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Midterm # 1 Review SheetPOLS 110: Introduction to International PoliticsProf. Eric Reinhardt, Fall 2012

[NOE: !" #ro$idin% this re$ie& sheet, &e do not 'ind oursel$es to as(in% only  a'out the to#ics,conce#ts, and e)a*#les listed here. +se this as a rou%h %uide onl".

It &ill 'e a closed-'oo( and closed-note e)a*. he *idter* &ill 'e co*#osed of *ulti#le choice and

short ans&ers of $arious t"#es, #lus a short essa". For the short ans&ers, "ou *a" 'e as(ed toe)#lain and #ossi'l" critiue a rele$ant conce#t or theor" or inter#ret so*e #ro$ided e$idence as it'ears on theories and de'ates in the stud" of international #olitics.

/once#tsActors - the 'asic unit for the anal"sis of international #olitics can 'e indi$iduals or %rou#s of #eo#le

 &ith co**on interestInterests-  &hat actors want to achieve through political action, their preferences o$er the outco*es

that *i%ht result fro* their #olitical outco*es. Funda*ental 'uildin% 'loc(s of #oliticsInteractions - the &a"s in &hich the choices of two or more actors co*'ine to produce political

outcomes

 Institutions - a set of rules known and shared '" the co**unit" that structure #olitical interactionsin #articular &a"s.

State - central authorit" &ith the a'ilit" to *a(e and enforce la&s, rules and decisions &ithin as#ecified territor"

Sovereignty - the e)#ectation that states ha$e le%al and #olitical su#re*ac" - or ultimate authoritywithin their territory

bureaucracy & military-industrial complexlevels o analysis ! the $ariet" of actors and institutions that #la" a role in &orld #olitics"omestic - su' national actors &ith different interest - #oliticians, 'ureaucrats, 'usiness and la'or

%rou#s , $oters interact &ithin do*estic institutions to deter*ine the countries forei%n #olic"choices

international - the re#resentati$es of states &ith different interests interact &ith one another,so*eti*es in the conte)t of international institutions such as the +N or O

$ransnational - %rou#s &hose *e*'ers s#an 'oarders such as *ultinational cor#orations,transnational ad$ocac" net&or(s, terrorist or%aniations - #ursue interest '" tr"in% to influence'oth do*estic and international #olic"

$heory - a lo%icall" consistent set of state*ents that e)#lains a #heno*enon of interest descri'e,#redict, #rescri'e

educted fro* assu*#tions that are lo%icall" coherent%robabilistic - *ost of the ti*e ) ha##ens - 3soft science4

 deter*inistic clai*s ) ha##ens all the ti*e - 3hard science' pu((le - o'ser$ations a'out the &orld that de*and e)#lanations

alsiiable theory - can 'e #ro$en falsenatural experiment - o'ser$ational stud"Anarchy - the a'sence of a central authorit" &ith the a'ilit" to *a(e and enforce la&s that 'ind all

actors.' purposive or rational action - actions in accordance &ith #olitical #referencesstrategic interaction - #ur#oseful non rando* non-strategic behavior - rando*bargaining interactions - an interaction in &hich actors *ust choose outco*es that *a(e one better

off at the expense of another , 'ar%ainin% is redistri'uti$e, it in$ol$es allocatin% a fi)ed su* of$alue 'et&een different actors

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)ooperation - an interaction in &hich t&o or *ore actors ado#t #olicies that *a(e at least one actor'etter off relati$e to the status uo without making the other worse off .

%areto rontier - n a Pareto efficient economic allocation, no one can be made better off without making at

least one individual worse off 

Mercantilism - an econo*ic doctrine 'ased on a 'elief that *ilitar" #o&er and econo*ic influence &ere co*#le*ents ,a##lied es#eciall" to colonial e*#ires in the 15 th - 16 th centuries . Fa$oredthe *other countr" o$er its colonies and o$er its co*#etitors

*egemony - #redo*inance of one nation state o$er others& hegemon - rulin% countr"Superpower - do*inant #osition in international s"ste* %i$es "ou #o&er and influence o$er the

affairs of other countries%ower - the a'ilit" of actor a to %et actor ' to do so*ethin% that ' &ould other&ise not do , *a(e

other side *a(e concessions and a$oid ha$in% to *a(e concessions oneself.+ational interest - interests attri'uted to the state itself usuall" securit" and #o&er,public interests vs 'particularistic or 'special interestscoordination problems - actors *ust si*#l" coordinate their actions &ith one another and once

their actions are coordinate there is no #otential 'enefit fro* deflectin%, a t"#e of coo#erati$einteraction in &hich actors 'enefit fro* all *a(in% the sa*e choices and su'seuentl" ha$e no

incenti$e to not co*#l" I.e &e all 'enefit fro* dri$in% on the sa*e side of the road. collaboration problems - a *ore serious 'arrier to coo#eration arises if actors ha$e an indi$idual

incenti$e to defect fro* coo#eration.%risoner.s "ilemma - colla'oration #ro'le* - t&o cri*inals ro' a 'an( and stashed *one", the"

are 'oth cau%ht '" #olice 'ut 7 doesn8t ha$e enou%h e$idence to con$ict the*, #uts the#risoner8s in se#arate roo*s and tells the* 3 if "ou #ro$ide e$idence a%ainst "our acco*#lice, I

 &ill let "ou %o and #ut hi* in 9ail for 10 "ears ho&e$er I a* *a(in% the sa*e offer to hi* and if he#ro$ides e$idence a%ainst "ou, "ou &ill 'e 'ehind 'ars , if "ou 'oth tell "ou 'oth end u# in #rison -collectively prisons do best by coopering with each other and staying silent, but each has anincentive to rat out his accomplice. the" 'oth reason the sa*e &a" thus 'oth end u# in 9ail individual incentive to deflect undermines collective interest.

' )oordination /ame fa game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know theequilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy

unilaterally, based on coordination problem meaning situations in which all parties can realize mutual gains,

 but only by making mutually consistent decisions' public good - indi$iduall" and sociall" desira'le %oods that are ine)cusa'le and non ri$al in

consu*#tion such as national defense +on rival in consumption - if one #erson consu*es or 'enefits fro* the #u'lic %ood, this does not

di*inish the uantit" a$aila'le to others.non excludable - if the %ood is #ro$ided to one #erson , other cannot 'e e)cluded fro* en9o"in% it

ie. If one #erson in a countr" is #rotected fro* forei%n in$asion , all other citiens are also#rotected

collective action problem - o'stacles to coo#eration that occur &hen actors ha$e incenti$es tocolla'orate 'ut each acts in antici#ation that others &ill #a" the costs of coo#eration ; #ro'le* of#u'lic %oods<

ree-riding - fail to contri'ute to a #u'lic %ood &hile 'enefitin% fro* others contri'ution' scarce good - resource &ith li*ited a$aila'ilit" and hi%h de*and' bargaining range - set of deals 'oth #arties #refer to &arthe bargaining model o war - Sees &ar as 3#olitics all the &a" do&n4 = &ar as a continuation of the

'ar%ainin% #rocess, rather than a 'rea(do&n. Fi%htin% 'rea(s out &hen t&o sides cannot reach a'ar%ain that 'oth #refer to &ar and each side fi%hts to i*#ro$e its chances of %ettin% a desira'le

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settle*ent. ar ends &hen the t&o sides stri(e a 'ar%ain that 'oth #refer to continuin% the &ar,7ssu*es that &ar is costl", 'oth sides *ust #a" the cost of fi%htin%, re%ardless of &ho &ins.

0essens incentive to deectrepeated interaction - coo#eration is *ore li(el" to ha##en &hen actors ha$e the o##ortunit" to

coo#erate o$er ti*e and across issuesIteration - re#eated interaction &ith the sa*e #artner , #unish cheater fro* &ithholdin% %ains in the

future coo#eration

 linage- the lin(in% of coo#eration on one issue to interactions of a second issue , allo&s $icti*s toretaliate '" &ithholdin% coo#eration on other issues I.e us and !rittan tied to%ether on so *an"issues , *ust coo#erate &ith each other

' Shadow o the 2uture - %ood 'eha$ior toda" is induced '" the fear of loosin% 'enefits fro*coo#eration to*orro&

Reciprocity - *utual a%ree*ents to lo&er tariffs and other 'arriers to trade. I*#licit or e)#licitarran%e*ent for one %o$ern*ent to e)chan%e trade #olic" concessions &ith another

coercive diplomacy3 the use of threats to influence the outco*e of a 'ar%ainin% interactionoutside option3 the alternati$es to 'ar%ainin% &ith a s#ecific actor

agenda-setting power3 a 3first *o$er4 ad$anta%e that hel#s an actor to secure a *ore fa$ora'le'ar%ain

 war3 an e$ent in$ol$in% the or%anied use of *ilitar" force '" at least t&o #arties that satisfies so*e*ini*u* threshold of se$erit"interstate war: a &ar in &hich the *ain #artici#ants are statescivil war3 a &ar in &hich the *ain #artici#ants are &ithin the sa*e state, such as the %o$ern*entand a re'el %rou#

compellence3 an effort to chan%e the status uo throu%h the threat of forcedeterrence3 an effort to #reser$e the status uo throu%h the threat of forceextended vs general deterrence3 the effort to deter attac( on one8s o&n countr" is %eneral

deterrence and its an acti$it" that states are constantl" en%a%ed in.

