MCWP 3-34.1 Military Police in Support of the MAGTF 3-34.1 Military... · Recommendations should include the following information: l ... execution of military police operations regarding

MCWP 3-34.1

Military Police in Support of the MAGTF

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 143 000081 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public; distribution is unlimited

To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes thatwill improve it. Recommendations may be sent directly to Commanding General, MarineCorps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division (C 42), 3300 Russell Road, Suite318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917 (DSN 278-2917) or by E-mail [email protected]. Recommendations should include the following information:

l Location of changePublication number and titleCurrent page numberParagraph number (if applicable)Line numberFigure or table number (if applicable)

l Nature of changeAdd, deleteProposed new text, preferably double-spaced and typewritten

l Justification and/or source of change

Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from Marine CorpsLogistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600,Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from theDoctrine Division, MCCDC, world wide web home page which is found at the following uni-versal reference locator: http://www.doctrine.usmc.mil.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

13 October 2000

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-34.1, Military Police in Support ofthe MAGTF, provides the doctrinal basis for employment of military police in supportof Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. This publication addressesmilitary police missions, functions, objectives, and capabilities in peace, crisis, andwar. MCWP 3-34.1 also describes how military police serve as a MAGTF forcemultiplier by interacting and supporting tactical-level expeditionary activities.

This publication is designed for commanders and staff planners responsible for conductof military police activities in support of expeditionary operations and operations otherthan war. MCWP 3-34.1 provides information for consideration in planning andexecution of military police operations regarding area security, force protection, enemyprisoner of war and civilian internee control, maneuver and mobility supportoperations, military law enforcement, and nonlethal weapons employment. It alsodetails logistic requirements, physical security, customs, and military working dogemployment.

MCWP 3-34.1 supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3-5, Employment ofMilitary Police in Combat.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

B. B. KNUTSON, JR.Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding GeneralMarine Corps Combat Development Command

DISTRIBUTION: 143 000081 00

MILITARY POLICE IN SUPPORT OF THE MAGTF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Chapter 1. Overview

Mission and Support Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Antiterrorism/Force Protection Operations Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1Area Security Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2Law and Order Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2Internment Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Combat Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Combat Service Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Provost Marshal Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5Control Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Support to a Marine Expeditionary Unit or Special Purpose MAGTF. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Nonlethal Weapons Employment Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Antiterrorism/Force Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Support During Military Operations Other Than War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Crisis Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Peace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Noncombatant Evacuation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Counterdrug Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7Disaster Relief and Military Support to Civil Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Future Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Chapter 2. Support for Antiterrorism/Force Protection Operations

Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Protective Service Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Crime Prevention and Physical Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Law and Order Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Military Working Dog Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3Information Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

iv ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Chapter 3. Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations

Route Reconnaissance and Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Main Supply Route Regulation and Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Main Supply Route Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Defiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Vehicle Holding Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Roadblocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Checkpoints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Traffic Control Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Route Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Support for River Crossing Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Support for Passage of Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Support for Area Damage Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Straggler and Dislocated Civilian Control Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Information Collecting, Reporting, and Dissemination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Chapter 4. Area Security Operations

Command Post Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Motor Patrols. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1Foot Patrols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Rear Area Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2Liaison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Airfield Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Aircraft Avenue of Approach Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Water Obstacle Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5Night Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Forward Arming and Refueling Point Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Hazard Monitoring and Surveying Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

Port Operations Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

Logistic Convoy Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

Chapter 5. Law and Order Operations

Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Persons Subject to Uniform Code of Military Justice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1Persons Not Subject to Uniform Code of Military Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1Persons Subject to Posse Comitatus Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Military Police in Support of the MAGTF_____________________________________________________________________ v

Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Exclusive Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2Concurrent Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2Proprietary Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Law and Order Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3Military Working Dog Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3Traffic Enforcement and Accident Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4Criminal Investigations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4Crime Prevention and Physical Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5Customs Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5Information Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5Joint, Combined, and Host Nation Police Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Chapter 6. Internment Operations

Geneva Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Personsin Time of War, 12 August 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of theWounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditionof the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Membersof Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Protection Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

U.S. Governing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Categories of Enemy Prisoners of War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Civilian Internees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Internment Camps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3Conditions for Internment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Objectives of Internment Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

Principles of Internment Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

Internment Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

Security Tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4Collection Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5Processing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8

Dislocated Civilian Internment Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8

U.S. Military Prisoner Internment Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9

vi ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Chapter 7. Nonlethal Weapons and Controls

Command Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Employment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Operational Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Support Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Flexible Deterrent Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2Classic Nonlethal Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Effects on Human Abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3Required Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Military Working Dog Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Appendices

A Customs Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B Military Police Support Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-1

C Personnel and Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C-1

D Physical Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

E Military Working Dogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .E-1

F Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1

G References and Related Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW

Military police support Marine air-ground task force(MAGTF) operations during peace, conflict, and war.Employed as a MAGTF force multiplier, militarypolice operate across the force continuum to supporttraining in nonlethal weapons use, antiterrorism/forceprotection (AT/FP) operations, noncombatantevacuation operations, civil unrest, and other securityoperations.

During joint and multinational operations, militarypolice perform specialized functions in areas ofaccident investigations, criminal investigations,employment of military working dogs, physicalsecurity, and corrections. In addition, military policeenhance interoperabi l i ty through l ia ison andcoordination with joint, combined, host nation (HN)and nongovernmental organizations. To maximize thelimited available military police (MP) assets,commanders must prioritize support requirements.

Mission and Support Capabilities

The MP mission and capabilities include support forAT/FP operations, maneuver and mobility supportoperations, area securi ty, law and order, andinternment operations. Excluding the manpowerintensive temporary internment operations, militarypol ice can normal ly conduct these miss ionssimultaneously.

Antiterrorism/Force Protection Operations Support

The inherent MP capabilities contribute to improvinga unit’s AT/FP posture. With the ever-changing enemyand environmental situation, military police advise thecommander of the probable impact a course of actionhas in regards to AT/FP. Military police conductvulnerability assessments to identify command areasthat are vulnerable to terroris t a t tack. Theseassessments and the criminal and tactical informationgathered by the military police, criminal investigationdivision (CID), and the Naval Criminal InvestigativeService (NCIS) assist in the development of aMAGTF AT/FP plan that is dedicated to safeguardingproperty and personnel. Military police also functionas a training cadre to provide necessary and required

AT/FP training. Support for AT/FP operations isdiscussed further in chapter 2.

Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations

At tactical levels, effective use of the road network is akey component of the movement function. Militaryunits and HN civilians will compete for space alonglimited and congested roadways. Stragglers andrefugees may further exacerbate this roadwaycongestion. To ensure maximum use of sparse roadnetworks, military police perform maneuver andmobility support operations as specified by thecommander and movement control elements. Militarypolice assist in the identification of primary andalternate routes, monitor route conditions, and keeproutes clear for vital military movements. Maneuverand mobility support operations are discussed furtherin chapter 3.

Military police support maneuver, mobility, andsurvivability by expediting forward, lateral, and rearmovement of combat, combat support, and combatservice support resources and by conducting thefollowing security missions.

Route Reconnaissance and Surveillance When conduc t ing rou te reconna i ssance andsurveillance missions, military police continuallymonitor the condition of main supply routes (MSR) byidentifying restrictions on terrain, effects of weatheron routes, damage to routes, nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) contamination, and the presence ofthe enemy. Military police also identify alternateMSRs. In addition, police report observations,maintain surveillance, and develop the enemysituation. Mobile MP teams also gather information onfriendly and enemy activity.

MSR Regulation and Enforcement Military police enforce the MAGTF commander’sMSR regulations and traffic circulation plans to keepMSRs free for priority military movement. Toexpedite traffic on MSRs, military police usepatrolling, traffic control points (TCPs), roadblocks,checkpoints, holding areas, defiles at critical points,and temporary route signs. Effective and efficientemployment of traffic control measures move militarytraffic, stragglers, and refugees through or aroundpotential congestion points.

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Area Damage Control The MP units support area damage control before,during, and after hostile actions or natural andmanmade d isas ters . Whi le conduct ing routereconnaissance and surveillance and MSR regulationand enforcement missions, military police identifyareas that are damaged. Military police also identifyareas contaminated by NBC munitions and report thisinformation to the command to affect planning and tofacilitate operations.

Information Collecting, Reporting, and DisseminationDuring the conduct of maneuver and mobility supportoperations, military police continuously collect andprovide information to commanders. While patrolling,military police gather information about the terrain,weather, and activities in the area of operations (AO).They a l so ga ther v i ta l opera t iona l p lanninginformation by routinely talking to military personnel,MSR users, local police, and the populace. A valuablesource of information, military police must pass andreceive information in a timely manner. Duringoperations, the information flow is continuousbetween the military police and the intelligencecommunity. Military police gather information basedo n t h e c o m m a n d e r ’ s p r i o r i t y i n t e l l i g e n c erequirements.

Area Security Operations

Units conduct area security operations to reduce theprobability or to minimize the effects of enemy attacksin their AO. Military police conduct area securityoperations to augment or reinforce these units and toprotect critical functions and facilities. These MP areasecurity activities may be performed as specificassignments or conducted concurrently with otherwarfighting capabilities. Area security operations arediscussed further in chapter 4.

While performing area security activities, militarypolice help safeguard against unexpected enemyattacks. They monitor likely enemy avenues ofapproach and landing zones (LZs) or drop zones (DZs)to give early warning of enemy activity. They alsoassist in the coverage of named areas of interest. Inaddition, military police conduct reconnaissance ofroutes and bridges and provide map overlays of thoseroutes.

Military police perform security functions throughoutthe AO to reduce criminal activities and the possibilityof sabotage at vital support facilities. They assist in the

security of designated critical assets through the use ofmounted or dismounted MP patrols, military workingdogs (MWDs), and existing technology. Militarypolice are most effective when kept mobile, althoughthey may be tasked to perform static posts such asTCPs, roadblocks, and checkpoints. Their mobilityenables them to provide securi ty for l ines ofcommunications (LOC) and MSRs. Military policeperforming area security may be tasked to—

l Secure and protect LOC and routes into the AO. l Secure designated critical assets (e.g., expedition-

ary airfields, combat service support areas, andforward arming and refueling points [FARPs]).

l Conduct MSR and area reconnaissance and surveil-lance.

l Detect enemy forces operating in the AO.l Disseminate physical security and threat advisories

for base and installation defense.

Law and Order Operations

The MP law and order operations are conducted tomaintain and extend the commander’s discipline andcontrol by providing a lawful and orderly environmentin which to operate. During law and order operations,military police establish liaison with HN police andconduct joint patrols with HN or multinational forcesto maintain order and conduct security operations,thereby enhancing interoperability. The type ofoperation determines the requirement for additionalMP support. Law and order operations are discussedfurther in chapter 5.

These operations are often performed in conjunctionwith maneuver and mobility support and area securityoperations and include measures necessary to—

l Enforce laws, directives, and punitive regulations.l Conduct criminal and traffic accident investigations.l Conduct MP information operations.l Support customs operations.

Law EnforcementAn evolving criminal threat will have an adverseeffect on military operations and will requirecommanders to take actions that will reduce thenegative impacts on forces, resources, and operations.As part of this effort, military police enforce laws andappropriate directives of the commander. To furtherreduce these negative impacts, military policemaintain liaison and coordinate with other Departmentof Defense (DOD) police organizations, HN military

Military Police in Support of the MAGTF __________________________________________________________________ 1-3

and civilian authorities, and multinational policeorganizations. A coordinated law enforcement effortremoves the conditions and opportunities that promotecrime, thereby maintaining military discipline andpreventing diversion of military resources.

Criminal Investigations

Offenses committed against U.S. Forces and propertydegrade military discipline, morale, and operationalcapabilities. These crimes and offenses must bei n v e s t i g a t e d t o s u p p o r t t h e c o m m a n d e r ’ sresponsibility to protect personnel, supplies, facilities,readiness, and operational capabilities. Depending onthe type and seriousness of the offense underinvestigation, such investigations may be conductedby military police investigators (MPIs) or CID andNCIS, working in coordination with other DOD andHN investigative agencies.

Customs Support Operations

Military police provide the commander a high degreeof flexibility through the execution of customsoperations. Personnel, equipment, and materialentering the customs territory of the United States(CTUS) must meet customs, postal, immigration,agriculture, and other Federal agency requirements.During the redeployment of forces, customs-trainedmilitary police, working with joint and U.S. Federalagencies, help ensure compliance with regulations andapplicable provisions of international agreements bydetecting and investigating violations. Customssupport operations are discussed in appendix A.

MP Information Operations

The MP information operations consist of thosemeasures to collect, analyze, and disseminateinformation gathered from criminal activities andincidents that disrupt law and order. Military policeconduct this function as part of other missions. In aneffort to provide the commander with a lawful andorderly environment, mili tary police use thisinformation to redirect mounted and dismountedpatrols and MWD teams to high crime and incidentareas. Military police also use this information tosupport the commander’s human intel l igence(HUMINT) collection plan.

