MEDITERRANEAN

AFFAIRS

Dossier IN THE CHAOS OF

LIBYA

M. Anastasi F. Angelone M. Ciola G. Morabito

Translation by

F. Azzarà

August 2014

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The social picture

by Matteo Anastasi

Libya is lying in a situation of social chaos. The absence of a central, strong and legitimized power has brought back some dynamics which were meant to be disappeared in the post Qaddafi era (1969-2011). In order to better understand the current social environment is necessary to focus on two intertwined internal dimensions – that is the role respectively covered by the clans/tribes and by non-governmental actors (specifically, the militias) which undoubtedly exercise an influence on the already complex regional socio-political situation.

When we talk about a tribe we refer to a typical social unit of a traditional society. A Tribe is composed of group of families or simply refers to a community sharing a system of values and norms. Throughout the Libyan history, the role of tribes – and, particularly, the chiefs’ attitude to power – passed through ups and downs. During the Senussi monarchy, the power was given to Idris I while the heads of the clans were appointed as counselors and had a direct role with the former. When Qaddafi took the power on September 1969, he abolished the aforementioned patronage system. Following to the ‘green revolution’, a new system of power was defined in the country. The charismatic leader, appointed as in a postmodern Caesarism, detained the power while the sole tribes of Warfalla and al-Magharba were allowed to have a say in the political domain.

The end of the Qaddafi era – determined, firstly, by the tribes’ revolt against the regime – signed a turning point: it coincided with the institutionalization of the clans’ participation to the country’s politics. Indeed, the first democratic elections were held in 2012. Although during the 20th century and during the first years of the new millennium the clans’ political role was not that clear, they maintained their re-distributive function though. In fact, the government has always remitted to the clans the function of redistributing to the people the money obtained from the oil exportation. In a future perspective, it is arguable that the Libyan tribes may continue to play a fundamental role – owed to the citizens’ nationalism which makes them identify with specific tribes: not only the clans and the tribes would preserve stability but also they would cover the eventual power gaps that would create in the meantime. As for the current picture, there are some major tribes to be mentioned: al-Rijban Awlad Busayf, al-Zintan e Warfalla in Tripolitania; al-Abaydat, al-Awagir, al-Barasa, al-Fawakhir, al-Majabra, al-Zuwayya and Drasa in Cyrenaica; al-Guwaid Syrte, al-Haraba, al-Hassawna, al-Hutman, al-Magharba, al-Qaddadfa, al-Riyyah, al-Zuwaid, Toubou and Tuareg in Fezzan.

When talking about the militias, we must not forget to make reference also to the clans, as the two are tightly connected. For this very reason, the former refused to give back the

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weapons they used during the civil war against Qaddafi. The link to the tribes is indeed the reason why the militias refused to integrate with the newly formed national military which is consequently still embryonic. Indeed, there is another relevant factor to mention. A substantial part of the government funds to the military for the latter’s development and empowerment is specifically provided by the Ministry of Defense with the sole aim of keeping the military forces under control. Unfortunately, the system of state funding allows the military to reinforce itself and to manipulate the politicians at the same time. The main militias are nowadays the well knows COLR (Cell for Operations of Libyan Revolutionaries); the February 17th Martyrs Brigade, which has 12 battalions at its disposal and a wide arsenal obtained through the management of several barracks in Cyrenaica; the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade, mainly composed of former Jihadist fighters, the Zintan Military Council, with four thousand men forming five brigades. On the contrary, the Militias of Misrata – an administrative entity, as a sort City-State, where two brigades emerge: the Sadun al-Suwayli Brigade and Ansar al-Sharia. The latter is fully integrated with the international jihadism and is tightly linked with the whole regional terroristic network: from the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to the Tunisian homonym Ansar al-Sharia. Therefore, bearing in mind what mentioned above, the government must quickly solve the militias’ issue, unless the brigades will take upon the power in the close future – which is something we cannot exclude.