7nother for* of deterrence, e)tended deterrence, occurs &hen a state see(s to #rotect a friend. Inthis case, the deterrent *essa%e ta(es the for* of 3on8t attac( *" all" > or else.4 herefore, thethreatener atte*#ts to e)tend #rotection to another state. E)tended deterrence is crucial in theconte)t of alliances

incomplete inormation3 a situation in &hich #arties in a strate%ic interaction lac( infor*ation a'outother #arties8 interests and or ca#a'ilitiestransparency3 the a'ilit" the outsiders to #eer into a state and learn a'out the factors thatinfluence its decision-*a(in% a'out &ar and #eace. 7 state8s *ilitar" ca#a'ilities are #ro'a'l" theeasiest factor to render trans#arent. International or%aniations *a" also enhance trans#arenc"'" #ro$idin% neutral o'ser$ers of a state8s *ilitar" acti$itiesresolve3 the &illin%ness of an actor to endure costs in order to acuire so*e %ood

credibility3 'elie$a'ilit"? a credi'le threat is a threat that the reci#ient 'elie$es &ill 'e carried out.7 credi'le co**it*ent is a co**it*ent or #ro*ise that the reci#ient 'elie$es &ill 'e honored.

commitment problems esp arising rom bargaining over goods that increase military powerand rom expectations o shits in power

he sources of 'ar%ainin% failure all arise fro* a co**on underl"in% challen%e: the difficult"that states can ha$e *a(in% credi'le #ro*ises not to use force to re$ise the settle*ent at a laterdate. 7 co**it*ent #ro'le* arises &hen a state cannot *a(e such a #ro*ise in a credi'le*anner. States 'ar%ain territor" all the ti*e, 'ut in so*e cases the #iece of territor" in uestion is*ilitaril" si%nificant, #erha#s 'ecause it contains hi%h %round fro* &hich one &ould 'e a'le tolaunch an effecti$e attac(. he @olan Aei%hts, for e)a*#le, on the 'order 'et&een Israel and

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S"ria, is such a #iece of territor". !ecause this territor" %i$es its occu#ier a co**andin% #ositiono$er northern Israel, an" dealin% that *i%ht hand the @olan Aei%hts 'ac( to S"ria &ould *a(eIsrael *ore $ulnera'le to attac(.

costly signals3 those actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and alsoincrease the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat, thereby revealing information about the actualcommitment of a state to defend against an attack. States that are bluffing will be unwilling to cross a certainthreshold of threat and military actions in a crisis for fear of committing themselves to armed conflict.

brinmanship3 a strate%" in &hich ad$ersaries ta(e actions that increase the ris( of accidental

 &ar, &ith the ho#e that the other &ill 3'lin(4 or lose its ner$e, first and *a(e concessionstying hands3 If threats e)#ose state leaders to audience costs, the" can ha$e the effect of 3t"in%their hands.4 his #hrase co*es fro* Ao*er8s Od"sse" in &hich the *ain character, Od"sseus,as(s to ha$e his hands tied to the *ast of his shi# as the" sail #ast the sirens. State leaders in acrisis tie their hands for si*ilar reasons: 'ecause threats are costl" to carr" out, the" (no& thatthe" *i%ht choose not to follo& throu%h if faced &ith that decision. !" e)#osin% the*sel$es toaudience sots, the" 'lunt the te*#tation to 'ac( do&n fro* their threats and there'" tie their o&nhands. Leaders sa" 3I cannot 'ac( do&n? hence *" threat is co*#letel" credi'le.4audience costs3 ne%ati$e re#ercussions for failin% to follo& throu%h on a threat or to honor aco**it*ent

the 'security dilemma3 asserts that both strength and weakness in national security can be provocative to

other nations. If a nation is too strong, this can be provocative since “most means of self-protectionsimultaneously menace others.” On the other hand, if a nation is too weak, “great dangers arise if anaggressor believes that the status uo powers are weak in capability or resolve.! "hus, directly andindirectly, both strength and weakness can upset the balance of security in international relations.

preventive war vs preemptive war3 7 #re$enti$e &ar is a &ar fou%ht &ith the intention of #re$entin%an ad$ersar" fro* 'eco*in% stron%er in the future. he" arise 'ecause states &hose #o&er isincreasin% cannot co**it not to e)#loit that #o&er in future 'ar%ainin% interactions. Pree*#ti$e

 &ar is a &ar fou%ht &ith the antici#ation that an attac( '" the other side is i**inentirst-strie advantage3 the situation that arises &hen *ilitar" technolo%", *ilitar" strate%ies, and or

%eo%ra#h" %i$e a si%nificant ad$anta%e to &hiche$er state attac(s first in a &arindivisibility3 a conce#t that descri'es %oods that cannot 'e di$ided &ithout di*inishin% its $alue

the 'rally 4round the lag eect3 the idea that leaders can further their o&n #olitical interest '"fi%htin% a &ar flo&s fro* the so-called rall"-round-the fla% effect, or rall" effect for short. It refers to#eo#le8s tendenc" to 'eco*e *ore su##orti$e of their countr"8s %o$ern*ent &hen it e)#eriencesdra*atic international e$ents, such as &ars. his effect is *ost a##arent in countries in &hich#u'lic o#inion #ollin% re%ularl" *easures the le$el of su##ort for a leader. he *ost dra*atic rall"e$en follo&ed the terrorist attac(s of Se#te*'er 11, 2001 &hich caused Pres. !ush8s a##ro$alratin% to 9u*# i**ediatel" fro* B1 to 65 #ercent.diversionary war3 &ar started to %ain #u'lic su##ort at ho*ediversionary incentive3 the incenti$e that state leaders ha$e to start international crises in orderto rall" #u'lic su##ort at ho*e

'gambling or resurrection3 i$ersionar" incenti$es are te*#tin% to leaders &ho are insecure

do*esticall", 'ecause of discontent &ith their #olicies or hard econo*ic ti*es. Such a leader *a"decided that she &ill surel" lose office if she does nothin%, so &a%in% &ar and in$o(in% the rall"effect *a" 'e an a##ealin% %a*'le. his #heno*enon has 'een called %a*'lin% for resurrection:ta(in% a ris(" action, such as startin% a &ar, &hen the alternati$e is certain to 'e $er" 'ad.

Aistorical and /onte*#orar" E)a*#les

$he $hirty 5ears. 6ar3 was a series of wars principally fought in #entral $urope, involving most of thecountries of $urope. It was one of the longest and most destructive conflicts in $uropean history, and one of thelongest continuous wars in modern history. "he origins of the conflict and goals of the participants were

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comple%, and no single cause can accurately be described as the main reason for the fighting. Initially, it wasfought largely as a religious war between &rotestants and #atholics in the 'oly (oman $mpire, althoughdisputes over internal politics and the balance of power within the $mpire played a significant part. )radually,it developed into a more general conflict involving most of the great powers of the time. In this general phasethe war became less specifically religious and more a continuation of the *ourbon+'absburg rivalry for$uropean political pre-eminence, leading in turn to further warfare between rance and the 'absburg powers.

%eace o 6estphalia  - ended C0 "r &ar ended reli%ious fi%htin%, %a$e &a" to idea of state

so$erei%nt"? often said to ha$e created the *odern state s"ste* 'ecause it included a %eneralreco%nition of the #rinci#les of so$erei%nt" and noninter$ention

%ax 7ritannica, the '*undred 5ears. %eace3 3!ritish Peace4, a centur"-lon% #eriod 'e%innin% &ithNa#oleon8s defeat at aterloo in 161B and endin% &ith the out'rea( of orld ar I in 1D1 durin%

 &hich !ritain8s econo*ic and di#lo*atic influence contri'uted to econo*ic o#enness and relati$e#eace

 6orld 6ar I & diplomacy leading up to it /erman strategy or the war at outset

• ain causes of war! "ysfunction within internationalization and mistakes of the principal actors# $efore

%orld %ar &ne was a weakening of the balance of power# "iplomats took the balance of power forgranted to the point that the factors that contributed to the weakening of the balance of power may also

 be seen as causes of the war# 'or e(ample! the polarization of the alliance system, an armaments race, a

new military metaphysic))foreign policymakers became increasingly responsive to military leaders andironclad timetables , Public opinion fed by a yellow press impatient with compromise#, *rave mistakes

resulting from miscalculations of the responses of potential enemies#, +tatesmen and military leaders

warped by personal ambition#

• he events leading up to war! assassination of -rchduke of 'ranz 'erdinand, -ustria.s ultimatum to

+erbia demanding +erbia must allow the -ustrian '$/ to come in and round up anti)-ustrian suspects

among the populace, +erbia.s reply, -ustrian declaration of war and the mobilization of 0ussia#

$reaty o 8ersailles3 the #eace treat" 'et&een the 7llies and @er*an" that for*all" ended orldar I on une 26, 1D1Dthe 0eague o +ations3 a collecti$e doctrine 'ased on a 'elief that *ilitar" #o&er and econo*icinfluence &ere co*#le*ents? a##lied es#eciall" to colonial e*#ires in the si)teenth throu%hei%hteenth centuries. Gercantilist #olicies fa$ored the *other countr" o$er its colonies and o$er itsco*#etitors

6orld 6ar II & diplomacy leading up to it esp 7ritish & 2rench crisis diplomacy with *itler.s/ermany during )(echoslova and %olish crises

Euro#e descended once a%ain into &ar. orld ar II lar%el" #itted the fascist %o$ern*entsthat had turned a%ainst the %lo'al econo*", one the one hand, a%ainst the de*ocratic #o&ersthat re*ained co**itted to so*e for of international econo*ic coo#eration. he three *a9orfascist #o&ers: @er*an", Ital" and a#an, for*ed an alliance, the 7)is ai*ed at restorin% andincreasin% their *ilitar" *i%ht and territor". !" in$asion, coercion, and #ersuasion, the" 'uilt anet&or( of follo&ers, #rotectorates and colonies. 7n e)#ansionist Nai @er*an" anne)ed 7ustriain 1DC6 and occu#ied /echoslo$a(ia in 1DCD. In 1DCD, @er*an" attac(ed Poland and uic(l"o$er#o&er it, leadin% !ritain and France to declare &ar on @er*an" in su##ort of their Polish all".@er*an" in$aded France, &hich it defeated and occu#ied &ithin si) &ee(s. he 7)is thuscontrolled $irtuall" all of Euro#e and 7sia e)ce#t for !ritain and Russia. In ece*'er, a#anattac(ed the +S na$al 'ase at Pearl Aar'or. he +S had 'een su##ortin% the !ritish &ithsu##lies, 'ut the Pearl Aar'or attac( o$erca*e an" lin%erin% 7*erican reluctance to %et in$ol$edin another &orld &ar. Fro* then on, the &ar #itted the 7)is a%ainst the three *a9or 7llies-+S, @!and S+. he 'ul( of the &ar &as fou%ht alon% the eastern front, 'et&een the @er*ans and the

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So$iets, &here *illions of troo#s faced each other o$er thousands of *iles of territor". he !ritishand 7*ericans carried out o#erations in North 7frican 'efore in$adin% Ital" and France. In Ga"1DB, @er*an" surrendered unconditionall". In 7u%ust, in an atte*#t to force a a#anesesurrender, the +S dro##ed nuclear &ea#ons on the a#anese cities of Airoshi*a and Na%asa(i?the a#anese surrendered se$eral da"s later.

