MENDOZA VS COMELEC

1. MENDOZA VS COMELEC

GR. No. 191084

March 5, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed winner in the May 14, 2007 gubernatorial race in the Province of Bulacan. Respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan who opposed him filed an election protest with the COMELEC questioning the election results in all the 5,066 precincts in the province due to massive electoral fraud that Mendoza allegedly committed .On December 1, 2009 the COMELEC Second Division decided the election protest and proclaimed Pagdanganan as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan. Mendoza opposed Pagdanganans motion for execution of the decision before the Second Division and filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision with the COMELEC En Banc. On February 8, 2010 the COMELEC En Ban denied Mendozas motion for reconsideration. Reacting to it, he filed an urgent motion to recall the February 8 resolution on the ground, among others ,that the En Banc issued such resolution (a) without the concurrence of the majority of its members and (b)without conducting a rehearing under Section 6, Rule18 of the COMELEC rules of procedure. Only three Commissioners voted to deny his motion for reconsideration. A commissioner dissented while three others took no part. On February 10, 2010 the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order for the rehearing of the motion for reconsideration on February 15, 2010. Meanwhile, on February 12 Mendoza filed with this Court the present petition, raising the same grounds which he cited in the urgent motion to recall that he earlier filed with the COMELEC En Banc. Following its February 15 rehearing, the members of the COMELEC En Banc maintained their votes. On March 4, 2010 the En Banc issued an order directing the immediate execution of the Second Divisions decision. This prompted Mendoza to file a supplement to his petition before this Court, bringing up the recent developments in the case

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion under the Rule 18, sec. 6 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure.

RULING: There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.

It is easy to understand the reason for the difference in the result of the two protests, one as original action and the other as an appeal, if and when the protest process reaches the COMELEC En Banc. In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the process. If, at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice except to dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed proceeding that has resulted in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as an appellate body, and after the appellate process is completed, reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and resultingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

The petition is GRANTED. The election protest of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-28348December 15, 1967

2. BERNARDINO ABES vs. COMELECPetitioners, candidates of the Liberal Party, the Nacionalista Reform Party and the Quezon City Citizens League for Good Government, first went to the Commission on Elections (Comelec). Upon the claim that more than 50% of the registered voters were not able to vote during the elections of November 14, 1967, they prayed for Comelec's declaration that there was failure of election. They petitioned for suspension of the canvass and the proclamation of winning candidates. They sought nullification, too, of elections in Quezon City for city officials and asked that new elections be held. Comelec, in a minute resolution of November 23, 1967, denied the petition, ordered the board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but not to proclaim any winning candidate for city offices and gave petitioners time "to go to the Supreme Court for the proper remedy."

Petitioners thus came to this Court oncertiorariwith a prayer for preliminary injunction.

Upon the petition and respondents' returns, the case was heard on the merits.

Issue:

whether Comelec has jurisdiction (1) to order the board of canvassers to suspend the canvassing and proclamation of the, winning candidates; (2) to annul the elections in Quezon City; and (3) following such annulment, to direct the holding of another election.

1. By way of prefatory statement, it may serve our purpose if we emphasize once again that the board of canvassers is a ministerial body.2It is enjoined by law to canvass all votes on election returns submitted to itin due form.3It has been said, and properly, that its power are "limited generally to the mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the face of the returns before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained."4Comelec is the constitutional body charged with the duty to enforce all laws relative to elections, duty bound to see to it that the board of canvassers perform its proper function.5Pertinent rulings of this Court have since defined Comelec's powers in pursuance of its supervisory or administrative authority over officials charged with specific duties under the election code. It is within the legitimate concerns of Comelec to annul a canvass or proclamation based on incomplete returns,6or on incorrect or tampered returns; annul a canvass or proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it lacked a quorum7or because the board did not meet at all.8Neither Constitution nor statute has granted Comelec or the board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of election returns, to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.

2. Petitioners' next prayer is for the annulment of the elections held on November 14, 1967. Their bases: frauds, terrorism, and other illegal practices committed before and during the elections.

The primary grant of power to Comelec is found in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution, thus:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. All law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Nothing in the foregoing constitutional precept will imply authority for Comelec to annul an election. So, too, did the Revised Election Code withhold from Comelec the specific power to annul an election.