At the regional level, the current social situation is deeply conditioned by the relationship with the main entities within this area. As for Egypt, following to the rapprochement of relations thanks to the affinities with the Morsi government and with the Justice and Construction Party, the situation changed with the advent to power of General Al-Sisi in 2013. Nowadays, Cairo is very concerned with the improvement of the links between the Libyan and Egyptian Islamists, the latter finding more and more often harbor in Cyrenaica.

In the meanwhile, Libya has been signing several economic and security-based pacts with Tunisia, which is also attempting to abolish the old elites’ logics and to open up a new page in its history. The establishment an entente between Tripoli and Tunisia is likely to modify the geopolitical equilibrium in North Africa, resulting in a damage for Algeria: the latter’s relationship with Libya has been frozen especially since 2011, owing to the alleged support that the country gave to Qaddafi during the revolution. Similarly to what Egypt did, Tunisia also declared its concern regarding the Libyan instability, being the latter menaced by some radical groups coming from the North-western border.

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The situation of the military

by Marcello Ciola

Soon after Qaddafi’s removal, around almost 200.000 armed people gathered around the streets and the squares of Libya for celebrating the end of the regime. The rebel militias were supposed to be integrated within the new Libyan military, through the compulsory conscription and the voluntary quittance of weapons. Indeed, someone believed that the jihadists, who also played a significant role in the overthrow of the Jamahiriya (‘State of the Masses’ or People’s Republic), would be then pushed back to the desert. Even better, they thought that the jihadists could be defeated by the new Libyan state with the (purported) support of the US or of the EU.

Unfortunately, things did not go on as the National Transitional Council of Libya expected. As a result, the current government is now facing an unprecedented crisis – especially due to the lack of territorial control owing, indeed, to the chaotic situation within the military domain.

Which actors are involved, for better or for worse, consciously or not, in this chaotic situation? Which links put them together and which are the points of conflict? Which relationships exist between the above mentioned ones and the institutions, both national and international? What is the current military scenario in Libya and which are the instruments that the international and Italian political actors can adopt to this regards?

In the next paragraphs, we will be trying to answer these few questions in order to better understand the central relevance of the Libyan ‘issue’ for the Mediterranean and European politics.

A conspicuous number of actors is active on the Libyan territory. We can group them in three macro areas but, still, it would be very hard to make precise distinctions as it not that unusual to have sometimes militias responding to Libyan institutions – like those asking for the defense of the 2011 revolution against the fundamentalist groups – or that are directly financed by these institutions. At the same time, it is not often clearly comprehensible how far these groups are from the jihadists’ ideas. In brief, the government forces and the paramilitary formations are the extremities of a continuum which has essentially two factors in common: the loyalty to the current Libyan institutions and the ‘degree of Islamization’.

At one extreme of this continuum, we can find the Libyan army which counts around 35.000 units, mainly former deserters of the foregoing army of Jamahiriya and groups of rebel militias that after the revolution of 2011 have abandoned their weapons for pursuing their activity within the Libyan institutions framework. Thus, the Libyan military apparatus

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still detains some remnants of the former Libyan army’s equipment, which was mainly bought from the USSR, but also from Italy, the US, China and others.

Parallel to the army, there is also a special force of 5.000 units, including in particular paramilitary organizations, called Al-Saiqa. This elitist group has rebelled to the Qaddafi regime and played a central role both in causing the fall of the Qaddafi’s regime and in the defense of Benghazi in summer 2013 and for all the 2014 as well.

The Al Saiqa’s establishment is much more ancient than 2011: in fact, it dates back to the 90s’ when it helped to prevent the rebellion of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Its role has determined the current rivalry with the fundamentalist groups connected to Al-Qaeda e AQIM. Not only Al-Saiqa has been perpetually clashing with the qaedist forces, but also its relationship with the police has been complicated. The latter, in fact, has not accepted that Al-Saiqa plays a role replicating the police’s, particularly in the fight against terrorism, and overcoming – thanks to its effectiveness – the Security National Direction’s. Furthermore, although Al-Saiqa’s forces are inferior in number, their training and equipment is better than the others’. Both Al-Saiqa and the Libyan army had frictions with the Libyan Shield Force (LS), a rather numerous organization, divided into brigades, of Islamic inspiration and distributed along the northern stripe of the Libyan coast.