9apanese con:uest o Manchuria in 1;<1 & )hina later in the 1;<=s> 9apanese attac on ?S at%earl *arbor in 1;@1See above

rival )old 6ar blocs 6arsaw %act & +orth Atlantic $reaty rgani(ation6arsaw %act3 a *ilitar" alliance for*ed in 1DBB to 'rin% to%ether the So$iet +nion and its /oldar allies in eastern Euro#e and else&here? dissol$ed on Garch C1, 1DD1, as the /old ar ended+ato3 a *ilitar" alliance created in 1DD to 'rin% to%ether *an" &estern Euro#ean nations, the +Sand /anada, for*in% the foundation of the 7*erican-led *ilitar" 'loc durin% the /old ar. oda",N7O8s role includes handlin% re%ional #ro'le*s and de$elo#in% a ra#id reaction force.

!retton oods s"ste*: the econo*ic order ne%otiated a*on% allied nations at !retton &oods, Ne&Aa*#shire in 1D, &hich led to a series of coo#erati$e arran%e*ents in$ol$in% a co**it*ent torelati$el" lo& 'arriers to international trade and in$est*ent

7erlin crisis & airlit 1;@B-@;3 On se$eral occasions, crises 'et&een the t&o ca*e to the 'rin( of &ar, such as the 1DD !erlin airlift and the 1D52 /u'an *issile crisis. In the after*ath of the

@er*an surrender, @er*an" &as di$ided into four ones, controlled res#ecti$el" '" the7*ericans, !ritish, French and So$iets. In une 1D6, the So$iet +nion 'loc(aded land and railroutes into !erlin fro* the estern ones. his cut est !erlin off fro* su##lies of e$er"thin%fro* food to coal. he So$iets clearl" e)#ected the estern allies to either &ithdra& or accede tose$eral So$iet de*ands a'out the occu#ation. !ut the allies uic(l" or%anied a *assi$e airliftthat lasted nearl" a "ear and in$ol$ed al*ost C00,000 fli%hts, #ro$idin% *illions of tons of su##liesto the residents of est !erlin. In Ga" 1DD, the So$iets finall" 'ac(ed do&n and once a%ain#er*itted trans#ort 'et&een the estern occu#ation ones and est !erlin. !ut the le$el oftension 'et&een East and est had 'een raised su'stantiall". So*e scholars re%ard the !erlin'loc(ade and airlift as the o#enin% sal$o in the /old &ar.

)uban Missile )risis ctober 1;CD3 On se$eral occasions, crises 'et&een the t&o ca*e to the

'rin( of &ar, such as the 1DD !erlin airlift and the 1D52 /u'an *issile crisis. Perha#s the *ostdra*atic confrontation of the /old ar too( #lace al*ost 1B "ears later in /u'a. In 1DBD, a left-

 &in% nationalist *o$e*ent headed '" Fidel /astro succeeded in oustin% #ro-7*erican dictator!atista. O$er the ne)t se$eral "ears, the ne& re$olutionar" %o$ern*ent of /u'a *o$ed uic(l"left&ard and allied itself &ith the So$iet +nion. 7n 7*erican-s#onsored in$asion in 7#ril 1D51failed, 'ut the /u'a %o$ern*ent &as dee#l" fearful of 7*erican atte*#ts to under*ine it.Gean&hile, the So$iet %o$ern*ent under Hhrushche$ &as concerned that it &as losin% thenuclear ar*s race to the +nited States. In Octo'er 1D52, 7*erican s#" #lanes s#otted the *issileinstallations, &hich the +.S. %o$ern*ent re%arded as a clear and #resent dan%er to 7*ericannational securit". 7*erican shi#s encircle the island, #re#ared to #re$ent So$iet na$al $esselsfro* reachin% it, and #lans for an 7*erican in$asion &ere de$elo#ed, e$en thou%h *an" of the

#artici#ants realied that this *i%ht lead to a nuclear &ar 'et&een the t&o sides. Finall", t&o sidesa%reed to a deal: the So$iets &ould dis*antle their *issiles in /u'a if the +S &ithdre& its nuclear*issiles fro* ur(e". his re#resented a *a9or concession '" the So$iets, es#eciall" as theur(ish &ithdra&al &as secret at the ti*e? it a##eared to *ost o'ser$ers that Hhrushche$ had'ac(ed do&n.

• 7erlin crisis & airlit 1;@B-@;: he crisis had its ori%ins in orld ar II=era a%ree*ents on the

occu#ation of #ost&ar @er*an" that #laced a 9ointl" occu#ied !erlin a##ro)i*atel" 110 *iles &ithin So$iet-occu#ied territor". !et&een 1DB and 1D6 relations 'et&een the international forces stationed in @er*an"deteriorated, &ith the %ro&in% conflict co*in% to a head in *id-1D6. Protestin% the *er%in% of the !ritish,

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French, and 7*erican occu#ation ones, So$iet officials in @er*an" &al(ed out of the 7llied /ontrol /ouncil,the uadri#artite %o$ernin% 'od", and the est i*#le*ented currenc" refor* in the estern ones. Inres#onse, the So$iets announced that the" &ere ta(in% ste#s to #reser$e the econo*ic inte%rit" of the So$ietoccu#ation one and that effecti$e 2 une technical difficulties &ould #re$ent land access 'et&een theestern ones of @er*an" and !erlin. Once it 'eca*e clear that the So$iets had in fact 'loc(aded !erlin,President Aarr" ru*an res#onded &ith a fir* decision that the +nited States &ould *aintain its ri%ht to 'e in!erlin e$en at the ris( of &ar. 7s a te*#orar" effort to *aintain the s*all estern *ilitar" %arrisons in the cit",!ritish and 7*erican forces i*#le*ented a s*all-scale airlift. he airlift 'rou%ht in the , B00 tons !erlinneeded dail" to su##ort its industr" and the cit"Js #o#ulation of t&o *illion. he airlift #lanes ;t&o-thirds

7*erican and one-third !ritish< &ere harassed '" So$iet #lanes, 'ut &ere not shot at.

• )uban Missile )risis ctober 1;CD3 Ga9or confrontation 'et&een the +.S. and the So$iet +nion o$er the

#resence of So$iet nuclear *issiles in /u'a. In Octo'er 1D52 a +.S. s#" #lane detected a 'allistic *issile on alaunchin% site in /u'a. Pres. ohn F. Henned" #laced a na$al 'loc(ade around the island, and for se$eral da"sthe +.S. and the So$iet +nion ho$ered on the 'rin( of &ar. So$iet #re*ier Ni(ita Hhrushche$ finall" a%reed tore*o$e the *issiles in return for a secret co**it*ent fro* the +.S. to &ithdra& its o&n *issiles fro* ur(e"and to ne$er in$ade /u'a. he incident increased tensions durin% the /old ar and fueled the nuclear ar*srace 'et&een the t&o countries. E)a*#le of 'rin(*anshi#.

• Ira:.s 1;EF negotiations with Iran.s Shah over the Shatt al Arab3 Shatt al 7ra' is a tidal ri$er, 120 *i

;1DC (*< lon%, for*ed '" the confluence of the i%ris and Eu#hrates ri$ers, flo&in% SE to the Persian @ulf,for*in% #art of the Ira-Iran 'order? the Harun is its chief tri'utar". Ira and Iran ha$e dis#uted na$i%ation ri%htson the Shatt al 7ra' since 1DCB, &hen an international co**ission %a$e Ira total control of the Shatt al 7ra',lea$in% Iran &ith control onl" of the a##roaches to 7'adan and Hhorra*shahr, its chief #orts, and una'le tode$elo# ne& #ort facilities in the delta. o #reclude Irai #olitical #ressure and interference &ith its oil andfrei%ht shi#*ents on the Shatt al 7ra', Iran 'uilt #orts on the Persian @ulf to handle forei%n trade. Iran and Irane%otiated territorial a%ree*ents o$er the Shatt al 7ra' &ater&a" in 1DKB. he 1DKB treat" &as ne%otiated'et&een the Shah of Iran and Sadda* ;at the ti*e IraJs de facto second-in-co**and<. In return for ehranhaltin% its su##ort for a Hurdish re'ellion in northern Ira, Sadda* conceded the thal&e% line as the 'order.Ao&e$er, '" the end of the decade s(ir*ishes in the area 'eca*e #re$alent. Full-scale &ar 'et&een the t&ocountries 'ro(e out in Se#t., 1D60, leadin% to ei%ht "ears of attac(s on coastal areas.

• Ira:.s 1;;= invasion o Guwait and the 1;;=-;1 ?S,?+-Ira: /ul 6ar3 International conflict tri%%ered '"

IraJs in$asion of Hu&ait in 7u%ust 1DD0. hou%h 9ustified '" Irai leader on %rounds that Hu&ait &ashistoricall" #art of Ira, the in$asion &as #resu*ed to 'e *oti$ated '" IraJs desire to acuire Hu&aitJs rich oilfields and e)#and its #o&er in the re%ion. he +nited States, fearin% IraJs 'roader strate%ic intentions andactin% under +N aus#ices, e$entuall" for*ed a 'road coalition, &hich included a nu*'er of 7ra' countries,and 'e%an *assin% troo#s in northern Saudi 7ra'ia. hen Ira i%nored a +N Securit" /ouncil deadline for it to

 &ithdra& fro* Hu&ait, the coalition 'e%an a lar%e-scale air offensi$e ;an. 151K, 1DD1<. 7 %round offensi$e '"the coalition ;Fe'ruar" 226< uic(l" achie$ed $ictor". Esti*ates of Irai *ilitar" deaths ran%e u# to 100,000?coalition forces lost a'out C00 troo#s. he Irai re%i*e su'seuentl" faced &ides#read #o#ular u#risin%s,

 &hich it 'rutall" su##ressed. 7 +N trade e*'ar%o re*ained in effect after the end of the conflict, #endin%IraJs co*#liance &ith the ter*s of the ar*istice. he fore*ost ter* &as that Ira destro" its nuclear,'iolo%ical, and che*ical &ea#ons #ro%ra*s.