Internment Operations

Internment refers to the wartime confinement imposedon prisoners of war (EPWs), and when required,

civilian internees (CIs). According to the GenevaConventions, commanders are responsible for thehumane treatment of EPWs and CIs. Military policeprovide the commander with the ability to collect,process, guard, protect, account for, and transferEPWs and CIs, as well as U.S. Military prisoners.

Extended internment operations are the responsibilityof the U.S. Army, the executive agent for EPWs.Because internment operations are manpowerintensive, military police tasked with this missionshould be dedicated to performing only this duty. Ifrequired, military police are capable of trainingaugmentees to assist them in conducting theseoperations.

EPW and CI Operations

The EPW and CI operations take place duringoffensive, defensive, and retrograde operations. Someaspect of EPW and CI operations occurs at everyorganizational level. The commander and supportingstaff must conduct careful planning to ensure theseoperations will not have a negative impact on missionaccomplishment. Beginning with the collection pointsin the forward area, military police process and collectEPWs and CIs for transfer to MAGTF temporaryholding facilities. Control of EPWs and CIs isdiscussed further in chapter 6.

U.S. Military Prisoner Operations

On the battlefield, military police provide for thetemporary confinement and evacuation of U.S.Military prisoners. The MP confinement operationsparal le l , but are separate f rom, EPW and CIinternment and evacuation operations.

Dislocated Civilian and Straggler Control

As part of internment operations, military policeidentify and separate dislocated civilians andstragglers from EPWs and CIs. Military police assist,direct, or deny the movement of identified dislocatedcivilians whose location, direction of movement, oractions may hinder military operations. In concert withjoint, allied, and HN forces, military police divertrefugees and other dislocated civilians from MSRs.Military police also return stragglers to militarycontrol or make other disposition, as appropriate.Mobile patrols and TCP and checkpoint teamsaccomplish these tasks as part of their day-to-dayoperations.

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Objectives

The MP warfighting capabilities are applicable acrossthe range of military operations and support MAGTFcombat, combat support, and combat service supportoperations. See figure 1-1.

Combat

Military police conduct combat operations to keepMSRs and LOC open and Military police may beformed into a response force or augment the securityforce conducting rear area security operations. Toallow the MAGTF commander to keep the groundcombat element (GCE) concentrated and operating inthe main battle area, military police assist in defeatingas much of the rear area threat as possible.

Combat Support

Military police provide combat support to facilitate themovement of GCE forces and supplies to the mainbattle area by conducting route reconnaissance, MSRregulation, and dislocated civilian and straggler

control and by aiding in the evacuation of EPWs andCIs from the main battle area.

Combat Service Support

Military police conduct operations to help combatservice support elements (CSSEs) provide sustainmentto the MAGTF. The MP maneuver and mobilitysupport and area security operation missions areinstrumental to the success of the CSSE. In addition,military police provide law enforcement capabilities toassist commanders in maintaining good order anddiscipline.

Command and Control

Each MAGTF commander may designate a MAGTFprovost marshal under the cognizance of the MAGTFassistant chief of staff, operations staff officer (G-3).The MAGTF provost marshal provides the MAGTFcommander with MP employment subject matterexpertise and coordinates MP activities to ensure theproper allocation of limited resources. The MAGTF

Figure 1-1. Range of Military Operations.


provost marshal is responsible for ensuring that MPtaskings are made according to the concept ofoperations and the priorities established by theMAGTF commander.

Provost Marshal Responsibilities

The MAGTF Provost Marshal is responsible for—

l Advising the MAGTF commander on matters per-taining to MP operations.

l Supervising and coordinating MP assets and opera-tions within the MAGTF.

l Coordinating law enforcement matters betweenmajor subordinate commands (MSCs).

l Coordinating MAGTF law enforcement matterswith other Services and or the HN.

l Coordinating and overseeing matters pertaining toEPWs, CIs, and other detained persons.

l Advising the commander on the establishment ofAT/FC measures.

Control Methods

The mission and needs of the MAGTF commandermay require the task organization of MP units.Consolidation of MP personnel and resources creates amore robust MP unit capable of executing a widerrange of operational missions while allowing greatersupport flexibility throughout the MAGTF AO. Tomaintain capabilities, an MP platoon (1 officer and 40enlisted) is normally the lowest level unit employed.

While MP assets are currently resident within eachMAGTF element of the Marine expeditionary force(MEF), a variety of control options may be employedto use these limited assets efficiently.

Decentralized Control and Decentralized Execution This traditional method retains MP units in each MSCelement. Military police are under the tactical controlof the respective MSC MP commander. They areorganic to the MAGTF element headquarters, whichprovides administrative and logistical support. Whilethis method is the most responsive to the individualMSC commander’s needs and is useful when theMAGTF elements may have wide geographicseparation, the MAGTF MP capability is diluted, andthe ability to rapidly mass MP capability may bedifficult to coordinate.

Centralized Control and Decentralized ExecutionIn this option, MAGTF MP assets are combined toform a provisional MP unit under a single commander.This MP unit provides either general supportthroughout the MAGTF AO or direct support tosubordinate elements. The MAGTF commanderretains the ability to shift MP assets as the situationdictates. Normally, MP units do not provide directsupport below the GCE, aviation combat element(ACE), or CSSE levels. This method of employmentmay be best suited in a combat environment wheresubordinate elements are collocated or share commonboundaries. It provides for timely response to asupported element’s needs, yet allows the senior MPcommander to analyze and direct MP activities.Control difficulties may occur as the AO increases.T h e M A G T F c o m m a n d e l e m e n t p r o v i d e sadministrative and logistical support.

Centralized Control and Centralized ExecutionIn this control method, MAGTF MP assets are placedin a provisional MP unit under a single commander(e.g., the MEF provost marshal may be designated asthe MEF MP commander); this MP unit providesgeneral support to the MAGTF. While this is the leasttraditional method of employment, it may be preferredwhen the MAGTF mission is peacekeeping orhumanitarian assistance within a limited area ofresponsibility. The MAGTF command elementprovides administrative and logistical support.

Support to a Marine Expeditionary Unit or Special Purpose MAGTF

The primary MP support for a Marine expeditionaryunit (MEU) or special purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF)is an MP detachment assigned to the MEU servicesupport group or CSSE of the SPMAGTF. The MPoperations are planned and coordinated with the CSSEstaff. Refer to Appendix B, Military Police SupportEstimate, and Appendix C, Personnel and Logistics.

The MP detachment is task-organized to provide theMAGTF commander capabilities in—

l Nonlethal weapons employment. l AT/FP planning and assessment. l Criminal investigations.

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l Accident investigations.l Physical security.

Nonlethal Weapons Employment Training

Military police provide the SPMAGTF or MEUcommander with tactics and nonlethal weaponsemployment subject matter experts and train thedesignated control force on nonlethal capabilities.Nonlethal weapons and controls are discussed furtherin chapter 7.

Antiterrorism/Force Protection

An MP officer assigned to a MEU or SPMAGTF staffis well qualified to function as the MAGTF AT/FPofficer, responsible for coordinating AT/FP training,planning, and execution. The MP detachment or cadreprovides the commander with force protectioncapabilities and suggests ways to detect and defeat theterrorist threat , thus supporting mobili ty andsurvivability functions.

Liaison

Military police provide the commander liaisoncapabil i t ies with HN, civi l , and mil i tary lawe n f o r c e m e n t a g e n c i e s t o d e v e l o p a l i n e o fcommunication that will enhance a unit’s survivabilityin a deployed environment.

Support During Military Operations Other Than War

Military police are ideally suited for militaryoperations other than war (MOOTW) missions due tothe i r un ique t r a in ing and exper ience . F romintroductory training, through execution of their dailytasks, military police are trained on the forcecontinuum and are adept at using the appropriate levelo f f o r c e w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h c i v i l i a n s a n dnoncombatants. See figure 1-2.

In MOOTW, MAGTFs may conduct operations thatinvolve crisis response, humanitarian assistance, peaceoperations, noncombatant evacuation operations,counterdrug operations, disaster relief, and militarysupport to civilian authorities, as well as domesticsupport such as law enforcement and combatingterrorism. In these operations, military police providethe commander a flexible option and a force that

competently functions within the constraints of theforce continuum.

Crisis Response

Crisis response may involve peace enforcement andemergency support to civil authorities. The ability ofthe MAGTF to respond rapidly and appropriately topotential or actual crises contributes to stability.During crisis response operations, military police helpplan and execute missions involving civil unrest, lawand order operations, and maneuver and mobilitysupport operations.

Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance (HA) operations relieve orreduce the results of natural or manmade disasters orother endemic conditions such as disease, hunger, orprivation in countries or regions outside the UnitedStates. The HA provided by the MAGTF is generallylimited in scope and duration and is intended tocomplement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencieswith the primary responsibil i ty for providingassistance. The MP support for HA operations maycover a broad range of missions, to include maneuverand mobility support operations and law and orderoperations. Military police provide a conduit for thec o m m a n d e r t o e s t a b l i s h c r u c i a l l i n e s o fcommunications and liaison with joint, combined, andHN law enforcement agencies conducting HAoperations.

Peace Operations

These military operations support diplomatic effortscategorized as peacekeeping operations and peaceenforcement operations. Military police aid in the safeand successful resolution of peace operations byproviding support in the areas of maneuver andmobility support operations, area security operations,and law and order operations.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

These operations are normally conducted to relocatethreatened noncombatants from a foreign country.Although principally conducted to evacuate U.S.citizens, noncombatant evacuation operations mayalso include selective evacuation of citizens from theHN as well as citizens from other countries. Militarypolice support the commander by conductingoperations to control civil disturbances, execute


searches, and provide security with the appropriatelevel of force.

Counterdrug Operations

Counterdrug operations support Federal, state, andlocal law enforcement agencies in their efforts todisrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the UnitedStates. The MAGTF support may include providingintelligence analysts, logistical support personnel, andsupport to interdiction. Customs-trained militarypolice and MWD teams are integral parts of thecounterdrug operation support effort.

Disaster Relief and Military Support to Civil Authorities

If permitted by law, these operations providetemporary support to domestic civil authorities whenan emergency overtaxes local capabilities. Support tocivil authorities can be as diverse as restoration of lawand order in the aftermath of riots, protection of lifeand Federal property, or relief after a natural disaster.Military police were essential to the success of themilitary support provided to civil authorities in the1992 disaster relief efforts provided during HurricanesAndrew in Florida and Iniki in Hawaii and in troopdeployment during California civil disturbances.

Figure 1-2. Use of Force Continuum.

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Future Operations

As the world population grows and migrates to citiesand urban areas in the littoral regions, the MarineCorps future will include challenges in homelanddefense, peacetime engagement, forward presence,and crisis response. As national boundaries becomeless distinct, the face of the enemy will become moreunconventional and the criminal element will becomea greater threat.

Future operations will be characterized by increasedinteraction between Marines and noncombatants. Tokeep pace with these challenges, the demand for MPskills will increase. The MP ability to operate across

the force continuum with appropriate restraint andauthority will provide the MAGTF commander with ahost of capabili t ies that can contribute to theaccomplishment of any mission.

Changes in the operational environment will cause ashift in the current execution methodology thatsupports future operational concepts. The MPcapabilities such as continuing use of emergenttechnologies in the area of nonlethal controls, physicalsecurity, and electronic security systems provide anadaptive force that can keep pace with these changes.In the future, military police will also enhance theMAGTF AT/FP posture while complementing areduced logistical footprint.

CHAPTER 2. SUPPORT FOR ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION OPERATIONS

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-2,Campaigning , indicates that force protectionsafeguards our centers of gravity and protects,conceals, reduces, or eliminates critical vulnerabilities.In military operations other than war, force protectionmay include protecting the supported nation’spopula t ion , inf ras t ruc ture , and economic orgovernmental institutions. An inherent commandresponsibility, force protection also encompassesprecautions taken against terrorist activities that targetU.S . Forces o r noncombatan t s . Leaders a reresponsible for ensuring that Marines are properlyprepared to meet, counter, and survive threats that maybe confronted throughout the battlespace, thusconserving combat power for application at a decisivetime and place.

Force protection is a security program designed toprotect military personnel, civilian employees, familymembers, facilities, and equipment. This protection isaccomplished through a systematic approach thatintegrates the planning and application of combatingterrorism measures, physical security, operationssecurity, law and order operations, and personalprotect ive measures which are suppor ted byintelligence, counterintelligence, and other securityprograms. The Navy and Marine Corps (NAVMC)2927, Antiterrorism/Force Protection Campaign Plan,clarifies the issue of antiterrorism as it relates to forceprotection and provides commanders with a sourcedocument upon which to institutionalize localprograms.

Commanders must establish, as part of the forceprotection plan, an AT/FP program that focuses onprotecting Marines and assets. To provide the bestprotection, commanders must focus on training andeducation, proper operational planning, and theprovision of the necessary resources.

