Military Reconnaissance: A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis …€¦ · Military Reconnaissance: A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of ... 1 Anthony E. Boardman et al. Cost-Benefit Analysis:

Military Reconnaissance: A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Satellites Policy Memorandum University of Denver Institute for Public Policy Studies Julia Bess Godshaw Faculty Advisor: Professor Richard A. Caldwell Cost-Effectiveness Advisor: Dr. Andrew J. Sherbo Spring Quarter 2014

Military Reconnaissance: A Cost-Effective Analysis of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Satellites

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary............................................................................................................................... 2 Problem Statement ..............................................................................................................................12 National Security Strategy .................................................................................................................13 Methods ..................................................................................................................................................18 Issue Analysis ........................................................................................................................................22 Proposed Solutions...............................................................................................................................34

Option 1: Status Quo ..................................................................................................................................... 35 Option 2: Purchase less satellites from the Space Radar program, purchase more drones .......... 39 Option 3: Cut the purchase of both satellites and of drones with a 10%budget decrease ............. 44 Option 4: Purchase more satellites and purchase more drones with a 10% budget increase ....... 48

Strategic Recommendations ..............................................................................................................52 Weaknesses and Limitations .............................................................................................................54 Cost Effectiveness Analysis ................................................................................................................56 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................56 Appendix ................................................................................................................................................58

Cost Effectiveness Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 58 MQ-9 Reaper Calculations........................................................................................................................... 59 RQ-4 Global Hawk Calculations................................................................................................................. 60 Space Radar Satellite Calculations............................................................................................................. 61 MQ-9 Reaper .................................................................................................................................................. 62 RQ-4 Global Hawk......................................................................................................................................... 63 Space Radar Satellites ................................................................................................................................... 64

Works Cited ..........................................................................................................................................65


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Executive Summary

The United States is in a new era of warfare. In the Cold War, there was a clear enemy and clear

goals: deterrence and containment. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the sole

hegemon. September 11, 2001 changed the course of history for the nation. The post-9/11 world is

completely different from that of the Cold War era. Even as current conflicts are vastly different than

those historically fought by the United States, methods of reconnaissance have not embraced new

technologies to the necessary extent. There are two systems of military reconnaissance utilized by the

United States Air Force: satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles are both tasked with reconnaissance. While it is important

to have both in an arsenal, with changing times, it is imperative to adapt. There is not enough emphasis

on technical advancements in reconnaissance by the United States Air Force even while enemies are

getting better at evading traditional methods. Unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites perform similar

functions, yet there are discrepancies between their cost as well as performance. Additionally, the fiscal

environment in the United States is not conducive to increased spending. A cost-effectiveness analysis

measures how to better provide allocation within current resources, especially when compared with

alternatives.

“Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is a widely used alternative to CBA, especially in areas such as health and defense policy… The exact contribution of different types of weapons systems to overall national defense is often unclear. In such situations, CBA is not possible, but CEA may give useful information concerning the relative efficiency of alternatives.”1

This cost-effectiveness analysis demonstrates the different solutions to solve for the lack of

technological innovation within the current spending limits of approximately $59.3 billion constant 2013

dollars.

1 Anthony E. Boardman et al. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice. Fourth. Pearson, 2011.


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This memorandum reviews two unmanned aerial vehicles (the RQ-4 Global Hawk and the MQ-9

Reaper) and the Space Radar satellite system. It discusses four alternatives: the status quo; purchasing less

satellites and more unmanned aerial vehicles; a 10 percent decrease in the budget; and a 10 percent

increase in the budget. The recommendation is to purchase two fewer satellites and sixty-two additional

unmanned aerial vehicles due to the ability of unmanned aerial vehicles to serve a dual purpose or

reconnaissance and attack.


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Introduction

One of the fundamentals for any nation is its ability to defend itself against external threats.

Without this essential capability to protect, the rest of the goals and ideals of the country can be

undermined. Keeping America safe and secure against impending threats is vital to the protection of our

democracy. The Founding Fathers held the protection of the nation as one of the foremost responsibilities

of government. Through the preamble of the Constitution, the Founders articulated the necessity of the

union to provide for the common defense as one of the primary objectives.

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

In order for the other important goals of the nation to be upheld, the foremost is safety and security. This

is a conviction that the country has always upheld in the face of new threats.

The safety and security of the United States relies heavily on the ability of the military to adapt to

new threats. In the face of asymmetric threats and a complex environment, the United States Air Force

must update its systems in order to protect the nation. Currently, there is not enough emphasis on

technical advancements in reconnaissance by the United State Air Force even while the enemies are

getting better at evading traditional methods. To understand how this problem arose, it is important to

both understand the history of the U.S. Armed Forces as well as the changing nature of the conflicts in

which the country is involved.

The United States emerged dominant militarily after World War II. Within the country, 16.4

million2 Americans were members of the armed services during the war, and the wartime economy and

production are widely acknowledged as the main sources for pulling America out of the Depression.

2 James T. Patterson. Grand Expectations; The United States, 1945-1974. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.


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While the country suffered 405,399 war-related deaths3, the allied and axis countries were reeling from

the total loss of an estimated 60 million people that died as a result of the war4. James T. Patterson argues,

“Alone of the world’s great powers the United States emerged immeasurably stronger, both absolutely

and relatively, from the carnage. In a new balance of power, it was a colossus on the international stage.”5

After the war, the United States was left with an overwhelming military advantage, including the atomic

bomb.

Shortly after they had fought alongside each other as Allied Powers in the war, the United States

and the Soviet Union shifted from allies to enemies in the Cold War. Under the recommendation of

George Kennan (written under the pseudonym X) in “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, the U.S. adopted a

strategy of containment that lasted for almost five decades. Kennan’s strategy meant that the United

States should embark on “a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with

unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a

peaceful and stable world.”6 This strategy of containment was to contain the “expansive tendencies” of

the Soviet Union. The purpose of deterrence was to “persuade a potential adversary that the risks and

costs of his proposed action far outweigh any gains that he might hope to achieve.”7 Through the

strategies of containment and deterrence, the United States upheld the concepts of a democratic society in

the face of communism. While World War II had led to the large buildup of US military power, the size

of the military was maintained through the Cold War. An example of this expansion was the nuclear

arsenal. The expanded military was utilized in order to defend both the borders and way of governance.

3 IJames T. Patterson. Grand Expectations; The United States, 1945-1974. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 4Ibid.

5 Ibid. 6 X. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign Affairs July 1947. 7 Richard C. Bush III et al. “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges.” The Brookings Institution. June 2010.


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President Eisenhower saw and understood the implications of a growing and more permanent

military. The President warned of the potential harms of the military-industrial complex to the liberties

and democratic process. In his farewell address and warning to Americans, Eisenhower talked about the

importance of military preparedness while at the same time, not letting the influence of the military-

industrial complex dictate the national agenda. While Eisenhower understood the need for the United

States to be ready militarily, he was resolute about the necessity to not mortgage the country’s future on

the defense budget.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction…In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist…. As we peer into society's future, we – you and I, and our government – must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without asking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage.8

This concern that defense industry has a too large of a share of federal spending persists. While it is

important that the United States maintains its superiority in national security and defense, at a time of

budget constraints, it is best to use the most cost efficient method of spending for national security.

When the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991, the United States was left in a new era as the

world’s sole hegemon. The end for the U.S.S.R. while not predicted, was gradual. The country had spent

two to three times their GNP as the United States did on military expenses, and the military expenditures

were unsustainable for the country.9 The Soviet economy could not afford to sustain its military forces at

previous levels. Gorbachev recognized many of the difficult problems that the Soviet Union was facing

and he implemented glasnost (the opening of Soviet Society) and perestroika (the restructuring of the

economy). These two programs, while meant to save the Soviet Union, played a role in its fragmentation.

The world was completely changed. Without the Soviet Union, the United States was left as the singular

8 President Eisenhower. Farewell Address, 1961. White House, 1961. 9 James T. Patterson. Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush V. Gore. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.


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world power. The 1990’s in the United States were relatively stable. The Unites States continued to be

involved in small conflicts, such as the ones in Bosnia and Kosovo, yet the country was in a new phase of

national security policy in which the common enemy had disappeared.

Francis Fukuyama wrote his famous book, The End of History, theorizing that the end of the Cold

War was going to bring about the end of war and usher in democracy as the most realistic form of

government. It brought to the forefront the notion of convergence that democracy is the most logical

form of government given the failure of collectivism. This theory proved to be incorrect following the rise

of autocratic governments in China and Russia, where economic activity has become open and political

activity remains suppressed. Islamist governments have rejected democratic principles to a greater degree.

Islamic regimes are “the most dramatic refutation of the convergence paradigm, since it is precisely

convergence, including the liberal world's conception of ‘universal values,’ that the radical Islamists

reject.”10 Fukuyama’s theory appeared plausible in the relative calm of the 1990’s but it was quickly

shattered in the twenty-first century.

Then once again, the post-Cold War world changed with the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.

This enemy was a whole new beast. Rather than one nation fighting another, the U.S. was attacked by an

amorphous terrorist organization spread throughout the world. The country began to fight the Global War

on Terror and invaded Afghanistan following suit in Iraq. With these wars, the tactics that were

necessary to succeed were different than those that had been used with the Cold War.

The Global War on Terror is a primary example of “asymmetric warfare.” Asymmetric warfare

includes “conflicts between nations or groups that have disparate military capabilities and strategies.”11

The simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wars were much different than any the country had fought

10 Kagan, Robert. “The End of the End of History: Why the Twenty-First Century Will Look Like the Nineteenth.” The New Republic 23 Apr. 2008. 11 “Asymmetric Warfare | RAND.” RAND Corporation.


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before. They involved unknown enemies among civilians. American troops are almost entirely out of

Iraq, and the American presence in Afghanistan is winding down, yet the enemy is still at-large. Al-

Qa’ida, while weakened since the death of Osama bin Laden, remains a powerful force in the Muslim

world. Despite the removal of troops from these countries, the Global War on Terror is far from over. The

Global War on Terror was a different war than the country had fought before with the Al-Qa’ida network

not centrally located. The Global War on terror is being fought on a number of platforms, from American

drone strikes in Pakistan to thwarting of attacks on the United States such as the underwear bomber.

There remain a number of terrorist organizations, with strategies much different than that of the United

States, intent on seeing the destruction of our nation. Although much of the leadership has been removed,

the prevalence of terrorist networks persists around the world, and the enemy has not been defeated.