• ?S-Ira: 6ar D==<3 ar in Ira that consisted of t&o #hases: a 'rief conflict in 200C 'et&een Ira and a

co*'ined force of troo#s lar%el" fro* the +.S. and @reat !ritain? and a su'seuent +.S.-led occu#ation of Iraand #rotracted Irai ar*ed insur%enc" a%ainst it. +.S. Pres. @eor%e . !ush ar%ued that the Se#te*'er 11attac(s on the +.S. in that sa*e "ear hi%hli%hted the threat to +.S. securit" #osed '" hostile countries such asIra. In No$e*'er 2002 the +N issued Securit" /ouncil Resolution 11 de*andin% that Ira read*it

 &ea#ons ins#ectors and co*#l" &ith all #re$ious resolutions. 7lthou%h ins#ectors did return to Ira, !ush and!lair declared in earl" 200C ;des#ite o'9ections '" *an" &orld leaders< that Ira &as continuin% to hinder +Nins#ections and that it still retained #roscri'ed &ea#ons. On Garch 20 the +.S. and !ritain ;&ith s*aller troo#contin%ents fro* other countries< launched a series of air attac(s on Ira, and a %round in$asion follo&ed. Irai

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forces &ere ra#idl" defeated, and on 7#ril D +.S. forces too( control of the ca#ital, !a%hdad. !ritish forcesco*#leted their occu#ation of the southern cit" of 7l-!arah the sa*e da", and '" Ga" 1 the *a9or co*'ato#erations of the in$asion had 'een co*#leted. Ao&e$er, the +.S. and other occu#"in% forces &ere soone*'roiled in escalatin% %uerrilla &arfare in Ira that hindered IraJs reco$er" and (illed thousands of soldiersand tens of thousands of ci$ilians. he &ar, lon% o##osed '" *an" throu%hout the &orld, also 'eca*eincreasin%l" un#o#ular in the +.S. Sectarian fi%htin% and insur%ent attac(s on +.S. and Irai forces #ea(ed in2005 and 200K. In earl" 200K the +.S. i*#le*ented a strate%" that ca*e to 'e (no&n as the sur%e te*#oraril"increasin% the nu*'er of troo#s in Ira '" *ore than 20,000 in a 'id to sta'ilie the countr". !" the end of the"ear, $iolence had decreased su'stantiall", althou%h the role of the sur%e in i*#ro$in% securit" re*ained a

source of de'ate. In 2006 the +.S. 'e%an to %raduall" reduce the nu*'er of its troo#s in Ira, co*#letin% its &ithdra&al in ece*'er 2011.

• ?S,+A$ invasion o Aghanistan D==1 diplomacy with $aliban leading up to it3 he ali'an had

risen to #o&er in the *id D0Js in reaction to the anarch" and &arlordis* that arose after the &ithdra&al ofSo$iet forces. he ali'an sou%ht to i*#ose an e)tre*e inter#retation of Isla*--'ased u#on the rural Pashtuntri'al code--on the entire countr" and co**itted *assi$e hu*an ri%hts $iolations, #articularl" directed a%ainst

 &o*en and %irls. Fro* the *id-1DD0s the ali'an #ro$ided sanctuar" to Osa*a 'in Laden. !in Laden and 7l-aida ha$e ac(no&led%ed their res#onsi'ilit" for the Se#te*'er 11, 2001 terrorist attac(s a%ainst the +nitedStates. Follo&in% the ali'anJs re#eated refusal to e)#el 'in Laden and his %rou# and end its su##ort forinternational terroris*, the +.S. and its #artners in the anti-terrorist coalition 'e%an a *ilitar" ca*#ai%n onOcto'er K, 2001. +nder #ressure fro* +.S. *ilitar" and anti-ali'an forces, the ali'an disinte%rated ra#idl",and Ha'ul fell on No$e*'er 1C, 2001. 7f%han factions o##osed to the ali'an *et at a +nited Nations-s#onsored conference in !onn, @er*an" in ece*'er 2001 and a%reed to restore sta'ilit" and %o$ernance to7f%hanistan--creatin% an interi* %o$ern*ent and esta'lishin% a #rocess to *o$e to&ard a #er*anent%o$ern*ent. +nder the !onn 7%ree*ent, an 7f%han Interi* 7uthorit" &as for*ed and too( office in Ha'ul onece*'er 22, 2001 &ith Aa*id Harai as /hair*an. he Interi* 7uthorit" held #o&er for a##ro)i*atel" 5*onths &hile #re#arin% for a nation&ide Lo"a ir%a ;@rand /ouncil< in *id-une 2002 that decided on thestructure of a ransitional 7uthorit".

• the ?S occupation and the Aghanistan civil war3 he So$iet +nion in$aded 7f%hanistan in ece*'er

1DKD to re#lace the e)istin% co**unist %o$ern*ent. 7f%hanistanJs resistance forces, (no&n asthe *u9ahideen, fou%ht a%ainst the So$iet in$asion of 7f%hanistan. So*e factions recei$ed su##ort '" the+nited States. he So$iet-'ac(ed 7f%han co**unist re%i*e sur$i$ed for three *ore "ears until the fall ofHa'ul in 1DD2. In 1DD2, the 7f%han #olitical #arties a%reed on the Pesha&ar 7ccords &hich esta'lishedthe Isla*ic State of 7f%hanistan and a##ointed an interi* %o$ern*ent. Gilitia %rou#s o##osed the a%ree*entand started a 'o*'ard*ent ca*#ai%n a%ainst Ha'ul &ith Pa(istani su##ort, &hile other *ilitias en%a%ed in a$iolent &ar a%ainst each other in Ha'ul su'ur's. Re%ional #o&ers such as Pa(istan, Iran, Saudi7ra'ia and +'e(istan see(in% influence o$er the strate%icall" located 7f%hanistan each su##orted and inso*e cases controlled one of those *ilitias. In late 1DDMearl" 1DDB as the Isla*ic StateJs *inister ofdefense 7h*ad Shah Gassoud had 'een a'le to defeat *ost of the *ilitia %rou#s in Ha'ul and had restoredso*e cal* to the ca#ital. he ali'an e*er%ed as a ne& faction threatenin% Ha'ul.

• the ?S Israel and global eorts to compel Iran to cease developing nuclear weapons> coercive

diplomacy attempts in this eort3

• Ira:i Sunni-Shiite civil war o mid-D===s3

• 0ibyan civil war o D=11 & ?nited +ations Security )ouncil action on 0ibyan intervention3

he Li'"an /i$il ar &as an ar*ed conflict in the North 7frican state of Li'"a, fou%ht 'et&een forces lo"al to/olonel Gua**ar @addafi and those see(in% to oust his %o$ern*ent. he &ar &as #receded '" #rotestsin !en%hai, &hich led to clashes &ith securit" forces that fired on the cro&d. he #rotests escalated into are'ellion that s#read across the countr". 7 *ulti-state coalition 'e%an a *ilitar" inter$ention in Li'"a toi*#le*ent +nited Nations Securit" /ouncil Resolution 1DKC, &hich &as ta(en in res#onse to e$ents durin% theLi'"an ci$il &ar. Gilitar" o#erations 'e%an &ith +S forces and one !ritish su'*arine firin% cruise*issiles, the French 7ir Force, +nited States 7ir Force and !ritish Ro"al 7ir Force underta(in% sorties across

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Li'"a, and a na$al 'loc(ade '" the Ro"al Na$". Since the 'e%innin% of the inter$ention, the initial coalition of!el%iu*, /anada, en*ar(, France, Ital", Nor&a", atar, S#ain, +H and +S has e)#anded to se$enteenstates, &ith ne&er states *ostl" enforcin% the no-fl" one and na$al 'loc(ade or #ro$idin% *ilitar" lo%isticalassistance. he effort &as initiall" lar%el" led '" the +nited States. @addafi &as ca#tured and (illed in Octo'erand, the National ransitional /ouncil declared the li'eration of Li'"a and the official end of the &ar onOcto'er 2C, 2011.

• Gosovo war o independence rom Serbia & current Serb-Gosovo territorial dispute3 7 'rief &ar

fou%ht in 1DDD 'et&een N7O and Ser'ia, the *ain re*nant of the for*er u%osla$ia, o$er the status of theu%osla$ian #ro$ince of Hoso$o. In 1DD6, the Ser'ian #resident sent Ser'ian troo#s to ta(e 'ac( areas ofHoso$o controlled '" ethnic 7l'anian %uerrillas, tri%%erin% a N7O air ca*#ai%n in 1DDD. he &ar ended &henSer'ia a%reed to a #eace a%ree*ent s#onsored '" the +nited Nations. he Hoso$o ar &as N7OJs first*ilitar" en%a%e*ent. It &as contro$ersial in #art 'ecause N7O &as not re#ellin% an attac( on *e*'er states'ut inter$enin% in &hat &as ar%ua'l" an internal affair. Hoso$o officiall" declared its inde#endence in 2006.7lthou%h Ser'ia has *aintained that the unani*ous declaration of inde#endence has ne$er 'een acce#ted, itis ta(in% #art in the E+-ad*inistered tal(s in order to hel# resol$e the situation to so*e e)tent and to deal &iththe ur%ent issues. he *a9orit" of the citiens are Ser's, &ho refuse to acce#t the 9urisdiction of the ne& state.he *ost recent #ro'le* arose re%ardin% the uestion of Ser'ian institutions still in #lace in the north ofHoso$o, 'order control and i*#osition of trade 'an on %oods fro* Ser'ia ;&hich &as done in res#onse to aSer'ian 'an on #roducts fro* Hoso$o<. he road'loc(s set '" the Ser's in the north, as a si%n of #rotest ofHoso$ar 'order controls, are still in #lace, thou%h there has 'een no $iolence. Ser'ia insists that an"thin% 'utne%otiations leadin% to a di#lo*atic solution is out of uestion. he %o$ern*ent is torn 'et&een the #ro*ise ofE+ *e*'ershi# and fi%htin% for its territorial inte%rit".