As part of the command force protection program,military police provide the commander with uniquecapabilities that contribute directly to improving aunit’s AT/FP posture. These MP capabilities include:planning, assessment, training, protective serviceoperations, crime prevention and physical security,and law and order operations.

Planning

Comprehensive AT/FP plans must be developed andimplemented to provide maximum personnel andassets protection. These plans must clearly describeAT/FP operational responsibilities for permanently ortemporar i ly ass igned uni t s and ind iv idua ls .Memorandums of agreement are established tocoordinate response to security threats and medicalemergenc i e s . These ag reemen t s a l so cove rcommunications interface with cooperating agencies,intelligence sharing, and other mutual physicalsecurity and loss prevention issues. Memorandums ofagreement must be reviewed, updated, and exercisedperiodically. The MAGTF AT/FP officer serves as anadvisor to assist the commander in meeting andplanning for AT/FP requirements.

As AT/FP subject matter experts, MP officers are wellsuited to function as the MAGTF AT/FP officer.Military police assist AT/FP planning efforts by—

l Assisting in the development of AT/FP plans forpermanent and temporary operations and exercises.

l Providing recommendations for specific measuresand actions to be taken for each threat condition(THREATCON) level.

l Recommending procedures to collect and analyzethreat information and threat capability.

l Assessing vulnerability to threat attacks.l Implementing procedures to enhance AT/FP and for

responding to threat incidents.l Maintaining liaison with HN and foreign author-

ities.

Assessments

Assessments are essential to the development of aneffective AT/FP plan. Threat assessments form thebasis for planning and justification of resourceexpenditures and contribute to planning and theestablishment of specific THREATCON measures.The Navy Antiterrorism Analysis Center prepares areathreat assessments to provide the commander withupdated analysis of the threat in a particular AO. The

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local threat assessment may also be obtained via theresident NCIS office.

Vulnerability assessments provide the commander athreat-based analysis and self-assessment tool toevaluate the unit’s vulnerability to terrorist attack. In atactical environment, vulnerability assessmentsenhance the AT/FP posture by improving stationaryasset security. The more vulnerable a unit, the moreattractive it becomes to terrorists.

Vulnerabilities identified during assessments providejustification for establishing specific THREATCONmeasures and ac t ions . Pr ior to dep loyment ,vulnerability assessments must be conducted toidentify appropriate force protection measures and toreduce risk. Military police, assigned to the MAGTF,should be tasked as part of an integrated team toconduct these assessments.

Military police reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist attackby—

l Focusing on those elements directly related tocombating terrorism, to include preventing terroristacts, and if prevention fails , l imiting masscasualties.

l Identifying vulnerabilities that may be exploited bythreat groups and recommending options toeliminate or reduce those vulnerabilities.

l Concentrating on areas identified by the com-mander as essential to mission accomplishment.

Training

A vital part of the commander’s force protectionprogram, training and education are main factors inreducing the terrorist’s opportunity to target U.S.Forces. Training increases individuals’ awareness andhelps them to focus on prevention of terrorism.

D e p l o y i n g p e r s o n n e l m u s t r e c e i v e L e v e l Iantiterrorism training within the 6 months prior todeployment or travel overseas. The AT/FP officers areresponsible for coordinating and conducting Level Itraining and may use local CID, NCIS, or speciallytrained mili tary police to increase the AT/FPawareness level of personnel.

Integration of terrorist scenarios into unit-leveltraining exercises provides practical application of

terrorism awareness skills and serves to reinforceforce protection readiness within the unit. Militarypolice assist in incorporating and coordinatingscenarios that—

l Evaluate a unit’s ability to detect terrorist surveil-lance and targeting.

l Implement increased THREATCON security meas-ures.

l Gauge the organization’s preparedness to respondto acts of terrorism and attack by traditionalconventional enemy forces.

Protective Service Operations

Commanders may be required to perform protectiveservice operations to reduce individual or groupvulnerability to terrorist attack. To assist in protectiveservice operations, military police provide personalsecurity for key Government leaders, flag officers, andequivalent civilian dignitaries. Military police alsocoord ina te and suppor t HN and fore ign lawenforcement protective service operations.

Crime Prevention and Physical Security

Military police provide units in a combat environmentwith advice on crime prevention and physical securitymeasures through a heightened degree of awareness.In addition, military police are responsible forinvestigating and reporting criminal activities that willassist the commander in maintaining unit order anddiscipline. Military police also provide commanderswith awareness programs, instruction, and informationon recognizing, countering, and preventing criminaland terrorist activities.

Physical security is the protection of critical assets,such as headquarters elements and communication andcontrol activities. See Appendix D, Physical Security.

Normally, MP involvement in physical security islimited to providing units advice for security in theirAO. When assist ing in securi ty enhancementplanning, military police provide advice on the use ofphysical security equipment that may include—

l Perimeter barriers.


l Protective lighting.l Security containers.l Locking mechanisms.l Intrusion systems.l Personal identification.l Access control.l Movement control.


Military police conduct law and order operations toprovide the commanders with a lawful and orderlyenvironment and to enhance the commander’s AT/FPposture. See chapter 5.

As part of the force protection program, militarypolice enforce laws, direct ives, and punit iveregu la t ions ; conduc t c r imina l and acc iden tinvestigations; and control the civilian populace andr e s o u r c e s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e M A G T Fcommander’s directives. Law and order operations insupport of AT/FP efforts also include MWD supportand police information operations.

Military Working Dog Support

Special MWD capabilities significantly enhance thecommander’s ability to protect forces and assets. SeeAppendix E, Military Working Dogs. AlthoughMWDs are normally garrison assets, the MAGTFcommander can request MWD support for combat,combat support , and combat service supportoperations. Dual-certified patrol and explosivedetector dogs give the commander the ability to—

l Detect explosives and tripwires.l Bypass the enemy in bunkers and built-up areas.l Conduct flight line security patrols, EPW control,

perimeter patrols, and other appropriate missions.

Information Operations

As part of the commander’s AT/FP program, militarypolice and CID or NCIS collect, analyze, and interpretcriminal and law enforcement information, whichplays an impor tant par t in the commander’sintelligence preparation of the battlefield. Militarypolice collect information and coordinate efforts withthe MAGTF intelligence staff officer (G-2/S-2) tosupport units’ HUMINT all-source production efforts.See figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1. HUMINT Operations.

CHAPTER 3. MANEUVER AND MOBILITY SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Reconnaissance, security, and mobility are critical tosuccessful military operations. In support of theserequirements, military police conduct maneuver andmobility support operations (MMSO) across the fullrange of military operations.

During peace operations, military police aid the safeflow of food and supplies and assist local authoritieswith road and highway regulation during disasterrelief operations. While performing MMSO functions,military police work closely with the logisticmovement control center (LMCC) to implement plansfor controlling the movement of combat resourcesalong LOC. In multinational operations, this supportintegrates available HN and allied forces capabilities.

In wartime, military police expedite forward, lateral,and rear movement of forces on the battlefield. Toassist the movement of forces across the battlefield,military police operate TCPs and conduct mobilepatrols to help stragglers return to their respectiveunits. In addition, military police help clear LOC bydirecting and controlling the movement of civilianswhose location or direction of movement may hindermilitary operations. They also provide escorts to moveU.S. noncombatants from assembly points to theaterembarkation terminals.

During MMSO, military police perform—

l Route reconnaissance and surveillance.l MSR regulation and enforcement.l MSR control measures (temporary route signing). l Support for river crossing operations.l Support for passage of lines.l Support for area damage control. l Straggler and dislocated civilian control operations.l Information collecting, reporting, and dissemina-

tion.

Route Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Military police conduct route reconnaissance andsurveillance operations to assist operational andintelligence collection planning efforts by gathering

detailed information on a specific route and itssurrounding terrain. Mobile MP teams record andreport the condition of MSRs and other criticalroadways to identify weather effects on road surfaces,trafficability, route damage, NBC contamination, andenemy activity. Military police continually monitorMSRs and the surrounding terrain to provide earlywarning of enemy activity to commanders.

In MOOTW, route reconnaissance is conducted toopen new routes to support peace operations,humanitarian assistance, or areas devastated by naturalor manmade disasters. Military police conduct detailedand continuous route reconnaissance to provideupdated information to the commander and unitstraveling the MSRs.

Main Supply Route Regulation and Enforcement

To support force movement, MP units enforce MSRregulation plans by controlling highway trafficactivities. Enforcement efforts focus on ensuring thatonly authorized traffic uses controlled MSRs.

The command with jurisdiction over the road networksets the highway regulation plan, which includes MSRregulation measures. These regulations appear intraffic circulation plans as well as in engineer route,bridge, and tunnel reconnaissance reports. Unitstanding operating procedures (SOPs) and commanddirectives also may contain MSR regulations. TheLMCC establishes route classifications usinginformation provided from MP route reconnaissancemissions.

Military police use TCPs, roadblocks, checkpoints,holding areas, and defiles at critical points to monitorMSRs and enforce command regulations. MountedMP teams patrol between static posts to observe trafficand road conditions, to gather information on friendlyand enemy activity, and to assist stranded vehicles andcrews. Changes in road condition and enemy activityalong MSRs are reported immediately through MPchannels.

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Main Supply Route Control Measures

While performing MMSO, military police permitMSR traffic to flow as smoothly and naturally aspossible. To keep traffic moving and regulate MSRs,military police move traffic through defiles; establishvehicle holding areas; set up roadblocks, checkpoints,and traffic control points; and monitor route signs.

Defiles

A defile is a narrow natural or manmade passage thatconstricts the movement of troops and vehicles.Military police use defiles to slow or restrictmovement along MSRs.

Vehicle Holding Areas

Vehicle holding areas are locations where vehicles andtroops using MSRs are staged temporarily. Militarypolice often use vehicle holding areas with defiles,checkpoints, and roadblocks to temporarily control orsuspend traffic movement.

Roadblocks

Roadblocks are manned or unmanned control sites thatlimit the movement of vehicles or close access tocertain areas. Military police set up roadblocks to stop,slow, or restrict movement of vehicles along a route. Aroadblock can help channel vehicles and personnel tocheckpoints, holding areas, or defiles.

Checkpoints

Checkpoints are set up to control movement and toprevent illegal actions or actions that aid the enemy.At checkpoints, military police inspect cargo, enforcerules and regulations, and collect and provideinformation.

Traffic Control Points

The main purpose of a TCP is to ensure smooth andefficient use of the road network in accordance withthe traffic circulation plan. Military police set up TCPsat critical sites along MSRs to control the movementof vehicles and personnel. Usually, TCP locations areidentified during the transportation planning process.

Route Signs

A signed military route system, like the signed U.S.highway system, enables road users to reach theirdestinations by following signs and road markingsdisplayed along the roadside. Route signs provideMSR users with locations of detours, key units, andfacilities. In addition, signs provide directions anddistances, identify routes or hazards, and providegeneral information to assist movement. Signs alsoreduce manpower requirements by eliminating theneed to post a military police along a route. Militarypolice routinely monitor signs before critical moves toensure the signs are not damaged, destroyed, or movedby weather, saboteurs, or battle.

Support for River Crossing Operations

Military police support river crossing operations byhelping units to move rapidly across river obstacles.River c ross ing MP suppor t serves to reducecongestion, speed the crossing, and enable themaneuver forces to maintain momentum. The MPemployment for a river crossing is influenced by thebattlefield situation.

The number and placement of MP assets supportingthis operation vary with the size of the force crossingthe river and the degree of enemy resistance expectedor encountered. Military police perform maneuver andmobility support activities leading up to, within thecrossing area, and on the entry and exit sides of theriver. To support river crossing operations, militarypolice—

l Establish holding areas. l Enforce MSR regulations. l Direct units to proper crossing locations.l Move units through crossing areas on schedule.

Support for Passage of Lines

Moving a maneuver unit through the position of anemplaced unit that is in contact with the enemy is acritical action. The degree of MP support depends onthe commander’s needs and the number of militarypolice available. The MP commander, the divisionlogistics staff officer (G-4), and the division G-3 plan


and coordinate the passage of lines operation. Militarypolice support a passage of lines by—

l Establishing TCPs.l Escorting and guiding vehicles.l Setting up temporary route signs.

Support for Area Damage Control

Area damage such as downed trees, urban rubble,damaged or destroyed bridges, cratered roads, andcontaminated road networks affect military operations.Area damage control (ADC) measures taken before,during, and after hostile actions and natural ormanmade disasters minimize effects and reducedamage. The focus of ADC is to limit the impact ofmilitary operations and to restore normal operations tothe local populace as quickly as possible.

The amount of MP suppor t needed for ADCoperations depends on the extent of the damage, theimportance of the affected area, and the impact of thedamage on military operations. Damage to an areamay be so great that roads may be closed and MSRtraffic may be rerouted. If roadways are passable,military police conduct MMSO in the affected area.Military police conduct route and area reconnaissanceto determine the trafficability of the routes into, out of,and around affected areas. When supporting ADCoperations, military police operate mounted anddismounted mobile patrols, checkpoints, roadblocks,and defiles to—

l Enforce emergency restrictions on movement into,within, and out of the affected area.

l Enforce curfews, orders, and movement authori-zation and prioritization.

l Watch for theft, pilferage, or arson against militaryproperty.

l Direct dislocated civilians.l Collect stragglers.