3. As unconvincing is petitioners' prayer that Comelec direct a new election in Quezon City. We have searched in vain for any constitutional or legal precept that would grant Comelec that power. All that there is in the statute books is Section 8 of the Revised Election Code, which reads:

Sec. 8.Postponement of Election. When for any serious cause the holding of an election should become impossible in any political division or subdivision, the President, uponrecommendationof the Commission on Elections, shall postpone the election therein for such time as he may deem necessary.12The remedy, however, lies in Congress. The hiatus in our election law may be filled only by legislation, not by judicial fiat.

4. The petition before this Court in effect seeks to nullify Comelec's order of November 23, 1967 heretofore adverted to. There was no lack nor excess of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion was involved. Correctly did Comelec decline to direct the Quezon City board of canvassers to suspend canvass and proclamation. Comelec is powerless to annul the election. Nor can it direct a new election. We cannot compel Comelec to act as petitioners prayed for. Absent Comelec's legal duty,mandamuswill not issue.

For the reasons given, we vote to dismiss the petition. No costs allowed. So ordered.

3. BARBERS VS COMELEC, JUNE 22, 2005

Facts:Robert Z. Barbers (Barbers) and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the Philippines inthe 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections(elections).On 2 June2004, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. NBC 04-005 proclaiming Biazon as the 12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines in theMay 10, 2004 national and local elections, to serve for a term of 6 years, beginning on June 30, 2004 in accordance with Article VI, Section IV ofthe Constitution of the Philippines. Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. The COMELEC stated that this difference will not materially beaffected by the votes incertain precincts where there was failure of elections.Claiming that Biazons proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines with the COMELEC on 7 June2004. In his petition, Barbers asserted thatthe proclamation was illegal and premature being based onan incomplete canvass. He asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the special elections, which were still tobe conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results ofthe elections. In his answer, Biazon assertedthat: (1) the First Divisionof the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to review, modify, or set aside what the COMELEC sittingen banc as the NBC for Senators has officially performed; (2) since the COMELEC has proclaimed Biazon and has taken his oath of office on 30 June2004, the Senate Electoral Tribunal, not theCOMELEC, hasjurisdiction to entertain the present petition.Thus COMELEC through the Special Division, deniedthe petition to annul theproclamation of respondent Biazon for lack of merit. The COMELEC en banc further affirmed the decision and stated that even if private respondents lead was decreased to threethousand two hundredninety-nine (3,299)votes even if the special elections are yet to be conducted, he remains to be the winner and therefore the lawful occupant ofthe 12th slot for the senatorial position., qualifies such powerof the Commission by sostating that a pre-proclamation contest may only apply in caseswhere there are manifest errors in theelection returns or certificates of canvass, with respect to national elective positions suchas herein case.To prove that the same is manifest, the errors must appear on the certificates of canvass orelection returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before theboard of canvassers and specifically noted inthe minutes of their administrative proceedings.Ruling:The alleged invalidity of Biazons proclamation involves a dispute or contest relatingto the election returns of members of the Senate.Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET.For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against Biazon would usurp the constitutional functions of the SET.In addition, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailedResolutions affirming Biazonsproclamation since the uncanvassed returns and the results ofthe special elections to beheld would not materially affect the results of the elections.4. Beso vs. Aballe

PetitionerVitoBesoandprivaterespondentRitaAballe(hereafterABALLE)were candidates for the position of Barangay Captain of Barangay Carayman,Calbayog City, in the barangay elections of 12 May 1997.In the canvass of the returns of the four precincts of Barangay Carayman,BESO was credited with four hundred ninety-five (495) votes, while ABALLEobtained four hundred ninety-six (496) votes. The latter was thus proclaimedthe winning candidate.BESO seasonably filed a protest with the Municipal Trial Court of CalbayogCity (hereafter MTCC). The case was docketed as Election Protest No.130. marieAfter due proceedings, the MTCC, per Judge Filemon A. Tandico, Jr.,promulgated on 20 January 1998 a decision dated 13 January 1998, in favor ofBESO.On 20 January 1998 ABALLE filed a Notice of Appeal manifesting therein thatshe is appealing from the decision "to the Regional Trial Court, Calbayog City."It likewise appears that on 22 January 1998, ABALLE filed a Notice of Appeal.indicating therein that she was appealing from the decision "to the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANILA."On 24 April 1998, ABALLE filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City(hereafter RTC) a special civil action forcertiorariand prohibition, with anurgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ ofpreliminary injunction (id., 91) against MTCC Judge Tandinco, Jr. to set asideand annul the latters order of 2 March 1998 denying the motion for inhibition;resolution of 5 March 1998 granting the motion for execution pending appeal;and the resolution of 21 April 1998 denying the motion to reconsider theresolution of 5 March 1998. BESO was impleaded as co-respondent. The casewas assigned to Branch 31 of the RTC, presided over by public respondentJudge Roberto A. Navidad, and was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 98-040.On 28 April 1998, Judge Navidad issued a Temporary Restraining Order (id.,104) restraining respondent Judge Tandinco, Jr. and all persons acting in hisbehalf "from enforcing the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal." The temporaryrestraining order was "effective within 72 hours only from its issuance.WON COMELEC hasjurisdiction over petition forcertiorari in election contests pending in inferiorcourts

COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election protests pending before inferior courts.In Relampagos that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1 (should be Section 2)Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction overthe election contest in question. In such cases the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs ofcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellatejurisdiction. The last paragraph of Section 50 reads:The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority tohear and decide petitions forcertiorari, prohibitionand mandamus involving election cases.Under the second paragraph of Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, theCommission on Elections has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over,inter alia, contestsinvolving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.5. Lazatin vs. HRET

157 SCRA 337 Political law The Legislative Department Electoral Tribunals HRETs Jurisdiction over Electoral ProtestsCarmelo Lazatin questionedthe jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC to annul hisproclamationafter he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests.

Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatins opposition), alleged that Lazatinspetitionhad become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that thepetitionshould be given due course because theproclamationwas valid. The order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code, was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that theproclamationof Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.

ISSUE:Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRETs jurisdiction.

HELD:Yes.The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to thepetition. Thepetitionis impressed with merit because Lazatinhas been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity of theproclamation(which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

6. Jalosjos vs. COMELEC

THE long arm of the law did not catch up with former Dapitan City mayor Dominador G. Jalosjos. For more than 30 years, that arm was inutile. Even the Sandiganbayan, in a decision in a related case, was left to wonder why (d)espite the lapse of 16 years, warrant of arrest was not effected against Jalosjos.

That case was People versus Gregorio Bacolod. Greg is a Cebuano (and a friend), who rose from being Probations Officer in Cebu to administrator of the Parole and Probations Administration.These are the facts as culled from the decision of the Supreme Court in Jalosjos versus Comelec (G.R. No. 193237) and of the Sandiganbayan First Division in Pp. vs. Bacolod (Crim. Cases No. 28118 and 28119):

Jalosjos and three others were charged with robbery in Cebu on Jan. 22, 1969. On April 30, 1970, all the accused were sentenced to suffer a penalty of prision correcconal minimum to prision mayor maximum.Jalosjos appealed to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on Aug. 9, 1973.

It was only after a lapse of several years or more specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed a petition for probation before the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then, on motion filed by his probation officer, Jalosjos probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19, 1987 and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued.

The probation officer who moved to recall the probation was Bacolod. He told the Cebu RTC that since the start of 1986 up until the time that he filed his motion, Jalosjos has not reported to him.

The Court granted Bacolods motion and on March 19, 1987 it revoked the probation and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Jalosjos in order that he can serve his sentence. For one reason or another, the warrant was never served. On Jan. 16, 2004 or some 17 years after, the Court, at the instance of Assistant City Prosecutor Victor Laborte, again ordered the arrest of Jalosjos.

In the meantime and anticipating that James Adasa will file a disqualification case against him, Jalosjos secured from the Parole and Probation Administration a certification that he has fully served his probation. (Adasa was Jalosjoss opponent for mayor of Dapitan City).

The PPA issued the certification stating that Jalosjos has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and his case is deemed terminated and that the certification served as a final discharge and shall operate to restore to him (Jalosjos) all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction.

Dated Dec. 19, 2003, the certification was signed by Bacolod, the same officer who earlier asked the court to revoke Jalosjos probation for failing to report to him.

Epilogue: Jalosjos ran for Dapitan City Mayor in the May 10, 2010 elections, won and was proclaimed. The Comelec, however, disqualified him because of his previous conviction for robbery, nullified his proclamation and in his place, declared his opponent, Agapito J. Cardino, as the duly elected mayor. Last Thursday, he informed the helpless police where to find him in the hospital.

