Foreign Fishery Developments

Mexico Launches ExtensiveMarine Fisheries Research Program

The Mexican Secretariat of Fisheries(SEPESCA) has launched the most am­bitious fisheries research project in Mex­ican history. As a result of fishery devel­opment programs, especially the $1.3billion 1977-82 National Fisheries De­velopment Program carried out by theLopez Portillo Administration, Mexicohas added hundreds of new vessels, im­proved existing ports and built newones, and constructed many new can­neries and cold stores. Much of this hadbeen done without any detailed knowl­edge of the extent of the resources to beexploited. The new De la Madrid Ad­ministration was concerned about thedangers of making costly investments infisheries without first assessing stocks.As a result, SEPESCA launched a mas­sive research program, the ProgramaNacional de Prospeccion y Investigacionde los Recursos Pesqueros de la ZonaEconomica Exclusiva de Mexico(PNPIRPZEE).

The new program is without prece­dent in Mexican research, both becauseof its extent and the level of coordinationamong the scientific community, gov­ernment agencies, cooperatives, andprivate companies. The project is an im­portant part of the Government's goal todiversify the fishing industry so it willnot be dominated in the future by theshrimp trawl fishery, which was the casebefore 1976.

Some observers were concernedabout the ability of Mexico's scientificcommunity to plan and execute such amassive plan. The number of trainedoceanographers and fishery biologists inMexico has been limited and some be­lieve that this may limit the ability ofSEPESCA to carry out the program.Other observers in Mexico point out thatSEPESCA may have been better advisedto have conducted its major researchprogram before launching the 1977-

46(2)

82 development program. The newSEPESCA administration, however,cannot be criticized for the decisionsmade by the previous administration,and the new research program is one ofthe first major fishery programs initiatedby the De la Madrid Administration.

Resource Data Needed

SEPESCA officials have increasinglycome to the conclusion that the efficientoperation of the country's expandingcommercial fishing fleet is impaired bythe lack of data on the magnitude, loca­tion, and seasonal migrations of fisherystocks in Mexico's 200-mile ExclusiveEconomic Zone (EEZ). Mexico, likemany third-world countries attemptingto develop their fishing industries, hasencountered great difficulty in profitablylaunching fisheries for tropical species.In the Gulf of Mexico, especially, Mexi­can offshore waters are basically tropicalor semitropical and lack large, single­species schools that countries in themore temperate areas exploit soefficiently.

The warmer water supports a bewil­dering variety of species. Trawler

Table l.-Mexico's commercial fishing fleet, 1983.

Owner Vessel Species No. ofcategory type fished vessels

State companies 1 Various Various '300

Joint ventures Longliners Billfish' 16

Cooperatives Trawlers Shrimp 3,400

Private companies Seiners Anchovy' N/A'

Various Seiners6 Tuna 52

Private owners Various Various N/A

l"Productos Pesqueros Mexicanos" and "Industrias Pes­queras Paraestatales del Noroeste."'About 100 additional vessels are on order.'Striped marlin and other billfish are some of the mainspecies taken, but the catch does include some otherspecies.'Sardines are also taken in quantity.'N/A = Not available.'Includes some baitboats.

catches often include a staggering vari­ety of different fish species and sizes;this makes profitable commercial fishingmore difficult. SEPESCA has now de­cided that it is essential to acquire de­tailed data on exactly what resources areavailable so that the utilization can bebetter planned. SEPESCA has also in­creasingly come to realize that data isneeded on the complex relationship be­tween species. SEPESCA wants toevaluate the impact of fishing effort notonly on the stocks of target species, butalso on species taken incidentally andeven on species not taken, but which arein biological competition with targetspecies.

Vessels and Institutions

SEPESCA hopes to mobilize Mex­ico's scientific community for thisstudy. The most important source ofdataare the 15 research vessels operated bySEPESCA's research institute, the In­stituto Nacional de Pesca (INP). TheINP has three large research vessels (theR/ V Alejandro de Humboldt, the R/VAutonio Alzate, and the R/V Onjuku)and 12 small BIp 1 series vessels. TheINP has deployed nine of its vessels inthe Pacific and six in the Gulf of Mexicofor this study. SEPESCA also wants toutilize the Universidad Autonoma deMexico's (UNAM)2 two oceanographicvessels (the R/V Puma and R/V JustoSierra), as well as the Navy's twooceanographic vessels and an airplane.

SEPESCA also plans to use the com­mercial fishi ng fleet of over 3,700 ves­sels to obtain data (Table I). SEPESCAintends to compensate the commercialvessel owners for costs incurred duringtheir participation in the program.SEPESCA and INP officials are awarethat utilizing data from commercialfishermen raises various statistical prob­lems, and some are privately concernedabout it. SEPESCA has decided, how­ever, that involving the fishermen in thestudy may return benefits such as sub-

I BIP stands for "Buque Investigacion Pesqu­era" (Fishery Research Vessel). Six BIP vesselsare 74 feet long and have steel hulls; the other sixare 40 feet long and have fiberglass hulls.2 UNAM is Mexico's largest and most presti­gious university and has a marine sciences center,the Centro de Ciencias del Mar y Limnologia.

69

stantially expanding the scope of thestudy as well as giving the study a prac­tical orientation which may be of greatfuture value. SEPESCA is particularlyinterested in data on yields per unit ofeffort from vessels actually engaged inthe commercial fisheries being studied.About 380 SEPESCA officials will workon the commercial vessels, helping tocollect data.

Most data will be compiled by theINP's Mexico City headquarters and its30 regional centers. SEPESCA alsoplans to involve personnel from otherresearch centers besides the INP.Specialists from UNAM, the Univer­sidad Autonoma Metropolitana (UAM) ,the Instituto Politecnico Nacional, andthe Instituto Oceanografico de la Marinawill also be involved in the new researchprogram.

Focus

SEPESCA plans to concentrate onfive different fisheries: Small pelagics(anchovy and sardine), tuna, miscel­laneous finfish, oceanic species, andshrimp. Mexican officials claim thatthey have data on where small pelagicspecies occur in the Pacific, and plan toconcentrate research on these species inthe Gulf of Mexico to locate new fishinggrounds there. For data on tunas,SEPESCA will rely primarily on thecountry's tuna fleet.

As for the miscellaneous finfishspecies, SEPESCA plans extensivestudies of fishing gear, especially in theGulf of Mexico, to determine the mostefficient fishing strategies for the impor­tant species. SEPESCA plans studies onhandlines, hooks, longlines, traps, andvarious types of nets. SEPESCA hasplans for 15 simultaneous cruises cover­ing all designated Gulf of Mexico re­search stations out to a depth of 600 m.

SEPESCA also plans extensive re­search in both the Pacific Ocean andGulf of Mexico on oceanic species,especially sharks, squids, and billfishes.One of the major sources of informationwill be the longliners operated by thegiant state-owned company, ProductosPesqueros Mexicanos. SEPESCA alsohopes to utilize the shrimp data obtainedin the study to improve existing man­agement measures.