Straggler and Dislocated Civilian Control Operations

Military police conduct straggler control operations toassist commanders in maintaining combat strength by

locating and returning stragglers to their units.Military police locate stragglers at TCPs, checkpoints,roadblocks, defiles, or on patrol. For large numbers ofstragglers, special posts and collecting points are setup along MSRs or military police can operate stragglerposts a t es tabl ished TCPs, checkpoints , androadblocks.

To expedite movement on MSRs, military policeconduct dislocated civilian control operations.Although the HN usually takes measures to control themovement of their populations during a conflict, amass flow of civilians can seriously affect themovement or security of military units. If needed,military police redirect or prevent the movement ofcivilians when their location, direction of movement,or actions hinder military activity. During controloperations, military police direct dislocated civiliansto secondary roadways and areas not used by militaryforces.

Information Collecting, Reporting, and Dissemination

Through information collecting, reporting, anddissemination operations, military police contribute tothe initial intelligence preparation of the battlespace(IPB) by providing input on—

l Terrain that helps or hinders a combat supportoperation (e.g., presence of a water supply for achemical decontamination point).

l Terrain that can be critical to the AO securitymission (e.g., presence of potential DZs or LZs,communications sites, depot sites).

l Civil-military considerations (e.g., presence ofbuilt-up areas, refugee evacuation routes, populatedareas sympathetic to the friendly or enemy cause).

Military police contribute to the intelligence cycleprocess by conducting reconnaissance patrols to fillintelligence gaps or to update information on criticalareas and high-value targets. For example, after G-3/G-4 planners assign MSRs from the MEF support areaforward, military police check the terrain for thepresence of high-value targets (HVTs). Onceidentified, critical bridges, routes, and other HVTs,which the enemy will want to interdict or destroy, canbe surveilled or replacements planned.

CHAPTER 4. AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS

Military police conduct area security operations toprotect critical functions, facilities, and forces. Toensure support and sustainment operations areuninterrupted, military police synchronize efforts withother combat support and combat service support unitswithin the AO. The HN, when capable, retainsresponsibility for security of areas outside U.S. bases,but commanders are ultimately responsible for thedefense and security of their forces.

During peace operations, military police conduct areasecurity in and around areas devastated by natural ormanmade disasters to assist civilian or governmentagencies with the protection of life and property.During contingency operations, military policeconduct area security operations to protect the Force,restore order, and ensure freedom of movement.

Area security operations encompass those areas withinthe boundaries of the GCE, CSSE, and ACE, as wellas the MAGTF rear area. Security measures taken byindividual units reduce the probability or minimize theeffects of enemy attacks on friendly installations andareas. Each unit must be able to provide local securitywith organic assets. Military police operatingthroughout the parent command’s AO may respond toaugment or reinforce those forces.

To support the MAGTF commander’s intent, militarypolice conduct security operations, which include:

l Rear area security.l Airfield security. l FARP security. l NBC hazard monitor and survey operations.l Port operations security.l Logistic convoy security.

Command Post Security

Often MP area security capabilities are misapplied toprovide command post (CP) security. The commandermay establish an interior guard to preserve order,protect property, and enforce regulations within thejurisdiction of the command. An interior guard force,which is entirely separate from the MP force, shouldbe the primary security force within the CP area.

Methods

By virtue of their constant movement, military policeprovide security to assist in protecting units, criticalfacilities, MSRs, and airfields. The mobility andfirepower inherent within MP teams allow them toengage small enemy units by fire and movement.Military police are capable of destroying these enemyunits or disrupting their actions or preparations.Should military police encounter a threat level toolarge to engage, they are capable of fixing or delayingthe enemy and calling for supporting fires. Militarypolice accomplish area securi ty primari ly byconducting motor and foot patrols.

Motor Patrols

The MP motor patrols perform the same functions forarea security as they do for MMSO in maintaining thesecurity of MSRs and LOC in the AO.

Foot Patrols The MP foot patrols help to prevent infiltration andsurprise attacks aimed at stationary units, facilities, orcritical points along MSRs. Though limited in size,these patrols can be used to perform hasty areareconnaissance or security functions. Based on themission, the situation, and the need for additionalsecurity, an MP foot patrol may be comprised of oneor more teams.

The MP motor patrol teams may also conduct limitedfoot patrols by parking their vehicle and providingsecurity while other team members move on foot.These teams are well trained in fire and movementtechniques, which prepare them to engage the enemy.Once enemy contact is made, the patrol takes actionsbased on the patrol’s mission. Regardless of themiss ion , MP pa t ro l s a lways ga ther as muchinformation as possible.

Rear Area Security

Rear area security (RAS) operations are conducted toprotect the MAGTF rear against enemy interference.In a contiguous battlespace, the MAGTF rear area is

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that area from the GCE rear boundary to the MAGTFrear boundary. Normally, the contiguous battlespace isorganized in a linear manner with deep, close, and rearareas adjacent to each other and oriented toward theenemy. Noncontiguous battlespace is organized in anonlinear manner. In a noncontiguous battlespace, therear area may consist of several different locations andat great distance from the majority of Marine units.

During MAGTF operations, combat service supportnormally originates from the rear area of thebattlefield. Many of the ACE facilities establishedashore also operate from the rear area. The enemy willattempt to disrupt and demoralize rear area forces byinterrupting support activities, interdicting LOC, andtrying to cause a diversion of combat power from theclose battle to protect the rear area. The threat must beminimized through economy of force operations,dispersion, and increased base defense capabilities.

Each unit operating in the rear area is responsible forproviding its own security. These units must beorganized and prepared to defend themselves so thatthe GCE can concentrate its effort on the close battle.

Support

Military police operating in the MAGTF rear area arean integral part of RAS. During planning, militarypolice provide input to the MAGTF operationalplanning team (OPT). The MP RAS support effortincludes the simultaneous execution of MP missioncapabilities (e.g., MMSO) and other area securityfunctions.

While conducting MMSO missions, military policesupport RAS by maintaining MSRs and LOC securityand by providing a hasty reconnaissance capability.When needed, mi l i ta ry pol ice respond as anaugmenting security force. In support of RAS, militarypolice patrol the area, conduct surveillance activities,provide early warning and rapid reaction forces, andcollect information for planning.

Patrolling

Military police move along rear area MSRs, LOC, andsurrounding terrain in motor patrols and on footpatrols to reconnoiter and search for signs of enemyactivity. These patrols can fix the enemy in place byfire and movement until other forces arrive orsupporting fires can destroy them.

Surveillance Activities

Through observation and surveillance activities,military police identify possible enemy LZs and DZsand deny their use to the enemy.

Early Warning and Rapid Reaction Forces

Military police provide early warning and rapidreaction forces for immediate commitment. When theenemy occupies an LZ or DZ, every attempt should bemade to destroy those enemy forces before they canleave the zone. Once located, enemy units must beattacked with the available force. Depending on thesize of the enemy force, military police conductimmediate combat operations to nullify the enemyforce or respond as an augmenting security force.However, the early identification of enemy zones maysubject these areas to preplanned, on-call fires. If theenemy force is too large to be assaulted, militarypolice fix and delay the enemy force until supportingtroops or fires can be received.

Information Collection

Military police assist the OPT in RAS planning byproviding information on significant threat activity orevents and by recommending secur i ty forcedeployment locations to reduce the threat’s effect onarea opera t ions . Mil i ta ry pol ice suppor t theinformation collection effort by monitoring—

l Road junctions.

l Forest paths and trails.

l Small groups of individuals trying to move throughor evade detection in rear areas.

l Areas with groups or individuals sympathetic to thethreat.

l Friendly high-value targets (e.g., ammo dumps,communications relay sites, CPs).

Liaison

While providing RAS support, military police mustmaintain constant liaison with the headquarterscoordinating rear area operations or, if established, therear area operations center (RAOC). Knowledge ofMP patrols’ locations and current situations enablesthe tactical security officer to support the militarypolice if the threat level requires or to call in MPsupport for unit reinforcement.


Airfield Security

Military aircraft and their supporting facilities areprime enemy targets. A dedicated approach to airfielddefense, which includes first echelon security, isessential to secure these assets. While military policeare essential to the airfield defense effort, unitsoperating in the ACE area of responsibility must alsobe able to provide organic security forces to counterenemy activities. The ACE provides guidance onwhere MP assets are needed to defend against thethreat.

Support

Military police complement the ACE security effortsby functioning as a response or augmentation force oras reinforcement for the airfield security force,providing physical security support and defense indepth.

Physical SecurityAn integral part of airfield defense, physical security isconcerned with physical measures designed tosafeguard personnel and prevent unauthorized accessto equipment, installations, material, and documents;and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage,damage, and theft. Military police assist the ACEcommander in ident i fy ing phys ica l secur i tyrequirements for a strong, active, physical securityprogram. Physical securi ty measures includeestablishing physical barriers, intrusion detectiondevices, motor and foot patrols, and access controltechniques. These measures, coupled with strongintelligence and threat analysis programs, are vital tothe security of the ACE AO.

Defense in DepthThe airfield defensive measures should includeestablishing a defense in depth to defeat or delayenemy forces intent on interfering with the aircraftlaunch. Defense in depth includes establishing strongdefensive positions along the perimeter as well asincorporating plans for fire control and active foot andmotor patrols inside and outside the perimeter.Military police assist the defensive effort in each ofthese areas. They are also suited to provide a defensivepatrolling force by using mobility and firepower tolocate and disrupt enemy intentions as early aspossible. When establishing the defense in depth,commanders should consider the following echelonapproaches:

l First Echelon. This defense provides forces to guardthe airstrip and aircraft within the confines of theairstrip and adjacent ramps. See figure 4-1. Firstechelon security is provided within the confines ofthe airfield security force.

l Second Echelon. This defense involves accesscontrol and security of the buildings and supportfacilities surrounding the airfield. See figure 4-2.

l Third Echelon. This defense involves MP motorpatrols to actively locate and destroy the enemy ordisrupt their activities as far away from the airfield

Figure 4-1. First Echelon Security.

Figure 4-2. Second Echelon Security.

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as possible, reducing the need for close defense. Seefigure 4-3.

Coordination

The RAOC tactical security officer and the MPcommander must work closely to coordinate limitedassets effectively. Knowledge of the MP missions andthe priority of these missions are keys in providing MPsupport to the ACE.

Security Measures

Area security plans should include airfield defenserequirements for increased security patrols and staticsecurity measures. As part of this effort, MP mountedand dismounted patrols screen the area around anairfield day and night. Screening operations arecoordinated with the RAOC or the tactical airoperations center, depending on whether the airfield isin the forward or rear area. Military police conductingthese operations concentrate on keeping the enemyfrom destroying resources on the ground and frominterrupting or stopping air operations. To provide thissupport, military police—

l Focus most of their efforts on night operations.l Conduct area and zone security patrols to detect,

delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy. l Increase mounted security patrols. l Maintain direct and indirect observation of possible

enemy DZs and LZs within the AO.l Determine and recommend defensive position loca-

tions.l Recommend the location of defensive barriers to

deny key terrain. l Set up MMSO measures, (e.g., TCPs and holding

areas) to control traffic moving onto the airfield. l Increase NBC detecting and reporting. l Conduct delays to allow follow-on support forces to

assemble if the enemy exceeds the combinedcapability of the ACE security augmentation forceand the MP forces.

l Establish external perimeter and entry control pointaccess measures.

Aircraft Avenue of Approach Security

The airfield avenues of approach that fan out from theends of runways are of particular importance to

Figure 4-3. Third Echelon Security.


military police and ground forces in the defense area.See figure 4-4.

In these areas on either end of a runway, aircraft areparticularly vulnerable to enemy ground fires becauseaircraft move slowly when taking off or landing.Threat forces scouting airfields will try to identifysector boundaries and hard-to-reach areas like swampswhere external defense may not be as extensive. Adismounted threat will try to infiltrate an airfieldthrough these areas and target aircraft with portablesurface-to-air missiles.

Commanders should concentrate security effortswithin these areas to discourage the enemy fromengaging aircraft. Military police conducting mountedor dismounted operations in these areas can detect andhelp prevent the threat from engaging aircraft as theytake off and land.

Water Obstacle Security

The airfield located next to a river, lake, or oceanprovides unique security challenges. Water obstaclesthat penetrate the defense area may require airfieldsecurity forces to set up continuous battle positionsbetween the water and critical facilities near the water,because threat infiltration, reconnaissance, andstandoff weapons attack may be directed from thewater.

