Mediaeval Views of Creation

7/25/2019 Mediaeval Views of Creation

1/22

Mediaeval Views of Creation: St. Albert, St. Bonaventure, and St. ThomasSteven Baldner, St. Francis Xavier UniversityGiven at Gonzaga University, 17 April 2007

Today I am going to compare the positions of three contemporaries who shared much in

common. They were all members of the new mendicant orders, they shared a

methodology that we today can call scholastic, they shared a philosophical outlook that

was broadly Aristotelian (each would have considered Aristotle to have been the best of

philosophers), they all received their intellectual formation from the same university and

at about the same time, and they were friends. It is true, of course, that Bonaventure was

a Franciscan, while Albert and Thomas were Dominicans, and it is also true that

Bonaventure was more influenced by Augustine than were Albert and Thomas.

Nevertheless, all three would have recognized that the fundamental terms and categories

in philosophy have been given definitively by Aristotle, and on our topic today, creation

and the temporal beginning of the world, they all thought that the supreme philosophical

authority was Aristotle. Should I also mention that all three belong to two rather

exclusive clubs? They were recognized by the Church to have lived lives of sanctity, and,

even more exclusive, they were recognized to be Doctors of the Church.

In spite of these similarities, and of others that I shall have occasion to mention,

my purpose in this lecture is to show how radically different was the position of Thomas

Aquinas from that of his Dominican mentor or that of his Franciscan colleague. Standing

apart from Albert and Bonaventure, and indeed apart from most scholastic thinkers, and

from just about everyone in the history of philosophy, Thomas held that the creation of


2/22

2

the world out of nothing was philosophically demonstrable and that in fact it had been

philosophically demonstrated by none other than Aristotle himself. By contrast, both1

Bonaventure and Albert, and most in the great traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and

Islam, have regarded the doctrine of creation as exclusively theological.

Let us examine the teaching of Bonaventure, Albert, and Thomas by considering

two topics: first, the problem of the temporal beginning of the world and, second, the

problem of the very meaning of creation out of nothing.

The Temporal Beginning of the World

It is, of course, well known that the traditional meaning of the revealed doctrine of

creation is that Gods act of creation brought about a radical beginning to all creatures,

both material and spiritual. Time itself had a beginning in the beginning, and before

the instant of the creative act of God, there was absolutely nothing in existence other than

God Himself. Those of us who have grown up with Christian teaching tend to take this

tenet of faith as though it were something obvious, but it does not reflect necessarily the

way in which the mind would naturally think about the universe and its origins. The

ancient Greek philosophers did not think about the origins of the universe in this way, and

Aristotle famously, or infamously, argued that the entire universe was always in

existence. There are only two possibilities: either the universe in some form always

existed or it had a radical beginning. Both alternatives are, as Kant pointed out,

See, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, In 2 Sent ., d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1 in contrarium; De potential Dei , q.13, a. 5, Resp.; In 8 Physic ., lec. 2, n. 5 (251a18-28); In 2 Metaph. , lec. 2, n. 7 (993b27-30); De substantiis

separatis , c. 9.


3/22


4/22

4

Time is a continuous, flowing reality. The present moment is a kind of connector, always

connecting the past with the future. If time ever exists, then it must always exist, for any

instant of time must connect the past with the future. There must always, therefore, have

been a past to be connected to the future. Similarly, motion is only possible now because

something has moved in the past. We are all in this room because we walked into the

room, but we only did so because some prior event took place, such as our reading the

notice advertising this lecture. But that notice could be read only because someone wrote

it before we could read it, and so on. Hence every present motion implies a previous

motion, and the existence of a previous motion always implies the eternal existence in the

past. Third, there are arguments based on the nature of God as the first cause of creation.

God Himself is eternally immutable: He does not change his mind, get new ideas, or go

from a state of inactivity to a state of activity. If God causes anything, He must cause it

eternally and unchangingly. Since God does cause the world in creating it, He must

necessarily create it eternally.

Bonaventure, Albert, and Thomas reject these arguments, and for similar reasons.