70

ObjectivesSEPESCA plans to achieve a wide

variety of goals as a result of the newresearch plan. Those objectives are to: I)Identify and quantify fishery resources,2) produce a catalog of species, 3) de­termine the fisheries yield in each fish­ing zone, 4) assess the impact of sea­sonal migrations, 5) determine the bestfishing methods for each importantcommercial fishery, 6) formulate man­agement plans, 7) set catch limits andclosed seasons, 8) improve statistical

INDIA STUDIESTUNA FISHERY

The Indian Government and severalforeign companies have discussed pos­sible participation in the development ofIndia's first commercial tuna fishery. TheGovernment would like to develop thefishery to provide a potentially impor­tant export product. Indian Governmentofficials have discussed a tuna fishery atthe Conference on Deepsea Fishing inNew Delhi in 1981, at the Tuna UpdateConference in Bombay in early 1983,and directly with various foreign com­panies during the past few years.

A Canadian consulting companybased in St. John's, Newfoundland, wasgiven partial funding by the CanadianDevelopment Agency to complete astudy on tuna resources, harvesting, andprocessing, and believes that the devel­opment of a tuna fishery in India's200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone iseconomically viable. The consultantsdetermined that the most promisinggrounds are off the Nicobar and Anda­man Islands in the eastern Bay of Bengaland off the Laccadive Islands (Lak­shadweep) in the southern Arabian Sea,where a coastal skipjack tuna fishery al­ready exists. The Canadian companymonitored the incidental catch of tuna byfishermen in these areas and projects aninitial annual tuna catch of 750-1,000metric tons (t) of mostly skipjack tuna(and some yellowfin tuna), and the de­ployment of one or two purse seiners.Currently, the Seychelles deploy theonly known purse seiner in the Indian

systems, 9) improve SEPESCA's en­forcement capability, 10) prepare a basictraining program for high seas fisher­men, and II) define a new policy toenable the most efficient utilization offishery resources.

SEPESCA began the first phase of thestudy a little over a year ago when 34commercial vessels sailed from variousPacific ports to begin collecting datafrom 28 research stations. The programwas also initiated in the Gulf of Mexico.(Source: IFR-83/1l1.)

Ocean. Indian fishermen caught 22,000t of tuna in 1981, most of it by artisanalfishermen in coastal waters.

The Indian Government has deter­mined that a joint venture with a foreigncompany should be established to enableIndia to initiate the tuna fishery. No In­dian company has the necessary exper­tise, but companies in several countrieshave expressed an interest in helpingIndia expand its tuna fishery. Bids fromfishing companies in Canada, France,and Italy have been made to the IndianGovernment, but no joint venture part­ner had yet been selected by the end oflast year. A U.S. tuna company had pre­viously discussed participating in thetuna fishery development with the IndianGovernment, but reportedly did not bidon the current venture. Some observersdoubt the potential for a tuna fishery offthe Nicobar, Andaman, and LaccadiveIslands and are skeptical about the via­bility of investing in a new tuna fisherygiven the currently depressed worldmarket for tuna.

If this tuna venture is successful, theIndian State Trading Corporation willfreeze most of the tuna catch for export.The Canadian consultants believe thatprocessing and canning tuna for exportcould eventually be profitable. The can­nery's viability, however, would requirea marketing relationship with an estab­lished company willing to sell thecanned product under an existing la­bel. Some of India's traditional mar­kets for meat and marine products inthe Middle East might also import tunaproducts. (Source: IFR-83/l21.)

Marine Fisheries Review

Table 1.-Japanese Imports 01 IIshery products, Table 3.-Japan's top ten 19831lshery product Imports,1974-83. by value.

CIF CIF CIF value CIF valueQuantity value Quantity value Commodity (106 ¥) Commodity (106 ¥)

Year (t) (106 ¥) Year (t) (106 ¥)Shrimp' 300,978 Yellowfin tuna 2 33,004

1974 604,141 323,239 1979 1,151,174 930,738 Salmon2 85,002 Eel (live) 32,6601975 710,414 385,529 1980 1.037,350 764.272 Squid' 55,739 Bigeye tuna' 30,2231976 814.516 563,468 1981 1,129,068 879,881 Octopus2 45,569 Crab 2 21,3531977 1,045,610 657,713 1982 1,202,857 1,046,744 Herring roe 3 33,560 Herring 1 19,4081978 1,012,351 674,790 1983 1,316,126 1,003,124

1 Frozen.'Fresh/frozen.'Frozen/salted.

Commodity Metric tons Commodity Metric tons

Table 2.-Japan's top ten 19831ishery product imports,by quantity.

ports in three categories set a new recordin 1983. These were capelins, squids,

and cads (including Alaska pollock).Compared with 1982, significant gainsin quantity were recorded in the importsof frozen cads (+ 151 percent), live eels(+ 58 percent), clams (+ 30 percent),and frozen yellowfin tuna (+ 23 per­cent), whereas sharp declines occurredin frozen skipjack tuna (- 55 percent)and crabs (- 24 percent). (Source: FFIR84-4.)

57.74153.16752,93140,54221,118

Yellowfin tuna'Herring'Bigeye tuna'Capelin'Sea bream 2

, Frozen.2 Fresh/frozen.

Shrimp'Squid'Salmon 2

Octopus'Cod'

Japan's 1983 FisheryImports A Record High

Japanese imports of fishery productsin 1983 were 1,316,126 metric tons (t), arecord high surpassing by 9.4 percentthe previous record high of 1,202,857 tset in 1982, according to the customsclearance data released by the JapaneseFinance Ministry (Table 1). In contrast tothe increase in volume, the value of theimports in yen dropped to ¥ 1,003,124million (US$4,233 million at ¥ 237= US$I), down 4.2 percent from the1982 import value.

Frozen shrimp imports totaling148,627 metric tons worth US$I,270million, led all other products both inquantity and value (see following arti­cle), and accounted for 11 percent inquantity and 30 percent in value of thetotal fishery imports (Tables 2, 3). Im-

Table 1.-Japan's frozen shrimp Imports.