Despite setbacks, the defense force and capability of the United States remains the most powerful

in world. The US military is the largest and also most capable military. In 2010, the U.S. had 2,266,883

active troops. Despite its size, there are many fiscal realities that the Pentagon and the U.S. military must

also face. The country spends 4 percent of its GDP and 20 percent of the Federal Budget on defense. This

is approximately $700 billion, which is larger than defense budgets for the next seventeen countries

combined12. The entire country is being faced with fiscal challenges as the national debt continues to

mount. The Pentagon is not removed from this dilemma. In a time of budget cuts, many look to the

military as a source of potential cuts. In the spring of 2013, sequestration took effect, arbitrarily cutting

the budget of the United States military.

In Healing the Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence While Cutting the Defense

Budget, Michael O’Hanlon argues, “while defense cuts must be made, they must be made carefully.”13

Fiscal realities cannot outweigh the need to keep America and her allies safe and secure. Force projection

12 R.M. “Defence Spending: Always More, or Else.” The Economist 1 Dec. 2011. 13 O’Hanlon, Michael E. Healing The Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence While Cutting the Defense Budget. Washington, DC: The

Brookings Institution, 2013.


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remains an important strategy. For the United States to remain the most powerful military in the world, it

must also maintain its image as the most powerful military in the world. In addition, the military must

reevaluate and conduct a cost effectiveness analysis on many systems; cuts must be performed in a

strategic manner. The need to change the budget dictates a time of change in military operation.

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The Department of Defense is coming to terms with the increasing necessity of changes to the

defense budget. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a review of the strategies and priorities for

the Department of Defense. It is published every four years. The United States Department of Defense

released its Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 in March 2014. The 2014 QDR recognizes the fiscal

realities that the United States is facing.

14 R.M. “Defence Spending: Always More, or Else.” The Economist 1 Dec. 2011.


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Given this dynamic environment, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is principally focused on preparing for the future by rebalancing our defense efforts in a period of increasing fiscal restraint…The QDR makes clear that this updated national defense strategy is right for the Nation, sustaining the global leadership role of the United States and providing the basis for decisions that will help bring our military into balance over the next decade and responsibly position us for an era of both strategic and fiscal uncertainty. 15

There have been changes in enemies and fighting tactics, yet many of the methods of military

reconnaissance have remained the same since the end of the Cold War. Satellites were positioned in order

to monitor the Soviet Union’s nuclear facilities. While there are various methods of military

reconnaissance, now the United States conducts reconnaissance from the air by both unmanned aerial

vehicles and by satellites. The purpose of the satellites during the Cold War was deterrence; both the

U.S.S.R and the U.S. used force projection to prevent military action. The Soviet Union and the United

States each had satellites focused on each other to monitor their nuclear weapon capabilities. For many

years, the two world powers had the ability to spy on one another to determine if nuclear weapons were

launched. The purpose of reconnaissance today is much different.

Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Admiral Mike Mullen has been one of the

biggest advocates for the United States dealing with fiscal realities. He acknowledges, “the single, biggest

threat to our national security is our debt, so I also believe we have every responsibility to help eliminate

that threat…we must, and will, do our part.”16 While the Department of Defense has previously been

mainly exempt from cuts to the budget, this is no longer the case.

President Obama’s proposed 2015 budget for the Department of Defense does a great deal to

align the armed forces with budget realities. The proposed 2015 budget reduces the number of troops in

the army to below World War II levels by 2019. The proposal is to reduce the number of troops from the

15 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. Washington, DC: The United States Department of Defense, 2014. 16 Marshall Jr., Tyrone C. “Debt Is Biggest Threat to National Security, Chairman Says.” American Forces Press Service 22 Sept. 2011


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post 9/11 level of 570,000 troops to between 440,000 and 450,000 troops.17 With this reduction, Secretary

of Defense Chuck Hagel is suggesting the increase of investment in Special Operations troops,

cyberwarefare, and the rebalance towards Asia. The new defense budget also includes an increase in the

number of Global Hawks purchased, but a reduction in the number of Reapers due to the winding down

of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.18 Yet, if Congress continues with the vast cuts to the budget

referred to as the sequester, the Air Force might be forced to ground a number of its Global Hawks.

The sequester consisted of “automatic, arbitrary, and across the board budget cuts”19 that took

place in 2013 as a result of Congress’s inability to make a deal to cut the cut the deficit. While there has

been a budget deal to replace and minimize the effects of the sequester, the Department of Defense is

unable to return to its previous budgetary plans. The 2015 budget specifically cites the fiscal environment

as one of the issues as to why the defense budget must change.

“The budget environment is challenging both because of fiscal considerations and because we are beginning the difficult process of resetting and restoring our force’s ability to conduct the full range of military operations in support of the current defense strategy. The Budget meets these transitional challenges even as the force structure and future funding levels are reduced.”20

Changes in strategy, such as a troop reduction, align the President’s 2015 budget and the 2014 QDR.21

The intelligence community and the United States Air Force must rely on “various systems to

provide imagery to tactical commanders and intelligence analysts”22 in order to get the crucial

reconnaissance necessary for national security. Reconnaissance is military observation conducted in order

to obtain information that reveals an enemy’s location or provides insight that helps with the discovery of

strategic features. There are a variety of methods and tools available for the United States Air Force to

17 The Editorial Board. “A Military Budget to Fit the Times.” The New York Times 25 Feb. 2014. 18 Jane Wells. “The Pentagon’s New Budget: Who Wins and Who Loses.” CNBC.com 24 Feb. 2014. 19 “What You Need To Know About The Sequester.” The White House. 2013. 20 Office of Management and Budget. Fiscal Year 2015 Budget of the U.S. Government. Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President of the

United States, 2014. 21 Anthony H. Cordesman. The FY2015 Defense Budget and the QDR: Key Trends and Data Points. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic International

Studies, 2014. 22 Joseph Post, and Michael Bennett. Alternatives for Military Space Radar. The Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office, 2007.


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perform reconnaissance tasks. These have changed over time, and must change with the advent of new

technologies.

Today, there are two primary methods of reconnaissance that the military uses: Unmanned Aerial

Vehicles (UAVs) and satellites. An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, commonly called a “drone” when used in

a military context, is a remotely controlled aircraft. Many UAVs are simply equipped with reconnaissance

ability and others have an additional small strike capability. While there are various types of satellites,

with GPS capability and weather capability, the United States military still relies on spy satellites to

gather intelligence information. Both unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites have the capability to

stealthy observe the ground from the air however they have large differences in cost.

In order to properly evaluate both the budget and reconnaissance capabilities of the United States

military, it is important to focus on a single branch. The Air Force operates unmanned aerial vehicles as

well as satellites, and is the optimal branch for understanding the military reconnaissance tools of the past

and the future. Current funding for the Air Force needs to be reallocated more to systems that provide

dual capabilities and are more suited to the reconnaissance needs of the Global War on Terror (also

referred to as Overseas Contingency Operations).

Problem Statement

There is not enough emphasis on technical advancements in reconnaissance by the United States

Air Force even while the enemies are getting better at evading traditional methods.

There needs to be a shift in the way that the United States performs military reconnaissance due

to both technological innovations and changes in the world. September 11, 2001 fundamentally


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transformed everything defense strategists thought to be true about the way that war is fought and won.

The strategy during the Cold War was deterrence. While both the United States and the Soviet Union had

missiles pointed at one another for the entirety of the war, there was the notion of Mutually Assured

Destruction (MAD). If one of the nations were to attack, the other would respond immediately. Satellites

played a large role in the concept of MAD. The theory of mutually assured destruction is that there are no

winners in a nuclear war.

National Security Strategy

The world post 9/11 is fundamentally different than that of the Cold War. Michael O’Hanlon, the

director of research for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, asserts, “American national security

strategy is premised on international presence, deterrence, and engagement.”23 This strategy shift is

evident in President George W. Bush’s 2006 National Security Strategy. President Bush had four steps in

order to prevent terrorism. The first of these steps was to prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they

occur. Seeking out enemies is a different strategy that the United States had taken during the Cold War

with containment and deterrence. In order to prevent terrorist attacks before they occur, the necessity for

advanced technologies and reconnaissance abilities is imperative.

Defeating terrorism requires a long-term strategy and a break with old patterns. We are fighting a new enemy with global reach. The United States can no longer simply rest on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run. 24

Rather than waiting for the enemy, this new strategy resulting from the aftermath of the terrorist attacks

on September 11, 2001, requires a proactive approach.

This represents a paradigm shift in national security interests. The shift is from that of a Cold War

mentality, to asymmetric warfare. Rather than waiting for future terrorist attacks, the United States took

23 Michael E. O’Hanlon. Healing The Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence While Cutting the Defense Budget. Washington, DC: The

Brookings Institution, 2013. 24 President George W. Bush. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC, 2006.


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the position that they would seek out those who had the intentions of harming the nation. Under President

Obama, this notion has expanded greatly.

The threats to our people, our homeland, and our interests have shifted dramatically in the last 20 years. Competition among states endures, but instead of a single nuclear adversary, the United States is now threatened by the potential spread of nuclear weapons to extremists who may not be deterred from using them. Instead of a hostile expansionist empire, we now face a diverse array of challenges, from a loose network of violent extremists to states that flout international norms or face internal collapse. In addition to facing enemies on traditional battlefields, the United States must now be prepared for asymmetric threats… 25

In President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy, one of the missions is to “disrupt, dismantle, and

defeat Al-Qa’ida and it violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world”26.

This is a fundamental change in that the United States switched to taking a proactive stance against to

disarm and eradicate its enemies.

25 President Barack Obama. National Security Strategy. Washington, DC, 2010.

26 Ibid.


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Table 1.

National Security Strategy President George W. Bush National Security Strategy Against Terrorism (2006)

President Obama Security Strategies (2010)

Prevent terrorist attacks before they occur

Invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners

Deny WMD to rogue states and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation

Disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qa'ida and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world

Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states

Reverse the spread of nuclear and biological weapons and secure nuclear materials

Deny terrorists control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror

Advance peace, security, and opportunity in the greater Middle East

Strengthen security and resilience at home

Secure Cyberspace -- Change of strategy away from containment. --Both President Bush and President Obama have the goals to strengthen security by preventing terrorist attacks. --President Bush is broader in the description of preventing terrorist attacks while President Obama hones in on Al- Qa'ida. --President Bush believed that the United States could prevent the attacks before they occurred, even if it was necessary to attack alone. --President Obama puts more of an emphasis in working with the international community, through his goal of investing in capable partners.

It is widely accepted that US security strategy must adapt to current threats. The Center for

Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) released a report in September 2013 called Changing US

Security Strategy: The Search for Stability and the “Non-War Against “Non-Terrorism.”27 It offers

important insight on how national security strategy needs to be realigned in order to deal with changing

27 Anthony H. Cordesman. Changing US Security Strategy: The Search for Stability and the “Non-War” Against “Non-Terrorism.” Center for

Strategic International Studies, 2013.