The argument about incorruptible creatures might at first strike us as quaint, because it

seems to depend upon a cosmology that we reject, for we do not today regard any of the

planets or stars as incorruptible beings, but we might think that matter itself prime

matter is incorruptible, and Christians would accept the incorruptibility of angels or of

the human soul. The point about this argument is that it depends upon the claim that

some creature has an incorruptible nature. The response to this argument is that the

power or potency for incorruptibility is a power or potency about the future. It does not


5/22

5

tell us about the past existence of any creature, but only that it will continue to exist

forever in the future. It is true that an incorruptible creature could not be generated by

natural means, but that fact does not mean that it could not have been created to have had

a temporal beginning. No creaturely, generative process could have brought them into

being, but the act of creation by God is not such a process at all.

The argument about time or motion, according to our three thinkers, is an

argument that begs the question. It is true that the present moment connects the past to

the future, but it is only true that the present moment always does this if one makes the

assumption that the world is eternal in the past the very thing, of course, that we are

trying to prove. If one does not assume that the world is eternal in the past, then it simply

is not true that every present moment connects a past with the future, for the very first

instant of time would be the first instant of a future but not the last instant of any past.

Similarly, the argument about motion also begs the question. Every motion is preceded

by a prior motion, only if one makes the assumption that the world in which motions

occur has always existed. If, however, one assumes that the world had an absolute

temporal beginning, then some motions would exist that were not preceded by other

motions.

The third argument is the most subtle of the three. It is, of course, impossible to

imagine Gods creative act without imagining some sort of change in God. Bonaventure,

Albert, and Thomas, however, point out two things about this argument. First, it

presupposes a false conception of God as a necessarily acting being: whatever God does

He must necessarily and eternally do. This is false, however, because God operates


6/22

6

freely, from his will that is not bound by any necessity. Second, this argument confuses

the way in which a material being brings about some new event with the way in which

God operates. When we cause something that is new, we can only do so by changing in

some way: we were not acting but have now begun to act. In us, this is necessarily a

change. God, however, who is not a material being does not operate by going from some

potential condition to an actual condition; He is pure act, and as such does not bring

about any change in Himself whenever He acts. If He has determined from all eternity

that He will cause something to begin to be, such a determination of his will does not

imply any change in God Himself.

Aristotles philosophy was taken to be the best that human reason and science

could do to understand the world in which we live. It came as a shock to theologians to

learn that this authority regarded the world as necessarily eternal in the past. But it was a

shock that Bonaventure, Albert, and Thomas thought could be easily withstood with some

careful philosophical reasoning.

There were also seriously advanced arguments on the other side, arguments that

derive ultimately from the Kalam theologians. These arguments purported to prove that

an eternal past was impossible and that, therefore the world must have had a temporal

beginning. Of course, if you can prove that the world had an absolute temporal

beginning, you are also thereby proving that some cause must have produced the world.

Since such a cause could only have been God, the arguments, if sound, would be

powerful proofs for the existence of God. But, in fact, neither Bonaventure, nor Albert,

nor Thomas regarded these arguments as very effective.


7/22

7

There are a number of different kinds of arguments given to show that the world

must have had a temporal beginning, but let us look at only two of them, recognizing that

the first of the two has an important variant. The first argument is founded on the3

premise that an actual infinity in physical, material, or natural things is impossible. It

may be a useful device to speak, mathematically, about sets containing an infinite number

of members or of lines or planes that are infinite in extension, but in the real, physical

world nothing is or can be infinite, either in number or in magnitude. If the universe had

existed eternally in the past, so the argument goes, the past itself would be something that

is actually infinite. There would be an infinite number of past days, an infinite number of

generations of plant or animal species, and an infinite number of any series of physical

events. But such a series could not be counted, added to, or traversed. Hence, the

universe could not have existed eternally in the past.

There is, of course, an intuitive appeal to such an argument. We cannot imagine,

count, or order an infinite series of anything, and if we suppose that the universe was

always in existence in the past, we must grant that such a past could not be counted or

ordered. Since we can only count or order that which is finite, an eternally existent

universe would be one that in principle was not amenable to chronological analysis. But

such a conclusion is hard to admit, for it means that the past was as a whole unknowable.