Bacolod was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt and Practices Act and of Falsification of Public Document and ordered jailed for six years and one month to ten years in the graft case and for two years, four months and one day to eight years and one day for falsification.

I do not know if he has appealed the decision.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same position from which he is now being ousted. Finally, the Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to the dispositive portion of its 11 August 2010 Resolution that the provisions of the Local Government Code on succession should apply.

We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy when he stated under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor? The COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos was not eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos made a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and not under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78 without, however, saying under what specific provision of law a petition against Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his certificate of candidacy.

What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by prisin mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.21Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections Cardino who received the highest number of votes.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."24The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED.

7. Soriano vs. COMELEC

The CaseThis is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to nullify the Orders dated 26 June 2004 of the Commission on Elections First Division (COMELEC First Division).

The FactsPetitioners and private respondents were candidates for City Council for the First and Second Districts of Muntinlupa City in the 10 May 2004 elections.

After the elections, the Muntinlupa City Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondents as the duly elected Councilors of the Muntinlupa City Council. Petitioners individually and separately filed election protest cases against private respondents, contesting the results of the elections in all the 603 precincts of the First District and the 521 precincts of the Second District of Muntinlupa City. The election protest cases for the Second District of Muntinlupa City were docketed as EPC Nos. 2004-36, 2004-37, 2004-38, 2004-39, and 2004-40 while those for the First District were docketed as EPC Nos. 2004-41, 2004-42, 2004-43, 2004-44, and 2004-45.

Issue:

The issues raised are:

1. Whether a writ of certiorari will lie in this case; and

2. Whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated 26 June 2004.

Held:

The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELECEn Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELECEn Banc.Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only delay the disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the Court. This does not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELECEn Banc. The exception enunciated inKhoandRepolis when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining order without a time limit, which is theRepolcase, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary period, which is theKhocase.

This Court has already ruled inReyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro,15that "it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELECEn Bancthat, in accordance with Section 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution,16may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari." The exception provided inKhoandRepolis unavailing in this case because unlike inKhoandRepol, the assailed interlocutory orders of the COMELEC First Division in this case are not a patent nullity. The assailed orders in this case involve the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will theRosalcase apply because in that case the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second Division and the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELECEn Bancon the main case were already consolidated.

The Court also notes that the COMELEC First Division has already issued an Order dated 31 May 2005 dismissing the protests and counter-protests in EPC Nos. 2004-36, 2004-37, 2004-38, 2004-39, 2004-40, 2004-41, 2004-42, 2004-43, 2004-44, and 2004-45 for failure of the protestants and protestees to pay the required cash deposits.17Thus, we have this peculiar situation where the interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division is pending before this Court but the main case has already been dismissed by the COMELEC First Division. This situation is precisely what we are trying to avoid by insisting on strict compliance of the rule that an interlocutory order cannot by itself be the subject of an appeal or a petition for certiorari.

WHEREFORE, weDISMISSthe petition andDENYthe prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.

SO ORDERED.8. Douglas Cagas VS COMELECG.R. No. 194139January 24, 2012Facts: The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista were candidate for Governor ofthe Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. On may 14, 2010, canvassing of votes were cast in favor of the petitioner.Alleging anomalies intheconduct oftheelection,Bautista filedanelectoral protest on May 24, 2010. In his answer the petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division issued the first order denying the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities. Bautista countered that the assailed orders, beingmerely interlocutory,could notbe elevatedto the COMELEC enbanc.The COMELEC FirstDivision issued its second order, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law. Hence, petitioner commenced the present special civil action.

Issue: whether or not Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.

Held: No. Though Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution grants SC the power to review any decision, order or ruling of COMELEC, this however is limited only to a finaldecisionorresolutionoftheCOMELECenbanc,anddoes notextendtoan interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.RulingWe dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court oncertiorariby the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to afinaldecision or resolution of the COMELECen banc,and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review oncertiorarian interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. The following cogent observations made inAmbil v. Commission on Elections24are enlightening,viz:

To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:

"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided bythis constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."[emphasis supplied]

"We have interpreted this provision to meanfinal orders, rulings and decisionsof the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be afinal decision or resolutionof the Comelecen banc,not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory orderof a division. The Supreme Court has no power to reviewvia certiorari,an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelecen bancmay be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action ofcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be noappeal, or any plain, speedyandadequate remedyin the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsiderationis a plainandadequate remedy provided by law.Failure to abideby this procedural requirementconstitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelecen banc viaa motion for reconsideration before the finalen bancdecision may be brought to the Supreme Court oncertiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.xxx25There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition forcertiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELECen bancalong with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.