The LS is a border-line organization between pro-governmental and pro-qaedist and fundamentalist groups. Sometimes its formations stood on the Libyan government’s side while, others, with the jihadists, in particular with Ansar al-Sharia and the brigades of Misrata. In collaboration with the latter, it contributed to the establishment of the Islamic emirate of Benghazi after days of violent clashes with the Al-Saiqa forces.

Among the other forces under governmental control, we can count the anti-crime unit, the Special Deterrence Force of Tripoli (the SDF, which had several problems with the local population); Joint security operations room and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG). The latter is a militia of masterpiece importance: it is formally controlled by the Ministry of Petroleum and financed by the Ministry of Defense; it includes at around 20.000 units of which only a little part – one tenth – has been trained by the Libyan army, while the others belong to the Ibrahim Al-Jathran militias (which is also a notorious political leader in Cyrenaica).

The latter, being the ‘tutor of the oil production’, obtained from the government the authorization to create his own oil company, ‘the Libyan Oil and Gas Corporation’. Al-Jathran did not hesitate to use the energy weapon for influencing the state politics and foreign companies working in the energy resources domain, in particular of ENI which is forced to stand the PFG’S vagaries.

Among the revolutionary militias which we have mentioned so far, we can find the Libya Revolutionaries Joint Operations Room (LRJOR), founded in 2013 thanks to an executive

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order the President of the Libyan Parliament, Nouri Abusahmain, with the aim of protecting the public order in Tripoli. Officially, these militias should respond to the Ministry of Defense; nonetheless, they have always acted independently: in fact, they have also been involved in the attempted coup d’état of 2013, which was followed their removal.

After a few weeks, the LRJOR came back to Tripoli and also to Benghazi in order to continue defending the revolution with the army. However, although it tried to ‘normalize’ the militias, refused to recognize the LRJOR’s role of tutor of the public order, especially for what concerns its brigade in Benghazi.

Among the above mentioned Islamic militias, we must also mention the Brigade of Al-Qaqaa which counts around 18.000 men and which is considered as one of the most important in Libya; the Al-Sawaiq Brigade, being very close to the Libyan army as well as the jihadist Rafallah al-Sahati. There is one difference: while As-Sawaiq has remained very faithful to the government during the disorders of the last months, Al-Sahati allied with the jihadists which took Bengasi. Tightly connected to the qaedist group of Ansar Al-Sharia, there is also the Omar Al-Mukhtar Brigade, inspired by the resistance of the homonym Libyan hero during the Ital-Turkish war of 1911-1912 and during the Italian colonization operations of 1935-1936.

During the last years, among the western block, leaded by NATO, some military bodies of several Member states to the Atlantic Pact gave assistance and trained the Libyan military. In the forefront there was the US, followed by the UK, France, Italy and Turkey. The greatest part of the training took place in Bulgaria at the end of 2013. Unfortunately, the training program did not obtain the expected results as the independence that some militias revenged face the central government triggered the instability within the army.

Thus, NATO did not have enough time for reinforcing the defense and anti-terrorism capacities of the Libyan military body. Therefore, the government control on the militias fell and, together with the almost inexistent political authority, it provoked the increase in political relevance of the jihadist/qaedist forces.

Resulting from the defeat of the forces of Al-Saiqa in Benghazi, which turned out in the worsening of the internal political situation, the international actors moved their personnel to Tunisia or brought it back home. The western military involvement in Libya, after its initial support to the rebels against Qaddafi, ended up as a negative sum game: who expected a huge advantage following to the regime’s fall (especially the US and France), had to face actually a undesirable situation due to the military instability especially around Tripoli and Benghazi, which affects also and in particular the border of the Libyan state where the commerce of weapons with the militias and the terrorist groups is concentrated. While the western (and Mediterranean) powers are seemingly losing the Libyan match, Qatar, on the contrary, seems winning.