The conclusion is hard to admit, but does it involve some sort of contradiction or

philosophical impossibility? According to Bonaventure, Albert, and Thomas, the answer

is no: there is nothing contradictory about admitting that the universe was always in

These arguments can be found in the same texts cited in note 2.3


8/22

8

existence. The reason for this has to do with the nature of time. Time is the number that

we apply to motion, and motion is a peculiar sort of actuality, for it is the actuality of that

which is in potency while it is in potency. This means that the only reality of motion, and

hence of time, is what is presently occurring: the past is no longer actual and the future is

not yet actual. This in turn means that neither the past as such nor the future as such can

be said to be actually anything, and if neither is actually anything, then neither can be an

actually infinite something. More simply put, the past, even if it has always existed,

cannot be an actual infinity for the simple reason that the past is not an actual entity.

Versions of the argument we are examining are sometimes expressed with a

graphic examples. If your were transported to a day infinitely in the past, for example,

you could not traverse the infinite number of days in order to arrive in the present; or, if

you were an eternally existing angel, you could not count all of the days that would have

existed. But images such as these involve fallacies. If it is impossible to traverse an

infinite series of days, then it is impossible to imagine going back to a day infinitely in

the past in order to suppose that we could not arrive in the present! And, if it is true that

no finite creature could count an infinite number of events, then it would be true that no

angel could remember or count all of past time. But it is fallacious to suppose an

uncountable series, and then to wonder why an angel cannot count it.

See my full discussion of this: Steven Baldner, "St. Bonaventure and the Temporal Beginning of the4World," The New Scholasticism 63(1989) 206-228.


9/22

9

Bonaventure is often thought to have held that arguments of this first sort are

sound. Let me say, without pausing more, that there is no evidence for this claim. I 4

would be happy, if you like, to discuss the matter further during the question period.

There is, however, an interesting variant of this argument. Suppose that the

human species existed eternally in an eternally existing world. If we grant that the human

soul is immortal, then there would now have to be an actual infinity of human souls. This

argument is crucially different from the typical form of this argument, because it implies

the actual existence of an infinite number of entities, namely, human souls. For this

reason, this argument was thought by Bonaventure, Albert, and Thomas to have been a

stronger version of the argument we are considering. It, too, however, fails to be a

demonstration of the temporal beginning of the world because it presupposes certain

assumptions that are irrelevant: it supposes that on an eternal world the species man

would have always existed, and it supposes that an infinite multitude of spiritual beings is

impossible. On this last point, it is worth pointing out that Thomas changed his mind.

Early in his teaching career he thought that it had not been shown that such a multitude

was impossible, but later he came to see that it was. The general point to retain about5

such an argument is this: none of our thinkers thought that eternal past existence as such

implied some sort of contradiction or impossibility. They certainly held that it is false to

suppose that the world existed eternally in the past, but they did not think that such a false

claim was incoherent or self-contradictory.

Compare the earlier text, In 2 Sent ., d. 1, a. 1, a. 5, with the later text, Summa theologiae I, q. 7, a. 4.5


10/22

10

A very different sort of argument to demonstrate the temporal beginning of the

world is the following. Some would argue that whatever has received its entire being

from a separate cause cannot have existed eternally in the past. That is, some believe that

the very fact that the world has been created out of nothing necessarily means that the

world has had a temporal beginning. If X has been created out of nothing, then X has had

a beginning in time. The world has been created. Therefore, the world has had a

beginning in time.

There are two difficulties with this argument. One concerns the premise, The

world has been created, and the other concerns the inference, If X is created, then X

has had a temporal beginning. And on these difficulties, our three thinkers divide into

two opposing positions. Bonaventure and Albert have no difficulty with the inference,

but they do not think that the premise asserting that the world is created can be known

philosophically. For them, the argument would be sound if we could prove the creation

of the world, but the fact of creation is itself a matter of faith. Thomas, on the other hand,

thinks that we can philosophically prove the creation of the world, but he thinks that the

inference expressed in the first premise is false.

