Medellín: A City Reborn? - WKU - Western Kentucky … · 2014-12-10 · Medellín: A City Reborn? by Holli Drummond, ... Photographs by the authors Contextualizing Medellín Cities

Medellín: A City Reborn?by

Holli Drummond, John Dizgun, and David J. KeelingPhotographs by the authors

Contextualizing Medellín

Cities all around the world experiencephysical and cultural transformations overspace and through time. Sometimes thesechanges are subtle, slow, and unspectacu-lar. At other times, the pace of urbanchange can be quite rapid, dramatic, andnewsworthy. Think of New Orleans afterHurricane Katrina, Sarajevo during the Bal-kan conflict, or Dubai over the last decade,and the broader context of urban transfor-mation comes more sharply into focus.Observing changes in a city’s infrastruc-ture, such as buildings, transportation, orgreen space, for example, can lead toimportant questions about planning, pol-icy, and growth strategies. These shifts canbe reasonably easy to examine throughmaps, landscape surveys, photography,and other methodologies. In contrast, teas-ing out changes in a city’s culture or iden-tity can prove a little more challenging,especially when conditions are not ideal foranalysis and interpretation. Understandingurban change in Pyongyang (North Korea),Yangon (Myanmar), Mogadishu (Somalia),or Grozny (Chechnya, Russia), for instance,can be fraught with practical and politicaldifficulties. Violent crime, war, politicalconflict, terrorism, and street gangs can allshape how outsiders perceive a specific cityand how the denizens of that city see them-selves (see Covey 2010).

Few cities in the world have experi-enced the level of violence and brutalitythat characterized Medellín, Colombia,during the 1980s and 1990s. The escapadesof Pablo Escobar, Colombia’s preeminentdrug lord until his death in 1993, Holly-wood movie depictions such as Clear andPresent Danger (Clancy 1989), and sensa-tional news exposés of drug- and guerilla-related murders in the city, have shapedmany people’s perception of Medellín asone of the world’s most dangerous urbanenvironments (Borrell 1988). In the early

1990s, Medellín recorded about 6,500 mur-ders annually, with city police afraid toenter certain areas of the city controlled bystreet gangs, guerilla groups, and drugcartels. In the city’s poorest neighbor-hoods, like Comuna 13 sprawling up theAndean slopes on Medellín’s southwestside, daily life became a struggle for secu-rity and survival. It seemed for a time thatthe local and national governments hadabandoned neighborhoods like Comuna13 to the gangs and cartels, causing seriousdisruption in the urban socio-economicfabric and stunting any likelihood of posi-tive development.

As part of the American GeographicalSociety’s Bowman Expedition program,which is designed to focus attention on thespatial context of change in communities,our team visited Medellín, Colombia, tostudy Comuna 13 and its constituent barri-os (Figure 1). The project’s goal is tounderstand how the residents of Comuna13, especially young people, have adaptedto changing socio-economic conditionssince the government reasserted controlover the neighborhood in 2002 after Oper-ation Orión. Of particular interest arequestions of security, economic develop-ment, perceptions of the community, andaccessibility and mobility in the Comuna.In this illustrated essay, we present a briefhistory of the city, discuss infrastructuralimprovements critical to the continuedincorporation of the Comuna’s residentsinto networks of employment, education,and opportunity, and analyze socialchange from the perspective of youngadults. Our goal is to shed light on boththe symbolic and practical impacts of in-frastructural improvements, and on gen-eral perceptions of change in Comuna 13.

From Oasis to Orión

Founded in 1616 by Spanish conquista-dores in the fertile valley of Aburrá (named

for one of the indigenous groups that hadlived in the region for over a thousandyears), Medellín grew in stature in thenineteenth century thanks to the produc-tion of gold and, more importantly, coffee.In 1875— at a time when the developmentof railroads was gradually becoming thesymbol of modernization and progress inmuch of Latin America— the recently-formed Ferrocarril de Antioquia or Antio-quia Railway completed La Quiebra Tun-nel, a colossal engineering feat thatconnected the Andean city to the Magda-lena River, Colombia’s central artery to theCaribbean Sea and, by extension, theindustrial powers of the North Atlantic.