Imports (t) ImportCountry of totals.

origin 1960 1961 1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1980-83

India 27 6,336 35,249 40,049 39,833 36,912 152,043Indonesia 3.684 27,569 24,193 23,600 21,766 97,128Australia 3.664 8,052 11,522 11.821 11,097 42,492China, Mainland 206 450 6,247 14,501 14,954 7,252 5,778 42,485

Thailand 5,982 8.850 10,321 9,188 7,541 35,900China, Taiwan 2,487 4,990 7,774 7,759 11,052 31,575Pakistan 2,276 3,574 6,382 4,175 3,264 17,395Mexico 52 2,600 7,209 3.398 3.137 3,887 3,141 13.563

Philippines 357 2,394 2.678 3,693 4,281 13.046Hong Kong 196 303 3,951 3,684 3.270 2,700 2,160 11,814Sabah 993 2,411 2,674 2,660 3,726 11,471Vietnam 25 1,665 1.763 2,884 3,536 9,848

South Korea 122 175 400 2,501 2,034 2,209 2,472 9,216Brazil 656 2,731 1,917 2,484 1,526 8,658Malaysia 2,060 1.716 1.567 1,453 1.300 6,036Other countries 48 502 10,818 19,971 27,490 25,798 29,075 102,334

-- -- --Total 624 4,057 57,145 143.256 161.725 151,396 148,627 605.004

Averageprice ( ¥ /kg) 375 618 863 1.677 1,664 2,157 2,025

71

Japan's 1983 ShrimpImports Down Slightly

Japanese imports of frozen shrimp in1983 were 148,627 metric tons (t) valuedat ¥ 300,977 million (US$I,270 mil­lion at ¥ 237= US$I), down 2 percentin quantity and 8 percent in value com­pared with 1982, according to the cus­toms clearance data released by the Fi­nance Ministry of Japan (Table 1). Theimport prices for the year averaged¥ 2025/kg ($3.88/pound). In value,the frozen shrimp represented 30 percentof all the fishery products imported.

Since Japan liberalized its shrimp im­ports in 1961, purchases from foreigncountries climbed each year except five:1968, 1974, 1980, 1982, and 1983. An­nual imports marked a thirty-seven-foldincrease over 1961. Between 1961 and1970, Mexico and Mainland China werethe major suppliers of shrimp to Japan.Since 1971, however, India and In­donesia have replaced them as leadingsuppliers, and in 1983, they together ac­counted for as much as 39 percent ofJapan's total shrimp imports. In thesame year, Mainland China was thesixth- and Mexico the thirteenth-rankedsuppliers.

46(2)

Countries which supplied over 10,000t each in 1983 were India with 36,912 t,Indonesia with 21,766 t, Australia with11,097 t, and Taiwan with 11,052 t.

Other suppliers were, in descendingorder of importance, Thailand with7,541 t, Mainland China with 5,778 t,Argentina with 4,839 t, Philippines with

4,281 t, Sabah with 3,726 t, Bangladeshwith 3,725 t, Vietnam with 3,536 t,Pakistan with 3,264 t, Madagascar with2,588 t, South Korea with 2,472 t,Denmark with 2,346 t, and HongKong with 2,160 t. Imports from theUnited States were 18 t. (Source: FFIR84-7.)

Table 2.-Species composition of the Jap­anese fishing quota in the Soviet fishingzone, 1983-84.

als and wanted, instead, to continue theagreement unchanged.

Iwazo Kaneko, Japanese Minister ofAgriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries,was still confident a week later about theeventual outcome of the negotiations.He told reporters on 29 November thathe expected the previous year's catchquotas would be renewed. The negotia­tions continued without much progress,however, until 8 December when FumioWatanabe, Director-General of theJapanese Fisheries Agency, traveled toMoscow to break the impasse in thenegotiations. He told reporters that thenegotiations should be completed by 21December. His optimism was onlyslightly overstated as an agreement wasfinally reached on 24 December.

Agreement Provisions

In the 1984 agreement, the Japanesecatch allocation was reduced by 50,000 tto 700,000 t, and the Soviet allocationwas decreased by 10,000 t to 640,000tons. Japan's quotas of such valuablespecies as pollock, saury, squid, red tan­ner crab, and Korean hair crab were sig­nificantly reduced (Table 2). The Sovietquota of sardine and mackerel was re­duced only slightly (Table 3).

The 1984 agreement eased Japaneseregulations governing Soviet fishing op-

Quota (1,000 t)

1983 1984

5.2137.7

0.80.52.42.80.53.5

700.0

52147.9

0.80.8262.80.53.5

750.0

12.7 11.8266 24.817.9 16.734.2 32.3

290.0 270.040.4 37.668.6 63.9

1.2 1.26.4 6.4

16.2 15.171.7 66.8

Total

Species

FinfishAtka mackerelFlounderOcean perchPacific codPollockSand lanceSaurySharkTunasWachna codOther fishes

ShellfishOctopusSquidBrown king crabKorean hair crabRed tanner crabTanner crabShrimpSnails

PACIFICOCEAN

Japanese quota Soviet quota inYear in Soviet zone Japanese zone

1978 850,000 650,0001979 750,000 650,0001980 750,000 650,0001981 750.000 650,0001982 750,000 650,0001983 750,000 650.0001984 700,000 640,000

Negotiations

The normally difficult discussions be­tween Japan and the U.S.S.R. report­edly were particularly trying in 1983. Atthe initial meeting on 21 November 1983the Soviets proposed a 50 percent reduc­tion of the Japanese quota in the Sovietzone which the Japanese considered un­reasonable. The negotiations centeredon the Soviet attempt to reduce Japan'sallocation as well as on the Soviet de­mands that the Japanese grant port-callprivileges to the Soviet fishing vesselsand ease restrictions on Soviet bottomtrawling in Japanese waters. TheJapanese objected to the Soviet propos-

CHINA

Table 1.-Japanese and Russian reciprocalcatch quotas, 1978-84, in metric tons.

Japanese-clai med Kaigara Island, nearthe northeastern coast of Hokkaido (seemap).

The salmon agreement governsJapanese fishing of Soviet-origin salmonon the high seas. The seaweed agree­ment is signed by the nongovernmentalHokkaido Fisheries Association and theSoviet Fisheries Ministry. This privateagreement governs the Japanese sea­weed harvest off the Soviet-held, but

Japanese-Russian FishingAgreement Negotiated:Port-Call Privileges Set

Japan and the Union of SovietSocialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) reachedan agreement pertaining to their respec­tive annual catch quotas on 24 December1983. The agreement was concluded inMoscow after 34 days of difficultnegotiations and permits the Japanese toharvest 700,000 metric tons (t) of fishand shellfish in Soviet waters during1984, a decrease of 50,000 t from the1983 quota. In return, the Soviets areallowed to take 640,000 t in Japanesewaters, a decrease of 10,000 t from 1983.The 1984 agreement represents the firsttime since 1979 that the 100,000 t differ­ence in quotas has been narrowed, nowto a difference of 60,000 t (Table 1).

Background

Soviet and Japanese fishermen haveoperated extensively off each other'scoasts since both countries energeticallypromoted the expansion of their fishingindustries following the Second WorldWar. The two countries have negotiatedseparate agreements to govern the catchof crab, herring, salmon, and seaweed.Japanese catches off the Soviet coast to­taled 1.4 million t in 1975 and 1.5 mil­lion t in 1976. Soviet fishermen alsooperated off Japan, catching 0.7 milliontin 1976.