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Last June, General Khalifa Haftar accused the Qatar’s government of financing the rebel groups for avoiding the Libyan state to become strong once again. Moreover, the General stated that the position of Sudan with regard to Libya is not clear while Egypt Chad, Niger, Mali, Algeria and Tunisia are collaborating with the government (elected on June 25th but not installed yet).

On one hand, The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Federica Mogherini, underlined the importance of a stable installment of the Libyan Government, on the other, the Undersecretary of State, Mr. Marco Minniti, asked for the international community’s intervention. Also Mr. Matteo Renzi, Italy’s Prime Minister, shared the latter’s claim, and addressed for this purpose the UN attaché to whom he suggested, indeed, the establishment of a Roma-Cairo axis to solve the military (besides economics, political and humanitarian) emergence.

According to the data, arming the Libyan army and supporting the establishment of a western-oriented democratic government could not be sufficient for the stability purpose: this system, founded on diplomatic and soft power means, triggered the military ‘egoisms’ of the clans and tribes affiliated to various jihadist groups or militias (a similar effect was obtained in the past in Somalia). The paradox is that, in order to provide the sought stability to the country, it would be necessary to give the power to another Qaddafi (like in Egypt, where Al-Sisi took the power as a new ‘Mubarak’).

Italy does not have, unfortunately, the diplomatic, economic and military means for changing this Somali-like path in Libya. However, Italy could ask for the establishment of an internationally-funded, Mediterranean task force which would take charge of the stability in Libya and, therefore, of the whole Mediterranean area. The chances of success of this solution highly depend on the timing of the intervention: we cannot wait any longer as the European and Mediterranean stability highly depends on the (lack) of military stability in Libya.

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The economy

by Francesco Angelone

Libya is seeking its own political identity through elections, being these considered as an essential element in a democratic system. At the same time, it will have to decide which route to take in order to recover the economy after years of internal conflicts, which seem unlikely to end very soon. Therefore, the North African country’s transition – which, according to some observers, might be leading to a state failure or to an authoritarian revival – proceeds on a double-track.

If the Libyan political framework is very intricate and fragmented, divided between factions more or less easily to identify, the Libyan economy presents critical issues related to the energy resources management sector, which alone accounts for almost the entire State revenues. The macroeconomic framework of the post-Qaddafi’s Libya is not the most encouraging one, as it is strongly affected by the country’s lack of stability. This picture is indeed likely to worsen if elections held on 25th June 2014, which ended with the victory of the ‘liberals’, will not be followed up by the establishment of a stable central authority in order to promote both institutional and economic reforms, and to exploit effectively the treasure that is hidden in the subsoil. The task of the government, therefore, is also to establish a business environment for attracting foreign investors in order to facilitate an effective economic recovery.

The Libyan economy, as previously mentioned, is typical of a rentier state, i.e. a country which derives almost all of its income from the sale of its natural resources, of whatever nature they may be, to foreign countries. The definition, intuitively, is perfectly applicable to countries such as Libya, also a member of the OPEC, which is at its turn composed of ‘oil states’, because of the large amount of oil they own.

In recent years, particularly since 2011, the GDP growth rate has been suffering of continuous fluctuations, an unusual phenomenon for the local economy. The latest available data, of January 2014, show a decline in GDP of 12.06%, but after the political crisis Libya has also recorded sharp declines of 52.5% and sudden growths of up to 104.37%. You cannot ignore the fact that these substantial deficits and surpluses depend almost exclusively on the interruption-resumption of oil exports. It is evident, therefore, that a worsening of the Libyan economic situation turns out into a worsening of the energy situation in this country.

Anyway, we must admit that since the outbreak of the crisis in the country, governments have been very committed on the implementation of programs of support and assistance to the citizens. However, the increase in public spending has further worsened the debt of a country whose production (energy more than anything else) has stopped.