Let us consider the inference first, if X is created, then X has had a temporal

beginning. Both Bonaventure and Albert regard the act of creation as an act that6 7

necessarily produces a change : in a radical way, the creature is different after the act of

creation. First it does not exist; then it exists. For these two, when we say that creation is

St. Bonaventure, In 2 Sent ., d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, a. 1.6

St. Albert, Summa theologiae , II, tract. 1, q. 4, Quaestio incidens secunda.7


11/22

11

out of nothing ( ex nihilo ) we mean that the creature is temporally after nothing ( post

nihil ). The act of creation is the making of something radically new that did not exist in

any way before the act of creation. For Thomas, however, the act of creation is not an act

that changes the creature in any way. It was accepted as a fact by him that the creation8

of the universe did have a radical beginning in time, but that fact is irrelevant to the basic

meaning of creation, that God is now and always (so long as the creature exists) giving

existence to the creature, making it to exist rather than not exist. But for Gods creative

act, according to Thomas, nothing would now exist; God is right now creating the entire

universe out of nothing, as He has been doing and as He (we hope!) will continue to do,

so long as the universe exists. The universe on its own does not have its own being such

that it can exist without a continual efficient cause. For this reason, Thomas rejects the

inference, but Bonaventure and Albert accept it.

On the other hand, neither Bonaventure nor Albert think that the second premise,

that the universe is created out of nothing, is something that can be known or proven

philosophically; Thomas does think that this fact can be proven. We shall spend some

time to see why this is so, but for the moment let me just point out that, for very different

reasons, none of the three think that the argument about the creation of the world proves

that the world had a temporal beginning. Hence this argument, like the first, fails to

demonstrate the temporal beginning of the world. Although our three thinkers differ

fundamentally about the act of creation, they are in complete agreement that philosophy

St. Thomas, In 2 Sent ., d. 1, a. 1, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles , lib. 2, c. 17.8


12/22

12

or natural reason cannot prove the temporal beginning of the world. Let us turn now to

the problem of creation itself.

The Creation of the World

Bonaventure

When Bonaventure discusses mans natural or philosophical knowledge of God, he grants

that we can know that God is the cause of the world, but he does not specify this cause as

the creator ex nihilo . Whenever Bonaventure discusses the philosophers actual9

contribution to the problem of creation, he points out that in fact they have failed to

understand this doctrine. Furthermore, when Bonaventure discusses the question of the10

relation of faith to reason, he gives the doctrine of creation as an example of the sort of

thing for which faith is required and about which reason can tell us little. In spite of11

such evidence, Bonaventure might yet think that in principle reason could demonstrate

creation, but in fact I think that Bonaventures doctrine could not admit of such a

position.

Bonaventures position on creation and how it can be known seems to be this. It

is philosophically obvious that there is some one causal principle God for the whole

world. Many metaphysical principles point to this: the fact that order requires an

ordering cause, the fact that multiplicity must be reduced to some principle of unity, the

dependency of creatures indicates a source upon which they are dependent, and so forth.

St. Bonaventure, In 2 Sent ., d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1.9

St. Bonaventure, In 2 Sent ., d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2.10

St. Bonaventure, In 3 Sent ., d. 24, a. 2, a. 3.11


13/22

13

Good philosophy shows indubitably that in this general sense there is an efficient and

final cause of the world, and we know this cause to be God. To say, however, that God is

known to be the cause of the world in this general way is not to say that God is known to

be the creator of the world out of nothing. This latter fact involves a much more radical

claim. It means that there is no potency or material substrate out of which the creature is

made, it means that an infinite act of Gods power is required, and it means that there was

a time when the creature did not exist at all. We have just seen that Bonaventure does not

think that one can argue from the nature of past existence to the certain conclusion that

creatures began to exist from nothing. Here I want to explain that Bonaventure does not

think that one can argue from the present state of creatures to the conclusion that they are

produced out of nothing. Two reasons are relevant.

First, when Bonaventure discusses Gods causality of creatures in the present state

of things, he talks about what the mediaevals called conservation rather than creation.