In 1977, both countries implemented2oo-mile fishery zones, and as a result,Soviet and Japanese officials begannegotiating to set reciprocal catch allo­cations. They have since met annually toset catch quotas and to settle other mat­ters affecting their fishery relations.These annual meetings cover their fish­ing for all species except salmon andseaweed, which are still governed byseparate agreements.

Salmon Pact

72 Marine Fisheries Review

46(2)

Table 3.-Species composition of theRussian fishing quota in the Japanesefishing zone, 1983-84.

Note: Unless otherwise credited, articlesin this section are from either the ForeignFishery Information Releases (FFIR)compiled by Sunee C. Sonu, ForeignReporting Branch, Fishery DevelopmentDivision, Southwest Region, NationalMarine Fisheries Service, NOAA, Ter­minal Island, CA 90731, or the Interna­tional Fishery Releases (IFR), LanguageServices Biweekly (LSB) reports, orLanguage Services News Briefs (LSNB)produced by the Office of InternationalFisheries Affairs, National MarineFisheries Service, NOAA, Washington,DC 20235.

erations within the Japanese 200-milezone. Japan will permit Soviet vessels tooperate throughout 1984 off eastern andsouthern Hokkaido. The Japanese pre­viously banned the Soviets frombottom-trawling off eastern Hokkaidofrom June to August and from purseseining off eastern Hokkaido fromJanuary to June. The Japanese had alsopreviously banned Soviet bottom­trawling off southern Hokkaido fromJune to August.

The agreement initiated an exchangeof port-call privileges for the first time.Japan will permit Soviet vessels to call atthe Pacific port of Onahama, near Iwakiin Fukushima Prefecture (see map). Theport-call privileges are restricted to 48hours per vessel and limited to 70 Sovietvessels during 1984. Only 150 Sovietfishermen may go ashore at anyonetime, remain for no more than 5 hours,and visit only the city of Iwaki. No callsare permitted during September and Oc­tober. In exchange, the U.S.S.R. willallow Japanese fishing vessels to call atthe Soviet Far Eastern port of Nakhodka,

7051322921

Percentcaught

455,000331,500208,000188,500136,500 E'

Soviet catchin Japanese

zone

Japanesecatch in Percent

Soviet zone caught

555,000 74532,500 71525,000 70480,000 64525,000 E' 70

Year

19791980198119821983

vessels deployed in Soviet waters. Japanhas not fully utilized its quotas in recentyears (Table 4), taking only 70 percent in1983.

The U.S.S.R. has utilized even small­er percentages from its quotas, taking aslittle as 25 percent in 1983. Observersalso believe that Japanese concern aboutillegal Soviet fishing in coastal fisheriesmay be overstated and that Soviet port­calls will, in fact, have a minimal impacton Japanese coastal fisheries. (Source:IFR-84-4.)

, E ~ Estimated catch figures based on Japanese pressreports.

Table 4.-Actual Japanese and Russian catches In theother country's fishery zones, by quantity (in metrictons) and percentage of quota, 1979-83.

mon Fisheries Policy (CFP), ratified inJanuary 1984, is working as planned. Incontrast to 1983, when constant Councildisagreements delayed the adoption ofTAC's and quotas until December, theCFP mechanism worked smoothly in1984 and catch quotas were establishedat the beginning of the calendar year. ECofficials hope that future TAC's andquotas will be established long beforethe beginning of the year, thus enablingEC fishermen to plan their operations forthe fishing year as early as possible.(Source: IFR-84/25.)

Table 1.-Total allowable catch and EC member-country quotas for 1984, by selected major species,

TotalTAC (1,000 t)

Species EC Germany France Netherlands Belgium United Kingdom Denmark Ireland

Cod 516 84 36 23 8 118 234 12Haddock 193 7 19 1 2 141 19 4Pollock 123 21 70 21 8 3Whiting 185 4 38 9 4 79 34 18Plaice 199 10 7 67 12 54 46 3Redfish 70 63 2 5Mackerel 407 26 17 37 235 7 85

Total 1,693 215 189 137 26 648 353 125

73

The European Community's (EC)Council of Fisheries Ministers, at its 30January 1984 meeting, approved the1984 total allowable catch (TAC) andmember country quotas for the sevenmajor species in the Community'swaters (Table 1). The TAC refers to themaximum amount of a particular specieswhich EC fishermen are allowed to catchin a given year. Quotas refer to allocationof the TAC's among the individual ECmember countries.

The Council's early decision on TAC'sand quotas is a sign that the EC's Com-

EC 1984 Fisheries Catch Quotas Set

near Vladivostok, on the Sea of Japan.Prior to this agreement, the Japanese

had not granted port-call privileges toany foreign fishing vessels. TheJapanese had previously rejected Sovietrequests for port-call privileges, exceptin emergencies, because of potentialproblems with Soviet vessels illegallyfishing and conducting intelligence op­erations in Japanese coastal waters.The Japanese Government had also re­fused Soviet requests for port-call priv­ileges because of the likelihood ofSouth Korean (ROK) requests for sim­ilar privileges. South Korean fisher­men, like Soviet fishermen, wouldbenefit from reduced operating costsif their vessels were allowed to makeport calls in Japan.

Overview

According to the NMFS ForeignFisheries Analysis Branch, Japan'squota reduction of 50,000 t is substan­tial, but not so significant as to cause theJapanese to curtail the number of fishing

90.010.0

490.010.040.0

650.0

Quota (1,000 t)

1983 1984

90.010.0

SOOO10.040.0

650.0

Species

LaemonemaPollockSardine and mackerelSauryOther fishes

Total

Austral ian Fisheries andForeign Fishing Policy

Figure I. -Some prospects for Australian fisheries expansion include yel­lowfin, bigeye, and skipjack tuna, jack mackerel, and squid.

Australia has a small fishing industrydespite the country's extensive coastlineand one of the world's largest fishingzones. Australian fishermen harvestedonly about 160,000 metric tons (t) of fishand shellfish in 1982, the first significantincrease since 1977 (Table 1). Exportsfor the 1982-83 season set a record $369million, up 14 percent from $323 mil­lion the year before. Japan took 51 per­cent of the exports, by value, and theUnited States took 30 percent.

Fisheries harvests have been limitedbecause Australian coastal waters do notsupport large fish populations-theylack nutrients and are located in predom­inantly tropical or subtropical regions.The country has a small population witha low annual fishery consumption rateand the demand for fishery products hasnot been strong enough to generate anincreased fishing effort. Moreover,Australian consumers tend to preferfish not found in local waters. Sincethe early 1960's, imports have suppliedabout 50 percent of the finfish con­sumed domestically.

Most of Australia's traditionalfisheries are fully exploited. Variousshrimp species, rock lobster, shark,southern bluefin tuna, and most speciestaken in the southeast trawl fishery prob­ably cannot sustain a significantly in­creased fishing effort. Australian offi-

Table l.-Australia·s fisheries catch,1977-82.

