Military and Economy

Lsn 13

Military Instrument of Power

• The military instrument of power must have the capability to conduct sustained peacetime engagement activities as well as respond to two general types of crises (those with significant escalation potential and those without)– Peacetime engagement activities lay the

groundwork necessary to ensure crisis operations are not conducted off-the-cuff

Carl von Clausewitz

• Prussian officer born in 1780• Resigned his commission in

1812 and joined the Russian Army to fight Napoleon

• Ideas on war were heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionary period and Napoleon’s Prussian adversary Gerhard von Scharnhorst

• Died in 1831 and his wife published his On War in 1832

Carl von Clausewitz

• War is neither an art nor a science– It is a continuation of “policy” (or “politics”) by

other means.– A form of social intercourse

• War is like a wrestling match– It is “an act of force to compel our enemy to

do our will.”– But it is not unilateral. It is a contest between

two independent wills.

Carl von Clausewitz

• Used a trinitarian analysis consisting of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to rational policy – Often loosely expressed as “the people, the military,

and the government”• Analyzed “absolute war” or “war in theory,” but then

noted that factors such as poor intelligence, chance, friction, etc make war in practice different than war in the abstract (the “fog of war”)

• Argued one should focus his military efforts against the enemy’s “center of gravity” (“Schwerpunkt”) – Very important concept in modern American military

doctrine

Albert Thayer Mahan• US naval officer who lived from 1840 to

1914• Wrote The Influence of Sea Power Upon

History, 1660-1783 and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812

• Considered “sea power” to include the overlapping concepts of command of the sea through naval superiority and that combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produces national “wealth and greatness”

Albert Thayer Mahan

• Advocated – “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the

enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive”

– “(1) Production; (2) Shipping: (3) Colonies and Markets– in a word, sea power”

• Thought the Navy should be used offensively and that its principle object should be destruction of the enemy’s fleet– Destroying the enemy’s battle fleet would in turn

cause his merchant fleet to find the sea untenable

Albert Thayer Mahan

• Saw the Navy’s economic strangulation of France by blockade as the key to Britain’s defeat of Napoleon– “It was not by attempting great military operations on

land, but by controlling the sea, and through the sea the world outside Europe,” that the British “ensured the triumph of their country.”

• Critics argue that Mahan confused a necessary or important cause with the sufficient cause– The British Navy was important, but the Army and

diplomacy also played key roles

Albert Thayer Mahan

• Increasingly became an imperialist in order to gain control of the resources the US needed to best use its naval power

• Considered the navy to be a better instrument of national policy than the army– This was especially true for the United States

which had “neither the tradition nor the design to act aggressively beyond the seas,” but at the same time had “very important transmarine interests which need protection”

Giulio Douhet

• Italian air power theorist who lived from 1869 to 1930

• Saw air power as a way for Italy to overcome its inherent weaknesses in manpower and natural resources– But to become the dominant weapon it

could be, aircraft had to be freed from the control of ground commanders who did not understand the new capability

– Advocated the creation of a separate air arm to be commanded by airmen

Giulio Douhet

• Saw airpower as being able to crush the enemy’s will to fight by destroying or neutralizing a country’s “vital centers”– those elements of society, government, and industry essential to the functioning of the state– It could do so without the need for the bloody

commitment of ground forces that had made World War I so costly

Giulio Douhet

• Douhet recognized the importance of targeting– Aircraft could strike virtually anything but in order to

be most forceful they should not attempt to strike everything

• Instead, focus on the five basic target systems that Douhet considered the vital centers of a modern country– Industry, transportation infrastructure, communication

nodes, and the will of the people– The will of the people was the most important target– Douhet did not advocate aircraft attacking or

supporting ground forces; airpower was to be used strategically, not tactically

Navy

• Safeguards maritime commerce

• Shows the flag

• Enables land power

Air Force

• Maximizes technology

• “Gratification without commitment”

• Sends a message, but seldom can be decisive

Army

• Can achieve decisive results

• Provides “boots on the ground”