Gods on-going causing of creatures is conserving them in being; it is not creating them

out of nothing. The difference between these two is that the conserving cause is a12

partial cause of being, whereas the creating cause is a total cause of being. In other

words, God now conserves creatures in existence, and they would not exist without Gods

conserving act, but creatures also contribute to their own conservation. God is a

necessary but not sufficient cause of conservation, unlike creation in which God is both a

necessary and sufficient cause. The creature contributes to its own conservation through

its fundamental principles of form and matter. Each of these principles is incomplete, but

St. Bonaventure, In 2 Sent . D. 37, a. 1, q. 2.12


14/22

14

together they compose a complete being that has a tendency to exist. Matter cannot exist

without form, and form cannot exist without matter, but the codependence of form and

matter does not indicate an absolute dependence on some outside cause.

Second, Bonaventure will talk about a kind of instability or vertibility in the

creature, but this lack in the creature is found not from its own principles but from an

extrinsic fact, namely, the fact that it was created out of nothing. Because the creature13

was created by God out of nothing, the creature could be annihilated but not because

there is some intrinsic lack in the creature. Nature in itself appears to be complete, but

the origin of creatures from nothing means that there is an external defect. This defect is

supplied, not by nature, but by grace: by a universal grace given to all creatures, God

conserves them in being. The point to notice is that Gods conserving of all beings is

considered by Bonaventure to be an act of grace, an act that helps nature to continue in

existence. Like other instances of grace, its effects are knowable but the grace itself is

not. There is nothing from nature, Bonaventure is saying, that indicates any instability or

tendency toward non-being, but because of the fact of creation, a universal grace is

required in order to keep creatures in existence.

A truism about the philosophy of Bonaventure is that the approach to God is

rather quick and easy. The truth that God exists is so vividly impressed on the human

mind, that the question for Bonaventure is the Anselmian one: how is it possible for us to

deny the existence of God? Bonaventure certainly thinks that Gods presence is obvious

to us through the created world, but he does not think that creation as such is something

St. Bonaventure, In 1 Sent . D. 8, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2.13


15/22

15

that we can come to know by our unaided philosophical reason. The world requires God

for its sustaining cause, and this is so in large part because the world is a created world,

but the fact of creation itself is not something we can know apart from revelation.

Albert the Great

Albert makes it perfectly clear right from the start that philosophers cannot give any

demonstrations of the creation of the world.

Creation is properly a divine work. To us, moreover, it seems like something

miraculous, since we cannot attain it, for it is not subject to a demonstration of

reason. For this reason the philosophers have not understood it, unless by chance

someone might have gleaned something [about it] from the words of the prophets.

But no one has ever investigated it through demonstration. Some, of course, have

found a few probable arguments, but [such arguments] do not give sufficient

proof. Indeed, my position is that [creation] appears as a miracle to us and as

something completely beyond our natural abilities. 14

The reason for this we have already partially seen. Creation necessarily means a

temporal beginning, and we cannot demonstrate the temporal beginning of the world. 15

There is, however, a further problem. Like Bonaventure, but for different reasons,

Albert does not think that there is anything about the very structure of created being from

which a demonstration of creation could be formulated. Physical things are composed of

St. Albert, in 2 Sent ., d. 1, B, q. 8., sol.14

St. Albert, Summa theologiae II, tract. 1, q. 4, Quaestio incidens secunda.15


16/22

16

matter and form, but each of these principles has a kind of independence. Matter,

according to Albert, is not a purely potential principle of change. In a number of different

ways, for example, when he is explaining the source of form in matter, the way in which

elements can remain in compounds, and the matter of the heavens, Albert asserts that

there is a composition in matter itself apart from form. The result of this is that, as Albert

says in the Metaphysics , matter is in itself, before it is recognized to be a subject of

motion, something given ( fundatum ), individuated ( individuatum ), and subsistent in

itself ( sustans in seipso ). Matter, apart from form and just in itself, is a quasi thing.16

Form, on the other hand, is not of itself something that is grounded or

substantiated in matter. Rather, it is more truly form to the extent that it is separate17

from matter. The forms of living things are more truly forms than are the forms of non-

living things, and the forms of higher animals are more truly forms than are those of

lower animals. The human form and the angelic form are forms in the truest senses. In

fact, the forms of mere elements and material compounds are only forms in some

derivative sense. Albert even thinks that he has an etymology of the word form to

justify his claim: forma is derived from foris manens . Notice how Albert ends his

comments on this. Moreover, although form gives nothing of being to matter, because

matter all by itself has its own being, nevertheless form alone gives being to the

composite, from which matter receives being and is both distinguished and specified.

