MH Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company | GR No 1719 |

Jan 23, 1907

Facts:

Rakes is one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of

Atlantic. He was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the

harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila.

Rakes claims that a one-hand car was used to transport iron rails, a

claim which was refuted by Atlantic when it showed that there were

actually two one-hand cars immediately following one another. The

workers piled seven rails (560lbs/each) lengthwise. The ends of the

rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but it was

not secured at the sides, making it unguarded if it will slip off. The

men were either in the rear, sides or front of the car.

The accident occurred when, at a certain spot near the water's edge,

the track sagged, the tire broke, the car was upset and the rails slid off

and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg.

Issue: Whether or not the accident happened through the

negligence of the defendant

Held: Yes, the accident happened through the negligence of the

defendant. In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was

necessary to show a breach of duty on its part in failing either to

properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transporting it, or to

skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or

to vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as the depression

in it became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to repair

the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below

based his judgment.

Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults

or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of

Chapter 11 of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:

A person who by an act or omission causes damage to

another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to

repair the damage so done.

SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article

is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions,

but also for those of the persons for whom they should be

responsible.

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are

equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in

the service of the branches in which the latter may be

employed or in the performance of their duties.

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the

persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the

diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damages.

As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be

sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the

employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances

for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one "not punished by the

law " and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the

answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any

conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes,

such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these

articles of effect, would shut out litigants their will from the civil

courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the

selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render

recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in

criminal actions.

Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it

is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person

criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to

the enforcement of the civil right.

His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of

employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage.

while that to that injured bystander would originate in the negligent

act itself.

We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or

negligence, may be understood in two difference senses;

either as culpa, substantive and independent, which on

account of its origin arises in an obligation between two

persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as

an incident in the performance of an obligation; or as

already existed, which can not be presumed to exist without

the other, and which increases the liability arising from the

already exiting obligation.

Of these two species of culpa the first one mentioned,

existing by itself, may be also considered as a real source of

an independent obligation, and it is logical to presume that

the reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto

and that it does not extend to those provisions relating to

the other species of culpa. -Manresa

Manresa says that these two species of negligence may be somewhat

inexactly described as contractual and extra-contractual, the letter

being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman law and not entailing so strict

an obligation as the former.

This contractual obligation, implied from the relation and perhaps so

inherent in its nature to be invariable by the parties, binds the

employer to provide safe appliances for the use of the employee, thus

closely corresponding to English and American Law. On these

principles it was the duty of the defendant to build and to maintain its

track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen

from unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one respect or the other it

failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not have occurred;

consequently the negligence of the defendant is established.

Whether or not the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk

incident to his employment and, as such, one assumed by him

No, it is not. The occurrence was due to the failure to repair the track

or to duly inspect, it for the employee is not presumed to have

stipulated that the employer might neglect his legal duty. Nor may it

be excused upon the ground that the negligence leading to the

accident was that of a fellow-servant of the injured man. It is not

apparent to us that the intervention of a third person can relieve the

defendant from the performance of its duty nor impose upon the

plaintiff the consequences of an act or omission not his own. Sua

cuique culpa nocet. This doctrine, known as "the fellow-servant,

rule," we are not disposed to introduce into our jurisprudence.

Adopted in England by Lord Abinger in the case of Prescott vs.

Fowler in 1837, it has since been effectually abrogated by "the

Employers' Liability Acts" and the "Compensation Law." The

American States which applied it appear to be gradually getting rid of

it; for instance, the New York State legislature of 1906 did away with

it in respect to railroad companies, and had in hand a scheme for its

total abolition. It has never found place in the civil law of continental

Europe.

What are the extent of plaintiff's negligence and the legal effect

that should be given to it

Two particulars of plaintiff's carelessness:

First. That having noticed the depression in the track he

continued his work; and

Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of

the car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.

As to the first point, the depression in the track night indicate either a

serious or a rival difficulty. There is nothing in the evidence to show

that the plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath the

sleeper. The claim that he must have done so is a conclusion drawn

from what is assumed to have been a probable condition of things not

before us, rather than a fair inference from the testimony. While the

method of construction may have been known to the men who had

helped build the road, it was otherwise with the plaintiff who had

worked at this job less than two days. A man may easily walk along a

railway without perceiving a displacement of the underlying timbers.