• Sudan.s civil war with south Sudan & coercive diplomacy & oil politics in D=1D3 he Second

Sudanese /i$il ar &as a conflict fro* 1D6C to 200B 'et&een the central Sudanese %o$ern*ent andthe Sudan Peo#leJs Li'eration 7r*". It &as lar%el" a continuation of the First Sudanese /i$il ar of 1DBB to1DK2. 7lthou%h it ori%inated in southern Sudan, the ci$il &ar s#read to the Nu'a *ountains and !lue Nile. heSecond Sudanese /i$il ar is often #resented as the on%oin% conflict 'et&een cultures and reli%ions na*el"the 7ra' Gusli* North and the /hristian 7frican South. It is no& o'$ious that the ci$il &ar in the Sudan islar%el" 'ased around the recourses found in the North and South. 7%riculture ;s#ecificall" sor%hu*, cotton andsesa*e< is a *a9or econo*ic acti$it" of the Sudanese and ha##ens to occur *ainl" in the South. heSudanese %o$ern*ent had introduced unfair tradin% la&s re%ardin% the e)#loitation of &ater, oil and land

 &hich fell &ell in fa$or of the North e$en thou%h the *a9orit" of these resources &ere found in the South.Ao&e$er, all the #rofits *ade fro* the a%ricultural as#ects in the South &ent *ainl" to the Northern Sudaneseelite and as a result, increasin% the di$ision and hatred 'et&een the North and South. 7fter the end of the ci$il

 &ar, &hich resulted in creation of a so$erei%n South Sudanese state, a treat" &as i*#le*ented to resol$e adis#ute o$er ho& South SudanJs oil &ealth &ill 'e distri'uted. In 2011, Hhartou* allo&ed the South to secede

 &ith the understandin% that !ashirJs %o$ern*ent &ould recei$e u# to B. 'illion in co*#ensation for the lossof 2MCrds of the countr"Js oil--as &ell as a fa$ora'le cut of Southern oil re$enues, &hich de#end u#on a #i#elinethat ter*inates in Port Sudan. In Fe'ruar", the South decided it &ould rather shut do&n its entire oil sectorthan #a" C0 a 'arrel transit fees to the northern %o$ern*ent, a le$" that is nearl" 1B ti*es the *ar(et rate.he oil shutdo&n &as a *utuall"-destructi$e %a*'it, and 'oth North Sudan and the SouthJs fled%lin%%o$ern*ent also #ushed itself to the 'rin( of 'an(ru#tc" in order to force its o##onentJs hand.

• 0ocali(ed spontaneous cease-ires across the trenches in 6orld 6ar I3

• ?S-Soviet nuclear arms race during the )old 6ar3 he nuclear ar*s race &as a co*#etition for

su#re*ac" in nuclear &arfare 'et&een the +nited States, the So$iet +nion, and their res#ecti$e allies durin%the /old ar. urin% the /old ar, in addition to the 7*erican and So$iet nuclear stoc(#iles, other countriesde$elo#ed nuclear &ea#ons, thou%h none en%a%ed in &arhead #roduction on nearl" the sa*e scale as thet&o su#er#o&ers. None of these defensi$e *easures &ere secure, and in the 1DB0s 'oth the +nited Statesand So$iet +nion had nuclear #o&er to o'literate the other side. !oth sides de$elo#ed a ca#a'ilit" to launch ade$astatin% attac( e$en after sustainin% a full assault fro* the other side ;es#eciall" '" *eans of su'*arines<,called a second stri(e.[6 his #olic" &as #art of &hat 'eca*e (no&n as Gutual 7ssured estruction: 'oth

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sides (ne& that an" attac( u#on the other &ould 'e de$astatin% to the*sel$es, thus in theor" restrainin% the*fro* attac(in% the other. !oth So$iet and 7*erican e)#erts ho#ed to use nuclear &ea#ons for e)tractin%concessions fro* the other, or fro* other #o&ers such as /hina, 'ut the ris( connected &ith usin% these

 &ea#ons &as so %ra$e that the" refrained fro* 'rin(*anshi#.

• ?nited +ations ?+ /eneral Assembly and ?+ Security )ouncil and ?+S).s decision-

maing,voting rules> the 0eague o +ations and its )ouncil voting rules3 International or%aniationfounded ;1DB< at the end of orld ar II to *aintain international #eace and securit", de$elo# friendl"relations a*on% nations on eual ter*s, and encoura%e international coo#eration in sol$in% intracta'le hu*an#ro'le*s. he ter* ori%inall" referred to the countries that o##osed the 7)is #o&ers. he @eneral 7sse*'l" isone of si) #rinci#al co*#onents of the +nited Nations and the onl" one in &hich all +N *e*'ers arere#resented. It *eets annuall" or in s#ecial sessions. It acts #ri*aril" as a deli'erati$e 'od"? it *a" discussand *a(e reco**endations a'out an" issue &ithin the sco#e of the +N charter. he Securit" /ouncil is the#er*anent #eace(ee#in% facet of the +N, co*#osed of fi$e #er*anent *e*'ers ;/hina, France, Russia, the+nited Hin%do*, and the +nited States< and ten elected *e*'ers. he Securit" /ouncil in$esti%ates dis#utesthat threaten international #eace and ad$ises on ho& to resol$e the*. o #re$ent or halt a%%ression, it *a"i*#ose di#lo*atic or econo*ic sanctions or authorie the use of *ilitar" force. Each of the #er*anent*e*'ers holds $eto #o&er in decisions on su'stanti$e *atters, such as the a##lication of sanctions. ecisionson 'oth su'stanti$e and #rocedural *atters reuire nine affir*ati$e $otes, includin% the affir*ati$e $ote of allfi$e #er*anent *e*'ers ;thou%h in #ractice a #er*anent *e*'er *a" a'stain &ithout i*#airin% the $alidit" ofa decision<. he Lea%ue of Nations &as &orld or%aniation esta'lished in 1D20 to #ro*ote internationalcoo#eration and #eace. he Lea%ue suffered fro* t&o handica#s. First, so*e of the *ost i*#ortant &orld#o&ers &ere not *e*'ers: @er*an" &as e)cluded until 1D25, the !olshe$i( %o$ern*ent in Russia denouncedit as a ca#italist clu' and did not 9oin until 1DC? &orst of all, ilson failed to #ersuade the +S Senate to ratif"the treat" and the *ost #o&erful nation of the &orld &as therefore a'sent. Secondl", the Lea%ue had no ar*edforce of its o&n and *e*'er states &ere reluctant to #ro$ide troo#s: it &as therefore o'li%ed to rel" u#onecono*ic sanctions, &hich &ere difficult to enforce and slo& to ta(e effect. Essentiall" #o&erless, it &asofficiall" dissol$ed in 1D5.

• )osta Rica v ?S 6orld $rade rgani(ation legal dispute over underwear imports3 In Garch 1DDB the

+nited States clai*ed that its do*estic under&ear industr" &as 'ein% seriousl" da*a%ed or threatened &ithactual da*a%e '" i*#orted cotton and *an-*ade-fi'er under&ear fro* /osta Rica and si) other countries.he +nited States initiated consultations &ith the countries alle%ed to 'e da*a%in% or threatenin% its industr"

 &ith the intention of in$o(in% the transitional safe%uard #ro$isions of the 7%ree*ent on e)tiles and /lothin%.So*e countries a%reed to uantitati$e restrictions on the i*#orted under&ear that &ould 'e allo&ed into the+nited States, 'ut the +.S. failed to reach a%ree*ents &ith /osta Rica and a fe& others. he +nited Statesintroduced restrictions on the i*#ortation of cotton and *an-*ade-fi'er under&ear. ith the unilateralintroduction of restrictions, the case &as referred to the e)tile Gonitorin% !od" ;G!<, &hich could not reachconsensus on &hether the e)istence of an actual threat of serious da*a%e had 'een de*onstrated, and thusreco**ended further consultations a*on% the #arties. he +nited States and /osta Rica &ere una'le toreach a *utual understandin% after additional consultations. On 22 ece*'er 1DDB /osta Rica 'e%an thedis#ute settle*ent #rocess under 7rticle >>III of the @eneral 7%ree*ent on ariffs and rade ;@7 1DD<and the corres#ondin% #ro$isions of the 7/. es#ite the concerns a'out #ursuin% the case and *ana%in% its#rosecution, /osta Rica #re$ailed in 'oth the dis#ute settle*ent #rocess and the su'seuent le%al a##eal. Notonl" did /osta Rica recei$e fa$ora'le rulin%s, 'ut the +nited States also acce#ted and confor*ed to the

decisions.

• Mexican-American 6ar o 1B@C-1B@B3 ar 'et&een the +.S. and Ge)ico. It %re& fro* a 'order dis#ute

after the +.S. anne)ed e)as in 16B? Ge)ico clai*ed that the southern 'order of e)as &as the NuecesRi$er, &hile the +.S. clai*ed it &as the Rio @rande. 7 secret *ission '" ohn Slidell to ne%otiate the dis#uteand #urchase Ne& Ge)ico and /alifornia for u# to C0 *illion &as a'orted &hen Ge)ico refused to recei$ehi*. In res#onse to the snu', Pres. a*es Pol( sent troo#s under achar" a"lor to occu#" the dis#uted land'et&een the t&o ri$ers. In 7#ril 165 Ge)ican troo#s crossed the Rio @rande and attac(ed a"lorJs troo#s?/on%ress a##ro$ed a declaration of &ar in Ga". Ordered to in$ade Ge)ico, a"lor ca#tured Gonterre" anddefeated a lar%e Ge)ican force under 7ntonio Santa 7nna at the !attle of !uena Qista in Fe'ruar" 16K.