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The future Libya must not forget what allowed it to impose as a continental power during the Qaddafi’s regime that is thanks to the mineral sources in the subsoil. The data on BP Statistical Review of World Energy describe Libya as the country holding the largest amount of oil reserves in all Africa and rank Libya as the fourth as regards to natural gas. The figures speak for themselves, and therefore it is likely that the country’s, at least for the moment, can only expect to flourish again thanks to the production and the commerce on hydrocarbons (in 2012, 95% of national exports consisted of oil and gas). However, the Libyan government’s challenge is to diversify the economy of the country, excessively dependent on the fortunes of the energy sector, certainly necessary but not sufficient condition for a sustainable and long-lasting growth. The efforts made in this direction by both Qaddafi and the following governments seem vain, though.

Oil production has sought an important stop in 2011, with the outbreak of the civil war. In that case, Libya’s oil production slipped from 1.66 million barrels per day to only 0.48. The figure is even more disconcerting when you consider that in 2010 about 1.5 million barrels of crude oil were exported. The net loss for the State revenues was huge, but it was partially recovered in the following year, 2012, when, benefiting from the end of most of the hostilities, the production climbed again and returned almost to the pre-war levels. During the year 2013, however, there was yet another abrupt interruption of production, similar in magnitude to that of 2011.

The reason for these disruptions lies mainly in the geographical location of the country’s oil fields and processing plants. Most of the deposits, in fact, are in the east of the country, in Cyrenaica, or in its proximity, the region where the tension seems to reach maximum levels. In this context, in which protests led to the closure of the loading ports, of the fields themselves and of the pipelines, as it was not physically possible to ensure the safety of the oil production, Libya paid to the tune of billions of dollars the price of its own domestic political scenario. But these problems, both in 2011 and 2013, also affected the fields in the western part of the country that is those of El Sahara (closed several times between the summer and the autumn of 2013) and El Feel. The Zintan militias, very influential in the area, have hindered the smooth operation of both reservoirs and pumping and storage facilities in order to renegotiate better terms contracts for the sale of refined oil. The strong cleavages between the different areas of the country brought people to think that a division of the national oil company, the National Oil Corporation (NOC), was possible, so that it could operate through two companies, with one based in Cyrenaica and dedicated to the refining and petrochemical industry.

Such a situation, as you might guess, affects not only the country’s finances, and the ability to support, financially speaking, and the plans of social intervention. As a result, also the relationships with the big foreign companies operating in Libya and with the foreign countries themselves. In 2013, the oil minister al-Arousi foresaw the possibility of

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reviewing the oil contracts as those were stipulated against the national interest, thus, with an undue advantage for foreign contractors. Foreign companies, therefore, already alarmed by the political instability, began to act more cautiously.

At the moment, things do not seem to have improved as hoped. In June, the Prime Minister Al-Thani announced that the government had regained control of the terminal of Ras Lanuf and Es Seder in the Gulf of Sirte. However, after two months from that announcement, the production is still blocked. NOC has announced that the current fighting (especially in Tripoli) has not affected the oil production while foreign companies, Total, Eni and Repsol, have evacuated their staff. For countries such as Italy and Spain, heavily dependent on energy imports, the situation in Libya has a fundamental importance, especially in light of other crises in relevant areas for their energy supply (Ukraine for example, where, however, the greatest anxiety concerns the gas supplies).

It is for all these reasons that the diversification of the national economy, although important, does not seem to be a matter of importance comparable to the return of crude oil extraction and processing to pre-war levels. As the incidents of the recent years and months have showed, is even more essential to restore a quiet and stable environment for enabling the flourishing of a productive activity. As long as these internal rifts continue to affect the Libyan politics, the country could not optimize the exploitation of its energy resources.

The argument, of course, is also valid for the production and the international trade of natural gas. Although quantitatively less important for the Libyan economy, the country’s gas could be of critical importance to overcome the energy security issue of such purchasers from the northern shores of the Mediterranean, like Italy. We must keep in mind that in 2012, for example, Libya exported less gas than in the previous years, and that the only buyer of Libyan LNG was Italy.