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enemies and threats. The report details important shifts that the United States needs to make in order to

remain the most powerful military in the world. The United States needs to:

“Rethink the ‘Air-Sea Battle’ and ‘Classic Coin’…It needs to develop a new doctrine, plans, training, and force elements for counterinsurgency and stability operations that focus on using enabler like airpower, Special forces, elite trainer and partners, drones, and other cost-effective measures that replace reliance on US combat forces with military and civil ‘enablers’ of local forces”28. The Air-Sea Battle Office in the Department of Defense describes the purpose of the concept of

Air-Sea Battle (ASB) as:

“…. The purpose of ASB is not to simply conduct operations more jointly. It is to increase operational advantage across all domains, enhance Service capabilities and mitigate vulnerabilities. In addition to other joint and service concepts, ASB will help ensure the U.S.’s ability to gain and maintain freedom of action in the global commons, and to the conduct of concurrent or follow-on operations against a sophisticated adversary.”29

The concept of Air-Sea Battle is costly, and CSIS makes the argument that there are more cost

effective methods. Likewise, classic COIN is the United States Armed Forces counterinsurgency strategy.

“Counterinsurgency (COIN) is the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes. Unlike conventional warfare, non-military means are often the most effective elements, with military forces playing an enabling role.”30

CSIS argues that traditional methods need to be refined to include more cost-effective measures.

Likewise, this is true for traditional reconnaissance. A cost-effectiveness analysis is important because it

determines how to more effectively spend money already allocated rather than requesting additional

monies. In a cost-effectiveness analysis, the same budget results in more efficient resource allocation. It is

extremely important that the United State move towards a more cost effective way of reconnaissance and

security strategies.

28 Anthony H. Cordesman. Changing US Security Strategy: The Search for Stability and the “Non-War” Against “Non-Terrorism.” Center for Strategic

International Studies, 2013. 29 Air-Sea Battle Office. Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges. U.S. Department of Defense, 2013. 30 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009.


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President Obama has begun the transition to a different type of warfare. David Sanger’s Confront

and Conceal discusses a new process of warfare. Sanger cites a senior American intelligence officer

describing part of the Obama administration’s national security strategy as a “light footprint strategy.”

This is same strategy Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had used in the Afghan War. In the 2001

QDR, Rumsfeld advocated for a transformation in defense strategy because, “Without change, the current

defense program will only become more expensive to maintain over time, and it will forfeit many of the

opportunities available to the United States today.”31 President Obama’s changes to national security also

necessitate a change to the defense establishment. Sanger argues that the President is working to use

drones as part of a “new concept of how the United States can ensure its military predominance around

the globe without resorting to the lengthy, expensive, and unpopular wars and occupations that dominated

the past decade.”32 A new military strategy is necessary to align with the values of the American people,

the current budget outlook, and growing sophistication of America’s enemies.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) are an important part of all national security

strategies. The 2014 QDR emphasizes the need to incorporate new strategies in ISR.

“We will rebalance investments toward systems that are operationally responsive and effective in highly contested environments, while sustaining capabilities appropriate for more permissive environments in order to support global situational awareness, counterterrorism, and other operations.”33

The QDR, the Pentagon’s primary national security strategy document, indicated the need for a shift from

traditional ISR to more nuanced technologies. ISR provides an important component of all military

strategy by informing the military of potential threats and dangers. This rebalance in intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies towards more advanced systems is an example of how the

United States Armed Forces are working to confront an increasingly complex environment.

31 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001. Washington, DC: The United States Department of Defense, 2001. 32 David E. Sanger. Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power. First. New York: Crown Publishers, 2012. 33 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. Washington, DC: The United States Department of Defense, 2014.


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Since the Great Recession, there has been a national shift in priorities to fiscal responsibility. In

spring of 2013, Congress enacted sequestration, significantly damaging the United States military through

across the board cuts. These cuts could potentially be reenacted in fiscal year 2016, and thus, it is more

important than ever to streamline the defense budget. The QDR emphasizes the harm that could be done

given the expansion of sequestration.

“The return of sequestration-level cuts in FY2016 would significantly reduce the Department’s ability to fully implement our strategy. Relative to funding levels in the President’s FY2015 Budget, risks associated with conducting military operations would rise substantially…As a global leader, the United States requires a robust national defense strategy to protect and advance its interests, with a military that can implement that strategy effectively. The Department is committed to working with Congress and the American people to ensure that as the Nation puts its fiscal house in order, we continue to provide sufficient resources for a strong national defense.”34

Methods

In order to gather the necessary information on the United State’s Air Force’s reconnaissance

systems, a variety of sources were utilized. Reports issued by the federal government, think tanks, books,

and newspaper and magazine articles all provided important information on the subject matter.

The federal government issues reports from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the

Department of Defense (DOD), the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and from

all federal agencies both to inform lawmakers and to remain transparent. Reports such as these were

essential in collecting necessary data for the procurement cost, quantity, and operations and support costs.

In order to determine to costs of the Space Radar Satellite system, the Congressional Budget Office

released a study in 2007. The CBO report Alternatives for Military Space Radar35 contained the data

necessary in order to calculate the operations and support cost of the United States Air Force’s Space

Radar program. The report provided information about the number of satellites that the Air Force would

34 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. Washington, DC: The United States Department of Defense, 2014.

35 Joseph Post, and Michael Bennett. Alternatives for Military Space Radar. The Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office, 2007.


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be acquiring over a certain period of time as well as important details about the features of the Space

Radar program. In order to determine the operations and support cost per Space Radar, the total

operations cost was calculated, divided by the number of satellites, the number was indexed to 2013

dollars, and finally divided by 20 years, the system life cycle.

This Congressional Budget Office study was completed as a follow-up to an initial 2005 report

from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office for Representative C.W. Bill Young, Chairman of

the Subcommittee in Defense in the Committee on Appropriations. The report, titled The Long-Term

Implications of Current Plans for Investment in Major Unclassified Military Space Programs36,

comprised crucial figures about the Space Radar program. It contained information from the 2006

Department of Defense Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to help pinpoint the cost of these

satellites. This report included the number of planned Air Force satellites as well as the overall cost for

the satellite program. In order to determine to cost per satellite, the overall cost was changed from 2006

dollars to 2013 dollars and divided the total cost by the number of satellites. All of the data contained in

the policy memo was indexed to 2013 constant dollars in order to make it comparable.

Gathering the necessary information for the costs of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles was also heavily

dependent on the Congressional Budget Office. The CBO report Policy Options for Unmanned Aircraft

Systems37, released in June 2011 contained critical information to completing the cost-effectiveness

analysis. This report included the Quantity and Cost of Acquisitions for the RQ-4 Global Hawk and the

MQ-9 Reaper. The report consisted of the procurement schedule as well as the cost of each UAV system

in 2011 dollars. To calculate the procurement cost, the costs included in the CBO report were indexed to

2013 dollars and then divided by the number of Global Hawks or Reapers.

36 Robie Samanta Roy, and Ray Hall. The Long-Term Implications of Current Plans for Investment in Major Unclassified Military Space Programs. The

Congress of the United States: The Congressional Budget Office, 2005. 37 Bernard Kempinski. Policy Options for Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office, 2011.


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Obtaining the necessary information for the operations and support costs for the Global Hawk and

the Reaper was slightly more complicated. In order to obtain crucial information surrounding operations

and support cost, the nonpartisan Washington based think-tank the American Security Project played a

large and important role. The Chairman of the Board of the American Security Project is the Honorable

Gary Hart, former Senator from Colorado. In the American Security Project there are a number of

military and civilian expert fellows that conduct research relating to the changing nature of national

security. In July 2012, the American Security Project released The US and its UAVs: A Cost-Benefit

Analysis38. This report contained links to and data from the Department of Defense’s unclassified Selected

Acquisition Reports (SAR reports) with the operations and support cost per Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. In

the American Security Project report, the Operations and Support (O&S) cost per aircraft included “unit-

level manpower, unit operations, maintenance, sustaining support, continuing system improvements,

indirect support, and others”39. The SAR report is important in that it summarizes the cost, schedule and

performance status of different Department of Defense programs. It is compiled in conjunction with the

President’s budget annually and as well as quarterly if costs increases by more than fifteen percent per

unit or has schedule delays of at least six months. In order to complete the calculations for O&S costs,

the dollars in the American Security Project Report needed to be indexed to 2013 dollars.

The policy memorandum will have information included based on lectures given by experts in

national security and unmanned aerial vehicles. In the fall of 2013, Michael O’Hanlon was the course

instructor for a Great Issue Forum at the University of Denver called American National Security and

Foreign Policy In the Age of Fiscal Constraint. Michael O’Hanlon is the Director of Research on

Foreign Policy and Senior Fellow at the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings

Institution. The lectures from Michael O’Hanlon contributed to understanding of the direction of U.S.

38 Ashley Boyle. “The US and Its UAVs: A Cost-Benefit Analysis.” American Security Project. 24 July 2012. Web. 26 Oct. 2013.

39 Ibid.


21

foreign policy and national security. In the spring of 2014, Dr. Kimon Valavanis was a co-instructor for a

Great Issue Forum at the University of Denver called Navigating the Future: Policy Challenges of

Advanced Technology, Privacy, Robotics and Employment in the 21st Century. Dr. Kimon Valavanis is

the Director of the DU Unmanned Systems Research Institute. He provided important information on the

future and current uses of unmanned aerial vehicles.

National Security strategy documents were crucial to conducting research about satellite systems

and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Both President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy40 as well as

President Barack Obama’s National Security Strategy41 laid the foundation for the goals and strategies of

the United States. These National Security Strategy documents are the Presidents’ observation of the

status quo as well as a politically and technically achievable goal for the future. In order to create the

Department of Defense Budget, there is a process called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and

Execution (PPBE) process42. One of the cornerstones of the planning process is the National Security

Strategy. The programming process consists of the Program Objective Memorandum, the Budgeting

process contains Congressional Review, and finally Execution, which is simply the execution of the

budget. This process demonstrates that the first step to creating the defense budget is aligning the budget

with the President’s National Security Strategy. Additionally, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)43

is the Department of Defense’s blueprint for national security strategy. It is the legislatively mandated

review of strategies and priorities of the Department of Defense. It not only plays an important role in the

budgeting process but it helps to explain the priorities and reasoning for the Department of Defense. The

QDR helps to define the national security direction of the United States.