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+nder the reat" of @uadalu#e Aidal%o, Ge)ico ceded to the +.S. nearl" all of #resent Ne& Ge)ico, +tah,Ne$ada, 7riona, /alifornia, e)as, and /olorado for 1B,000,000 and +.S. assu*#tion of its citiensJ clai*sa%ainst Ge)ico. /asualties included a'out 1C,000 7*erican deaths, all 'ut 1,K00 of &hich &ere caused '"disease. he &ar, &hich *ade a national hero of a"lor, reo#ened the sla$er"-e)tension issue su##osedl"settled '" the Gissouri /o*#ro*ise.

• 8arious Arab-Israeli wars 1;@B 1;FC 1;CE Six "ay 6ar 1;E< '5om Gippur 6ar3 he first &ar

;1D6< 'e%an &hen Israel declared itself an inde#endent state follo&in% the +nited NationsJ #artitionof Palestine. Protestin% this *o$e, fi$e 7ra' countries ;E%"#t, Ira, ordan, Le'anon, and S"ria< attac(edIsrael. he conflict ended &ith Israel %ainin% considera'le territor". he 1DB5 Sue /risis 'e%an after E%"#tnationalied the Sue /anal. 7 French, !ritish, and Israeli coalition attac(ed E%"#t and occu#ied the canalone 'ut soon &ithdre& under international #ressure. In the Si)-a" ar of 1D5K, Israel attac(ed E%"#t,ordan, and S"ria. he &ar ended &ith the Israel occu#"in% su'stantial a*ounts of 7ra' territor". 7nundeclared &ar of attrition ;1D5D< &as fou%ht 'et&een E%"#t and Israel alon% the Sue /anal and ended &iththe hel# of international di#lo*ac". E%"#t and S"ria attac(ed Israel in 1DKC ;the o* Hi##ur ar<, 'ut, des#iteearl" 7ra' success, the conflict ended inconclusi$el". In 1DKD E%"#t *ade #eace &ith Israel. In 1D62 Israelin$aded Le'anon in order to e)#el Palestinian %uerrillas 'ased there. Israel &ithdre& fro* *ost of Le'anon '"1D6B 'ut *aintained a narro& 'uffer one inside that countr" until 2000.

• Israel-%alestinian territorial dispute over 9erusalem 3 here are differin% le%al and di#lo*atic #ositions

on erusale* held &ithin the international co**unit". @o$ern*ents and scholars ali(e are di$ided o$er thele%al status of erusale* under international la&. Gost countries of the &orld do not reco%nie erusale* asIsraelJs ca#ital. Gan" do not reco%nie it as a cit" that is #ro#erl" IsraelJs. Gan" +N *e*'er states for*all"adhere to the +nited Nations #ro#osal that erusale* should ha$e an international status. he chief dis#utere$ol$es around IsraelJs control of East erusale*, &hile 'roader a%ree*ent e)ists re%ardin% the Israeli#resence in est erusale*. De jure, the *a9orit" of +N *e*'er states and *ost international or%aniationsdo not reco%nie IsraelJs control of East erusale* &hich occurred after the 1D5K Si) a" ar, nor its1D60 erusale* La& #rocla*ation, &hich declared a co*#lete and united erusale* as the ca#ital of Israel.7s a result, forei%n e*'assies are %enerall" located in el 7$i$ and its su'ur's. erusale* is a contentiousissue in final status #eace tal(s 'et&een Israel and the Palestinian National 7uthorit", &hich clai*s erusale*as 7l uds, the ca#ital of a future Palestinian state.  Israeli Pri*e Ginister !in"a*in Netan"ahu has stated thaterusale* 'elon%s to the e&ish #eo#le and &ill re*ain under Israeli so$erei%nt" for eternit". Otheror%aniations and co**unities ad$ocate erusale* should 'e an international cit".

• Israel-Syria dispute over possession o /olan *eights3 !et&een 1D6 and 1D5K, the stru%%le 'et&een

Israel and S"ria o$er their de*ilitaried 'order one &as a #rinci#al reason 'ehind the Si) a" ar of 1D5K, &hich ended in Israel ca#turin% the @olan Aei%hts. In ece*'er 1D61, the %o$ern*ent of Israel e)tendedIsraeli la&, 9urisdiction, and ad*inistration to the @olan, an action criticied '" the Rea%an ad*inistration andconsidered null and $oid '" the +nited Nations Securit" /ouncil. In ter*s of *ilitar" si%nificance, the area isof e)ce#tional %eostrate%ic $alue 'ecause it offers a co**andin% #osition o$erloo(in% southern Le'anon, the@olan #lateau, and *uch of southern S"ria and northern Israel. o the east, a ran%e of $olcanic hillsoffers do&nhill access to @alilee in the &est and to a*ascus in the east. o the &est, the @olan #lateauo$erloo(s Israeli *etro#olitan centers. he @olan is also i*#ortant for its re%ional &ater sources. his is#articularl" true of the area of Gount Aer*on, &here the head&aters of the ordan Ri$er lie. Peace-

ne%otiations, in &hich the @olan Aei%hts &ere a crucial co*#onent, ha$e 'een on%oin% inter*ittentl" 'et&eenIsrael and S"ria. 7fter the assassination of an Israeli Pri*e Ginister in the *id-D08s, su'seuent atte*#ts atrene&in% the ne%otiations re*ained futile.

• India-%aistan dispute over possession o Gashmir3 Hash*ir is a dis#uted re%ion, &hose so$erei%nt" is

contested '" India and Pa(istan. hen the !ritish announced their &ithdra&al fro* India and #artition in 1DK,the ruler of the State of a**u and Hash*ir &as reluctant to 9oin &ith either India or Pa(istan, 'ut in the li%htof *ilitar" incursions fro* Pa(istan acceded to India. /ontinued fi%htin% lasted until the +nited Nationsne%otiated a ceasefire, and the State &as di$ided '" a line of control. here &as another &ar 'et&een Indiaand Pa(istan o$er Hash*ir in 1D5B, and there ha$e 'een #eriodic *ilitar" flare-u#s since the 1DD0s. he Stateof a**u and Hash*ir is #redo*inantl" Gusli*, 'ut &ith si%nificant areas #o#ulated '" Aindus and !uddhists

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In the face of hardenin% reli%ious identities, set a%ainst a 'ac(dro# of a desta'iliin% and *ilitariin% conflict in7f%hanistan, and &ith $alue for 'oth India and Pa(istan as a (e" strate%ic location, the #ros#ects for conflictresolution see* re*ote. Since 'oth India and Pa(istan no& ha$e nuclear &ea#ons, such a source of tension is#otentiall" disastrous.

• )hina deterrent threat vs ?S,?+ orces during Gorean 6ar 1;F=3 In 1DB0 North Horea in$aded South

Horea, and +.S. Pres. Aarr" ru*an ordered troo#s to assist South Horea. he +N Securit" /ouncil, *inusthe a'sent So$iet dele%ate, #assed a resolution callin% for the assistance of all +N *e*'ers in haltin% theNorth Horeans. 7t first North Horean troo#s dro$e the South Horean and +.S. forces do&n to the southern ti#of the Horean #eninsula, 'ut a 'rilliant a*#hi'ious landin% at InchJn, concei$ed '" @en. ou%las Gac7rthur, turned the tide in fa$or of the +N troo#s, &ho ad$anced near the 'order of North Horea and /hina. /hinesePG /hou En-lai %a$e &arnin% throu%h Indian di#lo*atic channels that if the 7*erican authorities decided tocross /hina &ill 'e forced to act accordin%l"8. he !ritish chiefs of staff too( this to *ean /hinese *ilitar"inter$ention, a res#onse to 'e a$oided at all costs &hile Stalin threatened in Euro#e. he +S and !ritish%o$ern*ents, in close consultation, disa%reed? li(e&ise a *a9orit" in the +N. /hina *i%ht 'e 'luffin% and tohold 'ac( &ould surel" offer Hi* an o##ortunit" to raise ne& forces and stri(e a%ain. he /hinese &ere not'luffin%. he /hinese then entered the &ar and dro$e the +N forces 'ac( south? the front line sta'ilied at theC6th #arallel.

• 7argaining during wartime and 7ritish-/erman peace terms in 1;1C during 6orld 6ar I3

• +orth Gorea.s nuclear weapons program & ?S eorts to limit it3 North HoreaJs histor" of re%ional

*ilitar" #ro$ocations, #roliferation of *ilitar"-related ite*s, and lon%-ran%e *issile de$elo#*ent are of *a9orconcern to the international co**unit". In ece*'er 2002, follo&in% re$elations that the PRH &as #ursuin%a nuclear &ea#ons #ro%ra* 'ased on enriched uraniu* in $iolation of a 1DD a%ree*ent &ith the +S to freeeand ulti*atel" dis*antle its e)istin% #lutoniu*-'ased #ro%ra*, North Horea e)#elled *onitors fro* theInternational 7to*ic Ener%" 7%enc" ;I7E7<. In anuar" 200C, it declared its &ithdra&al fro* the internationalNon-Proliferation reat". In *id-200C P"on%"an% announced it had co*#leted the re#rocessin% of s#entnuclear fuel rods ;to e)tract &ea#ons-%rade #lutoniu*< and &as de$elo#in% a nuclear deterrent. !e%innin% in7u%ust 200C, North Horea, /hina, a#an, Russia, South Horea, and the +S ha$e #artici#ated in the Si)-Part"al(s ai*ed at resol$in% the stale*ate o$er the PRHJs nuclear #ro%ra*s. North Horea #ulled out of the tal(sin No$e*'er 200B. It test-fired 'allistic *issiles in ul" 2005 and conducted a nuclear test in Octo'er 2005.