Therefore, the battle of the Libyan government against political instability is of masterpiece importance not only for Libya’ state revenues and citizens, but also for other international players, both purchasers and investors.

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The political scenario

by Giacomo Morabito

The Libya which resulted from the 2011 war is still searching for a political equilibrium and is going through a phase of incertitude, instability which is not likely to end very soon. While in the rest of the country the clashes between the rival militias are ongoing, the city of Tobruk has been considered instead so safe to been chosen as the home city to the ‘Chamber of Representatives’.

This is a new parliamentary assembly which replaces the General National Congress (GNC), which has been established two years ago (9th August 2012) in substitution to the National Transitional Council.

The GNC, established during the Libyan revolution of 2011, counted 31 members. Its aim was mainly to pursue the revolutionary actions until the freed of the country and, afterwards, to organize free elections and redact a new constitution. The elections were held firstly on July 2012 when 200 members of the GNC were nominated. The latter had 100 members in Tripolitania, 60 in Cyrenaica, 40 in Fezzan. The GNC was meant to appoint the new government, as the former has been weakened by armed militias and various local radical groups. According to the official data from the Libyan High National Elections Commission, the liberal party ‘alliance of national forces’, led by Mahmoud Jibril, conquered 48.1% of suffrages, gaining 39 seats, meanwhile the Islamic party construction and Justice gained 10.3%, which got 17 seats. After these, there were other parties, in particular, the national front, the Wadi al-Hiya alliance, the Union for the country and the National central party.

When the elections ended, the figure of Ali Zeidan emerged: opponent to the Qaddafi regime, Zeidan passed almost 30 years in exile in Switzerland and came back to Libya just in occasion of the 2011 revolution. Afterwards, he was appointed representative in Europe of the CNT, the Libyan ad interim government, and this fact convinced the French government to support the rebel forces. Although he lost the presidential elections in 2012 against Mohammed Magariaf, he was afterwards appointed as Prime Minister by the GNC due to the Mustafa Abushagur’s incapability of forming a new government.

One year later, he was kidnapped by some armed men, just a few days after the US Special Forces’ raid which ended with the capture of one of the most influent leaders of Al Qaeda, Abu Anas Al-Libi, being him considered the head behind the massacre of Nairobi and Dar es Salam in 1998.

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The al-Zeidan’s government was overall weak, unable to impose a stood control on the territory and to bear the weight of the crisis in Cyrenaica, where the rebel forces have been occupying the main ports of oil exportation (which was blocked as a result).

His power lasted until, some moths afterwards, a north-Korean oil ship managed to ‘steal’ 200.000 barrels from the port of al-Sidra, in the Ras Lanuf area. The event put a shame on the country, according to the Libyan politicians. Therefore, on 11th March 2014, the GNC voted a motion of no-confidence against him, which was approved with a majority of 124 votes on 194.

He was then replaced by the Defense Ministry ad-interim, Abdullah al-Thani. However, the new government lasted only one month (Al-Thani resigned his dimissions on 13th April 2014) and the power was then given to Ahmed Omar Maitik. In the meanwhile, Khalifa Haftar, Lieutenant General the Libyan army, head of the Al-Saiqa brigade, launched the operation ‘dignity’ against the Islamist forces, particularly strong in Cyrenaica. Haftar tried to suspend the parliamentary works after an attack enacted by his soldiers and accused both al-Thani and Maitik of being too close to the Islamist forces.

His appointment was made under controversial circumstances, finally solved by the Libyan Supreme Court. On July 2014, it declared the illegality of the Malik’s appointment and that Al-Thani was effectively the Prime Minister. After his resignations, Al-Thani’s power was restored and he led the country until the political elections of last June, 25th for the election of the 200 Members of the Representative chamber, with its headquarters in Benghazi.

For these elections, the seats were to be assigned according to the three following methods: 40 through a uninominal majoritarian system; 80 through the proportional; the last 80 representatives had to be elected on the basis of a single non-transferable vote in 29 multinomial constituencies. The candidates were 1714 and they concurred as individuals, not belonging to one particular list, as foreseen by the law. Moreover, 32 of the 200 seats were reserved to women.