40 President George W. Bush. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC, 2006. 41 President Barack Obama. National Security Strategy. Washington, DC, 2010. 42 Andy Sherbo. “Perspectives on Defense Spending.” University of Denver. 43 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. Washington, DC: The United States Department of Defense, 2014.


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Issue Analysis

In order to understand the status quo of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and satellites, it is imperative

to understand the history of these two reconnaissance tools. The United States launched its first spy

satellite in the 1960’s after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, forever changing the face of

military reconnaissance. While the first forms of military reconnaissance from the air were spy planes, the

concept of military intelligence gathered from the air dates back to the Civil War, when the Union would

use tethered observation balloons to overlook Confederate positions. This was further expanded with the

invention of aerial photography on airplanes.

One of the first major issues with aerial photography was when pilot Gary Powers was shot down

in his U-2 spy plane in 1960 while on a mission over the Soviet Union. This caused many major problems

and derailed progress between the Soviet Union and the United States. Not only did this instance threaten

the life of an American, but it also put state secrets in jeopardy. This incident “convinced the CIA that

work on a new UAV, invulnerable to attack, should begin immediately.”44 Aerial photography was a far

from perfect reconnaissance system, and while it is still sometimes employed, it involves significant risk.

Satellite technology developed out of the space race between the United States and the Soviet

Union. Satellites have many advantages over aerial photography. Satellites were an incredible

technological innovation that allowed the United States (and USSR) to develop a number of other

technologies. Spy satellites have many advantages that aerial photography simply does not. The first of

these is that a system of satellites can keep the whole world in view at one time. A second large

advantage that satellites have is that while both the United States and Russia have reportedly developed

the technology to shoot satellites down and disable their usage; this is unprecedented. Satellites also have

the advantage of not violating air space and being legal.

44 “Time Line of UAVs.” Spies that Fly. PBS NOVA: Science Programming on Air and Online.


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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles have been a technological innovation. While drones do not have a

long history, they have played a large role in the way that America has fought wars in recent history. The

Department of Defense defines unmanned aerial vehicles “as powered, aerial vehicles that do not carry a

human operator, use aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted

remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payloads.”45

While UAVs have only recently gained popularity, they have been useful in different types of

warfare, dating back before manned flight46. During World War I, the United States tested and developed

different types of unmanned aircrafts, but they were not widely deployed. There was a period of UAV

innovation in the 1930s, but during World War II drones truly took off. The Nazis used V-1 “flying

bombs” which were a predecessor to modern cruise missiles but showed the United States the power and

the necessity of unmanned vehicles in future warfare. By the Vietnam War, the United States had

developed UAVs for reconnaissance missions, including the AQM-34 Ryan Firebee, which was air

launched and controlled from a director aircraft, and was retrieved by a helicopter after its mission. The

Vietnam era unmanned aerial vehicles were programmed to fly a predetermined route and take

photographs.47 The Israeli Air Force developed UAVs in the late 1970s and 1980s that could transmit

real-time, 360-degree surveillance data. Subsequently, the United States Department of Defense acquired

a number of Pioneer UAVs from Israel. The United States Navy implemented the Pioneer in Operation

Dessert Storm48. Since then, the United States has expanded greatly on its use of unmanned aerial

vehicles.

45 Elizabeth Bone, and Christopher Bolkcom. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2003. 46 “Time Line of UAVs.” Spies that Fly. PBS NOVA: Science Programming on Air and Online. 47 Peter Finn. “Rise of the Drone: From Calif. Garage to Multibillion-Dollar Defense Industry.” The Washington Post 23 Dec. 2011 48 Elizabeth Bone, and Christopher Bolkcom. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2003.


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From the usage of the Pioneer as an important source of intelligence in the Gulf War, the military

recognized the importance that unmanned aerial vehicles would play in the future of warfare. The Air

Force then developed the Predator, which in addition to reconnaissance capabilities, was also armed.49

“Growing military UAV use has mostly been driven by the U.S.'s operational experience of using these

platforms in most theatres, Israel’s adoption of the systems for intelligence and reconnaissance tasks as

well as usage in the Kosovo War, in Afghanistan and Iraq.”50 In 2003, upon the invasion of Iraq, America

only had a limited number of unmanned aerial vehicles.

“By the time it left, it had almost 10,000. Pilotless aircraft had been around for decades. What was new was that, thanks to the Global Positioning System (GPS), they knew where they were, and thanks to better satellite and other communications links they could send back copious data. That allowed them to feed intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to all levels of America’s increasingly information hungry armed forces.”51

Drones are beginning to play a role in a variety of aspects of American society. Jeff Bezos, CEO

of Amazon announced on “60 Minutes” in December of 2013 Amazon’s goal of having “Prime Air”

“octocopters” (a type of UAV) deliver packages within the coming years.52 From the future of the

Amazon drone delivering packages to the notion of UAV traffic monitoring, it is almost certain that

drones will become a more prevalent part of society. The future, given a responsive regulatory framework

that allows UAVs in American airspace, will include a variety of different types of civilian unmanned

aerial vehicles. Dr. Kimon Valavanis, the Director of the University of Denver Unmanned Systems

Research Institute, writes:

Possible civilian UAV applications include scientific research, search and rescue, emergency response, traffic control tasks, infrastructure support, aerial photography, forest protection and wild fire monitoring, environmental monitoring, energy and electrical facility monitoring, pipeline inspection, coast guard support, to name but a few possible applications. Further, UAVs may also be used for crisis management operations during and after natural disasters like

49 Elizabeth Bone, and Christopher Bolkcom. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2003.

50 George J. Vachtsevanos, and Kimon P. Valavanis. “Military and Civilian Unmanned Aircraft.” Handbook of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Springer Reference, 2015.

51 “Up in the Air: Drones Will Change War - and More.” The Economist 29 Mar. 2014. 52 “Amazon Drones: Amazon Unveils Futuristic Delivery Plan - CBS News.” Web. 12 Apr. 2014.


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hurricane Katrina and Sandy, or after terrorist attacks, to survey disaster zones or to look for survivors. The use of UAVs to transport civilian air cargo could be a lucrative area in the future.53

The future will most likely include UAVs performing tasks in a variety of areas. There has been pushback

from the idea of unmanned aerial vehicles becoming a part of everyday life. A Colorado town had a ballot

initiative to allow hunting licenses for residents to shoot down drones54. While the measure failed

overwhelmingly, incorporating UAVs into society may prove more difficult than developing the

technology and expanding regulatory framework.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are an integral part of American warfare. The Predator alone has been

used in every conflict since the Balkans, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya.

Additionally, UAVs have been used extensively in areas where the country is not technically at war. In

Pakistan or Yemen, UAVs are used to target members of extremist groups. While President Bush

employed drone warfare, it has been significantly expanded under President Obama.

Testimony from Peter Bergen, the director of the National Security Studies Program at the New

America Foundation to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution,

Civil Rights and Human Rights on April 23, 2013 demonstrates the proliferation of drone strikes under

President Obama. Bergen says,

The CIA drone program began quietly under President George W. Bush with one strike in Yemen in 2002, and then a smattering of strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2007 before a more sustained campaign in 2008. During his two terms in office, Bush authorized a total of 48 strikes in Pakistan. Upon taking office in January 2009, President Barack Obama almost immediately made drones one of his key national security tools. By mid-April 2013, he had already authorized 307 strikes in Pakistan, six times more than the number of strikes carried out during President Bush's entire eight years in office. Under Obama, the drone program accelerated from an average of one strike every 40 days to one every 4 days by mid-2011.55

53 George J. Vachtsevanos, and Kimon P. Valavanis. “Military and Civilian Unmanned Aircraft.” Handbook of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Springer

Reference, 2015. 54 Ryan Parker. “Drone Hunting Measure Rejected Tuesday in Deer Trail.” The Denver Post 1 Apr. 2014. 55 Peter Bergen. Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing. 2013.


26

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and satellites have similar missions: reconnaissance. While often

initially compared to fighter planes, like the newest model, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, UAVs and

fighter planes have many important differences that need to be taken into account. UAVs can only

function in uncontested air space with the exception of those with strike capabilities, for example, the

MQ-9 Reaper. This means that the United States needs to have air superiority in places where UAVs are

utilized. This is called SEAD or Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses. The Department of Defense

defines SEAD as “Activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air

defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means.”56 Most drones are solely for reconnaissance and

therefore do not have the capability to withstand an attack.

There are two types of aerial warfare, air to ground and air to air. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles may

only partake in air to ground strikes; they are completely defenseless in the air. For a drone to properly

function, and even successfully carry out the controversial strikes that spark arguments within the

international community, it must have support from the air that gives the United States air superiority.

“Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) are expected to replace and complement manned strike aircraft in the future, providing both an Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and deep penetration strike in environments where there is a high threat from enemy air defenses. However, at this stage, technologies have not matured to the point to enable UCAVs to replace manned air superiority fighter aircraft.”57

While the future plans for UAVs will have SEAD capability, the current technology does not allow for

UAVs to maintain complete air superiority.

The necessity for air superiority is exemplified by an incident in which Iran claimed to have shot

down an American drone. While the United States military has neither confirmed nor denied whether this

is the truth, it is widely reported that Iran has captured a RQ-170 Sentinel, a CIA drone, in December

56 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Department of Defense, 2014. 57 George J. Vachtsevanos, and Kimon P. Valavanis. “Military and Civilian Unmanned Aircraft.” Handbook of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Springer

Reference, 2015.


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2011. In 2013, Iranians claimed to have “reverse engineered” a different unmanned aerial vehicle, the

ScanEagle, and given a copy to Russia as proof.58 There are many concerns regarding what happens when

an enemy combatant gains control of an American UAV. Mark Bowden’s article The Killing Machines

argues that even if an enemy has an American UAV, it is useless.

The craft is essentially a conduit, an eye in the sky. Cut off from its back end, from its satellite links and its data processors, its intelligence analysts and its controller, the drone is as useless as eyeball disconnected from the brain. What makes the system remarkable is everything downrange- what the Air Force, in its defiantly tin-eared way, calls PED (Processing Exploitation, and Dissemination). Despite all the focus on missiles, what gives a drone its singular value is its ability to provide perpetual, relatively low-cost surveillance, watching a target continuously for hours, days, weeks, even months. 59

Even while strikes from drones are highly reported on, the true value in an unmanned aerial vehicle lies in

its ability to perform reconnaissance.

The United States does not have a monopoly on unmanned aerial vehicles throughout the world.

There are other nations, many allies of the United States, that also utilize unmanned aerial vehicles. The

Economist writes, “A deeper worry is that potential adversaries will themselves push ahead with drones,

perhaps finding an entirely new way of using them en masse.”60 Enemies of the United States will soon

have the ability to build or purchase their own UAVs. It is important that the U.S. continue to develop

new UAVs to compete with and maintain superiority over its enemies.