W h i l e p a t r o l l i n g , m i l i t a r y p o l i c e c o n d u c treconnaissance of these vulnerable areas and makerecommendations for securing and protecting them.

Military police identify security measures to beimplemented as part of the airfield security plan andrecommend the use of obstacles that may includeemplacement o f fenc ing , mines , and sensoremployment along portions of the perimeter.

Night Operations

The airfield is most vulnerable to threat whenvisibility is limited. The bulk of internal and externalairfield security operations must be dedicated to threatforces detection during periods of limited visibility.When supporting airfield security operations, militarypolice integrate and extensively use—

l Night vision devices.l Tactical deception. l Electronic sensors.l Aggressive patrolling. l Obstacles and barriers.

Forward Arming and Refueling Point Security

Future operations will continue to require a limitedlogistical footprint, which will probably include theuse of FARPs. The FARPs help sustain the battletempo by providing maneuver elements the ability toexpend minimum time rearming and refueling whilecontinuing operations.

Figure 4-4. Areas Where Aircraft are Most Vulnerable to Enemy Ground Fire.

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Military police assist in the planning and security ofFARPs . Spec i f i c mis s ion r equ i r emen t s andcapabilities are determined by the number of militarypolice available and other mission, enemy, terrain andweather, troops and support available–time available(METT-T). Military police quickly move vehiclesthrough the FARP while maintaining a secureenvironment. The MP units’ inherent mobility allowsthem to keep up with the FARP as it moves forward tosupport the mission.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Hazard Monitoring and Surveying Operations

Early detection of NBC hazards enhances the AOsecurity and facilitates the movement of forces.Military police are especially useful for warning thecommand of NBC hazards because they movethroughout the battlefield. Equipped with protectiveclothing and gear when performing NBC detectionoperations, military police may be formed in teams orsquads that operate independently or as part of a largerdetection effort.

To enhance force survivability, MP patrols makecontinuous observations throughout the AO. Whenmilitary police detect an NBC hazard, they mark thecontaminated area, secure the area, and report itsstatus through operational channels. Military policeinform road users and direct traffic to bypass thecontaminated road network or area. These NBCdetection efforts help troops and supplies to movesafely on the battlefield.

Port Operations Security

Critical ships cargoes are at great risk to sabotage,diversion, and/or theft during loading, transporting,and storing phases of port operations. Supply corridorsinclude ports, inland waterways, railways, pipelines,and airfields. Security measures should focus onaggressive patrolling of these corridors to detect,report, and combat the threat.

Normally, the HN or port authority identifies portsecurity requirements. Because port facilities are oftenshared with allied forces, users must provide their own

security. Once security requirements are established,the HN may request U.S. assistance.

An integral part of maritime pre-positioning forcearrival and assembly operations, military policeprovide security to ports, airfields, and connectingMSRs. Military police also support port operations byaggressively patrolling the area. The force movementcontrol center coordinates U.S. port requirements andcoordinates with the military police to ensure securityconcerns are addressed.

Strict port operations security measures must beestablished to offer protection of critical assets duringship loading and offloading. Depending on the size ofthe operation, military police assist port operationssecurity by—

l Conducting liaison with other agencies (HN policeand military, port security, Coast Guard).

l Enabling command relationships.l Designating restricted areas.l Controlling access.l Patrolling likely avenues of approach (land and

waterborne).l Identifying barriers (natural and manmade).l Determining MSRs (vulnerability, alternate routes)

to and from the port area.l Establishing static posts and roving patrols.

Logistic Convoy Security

The security provided by military police on MSRshelp ensure bat t lef ie ld resources reach theirdestination. Military police support logistic convoysecurity by conducting route reconnaissance andsurveillance to—

l Identify primary and alternate routes.l Establish convoy route traffic control measures.l Expedite the delivery of food and supplies to areas

devastated by natural or manmade disasters.

Typically, military police do not provide logisticsconvoy escorts because they do not have the organicmanpower to provide substantial security escorts.However, in critical situations, military police mayprovide a limited escort for a convoy through theirassigned patrol area. Primarily, military police direct


convoys to specific locations and provide security atspecific areas along a route until the convoy passes.

To update route information military police coordinatewith engineers, aviators, and HN police operating inthe area. In addition, military police coordinate withthe LMCC to ensure that control centers are aware oftraffic requirements and movement along MSRs.

Special ammunition convoys may require MP escort.Members of the MP convoy escort must be familiarwith the escorted unit’s SOP and ensure that their ownSOP is compatible.

Military police coordinate with HN, multinational,joint, and interagency units providing area security inthe AO to determine convoy restrictions, require-ments, and available support.

CHAPTER 5. LAW AND ORDER OPERATIONS

Successful law and order operations are important tomaintaining combat readiness and efficiency. Whileconducting law and order operations, military policeenforce laws, directives, and regulations; conductcriminal and traffic accident investigations; andcontrol populat ions and resources to providecommanders a lawful and orderly environment.Military police also coordinate actions to removeconditions promoting crime and reduce opportunitiesallowing crime. Key to the success of these operationsis the military police’s ability to operate with restraintand authority, probable cause, and minimum use offorce.

Military police conduct law and order operationfunction within their jurisdiction and authority. Whilemilitary police may have the authority to apprehend asuspect, the military may not have jurisdiction toadjudicate charges. The concept of jurisdictiondiscussed in this chapter refers to the authority ofmilitary police to apprehend military personnel and todetain civilians.

Authority

Authority is the lawful right of designated persons oragencies to exercise governmental power or control.The military police’s authority to enforce military law,orders, and regulations, by apprehension or detentionif necessary, is derived primarily from the President ofthe United States, as Commander in Chief of theArmed Forces, and the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice (UCMJ).

The UCMJ specifies the types of persons that aresubject to the provisions and articles of the UCMJ. Inthe continental United States (CONUS), the authorityof the military police over persons other than thosesubject to the UCMJ is derived from Federal law andthe policies and orders of the military commander.

Outside CONUS, MP authority is founded in the lawsof the country concerned, the status-of-forcesagreement (SOFA), and the UCMJ. Normally, theSOFA authorizes one government to take action incases where both governments could take action. Inthe absence of an international agreement or SOFA,U.S. Military Forces are subject to the UCMJ and thelaws of the nation in which stationed.

Persons Subject to Uniform Code of Military Justice

The UCMJ, as established by Congress, provides onebasic code of military justice and law for MilitaryServices. The code authorizes the President of theUnited States to set rules of evidence; pretrial, trial,and post-trial procedures; and maximum punishmentsfor violations of the UCMJ. Under this authority, thePresident issued the Manual for Courts-Martial(MCM). A primary source document for mattersrelating to military justice, the MCM is an executiveorder implementing the provisions of the UCMJ. TheMCM establishes the military law of evidence.

Active duty military personnel, as well as some retiredmembers and other personnel enumerated in Article 2of the UCMJ, are subject to the provisions of theUCMJ. Military police have authority to takeappropriate action with persons subject to the UCMJ.This authority is not limited to military reservations orFederal property.

Persons Not Subject to Uniform Code of Military Justice

Commanders and military police are advised toconsul t the local s taff judge advocate (SJA)concerning the circumstances warranting detention ofpersons not subject to the UCMJ. In areas undermilitary jurisdiction or control, military police maytake into custody and detain the following personswho are not in the military services or subject toUCMJ:

l Persons found committing a felony or a misde-meanor may be detained long enough to be turnedover to civil authorities.

l Persons found violating properly promulgated mili-tary regulations.

l Persons cited for violating the Assimilated CrimesAct, not including felonies or breaches of the peace,may be referred to a U.S. magistrate.

l Civilians may be subject to military authority insituations involving martial law or hostilities.

Persons Subject to Posse Comitatus Act

Within CONUS, MP authority does not extend tocivilians outside areas under military jurisdiction orcontrol. While the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the

5-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

use of the military and military police for enforcementof Federal, state, county, or local civilian law, otheroperations are not prohibited. These operationsinclude—

l Federal military forces employed to quell a civildisturbance, to protect Federal functions andproperty, or to act in an emergency.

l Acts having a primary military purpose and onlyincidentally enforcing civilian law.

l Military assistance to protect public safety. l Development and maintenance of effective working

relationships between military police and theircivilian counterparts and the loan of certain types ofequipment to civilian authorities.

l Investigation of offenses committed by civilians ifthere is a military interest. (The SJA should beconsulted on a case-by-case basis to determinewhether a specif ic invest igat ion should beconducted.)

Jurisdiction

Military jurisdiction is the extent of and limitation onthe right of an armed force to exercise authority andcontrol over persons and offenses. Jurisdiction limitsthe exercise of authority. The jurisdiction of everyoffense or incident depends on the status of thesuspect, international agreements and treaties, militaryinterest in the offense, and other factors. Militaryjurisdiction is exercised through the application ofmilitary law, orders, and regulations. Militaryjurisdiction extends to military personnel whether ornot they are in an area under military control. Themilitary has exclusive jurisdiction to try personssubject to the UCMJ. Civil jurisdiction is exercisedthrough the application of state and Federal law.

Under international law, the HN normally has primaryjurisdiction to prosecute nonmilitary offensescommitted within its borders by members of a visitingforce. This authority may be further defined orsurrendered to military authorities through SOFAs andother treaties or agreements depending on the natureand circumstances of the offense. This limitation toprosecute does not prohibit commanders from takingadministrative action against suspects. The SJA shouldbe consulted when questions exist about jurisdiction.While conducting law and order operations militarypolice operate under exclusive, concurrent, andproprietary jurisdictions.

Exclusive Jurisdiction

Under exclusive jurisdiction, the Federal Governmentassumes sole jurisdiction over the designated area.Many military installations have exclusive Federaljurisdiction. On these installations, the FederalGovernment exercises executive, legislative, andjudicial authority. To facilitate exclusive jurisdictionand to avoid the difficult task of enacting andmaintaining a code of criminal laws appropriate forareas under its jurisdiction, Congress passed Title 18,Assimilated Crimes Act, United States Code, Section13. This statute provides that all acts or omissionsoccurring in an area under Federal jurisdiction, whichwould constitute crimes if the area were under thestate jurisdiction, will constitute similar crimes,similarly punishable, under Federal law. This act doesnot assimilate crimes based on state statutes that arecontrary to Federal policy and law, such as civil rightslegislation, nor does it assimilate state law if there isan existing Federal statute or law on the subject.

Concurrent Jurisdiction

Concurrent jurisdiction exists when the Federal Gov-ernment and the state or local government exercisesimultaneous authority over an area. Essentially, thistype of jurisdiction is dual jurisdiction. Underconcurrent jurisdiction, state criminal laws are ap-plicable in the area and can be enforced by the state aswell as the Federal Government under the AssimilatedCrimes Act.

Proprietary Jurisdiction

Proprietary jurisdiction applies in instances where theFederal Government has ownership to an area but hasnot retained jurisdiction. In this case, the FederalGovernment has the same rights as any otherlandowner. The state retains jurisdiction over the areaand has the authority to enforce laws in the area. TheAssimilated Crimes Act does not apply to areas ofFederal proprietary jurisdiction. In such areas, militarypolice exercise authority in compliance with theinstructions of the appropriate commander.

Command and Control

Military police conduct law and order operations whenthe commander requires it and when battle intensitypermits. During intense combat operations, the


commander normally needs military police to expeditethe movement of supplies and resources and toconduct MMSO and area security operations.Typically, military police conduct full-scale, dedicatedlaw and order operations after the AO has matured.The commander determines when MP assets areneeded and can be afforded for dedicated law andorder operations. In a peacetime environment, militarypolice conduct extensive law and order operations.

Military police performing law and order operationsenhance the commander’s combat readiness ,efficiency, and command and control by—

l Preventing the diversion of military resources,thereby, aiding in the maintenance of combatstrength.

l Suppressing opportunities for criminal behavior. l Assisting and protecting forces.l Preserving good order and discipline. l Assisting intelligence organizations in obtaining a

complete tactical intelligence picture by collectingand providing criminal and operational data and in-formation.

l Providing liaison to civil or military law enforce-ment agencies.

Law and Order Functions

Law and order operations are often conductedsimultaneously with other MP missions. Militarypolice implement and perform physical securitymeasures for designated critical assets as part of areasecurity operations. They regulate traffic andinvestigate accidents as a part of the MMSO mission.Crime prevention measures and selective enforcementmeasures are also performed as part of other missions.

Crime is detrimental to MAGTF operations and cancause a severe deterioration in morale. Military policeassist the commander in curtailing and eliminatingcriminal activities by enforcing law and order andpreserving good order and discipline. Based on theMAGTF commander’s concept of operation, militarypolice employ the following law and order functions:

l Law enforcement.l Military working dog operations.l Traffic enforcement and investigations.

l Criminal investigations.l Crime prevention and physical security.l Customs support operations.l Information operations. l Joint, combined, and HN operations.