The foreman testified that he knew the state of the track on the day of

the accident and that it was then in good condition, and one Danridge,

a witness for the defendant, working on the same job, swore that he

never noticed the depression in the track and never saw any bad place

in it. The sagging of the track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was

reported in his hearing to the foreman who neither promised nor

refused to repair it. His lack of caution in continuing at his work after

noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature

as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe

American rule. On this point we accept the conclusion of the trial

judge who found as facts that "the plaintiff did not know the cause of

the one rail being lower than then other" and "it does not appear in

this case that the plaintiff knew before the accident occurred that the

stringers and rails joined in the same place."

In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the

judgment below is not so specific. While the judge remarks that the

evidence does not justify the finding that the car was pulled by means

of a rope attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further

that the circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons

necessary to operate the car could not walk upon the plank between

the rails and that, therefore, it was necessary for the employees

moving it to get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific

finding upon the instruction given by the defendant to its employees

to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the necessity of the plaintiff

putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to get hold upon the

car. Therefore the findings of the judge below leave the conduct of

the plaintiff in walking along the side of the loaded car, upon the

open ties, over the depressed track, free to our inquiry.

While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they

not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by

the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of

the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently

made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car,

and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the

starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think

that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the

extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so,

the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger

contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not

as its primary cause. This conclusion presents sharply the question,

What effect is to be given such an act of contributory negligence?

Does it defeat a recovery, according to the American rule, or is it to

be taken only in reduction of damages?

Doctrine of comparative negligence: "allowing a recovery by a

plaintiff whose own act contributed to his injury, provided his

negligence was slight as compared with that of the defendant, and

some others have accepted the theory of proportional damages,

reducing the award to a plaintiff in proportion to his responsibility for

the accident, yet the overwhelming weight of adjudication establishes

the principle in American jurisprudence that any negligence, however

slight, on the part of the person injured which is one of the causes

proximately contributing to his injury, bars his recovery."

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the

injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.

The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the

injury, between the event itself, without which there could have

been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,

independent of it, but contributing under review was the

displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this

produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the

shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event,

the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not

contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to

himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly

thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of

the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would

have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal

occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover.

Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his

own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible

for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable

equivalent for his own imprudence.

Amado Picart vs. Frank Smith | GR No L-12219 | Mar. 15, 1918

Facts:

Picart seeks to recover from Smith P31,000 as damages, alleged to

have been caused by an automobile driven by Smith. The CFI-La

Union absolved Smith from the liability, and Picart has appealed.

Picart was riding his pony over the Carlatan Bridge at San Fernando,

La Union. Before he had gotten halfway across, Smith approached

from the opposite direction riding an automobile, going at the rate of

10-12 mph. Smith beeped his horn when he saw the horseman to

warn him of the approach, and after he was on the bridge he gave

more blasts as the man on horseback was not observing the rules of

the road.

Picart apparently saw the automobile and heard the beeps, but due to

distress he pulled the pony up against the right-side railings, instead

of going to the left, reasoning that he thought that he did not have

enough time to get over the other side. When Smith approached, he

guided his car over to the left (his correct lane), assuming that Picart

would move to the other side. He continued on without slowing

down, but veered to the right to prevent hitting the horse. The close

proximity of the car unsettled the pony, which turned its body across

the bridge with its head down the railing. It struck on the hock of the

left hind leg by the flange of the car, breaking the horse's limb and

throwing both the horse and Picart violently. The horse died, and

Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness

and required medical attention for several days.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant Smith, in maneuvering his

car in the manner above-described, was guilty of negligence such

as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

Held: Yes, he is liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he

had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to

the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it

was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he

must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to

cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of

things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet

some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within

the power of Picart to escape being run down by going to a place of

greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to

the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an

immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the

bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the

horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the

defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was,

we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not

yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there

was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was

unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and jump under

the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant

exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion,

negligent in the eye of the law.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a

particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing

the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same

situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law considers

what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of

ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the

existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be

negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would

have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently

probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its

consequences. Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in

the present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A

prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our

opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was

fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the

horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under

these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to

guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from

fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself

on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the

defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is

to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It

will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not

contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded

the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these

circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance

to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the

consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other

party.

From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower

court must be reversed, and judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff

recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with

costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to

include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the

loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful

interest on the whole to the date of this recovery.

Sps. Bernabe Africa and Soledad Africa, Heirs of Dominga Ong

vs. Caltex Phil, Mateo Boquiren and CA | GR No L-12986 | Mar

31, 1966

Facts:

This is an action for damages under Art. 1902-1903 of the Civil

Code.