St. Albert, Metaphysica , lib. 3, tract. 3, c. 1.16

St. Albert, Metaphysica , lib. 1, tract. 4, c. 9.17


17/22

17

Matter all by itself has being; form, which really is what it is apart from matter, makes the

composite exist and in so doing determines or specifies matter.

With such a metaphysical view, what can the philosopher say about the creation of

creatures that are composed of these two principles? According to Albert, we recognize18

in some general way that any composed substance requires an explanation for its

composition. If a substance is composed of elements, something had to bring those

elements together, and even in the case of the elements themselves, something had to

cause the form and the matter of the elements to be united. There is always something

outside of any substance that explains why it is composed just as it is. The composition

of substances results in a diversity of substances: different compositions result in

different individuals and different kinds of substances. The problem, according to Albert,

is to account for the diversity. Why isnt everything the same? The source of diversity

cannot be matter, because matter is distinguished by form, and not vice versa . The

question, then, is why are there different forms? This is particularly a problem if we

accept the Neo-Platonic stricture, as Albert seems to have done, that from the one can

come only one. If we do accept such a stricture and only that, we would find the

diversity of beings impossible to explain. Accordingly, says Albert, we must recognize

that the Neo-Platonic stricture applies only to necessary and natural productions. It might

apply to a doctrine of necessary emanation, but it does not apply to the act of a free,

intelligent, and infinitely powerful creator. Since we do live in a universe of manifold

diversity, and since the stricture is true in some sense, we have some reason to conclude

The following probable argument is taken from St. Albert, Physica , lib. 8, tract. 1, c. 13.18


18/22

18

that the cause of our world is a free, intelligent, and infinite being, who is capable of

producing all things out of nothing. Such a being would have to be the source of forms,

and since form is not caused by matter, this being must have produced these forms, that

is, created them.

Such an argument, however, is not regarded by Albert as a demonstration of

creation. The Universal Doctor does not tell us why, but I think that we already have the

reason before us. Matter as such and as it is known by the philosophers already has its19

own being; it does not have to be made to exist by form or by anything. A probable

argument, and no more, can be given to explain the creation of forms, but no argument at

all can be given to explain the existence of matter. Since matter is a philosophical

given, philosophy is powerless to inquire into its source, as it would have to do to

frame a demonstration of creation out of nothing. Albert, then, like Bonaventure, thinks

that the material world as it is regarded by the philosophers does not require a cause to

explain its very existence.

Thomas Aquinas

Things are very different, however, for Thomas Aquinas. Thomas claims that he

can philosophically demonstrate the creation of the world out of nothing. He makes such

a bold assertion because he recognizes, as his great contemporaries do not, the being or

existence of things the famous doctrine of esse as a fundamental metaphysical

principle. More precisely, he recognizes that in all finite beings existence is something

I am indebted to Rev. Lawrence Dewan, O.P., for the fundamental insight on this problem in Albert: St.19Albert, Creation, and the Philosophers, Laval thologique et philosophique 40(1984) 295-307.


19/22

19

really distinct from essence. This means that the essence of no finite thing, that is, no

creature, contains within itself its own being or existence. Because existence is a real fact

about all finite things, it is something that must be explained. By nature or essence, no

finite thing has its own existence. How is it, then, that finite things do have existence?

They must have this existence from some outside cause, but if the cause itself needs a

cause of existence, then we must look for another cause. This process, however, cannot

go on infinitely. Hence we must come to recognize that there is some cause of existence

that is itself uncaused. This uncaused cause of existence would be God.