As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the COMELECen banc, this Court finds the respondent COMELEC First Division correct when it held in its order dated February 28, 1996 that no final decision, resolution or order has yet been made which will necessitate the elevation of the case and its records to the Commissionen banc.No less than the Constitution requires that election cases must be heard and decided first in division and any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commissionen banc. Apparently, the orders dated July 26, 1995, November 15, 1995 and February 28, 1996 and the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with counter-protest are issuances of a Commission in division and are all interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon an incidental issue regarding the admission of Espinosa's answer with counter-protest and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits. In such a situation, the rule is clear that the authority to resolve incidental matters of a case pending in a division, like the questioned interlocutory orders, falls on the division itself, and not on the Commissionen banc. Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure explicitly provides for this,

Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required xxx

xxx

(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commissionen bancexcept motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. (emphasis provided)

Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure confirms that the subject case does not fall on any of the instances over which the Commissionen banccan take cognizance of. It reads as follows:

Section 2.The Commissionen banc. The Commission shall siten bancin cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of a Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commissionen banc.

In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may siten banc. Neither is it shown that the present controversy a case where a division is not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the First Division unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the Commissionen banc. Clearly, the Commissionen banc, under the circumstances shown above, can not be the proper forum which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commissionen bancas this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Courtviaa petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.(Bold emphasis supplied)

Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELECRules of Procedurethat the matter is one that the COMELECen bancmay sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELECen banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELECen bancis not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed.

However, theKho v. Commission on Electionsexception has no application herein, because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution vested in the COMELEC broad powers involving not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections but also the resolution and determination of election controversies.27The breadth of such powers encompasses the authority to determine the sufficiency of allegations contained in every election protest and to decide based on such allegations whether to admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or to outrightly dismiss the protest in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFORSection 1.Title.This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."

Section 2.Declaration of part y.The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

Section 3.Definition of Terms.(a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Section 4.Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System.Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.

Section 5.Registration.Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.

Section 6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Section 7.Certified List of Registered Parties.The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.

Section 8.Nomination of Party-List Representatives.Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

Section 9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.

Section 10.Manner of Voting.Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998.

The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the party-list system.

Section 11.Number of Party-List Representatives.The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12.Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives.The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.

Section 13.How Party-List Representatives are Chosen.Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

Section 14.Term of Office.Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 15.Change of Affiliation; Effect.Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.

Section 16.Vacancy.In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.

Section 17.Rights of Party-List Representatives.Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.

Section 18.Rules and Regulations.The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 19.Appropriations.The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act.

Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its information campaign on the party-list system.

Section 20.Separability Clause.If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 21.Repealing Clause.All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

Section 22.Effectivity.This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved, March 3, 1995.

Republic of the PhilippinesHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNALElectoral Tribunal BuildingCommonwealth Avenue, Quezon City

THE 2011 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNALThe House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal hereby adopts and promulgates the following Rules governing its proceedings as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of Member of the House of Representatives, pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution.

TITLE AND CONSTRUCTIONRULE 1.Title. These Rules shall be known and cited as the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, or HRET Rules. The word Tribunal whenever used alone or without qualification in these Rules, shall refer to the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.

RULE 2.Construction. These Rules shall be liberally constructed in order to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every contest brought before the Tribunal.

THE TRIBUNALRULE 3.Composition.- The Tribunal shall be composed of nine (9) Members, three (3) of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six (6) shall be Members of the House of Representatives who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairperson.

RULE 4.Organization. (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the election of the Members of the House of Representatives who are to compose the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its organization and adoption of such resolutions as it may deem proper.

(b) Notwithstanding the provision of the immediately preceding paragraph, pending the election of the Members of the House of Representatives who shall sit in the Tribunal, the tree (3) Justices already designated shall have the authority to act on administrative and interlocutory matters subject to confirmation by the Tribunal upon its organization.