58 “Iran Gives Russia Copy of US Drone Captured Last Year.” www.JPost.com. 22 Oct. 2013. 59 Mark Bowden. “The Killing Machines.” The Atlantic 14 Aug. 2013 60 “Up in the Air: Drones Will Change War - and More.” The Economist 29 Mar. 2014.


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61

Source: The Economist March 29, 2014

The programs for satellites and drones across different sectors of the military are extensive, thus

this policy memorandum will focus on the United States Air Force reconnaissance program. Specifically,

this memorandum will focus on the MQ-9 Reaper, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and the Space Radar Satellite

program. While it would be beneficial to focus on the Department of Defense’s entire unmanned aerial

vehicle program, or even that of the U.S. Air Force, the three systems highlighted demonstrate important

systems in the Air Force. This memorandum focuses on the RQ-4 Global Hawk and the MQ-9 Reaper

specifically because the Department of Defense categorized these two UAVs in the same group in the

Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2013-203862. These three programs provide an accurate

sampling of different types of Air Force remotely piloted aircrafts and of the newest satellite program.

The MQ-9 Reaper is the first type of remotely piloted aircraft examined in this memorandum.

The M in the name references the fact that it is a multi-mission aircraft while the Q indicates that it is a

remotely piloted aircraft. A multi-mission aircraft means that the Reaper is both armed and used to strike

targets as well as collect important intelligence and reconnaissance information. The MQ-9 Reaper is

built by General Atomics, and is described by The Economist as “a hunter-killer drone, capable of flying

61 Up in the Air: Drones Will Change War - and More.” The Economist 29 Mar. 2014.

62 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY 2013-2038. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013.


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for many hours and armed with ‘hellfire’ missiles launched by remote control.”63 The Reaper can function

at a medium altitude, with the highest ceiling at 50,000 feet. It can fly for up to 1,150 miles (1,000

nautical miles) or 24 hours without needing to refuel. The Reaper has a cruise speed of 230 miles per

hour. The crew of a Reaper consists of one remotely located pilot and one sensor operator. The pilot flies

the aircraft, like that of a pilot of a manned aircraft.64 A sensor operator, according to the Air Force,

performs surveillance and reconnaissance, provides close air support, and real-time battle damage

assessment. The sensor operator is also the person that performs the strikes by using “precision-guided

munitions to help eliminate targets and threats”65. The UAV is first used as an intelligence collection

asset and second used “against dynamic execution targets”66. This indicates the multi-mission purpose of

the MQ-9 Reaper. This not only allows the MQ-9 Reaper to act in contested airspace it also provides the

ability for the unmanned aerial vehicles to carry out attacks against enemies of the United States.

The second type of unmanned aerial vehicle is the RQ-4 Global Hawk. The R in the name of the

UAV refers to its single purpose as a reconnaissance aircraft while Q indicates that it is remotely piloted.

The Global Hawk can function at high altitude, with a ceiling of 60,000 feet. It has an endurance of over

28 hours and can travel 8,700 nautical miles without needed to refuel. It provides intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (also referred to as ISR) around the world. It supplies “persistent near-

real-time coverage using imagery intelligence, or IMINT, and signals intelligence SIGINT, sensors”67.

The speed of the Global Hawk is 357 miles per hour. While it is an unarmed aircraft, it has three remotely

located crewmembers; LRE pilot, MCE pilot, and a sensor operator. MCE pilot is the abbreviation for

mission control element. The MCE controls the Global Hawk for the majority of the mission. LRE is the

abbreviation for the launch and recovery element. The LRE is in control of the functions necessary to

63 “Immigrants from the Future.” The Economist 29 Mar. 2014. 64 “MQ-9 Reaper.” U.S. Air Force. 18 Aug. 2010. 65 “Careers: Sensor Operator.” airforce.com. Web. 26 Jan. 2014. 66 “MQ-9 Reaper.” U.S. Air Force. 18 Aug. 2010. 67 “RQ-4 Global Hawk.” U.S. Air Force. 16 Oct. 2008.


30

launch, recover, and operate the aircraft and then passes responsibility to the MCE who is in control for

the rest of the flight.

The two unmanned systems are considerably different as well as perform greatly different

missions. The Global Hawk is much larger than the Reaper. The Global Hawk weighs 14,950 pounds, has

a wingspan of 130.9 feet, a length of 47.6 feet, and a height of 15.3 feet. Small in comparison, the Reaper

weighs 4,900 pounds, has a wingspan of 66 feet, a length of 36 feet, and a height of 12.5 feet. The Global

Hawk’s sole purpose is to perform reconnaissance missions. In contrast, the Reaper is armed and has the

ability to strike targets on the ground, so it has two important capabilities: reconnaissance and attack.

68

68 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY 2013-2038. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013.


31

An advantage of unmanned aerial vehicles is the ability to upgrade them without procuring

entirely new systems. The Global Hawk is has been in a number of different stages since its introduction,

meaning that it is easily upgradable. The Global Hawk first production version was in Block 20. Block 30

added signals intelligence to the UAV, and its next iteration is planned to be Block 40, which will add

new radar capabilities.69 This notion of upgrading systems rather than replacing them will prove to be

cost-effective in the future. While a drone can be easily upgraded, a satellite cannot.

There are many concerns that drone operators are more detached than pilots, or if it is similar to

playing video games. While there is a need for further information regarding the nature of drone

operators, there has been a significant amount of evidence rejecting the notion that drone operators are

“detached from their missions”. Air Force psychologists assessed combat drone operators through a

mental health survey in 2011. Of those surveyed:

“Forty-two percent of drone crews reported moderate to high stress, and 20 percent reported emotional exhaustion or burnout…A later study found that drone operators suffered from the same levels of depression, anxiety, PTSD, alcohol abuse, and suicidal ideation as traditional combat aircrews.”70

This evidence suggests that combat missions equally affect drone operators and traditional pilots from a

psychological perspective.

There are additional concerns about the effectiveness of UAVs as opposed to satellites. UAVs

have a higher propensity to crash or be shot down. A 2003 Congressional Research Service report cited

that UAVs have an accident rate almost 100 times more than manned aircrafts.71 This issue could both

cause threats to security as being costly.

Data about the specific features of any satellite system is much more difficult to procure. The

69 “Global Hawk.” Northrop Grumman. 70 Matthew Power. “Confessions of a Drone Warrior.” GQ 23 Oct. 2013. 71 Elizabeth Bone, and Christopher Bolkcom. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2003.


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Space Radar satellite system is the Air Force’s newest intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR) satellite. It will “provide the capacity to detect and track mobile targets in all weather conditions”72.

The U.S. Air Force, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence

Agency are developing the Space Radar. The purpose of the Space Radar is to use synthetic aperture radar

(SAR) techniques, which detect movement on the ground. The development of such a system would

represent a large advancement in the capability of different satellites. The ability to identify moving

targets from a satellite would allow for all weather observation. This requires very complicated

algorithms, as “from the point of view of an orbiting satellite, the ground is moving at 15,000 miles per

hour, so distinguishing a vehicle that is moving only a few miles per hour faster than that is difficult to

distinguish.”73 Unlike UAVs, images from satellites are not seen in real-time. For imagery with a

resolution of 1 meter, response times could take up to 45 minutes.

Even though satellites cannot perform tasks in real-time, there are a capabilities that satellites

have that UAVs do not. One of these tasks is the persistent reconnaissance. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

must be sent to specific areas to be able to perform reconnaissance tasks; satellites are perpetually

stationed. This provides the opportunity for them to provide information and intelligence 24 hours a day,

7 days a week, and 365 days a year. UAVs can go hours without the need to refuel and relocate, but

satellites never need to halt reconnaissance.

The satellites will be located at low earth orbit and will have two primary missions: synthetic

aperture radar (SAR) and ground moving target indication (GMTI). According to Lockheed Martin, SAR

is the “capability that can provide intelligence imagery anytime, in any type of weather, is critical to

enhancing situational awareness and gaining a tactical edge”74. According to a report form Northrop

72 Robie Samanta Roy, and Ray Hall. The Long-Term Implications of Current Plans for Investment in Major Unclassified Military Space Programs. The

Congress of the United States: The Congressional Budget Office, 2005. 73 Joseph Post, and Michael Bennett. Alternatives for Military Space Radar. The Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office, 2007. 74 “Synthetic Aperture Radar.” Lockheed Martin.


33

Grumman, GMTI “can depict vehicular movement of enemy forces in near-real time throughout a large

area, regardless of weather”75. These will improve the capabilities of current satellites.

Satellites are imperfect reconnaissance tools. One of the main flaws with satellites is when they

malfunction or age, they often fall back down to earth. This is problematic in that it is difficult to predict

where they may fall, and thus these falling satellites may then become a danger to societies. A Russian

satellite fell from orbit in February 2014. A European satellite also crashed from orbit in November 2013.

This is called an “uncontrolled entry”. While there are not any known occurrences of people being hurt by

space debris, an estimated 100 tons of it fell in 2013 alone.76 Space debris, including debris from

satellites, is especially problematic because it is difficult to know where the debris will fall. This has

implications affecting U.S. foreign policy given the damage that space debris could cause to both people

and property anywhere on earth.

A difference between satellites and UAVs are the quality of the imagery that the two systems

produce. While their exact resolutions of the systems are classified, the ISR gathered by UAVs has a

higher resolution than that of satellites, due to the closer proximity to the ground. Satellites have the

ability to observe a much larger area, while UAVs focus on a smaller piece of land. Northern Sky

Research describes the resolution issue as, “satellite orbits are largely fixed and their coverage areas

rigid, while UAV mission plans are designed ‘on-demand’, to cover specific areas. On the other hand,

satellites compensate their rigidity with extremely large coverage areas thanks to their altitude, while

UAVs have to fly rather close to their targets, requiring mission plans made of contiguous/close

targets.”77 As a default result of UAVs flying closer to the ground than satellites, UAVs have higher

resolution images than satellites, yet satellites have the ability to observe a much larger area.

75 Richard J. Dunn, III, Price T. Bingham, and Charles A. “Bert” Fowler. Ground Moving Target Indicator Radar and the Transformation of U.S. Warfighting. Northrop Grumman, 2004.

76 Chang, Kenneth. “Satellite Falls to Earth.” The New York Times 6 Nov. 2013. 77 Stéphane Gounari. “EO Satellites Vs. UAVs: A High-Resolution Battle.” Northern Sky Research. 13 Dec. 2012.