On the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex

station at the corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. The

fire started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the

underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where

the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread and burned

several neighboring houses. The petitioners were among the owners

of the houses, and sued Caltex and Mateo Boquiren (owner of the

station and agent in charge of operation), due to negligence which

caused the fire.

RTC and CA found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence,

and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with

respect to the supervision of their employees.

Issue: Whether the certain reports on the fire prepared by the

Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain

Tinio of the AFP are admissible

Held: The reports on the subject were ruled out as double hearsay by

the CA, which was assailed as an error. The petitioners contend that

the reports were admitted by the RTC without respondents' objection.

Regarding the police report, signed by Detective Zapanta, allegedly

for Salvador Capacillo, the latter was presented as witness but

respondents waived their right to cross-examine him despite

opportunity to do so. Thirdly, said reports are admissible as an

exception to the hearsay rule under Sec. 35 of Rule 130.

The first contention is not borne out by the record, which shows that

only part of the reports in question were admitted without ojection.

Second, Detective Capacillo did take the witness stand but only

testified that he was one of those who investigated the location of the

fire and gather witnesses. There was nothing to cross-examine him

upon.

Petitioners maintain that the reports in themselves, that is, without

further testimonial evidence on their contents, fall within the scope of

section 35, Rule 123, which provides that "entries in official records

made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the

Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially

enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."

There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just

mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by

another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was

made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by

such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by

law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient

knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired

by him personally or through official information. Of the three

requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here.

Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and

circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of

the officers who conducted the investigation. To qualify their

statements as "official information" acquired by the officers who

prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only

must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the

duty to give such statements for record; thus, it cannot be an

exception to the hearsay rule.

Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of

the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply, so as to

presume negligence on the part of respondents.

Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to apply the

doctrine in the instant case on the grounds that "as to (its)

applicability ... in the Philippines, there seems to he nothing definite,"

and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate

cases, "in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such

doctrine." The question deserves more than such summary dismissal.

The doctrine has actually been applied in this jurisdiction, in the case

of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. (CA-G.R. No.

3240-R, September 20, 1949),

"The first point is directed against the sufficiency of

plaintiff's evidence to place appellant on its defense. While

it is the rule, as contended by the appellant, that in case of

noncontractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden

of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the proximate

cause of his injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is

also a recognized principal that "where the thing which

caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under

the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such

as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he

having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable

evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury

arose from defendant's want of care."

And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish

that he has observed due care and diligence. This rule is

known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction

speaks for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case at

bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every

right to be on the highway, and the electric wire was under

the sole control of defendant company. In the ordinary

course of events, electric wires do not part suddenly in fair

weather and injure people, unless they are subjected to

unusual strain and stress or there are defects in their

installation, maintenance and supervision; just as barrels do

not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure

passersby, unless someone was negligent. Consequently, in

the absence of contributory negligence (which is admittedly

not present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise

a reasonable presumption of negligence in its installation,

care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief

Baron Pollock, "if there are any facts inconsistent with

negligence, it is for the defendant to prove."

It is true of course that decisions of the Court of Appeals do not lay

down doctrines binding on the Supreme Court, but we do not

consider this a reason for not applying the particular doctrine of res

ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a highly combustible

material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken.

On the other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it

arises almost invariably from some act of man. A case strikingly

similar to the one before Us is Jones vs. Shell Petroleum Corporation:

Plaintiff's petition contains two distinct charges of

negligence — one relating to the cause of the fire and the

other relating to the spreading of the gasoline about the

filling station.

Taking up plaintiff's charge of negligence relating to the

cause of the fire, we find it established by the record that

the filling station and the tank truck were under the control

of the defendant and operated by its agents or employees.

We further find from the uncontradicted testimony of

plaintiff's witnesses that fire started in the underground

tank attached to the filling station while it was being filled

from the tank truck and while both the tank and the truck

were in charge of and being operated by the agents or

employees of the defendant, extended to the hose and tank

truck, and was communicated from the burning hose, tank

truck, and escaping gasoline to the building owned by the

plaintiff.

Predicated on these circumstances and the further

circumstance of defendant's failure to explain the cause of

the fire or to show its lack of knowledge of the cause,

plaintiff has evoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is

shown to be under the management of defendant or his

servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course

of things does not happen if those who have its

management or control use proper care, it affords

reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by

defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal

force here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment

and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire occurred

therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons

who knew or could have known how the fire started were

respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation

thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the

incident happened because of want of care.