• Represents maximum commitment

• Very costly (casualties, time, logistics, etc)

Traditional Military Strategies

• Attrition– The reduction of the effectiveness of a

force caused by loss of personnel and materiel

• Exhaustion– The gradual erosion of a nation’s will or

means to resist

• Annihilation– Seeks the immediate destruction of the

combat power of the enemy’s armed forces

Case Study

The Korean War

Divided Korea

• After World War II, Japan’s former colony of Korea was divided into two occupation zones along the 38th parallel with the Soviet zone in the north and the US zone in the south

• Before the occupation forces departed, an anticommunist regime was established in the south and a communist one in the north

US in Asia

• The US was uncertain as to the extent of its commitment in Asia

• It knew its umbrella definitely covered Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, but it was unclear about Taiwan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia

• Believing the US did not intend to protect South Korea, the USSR allowed the North Koreans to invade the south in 1950

Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech to the

National Press Club omitted South Korea from

the US “defensive perimeter”

North Korea Attacks: June 25, 1950

• North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel with an invasion force totaling over 90,000 troops and 150 Soviet-built tanks

• By the night of June 28, Seoul had fallen and the South Korean forces were in disarray

• South Korea appealed to the United Nations for assistance

• The UN passed a resolution recommending that “the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the area.”

United Nations

• As a member of the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union could have vetoed UN involvement in the war, but instead Moscow was boycotting the Security Council at the time in protest of the UN’s failure to seat a representative of the newly established People’s Republic of China

• In the absence of the USSR, the UN passed a resolution sending a military force to South Korea

• The force was predominately American with Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander – There were also substantial contributions from the

UK, Canada and other Commonwealth countries.

Force Comparison

• U.S. Armed Forces in 1950– 10 Army divisions (4

in Japan)– 48 USAF air groups– 331 combatants (64 in

Pacific)– 2 Marine divisions (-)

• North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) – 14 Divisions (9 in

invasion force)– Soviet trained, armed

and advised– 150 tanks, almost 100

modern aircraft

Task Force Smith

• To stem the North Korea advance, the US deployed “Task Force Smith,” a delaying force of two reinforced rifle companies to Pusan

• MacArthur thought this “arrogant display of strength” would cause the North Koreans to take pause and slow their aggression

Elements of Task Force Smith arriving

at Taejon

• Task Force Smith began occupying defensive positions on July 5 at 3:00 am– At 7:00 they began seeing enemy

movement– At 8:16 they began firing artillery– At 2:30 the commander decided to

withdraw

• When LTC Smith arrived at Ch’onan on July 6, he counted 185 men – He began with 540

• After all stragglers returned, the total loss to TF Smith was 35%

Task Force Smith

Implications of Task Force Smith

• Task Force Smith has become the poster child for the cost of military unpreparedness

• “No more Task Force Smiths” – GEN Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff,

1991-1995 (administered the post Desert Storm Army downsizing)

“Hollow Army”

- World War II peak Army strength was 8,268,000 - 89 combat divisions in June 1945 - June 1950 strength was about 591,000 (1/14 the peak World War II size) - 10 active combat divisions

- But to keep them fielded, one battalion from each infantry regiment and one firing battery from each field artillery battalion had been eliminated - This move effectively reduced combat power by 1/3

Far East Command (FEC)

• 108,500 troops under MacArthur • 4 infantry divisions in Japan (7th, 24th, 25th and 1st Cavalry) • Authorized peacetime divisions strength was 12,500 (13,500 for the 25th )• Authorized wartime strength was 18,900 • 3 of the 4 divisions in Japan had about 11,000 men

• In addition to the missing infantry and artillery battalions each • Lacked three anti aircraft artillery batteries • Lacked the regimental tank companies • Had only a company of M24 Chaffee light tanks in place of the divisional tank battalion

• Estimated the divisions could field 62% of normal infantry firepower, 69% of normal anti-aircraft capability, and 14% of armored support