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This memorandum does not focus on the moral aspects of the drone and satellite debate due to its

emphasis on cost-effectiveness. While morality is a large and relevant portion of the debate, it is difficult

to quantify. There are a number of moral arguments on both sides and Americans are deeply divided on

the issue.

There are a variety of stakeholders in this debate. The first is the American people. Americans are

the purchasers of both UAVs and satellites, through taxes. The country is recovering from difficult

economic times, and taxpayers ultimately pay for both programs. The second, and perhaps the most

important stakeholder, is the United States Air Force. The budget for the Pentagon will be the budget that

is affected based on any changes to the cost. It is important the budget reflect the priorities for the Air

Force and allows the country to remain safe and secure. The United States Congress is also a stakeholder

as it creates the budget and prioritizes the nation’s spending. Additionally, the Executive Branch is a

stakeholder. As the Commander-in-Chief, the President has initiated many drone strikes in order to

mitigate threats to the country and its people. Many of the decisions made by the President are based on

information from military intelligence, a large portion of which is gathered either by satellites or drones.

The allies of the U.S. also benefit from the safety that these reconnaissance tools provide.

Proposed Solutions

The budget is the instrument for implementation of any policy goals. It is a reflection of policies

and what lawmakers in the country are willing to prioritize. When adjusting the budget for the United

States Air Force, it is important to recognize the difficulty of changing the budget. Each of the following

proposed solutions offers advantages and disadvantages in either capability or cost. This memorandum

will approach four different potential options of solutions to the issue of the lack of emphasis of

technological changes even with a changing enemy.


35

Each potential policy option will include both the cost of the systems and the total cost in real

2013 dollars and present value (PV). The real cost is the amount in today’s dollars. There are numerous

advantages to measuring both in a cost-effectiveness analysis. To understand the cost in 2013 dollars (the

first table for each option), it is the cost if a check was written today for the purchase of the system. It

does not include the discount rate. In contrast, the present value takes into account the discount rate. The

discount rate is “used for discounting constant-dollar flows, as is often required in a cost-effectiveness

analysis.”78 It is the rate of return on the alternative, and the discount rate is derived from the OMB

Circular No. A-94. The current 20- year real discount rate, as of February 2014, is 1.6 percent. The

discount rate helps to derive the present value.

The definition for present value is “the value of money today for an amount of money in the

future”79. Present value is especially important because different alternatives have different cash flows in

both timing and size. Present value enables objective financial analysis for the comparison of alternatives.

It “levels the playing field” by allowing different alternatives to be measured against one another.

Policymakers must make decisions that affect the future. Using present value provides a glimpse at the

financial consequences of decisions in the future. It essentially allows policy makers to “look before they

leap” by understanding the true financial consequences of a decision.

Option 1: Status Quo

In the making and shaping of public policy, the first option always is to leave policies unchanged.

This consists of the status quo and keeping the options the same. Currently, the United States Air Force

has the plans to purchase 9 satellites from the Space Radar program, beginning in 2015. The acquisition

78 Office of Management and Budget. “Circular A-94 Appendix C: Discount Rates for Cost- Effectiveness, Lease Purchase, and Related Analyses.” The

White House. Dec. 2013. 79 Henderson, David R. “Present Value.” The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics 2008.


36

cost is $616.5 million and the Operations and Support (O&S) $118.5 per satellite upon initial purchase.

Projected out over twenty years, with the OMB Real Discount Rate of 1.6% (as of February 2014), the

present value cost per satellite over a 20-year period of time is $2.699 billion. The total present value

total cost for this program is $24.3 billion.

The Air Force will continue with the purchase of 288 MQ-9 Reapers from 2015-2020. The

acquisition cost is $23.8 million and the O&S is $3.2 million per Reaper. Over the 20-year span of time,

given the continuing O&S, the present value cost is $77.54 million per Reaper. The total present value

cost for the Reaper program is $22.3 billion.

The Air Force will purchase 15 RQ-4 Global Hawks over the next 20 years. The procurement

cost for a Global Hawk is $230.5 million while the O&S cost is $21 million. The present value for a

Global Hawk is $586.9 million and for the whole Global Hawk program it is $8.8 billon over a 20-year

period of time. While the status quo has an emphasis on unmanned aerial vehicles, the budget for the

status quo still contains an emphasis on satellites.

Table 2.

Unit Life Cycle 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost (Constant 2013 Dollars)

MQ- 9 Reaper RQ-4 Global Hawk Space Radar Satellite

Procurement Cost (Millions) $23.80 $230.50 $616.50

O&S Cost (Millions) $3.20 $21 $118.50

Quantity Acquired 288 15 9

Unit Life Cycle (Years) 20 20 20

80

80 See appendix MQ-9 Reaper Calculations, RQ-4 Global Hawk Calculations, and Space Radar Satellite Calculations for more information


37

Table 3 describes the status quo 20-year estimates of total costs in millions of dollars for the MQ-9

Reaper, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and Space Radar Satellites. Table 3 includes the unit cost plus operations

and support (O&S), the quantity of satellites or UAVs purchased, the cost per system, and the total cost of

the three reconnaissance programs. The pie chart for Option 1 is a visual for the amount the Air Force

spends per system currently.

Table 3.

(Option 1) Status Quo 20-Year Estimates of Total Cost (Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)


Unit Cost Plus O&S (With Procurement Schedule) $83 $624 $2,894 Quantity 288 15 9

Cost per System $23,904 $9,359 $26,049 Total Cost $59,312

$23,904

$9,359

$26,049

(Option 1) Status Quo 20-Year Estimates of Total Cost (Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)

Total Cost: $59,312

MQ-‐ 9 Reaper (288 Units)

RQ-‐4 Global Hawk (15 Units)

Space Radar Satellite (9 Units)


38

Table 4 describes the present value status quo 20-year estimates of total costs in millions of

dollars for the MQ-9 Reaper, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and Space Radar Satellites. Table 4 includes the

unit cost plus operations and support (O&S), the quantity of satellites or UAVs purchased, the cost per

system, and the total cost of the three reconnaissance programs. The pie chart for the present value of

Option 1 is a visual for the amount the Air Force spends per system currently.

Table 4. (Option 1) PV Status Quo

System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost OMB Real 20-Year Discount Rate 1.6%

(Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)




$20,923

$8,301

$22,723

(Option 1) PV Status Quo System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost OMB Real 20-Year Discount Rate 1.6%

(Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions) Total Cost: $51,947





39

Option 2: Purchase less satellites from the Space Radar program, purchase more drones

The United States is in a new era of defense policy. It is time to focus less on the technologies

that have driven past conflicts, and refocus on future technologies. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense

Review Report listed one of the enhancements to the capability and capacity in order to succeed in

counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations as to “expand manned and unmanned

aircraft systems (UASs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)”. The report specifies,

“Long-dwell UASs, such as the Predator, Reaper, and other systems, have proven to be invaluable for

monitoring activities in contested areas, enhancing situational awareness, protecting our forces, and

assisting in targeting enemy fighters.”81 This expansion of unmanned aircraft systems would be both

beneficial to the defense budget as well as strategically.

In President Bush’s The National Security Strategy of the United States, the President offered

four important security steps. These steps were to: prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur,

deny weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue states and to their terrorist allies who would use them

without hesitation, deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states, and deny the terrorists

control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror. The first of these steps

aligns with the importance of military reconnaissance. The goal is no longer deterrence as it was in the

Cold War. Under this first goal, Bush asserted, “the network must in turn be deterred, disrupted, and

disabled by using a broad range of tools”82. Satellites are important in the mixture of different types

reconnaissance instruments, yet it is time to switch towards a heavier focus on UAVs.

While they differ in opinion on many other policy debates, President Obama has similar national

security goals as President George W. Bush. President Obama’s security goals are organized differently

81 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010. Department of Defense, 2010. 82 President George W. Bush. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC, 2006.


40

than his predecessor. President Obama’s National Security Strategy has a strong focus on the importance

of diplomacy. Regardless, Obama is as determined to “deny Al-Qa’ida the ability to threaten the

American people, our allies, our partners, and our interests overseas”. Additionally, “to prevent acts of

terrorism on American soil, we must enlist all of our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland

security capabilities.”83 For Obama, the variety of tools is also important in order to protect the American

people.

P.W. Singer, the Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the

Brookings Institution makes the case for investing in new technology. He argues that America must adapt

as not to “[set] up ourselves for failure in the geopolitics and battlefields of tomorrow”84. Changing

technology to meet the new security issues in the world is imperative in order to achieve success in the

future. It is important to improve and redesign current technology to remain ahead of enemies to the

country.

In this option the United States will purchase two less satellites. While satellites will remain part

of the tools for reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicles will play a larger role in reconnaissance

capabilities. In exchange for the satellites, the United States Air Force will purchase 61 new MQ-9

Reapers and 1 additional RQ-4 Global Hawk.

83 President Barack Obama. National Security Strategy. Washington, DC, 2010. 84 Singer, P. W. “What Churchill Can Teach Us About the Coming Era of Lasers, Cyborgs, and Killer Drones.” Foreign Policy 22 Oct. 2013.


41

Table 5 and Table 6 demonstrate trade offs between satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Table 5. 85 Trade offs

1 Space Radar Satellite 34 MQ-9 Reapers

1 Space Radar Satellite 4 RQ-4 Global Hawks

1 RQ-4 Global Hawk 7 MQ-9 Reapers

Table 6. 86 Trade offs

2 Space Radar Satellites 68 MQ-9 Reapers

2 Space Radar Satellites 9 RQ-4 Global Hawks

1 RQ-4 Global Hawk 7 MQ-9 Reapers

85

Calculations: Space Radar/MQ-9 Reaper $2,986.50/$87.80 = 34.01 Space Radar/RQ-4 Global Hawk $2,986.50/$650.50 = 4.59 RQ-4 Global Hawk/MQ-9 Reaper $650.50/87.80= 7.40

86

Calculations: Space Radar/MQ-9 Reaper $5,973.00 /$87.80 = $68.03 Space Radar/RQ-4 Global Hawk $2,986.5/$650.5 = $9.18 RQ-4 Global Hawk/MQ-9 Reaper $650.5/87.8= $7.40


42

Table 7 describes the 20-year estimates of total costs in millions of dollars for the recommended

procurement of the MQ-9 Reaper, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and Space Radar Satellites. Table 7 includes

the unit cost plus operations and support (O&S), the quantity of satellites or UAVs purchased, the cost per

system, and the total cost of the three reconnaissance programs. The pie chart for Option 2 is a visual for

the amount the Air Force spends per system in Option 2.

