Midterms.torts

8/19/2019 Midterms.torts

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I. THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICTA. ELEMENTS

BARREDO V GARCIABOCOBO; July 8, 1942FACTS- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed byFausto Barredo- May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilisthereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed> no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barr edo is careless in employing (sel ection and supervision) Fontanilla who had beencaught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding> CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising from wr ongful act or negligent acts oromissions punishable by law- Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be heldresponsibleISSUEWON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making him primarily liable and directly responsible under A1903CC as employerof FontanillaHELDYES- There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damagesarising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) whereinas the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. Theparents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer bec he has more money to give than

Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence.ObiterDifference bet Crime and Quasi-delict1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligenceintervenesNOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibilitye.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere preponderance of evidence- Presumptions:1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater familias- motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles

ELCANO V HILL77 SCRA 98BARREDO; May 26, 1977FACTS- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and wasacquitted for “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.” - Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it.ISSUES1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald,though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally marriedHELD1. NO -The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant actionagainst him.-Barredo v Garcia (dual character —civil and criminal — of fault or negligence as a source of obligation):"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action ofthe agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subjectof a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.""It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of thechild was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of acriminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence underarticle 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a c uasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fullyand clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria forwhich, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civ il liability arising from his crime.” -Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.-ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and byspecial laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides:"ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front negligenceunder the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice f or the same act or omission of the defendant."- According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when weconsider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict,of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal


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negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, soundand perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminalnegligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, butfor damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery,"- Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same ar gument of Justice Bacobo about construction thatupholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be obs erved in applying the same. Andconsidering that me preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in acivil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised PenalCode, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it’s "more congruent with thespirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault ornegligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.- Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,

provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores , and would be entitled insuch eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.2. Y ES (but…) - Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now ofage, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.)- While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takesplace "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399 , emancipation by marriage of the minor is not reallyfull or absolute . Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enablethe minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent ofhis father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."- Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons forwhom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death orincapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."- In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of theoccurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.- It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons.- On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be suedwithout the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give riseto judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.

CINCO V CANONOY90 SCRA 369Melencio-Herrera; May 31, 1979FACTS- Cinco filed on Feb 25, 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven byRomeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.- Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident.- At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit.- The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner’s MFR having been denied, he elevated the matter on Certiorari to theCFI Cebu., which in turn dismissed the petition.Plaintiff’s claims:

- it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision.- Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision- There was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.Respondents’ Comments: - They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot.ISSUE WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal actionHELDYES- Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Art 2177of the Civil Code.- The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:

Sec 2. Independent civil action. – In the cases prvided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f the Philippines, an independentcivil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the cri minal prosecution, andshall require only a preponderance of evidence.

- Petitioner’s cause of action is b ased on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code, is so broad that in

includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between “damage to persons” on the one hand and“damage to property” on the other. The word damage is used in two concepts: the “harm” done and “reparation” for the harm done . And withrespect to “harm” it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since “harm” is not limited to perso nal but also to property injuries.DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted.

BAKSH V CA (Gonzales)219 SCRA 115DAVIDE, JR; Feb.19, 1993FACTS- Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of theiragreement to get married.**MG’s allegations in the complaint:- That she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of good moral character and respected reputation in her community.- That Baksh is an Iranian citizen, residing in Dagupan, and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan.- That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. MG accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They later agreed to getmarried at the end of the school semester. Petitioner had visited MG’s parents to secure their approval of the marriage. Baks h later forced MG to live


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with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment,she sustained injuries. A day before the filing of the complaint, Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymoreand that he is already married to someone in Bacolod. She prayed for payment for damages amounting to Php 45,000 plus additional costs.- Baksh answered with a counterclaim, admitting only the personal circumstances of the parties in the complaint but denied the rest of the allegations.He claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married; neither sought the consent of her parents nor forced her to live in his apt.; didnot maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his place after having discovered that she stole his money and passport. He also prayed for 25,000as moral damages plus misc. expenses.- The RTC, applying Art. 21 CC decided in favor of private respondent. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php 20,000 as moral damages and 3,000pesos atty’s. fees plus litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed this decision to respondent CA, contending that the trial co urt erred in not dismissing thecase for lack of factual and legal basis and in or dering him to pay moral damages, atty’s fees, etc. - Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court’s ruling which prompted Baksh to file this petition for certiorari,raising the single issue of WON Art. 21 applies to this case.