North Horea returned to the Si)-Part" al(s in ece*'er 2005 and su'seuentl" si%ned t&o a%ree*ents ondenucleariation. he +nited States *aintains $arious sanctions on North Horea due to its hu*an ri%htsrecord, nuclear &ea#ons #ro%ra*s, &ea#ons #roliferation acti$ities, and other reasons. E)#orts of *ilitar" andsensiti$e dual-use ite*s are #rohi'ited, as are *ost t"#es of +.S. econo*ic assistance. 7t this ti*e, %oods ofNorth Horean ori%in *a" not 'e i*#orted into the +nited States either directl" or indirectl" &ithout #riornotification to and a##ro$al of the +.S. reasur" e#art*ent8s Office of Forei%n 7ssets /ontrol ;OF7/<.

• nuclear weapons inspections & transparency in )old 6ar agreements3 he reat" on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear ea#ons, co**onl" (no&n as the Non-Proliferation reat" or NP, is a land*ar(international treat" &hose o'9ecti$e is to #re$ent the s#read of nuclear &ea#ons and &ea#ons technolo%", to#ro*ote coo#eration in the #eaceful uses of nuclear ener%" and to further the %oal of achie$in% nucleardisar*a*ent and %eneral and co*#lete disar*a*ent. he NP is often seen to 'e 'ased on a central 'ar%ain

3the NP non-nuclear-&ea#on states a%ree ne$er to acuire nuclear &ea#ons and the NP nuclear-&ea#onstates in e)chan%e a%ree to share the 'enefits of #eaceful nuclear technolo%" and to #ursue nucleardisar*a*ent ai*ed at the ulti*ate eli*ination of their nuclear arsenals4. Se$eral *easures ha$e 'eenado#ted to stren%then the NP and the 'roader nuclear non#roliferation re%i*e and *a(e it difficult for statesto acuire the ca#a'ilit" to #roduce nuclear &ea#ons, includin% the e)#ort controls of the Nuclear Su##liers@rou# and the enhanced $erification *easures of the I7E7 7dditional Protocol. 7fter the NP, the t&oco*#onents of the Strate%ic 7r*s Li*itation reaties ;S7L< re#resented a &illin%ness '" the +nited Statesand the So$iet +nion to constrain an ar*s race that 'oth reco%nied &as costl" and #otentiall" desta'iliin%.So$iet nuclear ad$anta%e in the earl" 1DK0s concerned the +nited States, and the So$iets reco%nied that7*erican fears &ould li(el" translate into a *assi$e &ea#ons #ro%ra* ai*ed at re%ainin% nuclear su#eriorit".hus the So$iet +nion chose to forsa(e short-ter* ad$anta%e in fa$or of %uaranteed #arit" o$er the lon% ter*.

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!oth sides a%reed that strate%ic #arit" &ould si%nificantl" contri'ute to sta'ilit". he chief #roducts of S7L I &ere the 7nti-!allistic Gissile ;7!G< reat" in 1DK2, and an interi* a%ree*ent &hich set li*its on the totalnu*'er of offensi$e *issiles allo&a'le ;further addressed in S7L II<. he 7!G reat" li*ited the nu*'er ofdefensi$e &ea#ons, indicatin% that 'oth the +nited States and the So$iet +nion acce#ted the idea that *utual$ulnera'ilit" &ould increase sta'ilit" - there'" institutionaliin% *utual assured destruction ;G7<. S7L IIli*ited the total nu*'er of all t"#es of strate%ic nuclear &ea#ons. Ao&e$er, althou%h a%reed u#on '" 'othcountries, S7L II &as ne$er ratified 'ecause 7*erican President i**" /arter &ithdre& his su##ort after theSo$iet in$asion of 7f%hanistan in ece*'er 1DKD.

• nuclear &ea#ons ins#ections T trans#arenc" in /old ar a%ree*ents

!oth sides %enerall" (ne& that each had a %reat a*ount of nuclear &ea#ons. Each side &atchedcarefull" &here the other &as *antlin% *issiles and ca*e to a%ree*ents to dis*antle certainones. his %eneral trans#arenc" of each side8s &ea#onr" and the threat of 3*utuall" assureddestruction4 hel#ed the +.S. and the So$iet +nion a$oid &ar.

• Russia and the Second /hechen ar

Isla*ic se#aratist *ilitants in$ade Russian #ro$ince of a%estan fro* /hechn"a, and Russianforces roll in. irect 'attle a'andoned '" earl" 2000, shift to %uerrilla &ar.

• 2012 ne%otiations a*on% Euro#ean countries o$er 'an(in% ca#ital standards

hich banking capital standard to useUGa" 2012: +H ne%otiates &ith France T @er*an" on standards ;!asel III i*#le*entation<.

+H &anted a hi%her safet" 'uffer, ti%hter rules on &hat 'an(s can count as reser$es. It did not &ant the failure to ha$e enou%h cash to 'e a ris( once a%ain.3/o*#ro*ise4: +H can do &hat it &ants, e$er"one else has a &ea(er standard .

• 7r%entina8s *ilitar" 9unta, !ritish Pri*e Ginister hatcher, and the Fal(lands ar, 1D62

!ritain and 7r%entina fou%ht o$er the in$alua'le Fal(land Islands. he 7r%entina 9unta thou%ht anattac( on the islands &ould sol$e do*estic econo*ic #ro'le*s. heir rule &as re#ressi$e andun#o#ular. Fearin% threat to their rule, the" tried to unite the countr" a%ainst the !ritish control ofthe islands ;7r%entinians resented !ritish control of the Fal(lands<.On the !ritish side, Pri*e Ginister Gar%aret hatcher &as also #ro'a'l" thin(in% of #oliticalsur$i$al. Aer #o#ularit" &as lo& 'ecause of une*#lo"*ent. !ecause of her fir* stance on theislands, her a##ro$al ratin% soared.

• +S /I7 inter$ention in @uate*ala, 1DB/I7 su##orted cou# in @uate*ala on 'ehalf of +nited Fruit /o*#an". he /I7 &as ar*in% andtrainin% @uate*alan re'els. Political insta'ilit" &ould8$e ne%ati$el" i*#acted the +nited Fruit/o*#an"8s #roduction facilities in @uate*ala. he co*#an" also sou%ht to #rotect its lands fro*the @uate*alan %o$ern*ent.

• the /arter octrine

37n" atte*#t '" an outside force to %ain control of the Persian @ulf re%ion &ill 'e re%arded as anassault on the $ital interests of the +S7, and such an assault &ill 'e re#elled '" an" *eansnecessar", includin% *ilitar" force.- President /arter. he +.S. had an interest in ensurin% astead" su##l" of oil.

• the Russo-a#anese &ar of 1D0-1D0B

Russians ho#ed for a $ictorious &ar 'ut suffered hu*iliatin% defeat at the hands of the a#anese.efeats on the 'attlefield *i)ed &ith unha##iness of the tsar8s re%i*e 'rou%ht the Re$olution of1D0B, in &hich the tsar &as forced to *a(e #olitical concessions to his o##onents. his sho&sho& a failures a'road can affect leaders do*esticall".

• trends in +S #u'lic o#inion in su##ort of the &ars of the #ast centur"

here is an increasin% o##osition to &ar in the +.S. he leader8s infor*ational ad$anta%e hel#s'uild a rall" earl" in the conflict. Ao&e$er, if casualties increase and $ictor" is not in si%ht, #u'lico##osition %ro&s.

• the !oer ar

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!ritish lost *an" li$es in the &ar to defend an e*#ire in 7frica. 7lthou%h !ritain didn8t 'enefit as a &hole, a fe& s*all %rou#s &ithin the countr" did. he" &ere the rich #eo#le &ith the a'ilit" toin$est o$erseas. !" fi%htin% and (ee#in% these colonial #ossessions, rich #eo#le continued toha$e o##ortunities for #rofita'le in$est*ents. he" e)erted their #o&er and influence to force!ritish %o$ern*ents to #ursue a #olic" that 'enefited the* at the e)#ense of the %reater %ood.

• +S s#ecial interest lo''" %rou#s and +S #olic" to&ards Israel and /u'a

-he *ain lo''"in% %rou# of #ro-Israel is the 7*erica-Israel Political 7ction /o**ittee ;7IP7/<. 7$er" effecti$e %rou#, the" &ant the +.S. to su##ort and defend Israel. his #uts +.S. in conflict

 &ith Israel8s ene*ies in the Giddle East.-/u'an 7*ericans are o##osed to the co**unist re%i*e in /u'a, *ost are ones &ho fled /u'a

 &hen Fidel /astro too( o$er in 1DBD. /u'an 7*ericans lo''ied the +.S. %o$ern*ent tocontainMunder*ine the /astro re%i*e '" su##ortin% a failed in$asion '" e)iles in 1D51 andi*#osin% e*'ar%os.

• +S Secretar" of State Se&ard8s 1650 #eace #ro#osal #rior to the +S /i$il ar

+S Sec. State Se&ard &as a Senator in ec 1650. !efore the +.S. /i$il ar, southern states'e%an secedin%, threatenin% &ar. Se&ard &as a founder of the antisla$er" Re#u'lican Part" anda *a9or o##onent of sla$er", he #ro#osed a constitutional a*end*ent 'annin% /on%ress fro*#assin% a la& to re*o$e or alter sla$er".Ae de#arted fro* his 3cherished con$ictions4 'ecause3#oliticians *ust consider not onl" #ersonal $ie&s 'ut also those &ith &ho* &e *ust necessaril"

act84

uestions

• hat is a 3#ule4U hat is the social scientific a##roach to the stud" of international #oliticsU

Pules are o'ser$ations a'out the &orld that de*and an e)#lanation.

+sin% the scientific a##roach, &e for* a theory , a lo%icall" consistent set of state*ents thate)#lains a #heno*enon of interest. O'ser$in% #olitical e$ents fro* the #ast and a##l"in% the*to the #resent or to #redict future outco*es for* theories. heories ha$e to 'e si*#lified'ecause the" atte*#t to ans&er onl" certain #heno*enon. e *ust cut a&a" so*e of theco*#le)ities.

• hat is our 'asic theoretical fra*e&or( for understandin% international #olitical #heno*ena,'roadl" s#ea(in%U

he three core conce#ts are:

Interests: hat actors &ant to achie$e throu%h #olitical action.