Law Enforcement

An efficient and effective law enforcement efforteliminates the conditions and opportunities thatpromote cr ime. Successfu l law enforcementoperations maintain combat readiness and efficiencyby preventing the diversion of personnel and resourcesto fight crime and by maintaining military discipline.Marine Corps Order (MCO) P5580.2, Marine CorpsLaw Enforcement Manual, provides specific guidanceon the establishment of law enforcement operations.

Patrol Operations The key to an effective law enforcement effort is anaggressive MP patrol operation. The method of MPpatrol depends on the mission, number of militarypolice available, terrain, time of response, and level ofHN support. Military police establish patrols to—

l Meet prescribed objectives.l Protect designated resources.l Identify and apprehend or detain offenders.

Desk OperationsMilitary police establish desk operations to—

l Coordinate and document MP patrol activity. l Receive complaints and calls for assistance. l Refer incidents to the appropriate investigative

agency for further action.

Military Working Dog Operations

Military working dog (MWD) teams enhance theeffectiveness of law enforcement operations withcapabilities to detect explosive devices and residue,controlled substances, and to detect, track, control andapprehend personnel. They are used in peacetimeenvironments to extend MP resources and contributeto the detection, investigation, and prevention ofcriminal activity. The MWD teams support a varietyof MP operations, which are discussed in appendix E.

Mission support requirements determine the numberof functional MWD teams that make up a wartime

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mission-oriented MWD team. On the battlefieldMWD teams—

l Help deter and detect the enemy. l Support force protection operations by augmenting

security forces and assisting in the protection of keypersonnel.

l Support population control by augmenting dis-located civilian and crowd control forces.

l Assist in temporary internment operations.

Traffic Enforcement and Accident Investigations

Traffic accidents account for a large number ofdeployed military casualties. Military police help toreduce the number of nonbattle traffic accidentcasualties and loss of equipment through enforcementof HN and command traffic regulations. Accidentinvestigators assist HN or other authorities investigatethose accidents involving U.S. personnel or property.Traffic enforcement reduces the military traffic threatto the HN population.

Types of Accidents InvestigatedProviding they do not interfere with the tacticalmission or mission-essential operations, the types ofaccidents military police investigate include those—

l Resulting in the fatalities of U.S. military person-nel.

l Involving U.S. military personnel and equipment aswell as HN persons and/or property.

l Involving substantial vehicle damage and/or multi-ple vehicles.

Investigative ServicesThrough the investigation of traffic accidents, militarypolice serve to—

l Identify the personal, environmental, and equip-ment factors that caused or contributed to theaccident.

l Document the facts of the incident for criminal orcivil actions that may result from the accident.

l Expedite HN litigation.

Traffic Enforcement MeasuresBased on the operational and political environment,traffic enforcement measures may include—

l Development of the traffic circulation plan.

l Operator license and dispatch checks.l Safety inspection checkpoints. l Enforcement of vehicle load and route restrictions. l Speed control measures.

Criminal Investigations

Crimes occurring within an AO may require anindepth investigation. Military police investigateoffenses committed against U.S. personnel orp r o p e r t y . T h e r e a r e t w o t y p e s o f c r i m i n a linvestigations on the battlefield. Minor crimes areusually investigated by MPIs. Major incidents andserious offenses, especially those involving death,serious bodily injury, and war crimes, are referred tothe MP criminal investigation division. The CIDinvestigative authority originates from the provostmarshal or from the commander to whom the CIDelement is attached.

During peacetime, the Department of the Navy, NCIS,is primarily responsible for the investigation of majorcriminal offenses committed against persons, the U.S.Government or its property, and certain classes ofprivate property.

During combat and contingency operations, CIDinvestigators provide criminal investigative support tocommanders. The CID personnel are authorized toinitiate appropriate criminal investigations duringthese operations.

Commanders are prohibited from interfering with theinvestigations or impeding the use of investigativetechniques. When a commander objects to the openingof a criminal investigation for operational or otherr e a s o n s , t h a t c o m m a n d e r m u s t r e p o r t t h ecircumstances immediately via the chain of commandto the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)(POS). Only the Secretary of the Navy or CMC maydirect Marine Corps CID to delay, suspend, orterminate an investigation.

Alleged War Crime InvestigationsUpon receiving information concerning alleged warcrimes committed by Marines, commanders mustimmediately notify the nearest CID field office. It isextremely important that alleged war crimes beinvest igated promptly by CID and not by aninvestigating officer appointed by the command. Closecoordination between the SJA and CID during warcrime investigations is essential.


Joint Activities Joint investigative activities, such as drug or black-market suppression teams, may involve investigatorsfrom NCIS, CID, MPI, or other U.S. Services oragencies. Such operations may require close liaisonand cooperation with HN or allied civil or militaryagencies. The CID investigators also work closelywith counterintelligence teams, pooling their resourcesto gather information on underground activities,terrorist groups, black-marketing, etc. In addition, CIDinvestigators are trained to handle hostage incidents,hostage negotiations, and related terrorist incidents.

Crime Prevention and Physical Security

The objective of crime prevention is to provide asecure environment for military personnel to operate.Crime prevention employs proactive measures aimedat protecting persons and property. A successful crimeprevention effort focuses on the number, type,location, and causes of crimes being committed. Aftercauses are identif ied, mili tary police employpreventive techniques by planning, implementing,evaluating, modifying, and developing new crimeprevention measures.

A strong physical security program supports the crimeprevention effort by helping to identify, reduce,eliminate, or neutralize conditions favorable tocriminal activity. As part of the overall crimeprevention effort, military police conduct physicalsecurity inspections and surveys of designatedmission-essential or vulnerable activities within acommand. Physical security inspections and surveysalso identify measures to reduce the opportunity, anddesire, for engaging in criminal acts.

Crime prevent ion is accomplished through aheightened degree of awareness. Units aware of thedetrimental effects of criminal activities often policethemselves to maintain unit integrity and morale.Mil i tary pol ice provide the commander withawareness programs, as well as instruction andinformation on recognizing, counter ing, andpreventing criminal activities. Crime prevention andphysical security are discussed further in appendix D.

Customs Support Operations

Customs support is a requirement when U.S.personnel return to CTUS. Military police providecustoms support to ensure units and individualscomply with U.S. Customs, other governmentalagencies, and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

requirements. In the absence of U.S. Customspersonnel, customs-certified military police, oftenaided by MWD teams, conduct military customsinspections to enforce U.S. customs laws andregulations. Customs support operations are discussedfurther in appendix A.

Border ControlWhile conducting customs support operations,military police may be required to establish andoperate or assist HN authorities in supervisingcrossing points at international borders. Border controlis maintained for—

l Security. l Customs and tariff enforcement. l Protection of the civilian economy.l Apprehension of criminals, absentees, and persons

of intelligence interest.

FunctionsControl is maintained through the establishment ofauthorized road or rail crossing points, border patrols,and control posts. Essential to success of theseopera t ions i s cons tan t l i a i son wi th HN andneighboring country authorities. Military policeconducting these operations—

l Establish the identity of U.S. military memberscrossing borders, determine the purpose of travel,and examine vehicles and travel documents.

l Instruct U.S. military members to make oral orwritten customs declarations as required.

l Conduct searches of vehicles, luggage, and anyother property being imported or exported by U.S.military personnel.

l Seize contraband items that are in violation ofcustoms regulations.

Information Operations

Success in MP law and order operations relies on theuse of essential information and intelligence, whichaid in the crime prevention and criminal investigationprocess. Military police collect, analyze, anddisseminate information and intelligence as part ofother missions. Force dispersion and the growingcriminal threat will result in greater reliance on MP-gathered information.

The MP information operations complement thecommand intelligence program by integratinginformation with military intelligence and by

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contributing to IPB, providing the commander acomplete and relevant intelligence picture for militaryoperations.

Joint, Combined, and Host Nation Police Operations

The MP law and order operations may involve patrolswith joint, combined, and HN military or civilianpolice, or a combination of these options. The SOFA,rules of engagement (ROE), rules of interaction, and

other guidance serve as the basis for MP law and orderactivities. When conducting these activities, militarypolice must maintain constant liaison with other DODpolice organizations and with HN authorities andallied police agencies to develop employment optionswhich best support MAGTF operations. As part ofthese operations, military police may, in situationswhere the local national authority has deteriorated orbeen eliminated, provide initial assistance and trainingto HN military and civilian police forces or assist inthe creation of these forces.

CHAPTER 6. INTERNMENT OPERATIONS

The DOD Directive 2310.1, DOD Program for EnemyPrisoners of War (EPOW) and Other Detainees,designates the Secretary of the Army as the executiveagent for the administration of the DOD EPW/Detainee Program. When operating jointly, the U.S.Army receives detainees captured by the U.S. MarineCorps, Navy, and/or Air Force. The U.S. Armyreceives prisoners as soon as possible after capturingf o r c e s c o m p l e t e i n i t i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a n dadministrative processing.

Military police support the MAGTF and relieve theconcern over EPWs and CIs by under tak ingadministrative processing of internment operations.Internment operations are the confinement andhandling of EPWs, CIs, dislocated civilians, and U.S.mil i tary pr isoners dur ing war t ime and otherexpeditionary operations. The handling of EPWs andCIs is a tactical and operational consideration thatmust be addressed during planning to prevent forcesfrom being impeded by large numbers of EPWs andCIs. During Desert Storm, coalition forces captured86,743 EPWs and CIs; only 1,492 were categorized asinnocent civilians. The impact of a large prisoner andinternee population on operations can slow tempo andburden combat forces. Internee operations areconducted to free the MAGTF commander of thisadministrative burden.

Through the use of collecting points and holding areas,military police furnish the commander with the abilityto collect, process, guard, protect, account for, andtransfer EPWs and CIs. Military police enhance thetempo of operations by providing for the quick controlof prisoners from the forward battle area to temporaryholding areas and, in joint operations, on to U.S. ArmyEPW and CI holding facilities. In addition, militarypolice aid in the movement of forces by clearing theAO of EPWs and CIs.

These MP efforts prevent the diversion and tasking ofother MAGTF resources to conduct internmentoperations, which aids in the maintenance of combatstrength. Although military police provide theMAGTF commander with these unique capabilities,internment operations are manpower intensive. Tomaximize the capabilities of limited MP assets, theMAGTF commander must prioritize the MP missionsand taskings.

Even though military police support the MAGTF byundertaking internment operations, commanders andstaffs should understand the Geneva Conventions andthe U.S. policy governing provisions for handlingEPWs and CIs. Commanders should also understandthe objectives, principles, and the MP role ininternment operations.

Geneva Conventions

Internment operations are governed by the provisionsof the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventionsfor the Protection of War Victims of 12 August 1949were ratified by the United States and came into forcefor this country on 2 February 1956. Comprised offour treaties, the Geneva Conventions provideinternationally recognized humanitarian standards forthe treatment of victims of war. As such, the UnitedStates recognizes the spirit and intent of these treatiesin its treatment of EPWs, CIs, and detained persons.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949

The governing motive of this Convention is to providefor the humane treatment of EPWs by the parties to aconflict. It regulates, in detail, the treatment of EPWs,including—

l Care, food, clothing, and housing. l Discipline and punishment. l Labor and pay. l External relations. l Representation. l International exchange of information.l Termination of captivity.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949

This Convention deals with the general protection ofpopulations against the consequences of war, thestatus and treatment of protected persons, and thetreatment of CIs.

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Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949

This Convention provides for the protection ofmembers of armed forces and other persons who arewounded and sick on the battlefield. It provides formembers of the conflict to take all possible measuresto—

l Search for and collect the wounded and sick. l Protect them against pillage and ill treatment. l Insure their adequate care.l Search for the dead and prevent their being de-

spoiled.

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949

This Convention deals with the humane treatment andprotection by the parties to a conflict of armed forcesmembers and other persons at sea who are wounded,sick, or shipwrecked. This treaty also deals with theprotection of hospital ships and burial at sea.

Protection Provisions

The provisions of the Geneva Conventions areapplicable to EPWs and CIs from the time of theircapture until release or repatriation. Persons takencaptive must be given the protection to which they areentitled as an EPW or CI.

The EPW or CI must receive humane treatmentwithout distinction founded on race, sex, nationality,religious belief, political opinions, or other similarcriteria. The EPWs or CIs may not be murdered,mutilated, tortured, or degraded, nor may they bepunished for alleged criminal acts without a previousjudgment pronounced by a legally constituted courtwhich has accorded them those judicial guarantees.Individuals and capturing nations are responsible foracts committed against EPWs and CI, which are inviolation of the Geneva Conventions.

The EPWs and CIs are entitled to respect and honor ashuman beings. They are to be protected against acts ofviolence, insults, public curiosity, and reprisals. They

are not to be subjected to physical mutilation or tomedical or scientific experimentation, which is notrequired incident to normal medical, dental, orhospital treatment.

No form of coercion may be inflicted on EPWs andCIs to obtain information. Those who refuse to answermay not be threatened, insulted, or exposed tounpleasant or disadvantageous treatment. FemaleEPWs and CIs are to receive treatment at least asfavorable as that accorded to male EPWs and CIs.