ISSUEWON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art.21 of the Civil CodeHELD1. YESRatio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction, Art. 21 may be applied.Reasoning- Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promisebecomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that thepromise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify theaward of damages pursuant to Art.21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to herhonor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,good customs or public policy.- In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiffthat made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and itwas likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to theirsupposed marriage. In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust butbecause of moral seduction. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Art.337 or Art.338 of the RPC becausethe private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the seduction.- Moreover, it is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter courthaving heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainlyoverlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that boththe appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the result of the case.**Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New CivilCode the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code,from which We quote:

“The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided i n the case of De Jesus vs.Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse bydesigning women and unscrupulous men...” - This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictionby granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specific ally enumerate and punishin the statute books.- As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

“But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible th at there are countlessgaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, theCommission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

“Art.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensatethe latter for the damage.”

“An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen -year old daughter of 'X.' A promise of marriage either has notbeen made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above 18 yrs of ag e. Neither canany civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and although the girl andher family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the pr oposed article, she andher parents would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongswhich it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.” - Art.2176 CC, which defines a quasi-delict, is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, knownin Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana , is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader thanculpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, f alse imprisonment and deceit.In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional andmalicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are t o be covered by Art.2176

CC. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Art.21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Art.21 fills thatvacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Art.21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; ithas become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED

DULAY VS CA243 SCRA 220

GARCIA V FLORIDO52 SCRA 420

ANTONIO; AUGUST 31, 1973NATURE

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dismissing petitioners' action f or damages againstrespondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in thecriminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denyingpetitioners' motion for reconsideration.


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FACTS- On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garci a, and EsterFrancisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, MarcelinoInesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference ofchiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City.- At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboangadel Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc.and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated theirmedical treatment and hospitalization.- Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in areckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PUcar, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of

Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car andthe passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.- The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971,or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Courtof Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action couldbe filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore,the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment hasbeen rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33 applied only tothe crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.- The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the complaintISSUES1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants,the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case 2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not betainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint askin g the Court to declare thedefendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages. HELD1. YESRatio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently f rom a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, acomplainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case . Reasoning- In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent PedroTumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.- It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recoveryfor damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.- As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action.Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expresslyreserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case hasdisappeared.- As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always hadits own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict mayproceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of

Rule 111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted. . . and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, mayalso be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservationrequired in the proviso."- But in whatever way We view the inst i tut ion of the civi l act ion fo r recovery of damages under quasi-del ic t by pet i t ioners , whether as one thatshould be governed by the provis i ons of Sect ion 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservat ion by the injured par ty con sider ing that bythe inst i tut ion of the c ivi l act ion even before the comm encement of the t r ia l of th e cr iminal case, pet i t ioners have thereby foreclosed theirr ight to intervene therein, or on e where reservat ion to f i le the civi l act ion need not be made, for the reason that the law i tself (Art ic le 33 of theCivi l Code) al ready makes the reservat ion and th e failure of the offended par ty to do so d oes not bar him from bringing th e act ion, under thepecul iar c i rcumstances of the case, We f ind no legal just i f icat ion for respondent cou rt ' s order of dis missal .2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict.Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code arepresent, namely:a) act or omission of the private respondents;b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in thecollision of the bus with the passenger car;c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision;

d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; ande) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.Reasoning- The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless,grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does notdetract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merel y descriptive of the failure ofsaid driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the samenegligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action bypetitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasizedthat the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create anaction for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs.Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 607, 620-621).- It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the casesprovided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct fr om the civil action, may be


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instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it shouldbe noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.SEPARATE OPINIONBARREDO [concur]- Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the RevisedPenal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, Icannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is myconsidered view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate,and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislaturesuperseding the Rules of 1940.- Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required, there being no showing that prejudice could be causedby doing so.

- Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to thelimitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured party isentitled exclusively to the bigger one.

ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette, Inc)191 SCRA 195FERNAN; November 6, 1990NATUREPetition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamusFACTS - Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent tothat of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.- Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated anderoded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives ofpetitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.- In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of respondentcorporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.- On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunc tion against respondentcorporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land.- On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case. Andlater on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.Thedecision was based on Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising f rom the same offense may beinstituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in thecriminal action."- Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.- On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied bythe Appellate Court .ISSUE WON a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation anddamage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resultingcivil case can proceed independently of the criminal caseHELD Ratio YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33

and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the resultof the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and theclear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."Reasoning - A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All theelements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person forwhose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred bythe plaintiff.- The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertionof a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault ornegligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.- In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without dueauthority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to athird party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity forloss and damages to the injured party.- While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the factremains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and

contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omissionof respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existingcontractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.- It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot makeuse thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoi ning landownershave mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights andinterests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintainedusing all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If thestructures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.- Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence.- Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whetherintentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, wh ether or not he is criminallyprosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover

1 Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.


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damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two casesvary.- The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 2 of the Civil Code. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provisionthough at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violationof the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having alwayshad its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual"or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that aquasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart andindependent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpaextra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or cr eate an action forquasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civilcase, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which

case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC16 PHIL 8CARSON; March 22, 1910NATURE

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.FACTS- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The plaintiff, DavidTaylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the averageboy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.- On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provis or,for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniatur e engine. Finding oninquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusu al interest which both seemto have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises.- After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood ofthe place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating capsscattered on the ground. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosivepower. they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap whileManuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boysproposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his handburned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent asto the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.- The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there whenthe boys found them.- No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premisesunattended, when they felt disposed so to do.- The trial court's decision, awarding damages to the plaintiff, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903,and 1908 of that code.

ART. 1089 Obligations are cr eated by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts , and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault ornegligence occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to r epair the damage sodone.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the personsfor whom they should be responsible.The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them.Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches inwhich the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of afamily to avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused — 1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not havebeen placed in a safe and proper place.

- Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability ofthe defendant company under the provisions of these articles.ISSUEWON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuriesHELDNO- We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the

proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff.- We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an actionsuch as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

- These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to theparticular facts developed in the case under consideration.- It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if theirowner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for hisown pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant,

2 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for theomission of the defendant.


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and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cutopen one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.- But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the interventionof his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should notbe held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the capsexposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustainedby him.- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the casesknown as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injuryreceived by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under c ircumstances, attributable tothe negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to t he same degree of care in

regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to suchstrangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by thesame rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting fromthe fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care andcaution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case."- The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several courts. But the doctrine of thecase is controlling in our jurisdiction.- This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property orthat children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weightto put in doubt.- But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieveddefendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of thedefendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premiseswas not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of thedefendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was theproximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for theinjuries thus incurred. Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of hisaction between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his in jury should notbe held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of theTurntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision.- In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy ofhis age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and therecord discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself.- True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contentsof the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion mightbe expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to hismaturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should beheld civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself whenhe put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciatethe necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that theinjury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that

these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, neverth elessplaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

TAYAG V ALCANTARA98 SCRA 723CONCEPCION; July 23, 1980NATURE Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac (dismissing petition for damages)FACTS - Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo Villa, which caused his instantaneous death.Pending the criminal case against the driver, the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) andthe driver. In turn, the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground that the criminal case was still pending. Judge

