Milestone Farms vs Office of the PresidentFACTS: Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms. Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage. Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO. DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property and recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP. DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCECs recommendation The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the MCTC. MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone RTC reversed the decision of MCTC CA ruled in favor of Milestone DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP. Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration, Office of the President reinstated the decision of Director Garilao. CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted was with a total area of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares. With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended decision, states that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.

ISSUE:Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP

HELD: No. When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and effect. As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising

LUZ Farm Vs DAR

ISSUE:Whether the term agriculture as used in the Constitution embraces raising livestock, poultry and swine.Transcript of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of agriculture clearly shows that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.Agricultural lands do not include commercial industrial, and residential lands.

RULING:it is evident in the foregoing discussion that Sec 2 of RA 6657 which includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of commercial farms is INVALID, to the extent of the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.

Sutton

Transcript of Central Mindanao University vs. Executive SecretaryCMU v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)DARAB ordered the segregation for distribution of lands 400 hectares of CMU site.

SC nullified DARAB order considering the inalienable character of subject land, being part of the long term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution.Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)

RA 8371Section 56: property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of RA 8371 shall be recognized and respected.UnderscoreCentral Mindanao University (CMU)

chartered educational institution owned andrun by the State

1958 - Pres. Garcia issued "Proclamation 476"

Reserving 3401 ha for CMU site3401 ha came from public dominion

1997 - RA 8371 enacted

Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)

2003 - Pres. Arroyo issued "Proclamation 310"

Taking 670 ha from CMU site To be distributed to Musuan, Bukidnon pursuant to IPRARTCCMU (Prohibition) vs. Exec. Sec., NCIP Et. al.

To stop Proc 310 and have it unconstitutionalMalaybalay RTC, Bukidnon

National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) moved to dismiss - lack of jurisdiction

Manila RTC has jurisdiction of MalacananProc 310 executed in ManilaMotion Denied; MR Granted; Case dismissed

PROCLAMATION 310 CONSTITUTIONAL. VALID STATE ACT. ULTIMATE OWNER OF THE LANDS IS THE STATE AND CMU MERELY ACTING IN ITS BEHALF.

CMU MR Denied

CMU Appealed to CA Dismissed; MR DeniedEnvironmental Law Issue

Is Presidential Proclamation 310 valid and constitutional?Statement of FACTSStatement of LAWAPPLICATIONofLAW to FACTSCentral Mindanao University vs. Executive SecretaryTHANK YOU!Digest presentation by: Leomard Silver Joseph C. LimG.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 86EXISTING PROPERTY RIGHTSPRIOR TO EFFECTIVITY OF RA 8371 SHALL BE RECOGNIZEDAND RESPECTEDOwnership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958.

Transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in consonance within IPRA's contemplation. Supreme Court GRANTS petition, SETS ASIDE decision and resolution of Court of Appeals, and DECLARES Presidential Proclamation 310 as null and void for being contrary to law and public policy.WHAT DO YOU THINK?

DAR as represented by its Secretary, Roberto M. Pagdanganan vs. DECSG.R. No. 158228 (April 27, 2004)Facts: The subject of this controversy are Lot Nos. 2509 and 871-D of Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental with an area of 189.2462 hectares. The lands were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS on October 21, 1921 and consequently transferred to DECS under TCT No. 167175. DECS in turn, leased the subject landholdings to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years or from 1984-1985 to 1993-1994. Subsequently, the lease was renewed for another 10 years from 1995-1996 until 2004-2005. On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farmworkers therein filed a petition for Compulsory Coverage. A "Notice of Coverage" was issued with the approval of the Regional Director. DECS appealed to the Secretary of DAR who in turn affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. DECS filed a petition for review with the CA to set aside the Decision of the DAR Secretary. However, the CA affirmed the aforementioned Decision. Hence, this Appeal.Issue:Whether or not the properties (owned by DECS) are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)Held: Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of land which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption,viz.:c)Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, x x x x x x shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be"actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary"and 2) the purpose is"for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes." The importance of the phrase"actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary"cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the"plain meaning rule"orverba legisin statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. The ruling in Central Mindanao University vs. DAR Adjudication Board is inapplicable in the case at bar. First, in the CMU case, the land involved is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain because it was specifically reserved by the late President Carlos P. Garcia for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (CMU) under Proclamation No. 476. Second, x x x x x"The retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future educational needs of CMU. On the other hand, the lands in this case were not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses, as they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational purposes but for the furtherance of its business. Also, as conceded by respondent DECS, it was the income from the contract of lease and not the subject lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of the schools in the locality."Province of Cam Sur v CA, 222 SCRA 137, GR 103125 (1993)

Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employeesPursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue: WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

HELD: To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ratio: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.SO ORDERED.

Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DARFACTS:Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987, theCongress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. This Congresspassed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed bythe President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before thelaws effectivity, on May 6, 1988,[Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to theprovisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsoryacquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its President, sent a letter totheSecretary of DARwithdrawing its VOSof Hacienda Caylaway.The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,Batangasallegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agriculturalto non-agriculturalAs a result,petitioner informed respondentDAR that itwas applying forconversion ofHacienda Caylaway from agricultural to otheruses. The petitions nubonthe interpretation of PresidentialProclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE INCAVITE PROVINCE ANDTHE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS ASA TOURISTZONE, ANDFOR OTHER PURPOSES Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application forconversion of its three haciendas fromagricultural tonon-agricultural onthe assumption thatthe issuance ofPP 1520which declared Nasugbu,Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding,the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to thefarmer-beneficiaries in the threehaciendasincluding CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an applicationfor exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basisof PP 1520 andof DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 19943which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity ofCARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.ISSUES:WhetherPP1520reclassifiedin1975alllandsintheMaragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourismzoneto non-agricultural useto exempt Roxas & Co.s threehaciendas in Nasugbu fromCARP coverage;RULING:PP 1520 DIDNOTAUTOMATICALLYCONVERTTHEAGRICULTURALLANDSINTHETHREEMUNICIPALITIES INCLUDINGNASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS.Roxas & Co.contends that PP1520declared thethree municipalities aseachconstituting atourism zone,reclassified alllandstherein to tourismand, therefore,converted their usetonon-agricultural purposes.Theperambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising the [three Municipalitiesthat] havepotential tourism value"and mandated theconduct of"necessary studies" and the segregationof"specific geographic areas" toachieve its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority(PTA) to identify what those potential tourismareas are. If all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural use, there would have been noneed for the PP to direct the PTA to identify whatthose "specific geographic areas" are.In the above-cited case ofRoxas & Co. v. CA,9the Court made it clear thatthe "power to determine whether Haciendas Palico,Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exemptfrom the coverage of the[Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies withthe[Department of Agrarian Reform], notwith this Court." The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, byOrder, the application forCARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands intheaffected municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the"specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending tourism development projects in theareas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated thatthe areas were planted with sugar cane and other crops.11Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7,Seriesof2004,12came upwith clarificatory guidelinesandtherein decreedthatB. Proclamations declaringgeneral areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas astourist zones thatmerely:(1) recognize certain stillunidentified areas withinthe covered provinces, municipalities,barangays,islands, or peninsulasto be with potential tourism value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority with the taskto identify/delineate specificgeographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and to coordinate saidareas development; or(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the general areadeclared as tourist zone (i.e. x x x x)and direct the PhilippineTourism Authority to coordinate said areasdevelopment;could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land areadeclared as tourist zone. This is sobecause "reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation into some specificuse and "providing for the manner of their utilizationand disposition (Sec. 20, LocalGovernment Code) or the "actof specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, orcommercial, as embodied in the land useplan." A proclamation that merelyrecognizes the potential tourism valueof certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate,reserve, or intend theentirety oftheland areaof thezone fornon-agricultural purposes. Neitherdoes saidproclamation directthatotherwiseCARPablelandswithinthezoneshallalreadybeusedforpurposesotherthanagricultural.Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes ofentire provinces, municipalities,barangays, islands, or peninsulaswould beunreasonable as itamounts toanautomatic and sweeping exemptionfrom CARP inthename oftourism development. The samewouldalso undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in local governmentunits in conjunction with pertinentagencies of government.C. There beingno reclassification, it is clearthat said proclamations/issuances, assuming[these] took effect before June 15, 1988,could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the landsembraced therein from CARP coverageD. The DARs reading intothese general proclamations of tourism zonesdeserves utmost consideration, more especially in thepresent petitions which involve vast tracts of agriculturalland. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the generalarea declared as tourism zones It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does notautomatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion before oneis permitted to use it for other purposes

Facts:These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.G.R. No. 79777The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310G.R. No. 79310This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.G.R. No. 79744The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.G.R. No. 78742Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.

Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling:There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain