Middle Class and Democracy Structural Linkage Chunlong Lu Old Dominion University

8/13/2019 Middle Class and Democracy Structural Linkage Chunlong Lu Old Dominion University

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MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURAL LINKAGEAuthor(s): CHUNLONG LUSource: International Review of Modern Sociology, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Autumn 2005), pp. 157-178Published by: International JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41421642.

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InternationaleviewfModem ociology,ol.31,No.2 (Autumn)005

MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY:STRUCTURAL LINKAGE

CHUNLONG LUOld Dominion UniversityIn the emocracyiterature, iddle lasshas been onsideredpotent gentofthe ociopoliticalransitionoward emocracynd thecornerstonefdemocratic ule. This articleoffers structuralperspective n therelationshipetweenmiddle lass and democracy. his articleuses themethod f structuralquationmodeling o testthe structural elationbetween country'size ofmiddle lass and its levelofdemocracy.hefindingsndicatehatwhere hemiddle lass s numerousndstrongtherearemore ossibilitiesorthe ountryo bea stable emocracy; hilewherethemiddle s weak thererefewpossibilitiesobe democratic. nd thefindings lso indicate hateconomic evelopmentoes not exertdirectimpactsndemocratictatusrathertworkshrough iddle lasstoexertindirectmpacts. hese indings ave ignificantmplicationsor he ole fmiddle lass n the emocratization.

IntroductionThis article serves several purposes. First, tmakes contributions o theextantdemocratizationliterature y exploringtherole ofmiddle classin democratic change. Second, this article focuses on the structural-level analysis ofthe role ofmiddle class in democracy. The structural-level analysis emphasizes the impact of the size (or the number) ofmiddle class in a society on democracy. The method of structuralequation modeling1 is employed to test the validity of the relationsbetween a country'ssize (or number) ofmiddle class and its level ofdemocracy.Like Charles Kurzman and Erin Leahey's (2004) article, thisresearch bridges the methodological gap by combining qualitative-historicaland quantitative approaches in studyingthe role of middle

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158 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGYclass in democratic transitions nd consolidations. However, it makesdifferences romKurzman and Leahey's article;this researchis basedon individual-level surveydata fromthe World Values Survey.Thus,in this research I am able to measure a country'smiddle class in amuch more substantive and theoreticalway. While Kurzman andLeahey's research measures a country'smiddle class by adding thesecond and the third highest quintiles of income distribution(Kurzman and Leahey, 2004: 963), this article discusses themeasurement of middle class substantively and employs thequalitative branch of objectivemeasurement to identifymiddle classacross countries in contemporaryworld. This article operationalizesmiddle class by combining three occupational groups: privateentrepreneurs of small-size business, managerial personnel, andprofessionals (including white-collarofficeworkers).Class, Middle Class, and DemocratizationThe relationshipbetween class and politics s a salienttopic in the fieldof political sociology (Lipset, 1981; Zipp, 1986; Alford, 1963). Theconventional wisdom of political sociologists holds that the classmakeup in a society has impacts on the polity.The earliest argumenton the relations between class and politycan be found in Aristotle'swritings. n this section,we will answer the criticalquestion: what istherelationshipbetween class and a democraticsystem?According to some, the bourgeoisie class may be a democraticforce Moore, 1966). Marx emphasized that thisclass was the leadingactor in establishing capitalist democracy; in contrast to thereactionary landed aristocracy. Moore (1966: 418) echoed Marx'sargument in noting that we may simply registerstrong agreementwith the Marxist thesis that a vigorous and independent class of towndwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth ofparliamentarydemocracy. No bourgeois, no democracy.As owners of large-size business, bourgeoisie has the interest nprotecting their properties and a less state intervention in theirmarket behaviors. They need the institutions of property andcontract,minimal governmentby law, a just and predictable judicialsystem, a well-functioning and independent market for business(Glassman, 1991; 1995; Moore, 1966; Rueschemeyer et. al., 1992).They believe that the rule of law will subject the state power to thelimits set by constitutional law, and theycan use the legal weaponsstipulated by constitutional law to protect their private propertiespolitically.



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MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURALLINKAGE 159On the other hand, we cannot overestimate the democraticimpulse of bourgeoisie, moreover, empirical studies have revealedthat bourgeoisie is a much less consistently driving force fordemocracy (e.g., Rueschemeyer et. al., 1992; O'Donnell, 1973; Collier,1999; Huber and Stephens, 1999). Bourgeoisie as a class has moreeconomic resources, wider social networks and more importantlyinformal stablished clientelist ies with the state power to secure theprotection of its private properties (Rueschemeyer et. al., 1992;O'Donnell, 1973; Collier, 1999) and thus it does not necessitate

democracy.Working class may work as a democratic force (e.g.,Rueschemeyeret.al., 1992; Collier, 1999; Huber et al., 1997;Huber andStephens, 1999; Therborn,1977). Collier (1999) and Rueschemeyer et.al. (1992) documented the importance ofworkingclass in theprocessof democratization. They suggested that, [it] is a crucial hypothesisthat the relative size and the density of organization of the workingclass- of employed manual labor outside of agriculture are ofcriticalimportancefor the advance of democracy (Rueschemeyer et.al., 1992: 59).However, working class cannot work as a leading force fordemocracy,since it is in lack of material and organizational resourcesand attitudinal elf-motivations.As suggested by Rueschemeyeret. al.(1992 : 59), the workingclass was - contrary o socialist expectations- far too weak to achieve by itself democratic rights for thesubordinate classes. Ifthis was true of the countries ofearly capitalistdevelopment, it is an even more significantconsideration in theanalysis of the late developing countries of the Third World.Furthermore,working class is a much less consistentlydrivingforcefor democracy. Most of working class demands are focused onimmediate economic interest rather than long-term political interest(e.g., Lipset, 1981). The workingclass maybe more liberal or leftist neconomic issues, and it may favor more welfare state measure,higher wages, graduated income taxed, support of trade-unions,andso forth. However, when liberalism is defined in non-economicterms as support of civil liberties, ..- the correlation s reversed(Lipset, 1981: 92). Moreover, working class may work as an anti-democratic force. As Lipset (1981) suggests that, working class iseasily influenced by extreme ideology and has authoritarianorientations hat are incompatiblewith democracy bynature (also seeLuebbert, 1991).



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160 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGYMiddle class is identified as the consistentlydriving class fordemocratization (e.g., Luebbert, 1991; Rueschemeyer et. al., 1992;Huntington,1991; Glassman, 1995; 1997; Huber and Stephens, 1999).This macro-level conviction about the role of the middle class isderived from the micro-level observations and analyses mainlyof theWestern societies, most of which suggest that middle-classindividuals think and act democraticallythat s, theyhave attitudes nsupport of democratic principles,and engage in actions (non-actions)forthe rise and /or maintenance ofa democraticsystemand against a

non-democratic system (e.g., Eulau, 1956a; 1956b; Nie et. al., 1969a;1969b; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Walsh et. al., 2004; Lipset, 1959; 1981;Glassman, 1995; 1997; Hsiao and Koo, 1997; So and Kwitko,1990).Unlike bourgeoisie, middle class is in lack of powerful politicalpatrons to protect its property interest,which makes middle classvulnerable to politics. Thus middle-class members have to rely onsuch democratic institutions as the popular election of leader, thelimitation of state power, the constitutionalprotectionof individualrights o protecttheirown rights nd properties against any powerfulintruders e.g., the governmentand its officials) Glassman, 1995 and1997).We make distinctionsbetween structural nd micro- evel analysisin the discussion of the relationship between middle class anddemocracy. The structural micro distinction is important for anyclass analysis. The micro-level class analysis defines a set of classlocations filled by individuals subjected to a set of mechanisms thatimpinge directlyon their lives as theymake choices and act in theworld. (Wright, 1997a: 44) On the other hand, the structural-levelclass analysis is meant to describe a crucial property of wholesocieties. (Wright,1997a: 44) Accordingly,the structuralperspectiveon the role of middle class in democracy focuses on the relationsbetween a country'snumber (or size) ofmiddle class and its level ofdemocracy (see, e.g., Lipset, 1981; Luebbert, 1991; Glassman, 1995);while the micro-level perspective answers the question whethermiddle class individuals think nd act democratically n a society see,e.g., Eulau, 1956a; 1956b; Nie, Powell and Prewitt, 1969a; 1969b;Walsh, Jennings nd Stoker,2004; Lipset, 1981).StructuralAnalysis of the Relationship Between Middle Class andDemocracyMacro-level analysts embark on the micro-level assumption thatmiddle-class individuals think nd act democratically, nd theyargue



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MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURALLINKAGE 161that the role of middle class in promotingdemocracy depends on itsrelativestrength n the class structure.Democracy only occurs wherethe middle class is large. Nonetheless, the middle class did not haveto be in the actual numericalmajority.Rather, t had to be numerousenough and prosperous enough to be in alliance with the poorerclasses, so as to counterbalance thepower of the rich- or, n a situationwherein the rich,few and weak, would join, rather than oppose, theestablishment of the legal democraticpolity (Glassman, 1991: 4).For example, American democracy occurred wherein the richwere relativelyweak, the poor easily absorbed into the middle class,and the middle class burningwith desire for democratic and lawfulgovernmentmade the heroic success possible ; while in England,where the gentrywere all-powerful,and in France, where the poorswelled to vast proportionsand could not gain upward mobility, ndwhere the feudal classes still held some power, the political ideas ofthe . middle classes could not become institutionalized. Glassman,1995: 158)Moreover, empirical studies found that middle class onlyconsistentlypushed for their own inclusion in the polity but theirattitudes toward full democracy which included the lower classeswere ambiguous (Rueschemeyer et. al., 1992; Huber and Stephens,1999; Huber et. al., 1997; Lipset, 1981). Middle class would push forfull democracy where they were confronted with intransigentdominant classes and had the option of allying with a sizeableworking class (Rueschemeyer et. al., 1992: 8). However, if middleclass is not numerous in a society, tmaynotsupportfulldemocracy atall, since middle class would not use itsrelativeadvantage ofstrengthtowin the control over the result of one person,one vote democracy.Middle class may feel threatenedby the lower class (i.e.,workers andpeasants) and believe that one person,one vote democracywill onlyallow workers and peasants to use their advantage of number tocontrolpolitics. If thathappens, middle class will feel vulnerable andthus support repressive state power (Rueschemeyer et. al., 1992;Huber and Stephens, 1999; Lipset, 1981). For example, Lipset (1981:132-133) observed that,where middle class shrunk and its relativeposition in a society declined, its liberal ideology the support ofindividual rights against large-scale power

-changed fromthat of arevolutionary lass to that of a reactionary lass and fascismwas theextremeexpression ofa shrinkingmiddle class.A middle class-dominantsocietytends to be less unequal in termsof the distribution f socioeconomic resources Muller,1988; 1995; Dahl,



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162 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGY1971). Without a preponderantmiddle class, a societybecomes moreunequal in the distribution f socioeconomic resources. The inequalitiesin the distributionof socioeconomic resources are equivalent to theinequalities in distributionof political resources. Thus, obviously acountrywith extreme inequalities in political resources stands a veryhighchance ofhavingextreme nequalities n the exercise ofpower,andhence a hegemonic regime (Dahl, 1971: 82). And extreme nequalitieswill generate resentments nd frustrationsamong the disadvantagedgroup,and resentments nd frustrations ill weaken theirallegiance totheregime.Such situation s not favorableto competitivepoliticsand topolyarchy (Dahl, 1971). Cross-national studies uncovered thatsocioeconomic inequality has a negative effect n democracy: it willeither reduce the likelihood of the inauguration of democracy incountriesunderauthoritarian egimeor cause a reductionofdemocracyin countries under democracy (Muller,1988; 1995).A middle class-dominant society may not necessarily entail theelimination of all substantive inequalities, however, in a middle class-dominant society,the most important ocioeconomic inequalities willbe based not on inherited ocial positionbut on education, occupation,and individual achievement. Hence, a middle class-dominant societypresents to have high social mobility.Consequently, middle-classsocieties featuring high social mobility are obviously betterenvironments for fostering iberal democracy than those riven bylongstanding class barriers. (Fukuyama, 1993: 101-102).In history,middle class in the Iberic-LatinWorld continued to beminor over a long developing period, and socioeconomic inequalityremained to be high, and government always met with intensepressure from a large poor population for more egalitarian policies.Meanwhile, widespread social grievances and radical politicalappeals, particularly among desperate peasants and unemployedworkers, cause much panic among the middle classes. The extremepopulist politics (i.e., Peronism) that appealed to the lower classesagainst the middle class and upper class ever was widely accepted inthe Iberic-Latin world for a long time (Lipset, 1981). Consequently,with the existence of threat of populist politics and deterioration ofsocioeconomic polarization and class antagonism, the middle classeschose to ally with the bourgeoisie and the military, nd theywerecontent with their own inclusion and supported a repressive statepower that was freefrom he nfluence of thepopulace toprotect heirwealth and properties (Huber and Stephens 1999; Rueschemeyer et.al., 1992; O'Donnell, 1973).



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MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURALLINKAGE 163Based on these discussions, we induce thefollowing hypothesis:Hypothesis 1: There s a positiverelation etween country'snumber(or size) ofmiddle lass and its probabilityfbeingdemocracy.Where hemiddle class is numerous nd strong, here re morepossibilities or thiscountry o be stabledemocracy.

Middle Class in ContemporaryWorldTo test the structuralrelationship between the relative strengthofmiddle class and democracy cross-nationally,we need to firstspecifywho is middle class? How do we develop a measurement of middleclass that s valid cross-nationally?In the debate on conceptualizing middle class, two dichotomousapproaches can be identified: the objectivist and the subjectivist(Campbell, et. al., 1960; Lipset, 1968; Kamieniecki and O'Brien, 1984;Mills, 1953; Kahl, 1957; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Ray, 1971; Walsh et.al., 2004). The subjective approach suggests that,because a socialclass is a psychological attachment that is part of an individual'soverall self-concept (Walsh et. al., 2004: 470), middle class isidentifiedbased on an individual's belief or perception thathe or shebelongs to the middle stratumof a certainsociety.The origin of subjective approach may be attributed back toAristotle. Aristotle thought of classes as subjective rather thanobjective entities. Membership in a class, according to his way ofthinking, s not determined by physical characteristicsof any kind,such as wealth or income,or at least notdefinitely eterminedbysuchcharacteristics.Members of themiddle class gain theirpositionthereinby thinkingof themselves as above the lower class and below theupper class (Eulau, 1956a: 236-237). According to subjectivists,middle class is a socially constructedattribute, he identificationwithmiddle class depends on an individual's awareness of class divisionsand the salience of these divisions and also his/her belonging tomiddle class (Hayes, 1995; Walsh et. al., 2004).The objectivists argue for the importance of such objectivesocioeconomic indicatorsas income,education, and occupation in theconceptualization of class structure see, e.g., Alford, 1962; Nie et. al.,1969a; 1969b; Verba and Nie, 1972; Kamieniecki and O'Brien, 1984;Sherkat and Blcjcker,1994; Wright,1978; 1985; 1997b; Burris, 1986;Glassman, 1995; Zipp, 1986). Within the objective approach, there aretwo conceptual branches. One branch emphasizes the quantitative,cumulative property of the objective indicators (e.g., Milbrath andGoel, 1977; Nie et. al., 1969a; 1969b;Verba and Nie, 1972; Kamieniecki



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164 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGYand O'Brien, 1984; Sherkat and Blocker, 1994). This branch, orquantitative branch, suggests that the best way to capture anindividual's class identification s to form a quantitative index ofincome, education, and occupation, and then to identify he personwith a social class according to the person's position in the overallscale of the ndex. As a result, he middle class usually consists of thosewho are in the middle range of the scale.2The other branch, or qualitative branch, of the objectiveapproach stresses the qualitative propertyof the various objectiveindicators of social class (e.g., Wright,1978; 1985; 1997b; Burris, 1986;Glassman, 1995; Zipp, 1986). This branch argues that themiddle classis composed of those who possess a set of certain socioeconomicattributes, which qualitatively distinguish themselves from othersocial classes. As Oppenheimer (1985: 7) says, class is not aquantitativemeasurementalong some mathematicalcontinuum,but aqualitative measurement representinggroupings that are distinct ndseparate fromone another. These qualitative attributes re deriveddirectly from some key modern occupations in a society, such asprivate entrepreneursofsmall/medium firms,managerial personnel,and white-collarprofessionals.This articlewill not discuss and compare which measurement ismore valid in detail. Rather, t suggests here, it is possible to employthe qualitative branch of objective measurement to identifymiddleclass across countries in contemporaryworld. More in specific,thisarticle operationalizes middle class by combining threeoccupationalgroups: private entrepreneurs of small-size business, managerialpersonnel, and professionals (including white-collarofficeworkers).There are two theoretical ustificationsfor us to use occupation toidentifymiddle class.First, occupation is particularly suitable for cross-nationalcomparative research. Such a single index of occupation retains thekey elements of class in a disaggregated formwhich makes the cross-national measurementpossible; meanwhile, it s cross-nationallyvalidsince occupation does notchange quite differentlycross societies andcultures so it may guarantee that we measure the same thingwithregard to middle class (see, e.g.,Alford, 1962;Marsh and Kaase, 1979).Second, it is worthnoting that, an appropriate treasure ofsocialclass . depends entirely n thetheoreticalpurposes and assumptionsof a particular research problem (Alford, 1962: 417). Since thepurpose of this study, as mentioned earlier, is to examine thestructural relationbetween the relative strengthof middle class and



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MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURALLINKAGE 165democracy ratherthan the social stratificationtself, single index ofoccupation can probably be used as a convenient way of measuringmiddle class position (Alford,1962; Marsh and Kaase, 1979).Based on World Values Survey 1999-2001,we measure middleclass cross-nationally.The results are presented by Table 1. To mapfrom cross-country erspective,thecountries are displayed in Table1 by the percent of middle class in overall population, divided incolumns across different evels of economic development. We arraycountries in three columns: low economic development, mediymeconomic development, and high economic development. Economicdevelopment is measured by Gross Domestic Production (GDP) percapita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) at year 2000.3 Economicdevelopment is believed to bring about the emergence of a largepopulation of middle class in a society. As summarized by manyscholars, economic development will change the structureof socialstratification rom the pyramid-shaped one, in which the majorityofthe population is lower-class, to a diamond shape, in which themajorityofthepopulation is middle-class (see, e.g., Muller, 1995; Nieet. al., 1969a; Lipset, 1981).Table 1 illustrates the intimate relations between the level ofeconomic development and the size of middle class in a countryclearly. In those low economic development countries,the percentofmiddle class in overall population is less than 28 per cent. On average,in those underdeveloped societies, around 19 per cent of theirpopulations belong to middle class. In most of the high economicdevelopment countries, the per cent of middle class in overallpopulation is no less than30,with half ofhigheconomic developmentcountrieshaving more than 40 per cent of middle class in theiroverallpopulation. On average, in thehighlydeveloped societies,around 42per cent of theirpopulations belong to middle class. In the mediumeconomic development countries, the percent of middle class inoverall population oftenfalls into the range between 20 and 30. Onaverage, in those moderatelydeveloped societies, around 26 per centof their populations belong to middle class. Overall, the bivariatecorrelation between economic development and the size of middleclass generates a prettyhigh value of .832/ supporting the intimaterelations between economic development and middle class-society.Model SpecificationsThis study uses Freedom House Scale to measure the level ofdemocracy in contemporaryworld. Freedom House Scale is a 7-point



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166 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGYTable 1Middle ClassbyEconomic evelopmentLowDevelopment Mediumevelopment HighDevelopmentAlbania .22 Bosnia-Herzegovina .28 Argentina .38Bangladesh .19 Bulgaria .28 Austria .48China .13 Chile .26 Belgium .54Egypt .22 Iran .20 Canada .47India .25 Latvia .23 CzechRepublic .40Jordan .19 Lithuania .33 Denmark .47Morocco .19 Macedonia .26 Estonia .45

Nigeria .15 Mexico .22 Finland .32Pakistan .21 Poland .30 France .53Peru .28 Romania .24 Germany .45Vietnam .19 Russia .34 Greece .40Zimbabwe .11 SouthAfrica .28 Hungary .33Turkey .17 Iceland .42Venezuela .24 Ireland .34Italy .37Japan .52Korea, outh .47Netherlands .37Portugal .26Singapore .49Slovakia .33Slovenia .36Spain .26Sweden .43UnitedKingdom .33United tates j63Note: earson = 0.832Lowdevelopment: DP per apitaPPP)of4999$ or ess;Mediumdevelopment:GDPper apitaPPP)of 000 to9999 ;Highdevelopment:DPper apitaPPP)of10000 or more.(1-7) ordinal scale constructedfrom wo subscales: PoliticalRightsandCivil Liberties, with a rating of 1 indicating the highest degree offreedom and 7 the least amount of freedom. Political Rights is a 7-point scale (1-7) evaluated from three subcategories of 10 politicalrights questions: electoral process, political pluralism andparticipation, and functioningof government.Civil Liberties is a 7-point scale (1-7) based on four subcategories of 15 civil libertiesquestions: freedom of expression and belief, associational andorganizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy andindividual rights. Each of 10 political rights questions and 15 civilliberties questions are evaluated on a scale of 0 to 4, where 0 pointrepresents the smallest degree and 4 points the greatest degree ofrightsor liberties.Thus, 10 political rightsquestions form n additive



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MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURALLINKAGE 167index from 0 to 40, and 15 civil libertiesquestions form an additiveindex from 0 to 60. The additive indexes forpolitical rightsand civilliberties are furtherrated into a 7-point scale.5 The 7-point scalePolitical Rights and Civil Liberties are averaged to forma 7-pointFreedom Scale foreach country.For Political Rights,a ratingof 1 suggests the existence of a freeand fair election, competitive parties or other political groups,competitive political participation, and a responsive government;while a ratingof 7 suggests the absence of political rightsdue to anextreme oppression. For Civil Liberties, a rating of 1 suggests theexistence of freedom of expression, assembly, association, education,and religion, n equitable systemof rule of aw, free conomic activity,and equality of opportunity; while a rating of 7 suggests thewidespread fear ofrepressionwith no freedom at all.In this article,the Freedom Scale is rated into threecategories offreedom statuses: Free, Partly Free and Not Free. Those countrieswhose Freedom Scale from1 to 2.5 are considered as Free, 3 to 5 asPartlyFree, and 5.5 to 7 as Not Free.6We believe that the designationofFree, PartlyFree and Not Free is criticallyuseful in measuring thelevel of democracy in contemporaryworld. This study distinguishestwo types of definition of democracy: liberal democracy andprocedural democracy (see, e.g., Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1991;O'Donnell, 1997; Diamond, 1996). It is Joseph Schumpeter who firstformulatedtheconcept ofprocedural democracy in his path-breakingwork, Capitalism, ocialism, nd Democracy.According to Schumpeter(1947: 269), democracy is a polity that institutional rrangementforarrivingat political decisions in which individuals acquire thepowerto decide by means of a competitive struggleforthe people's vote.Recent followers of such procedural definitionof democracy includeHuntington 1991) and O'Donnel (1997). And these literatures uggestthat, there are four key components of procedural democracy:regularly free and contested election, universal adult suffrage, acompetitive,multi-partypolitical system, and elected officialswhoare responsive to the electorates.7Liberal democracy, compared toelectoraldemocracy,has one more importantfeature: hepresence of asubstantial array of civil liberties, which including freedom ofexpression,associational autonomy,and an equitable systemof rule oflaw (Diamond, 1996; Dahl, 1971).The Free Status in theFreedom House surveyis the best empiricalindicator of liberal democracy. By contrast, those partly freecountries qualify only as electoral, but not liberal democracies. The



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168 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGYgap between electoral democracy and liberal democracy has becomeone of themost striking eaturesof new democracies (Diamond, 1996).If adopting the definition of electoral democracy, the percent ofdemocratic countries in contemporaryworld is rising; on the otherhand, if adopting the definition of liberal democracy, the percent ofdemocratic countries is declining (Diamond, 1996). Those Not Freecountriesqualify as nor electoral,neither iberal democracies.Table 2 shows the intimaterelations between the size of middleclass and freedom status. In those no free countries which are not

Table 2MiddleClassbyFreedom tatusFree ountry Partlyree ountry NotFree ountryArgentina .38 Albania .22 China .13Austria .48 Bangladesh .19 Egypt .22Belgium .54 Bosnia-Herzegovina .28 Iran .20Bulgaria .28 Jordan .19 Pakistan .21Canada .47 Macedonia .26 Vietnam .19Chile .26 Morocco .19 Zimbabwe .11CzechRepublic .40 Nigeria .15Denmark .47 Russia .34Estonia .45 Singapore .49Finland .32 Turkey .17France .53 Venezuela .24Germany .45Greece .40Hungary .33Iceland .42India .25Ireland .34Italy .37Japan .52Korea, outh .47Latvia .23Lithuania .33Mexico .22Netherlands .37Peru .28Poland .30Portugal .26Romania .24Slovakia .33Slovenia .33SouthAfrica .28Spain .26Sweden .43UnitedKingdom .33United tates .63



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MIDDLE CLASSAND DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURALLINKAGE 169electoral neither iberal democracies, the per cent of middle class inoverall population is less than22 percent.On average, in those no freecountries,around 18 per cent of theirpopulations belong to middleclass. In most of the freecountries,which are liberal democracies, thepercent of middle class in overall population is no less than 30. Onaverage, in the freecountries,around 37 per centof theirpopulationsbelong to middle class. In thepartlyfreecountries,which qualify onlyas electoral democracies, the average per cent of middle class inoverall population is around 25.

To test the structuralrelationships between the size of middleclass and freedom statussubstantively,we conducted a recursivepathanalysis. In order to assess whether a country'snumber (or size) ofmiddle class independently influences freedom status, we includedsome control variables: population size, British olony, adult literacy,Christianculture,and subjective support ofdemocracy.Christianculture:Cross-national quantitative studies have foundthat Christian countries are more likely to be democratic thancountries with other religious cultures (Bollen and Jackman, 1985;Kurzman and Leahey, 2004). First,Christiantheologies facilitatedthecultivation of democratic values of equality and liberty.Christianculture provides democracy with a systemof beliefs that integratesits concerns for liberty and responsibility, individuality andcommunity. (Witte,1993: 12) Second, Christian churches as one ofimportant and powerful force of civic organizations in a countryhave served as benevolent agents of welfare and catalysts ofpolitical development (Witte, 1993). This variable is measured by acountry'sdominant religion thatwas Christian in 2000 fromNationMaster.8Literacy: Empirical studies in the democracy literature havesuggested that the bettereducated the population of a country,thebetter the chances for democracy, for example, those democraticEuropean countries are almost entirely iterate:the lowest has a rateof 96 per cent,while the 'less democratic' nations have an averageliteracy rate of 85 per cent. (Lipset, 1959: 78) The theoreticaljustification orthisargument s as follows:First, ducation will makepeople good citizens. Educated people are more politically tolerant,and less susceptible to extremist deologies (Lipset, 1959 and 1981).Second, education will make people more efficacious. Educatedpeople are more likelyto consider themselves capable of influencingthe government,to have political discussions, to interest n politics,which, in turn, heywill demand more institutionalized nd inclusive



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170 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGYpolitical participation and feelready to participate in it (Almond andVerba, 1963). In thisarticle,a country's iterary ate is drawn fromtheHuman Development Report (2002). The literacyrate is defined asthe percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, withunderstanding,both read and write a shortsimple statementrelatedto theireveryday life (Human Development Report,2002).Population: Empirical studies in the democracy literature haveindicated that a country's population size may have impacts on therise and stabilityofdemocracy (Kurzman and Leahey, 2004). There isa long historyofpolitical thoughtsthat a well-functioning emocracyhas to be small. According toMontesquieu, it is the natural propertyof small states to be governed as republics, of middling ones to begoverned by monarchs, and of large empires to be ruled by despots(Dahl and Tufte, 1973: 7). The theoretical justification for thisargument is as follows: first, small democracies provide moreopportunity for citizens to participate effectively in decisions ;second, in small democracies, leaders are likely to be moreresponsive to citizen views ; and third, small democracies are morelikelyto generate loyaltyto a single integratedcommunity see, Dahland Tufte, 1973: 13-16). This variable is drawn from the HumanDevelopment Report (2002).BritishColony: Empirical studies in the democracy literaturehavesuggested that former verseas colonies with a British olonial historyshould facilitatethe rise and stabilityof democracy (Bernhard andReenock, 2004: 235). First, the presence of British colonialismprevented the dominant classes fromusing the state apparatus torepress the emerging organizations of subordinate classes, rather, tallowed forthegradual emergenceof a stronger ivil society, apableof sustaining democracy afterindependence (Rueschemeyer et. al.,1992: 9). Second, unlike other colonial powers who lefttheirformercolonies ill prepared for democratic governance, Britain reacted tocolonial discontentby gradually introducing eforms hatincorporateda morerepresentative orm frule,whichaided thetransition o a moredemocratic formofgovernment Bollen and Jackman, 985: 445). Thisvariable is a measure of British colonial experiences forthose statesthat became independent in the years after the Second World War(Bollen and Jackman,1985: 444). In thisstudy,those countries with aBritishcolonial experience include: Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Jordan,Nigeria,Pakistan,Singapore, SouthAfrica, nd Zimbabwe.Subjective Support of Democracy: There is general consensusamong democracy theorists hat a set ofpro-democraticvalues held at



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MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURAL LINKAGE 171the individual level is conducive to the installation and consolidationofdemocracy (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993; Inglehart,1990; Gibson et al., 1992). Among those democraticvalues, the overallsupport of norms of democracy is the most importantone (Gibson etal., 1992; Norris, 1999). This article measures the level of support ofnorms ofdemocracy among people in a countrybased on the surveyquestion democracy may have problemsbut it's better hanany otherform of government. This survey question captures respondents'evaluative support ofnormsofdemocracy and theadvantage ofusingthe evaluative support of norms ofdemocracy in measurement is thatits focus is on broad features of democratic governance, and notshort-termudgments about specific governments (Dalton and Shin,2004). The level of support of norms of democracy in differentcountries is measured by the percent of those who choose agreestrongly and agree with the statement thatdemocracy may haveproblemsbut it's better hanany other formofgovernment.The resultis presented in Table 3. Western scholarship suggested that middle-class individuals think and act democratically (see, e.g., Eulau, 1956aand 1956b;Nie et. al., 1969a; 1969b;Milbrathand Goel, 1977;Walsh et.al., 2004; Lipset, 1959 and 1981; Glassman, 1995 and 1997), thus weexpect that the size of middle class in a country s positivelyrelatedwith the level of support of norms of democracy. The bivariatecorrelationbetween the level of support of norms of democracy andthe size of middle class generatesa significant alue of 34,supportingthe intimate relations between a middle class societyand the level ofsupport of norms ofdemocracy.Moreover, it is our intention o argue in this articlethat economicdevelopment does not have direct mpacts on a county's probabilityofbeing stable democracy, while economic development may workthrough the size of middle class to influence a country's freedomstatus.With economic development, themiddle class as themain pro-democratic forceemerges and gains in size, which,in turn,works as acausal agent forthe establishmentofdemocracy (see, e.g, Lipset, 1959and 1981; Rueschemeyeret. al., 1992). Second, economic developmentchanges a country'ssocial structure rom hepyramid-shaped one to adiamond shape with the majorityof the population being middle-class. This structural hange temperstheintensity fa country'ssocialconflict by reducing the proportion of the lower class that issusceptible to anti-democratic nd extremistideologies and forcesandby increasing the proportion of the middle class that supports pro-democratic ideologies and forces,which, in turnwill facilitate herise



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172 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGYTable 3The Level ofSupport f Norms fDemocracyyFreedom tatusFree ountry Partlyree ountry NotFree ountry

Argentina .91 Albania .95 China .90Austria .97 Bangladesh .98 Egypt .98Belgium .92 Bosnia-Herzegovina .92 Iran .69Bulgaria .84 Jordan .89 Pakistan .82Canada .87 Macedonia .81 Vietnam .72Chile .82 Morocco .96 Zimbabwe .88CzechRepublic .93 Nigeria .45Denmark .99 Russia .63Estonia .90 Singapore NAFinland .91 Turkey .88France .94 Venezuela .93Germany .97Greece .97Hungary .81Iceland .97India .92Ireland .92Italy .94Japan .92Korea, outh .91Latvia .89Lithuania .88Mexico .80Netherlands .96Peru .89Poland .90Portugal .93Romania .78Slovakia .84Slovenia .90SouthAfrica .84Spain .93Sweden .94UnitedKingdom .78United tates .88and stability fdemocracy (see, e.g.,Muller, 1995; Lipset, 1981). Basedon such discussion, we induce thefollowinghypothesis:Hypothesis 2: Economicdevelopmentwill be indirectly elatedto acountry's reedomtatusthroughhanging country's ocialstructurefromthepyramid-shapedne withthemajority f ower class to a middle lass-dominantsociety.



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MIDDLE CLASSAND DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURALLINKAGE 173Findings and DiscussionsFigure 1 displays the recursive path model of a country's freedomstatus. First,we test the hypothesized structural elationshipbetweenthesize of middle class and freedom tatus. As Figure1 shows, the sizeof middle class has a negativeand significant irect ffectbeta = - 0.35)on freedom tatus, ndicatingthat:where hemiddle lass is numerousndstrongtheres more ossibilitiesorthis ountryobe stabledemocracy; hilewhere hemiddle sweak there refewpossibilitieso bedemocracy.

Figure :Recursive athModelofFreedom tatus

Note:p < .05; *p < .01.Chi-square=0.47, f= 5,CFI= 0.91,FI= 0.92, hi-square/dfatio 2.03.1. Freedomtatuss measuredn 3-pointndex: ree 1,Partlyree 2,NotFree 3.2. Britisholonysmeasuredna dichotomouscale:Britisholony 1,NotBritishColony 0.3. Populations measurednmillions.4. Christians measuredna dichotomouscale:Mainly hristianociety 1,NotChristianociety 0.