U.S. Governing Policy

In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, U.S.policy directs that EPWs and other enemy personnelcaptured, interned, or held in custody during thecourse of a conflict shall be afforded humanitariancare and treatment from the moment of custody untilfinal release or repatriation. The observance of thispolicy is binding on U.S. personnel.

This policy also applies to the protection of detainedor interned personnel whether their status is that ofprisoner of war, civilian internee, or a criminalsuspected of a war crime. The punishment of criminalsis administered by due process of law and underlegally constituted authority. The administration ofinhumane treatment, even if committed under stress ofcombat and with deep provocation, is a serious andpunishable violation under national law, internationallaw, and the UCMJ.

Categories of Enemy Prisoners of War

Captured enemy personnel may be presumed to beEPW immediately upon capture if they are armeduniformed enemy. Should any question arise as towhether enemy personnel captured by U.S. Forcesbelong to the following categories, such personnelmust receive the same treatment to which EPW areentitled until competent military authority hasdetermined their status. Marine Corps ReferencePublication (MCRP) 4-11.8C, Enemy Prisoners ofWar and Civ i l ian In ternees , descr ibes EPWclassification criteria.

The Geneva Conventions define EPWs as—


l Members of the enemy armed forces as well asmembers of militias or volunteer corps forming partof such armed forces.

l Members of other militias and members of othervolunteer corps, including those of organizedresistance movements, belonging to an enemypower and operating in or outside their ownterritory, even if this territory is occupied, providedthat such militias or volunteer corps, including suchorganized resistance movements, fulfill thefollowing conditions:

n That of being commanded by a person responsi-ble for his subordinates.

n That of having a fixed distinctive sign recogniz-able at a distance.

n That of carrying arms openly.

n That of conducting their operations in accor-dance with the laws and customs of war.

l Members of enemy regular armed forces whoprofess allegiance to a government or an authoritynot recognized by the detaining power.

l Persons who accompany the armed forces of theenemy without actually being members thereof,such as civilian members of military aircraft crews,war correspondents, supply contractors, membersof labor units, or of services responsible for thewelfare of the enemy armed forces, provided thatthey have received authorization from the armedforces which they are accompanying.

l Members of crews, including masters, pilots, andapprentices, of the merchant marine and the crewsof civil aircraft of the enemy power, who do notbenefit by more favorable treatment under any otherprovisions of international law.

l Inhabitants of nonoccupied territory, who, on theapproach of U.S. Forces, spontaneously take uparms to resist the invading forces, without havinghad time to form themselves into regular armedunits, provided they carry arms openly and respectthe laws and customs of war.

l Persons belonging, or having belonged to the armedforces of a country occupied by U.S. Forces, if thecommander considers it necessary by reason ofsuch allegiance to intern them, even though theymay have been originally liberated from EPWstatus while hostilities were going on outside theoccupied territory.

Civilian Internees

A civilian internee is a person who is protected underthe provisions of the Geneva Conventions and isinterned during an armed conflict or occupation forsecurity reasons. Civilian internees can also beinterned for their protection, for the protection of theoccupying force, or because the individual issuspected or convicted of an offense against thedetaining power and sentenced to internment in lieu ofconfinement.

Internment Camps

Military police collect, process, evacuate, safeguard,and, if established, transfer CIs to U.S. Armyinternment camps. The handling of CIs and EPWs issimilar; however, CIs are normally not processed orinterned with EPWs. The CI camps provide forseparate internment and complete administration ofdetained civilians. These camps are operated in thesame manner as EPW facilities, with due regard givento the fundamental differences between the twocategories. For example, special consideration is givento the age, physical condition, and the ability ofcivilians to adjust to internment conditions. Separatequarters are provided for family groups when theinternment of more than one member of a family isnecessary.

Conditions for Internment

The internment of civilian persons in a CI camp isauthorized and directed if such persons satisfy therequirements for CI status and one of the followingtwo conditions applies:

l Internment has been determined by competent au-thority to be necessary for imperative reasons ofsecurity to the U.S. Forces in the occupied territory.

l Internment has been directed by a properly consti-tuted military court, sitting in the occupied territory,as the sentence for the conviction of an offense inviolation of penal provisions properly promulgatedby the occupying force.

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Objectives of Internment Operations

Under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, acapturing power is responsible, from the moment ofcapture or apprehension, for proper and humanetreatment of detainees. The EPW and CI internmentoperations must provide for—

l Implementation of the Geneva Conventions provi-sions.

l Humane and efficient care and full accountabilityfor persons captured or detained because of foreignmilitary or related operations.

l Appropriate support of the military objectives of theUnited States.

Principles of Internment Operations

To achieve internment operation objectives, militarypolice employ the following principles:

l Humane treatment. l Prompt evacuation from the combat zone. l Instruction to troops on the provisions of inter-

national agreements and regulations relating toEPWs and CIs.

l Integration of procedures for EPW and CI evacu-ation, control, and administration with othercombat, combat support, and combat servicesupport operations.

Internment Functions

Military police assist the MAGTF commander in thedevelopment of plans, policies, and procedurespertaining to EPWs and CIs. During operations,military police focus their efforts on collecting,safeguarding, processing, evacuating, and transferringEPWs and CIs. Specific guidance on legal and tacticalrequirements for EPW handling procedures can befound in MCRP 4-11.8C. Military police handle U.S.military prisoners separately.

Depending on the number of EPWs and CIsanticipated, military police may require augmentation.As a rule, an MP platoon can guard up to 500 captives;

a company can guard up to 2,000. During internmentoperations, military police—

l Perform security tasks.l Exercise firm control. l Establish collection control measures. l Conduct field processing. l Coordinate evacuations.

Security Tasks

Military police receive EPWs and CIs from operatingforces as far forward as possible. When receivingprisoners, military police perform the followingsecurity tasks.

SearchingMilitary police search each EPW and CI as soon asthey are captured or received. Searching is conductedfor MP safety, to gather information, and to confiscateweapons and documents.

SegregatingMilitary police segregate EPWs and CIs into separategroups of officers, noncommissioned officers,enlisted, civilians, as well as males and females.Segregation, and the resulting break up of the enemychain of command, is crucial to the security andcontrol of prisoners.

SilencingMilitary police silence EPWs and CIs to prevent themfrom planning escapes or disruptions.

SafeguardingMilitary police safeguard EPWs and CIs while theyare in custody by ensuring that prisoners receivehumane treatment.

MovingMilitary police move prisoners from the point ofcapture to collecting points as soon as possible.Speedy removal from familiar surroundings lessensthe likelihood of an attempted escape. To facilitate therapid movement of EPWs and CIs to collecting points,military police make maximum use of availabletransportation returning to the rear.

Control

Military police treat EPWs and CIs humanely butfirmly at all times. To maintain control and ensure


understanding, military police issue instructions toEPWs and CIs in their native language. Military policealso issue a warning of the serious consequences,which may result from violations of such instructions.

While detained, captives may complain about thefood, clothing, living conditions, or their treatment.Displays of conflict must be brought under controlquickly to promptly and properly segregate and isolateoffenders. By quickly restoring order, military policecan maintain effective control of EPWs and CIs andavoid the use of physical and lethal force. Excessiveforce provides the captives a rallying point for futuredis turbances and can be the basis for enemypropaganda. To counter disruptions, military policedevelop and rehearse plans for defusing tensesituations, handling unruly captives, and quelling riots.

Collection Control Measures

Capturing units are responsible for delivering EPWsand CIs to collecting points. Normally, military policeoperate collecting points to the immediate rear area offorward units. Collecting points and holding areas areestablished wherever they are needed. The MAGTFcommander decides the general location of collecting

points, which are preferably located near an MSR toease the movement of EPWs and CIs to the nexteche lon o f i n t e rnmen t and to f ac i l i t a t e t hetransportation of supplies and medical support. Tosupport EPW and CI collection and evacuation efforts,military police establish forward collecting points,central collecting points, and holding areas.

Forward Collecting PointMilitary police set up and operate forward collectingpoints to receive prisoners quickly from operatingforces and to support the tempo of operations. Seefigure 6-1. The establishment of forward collectingpoints allows capturing forces the opportunity torapidly transfer the custody of captives withouthindering their own combat effectiveness.

At forward collecting points, military police conductsecurity tasks, process and secure the captives, andprepare them for evacuation to a central collectingpoint or holding area. As a rule, EPWs and CIs shouldbe transferred from the forward collecting point within24 hours.

The size of the forward collecting point enclosure andthe placement of internal facilities, water, latrine,

Figure 6-1. Example of a Forward Collecting Point.

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trench, and cover vary based on the situation. Suppliesand instructions on components are discussed in U.S.Army Field Manual (FM) 5-34, Engineer Field Data,

Central Collecting PointA central collecting point is larger than a forwardcollecting point, but the considerations for setup andoperations are the same. The EPWs and CIs are held atcentral collecting points until they can be transferredto holding areas. Military police use existing structureswhen possible to reduce construction requirements.See figure 6-2. The size, compound configuration, andplacement of internal facilities, field processing site,and military intelligence screening site vary based onthe situation. Instructions for the use of triple standardconcertina wire can be found in FM 5-34.

Holding AreasA holding area is a temporary structure, building, orenclosed area, where EPWs and CIs are held pendingfurther evacuation. Holding areas accommodate morecaptives for longer stays than collecting points. Most

holding areas, like collecting points, are temporaryfacilities that must be able to move with little or nonotice. Prisoners are interrogated and detained inholding areas until they can be evacuated farther to therear. Although holding areas are temporary facilities,captives may remain at a holding area until they can bemoved to a more permanent internment facility.

Usually one holding area is set up to support eachM A G T F c o n d u c t i n g o p e r a t i o n s . T h e f i r s tconsideration in the selection of an EPW holding areais that it be adjacent to the evacuation route. Relatedconsiderations include the location of suitable existingfacilities, proximity to supply areas, and protectionfrom enemy activities. Holding areas are operated onan austere basis and should be designed to meet theminimum requirements necessary for the temporaryretention of EPWs and CIs. Figure 6-3 is an exampleof a holding area with four, 120-person segregationcompounds. The area includes receiving, fieldprocessing, screening, and intelligence collection sites.

Figure 6-2. Example of a Central Collecting Point.


Processing

Proper processing of EPWs and CIs is essential forsecurity and effective control of prisoners and forintelligence gathering purposes. Processing also helpsto establish the condition and welfare requirements ofEPWs and CIs. Field processing actions includeindividual searches, segregation, interrogation,sanitation, medical care, and classification measures.

SearchesImmediately upon capture, EPWs and CIs must bedisarmed and searched for concealed weapons and forequipment and documents of particular intelligencevalue. If capturing forces are unable to searchprisoners, then military police will do so when theyreceive the prisoners.

During this phase of processing, items that may be ofinterest to intelligence personnel are confiscated bythe military police and turned over to interrogation

teams. Military police work closely with militaryintelligence teams to determine if captives and theirequipment have intelligence value. Normally, militarypolice permit EPWs and CIs to retain personal effects,to include—

l Money. l Valuables. l Protective equipment (e.g., helmets, protective

masks). l Articles used for clothing or eating (except knives

and forks). l Identification cards or tags. l Badges of grade and nationality.l Articles having a personal or sentimental value.

Segregation and InterrogationMilitary police segregate EPWs and CIs by categoriesto expedite the intelligence gathering and interrogationprocess. Officers, senior noncommissioned officer,

Figure 6-3. Example of an EPW Holding Area.

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and other personnel that may provide vital informationare separated and identified. Intelligence personnelconduct interrogations.

SanitationMilitary police provide EPWs and CI with sanitationfacilities and supplies as soon as possible to permitthem to disinfest themselves and their clothing ofvermin. Soap and washing facilities are also madeavailable when possible.

Medical CareMilitary police coordinate and ensure that medicalcare, equipment, and supplies are administered toEPWs and CIs. Although they are normally notassigned to medical facilities to process or guardcaptives, military police may be tasked to escortprisoners to medical facilities for medical care.Military police process these captives after medicalpersonnel classify their physical condition.

ClassificationBefore evacuation, EPWs and CIs are medicallyclassified as walking wounded, nonwalking wounded,or sick. Walking wounded are evacuated through MPevacuation channels. Nonwalking wounded and sickare delivered to the nearest medical aid station andevacuated through medical channels.

Evacuation

Military police coordinate the prompt evacuation ofEPWs and CIs out of the combat zone. The evacuationchain moves from the forward collecting point to therear area holding areas. In a joint operation, EPWs andCIs are moved to an U.S. Army internment camp.

RequirementsThroughout the evacuation process, military policetreat EPWs and CIs humanely by ensuring—

l They are not used to shield areas or facilities fromattack.

l They are not retained for psychological operations.l Food, potable water, appropriate clothing and shel-

ter, and medical attention are provided if necessary.l They are provided protective facilities and equip-

ment in case of NBC attack. l Rigorous security is maintained to prevent escape

and to protect U.S. Forces.