The elections were meant to inaugurate a new phase of stability for Libya especially if we consider that, after the Qaddafi regime, the basis for the development of a national dialogue had been set, its necessity for the redaction of a new Constitution by the end of 2014 being neglected.

Overall, the affluence to the ballots was pretty low: according to the report from the Libyan High National Elections Commission, only 45% of the entitled Libyans voted. No votes were registered from Derna, where a number of terrorist attacks and homicides were realized by a group of local radical Islamists. Some polling stations were closed in Kufra and Sebha for security reasons. On the election day, there have been cases of violence, with at least 5 people dead and 30 injured during the clashes between the governmental forces and the rebel militias in Benghazi.

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On 22nd July 2014, 188 seats were assigned meanwhile the remaining 12 were not given to anyone due to manifest irregularities in some circumscriptions ascertained by the Libyan High National Elections Commission. The distribution of parliamentary seats of the new assembly (25 deputies represented Fezzan, 60 the Cyrenaica and 103 Tripolitania) goes in favor to the moderate and liberal forces, which are willing to delete the dark parenthesis of the country’s government.

The Libyan Parliamentary assembly met for its first official session after the election of June and after the emergency reunion due to the alarming security situation in the country owing to the violence in Tripoli and Bengasi. After the first meeting, boycotted by the Islamists, the president of the House of Representatives was elected: it was Ageela Salah Issa Gwaider, lawyer and magistrate in Cyrenaica, who obtained 77 against the 74 of the other candidate, Abubakr Bahira.

The House of Representatives which replaces the GNC, was meant to meet in Bengasi, but the meeting has been moved to Tobruk for security reasons: the clashes in Benghazi and Tripoli between competing militias provoked 200 deaths, forcing many people to flee the country and many countries to withdraw their diplomatic delegations. Nonetheless, the whole international community hopes that the elections, together with the beginning of the work for the adoption of a new constitution, could underpin the process of democratization and national reconciliation.

The election of the Constituent Assembly on February 2014 could be seen as something positive on the pursuit of more stability. Its 60 members, meeting in must wait for the approval of the new Constitution and for the subsequent elections in order to gain a more stable environment for working in the long term.

There are few possibilities that this scenario may realize before the end of the year because of a debilitating environment surrounding the Libyan institutions, such as the regional pro-independence tendencies, which could even divide the country: for instance, the regions of Cyrenaica and Fezzan have already been declared independent from the respective local tribes. Moreover, the jihadist groups, reunited in the Shura council of the Benghazi revolutionaries, have recently proclaimed the Islamic emirate: among them there are also the Salafis of Ansar al-Sharia, who have been accused of the attack of 11th September 2012, when the US ambassador Chris Stevens died.

This situation represents another weakness of the Libyan authorities which are often forced to intervene to solve – in a short time – the problems of the post-war reconstruction era. The main goal is to reestablish the ‘State of Law’, in order to regain full control over the territory: therefore, it is necessary to dismantle the illegal and jihadist militias as those may menace the political stability, the citizens’ security and the economy.

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According to the research centre ‘Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East’ of the US think tank ‘Atlantic Council’, the Libyan authorities must target these three main areas for the economic development of the country:

1) Diversify the economy through the expansion of the private sector, besides the oil business. This would imply the development of the services and tourism sector. However, if willing to make it happen, the juridical system must undergo some relevant changes too.

2) Reduce the unemployment of young people. This goal can be accomplished through the improvement of the education level and of the professional training system so that the young Libyans can satisfy the requests of the private sector. It will be necessary also to change the way that Libyans see the job system, as they believe that working in the public sector is ‘their right’.

3) Develop a modern financial system: it is a goal of masterpiece necessity for the private sector as it would allow the small and medium companies to receive the necessary credit for triggering their expansion and creating, therefore, new jobs. The reforms should also focus on the privatization of the banks, so that also foreign ones could have access to the system.

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