That geographic breakthrough coin-cided with the regional discovery of coaland the construction of hydroelectricplants, providing Medellín with the energyand transport infrastructure to fuel itsindustrial growth. As coffee exports

Figure 1. Medellín, Colombia, highlightingthe Metro system and Comuna 13.

146 Focus on Geography Volume 55, Number 4

increased, the textile industry— led by thecreation of the Coltejer Company in 1907—signaled Medellín’s rise as a center ofcommercial and entrepreneurial activity.Major food, beverage, and glass companiessoon followed and Medellín’s first airportwas built in 1932. From 1905 to 1951, thepopulation of the city grew from justunder 60,000 to nearly 360,000. In short,Medellín emerged as Colombia’s leadingindustrial center in the first-half of thetwentieth century (Restrepo 1981; Melo1996; Ramírez Patiño 2011) (Figure 2).

This momentum led local governmentofficials, industrialists, entrepreneurs, andcultural leaders to sponsor in the 1950swhat in English has been dubbed the Me-dellín Master Plan (MMP). This urban ini-tiative called for the expansion of the city,the creation of an industrial zone, the cana-lization of the Medellín River (which runssouth-north through the city), the beautifi-cation of the riverbanks and other parts ofthe city, and the construction of both a soc-cer stadium and La Alpujarra administra-tive center (Restrepo 1981). Two newuniversities— the University of Medellín(1950) and EAFIT University (1960)— werefounded, joining the renowned Universityof Antioquia (1803) to enhance Medellín’sreputation as an intellectual center. The1950s also saw the emergence in Medellínof a new generation of artists and writers,including Gonzalo Arango and FernandoBotero, the latter gaining internationalnotoriety for his portly, satirical sculpturesof both privileged and common citizens(Figure 3).

The MMP of the 1950s and Medellín’searlier accomplishments in the first-half ofthe century masked other, less desirablerealities. While undoubtedly a leader interms of modernization, since the early1900s Medellín also led the nation in levelsof prostitution, alcoholism, and imprison-ment rates. These undesirable characteris-tics were something local elites and theCatholic Church continually sought toovercome by publicly promoting theirmore conservative views of morality and

the antioqueño “work-ethic” ethos. The an-tioqueño is a core tenet of the city’s collec-tive identity to this day (CeballosMelguizo and Cronshaw 2001). Moreover,like many Latin American cities, the gapbetween the rich and poor in Medellínremained palpable. In the 1950s, the MMPaimed to regulate the growing settlementsof rural migrants that had developed inrecent years on the city’s steep slopes(Restrepo 1981) (Figure 4). MMP leadersstruggled to deal with these squatterneighborhoods, often unable (and some-times unwilling) to provide them with

Figure 2. Panorama of the southern Aburrá Valley, Medellín.

Figure 3. Botero sculpture in the downtownplaza of Medellín.

Figure 4. Makeshift accommodations in the upper reaches of Comuna 13.

Winter 2012 Focus on Geography 147

basic services such as sewage, water,schools, roads, and health care.

However much a challenge in the1950s, rural-to-urban migration in Me-dellín (and throughout Colombia) mush-roomed in the 1960s and 1970s. In thedecades following the 1948 assassinationof widely-regarded populist presidentialcandidate Jorge Gaitán by conservativepolitical forces, Colombia witnessed anunimaginable spike in violence that wouldlast for decades. At first, it pitted factionsof liberal and conservative elites againstone another; that struggle came to an endin 1958 in the form of a power-sharingagreement called the National Front. How-ever, for armed (communist and left-lean-ing) peasant groups, who throughout the1950s had been the target of heavy-handedgovernment-sponsored military offensives,the National Front did little to squelchtheir demands for broad agrarian reformand greater political representation. Whenin the post-1958 period landowning elites(both liberal and conservative) launchedmilitary attacks against armed peasants inan effort to reclaim landholdings occupiedby peasants between 1948 and 1958, civilwar ensued. By the mid-1960s, armedpeasant groups banded together to formleftist revolutionary guerrilla groups suchas the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia) and ELN (National Libera-tion Army), among others. Differencesamong the various guerrilla groups aside,

they all battled the Colombian state inbloody fashion, predominantly in thecountryside, for decades to come (Bailey1967; Bushnell 1993; Melo 1996; Saffordand Palacios 2001; Palacios 2006).

