;or to form, simultaneously, both frontsalong different axes of advance. Themethod employed depended upon theforce relationships, the compositionand size of the tank formation available to the Soviet commander, and theover-all concept of the operation.

The first method was used when theSoviet force had no significant supe-Military Review40


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riority and the Germans had sizablereserves available to assist in reliefof the encircled units. As a consequence, there was an overpowering requirement to complete the interiorfront of the encirclement before theenemy's reserves could interrupt themaneuver.Double EnvelopmentAs the over-all force relationshipsalong the Soviet-German front swungto the Soviet favor in 1944 and 1945,the technique of simultaneously creating interior and exterior fronts wasemployed more frequently. However,the first method was employed in thefinal Berlin operation, a fourfold Soviet superiority in armored forces notwithstanding.Whatever the method employed, themobile groups always executed theiradvances along two converging axesfrom two sectors of the front, that is,the double envelopment was alwaysenvisaged. The aim was rapidly to cutthe encircled German formations offfrom adjacent forces and the operational reserves. The mobile forces heldthe interior and exterior fronts untilthe combined-arms formations wereable to establish a total blockade anddestroy the encircled units.The depths of envelopment of theenemy flanks ranged from 30 to 95miles, depending on the compositionand disposition of the enemy's forces,the extent to which they were echeloned, and the availability of his operational reserves. The double envelopment always aimed at encompassingthe entire hostile groupment.

During the last two years of thewar, the mobile groups completed theirdouble envelopments within three tofive days. The only exceptions duringthis period were the Budapest opera-March 1969

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tion of December 1944 which requiredsix days for completion of the envelopment and the Berlin operation whereeight days were needed.A Soviet Ministry of Defense directive of 16 October 1942 decreed that

the tank corps be employed on theaxis of main effort in pursuit of withdrawing enemy forces. Upon formation of tank armies in 1943, they became the front commander's pursuitforce, with missions of seiZing rivercrossings, defiles, and critical roadjunctions, and developing the conditions necessary for the destruction ofan enemy force in the withdrawal.Determining FactorsThe chief factors which determinedwhen the tank formation initiated thepursuit were the nature of the enemy'sdefenses, the dispositions of his mainforces and reserves, the force relationships along the axis of main effort, and the speed with which thetactical defenses were breached. Normally, the pursuit began after the enemy's tactical defenses had been ruptured throughout their entire depth orhis locally available operational reserves had been defeated.

During the war's latter phase, thedelay in beginning the pursuit dec

Documents

Military Review March 1969