Alcantara granted this motion.- In the criminal case, the driver as acquitted based on reasonable doubt. The company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the groundthat the heirs do not have a cause of action because of the acquittal. Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil case.ISSUE WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismiss ed the civil case on the ground of no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver

HELD 1. NORatio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution fordamages based on quasi-delictReasoning - Art. 31, NCC provides: “When the civil action is based on an obl igation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil actionmay proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter” - Evidently, this provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. The complaint itself shows that the claim was based onquasi-delit, viz :“6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino, Inc., has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of itsemployees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. Otherwise, the accident in question which resulted in the death of P edro Tayag, Sr. anddamage to his property would not have occurred;”

All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present:(1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent(2) damage caused by the said act or omission(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission and


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(4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,provided that offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scoresDISPOSITION petition granted. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside, case REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings.SEPARATE OPINIONAQUINO [concur]- I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code, under which according to the Code Commission, "acquittalfrom an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability fromcriminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana".

Article 33 of the Civil C ode also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action f or damages s ince the term "physical in juries" therein embraces death(Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).- Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as plaintiffs in the civil case, can amend their complaint and

base their action also on article 29 NCC which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.- The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute anindependent civil action is contrary to law.

B. DISTINCTIONS1. QUASI-DELICT VS DELICT

BARREDO V GARCIABOCOBO; July 8, 1942

PADILLA V CA (Vergara)129 SCRA 558GUTIERREZ; [date]NATUREPetition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court of AppealsFACTS

- Petitioners, on or about February 8, 1964, went to the public market to execute an alleged order of the Mayor to clear the public market of stalls whichwere considered as nuisance per se. The stall of one Antonio Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. In the process however the stock in tradeand certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed.- The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day impr isonment and ordered topay fines.- On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to payP9,600.00 as actual damages. The decision of the CA was based on the fact that the petitioners were charged with coercion when they should havebeen more appropriately charged with crime against person. Hence, the crime of grave coercion was not proved in accordance with the law.- The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict.ISSUEWON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminalchargeHELDNO- The SC, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia, held thatextinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment thatthe facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist. In the case at bar, the judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt. Since thestandard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence, the court express a finding that the defendants’ of fenses are civil in nature.- The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a criminalprosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The SC took the position that the said provisionmerely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act. The acquittal extinguishes the criminalliability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground.

CRUZ V CA ( UMALI)282 SCRA 188FRANCISCO; 1997NATURE Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit.FACTS- Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examinedby the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.

- Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in theafternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendantfor a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with theoperation.

- The following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had aconversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled.- Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of theoperating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillocame out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood and the same was brought by the attendant into the operatingroom.- After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. The operating staff then went i nside the petitioner's clinic totake their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the otherrelatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" bloodavailable in the blood bank.- Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was att ached to an oxygentank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the SanPablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived.

- At around 10pm, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo


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District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without theprior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia tothe San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance.- Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on herbecause there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics andGynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as herblood pressure was already 0/0. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediatecause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.ISSUEWON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting inhomicideHELD

NO- The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3)that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the partof the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regardingpersons, time and place.- WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observedby other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time oftreatment or the present state of medical science. - For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a

matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization th at the latter possess unusualtechnical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that thecircumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other phys icians in good standingwhen performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is aninevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients,unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.- Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any ofthese circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injur y to the person or propertywas a consequence of the reckless imprudence.- In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion ofnegligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of hispatient.

PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLEGR NO.147703PANGANIBAN; April 14, 2004NATUREPetition for ReviewFACTS- Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries anddamage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years, and to pay damages. But in the event the theaccused becoems insolvent, Phil. Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities. But admittedly, the accused jumped bail and remained at large.ISSUEWON an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the

accusedHELDNO- The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15days from notice of the judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. Inthe case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned hisappeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.- After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within theprescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.- In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that theemployer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be said that by jumpingbail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.- On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment:- Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of thelatter’s insolvency. - To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by acompetent court. By the same token, to allow the m to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result

in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.- The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upo n the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability,but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

PEOPLE V LIGON152 SCRA 419YAP; July 29, 1987NATURE

Appeal from the judgment of the RTC ManilaFACTS- February 17, 1986, RTC convicted Fernando Gabat, of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua where he robbed and killedJose Rosales y Ortiz, a seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarettebox containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less. Rogelio Ligon,the co-accused, was never apprehended and is still at large.- October 23, 1983 - at about 6:10 p.m. Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused, Ligonwhich was coming from España Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning


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left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, they stopped. While waiting, Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Rosales to buy some cigarettes fromhim. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to green,and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucialmoment, and immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is not controverted, however, thatas the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on thepavement . Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and wasconfined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.- Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. He was travel ing on the same lane in aslightly oblique position. The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it spedtowards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument, Cast illo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao." The t wo men in the jeep joinedthe chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He

immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, PatrolmenLeonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from theKombi. It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat.- The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fermin Payuan. The taxicab driver, PrudencioCastillo, also went along with them. Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primiciaswere released early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.- December 6, 1983 - Investigating Fiscal Cantos, filed an information against Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.- October 31, 1983 - an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic,bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."- June 28, 1984 - Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on aSupplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigar ette vendors, who allegedly witnessed theincident . These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.- prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loosethe latter's hand from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. - The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette boxfrom Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. The court also believedCastillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could nothave fallen down, having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard.- On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill ofthe Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is ofcommon knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box ofcigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a customer.ISSUEWON the prosecution’s set of facts should be giv en credenceHELDNO- a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account,would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal.- While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no motive, according to the court a quo, "other than to see that justice bedone," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty ormistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at thetrial.- Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying approximately

one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the frontend where Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactlyhappened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi,following it at a distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony that he sawGabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt,specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic.- Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has beenestablished beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery withhomicide has not been met in this case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.- However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminalprosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.- Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubtdoes not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippinelegal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of thecourt as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when thelatter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

"This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line ofdemarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate anddistinct from each other, One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the otheris for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present(Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of thelegal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offenseshould be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyondreasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrievedperson any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and homicide, but sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz.

2. QUASI-DELICT VS BREACH OF CONTRACT

CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO38 Phil 768FISHER; October 14, 1918


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NATURE An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1,000 against the estate of the deceased James P.McElroy.FACTS- Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo, Rizal, located upon the line of the defendant railroadcompany; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, whichentitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.- January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff whilemaking his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach.- On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradientsome distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches.

As the train slowed down another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, ali ghting safely at the point

where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco stepped off, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack ofwatermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once roll ed from the platform and wasdrawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forwardpossibly six meters before it came to a full stop.- The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform wherethe accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.- The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the stationfor shipment to the market. This row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge ofthe platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped uponthe platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.- The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and with serious injuries. He was immediately brought to a hospital where anexamination was made and his arm was amputated. The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and themember was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. Expenses r eached the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgic al fees and for otherexpenses in connection with the process of his curation.- August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon thenegligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be amenace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the CFI, the trial judge, found th e facts substantially as abovestated, and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstructpassengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was thereforeprecluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.ISSUEWON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffHELDNORatio In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act - that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly -the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Reasoning- The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as healighted from the train; and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows that the defendant company isliable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.- The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff hassuffered arises from the breach of that contr act by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.- Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their

selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations- In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes thesource of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of anobligation already existing . . .."- In the Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to acts ofnegligence which constitute the breach of a contract.- Under the Spanish law, in cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to persons to whom theyare not bound by contract, such is not based upon the principle of respondent superior - but upon the principle announced in article 1902 which imposesupon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused.- The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligenceor inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration thequalifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence,thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if , by reason of the negligenceof his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third persons suffer damage. Article 1903 presumes negligence, but that presumption isrefutable.- In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damagecaused by the carelessness of his employee while acting wit

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