As violence spread in rural areas in the1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, hundreds of thou-sands of poor Colombian farmers and theirfamilies fled the countryside for the cities.Since the conflict began in the 1950s,approximately 5 million Colombians havebeen displaced, putting Colombia secondonly to Sudan for the country with the high-est total of displaced persons in the world.In Medellín alone, the population swelledfrom 358,000 in 1951 to 1,071,000 by 1973.Not surprisingly, most settled in the rapidlyexpanding slums built on Medellín’s moun-tainsides in the northern and western partsof the city—Comuna 13 serving as a primeexample (Figure 5). The Medellín MasterPlan could not handle, let alone project sucha demographic increase. Worse, the eco-nomic and modernizing gains of the first-half of the century stalled as Colombia’scivil war escalated. In Medellín, prominentindustries downsized, new initiativesstalled, and already high unemploymentskyrocketed. Politically, local parties wereunequipped to represent (or even compre-hend) the interests of this growing mass ofurban poor and, not surprisingly, the chal-lenge of providing basic utilities to theseindigent mountainside neighborhoodsremained daunting. Ever more, Medellín

developed into a city of haves and have-nots, segregated by social class and geo-graphic boundaries (Ceballos Melguizo andCronshaw 2001; Álvarez Echeverri 2003).

Although rural-to-urban migrationslowed in the 1980s, industrial output inMedellín (and Colombia as a whole)remained weak and unemployment high.Making matters worse, the economic slow-down facilitated the dramatic rise of theMedellín drug cartel. Led by modern-daycaudillo Pablo Escobar, the cartel devel-oped a multi-billion dollar, export-orienteddrug trade that forever transformed Me-dellín, Colombia, Latin America, and theUnited States. In Medellín, where civilinstitutions and the rule of law hadalready been weakened over the previoustwo decades, the cocaine trade signaledthe rapid rise of Mafia praxes, gang activ-ity, urban crime, vigilante justice, and vio-lent homicides. On the national level, theMedellín cartel sponsored a number of ter-rorist attacks against the Colombian stateaimed in large part at blocking the govern-ment from signing an extradition treatywith the United States. The cartel’s bloodyoffensive in the 1980s—the assassination ofhigh-ranking politicians and journalists,bombings of government facilities andshopping malls, and the blowing up anAvianca jetliner over Bogotá in 1989 (kill-ing all 107 passengers aboard)—led to asharp escalation in armed violencethroughout Colombia. Not only did it con-tribute to a government counter-offensive(with monetary and military assistancefrom the United States), but it alsoemboldened guerrilla groups such asFARC and ELN to sponsor a new wave ofattacks on the Colombian army in thenation’s southern provinces (or, in the caseof the M-19 guerrilla group, to raid theColombian Supreme Court in 1985 and kill11 Justices in the process). This in turngave rise to violent paramilitary and self-defense groups who practiced their ownbrand of vigilante justice, at times with thetacit approval of the Colombian military(Bushnell 1993; Bowden 2002; CeballosMelguizo and Cronshaw 2001; Safford andPalacios 2001; Palacios 2006; Ramírez2008). Of all Colombian cities, Medellínexperienced the most acute violence andbloodshed. Between 1990 and 2002, therewere 55,365 recorded homicides in Me-dellín, the overwhelming majority involv-ing poor individuals in the city’s slums(Cardona et al. 2005). During that thirteen-year span, the peak year for recordedhomicides was 6,658 in 1991 compared toa “low” of 2,854 in 1998.Figure 5. Urban expansion along the Andes ridges that overlook Medellín.