Second, we testthe hypothesized relationshipbetween economicdevelopment and the per cent of middle class in overall population.As Figure 1 shows, economic development has a positive andextremely ignificant irecteffectbeta = 0.83) on thenumber (or size)ofmiddle class in a society, ndicatingthatwhere national economy ishighly developed, there is more probability of the emergence of amiddle class-society;butwhere national economy is underdeveloped,there is more probabilityof being a pyramid-shaped society with amajorityof lower class in overall population. The direct effectsof



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174 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGYeconomic development on the number (or size) of middle class in asocietyexplain 69 percentof the variance in the variable.Third, we test the hypothesis that the relationship btweeneconomic development and freedomstatuscan work throughthe sizeof middle class. As Figure 1 shows, the direct effect of economicdevelopment on freedom is not significant. But, economicdevelopment has the indirect effecton freedomstatus, that is - 0.29(beta = -0.83 x 0.35 = - 0.29), indicatingthatwhere national economy ismore developed, it tends to launch electoral and liberal democracies.This finding confirms our hypothesized causal path betweeneconomic development and freedom status: the more developed is acountry's economy, the more likely t has a large population ofmiddleclass, which, in turn, eads to a liberal democracy.Finally, even when the control variables were taken intoconsideration, the causal path from the number (or size) of middleclass in a society to freedomstatus stillfunctionsindependently. Thestandardized coefficient beta) between middle class and freedomstatus is significant t 0.05 level. Figure 1 shows thatpopulation size,British olony, and the level ofsupport ofnorms ofdemocracy do notexertdirect mpacts on freedomstatus.Christianitybeta = - 0.46) hassignificantdirect effects n freedomstatus at 0.01 level. This findingindicates thatwhere Christian culture is prevailing in a society,it ismore likelyto launch electoral and liberal democracies. Figure 1 alsoshows that the size of middle class in a countryhas significantdirecteffectson the level of norms of support of democracy (beta = 0.34).Such finding ndicates thatwhere hemiddle lass is numerous nd strong,there re morepossibilitiesorthepeople n thiscountryosupportnormsofdemocracy.Overall, this recursive path model explains 55% of thevariance in the freedomstatus.ConclusionBy employing the method of structuralequation modeling, we havefound that there is a strong positive relation between the size ofmiddle class and democratic status. And we also found thateconomicdevelopment does not exert direct impacts on democratic status,rather it works throughmiddle class to exert indirectimpacts. Thisfindingsuggests thatwith economic development, middle class as aconsistentlypro-democraticforcegains size, which is a favorablepre-condition for the installation of a democratic system and theconsolidation of such political system. Since the findings presentedabove are based on a cross-sectional analysis, we do realize the



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MIDDLE CLASSAND DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURALLINKAGE 175shortcomings of this analysis. And we are cautious about makingdirect causal inferencesfromthis cross-sectional data. Nonetheless,we do believe that the findingsfromthisstudy and their mplicationscan contribute o our understandingof the centralquestion about therole of middle class in democracy. Here we highlightthese findingsand implications.First,we have found that the size of middle-class objectivelydefined by occupation is significantlyassociated with democraticstatus. These findingsapparently suggest that the objective indicatorof middle class is applicable to our understanding of democratictransitionand development. Second, that where the middle class isnumerous and strong,there are more possibilities forthis countrytobe stable democracy; while where the middle is weak, thereare fewpossibilities to be democracy. If such findings about the role ofmiddle-class in democracy presented above can be repeated in futurestudies based on a time-series nalysis or on broader country amplesor some in-depthcase studies, then it can be more assertivelyarguedthatthe middle class is theharbingerofdemocratization.ReferencesAlford, . 1962),ASuggestedndex f heAssociationf ocialClassandVoting.PublicOpinionQuarterly6: 417-425. (1963), artyndSociety. hicago:RandMcNally.Almond,G., and Verba,S. (1963),The CivicCulture: oliticalAttitudesndDemocracynFiveNations. rinceton:rincetonniversityress.Bernhard, ., ndReenock,. 2004), heLegacy fWestern verseas olonialismonDemocraticurvival.nternationaltudies uarterly8: 225-250.Bollen,. A., and Jackman, .W. (1985),PoliticalDemocracy nd theSizeDistributionf ncome.Americanociologicaleview0:438-457.Burris, . (1986), heDiscoveryftheNewMiddleClass.TheoryndSociety5(3):317-349.Byrne, . M. (2001), tructuralquationModelingWithAMOS:BasicConcepts,Applications,ndProgramming.ahwah,NewJersey:awrence rlbaumAssociates,ublishers.Campbell, .,Converse, .E.,Miller,W.E., ndStokes, . E. I960),TheAmericanVoter.New York:JohnWiley& Sons, nc.Collier, . B. (1999), athsTowardDemocracy:heWorking lassandElitesnWesternurope ndSouthAmerica. ambridge:ambridge niversityress.Dahl,R. A. (1971),Polyarchy:articipationnd Opposition.New Haven:YaleUniversityress.



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Middle Class and Democracy Structural Linkage Chunlong Lu Old Dominion University