Interactions: he &a"s in &hich the choices of t&o or *ore actors co*'ine to #roduce #oliticaloutco*es.

Institutions: Set of rules (no&n and shared '" the co**unit" that structure #oliticalinteractions in #articular &a"s.

e assu*e that actors are #ur#osi$e.

•

In 'road stro(es, &hat ha$e 'een the *a9or #hases of &orld #olitics since 1B00U hat &erethe characteristics of those #hases, in ter*s of the nature of the state s"ste*, the actors,interests, and t"#es of interactions do*inant in each #haseU

Gercantilist Era ;1B00-161B<: *assi$e coloniation '" the Euro#eans in the Ne& orld ;then7frica, 7sia<. E*#ires used resources #roduced '" colonies in the ne& &orld to #roduce%oods, then #roceed to sell these %oods at *ono#olistic #rices to colonies. +sin% *ilitar"#o&er to increase econo*ic %ain, then usin% the econo*ic %ain to enrich the*ilitar"M%o$ern*ent.

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Pa) !ritannicaM !ritish Peace ;161B-1D1<: interest in tradeMin$estin% leads to %reat econo*ic%ro&th &orld&ide. u''ed the 3Aundred ears8 Peace4, relations a*on% #o&erful nations

 &ere far cal*er than 'efore. !ritain8s econo*ic influence contri'uted to o#en trade andrelati$e #eace.

he hirt" ears8 /risis ;1D1-1DB<: ensions in Euro#e increases as @er*an" rises in#o&er, e$entuall" Euro#e di$ides into t&o hostile sides and I 'e%ins. I does little tosettle tensions in Euro#e ;es#eciall" 'ecause @er*an" &as #unished so harshl" after the

 &ar<. II 'e%ins in 1D1 and ended &hen the Nai re%i*e fell and a#an &as 'o*'ed t&ice

 &ith nuclear &ea#ons.

he /old ar ;1DB-1DK0s<: &o su#er#o&ers e*er%e: N7O led '" +.S. and the arsa&Pact led '" the So$iets. Econo*icall", +.S. fa$ored ca#italis* &hile So$iet +nion fa$oredsocialis*. Each &as afraid of the other %ain in #o&er. ar al*ost occurred durin% the 1DD!erlin 7irlift and the 1D52 /u'an Gissile /risis, 'ut ne%otiations &ere reached. ecoloniationand the rise of third-&orld countries also occurred durin% this #eriod.

Post /old ar ;1DK0s on&ards<: So$iet +nion falls and +.S. e*er%es as the sole &orld #o&er.@lo'aliation is the ne& idea of the 21st centur", as *an" a%ree on the 'enefits of internationalecono*ic inte%ration.

• h" is coo#eration often so difficult in international #oliticsU h" is it #articularl" difficult

a*on% lar%e nu*'ers of actorsU hat other t"#es of situationsMinteractions *a(e coo#eration#articularl" difficultU

/oo#eration is difficult 'ecause of conflicts o$er #u'lic %oods, collecti$e action #ro'le*s, and'ecause of free riders.

It is easier for a s*aller nu*'er of actors to coo#erate 'ecause of the need to *onitor ando'ser$e each other8s actions to *a(e sure e$er"one is a'idin% '" the rules. his is difficult ifthe %rou# of actors is too lar%e.

Lac( of infor*ation and lin(a%e ;&ithholdin% coo#eration on another issue if other actor doesnot consent to current issue< also *a(e coo#eration *ore difficult.

• hat factors deter*ine &hich side &ins and &hich side loses in a 'ar%ainin% interactionU

Po&er: the a'ilit" to %et the other side to *a(e concessions &ithout ha$in% to *a(econcessions oneself.

/oercion: usin% threats or i*#osin% %reater costs to chan%e the other actor8s 'eha$ior.

Outside o#tions: the *ore outside o#tions a state has outside of reachin% an a%ree*ent, the*ore li(el" that state &ill %et &hat it &ants.

7%enda-settin% #o&er: First *o$er ad$anta%e, settin% the rulesM#olicies 'efore 'ar%ainin% cane$en 'e%in. ;Gicrosoft had this ad$anta%e of other o# s"ste*s<.

• Ao& *i%ht institutions and rules affect state 'eha$ior in &orld #oliticsU h" do states

so*eti*es follo& 3the rules4U

Institutions #lace rules that reduce the cost of 9oint-decision *a(in%. he" define the decision-

*a(in% #rocess so states do not &aste ti*e ha%%lin% o$er rules as &ell as &hate$er the" &antto 'ar%ain for. he" also define standards or 'eha$ior, $erif" that states are follo&in% thesestandards, and atte*#t to resol$e dis#utes if the" should arise. States 3follo& the rules4'ecause so*eti*es the" ha$e no incenti$e not to follo& the* ;coordination<. States &ant tore*ain credi'le on the face of international #olitics as &ell.

• h" do states e)#erience conflicts of interestU

 7ll states &ant the *ost for the*sel$es, &hether it8s territor", resources, or #o&er ;an"thin% of$alue<. he desire for these scarce %oods often causes conflicts. Policies that 'enefit certain

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states 'ut har* others also induces conflict. Lastl", states ha$e conflicts o$er re%i*e t"#es;such as &hen +.S. sou%ht to #re$ent the rise of co**unist re%i*es<.

• hat causes &ar to 'rea( outU h" does a &ar not end soonerU hat role do inco*#lete

infor*ation, co**it*ent #ro'le*s, and indi$isi'ilit" #la" in causin% 'ar%ainin% 'rea(do&n,and &hat are these conce#ts in #racticeU

ar 'rea(s out 'ecause of #ro#ert" dis#utes, #olic" disa%ree*ents, and conflictin% ideas of &ho should %o$ern. +nfortunatel", dis#utes that lead to &ars can often 'e sol$ed throu%h

institutional *echanis*s. ars last lon%er than e)#ected 'ecause one or 'oth sides*iscalculate the costs of &ar fro* the other side. his is inco*#lete infor*ation, &hen statescannot accuratel" deter*ine the 'ar%ainin% ran%e 'ecause of lac( of infor*ation re%ardin%interests and ca#a'ilities ;Hu&ait in$asion-Aussein 'luff #%. DB<. here are also ne& sourcesof uncertaint" and continuation of co**it*ent #ro'le*s. /o**it*ent #ro'le*s occur &henstates ha$e incenti$es not to honor institutional settle*ents that are alread" in #lace? thisincludes 'ar%ainin% o$er %oods that ha$e future 'ar%ainin% #o&er, &ars in res#onse tochan%in% #o&er, and #ree*#ti$e &ars that start 'ecause of the first-stri(e ad$anta%e.Indi$isi'ilit" can s#ar( &ars 'ecause there are so*e %oods that cannot 'e di$ided, ne%otiationas a settle*ent see*s unli(el". It8s all or nothin% ;e.%. erusale*<.

• hat are so*e #redictions of the 'ar%ainin% *odel of &ar for understandin% &hen &ar &ill

'rea( out, ho& lon% it &ill last, and &hether it &ill recur once it la#sesUar 'rea(s out &hen t&o sides fail to *a(e a deal in the 'ar%ainin% ran%e or &hen a statee)#ects to %ain *ore throu%h &ar ;#lus cost of &ar< than it has in the status uo. arcontinues as lon% as one side continues to *a(e concessions and ends &hen one side isdefeated *ilitaril" and is &illin% to chan%e its ne%otiation ;'ar%ainin% ran%e has chan%ed<stance to acce#t an a%ree*ent.

• +nder &hat circu*stances *i%ht #ri$ate interests ;of #articularistic lo''" %rou#s, industries,

'ureaucracies, or the nation8s leader< #ush a state into a *ore a%%ressi$e forei%n #olic" and#erha#s into &ar itselfU

Interest %rou#s often sha#e the decisions re%ardin% &ar and #eace. hile these %rou#s also

care for the countr" as a &hole, so*eti*es the" also &ant to %ain so*ethin% ;resources,influence, etc.< for the*sel$es. If a *ore a%%ressi$e forei%n #olic" can %reater ena'le #ersonal#ro*otion, certain interest %rou#s &ill ha$e an incenti$e to su##ort such #olicies.

E). Oil %rou#s su##ort the Irai &ar 'ecause the" &ere interested in Ira8s oil. ;7lso, !ush &asonce an oil industr" e)ecuti$e<

• o leaders start &ars to achie$e a 3rall" effect4U henU

es, 'ecause the rall" effect ena'les %reater su##ort fro* a nation8s citiens to&ards theircountr"8s leadersM %o$ern*ents. he first 'est outco*e is to %et out of fi%htin%, 'ut if conflicta'road i*#ro$es a leader8s chance of sta"in% in #o&erM%ainin% su##ort, heMshe *i%ht #refer

 &ar to a ne%otiation. Leaders &ant to achie$e the rall" effect &hen there are do*estic#ro'le*s? &hen a countr" is di$ided internall", a &ar can ser$e to unite citiens. he incenti$ethat a leader has to start crises to %ain su##ort at ho*e is diversionary incentive.

• o leaders continue &ars to 3%a*'le for resurrection4U +nder &hat conditionsU

es, &hen leaders see that the alternati$e to not startin% a &ar is &orse, e$en if %oin% to &ar isris(".

E). Political leaders &ho are sure the" are %oin% to lose #o&er #refer &ar, 'ecause the" are*ore #rone to %a*'le on the outco*e ;the" are %oin% to lose #o&er an"&a"s, &h" notU<.

• o leaders start &ars to 'enefit a certain s#ecial interest %rou# or industr"U

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es, es#eciall" &hen certain %rou#s e)ert %reater influence a*on% #olitical leaders or &hencertain leaders hold 3o'li%ations4 to 'ac( u# a certain %rou#.

E.%. efense e#art*ent #refers &ar to su##ort the *ilitar"8s $ie&s ;*ilitar" has ideolo%icaland #rofessional interest in #olicies that *a(e &ar *ore li(el"<.

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