The death of Pablo Escobar at thehands of Colombian and U.S. specialforces in December, 1993, fueled hopes forthe demise of the cartel and a decrease inviolence. On a positive note, the 1994 and1995 homicide rates in Medellín droppedmodestly (Ramírez 2008). Ultimately, how-ever, Escobar’s death underscored a cal-lous reality: many of Medellín’s gangs“were not simple mercenaries working forthe drug kingpins” (Ceballos Melguizoand Cronshaw, 2001:130). For the urbanpoor, drug trafficking increasingly hadbecome a cultural avenue of upwardmobility, leading to a proliferation ofgangs and militia groups and, by exten-sion, criminal activity in the post-Escobarera.

Following a relatively significant dropin the homicide rate in 1998, there was adisturbing uptick over the ensuing threeyears. City officials and residents grewparticularly concerned as the violencebegan to spread beyond the poorest sec-tors of the poorest neighborhoods. On thenational scene, following the ineffectivepresidency of Ernesto Samper (1994–1998),newly-elected conservative ColombianPresident Andres Pastrana (1998–2002)expressed renewed determination to combatthe drug trade, (leftist) guerrillas, and even(rightist) paramilitaries; his loyalty to theU.S. cause won him significant newsources of Congressional funding. Pastr-ana’s more assertive tone, which his suc-cessor Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010) moresuccessfully put into action, coincided withgrowing public cries for peace and stabil-ity. Working in close cooperation with theColombian military and national intelli-gence services, Medellín’s local govern-ment and security forces took political andtactical advantage of these developmentsto launch two highly-coordinated police-military-intelligence operations in Comuna13 and other violence- and poverty-stricken mountainside neighborhoods. Thefirst, dubbed Operación Mariscal (May2002), was not particularly successful. Incontrast, during Operación Orión (October2002) police and military units, for the firsttime in decades, successfully managed togain and, more importantly, maintain aphysical presence in Comuna 13 (Dema-rest 2011). So much so that, by 2003, thehomicide rate had dropped to 600 andwould remain at or near that level formuch of the remainder of decade. Withsome measure of normalcy returning toComuna 13 in the mid-2000s, city govern-ment and local community leaders beganto think more about the development

challenges facing the neighborhood withinthe broader context of urban change (Fig-ure 6).

Changing Accessibility and Mobility inComuna 13

Across the planet, millions of urban-ites still live in conditions of economic,social, and political deprivation that limittheir access to growth and opportunity. InLatin American cities particularly, accessi-bility and mobility in many of the poorestneighborhoods have been negativelyimpacted further by gangs, guerilla organi-zations, and a lack of local governmentaction (Zibechi 2008). In Medellín, some ofthe poorest sectors of the city have longhad a reputation for violence, drug activ-ity, and battles over control of barrios, asoutlined in the previous section. Waves ofurban expansion across the city, particu-larly in the 1960s and 1970s, exacerbatedthese socio-economic challenges in the hill-side barrios, with populist city leadersignoring the accessibility and mobilitychallenges created by tens of thousands ofsquatters. These new urbanites were influ-enced by a need to be closer to urban ser-vices and jobs, and by low property pricesand informal land ownership opportuni-ties. The barrios of Comuna 13 provedattractive to these migrants, despite thelack of basic services, a lack of security,and violent conditions up and down thehillsides (Figure 7).

Sprawling up the northeastern andsouthwestern hills that parallel the AburráValley of Medellín, makeshift dwellings,

along with more substantial structures,cover the steep, sloping terrain in a densepattern that makes traditional road accessdifficult (Figure 8). Although accessibilityand mobility in the urban environmenthad received varying degrees of planningattention from the national and city gov-ernments since the 1940s, no real effort toconsider modernizing mobility in Medellínoccurred until the early to mid-1980s(Figure 9). Planning for a mass-transit rail

Figure 6. Turning guns in to music – in thelocal museum.

Figure 7. Looking westward up the hillsidefrom the Metrocable Station at San Javier,Comuna 13.

Figure 8. Typical hillside pathway betweenresidences on the hillsides of Comuna 13.


system for the valley began in the early1980s, with construction underway by1985, despite arguments that insufficienteconomic demand existed to make theMetro profitable. The goal of the systemwas to move workers more efficientlyfrom the low-income barrios north of thedowntown core to a cluster of factoriesconcentrated in Medellín’s southern dis-tricts (Figure 10). Financial problems inter-rupted construction of the Metro, with thefirst line not inaugurated until 1995. More-over, continued violence and unrest in thehillside barrios east and west of the valleystymied any thoughts of improving acces-sibility and mobility in neighborhoods likeComuna 13.