Year Catch (t) Year Catch (t)

1977 127,800 1980 136,600

1978 122,900 1981 129,900

1979 127,700 1982 161,000

Source: FAO "Yearbook of Fishery Statistics,"1980 and 1981 (1977-81 data) and Australianpress reports (1982 data).

cials, however, believe that the catch ofa few species could be expanded. Thebest prospects are for yellowfin andbigeye tuna (Coral Sea), skipjack tuna(western Pacific), jack mackerel, andsquid (Fig. I).

Foreign FishingPolicy Development

The Government establ ished theAustralian Fishing Zone (AFZ) in 1979,claiming jurisdiction over all domesticand foreign fishing activities in thatzone. Once this action was taken, theGovernment had to determi ne the statusof fishery resources within the AFZ andthe level of Australian fishing so thatforeign fishermen would be allocatedonly those species which domesticfishermen were not fully utilizing. The

data on offshore resources was limited,primarily because Australia's fishermenwere not fishing extensively in watersbeyond 12 miles. The Government de­cided that it was important to obtaincatch statistics collected by foreignfishermen as they were in some cases theonly existing source of data on offshorefisheries. The Government needed suchdata for use in determining the status ofoffshore stocks.

The Australian Government's foreignfishing policy allows foreign fishermenaccess to surplus stocks of underutilizedspecies in three ways: through jointfeasibility projects, joint fishing ven­tures, or through bilateral agreements.The major objective of the Govern­ment's foreign fishing policy is "Aus­tralianization," a gradual expansion ofthe Australian fishing industry until allforeign fishing in the AFZ can eventu­ally be phased out.

The Government has given preferenceto joint feasibility projects becauseforeign fishermen conduct exploratoryfishing and obtain resource data neces­sary to establish fishery managementplans. The Government has attempted torestrict the other two types of foreignaccess until exploratory fishing has been

74 Marine Fisheries Review

Australia's lengthy coastline gives it one of the world's largest 200-milefishing zones.

squid fisheries in other countries, opera­tional costs and earnings, as well as in­formation on radio reporting proce­dures, crew composition, and vesselspecifications. In general, these reportsmet the requirements which the Austra­lian Government established. However,both the Australian and Japanesepartners reported a variety of problemsassociated with the squid feasibilityprojects.

Squid Export Status

Austral ian authorities ruled that IOpercent of the catch had to be consideredAustralian products. As a result, thisportion of the squid catch, when landedfrozen in Japan, was assessed an importtax by the Japanese customs authorities,making the product more expensive toJapanese consumers and thereby damp­ening the demand. The Australian andJapanese partners criticized this policy,preferring to ship squid under a Japaneselabel to avoid the import tax and thusincrease their profits.

Radio Reporting Procedures

Japanese fishing vessels used radiofrequencies which were issued under an

CORALSEA

• Sydney

QUEENSLAND

SOUTHAUSTRALIA

NORTHERNTERRITORY

WESTERNAUSTRALIA

try's fisheries jurisdiction was extendedto 200 n.mi. The Australian Govern­ment has approved 22 projects deploy­ing II3 foreign vessels. Major projectsinvolved Japanese companies in thesquid fishery off southern Australia andU. S. companies taking skipjack tuna offthe east and west coasts. Other approvedfeasibility projects permitted Japanese,Korean (ROK), and Polish trawling op­erations in the AFZ.

Japanese-Australian SquidFeasibility Projects

One of the most important and largestfeasibility projects involved Japanesecompanies exploring for squid off thesouthern coast, particularly in the BassStrait between the island of Tasmaniaand the Australian mainland (see map).By 1980, the Japanese were deploying64 squid-jigging vessels, and six Austra­lian companies had established jointfeasibility projects with Japanese com­mercial interests.

These projects submitted reportswhich included the number and durationof the Japanese fishing trips, descrip­tions of departures from proposed opera­tions, comparisons of catch rates with

completed, but prefers joint fishingventures because of the potential ben­efit to the country's fishing industry.The Government considers bilateralagreements the least preferable formof foreign access because they havethe lowest potential of contributingto "Australianization."

Joint Feasibility Projects

The Austral ian Government con­ceived feasibility projects as a means ofobtaining resource and economic dataon a particular fishery. Under a jointfeasibility project, foreign fishermenconduct exploratory fishing to obtai ndata on a particular fishery. Although thecatch landed by foreign vessels par­ticipating in feasibility projects may besold, a feasibility project is not strictly acommercial fishing operation. The Gov­ernment has sought to promote foreignparticipation because its own researchcosts would be lessened and Australiancompanies would be provided reliableinformation on a resource's commercialpotential. Australian officials could usethis data to develop a fishery manage­ment plan and Australian fishermencould then make better informed deci­sions on investments or joint venture as­sociations with foreign companies.

The Australian Commonwealth Gov­ernment, State Governments, and thefishing industry have all collaborated inestablishing regulations governing jointfeasibility projects. Each project is re­stricted to a particular species, gear, fish­ing area, and port, and is usually notpermitted to operate longer than 2 years.The participating foreign company mustsubmit an interim report to the Austra­lian authorities at the end of the firstyear; a more comprehensive report mustbe released at the end of the second year.The final report must indicate the extentof the resource, its seasonality, vulnera­bility to specific gear, catch rates, mar­keting plans, and the potential for pro­cessing the catch in Australia. Theforeign partner is not guaranteed anyfishing access beyond the duration of thefeasibility agreement.

More than 50 feasibil ity proposals hadbeen made to the Australian Govern­ment by October 1982. Most were pro­posed in the late 1970's after the coun-

46(2) 75

international radio agreement, but werenot allotted to, nor used by, Australiancoastal authorities. Both the Japaneseand Australian partners recommendedthat the international radio agreement beamended to give new frequencies to acountry's deep-sea vessels required tomaintain contact with authorities of acoastal country. Neither the Japanesevessels nor the Australian coastal au­thorities had enough bilingual radiooperators.

Port Calls

Japanese vessels, when calling inAustralian ports, encountered addition­al regulations (particularly concerningpiloting) which were not applied toAustralian vessels of the same tonnage.The Japanese claimed that these regu­lations increased the operating costs ofthe joint ventures. Also, the Australiancustoms authorities confiscated certainfood products on Japanese vessels andthe partnerships had to buy new sup­plies. The crews on some vessels hadto pay a customs tax on tobacco andalcoholic beverages when they cameinto Australian ports. Other Japanesecrews, however, were not required topay this tax. This Australian inconsis­tency proved especially upsetting tothe Japanese fishermen and arousedconsiderable animosity.

Low Catch Rates

Catch rates off Australia tended to bewell below the capacity of the Japanesesquid vessels and below comparableJapanese squid landings off Japan andNew Zealand.

Low Prices

Australian squid brought lower pricesbecause it was smaller and was graded asbeing of lower quality. The Japanese alsosaid that it tasted inferior to the squidwhich the Japanese took in otherfisheries, particularly off Japan and NewZealand.