Table 7. Recommendation

(Option 2) Less Satellites, More Drones. 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost




Cost Per System $28,967 $9,982 $20,260 Total Cost $59,210*

*$102 million lower cost than the status quo by procurement schedule and price per whole weapons system. See Table 3

$28,967

$9,982

$20,260

(Option 2) Less Satellites, More Drones. 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost (Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)

Total Cost: $59,210





43

Table 8 describes the present value of the 20-year estimates of total costs in millions of dollars for

the recommended procurement of MQ-9 Reaper, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and Space Radar Satellites.

Table 8 includes the unit cost plus operations and support (O&S), the quantity of satellites or UAVs

purchased, the cost per system, and the total cost of the three reconnaissance programs. The pie chart for

the present value of Option 2 is a visual for the amount the Air Force spends per system in Option 2.

Table 8.

Recommendation (Option 2) PV Less Satellites, More Drones.

System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost (Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)


Unit Cost Plus O&S (With Procurement Schedule) $72.65 $553 $2,525 Quantity 349 16 7


$25,355

$8,854

$17,673

(Option 2) PV Less Satellites, More Drones. System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost OMB Real 20-Year Discount Rate 1.6% (Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)

Total Cost:$51,882





44

Option 3: Cut the purchase of both satellites and of drones with a 10%budget decrease

The United States has entered an era of fiscal restraint. The United States has the most powerful

military in the world but that it is time to focus domestically. It is no longer necessary for the United

States to outspend every other military. The sequester, which went into effect in spring of 2013, had a

drastic and perhaps consequential impact to the Department of Defense. In December 2013, Republican

Congressman Paul Ryan and Democratic Senator Patty Murray came to an agreement on a new budget

deal. The sequester consisted of $85 billion in automatic, across-the board spending cuts. The Ryan-

Murray budget deal eased those cuts to the Department of Defense. Even though the cuts are not as

drastic, they remain uneven and ill distributed. Gordon Adams, fellow on Budgeting for Foreign Affairs

and Defense at the Stimson Center and a Professor at American University, argues that defense cuts are

rarely strategic. He says, “What the country has, instead, is the same kind of defense drawdown we have

seen before -- cuts that are spread around in lumpy bits and pieces.”87 Cutting the defense budget with a

reduction in both drones and satellites could be a more strategic method of going about defense budget

cuts.

In his 2014 State of the Union, the President argued that while the country must go about

changing from large-scale conflicts and refocus on targeted efforts, there needs to be a limit on drone

strikes.

But I strongly believe our leadership and our security cannot depend on our outstanding military alone. As commander in chief, I have used force when needed to protect the American people, and I will never hesitate to do so as long as I hold this office. But I will not send our troops into harm's way unless it is truly necessary, nor will I allow our sons and daughters to be mired in open-ended conflicts. We must fight the battles that need to be fought, not those that terrorists prefer from us -- large-scale deployments that drain our strength and may ultimately feed extremism.

So even as we actively and aggressively pursue terrorist networks, through more targeted

efforts and by building the capacity of our foreign partners, America must move off a permanent

87 Gordon Adams. “Deferring the Inevitable: Political and Piecemeal Pentagon Budget Cuts Can’t Hide the Fact That There’s No Strategy Behind the

Sequester Drawdown.” Foreign Policy 30 Jan. 2014.


45

war footing. That's why I've imposed prudent limits on the use of drones, for we will not be safer if people abroad believe we strike within their countries without regard for the consequence.88

President Obama’s address evoked a great deal of criticism. Yet, this limit on drone strikes deals with the

concerns of both the morality and effectiveness of UAVs, may affect future budget recommendations and

concerns. Therefore, it is important to analyze the effect a reduction of the defense budget would have on

these systems.

Furthermore, both of these reconnaissance systems have many drawbacks. While it is much more

difficult to shoot down a satellite, both unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites have the potential to be

shot down. The Iranians claimed to have shot down an American drone, and Russia has anti-satellite

weaponry. By purchasing less UAVs and less satellites, there is an opportunity to strategically shrink the

defense budget.

Under President Carter in the 1970s, departments throughout the federal government had to

participate in zero-base budgeting. Through zero-based budgeting, departments were meant to evaluate

the most important and least important of government programs. While the process was cumbersome, it

was the predecessor of alternative budgeting, “in which agencies make budget requests at various

percentages of their previous funding-for example, at 90 percent, 100 percent, and 110 percent- and

analyze what effects those levels of spending would have on their programs.”89 This option allows the

United States to consider the effects of 90 percent of funding for these programs.

By reducing the reconnaissance budget by approximately 10 percent, the United States Air Force

could eliminate the acquisition of certain reconnaissance instruments for 2015 and buy 1 less Space Radar

Satellites, 2 less RQ-4 Global Hawks, and 29 less MQ-9 Reapers.

88 President Barack Obama. “Obama’s 2014 State of the Union Address.” The Washington Post 30 Jan. 2014.

89 Ronald Snell. NCSL Fiscal Brief: Zero-Base Budgeting in the States. National Conference of State Legislatures, 2012.


46

Table 9 describes 20-year estimates of total costs in millions of dollars for a 10 percent reduced

budget for the MQ-9 Reaper, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and Space Radar Satellites. Table 9 includes the




Table 9.

(Option 3) Approximate 10% Budget Decrease System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost





$21,497

$8,111

$23,155

(Option 3) Approximate 10% Budget Decrease System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost (Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)

Total Cost: $52,762





47

Table 10 describes the present value of the 20-year estimates of total costs in millions of dollars

for a 10 percent reduced budget for the MQ-9 Reaper, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and Space Radar Satellites.

Table 10 includes the unit cost plus operations and support (O&S), the quantity of satellites or UAVs

purchased, the cost per system, and the total cost of the three reconnaissance programs. The pie chart for

the present value of Option 3 is a visual for the amount the Air Force spends per system in Option 3.

Table 10.

(Option 3) PV 10% Budget Decrease System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost





$18,816

$7,194

$20,198

(Option 3)PV 10% Budget Decrease System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost OMB Real 20-Year Discount Rate 1.6% (Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)

Total Cost: $46,208

MQ-‐ 9 Reaper(259 Units)




48

Option 4: Purchase more satellites and purchase more drones with a 10% budget increase

In order to remain the most powerful country in the world, this option operates under the notion

that in order to have the best capability, the United States must have larger reconnaissance network than it

currently does. With terrorist networks growing stronger, it is imperative the United States has an

increased capability in order to deal with these threats. A video was released in April 2014 showing the

largest gathering of Al-Qa’ida in years.90 Terrorist groups remain strong, and the United States must have

the proper tools to defeat them. An expansion in the Space Radar program would allow for the satellites

to be positioned in a manner that monitors the whole world at the same time. Additionally, an increase in

the number of unmanned aerial vehicles would allow for an increase in military reconnaissance across the

globe. While globally, people are opposed to drones, they receive strong support in the United States,

with the only country supporting the use of drones more being Israel.91 With the support of the nation, the

Air Force could easily increase its purchase of drones.

90 Barbara Starr. “Unsettling Video Shows Large Al Qaeda Meeting in Yemen.” CNN. 16 Apr. 2014. 91 Bruce Drake. “Report Questions Drone Use, Widely Unpopular Globally, But Not In The U.S.” Pew Research Center 23 Oct. 2013


49

92

This option argues that there should not be a budget constraint on the safety and security of the

American people. It uses alternative budgeting to arrive at how the reconnaissance program would

function with an increase in approximately 10 percent of funding. The Air Force could increase the

acquisition of reconnaissance instruments by using 2015 as a benchmark and buy 1 additional Space

Radar Satellite, 1 more RQ-4 Global Hawks, and 29 more MQ-9 Reapers.

92 Motel, Seth. “Americans Divided on Whether Drones Make U.S. Safer.” Pew Research Center 3 Dec. 2013.


50

Table 11 describes 20-year estimates of total costs in millions of dollars for a 10 percent budget

increase for the MQ-9 Reaper, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and Space Radar Satellites. Table 11 includes the




Table 11.

(Option 4) Approximate 10% Budget Increase System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost

(Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions




$26,311.00

$9,982.00

$28,943.00

(Option 4) Approximate 10% Budget Increase System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost (Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)

Total Cost: $65,237





51

Table 12 describes the present value of the 20-year estimates of total costs in millions of dollars

for a 10 percent budget increase for the MQ-9 Reaper, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and Space Radar

Satellites. Table 12 includes the unit cost plus operations and support (O&S), the quantity of satellites or

UAVs purchased, the cost per system, and the total cost of the three reconnaissance programs. The pie

chart for the present value of Option 4 is a visual for the amount the Air Force spends per system in

Option 4.

Table 12.

(Option 4) PV 10% Budget Increase System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost





$23,030

$8,854

$25,248

(Option 4) PV 10% Budget Increase System 20- Year Estimates of Total Cost OMB Real 20-Year Discount Rate 1.6% (Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)

Total Cost: $57,132

MQ-‐ 9 Reaper

RQ-‐4 Global Hawk

Space Radar Satellite


52

Strategic Recommendations

Each policy option has its merits as a proposed solution to either the high costs of reconnaissance

technologies or to the need for updated systems to keep pace with a changing enemy. The different

choices in policies could have a profound impact not only on the United States defense budget but also on

national security as a whole.

While national security is a priority in the status quo, it does not consider changing from old

defense tools that try to solve changing problems. By continuing to have satellite reconnaissance as a

priority, the United States is relaying on Cold War technology to deal with the threats of the twenty-first

century. There have been a number of technological advancements in reconnaissance. While the Space

Radar satellite is a technological improvement, the reliance of this outdated reconnaissance tool is costly,

and redundant.

Even while the United States is in a time of fiscal restraint, it is important to deal with budget

constraints carefully. Michael O’Hanlon warns of the necessity to be careful when imposing defense cuts.

“Further defense cuts should be viewed in a tempered, moderate way. They are not inconceivable, even if the United States retains its current grand strategy and basic military policy. But they should not approach levels foreseen by either sequestration or plans like that of the Simpson-Bowels commission. While hardly emasculating the country or its armed forces, such cuts would be too risky, given the world in which we live.”93

Option 3, cutting of both the satellite program and the unmanned aerial vehicle programs could

potentially negatively affect the country, and risk aspects of national security.

93 Michael E. O’Hanlon. Healing The Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence While Cutting the Defense Budget. Washington, DC: The

Brookings Institution, 2013.