Although not without controversy,Operación Orión paved the way for a boldand ambitious local development planspearheaded by Medellín Mayors LuísPérez (2001–2003) and, particularly, SergioFajardo (2004–2007). At once, the MedellínModel has sought to deal with past urbantrauma and fuel future economic and cul-tural growth. City officials, in cooperationwith the national government, sponsoreddirect negotiations with Medellín’s variousgangs, militias, guerrillas, and paramilitarygroups, including relatively successfuldemobilization and re-integration efforts.Counselors, psychologists, NGOs, andcommunity youth groups such as Sal y Luzhave been tapped (and funded) to helpresidents overcome years of trauma. Police

have worked in close cooperation withcommunity members to maintain andimprove neighborhood security. The muni-cipal government has dedicated over 30%of its budget to education, building newschools, libraries, parks, and recreationalspaces in Comuna 13 and other poorneighborhoods. It also has invested heav-ily in the city’s transportation infrastruc-ture, notably the construction of twoseparate MetroCable (ski-lift style) linesand, more recently, an “escalator” that forthe first time have connected isolatedmountainside boroughs directly to thecity’s subway network and, by extension,the city center (Figure 11). The govern-ment and the private sector have estab-lished cash grant and microloan programsto support business development by thepoor while also seeking direct foreigninvestment to foster industrial growth, jobcreation, and economic renewal. To payfor many of these publicly-funded projects,the city channels 30% of the annual profitsof the well-managed, quasi-private mainenergy company (Empresas Públicas de Me-dellín or EPM) into its administrative bud-get (Bateman et al. 2011).

When the idea of a cable-car systemto improve access to and from these areaswas presented to the city’s mayoral candi-dates in 2000, it did not receive enthusias-tic support. However, Luís Pérez, thesuccessful candidate (2001–2003), endorsedthe project, and the first line (K) came intoservice in 2004 during the administrationof Sergio Fajardo (2004–2007). MetrocableLine K serves the barrios of Comuna 1 and2, which have a combined population ofaround 250,000, with stations at Acevedo,Andalucia, Popular, and Santo Domingo.Figure 9. La Alpujarra Administrative Center constructed in the 1980s in downtown Medellín.

Figure 10. The Medellín heavy-rail metro system. Figure 11. Metrocable gondolas at the interchange station at San Javier.


Line J, which serves approximately300,000 people in Comuna 7 and 13,opened to the public in April 2008 withstations at San Javier (metro interchange),Juan XXIII, Vallejuelos, and La Aurora. Itcovers a length of 2.8 kilometers, ascendsvertically about 300 meters overall, andhas a capacity of 3,000 passengers perhour using 119 serviceable cabins eachholding 10 passengers (Figure 12).

After traveling on the Metrocable sys-tem during our research in Comuna 13, itbecame apparent that it has had positiveimpacts, but significant limitations exist interms of improving overall accessibilityand mobility. Improved passenger comfortand security, shortened journey times tothe urban core, combined transport tariffs(bus+Metro+cablecar), and the psychologi-cal impact of the infrastructure are all wor-thy of praise. However, the Metrocablehas technical limitations that restrict loadsto about 3,000 passengers an hour, whichreduce its functionality as a mass-transitsystem. In addition, the spatial dynamicsof the barrios that comprise Comuna 13require long walks to the nearest stationfor many passengers, with wait times toboard during peak periods often 30 min-utes or more. Bulky personal effects arenot allowed on the Metro system, unlikebuses, which make it a less attractivemode of transportation for some, espe-cially those who sell on the street in theinformal economy (Figure 13). At the city-wide scale, there is insufficient multimo-dality planning to take account of travelpatterns that require access to the furthestreaches of the metropolitan region. Formany Comuna 13 residents, walking downthe hillsides to take conventional buses to

their destinations appears to remain amore practical and time-effective means ofaccessibility and mobility to desired ser-vices and employment.