Equipment in FEC • Mostly outdated World War II equipment and much of it was unserviceable

– Of 18,000 jeeps only 8,000 were serviceable– Of 13,780 2 1/2 ton trucks, only 4,441 were serviceable

• Had none of the new 3.5 inch antitank rocker launchers – Only the 2.36 inch Bazooka which had proved inadequate in 1944 – 1945

• Hydraulic fluid for recoil mechanisms in the M24 tanks had been on backorder for two years, so most of their 75 mm guns had never been fired • Some men were wearing tennis shoes because of a lack of boots • ¼ of the small arms were defective

Training Problems

• Occupation duties took precedence over training • No unit training above the company level had taken place in Eighth Army before April 1949 • Limited maneuver area and an annual personnel turnover rate of 43% impeded training • The four divisions were rated as 65% to 84% combat ready

– Some senior officers felt that 40% was more realistic

US troops parade across the Yoshida Bridge

Pusan Perimeter:June 27 to Sept 15

• The American forces were unprepared for the North Korean attack

• By the end of July, the North Koreans had pushed the UN forces to the southeast corner of the peninsula, where they dug in around the port of Pusan.

Korean War Case Study

• What role did diplomatic communications play in the North Korean decision to attack?

• How was “risk” not properly considered in the configuring of the post World War II US Army?

• How did the American application of its military power in Korea fail in its peacetime engagement activity?

• How did it fail in its response to a crisis?

Instruments of Power

Economic

Economic Instrument of Power

• Nations pursue the economic instrument of power to obtain broadly conceived welfare goals including security, prestige, autonomy, and access to markets and sources of supply all designed to enhance domestic economic growth

• Economic power is influenced by a nation’s people, technology, financial resources, and raw materials

Economic Instrument of Power

• People– Acquisition, preparation, production,

management, and innovation all depend on human resources

– A motivated and dedicated population can create many conditions of economic greatness despite the lack of raw materials

– Japan is a good example

Post World War II Japan

• Japan’s large and mostly compliant work force fueled an economy based on manufactured goods slated for export to markets with higher labor costs like the US

• In the 1960s the Japanese used their profits to switch to more capital-intensive manufacturing but “Made in Japan” usually was associated with a cheap product

Economic Instrument of Power

• Technology– People alone cannot manufacture products or

provide services– Technology is required to enable an economy

to alter, modify, build, or turn materials into products faster, better, and cheaper than before

– Technology involves the application of science towards solving a particular objective or to produce selected products

Post World War II Japan

• In the 1970s, Japan took advantage of a highly trained and educated work force to shift their economy toward technologically-intensive products and “Made in Japan” came to represent state of the art technology

Sony turntable

Economic Instrument of Power

• Financial Resources– Required for a nation to expand its economic

power– Allow nations to invest in new plants and

equipments, conduct research, purchase raw materials, hire and educate labor, and provide resources in an emergency

– Financial resources can be acquired by savings and/or increased trade

Post World War II Japan

• During the 1980s Japan used its strong economy to greatly expand its investments abroad, especially in the US

• One survey reported that in 1970 there were only 12 US manufacturing companies in which Japanese firms held more than 50 % of the stock– By 1985, there were nearly 400 such companies, plus

more than 500 Japanese-owned plants.

Japanese direct investment flows 1980–90 ($ million)

Economic Instrument of Power

• Raw Materials– Include minerals,

metals, and energy sources

– Growing economies often outstrip domestic supplies

Petroleum refinery in Saudi Arabia

Post World War II Japan

• Japan lacks abundant internal raw resources• In 2008 it held a trade fair aimed at boosting investment

in Africa, in part to compete with China for a share of Africa’s oil resources

Economic Instrument of Power

• Economic Tools– Improve domestic capability to out-compete potential

foes• Large part of President Reagan’s strategy to defeat the

USSR during the 1980s– Provide instant, direct assistance to a country in need

• The Marshall Plan helped Europe recover after World War II– Debt forgiveness

• In 1991 the US fully forgave Egypt’s military debt in recognition of Egypt’s role in forging the Desert Storm coalition

– Sanctions• Throughout the 1980s the US imposed sanctions on Libya

for being a state sponsor of terrorism

Case Study

Marshall Plan

Marshall Plan

• The economic devastation suffered by Europe in World War II made many European countries vulnerable to the spread of communism

• On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall called on the Europeans themselves to draw up a plan for European recovery, which the US would then financially support.

• In four years, the US would contribute $13 billion.

Dresden, 1944

Berlin, 1945

Results of the Marshall Plan

Hamburg's Moenckebergstrasse in the business district at the end of the war (left) and in 1950 (right).

Results of the Marshall Plan

Results of the Marshall Plan• By 1951 Marshall Plan

countries had raised their industrial output 40% over 1938.

• Dramatic economic recovery both reduced the threat of the spread of communism to western Europe and set that region on the road to independence in world affairs.

• Offer extended to eastern bloc countries but USSR ensured there are no takers.

• Marshall awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1953.

Case Study

The Continental System

Napoleonic Wars: Trafalgar

• In the Napoleonic era, the British navy dominated the sea while the French army dominated the European continent

• Napoleon hoped to draw the British fleet away from the English Channel where it blocked a French invasion

Trafalgar

• British Admiral Horatio Nelson and French Admiral Pierre de Villeneuve met off Cape Trafalgar on the southern tip of the Spanish coast on Oct 20, 1805

• The British gained one of the most decisive victories in naval history– The British took or destroyed 18 of the enemy’s 34

ships of the line while losing none of their own• Trafalgar gave the British undisputed control of the seas

and the French were confined to the land and made vulnerable to strikes from the coast

Continental System

• With Britain safe from attack, Napoleon turned more energetically to economic warfare

• In Nov 1806, he established the Continental System which sought to blockade the British Isles and close the ports of France and its satellites to ships coming from Britain or its colonies

• The idea was to ruin Britain’s trade-based economy by eliminating its chief market

• By the fall of 1807, all the nations of continental Europe except Portugal and Sweden had joined the Continental System

Continental System

• Enforcing the Continental System proved difficult because:– Europeans had become reliant on cheap

British goods– The British worked around the system through

smuggling and bribery– The system hurt the French too

Peninsular War

• Napoleon’s efforts to enforce the Continental System eventually led him into battle on the Iberian Peninsula – Napoleon arranged with the king of Spain to

attack Portugal through Spain– Although Napoleon occupied Portugal easily

he ultimately became embroiled in a guerrilla war in Spain and Portugal that greatly weakened his empire

Case Study

Yom Kippur War and the 1973 Oil Embargo

The Yom Kippur War (1973)

• Egypt attacked Israel along the entire front of the Suez Canal on Saturday, Oct 6, both the Jewish Sabbath as well as the holy Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur)

• Syria simultaneously attacked in the Golan Heights

• The Egyptians were able to defeat Israeli armored attacks with Sagger antitank missiles provided by Russia

Israeli tank driving by wounded soldiers

The Yom Kippur War (1973)

• President Nixon promised, “We will not let Israel go down the tubes.”– On October 13 he ordered a massive

airlift of military material to Israel• Newly arrived US TOW antitank missiles

helped Israel destroy 200 Egyptian tanks in a subsequent battle

The 1973 Oil Embargo

• On October 20, Saudi Arabia began embargoing oil shipments to the US to punish the Americans for supporting Israel

• By October 21 most of the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had joined the embargo

Gas lines during the oil embargo

The 1973 Oil Embargo

• The US was importing between 10 and 15% of its oil from the Middle East

• The US was plunged into an energy crisis and gas prices soared

• The embargo was finally lifted in March 1974 but prices remained high

• America’s vulnerability to foreign oil had been exposed

• The Yom Kippur War and the ensuing oil embargo showed the political and economic power of OPEC

Next

• Student Article Presentations