(c) The Tribunal may constitute itself into three (3) divisions for the purpose of allocating and distributing its workload. Each division shall be composed of one (1) Justice and two (2) Members of the House of Representatives.

Each division shall act on such matters as may be assigned to it by the Tribunal En Banc, including the appreciation of contested ballots, returns and election documents pertaining to the particular contested precincts assigned to it by raffle and the submission to the Tribunal En Banc of its findings and recommendations thereon within the time specified therefor.

RULE 5.Meetings; Quorum; Executive Committee Actions on Matters in between Regular Meetings. (a) The Tribunal shall meet on such days and hours as it may designate or at the call of the Chairperson or of a majority of its Members. The presence of at least one (1) Justice and four (4) Members of the Tribunal shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. In the absence of the Chairperson, the next Senior Justice shall preside, and in the absence of both, the Justice present shall take the Chair.

(b) In the absence of a quorum and provided there is at least one Justice in attendance, the Members present, who shall not be less than three (3), may constitute themselves as an Executive Committee to act on the agenda for the meeting concerned, provided, however, that its action shall be subject to confirmation by the Tribunal at any subsequent meeting where a quorum is present.

(c) In between the regular meetings of the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or any three (3) of its Members, provided at least one (1) of them is a Justice-Member, who may sit as the Executive Committee, may act on the following matters requiring immediate action by the Tribunal:

1. Any pleading or motion,

(a) Where delay in its resolution may result in irreparable or substantial damage or injury to the rights of a party or cause delay in the proceedings or action concerned;

(b) Which is urgent in character but does not substantially affect the rights of the adverse party, such as one for extension of time to comply with an order/resolution of the Tribunal, or to file a pleading which is not a prohibited pleading and is within the discretion of the Tribunal to grant; and

(c) Where the Tribunal would require a comment, reply, rejoinder or any other similar pleading from any of the parties or their attorneys; and

2. Administrative matters which do not involve new applications or allocations of the appropriations of the Tribunal.

However, any such action/resolution shall be included in the order of business of the immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation.

RULE 6.Place of Meetings. The Tribunal shall meet in the Conference Room of the Tribunal at its main office or at such other place in Metro Manila as it may designate. When in its judgment the interest of justice so requires, it may also hold sessions outside of Metro Manila.

RULE 7.Exclusive Control of Functions. The Tribunal shall have exclusive control, direction, and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation.

RULE 8.Express and Implied Powers.- The Tribunal shall have and exercise all such powers as are vested in it by the Constitution or by law, and such other powers as may be necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its purposes and the effective exercise of its functions

RULE 9.Inherent Powers. When performing its functions, the Tribunal shall have inherent power to, inter alia:

(1) Preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;

(2) Enforce order in proceedings before it or before any of its officials acting under its authority;

(3) Compel obedience to its judgments, orders, resolutions and processes;

(4) Compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in any case or proceeding before it;

(5) Administer or cause to be administered oaths in any case or proceeding before it, and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of its powers;

(6) Control its processes and amend its resolutions or orders to make them conform with law and justice;

(7) Authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be filed and used in lieu of the original, and restore and supply deficiencies in its records and proceedings; and

(8) Promulgate its own rules of procedure and amend or revise the same.

RULE 10.The Chairperson; Powers and Duties. The Chairperson shall have the following powers and duties:

(1) Act as the Chief Executive Officer of the Tribunal;

(2) Exercise administrative supervision over the Tribunal, including the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal and the administrative staff of the Tribunal;

(3) Issue calls for the sessions and meetings of the Tribunal and preside thereat, and preserve order and decorum during the same; and pass upon all questions of order subject to such appeal as any member may take to the Tribunal;

(4) Take care that the orders, resolutions, and decisions of the Tribunal are enforced;

(5) Appoint, dismiss or otherwise discipline the personnel of the Tribunal in accordance with Civil Service laws and regulations. The confidential employees of every Member shall serve at the pleasure of such Member and in no case beyond the tenure of such Member; and

(6) Perform such other functions and acts as may be necessary or appropriate to ensure the independence and efficiency of the Tribunal.