Youth, Perception, and Security inComuna 13

As part of the Bowman Expedition toMedellín, in June, 2009, our team con-ducted a survey of approximately 1,500youth enrolled in three of six secondaryschools in Comuna 13 (representing 60%of all students in these schools). The 130-question survey of adolescents and pread-

olescents (participants ranged in age from9 to 19) focused on concerns about safety,the prevalence of risky behaviors, accessi-bility and mobility, social and politicalintegration, and attitudes about the pres-ent and future direction of Comuna 13 andMedellín. The success of our survey pro-ject, in no small measure, relied upon thesupport Sal y Luz provided (Figure 14).This community organization, serving theneeds of neighborhood youth, helped usboth select schools that would capture thediversity of youth experience in Comuna13 and locate native speakers to readaloud the survey questions, allowing for

Figure 12. Advertising Medellín culture through the Metrocablegondolas.

Figure 13. Informal street vendors in Comuna 13 often carry theirwares on public transport.

Figure 14. Sal y Luz community offices in Comuna 13.


quality information to be obtained in anefficient manner.

Survey results are mixed. On the onehand, they illustrate that Medellín’s newcivic culture has served as a rallying pointfor community pride and the belief thatComuna 13 and Medellín as a whole areimproving (Figure 15). At the same time,the evidence suggests that complicationspersist. For instance, a slight majority ofstudents (51%) reported never feelingunsafe at school compared to 8% who feelunsafe most or all of the time. Similarly,41% never feel unsafe getting to school

compared to 10% who feel unsafe most orall of the time. In contrast, only 18% of stu-dents never feel unsafe in their residentialneighborhood compared to 25% who feelunsafe most or all of the time. In short,survey results suggest that most studentshave little or no concern about safetywhen at school, yet live with a heightenedsense of potential danger in and aroundhome (Figure 16). On a positive note, stu-dents reported that Comuna residentsenjoy access to basic goods and services.Ninety-seven percent contend that theirresidence has electricity, 88% have runningwater and an indoor toilet, 87% a phone,and 86% basic cable. A large percentagealso makes use of local parks (73%), aneighborhood or school library (69%), orreports having “easy access’’ to the Inter-net (77%) in their community (Figure 17).Fifty-eight percent agree that they hadaccess to affordable shopping.

If access to basic utilities, parks, andlibraries appears widespread, there iscause for concern with respect to commu-nity health care and, particularly, banking.While 56% of students feel that a medicalclinic is conveniently located within theirneighborhood, a more modest 48% havevisited the doctor at least once in the lasttwo years. Possible consequences includenot only a potential lack of basic healthmaintenance and preventive care, but alsolost opportunities to develop relationshipswith knowledgeable, often influential pro-fessionals. Of greater concern is that only16% of students reported the presence of abank in their neighborhood. Of course,students and their families can make useof financial institutions in other parts of

Medellín, but the absence of banks in theComuna suggests, first, that local familiesare less likely to establish relationshipswith these core social-economic entitiesand, second, private investment in thecommunity is lacking and with it access tocapital for local residents and (potential)small business owners. The prospects oflocal economic development invariablysuffer.

The survey also raised some concernsabout city governance and police protec-tion (Figure 18). While 71% of students areaware of concerned community groups (i.e.such as Sal y Luz) in their neighborhood,less than half (41%) feel that local politicalofficials represent their concerns or those oftheir family. Roughly the same percentage(40%) agrees that the police do a “goodjob” in making them feel safe in their com-munity. Such responses take on addedmeaning when we consider student atti-tudes towards gangs, gang affiliation, andthe use of violence (Figure 19). On a rela-tively positive note, only 15% of those sur-veyed report ever being a member of agang and 22% admit to hanging out withgang members. On the other hand, 48% ofrespondents agree that kids who are mem-bers of a gang continue to get respect in theComuna, while 53% answer “many” whenasked “Are there any gang problems inyour neighborhood?” Most alarming is notthat 35% of students admit to beinginvolved in a physical fight (i.e. pushing,hitting, kicking, or worse) within the lastmonth, but that: a) 54% agree that it is notpossible to avoid fights in their neighbor-hood, b) 47% of those involved in a fightresponded that they would “finish it,” and

Figure 15. Poster in the Comuna promotingcivic engagement.