The problem, then, is to know how it is that we know that existence and essence

are really distinct in all finite beings. It is sometimes argued, and there are Thomistic

texts that seem to support such a conclusion, that we come to know the real distinction20

of existence from essence by means of an inspection of concepts. If we merely examine

the concept of any limited thing, we see right away that no such thing contains existence

in its very nature. If we think, for example, of the nature of a man or an angel or a

phoenix, we find that we can easily think of the non-existence of any such nature. If

none of these beings ever existed, that sad fact would not contradict what we know about

the essence of each kind. Such an examination of concepts seems to show that the

existence and essence of any finite being is distinct.

It may be that Thomas argues philosophically for the creation of the world with

something like the argument I have just given. If so, then the existence of God and the

creation of the world can be demonstrated by one, neat metaphysical argument. Once we

St. Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia , c. 4.20


20/22

20

recognize that the being of creatures is something in need of causal, metaphysical

explanation, we are well on our way to recognizing that God exists and is the creator of

all things other than Himself. There are Thomistic interpreters who favor this sort of

reasoning, but Thomas actual practice, especially in his mature and major works, such as

the Summa contra Gentiles , the Summa theologiae , and the Aristotelian commentaries

was rather different. In these works, Thomas argued for the creation of the world in three

distinct stages.

First, Thomas demonstrates the existence of God. This he does, usually, by21

using Aristotles argument from the Physics to prove that there is a first cause of motion.

Most of you are familiar with this argument, which is based on two premises: whatever

is moved is moved by something else, and there cannot be an infinite regress in movers

and things moved. If all moving things must be caused by something other than

themselves, and if, in the case in which any cause of motion is itself caused, there cannot

be an infinite number of actual causes of motion, there must be some cause of motion that

is itself uncaused. Such a cause, of course, would have to be completely unmoved. The

first step is to prove the existence of an unmoved mover or of an uncaused cause of the

world.

Second, Thomas argues that this unmoved mover must be completely simple. 22

This mover cannot be material, bodily, or potential in any way, for if it were, it would

have to be not an unmoved mover but a moved mover. But if this mover is not in any

St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles , lib. 1, c. 13.21

St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles , lib. 1, cc. 15-27.22


21/22

21

state of potentiality, then it cannot be composed in any way, for composite substances are

in some state of potentiality. Not being composed means that it is not composed of form

and matter, not composed of its individuality and its essence, and not composed of

existence and essence. God, in other words, is simply pure actuality or pure being.

Third, Thomas argues that there can only be one instance of pure being. Just as23

Plato had argued that the Forms-In-Themselves could only be one and that all derivative

instances of such Forms could only be composed or participated instances of the pure

Forms, so Thomas argues that there can only be one instance of pure being. All other

instances of being must be instances in which being is composed or received, for there is

no other way to explain the multiplication of beings. These derivative or composed

things are really composed of their essences or natures, on the one hand, and their being

or existence, on the other. That is to say, their essence is really distinct from their

existence, or, in other words, their being must be caused by a first cause of being.

Everything other than God is a creature and is made to exist entirely by Gods creative

act.

This has been only a sketch of Thomas rather complicated chain of arguments

that is given to show that the universe is a created universe. The important point here is

that the reasoning for such a conclusion is entirely philosophical. This philosophical

conclusion is one that is possible for Thomas, but impossible for Albert or for

Bonaventure, because Thomas recognizes the crucial act of being ( esse ) as the

metaphysical principle in need of an explanation. For Thomas, the problem of creation is

St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles , lib. 2, cc. 6-16.23


22/22

22

fundamentally a philosophical problem, in a way that it can never be for Albert or for

Bonaventure, because Thomas philosophy is one founded in being ( esse ). To see the

importance of this philosophical insight on Thomas part is to see what sets his

philosophy apart from most of his contemporaries and from most other philosophers, as

well. It is what allows Thomas, and not Albert or Bonaventure, to understand the

doctrine of creation as a philosophical doctrine.

Documents

Mediaeval Views of Creation