Limited Markets

The Australian market for squid waspractically nonexistent. The few Austra­lian consumers who purchased squidpreferred Mediterranean squid or"calamari." The Japanese squid market

76

was depressed when the joint ventureswere in operation (1979-80) because oflarge cold storage inventories. In addi­tion, the Japanese fishermen were catch­ing squid elsewhere more profitably andwere also importing squid cheaper fromother countries. The Japanese attemptedto market Austral ian-caught squid inEurope and Southeast Asia, but wereunsuccessful.

Insufficient Resource Data

Japanese fishermen considered the2-year agreement inadequate to deter­mine the resource's potential.

Lack of Long-TermFishing Privileges

The Japanese partners consideredlong-term commercial fishing accessnecessary to warrant the costs of con­ducting exploratory fishing and submit­ting resource data.

Processing Difficulties

Austral ian authorities permitted theAustralian-labeled squid to be frozen atas little as - 20°C, while Japan requiresJapanese-labeled squid to be frozen at noless than - SO°c. The less demandingAustralian standard reportedly affectedthe texture, color, and flavor of thesquid.

The Australian partners also criti­cized a few elements of the feasibilityprojects. The Austral ian observersaboard Japanese vessels encounteredlanguage problems and complainedabout unfamiliar food and uncomfort­able living quarters. Some Australianfishermen clai med that the Japanese mayhave adversely affected other fishery re­sources in areas where they harvestedsquid.

Joint Ventures

The Australian Government has giventhe country's fishing companies consid­erable flexibility in negotiating jointventures. While "Australianization" ofthe management, vessels, equipment,and crews is the primary objective of alljoint fishery ventures, the AustralianGovernment has not determined eitherthe criteria for, or the rate at which thismust take place. The responsibility forthe implementation of the" Australiani-

zation" policy was left to the fishingindustry, although the Government mustultimately approve all joint ventureproposals.

The Government also has not set aminimum level for Australian equity in ajoint venture company. Instead, theForeign Investment Review Board, inthe Ministry of the Treasury, must ap­prove all equity participation plans. TheGovernment has also done little to en­courage the introduction of new fishingtechnology. Joint ventures do not have todeploy new vessels, use new fishinggear, or assure participation of Austra­lian fishermen in their operations. Simi­larly, the Government has not approvedany incentives to promote domestic con­struction of fishing vessels or purchasesof locally produced gear and has notpassed any regulations providing for the"Australianization" of fish processingor marketing operations.

A joint fishing venture is strictly acommercial operation; the same exten­sive statistical data submitted under ajoint feasibility project are not required.The Australian Government receivedseveral joint venture proposals prior to1980. Much of this foreign interest wasprobably generated as a response to theincreasing number of 200-mile zone ex­tensions by coastal countries in themid-1970's. Polish, British, Malaysian,Japanese, and U.S. companies, amongothers, submitted proposals which wererejected. The Government was unwill­ing to approve joint commercial fishingventures until the status of fishery re­sources in the AFZ was determined. Theinitial foreign interest seems almostnonexistent, and by August 1983, nojoint ventures were operating.

The Australian experience with jointventures has also been affected byforeign policy considerations, especiallywith regard to the Soviet Union and Ja­pan. Soviet fishermen were allowed totrawl for shrimp and finfish near BarrowIsland and Dampier Archipelago off thenorthwest coast. The entire catch was tobe offered for sale to Australian com­panies; if any catch was not sold domes­tically, it would be labeled "Product ofAustralia" and exported. The AustralianGovernment terminated the joint ven­ture with the Soviet Union after that

Marine Fisheries Review

country invaded Afghanistan in De­cember 1979.

Bilateral Agreements

Under the third type of access, a bilat­eral agreement, Australia requiresforeign vessel owners to pay an accessfee in exchange for permission to fish inthe AFZ. Australia currently has bilat­eral agreements with the ROK, Taiwan,and Japan. The Korean and AustralianGovernments signed an agreement inNovember 1983, allowing the Koreans totake squid. Fishermen from Taiwan havebeen permitted to catch various finfishesincluding shark since 1979. Japan andAustralia signed an agreement in 1968,allowing Japanese fishermen to harvestsouthern bluefin tuna.

The agreement permitting theJapanese to take tuna is noteworthy forthree reasons: Tuna is an underutilizedspecies, Australian fishermen wanted toexpand their own operations in thisfishery, and the Japanese used economicpressure to secure access to a valuablefishery, Australian fishermen who re­cently made significant investments inthe tuna fishery complained to theirGovernment about the extensive Jap­anese fishing for tuna in the AFZ.

The Committee on Trade and Com­merce of the Australian Senate issued areport in November 1982 stating that theAustralian Government attempted tolimit the Japanese access, The reportalso said that the Japanese Governmentmaintained that a curtailment of Japan'stuna fishing would force a reevaluationof its entire commodities trade withAustralia, particularly the imports ofbeef, one of Australia's major exports.The Australian Government backeddown and was strongly criticized bythe fishing industry for favoring thebeef industry at its expense. In October1983, the Australian Government re­newed the tuna agreement permittingthe Japanese to continue harvestingsouthern bluefin tuna with as many as290 longl iners.

Conclusion

The Australian Government's foreignfishing policy has not effectively chan­neled foreign interest in Australianfisheries into any substantial long-term

46(2)

benefits for the country's fishing indus­try. The Government's policy of requir­ing costly foreign commitments in jointexploratory projects, before approvingjoint commercial fishing ventures, hasIimited the interest of foreign com­panies. Without firm prospects of accessto commercial fishing, foreign com­panies have been reluctant to make thenecessary investments. Foreign policyconsiderations have also affected jointventures. The Australian Government'sdecisions to safeguard Australian beefexports to Japan and to show its displea­sure over the Soviet invasion of Af­ghanistan indicate that these issues wereconsidered more important than thefishery issues at stake.

Australia's foreign fishing policy hasnot been a complete failure. The squidfeasibility projects with the Japanesehave produced two major benefits forAustralia's fishing industry: I) Theknowledge that squid may be a commer­cially exploitable resource, as well as 2)information on other fishery resourcescaught incidentally to squid,

The squid projects, however, did notcontribute to the"Austral ianization" ofthe country's fishing industry. Process­ing in Australia was limited because ofthe high charges for port calls, process­ing, and cold storage. Australianfishermen showed little interest in learn­ing squid fishing techniques and wereunwilling to work on Japanese vesselsbecause of low pay, cramped living quar­ters, long working hours, and extendedfishing trips, Similarly, Australian com­panies were reluctant to make significantinvestments in this fishery. (Source:IFR-84/8.)

Taiwan Ups Fish ImportsFrom the United States

The value of U.S. fishery exports toTaiwan in 1983 increased by 72 percentcompared with such exports in 1982,when the United States exported 2,200 tof fishery products worth $6.9 million.In 1983, shipments increased 370 per­cent by quantity to 10,400 t and 72 per­cent by value to $]].8 million.