RULE 11.Administrative Staff. The Tribunal shall have a Secretary and a Deputy Secretary. Unless the Tribunal otherwise provides, the administrative staff of the Tribunal shall function in eight (8) services, namely:

(1) Legal Service;

(2) Canvass Board Service;

(3) Information System and Judicial Records Management Service;

(4) Human Resource Management Service;

(5) General Service;

(6) Finance and Budget Service;

(7) Accounting Service; and

(8) Cash Management Service.

RULE 12.Duties of the Secretary of the Tribunal; the Deputy Secretary of the Tribunal. The Secretary of the Tribunal shall have the following duties:

(1) Receive all pleadings and other documents properly presented, indicating on each such document the date and time when it was filed, and furnishing each Member of the Tribunal a copy thereof;

(2) Keep a judicial docket wherein shall be entered in chronological order the contests and cases brought before the Tribunal, and the proceedings had therein;

(3) Prepare the calendar of contests and cases;

(4) Attend the sessions or meetings of the Tribunal and, whenever necessary, of its divisions, and keep the minutes thereof which shall contain a clear and succinct account of all business transacted;

(5) Certify under his signature and the seal of the Tribunal all notices, orders, resolutions and decisions of the Tribunal;

(6) Implement the orders, resolutions, decisions and processes issued by the Tribunal;

(7) Keep a judgment book containing a copy of each decision and final order or resolution rendered by the Tribunal in the order of its dates, and a Book of Entries of Judgments containing in chronological order entries of the dispositive portions of all decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Tribunal;

(8) Keep an account of the funds received and disbursed relative to the cases;

(9) Subject to the authority of the Tribunal and the Chairperson, oversee the performance of the line and support (adjudicatory and administrative) functions of the various divisions of the administrative staff;

(10) Keep and secure all ballot boxes, election documents, records, papers, files, exhibits, the office seal and other public property belonging to or officially brought to the Tribunal;

(11) Perform such other duties as are prescribed by law for clerks of superior courts; and

(12) Keep such other books and perform such other duties as the Tribunal or the Chairperson may direct.

The Deputy Secretary of the Tribunal shall assist the Secretary of the Tribunal; act as Secretary of the Tribunal in the absence of the latter; and perform such other duties and functions as may be assigned by the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or the Secretary of the Tribunal.

RULE 13.The Seal. The seal of the Tribunal shall be circular in shape and shall contain in the upper part the words "House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal," in the center, the coat of arms of the Republic of the Philippines; and at the base, the words "Republic of the Philippines."

The seal of the Tribunal shall be affixed to all decisions, orders, rulings or resolutions of the Tribunal, certified copies of official records, and such other documents which the Tribunal may require to be sealed.

THE TRIBUNAL

The presentSenate Electoral Tribunal (SET)was constituted under theSection 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitutionto be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of members of the Senate of the Philippines. It is an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal composed of nine (9) members, Three (3) members are Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice. As envision by the framers of the Constitution, they serve to neutralize the partisanship that may arise from the political affiliation of the other six (6) members, who are Senators of the Philippines chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties represented in the Senate. The Tribunal is chaired by the most senior Justice-Member.The current tribunal is composed of: Hon. Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Chairman

Hon. Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Member

Hon. Justice Arturo D. Brion, Member

Hon. Senator Loren B. Legarda, Member

Hon. Senator Manuel Lito M. Lapid, Member

Hon. Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II, Member

Hon. Senator Manuel B. Villar, Jr., Member

Hon. Senator Capanera Pia S. Cayetano, Member

Hon. Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, Member

The Senate Electoral Tribunal functions under the vision of steadfastly upholding the true will of the electorate as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate. Its mission is to resolve all electoral contests brought within its jurisdiction through just, expeditious, and inexpensive proceedings. Its avowed value is love of fellowmen and country as manifested by:

Integrity, which is defined as consistency of thoughts and feelings with words and actions honesty and transparency in all dealings;

Commitment or dedication of self to the realization of the SET vision and to excellence in public service;

Impartiality; i.e. neutrality and faithful adherence to fairness and justice;

Prudence, meaning care and foresight in the utilization and management of resources; and,