The foregoing report by Leoncio Mariano, having been submitted by

a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his

own personal observation of the facts reported, may properly be

considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts,

descriptive of the location and objective circumstances surrounding

the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the

presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,

since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution

than those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under

ordinary circumstances. There is no more eloquent demonstration of

this than the statement of Leandro Flores before the police

investigator. Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who,

alone and without assistance, was transferring the contents thereof

into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He said:

"Before loading the underground tank there were no people, but

while the loading was going on, there were people who went to drink

coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about a meter from the

hole leading to the underground tank." He added that when the tank

was almost filled he went to the tank truck to close the valve, and

while he had his back turned to the "manhole" he, heard someone

shout "fire." Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the

neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the

part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall

high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it was the

concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it

consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably

crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendants'

negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the

fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring

houses.

There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer

to the second amended complaint that "the fire was caused through

the acts of a stranger who, without authority, or permission of

answering defendant, passed through the gasoline station and

negligently threw a lighted match in the premises." No evidence on

this point was adduced, but assuming the allegation to be true —

certainly any unfavorable inference from the admission may be taken

against Boquiren — it does not extenuate his negligence. "The

intention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to

relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such

negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent

cause in the resulting injury."

Issue: Whether Caltex should be held liable for the damages

caused to the appellants

Yes. Boquiren made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex; at

the time of the fire Caltex owned the gasoline station and all the

equipment therein; Caltex exercised control over Boquiren in the

management of the state; the delivery truck used in delivering

gasoline to the station had the name of CALTEX painted on it; and

the license to store gasoline at the station was in the name of Caltex,

which paid the license fees.

Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the

equipment therein, but claims that the business conducted at the

service station in question was owned and operated by Boquiren. But

Caltex did not present any contract with Boquiren that would reveal

the nature of their relationship at the time of the fire. There must have

been one in existence at that time. Instead, what was presented was a

license agreement manifestly tailored for purposes of this case, since

it was entered into shortly before the expiration of the one-year

period it was intended to operate. This so-called license agreement

was executed on November 29, 1948, but made effective as of

January 1, 1948 so as to cover the date of the fire, namely, March 18,

1948. This retroactivity provision is quite significant, and gives rise

to the conclusion that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from

any responsibility with respect to the fire, as shown by the clause that

Caltex "shall not be liable for any injury to person or property while

in the property herein licensed, it being understood and agreed that

LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an employee, representative or agent of

LICENSOR (Caltex)."

But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can

hardly be considered an independent contractor. Under that

agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of

P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the equipment therein. He

could sell only Caltex Products. Maintenance of the station and its

equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control, of

Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee

without the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed

to be from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter

until terminated by Caltex upon two days prior written notice. Caltex

could at any time cancel and terminate the agreement in case

Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not conduct the

business with due diligence, in the judgment of Caltex. Termination

of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to

Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the extent of the

control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter

was virtually an employee of the former.

Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his position

to the company and the latter could remove him or terminate his

services at will; that the service station belonged to the company and

bore its tradename and the operator sold only the products of the

company; that the equipment used by the operator belonged to the

company and were just loaned to the operator and the company took

charge of their repair and maintenance; that an employee of the

company supervised the operator and conducted periodic inspection

of the company's gasoline and service station; that the price of the

products sold by the operator was fixed by the company and not by

the operator; and that the receipts signed by the operator indicated

that he was a mere agent, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the

operator was an agent of the company and not an independent

contractor should not be disturbed.

Juan Bernardo vs. M.B. Legaspi | GR No 9308 | Dec. 23, 1914

Facts:

This is an appeal from the judgment of CFI-Manila, dismissing the

complaint on the merits in an action to recover damages for injuries

sustained by Bernardo's automobile by reason of Legaspi's

negligence in causing a collision between their vehicles. On the other

hand, Legaspi's cross-complaint, praying for damages against

Bernardo for the injuries sustained by his vehicle in the collision, was

dismissed as well.

The court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the

defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said

negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as

to prevent either from recovering.

Issue: Whether Legaspi is liable for damages caused to the

automobile as a result of the collision?

Held: No, he is not. Upon the facts, as they appear of record, the

judgment must be affirmed, as the evidence clearly supports the

decision of the trial court. The law applicable to the facts also

requires an affirmance of the judgment appealed from. Where the

plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes to

the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the

determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. This is equally true of

the defendant; and as both of them, by their negligent acts,

contributed to the determining cause of the accident, neither can

recover. Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide

on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is

found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent

and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining

causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for the damages

suffered.