The most valuable U.S. commodity

export to Taiwan in 1983 was fish roewhich accounted for $5.6 million, or 47percent of the total value of U.S. fisheryexports to Taiwan. The quantity andvalue of U.S. exports of salmon, sab­lefish, and canned shrimp to Taiwan alsoincreased significantly in 1983. UnitedStates fishmeal exports to Taiwan in1983 accounted for 83 percent of thattotal export quantity, but only 23 percentof the total fishery export value.

Japan and PortugalExtend Tuna Pact

Japanese and Portuguese representa­tives, meeting in Lisbon late last year,extended their existing bilateral tunaagreement, first concluded in 1980. Theagreement allows Japanese tuna longlin­ers to fish off the Portuguese mainland,the Madeira Islands, and the Azores fora specified number of fishing days(Table 1).

In return, the Japanese will train twoPortuguese tuna fishermen for 1 montheach, provide the services of a Japanesetuna longlining expert for 3 months, andallow Portuguese biologists to collectdata aboard the Japanese longliners de­ployed in Portuguese waters. The JapanTuna Federation also agreed to grant$70,000 to help the Portuguese purchasea small computer. Japanese sources re­port that the Japanese tuna catch (mostlybluefin and bigeye tuna) in Portuguesewaters varies from 2,000 to 5,000 metrictons per year. (Source: IFR-84/6.)

Table 1.-Terms 01 tuna agreement between Portugaland Japan, 1980-84.

Max, fishingSpecialeffort' Fees (US$)

JapaneseMain- Ma- Fish- Ves- contribu-

Year land deira ing 2 sel tion (US$)

1980 150 1,190 0.26 N/A' 55,0001981 428 1,284 0.30 N/A N/A1982 517 1,550 030 100 -'1983 800 1,550 032 100 -,1984 1,000 1,550 0.35 100 70,000·

'Effort in fishing days; data not available for Azores.'Dollars per vessel ton (GRT) per fishing day.'N/A = not available.'The Japanese contributed a 20 GRT vessel and naviga­tion system, but the value is unavailable.'Contribution of engine parts for the 20 GRT vessel andtechnical assistance (services of one Japanese longliningexpert and training for two Portuguese fishermen),61n addition to technical assistance.

77

Mexico Moves to SolveTuna Fisheries Problems

The Mexican Secretariat of Fisheries(SEPESCA) is attempting to solve thecountry's growing tuna problem. Debtsowed foreign shipyards continue tomount while the country's tuna catch isdeclining.

Government officials estimate that al­though the Mexican tuna fleet had grownto 58 vessels with a carrying capacity of37,900 short tons (Table I), the tunacatch totaled only 28,100 metric tons (t)of yellowfin and skipjack in 1983, a de­cline of over 20 percent from the 36,800t of tuna taken in 1982 (Table 2). Thecatch has been affected both by prob­lems in marketing tuna and the 1982-83EI Nino event in the Eastern Pacific.

SEPESCA estimates that vessel own­ers owe 80 bill ion pesos (= $450-490million depending on exchange rate) toforeign creditors for tuna vessels orderedfrom overseas shipyards. Many tunafishermen have been reporting operatinglosses. Many owners even lack thenecessary working capital to continuefishing. Denied access to the U.S. tunamarket because of the 1980 tuna em­bargo by the U.S. Government and un­able to increase exports to other foreignmarkets, Mexican fishermen have had torely on the domestic market which hasproven unprofitable.

The 1982 devaluation of the peso hadthe impact of increasing the cost, inpesos, of the vessels ordered overseas byabout 500 percent. Foreign exchangeshortages further complicated the abilityof the owners to meet their payments. Itis difficult to buy foreign currencies inMexico because of the country's $85billion foreign debt. The vessel ownersare, as a result, unable to make the pay­ments to foreign creditors, even if theyhave pesos to buy the needed foreigncurrency.

SEPESCA is seeking to reverse thedecline in the tuna fishery. It organized ameeting in late December 1983 of allinterested parties, including Govern­ment officials, cooperative leaders, andindustry representatives. SEPESCA in­tervened because most of the vessels or­dered overseas were secured by guaran­tees from the Banco NacionaI Pesquero y

78

Table 1.-Mexico's tuna fleet, 1975-83, and carryingcapacity in short tons.

Seiners Saitboats Tolal

Year No. Cap. No. Cap. No. Cap.

1975 20 3,709 2 270 22 3,9791976 25 13,860 2 270 27 14,1301977 24 13,798 24 13,7981978 23 13,437 2 174 25 13,6111979 25 14,622 3 405 28 15,0271980 46 35,162 6 705 52 35,8671981 45 33,358 10 1,133 55 34,4911982 43 33,900 13 1,310 56 35,2101983 49 36,891 9 1,045 58 37,936

Table 2.-Mexico's tuna catch, 1975-83.

Calch (1,000 I)

Year Yellowfin Skipjack Total

1975 15.3 6.8 22.11976 13.0 7.1 20.11977 17.0 3.7 20.71978 18.1 4.7 22.81979 223 4.8 27.11980 18.6 12.6 31.21981 41.1 26.1 67.21982 18.9 16.7 3561983 20.1 80 28.1

Portuario (BANPESCA). The Govern­ment offered to convert the $450 milliondebt to 80 billion Mexican pesos tomake it possible for the shipowners tomake payments on their debt. The ship­owners would be gi ven 8 years to payofftheir loans with a 4-year grace periodbefore payments have to be made. Thedebt would be restructured by theFideicomiso para la Cobertura de Ries­gos Cambiarios (FICORCA) 1.

Through the BANPESCA, FICORCAwill assume the foreign currency notes.The boatowners would make paymentsin pesos to FICORCA and BANPESCAwould make the foreign currency pay­ments. The De la Madrid Administra­tion has been working for some timewith the Comite Mixto de Atun of theComision Nacional Consult iva de Pescato resolve the tuna problem. SEPESCAhopes that the restructuring plan willavoid a total collapse of the industry.

SEPESCA also planned to provide

I FICORCA is the Mexican Government trust(Exchange Risk Trust) responsible for refinanc­ing foreign currency debts. It is also restructur­ing foreign debts in several other sectors of theeconomy.

vessel owners with the working capitalneeded to keep tuna vessels fishing dur­ing 1984. Some owners had tied up theirvessels and did not fish in 1983. NMFSestimates that during 1983, only abouthalf the fleet, and often less than half,was at sea fishing at any given time.Many owners maintained that the samewould happen in 1984 and that theywould not have enough working capitalto fish. SEPESCA plans to make asmuch as $40 million pesos 2 available tothe owners of the large (1,200 short ton)seiners. Smaller sums will be availableto owners of smaller vessels.