53

Over-purchasing could be just as disastrous and not having enough. In option 4, the result could

be an over reaction. It would spread resources too thin, and perhaps undermine the initial goals to keep

America safe and secure. Obama’s National Security Strategy states:

“The goal of those who perpetrate terrorist attacks is in part to sow fear. If we respond with fear, we allow violent extremists to succeed far beyond the initial impact of their attacks, or attempted attacks—altering our society and enlarging the standing of al-Qa’ida and its terrorist affiliates far beyond its actual reach. Similarly, overreacting in a way that creates fissures between America and certain regions or religions will undercut our leadership and make us less safe.”94

While seeking to make the country more safe and secure, option 4 undermines that idea. It is not strategic

and does not adhere to changing policy goals.

The strategic recommendation of this memorandum is option 2, buying fewer satellites and more

drones. It strategically cuts the defense budget while at the same time increasing the capability of the

United States military. This option aligns with the current National Security Strategy as well as the

Quadrennial Defense Review report. It keeps the country safe and secure while helping to go forward

with the new doctrine for a new time period. The focus is switched from Cold War technologies to ones

that better align with the threats and new priorities.

The problem posed in this memorandum is: There is not enough emphasis on technical

advancements in reconnaissance by the United States Air Force even while enemies are getting better a

evading traditional methods. Option 2 makes the most progress towards solving this critical policy

problem. First, it allows for the Air Force to continue use of both satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles.

It is important to have satellites as a part of reconnaissance because they have the ability to monitor the

“big picture” while UAVs focus on small pieces of land. It is unprecedented for satellites to be shot down

or disabled, and satellites are very stable. Nevertheless, it is time for the Air Force to shift focus onto

more technologically advanced tools, such as UAVs. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are both less expensive

94 President Barack Obama. National Security Strategy. Washington, DC, 2010.


54

and lighter than satellites. Many, such as the Reaper, have both reconnaissance and strike capabilities.

This makes them more useful on the battlefield.

The images gathered by UAVs have a higher resolution due proximity to the ground. A satellite

has a fixed area that it watches but a UAV may be directed to monitor areas of specific concern.

Purchasing 61 more Reapers and 1 more Global Hawk, while remaining within the current budget for the

United States Air Force, is the most strategic method of spending. This is more apparent when compared

to other options. The status quo does nothing to address the need for new technology and changing

threats. A simply increase or decrease in the budget as options 4 and 5 suggest, is not strategic, and both

leave the country in a more vulnerable position. The world is dynamically different than it was during the

Cold War. Option 2 incorporates the need for new strategies with the current fiscal outlook. For the

United States to remain the most powerful nation in the world, it is important that the reconnaissance

tactics align with threats.

Weaknesses and Limitations

Every policy memorandum is plagued by weaknesses and limitations. This is especially true

when dealing in the national security policy. The first of these weaknesses and limitations is that it is very

difficult to conduct a cost-benefit analysis in the realm of national security. It is nearly impossible to

identify the benefits of security and safety. While there are actuarial methods to determining the value of

a human life, doing a cost benefit analysis for security is not feasible. Performing a cost-effectiveness

analysis is the principle manner the Department of Defense analyzes weapons systems. While there is

clearly an important benefit from any national security measure, it is nearly impossible to monetize.

The lack of a cost-benefit analysis necessitated a cost-effectiveness analysis. This memorandum

measures cost-effectiveness of satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles. A cost-effectiveness analysis


55

allows the alternatives to be compared to one another based on efficiency and effectiveness rather than

benefits. While the numbers of lives saved due to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles can be estimated,

there is no clear way to measure this statistic. Furthermore, the safety provided by these reconnaissance

systems is immeasurable because much of reconnaissance success is based on what does not happen

rather than what does.

A second limitation is due to the nature of the military and national security. Due to the sensitive

nature of the military, many documents involving both cost and functions of systems are classified. This

is especially true in reconnaissance and intelligence collection activities. It is difficult to obtain specific

information regarding the entire Space Radar program as well as the programs surrounding the RQ-4

Global Hawk and the MQ-9 Reaper. The data based on the resolution of the cameras attached to these

instruments is difficult to acquire. This policy memorandum solely relied on unclassified information,

which resulted in difficulty.

A third weakness or limitation is the inability to predict the success of the changed strategy. This

important limitation is widely acknowledged by military strategists and experts. Dwight D. Eisenhower

said, “In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

This is similar to Carl von Clausewitz's “fog and friction of war”95. This is the concept that once battles

actually occur, there are usually different results and different battlefield situations than those anticipated.

Even Napoleon is credited with saying that battle plans often go awry at the “firing of the first shot.” It is

important to strategize but often the actually results of conflicts or the success of strategies cannot be

predicted. Even as success is not guaranteed, it is important for the Department of Defense to plan for the

unpredicted future.

95 Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Trans. Colonel J.J. Graham. Vol. 1. 1832.


56

Cost Effectiveness Analysis

While the majority of policy memorandums conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), it would be

extremely difficult to conduct a cost-benefit analysis in regards to national security, as the benefits of

safety are somewhat immeasurable. There are a number of differences between a cost-benefit analysis and

a cost-effectiveness analysis. A cost-effectiveness analysis is a method to better spend current

government allocations rather than a cost-benefit analysis, which changes resource allocation. A cost-

benefit analysis calculates net-present value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), and the benefit/cost ratio

(B/C). A cost-effectiveness analysis does not use these measures to calculate effectiveness.

“Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is a widely used alternative to CBA, especially in areas such as health and defense policy… The exact contribution of different types of weapons systems to overall national defense is often unclear. In such situations, CBA is not possible, but CEA may give useful information concerning the relative efficiency of alternatives.”96

It is incredibly difficult to quantify the benefits of a reconnaissance system used in national security.

According to Stephanie Riegg Cellini and James Edwin Kee in the Handbook of Practical Program

Evaluation, “Cost -effectiveness analysis is a technique that relates the costs of a program to its key

outcomes or benefits. Cost -benefit analysis takes that process one step further, attempting to compare

costs with the dollar value of all (or most) of a program’s many benefits.”97 While the dollar amount is

clearly measurable in the realm of national security, it is impossible to follow up with it by comparing the

dollar value of the cost with the program’s benefits.

Conclusion

Threats posed from enemies of the United States have evolved and it is time for the U.S. Military

to use cost-effectiveness measures for reconnaissance. Satellites represent a Cold War solution to military

reconnaissance. They remain important to have as a part of a diverse military strategy. Unmanned aerial

96 Anthony E. Boardman et al. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice. Fourth. Pearson, 2011. 97 Cellini, Stephanie Riegg, and James Edwin Kee. “Cost-Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analysis.” Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation. Jossey-

Bass, 2010.


57

vehicles offer a cost effective alternative to military reconnaissance. In addition to reconnaissance, many

UAVs have strike capabilities. This allows them to perform dual missions. Unmanned aerial vehicles

have a number of advantages over satellites. They are less costly, can result in better images due to their

proximity to the ground, and can be directed to remote parts of the world. While they can be shot down,

they are inexpensive relative to other systems and do not endanger the lives of U.S. soldiers. This

memorandum recommends a decrease in the procurement of 2 Space Radar Satellites and an increase in

62 unmanned aerial vehicles (61 additional MQ-9 Reapers and 1 addition RQ-4 Global Hawks). This

increase in UAVs aligns with the necessary changes in defense strategy. Through the cost-effectiveness

analysis, this option is not only the most appropriate because of military strategy but it reallocates current

spending in a more efficient manner.


58

Appendix

Cost Effectiveness Analysis

20-Year System Estimates of Total Cost Per Option (Constant 2013 Dollars) (Millions)

MQ- 9 Reaper RQ-4 Global Hawk

Space Radar Satellite Total Cost

Option 1 (Status Quo) $23,904 $9,359 $26,049 $59,312 Option 2 (More UAVs, Less Satellites) $28,967 $9,982 $20,260 $59,210 Option 3 (-10%) $21,497 $8,111 $23,155 $52,726 Option 4 (+10%) $26,311 $9,982 $28,943 $65,237

PV 20-Year System Estimates of Total Cost Per Option OMB Real 20-Year Discount Rate 1.6%


MQ- 9 Reaper RQ-4 Global Hawk

Space Radar Satellite Total Cost

Option 1 (Status Quo) $20,923 $8,301 $22,723 $51,947 Option 2 (More UAVs, Less Satellites) $25,355 $8,854 $17,673 $51,882 Option 3 (-10%) $18,816 $7,194 $20,198 $46,208 Option 4 (+10%) $23,030 $8,854 $25,248 $57,132


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MQ-9 Reaper Calculations


60

RQ-4 Global Hawk Calculations


61

Space Radar Satellite Calculations


62

MQ-9 Reaper 98

Life Cycle Unit Cost- $83 Million (Constant 2013 Dollars)

•Armed •Multi-mission •Medium altitude (Ceiling up to 50,000 feet) •Long-Endurance •Remotely piloted (2 crew members, pilot and sensor operator) •Range – 1,000 nautical miles •Cruise Speed- 230 miles per hour •Used primarily as an intelligence collection asset •Used Secondly “against dynamic execution targets” •Used to perform a variety of tasks including reconnaissance

MQ- 9 Reaper Advantages Disadvantages Dual mission Operate in contested environment

Attack Can be shot down

Reconnaissance No stealth capability

Can defend itself Alleged Iran example of drone shot down 2011. “Neither confirmed or denied by Pentagon”

Remotely piloted

98 “MQ-9 Reaper.” U.S. Air Force. 18 Aug. 2010.


63

RQ-4 Global Hawk99

Life Cycle Unit Cost- $623.9 million (Constant 2013 Dollars)

•High Altitude (Ceiling up to 60,000 feet) •Long Endurance •Unmanned aircraft system with three crewmembers (LRE Pilot, MCE pilot, and sensor operator) •Speed- 357 miles per hour •Range 8,700 nautical miles •Provides a broad spectrum of ISR collection capability to support joint combat forces •Provides consistent near real-time coverage using imagery intelligence and signals intelligence

RQ-4 Global Hawk Advantages Disadvantages Real Time Expensive

High Altitude Can only operate in uncontested airspace

High range Cannot defend itself Fast

99 “RQ-4 Global Hawk.” U.S. Air Force. 16 Oct. 2008.


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Space Radar Satellites100

Unit Life Cycle Cost- $2.894 billion (Constant 2013 Dollars)

•Provide the capability to detect and track mobile targets in all weather conditions •Unarmed •Would have synthetic aperture radar mapping and surface moving target indication capabilities •SBRIS-Low (Space Based Infrared System)

Space Radar Advantages Disadvantages

Can’t get shot down Lower resolution Big picture No attack capability

Big Camera Possible uncontrolled reentry back down to Earth

100 Post, Joseph, and Michael Bennett. Alternatives for Military Space Radar. The Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office, 2007.


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