Personnel Empowerment defined as the optimization of employee capability and potentials.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 1793AN ACT CONSTITUTING AN INDEPENDENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL TO TRY, HEAR AND DECIDE PROTESTS CONTESTING THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PROVIDING FOR THE MANNER OF HEARING THE SAME.Section 1.There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to be composed of eleven members which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines. It shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice shall be its chairman. If on account of illness, absence, or incapacity upon any of the grounds mentioned in section one, Rule one hundred and twenty-six of the Rules of Court, of any member of the Tribunal, or whenever, by reason of temporary disability of any member thereof, or vacancies occurring therein the requisite number of members of the Tribunal necessary to constitute a quorum or to render a judgment in any given contest, as hereafter provided, is not present, or for any other good reason for the early disposal of the contest, the Chief Justice may designate any retired justice or justices of the Supreme Court as may be necessary, to sit temporarily as Member of the Tribunal, in order to form a quorum or until a judgment in said contest is reached:Provided, however, That if no retired justices of the Supreme Court are available or the number available is not sufficient, justices of the Court of Appeals and retired justices of the Court of Appeals may be designated to act as Member of the Tribunal.

Section 2.A majority of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall constitute a quorum to do business. Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, it may promulgate its own rules and regulations governing the procedure to be followed in the filing and hearing of such contest, and may authorize any three of its members to receive evidence.

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall hear and decide in banc all presidential election contests brought under this Act and the concurrence of at least seven members of the Tribunal shall be necessary for a final decision thereon.

Section 3.The Presidential Electorial Tribunal shall decide the contest within twenty months after it is filed, and within said period shall declare who among the parties has been elected, or, in the proper case, that none has been elected, and in case of a tie between the candidates for president or for vice-president involved in the contest, one of them shall be chosen President or Vice-President, as the case may be, by a majority vote of the members of the Congress in joint session assembled.

The party who, in the judgment, has been declared elected, shall have the right to assume the office as soon as the judgment becomes final which shall be ten days after promulgation. The promulgation shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys, personally or by registered mail or by telegraph. No motion shall be entertained for the reopening of a case but only for the reconsideration of a decision under the evidence already of record, No party may file more than one motion for reconsideration, copy of which shall be served upon the adverse party who shall answer it within five days after the receipt thereof. Any petition for reconsideration shall be resolved within ten days after it is submitted for resolution. As soon as a decision becomes final, a copy thereof shall be furnished both houses of the Congress.

Section 4.The Tribunal shall have a Clerk of the Tribunal and such other subordinate officers and employees as may be necessary for the efficient performance of its functions and duties, all of whom shall be appointed by the Tribunal in accordance with the Civil Service Law and Rules. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal may designate the Chief Attorney of the Commission on Elections to act as Clerk of the Tribunal, and may assign other employees of the Commission on Elections and of the Supreme Court as may be necessary to perform duties in connection therewith. Such officials and employees when so assigned by the Tribunal, shall perform their duties and functions under the exclusive supervision and control of the Tribunal.

Section 5.Any registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received not less than five hundred thousand votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a petition of contest with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty days after the proclamation of the result of the election.

Before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall take cognizance of a petition of contest or counter-contest, the contestant or counter-contestant shall file a bond with two sureties satisfactory to the Tribunal and for such amount as it may fix, to answer for the payment of all expenses and costs incidental to said contest, or shall deposit with the Tribunal cash in lieu of the bond, or both, as the Tribunal may order. Within five days from the filing of the contest or counter-contest, the Tribunal shall fix the amount of the bond or the cash deposit or both and if the contestant or counter-contestant fails to file the required bond or cash deposit or both within ten days from notice, his petition of contest or counter-contest, shall be dismissed. The Tribunal may, for good reason, order from time to time that the amount of the bond or the cash deposit be increased or decreased, or order the disposition of such deposit as the course of the contest may require. In case the party who has paid the expenses and costs wins in the contest, the Tribunal shall assess, levy and collect the same as costs from the losing party.

Section 6.The Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall have and exercise the same powers which the law confers upon the courts or justice, including the issuance of subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, the taking of depositions, the arrest of witnesses for the purpose of compelling their appearance; the production of documents and other evidence, the compulsory payment of the costs and expenses which may have been assessed against the parties and their bonds and the enforcing of said payment through the officers charged with the enforcement of judicial orders.

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal or any of its Members shall have the power to punish contempts provided for in Rules 64 of the Rules of Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein and exercised by superior courts.

The telegrams and correspondence of the Tribunal shall be transmitted free of charge.

Section 7.The sum of two hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 8.This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 21, 1957