SEPESCA has reportedly placed onlytwo major limitations on participation inthe plan. Participating vessel ownersmust pledge to land an amount of tunaannually equal to 70 percent of the ves­sels' carrying capacity and at least 75percent of the catch must be turned overto the Government for sale on the domes­tic market. The vessel owners will haveto set up a repayment schedule whichwill then be deducted from payments fortuna landed. Currently most of Mexico'stuna is sold to state-owned companies,thus ensuring BANPESCA's ability toget its share. Special arrangements willhave to be made for sales in foreignports. Such sales, however, in 1983 wereonly a small part of Mexico's total tunacatch.

Mexican tuna fishermen were report­edly undecided about the Government'sdebt restructuring scheme. The Gov­ernment opened enrollment in the planon 18 January. As of late February, how­ever, few vessel owners had enrolled.Other observers were skeptical that thefishermen, if they enrolled in the plan,could land 70 percent of their vessels'carrying capacity in 1984. Tuna catchesin the eastern Pacific declined sharply in1983, and there was no indication that1984 catch rates for the internationalfleet are improving. Reports fromMexico, however, indicate that Mexicanfishermen are reporting better resultsthan they had during the slow 1983 start

'The Mexican peso has fluctuated widely oninternational markets since January 1982. Thefree-market rate was about 160 pesos to the U.S.dollar in early March 1984.

Marine Fisheries Review

when many vessel owners tied up theirvessels and refused to fish. SEPESCADirector of Fisheries Promotion, GarciaLeyva Lara, has projected a 1984 tunacatch of 60,000 to 70,000 tons. Otherobservers believe that, even if fishingimproves, the fishermen will be unlikelyto payoff an 80 billion peso debt in only8 years, even with the 4-year graceperiod. (Source: IFR-84/19.)

South Pacific NationsAssert Marine Role

The Foreign Ministers of Chile, Co­lombia, Ecuador, and Peru, which makeup the Permanent Commission for theSouth Pacific (CPPS), met in Vina delMar, Chile on 9-10 February 1984 andsigned the Declaration of Vina del Mar,proclaiming their intent to playa moreactive and assertive role in Pacific Basinmarine and other affairs. The Declara­tion, signed by Jaime del Valle (Chile),Rodrigo Lloreda (Colombia), Luis Val­encia (Ecuador), and Fernando Schwalb(Peru), charts a new course for theCommission which will serve as a coor­dinating mechanism to help memberstates obtain greater control over seabedresources and fisheries, as well as a toolto advance technical and economic de­velopment for the four countries.

The main thrust implicit in the Decla­ration of Vina del Mar is the statementthat member countries intend to partici­pate in and receive the benefits of par­ticipation in political, economic, andscientific activities in the Pacific Basin.Discussion during the conference high­lighted the CPPS's achievement (stem­ming from the 1952 Declaration of San­tiago) in establishing the principle ofcoastal-state control over 200-mile ex­tended marine jurisdiction zones.

Technical working papers were pre­pared and topics discussed includedliaison with other Pacific Basin organiza­tions, scientific research, environmentalprotection, marine resource conserva­tion, and exploration and exploitation ofthe seabed. The Declaration reaffirmsthe rights and duties of each state toprotect its interests within 200-milezones. The Ministers were also con­cerned about foreign fishermen operat-

46(2)

ing outside 200-mile coastal zones andagreed that the CPPS Secretary Generalwill coordinate consultations regardingconservation and optimum use of re­sources outside such zones.

The Foreign Ministers agreed that na­tional authorities should work with theCPPS under the United Nations (UN)Environmental Program Regional Con­tingency Plan to accelerate research andtechnical cooperation. The Ministersreiterated the position affirmed by theCali Declaration in 1981 on seabed re­sources outside national jurisdiction,and judged that close coordination withthe Preparatory Commission for the In­ternational Sea-Bed Authority is essen­tial. The Ministers agreed on immediatecooperation to advance scientific re­search and increase understanding of theSoutheast Pacific marine environment.

The participants were particularly in­terested in promoting research on the EINino event which had such a severe im­pact on Peru and Ecuador during 1982­83. They also agreed to increase bothtechnical cooperation between CPPS na­tions and with UN specialized agenciesand bilateral and multilateral sources ofassistance. The CPPS is also seeking atechnical agreement with the UN Foodand Agriculture Organization.

Chilean Foreign Minister, Jaime delValle, in the keynote speech at the inau­gural session, suggested that the Law ofthe Sea (LOS) Convention brought to aclose the initial stage of the CPPS's ac­tivities. The first phase changed the uni­versal acceptance, valid for centuries,"that use and control of the seas wasbased on the widest freedom of accessand exploitation by the mercantilistpowers, to the detriment of the rights ofthe coastal state". The new phase of theCPPS's activities is characterized bygreater coastal-state sharing in and con­trol over marine resources.

The Foreign Ministers also stressedthat greater responsibilities will accom­pany the benefits to be gained throughdevelopment of coastal resources. DelValle suggested that the CPPS will focusits efforts on the defense of acquiredrights, marine environmental protec­tion, preservation and optimum use ofresources, and especially, modificationof the CPPS to widen its field of ac-

tivities to the entire Pacific Basin. TheCPPS countries' joint effort will requirecooperation of and contribution from re­gional international organizations, in theform of financing, professional training,and technology.

Del Valle said that the CPPS nationswill continue to pioneer developmentsconcerning coastal-state control overmarine resources, characterizing it as amoral obligation. The Ministers foundthat this requires institutionalization ofForeign Ministers' meetings and morefrequent and regular ordinary meetings.

Chilean President Pinochet hosted aluncheon for the Ministers after the 9February opening session. According topress reports, Pinochet called for theCPPS to assume the responsibilities of­fered by the new LOS regime, and toextend its activities into new fields. Hesaid that the historic moment calls uponthe CPPS countries to "project them­selves toward the immense reality of thePacific Basin".

Colombian Foreign Minister RodrigoLloreda praised the Commission's ear­lier achievement of control over 200­mile coastal zones, and suggested thatclose attention be given the new LOSregime. The present problem, Lloredasaid, is to consolidate the gains whichhave been made and to cooperate in ef­forts to protect the common interest. Re­ferring to the LOS regime, Lloredalinked 18th century high seas "piracy"with 19th and 20th century fishing prac­tices. He also said that the CPPS needs todevelop a "mechanism" to protectfisheries, limit catches, and preservespecies. (Source: IFR-84/21.)

Krill From ChileChilean officials report that they ex­

ported 2,000 tons of krill to Japan in1983. They claim that the Chilean prod­uct is about 40 percent more expensivethan krill available from the Soviets andKoreans (ROK), but is of higher qual­ity. The Chilean company producingkrill was a joint-venture with Japan.Still, krill remains a rather minor partof Chile's total seafood exports whichamounted to about $375 million in thefirst 10 months of 1983 alone.

79