Figure 16. Neighborhood schools provide a safe environment in theComuna.

Figure 17. New parks and open spaces have helped to create positiveviews of the Comuna.


c) an alarming 66% concur that, when in adispute, you should “stand your ground toget what you want no matter the cost.”While Anderson (1999) and others (seeDrummond et al. 2010 for a review) haveillustrated that this “Code of the Streets” isnot unique to Medellín, the belief among alarge segment of survey respondents aboutthe appropriateness of resolving conflictthrough physical violence is nonethelesstroubling. If for some it comes as a surprisethat 65% of surveyed students believe “Me-dellín is moving in a positive direction,”fewer are startled to learn that 68%acknowledge that they would like to moveout of the Comuna.

A City Reborn? Medellín for the NextGeneration

Emerging from our initial research onthe rebirth of Comuna 13 over the pastdecade is a clearer understanding of sev-eral key issues. First, in terms of the valueof the Metrocable system to Comuna 13,there is little doubt that this highly visiblepiece of transport infrastructure plays animportant symbolic and aesthetic role infostering a sense of inclusion into theurban mainstream (Figure 20). Nonethe-less, any new infrastructure such as trans-portation, schools, services, or businessesin the Comuna must be planned with sen-sitivity to geographic and social integra-tion processes. More recent research on theMetrocable’s impacts argues that signifi-cant doubt remains concerning the overallmobility benefits of the system, and that

stimulus to the local economy, land, andhousing markets has been limited to thosepeople living in the immediate zones ofthe stations (Brand and Dávila 2011).Without a significant investment in thematerial wellbeing of Comuna 13 residentsin order to reduce poverty and socialinequity and enhance participation in the

local political process, the Metrocable willremain primarily symbolic.

Second, despite better times in Me-dellín generally and Comuna 13 specifi-cally, various media reports over the pasttwo years have pointed to an alarmingincrease in murder rates across the region,especially among young men aged 18–25

Figure 18. Poster in the Comuna promotingthe importance of safety and security.

Figure 19. Community police station.

Figure 20. Metrocable station entrance at La Aurora.


(in Medellín in 2009, homicides numberednearly 2,900). Some attribute the rise to the2008 extradition of paramilitary druglordDiego Fernando Murilo (a.k.a. Don Berna)to the United States, which, reminiscent ofthe period following Escobar’s death in1993, has led to an increase in fightingamong midsize local gangs eager to fillpower vacuum. If student responses in the2009 youth survey are any indication,much work remains to be done by the gov-ernment to improve security and the over-all quality of life in the city and Comuna.

Finally, social and transport infra-structure like the Metrocable are a neces-sary, but not sufficient, component ofsocial improvement. The potential impactsof improved accessibility and mobility forneighborhoods like Comuna 13, alongwith the impacts of improved social ser-vices and enhanced security, depend on acomplex set of conditions that are shapedin part by local, regional, national, andglobal processes. For example, perceptionsof opportunity, safety, mobility, and qual-ity of life by young people in the Comunaare influenced by myriad political andsocio-economic conditions that must beconsidered in any neighborhood develop-ment strategies. Medellín has certainlystepped back from the abyss of social col-lapse that it faced during the 1980s and1990s, but many of the underlying condi-tions that shaped those decades still existtoday. Although life for many in Comuna13 has improved measurably since Operac-ión Orion, our preliminary analysis sug-gests that much remains to be done bylocal and city authorities if future genera-tions of residents are to fulfill the promiseof development offered by the policies andevents of the past decade. The enduringchallenge for Medellín is to capitalize onthese improvements and harness all of the

city’s human and material potential tobecome of paragon of urban change.

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Documents

Medellín: A City Reborn? - WKU - Western Kentucky … · 2014-12-10 · Medellín: A City Reborn? by Holli Drummond, ... Photographs by the authors Contextualizing Medellín Cities