RoutesEvacuation routes for EPWs and CIs are prede-termined by the location of MSRs, rail lines, airfields,and the mode of transportation (e.g., foot, vehicle, rail,aircraft, ship).

Temporary Holding FacilitiesWhen distances or conditions preclude the completionof EPW and CI movement, military police mayestablish temporary holding facilities along theevacuation route. If possible, military police selectexisting facilities that provide shelter from theelements as well as a perimeter fence, wall, or otherbarrier for security.

SecuritySpecific guidance concerning security requirementsduring the evacuation process as well as otherinformation on internment operations can be found inFM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civil ianInternees, and Detained Persons.

Guiding Principles Regardless of how EPWs and CIs are evacuated to therear, military police are guided by the followingprinciples:

l Prompt evacuation to the rear.l Noninterference with tactical movements of U.S. or

combined forces.l Maximum use of transportation returning to the

rear. l Close liaison and maximum assistance from higher

echelons.

Dislocated Civilian Internment Operations

Dislocated civilians are initially processed andhandled the same as EPWs and CIs until their status isdetermined. Civil affairs units, in coordination withHN authorities, work to resettle dislocated civiliansand refugees. Military police support these efforts byass i s t ing in the co l lec t ion , evacua t ion , andresettlement of these persons. During operations,military police ensure that dislocated civilian andrefugee traffic does not adversely affect militarymaneuver and mobility by redirecting these personsout of harm’s way. Dislocated civilian camps areestablished in the same manner as EPW and CIfacilities. When internees are contained in a facility for


extended periods, dissatisfaction and restlessness mayresult. Commanders and military police should expectand be prepared for demonstrations, disturbances, orriots. Effective communications and rumor controlmeasures, coupled with professional, humanetreatment by security forces, will minimize thepossibility and severity of disturbances in the interneepopulation.

U.S. Military Prisoner Internment Operations

Military police have a continuing mission to detain,sustain, protect, and evacuate U.S. military prisoners.

In CONUS, corrections specialists are the primaryperformers of this mission.

During operations, a corrections detachment is theideal organization to perform U.S. military prisonerinternment operations. The U.S. military prisonersmust be segregated from the EPWs and CIs andevacuated as rapidly as possible from the combat zone.

In a deployment, Marines awaiting trial remain withtheir respective units when possible. Only when theyare a hazard to the mission, themselves, or others arethey detained in pretrial confinement under MPcontrol. When possible, these prisoners are moved toconfinement facilities outside the combat zone.

CHAPTER 7. NONLETHAL WEAPONS AND CONTROLS

Nonlethal weapons (NLW) are weapons that areexplicitly designed and primarily employed toincapacitate personnel or material, while minimizingfatalit ies, permanent injury to personnel, andundesired damage to property and the environment.Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy theirtargets through blast, penetration, and fragmentation,nonlethal weapons employ means other than grossphysical destruction to prevent the target fromfunctioning.

Military police are trained to use the lowest level offorce necessary to control incidents in war, peace, andMOOTW. Because military police use NLW daily inthe performance of their law enforcement missions,their skills are highly developed for NLW use inmilitary operations.

Military police are the Marine Corps’ primary user ofNLW and munitions, MWDs, and crowd controldevices, such as the riot baton. The traditional MP rolein crowd control and law and order operations requiresthe use of NLW under certain conditions and underrestrictive ROE. Accordingly, military police use ofNLW affords the MAGTF commander additionalflexibility and options for action. Military police alsoprovide the commander a force that can function as atraining cadre for the application of NLW.

Command Responsibilities

Commanders must plan, resource, and employ NLWin support of both war and MOOTW. The NLWemployment must be well documented in ROE for alloperations. Commanders must constantly ensure thatMarines understand when and how to effectivelyemploy NLW. Incorrect application of NLW can havesignificant operational and political ramifications. Toensure that this does not occur, command emphasis byleaders coupled with effective NLW training must beaccomplished. Well-trained military police providetimely and clear guidance to Marines using NLW.

Employment

Nonlethal capabilities can be used to supplement andsupplant lethal weapons in small-scale conflicts.Although the nonlethal capability is most useful at thelower end of the conflict spectrum, it has significantapplicability for major theater warfare and should beemployed to enhance the effectiveness and efficiencyof lethal weapons. Nonlethal capabilities can also beused to punish aggressor states and to facilitate post-war reconstruction.

While complete avoidance of fatalities or permanentinjuries is not guaranteed or expected, when properlyemployed, nonlethal weapons should significantlyreduce them as compared with physically destroyingthe same target. The NLW provide additional optionsfor the MAGTF and may produce a psychologicalimpact. To ensure the best possible solutions to endlow intensity conflicts without eroding public support,NLW use must be adjusted to the level of provocation.

The NLW employment is a mind-set, not justmunitions. The Marine must know when to employnonlethal means and not just how to employ them.Additional NLW resource material can be found inFM 90-40, Multiservice Procedures for the TacticalEmployment of Nonlethal Weapons.

Doctrine, NLW, and concepts of operation aredesigned to reinforce deterrence and expand the rangeof options available to MAGTF commanders.Nonlethal weapons enhance the capability of theMAGTF to—

l Discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions.l Limit escalation.l Take military action in situations where use of

lethal force is not the preferred option.l Protect U.S. Forces.l Disable equipment, facilities, and personnel tempo-

rarily.

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Operational Capabilities

The nonlethal capability has operational utility beyonddeterrence . Some MOOTW operat ions (e .g . ,humanitarian assistance, military support to civilianauthorities, peace operations, and noncombatantevacuation operations) provide fruitful areas for NLWcapabilities. In fact, NLW should be part of thestandard mission package in MOOTW. Employmentof NLW can range from low- to mid-intensity andfrom very short effect to lasting effect (which can bereversed when the situation permits). In MOOTW,NLW capabilities could be used for—

l Force and site protection. l Riot and crowd control. l Physical separation through buffers or demilitarized

zones. l Interdiction and isolation. l Operational persuasion. l Security assistance. l Strategic preemption. l Hostage rescue and combating terrorism.

Support Capabilities

Nonlethal capabilities expand options and toolsavailable to the National Command Authorities andcommanders. Nonlethal capabilities support theobjectives of thwarting aggression and promotingstability and afford expanded crisis and contingencyresponse options by—

l Reducing the risks of perceived excessive militaryforce.

l Promoting international political support.l Alleviating environmental concerns.l Enhancing post conflict transitions and termination.

Flexible Deterrent Options

At one end of the operational continuum, nonlethalcapabilities should be integrated into flexible deterrentoptions, which are a blend of steps taken to deterthreats to U.S. interests. These steps usually includemilitary and nonmilitary actions. Employment ofNLW can create a firewall between adversaries andminimize confrontation, thus allowing effective

diplomacy. Nonlethal capabilities may also limit thechances of escalation. In the first case, the rapiditywith which the nonlethal flexible deterrent optionscould be introduced would be key. In the second case,timing would be critical.

Classic Nonlethal Force

Military forces have long used nonlethal force toinfluence behavior of people and nations to defeatadversaries with minimum use of lethal capabilitiesand to weaken adversaries to more quickly, easily, oreconomically defeat them with conventional arms.Examples of classic nonlethal means include—

l Show of force. l Deliberately delivered information or propaganda

meant to dissuade or persuade actions. l Physical obstacles. l Noise to create or enhance psychological effects. l Electromagnetic energy to disrupt communications. l Smoke and obscurants to mask operations or defeat

homing and guidance mechanisms.l Light or fires used to harass.

Effects on Human Abilities

Nonlethal capabilities disrupt or prevent normaloperations by affecting human abilities and senses.Nonlethal capabilities intended for use againstpersonnel will have relatively reversible effects. TheU.S. Army develops nonlethal capabilities that do notmaim, permanently disable, or kill personnel.Required nonlethal munitions effects on humancapabilities include—

l Temporary disorientation.l Crowd control and/or dispersal.l Calm or stun personnel.l Immobilize personnel.l Sensory impairment.

Training

The successful accomplishment of missions usingnonlethal measures requires an understanding of thesubject area and extensive preparation. Training for


NLW use requires individuals to understand thelimited use of these systems in environments withrestrictive ROE. This training should be continuous atall levels to ensure that NLW are properly employed.The Marine Corps trains DOD personnel in the properapplication of nonlethal capabilities.

Development

The Marine Corps and the Army developed a programof instruction for the Nonlethal Individual WeaponsInstructor Course (NIWIC), which is the only formalDOD nonlethal training course. Marine Corps militarypolice are directly involved with the NIWIC and in thedevelopment of DOD NLW doctrine. Military policeare incorporating applicable NLW capabilities intoprograms of instruction for instructor and userdevelopment courses. The NIWIC is designed toprovide commanders with instructors well trained inthe employment of NLW, who, in turn, can train theirMarines.

Required Topics

Marines employing NLW and force require training inthe following areas:

Force ContinuumUnderstanding the concept of escalation of force is thefoundation for proper employment of NLWs.Nonlethal force offers flexibility in the application ofminimal measures required to control the situation in amanner that lethal force does not.

Communications SkillsUnderstanding the individual as the base of a crowd’semotional state of mind is fundamental in under-standing “mob” mentality.

Crowd DynamicsUnderstanding the dynamics that influence a crowd’sbehavior is crucial in developing a course of action todefeat that crowd through NLW employment.

Individual Defense TacticsMarines require training in knowing how to defendthemselves against an unarmed aggressor byemploying unarmed self-defense and straight batontactics.

Oleoresin Capsicum SprayProper training in this organic munition allows aMarine to maintain a standoff position without havingto escalate the level of force.

Crowd ControlThorough training in formations and tactics is arequirement to defeat a passive or aggressive crowdthat allows for mission accomplishment throughnonlethal means.

Nonlethal Impact MunitionsThe individual Marine must be proficient in thecharacteristics of these munitions, which allows acommander to accomplish the mission withoutadverse effects on a crowd.

Military Working Dog Employment

Properly trained and employed MWDs offer thecommander the flexible capabilities to ensure thesurvivability of both the handler and other militarypersonnel. A significant nonlethal capability, MWDsprovide additional capabilities to the MAGTF, whichare discussed in appendix E. The MWD can besuccessfully employed to assist in—

l Crowd deterrence and control.l Drug detection.l Law and order operations.l Bomb detection for the U.S. Marines and other

Federal agencies.

APPENDIX A. CUSTOMS SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Personnel, equipment, and material entering thecustoms territory of the United States (CTUS) mustmeet customs, postal, immigration, agriculture, andother Federal agency requirements. Customs supportis provided to ensure units and individuals returning toCTUS comply with those requirements.

Military police provide commanders a high degree off lexibi l i ty through the execut ion of customsoperations. In the MAGTF, military police, trained asmilitary customs inspectors (MCIs), work with jointand U.S. Federal agencies to help ensure compliancewith regulations and applicable provisions ofi n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s b y d e t e c t i n g a n dinvestigating violations. Commanders and staffsshould be famil iar with the mil i tary customsinspection program.

Responsibilities

The Department of Defense (DOD) established DOD5030.49-R, Customs Inspection, to—

l Define responsibilities.l Regulate the military customs inspection program.l Eliminate the flow of narcotics, drugs, and other

contraband into the United States through DODchannels.

U.S. Customs Service

The U.S. Customs Service (USCS) regulates the U.S.Customs Inspection Program and approves customstraining programs.

Commissioner of Customs

The commissioner of customs pre-approves employ-ment of MCIs for customs pre-clearance procedures.

Customs Service Advisor

The USCS advisor serves within an overseascommand, normally on a 2-year tour of duty, under thedirection and control of the commissioner of customs.The advisor—

l Provides information pertaining to customs rulesand regulations.

l Informs military commanders of responsibilities. l Works closely with military customs staff advisors.

Military Customs Staff Advisor

A member of an overseas command staff, a militarycustoms staff advisor—

l Counsels the commander on customs matters. l Develops local policy and programs. l Establishes training programs. l Conducts host nation liaison. l Monitors operations for effectiveness. l Serves as the point of contact for USCS advisors,

assisting them in reviewing military customsoperations and keeping them informed of militaryand host nation policy.

Theater Executive Agency

The theater executive agency is responsible for themanagement of a major command’s military customsinspec t ion p rogram. Th i s agency deve lops ,coordinates, and promulgates policy, doctrine, andimplementing instructions in accordance with theregulatory guidance contained in DOD 5030.49-R.The executive agency is also responsible for theaccreditation visits and assessments of militarycustoms inspection programs.

Commander

The commander of the combatant command isresponsible for getting USCS approval on MCIemployment but delegates this authority to the provostmarshal (PM).

Provost Marshal

The PM is responsible for implementing and enforcingcustoms training and requirements.

Senior Military Customs Inspector

A senior military customs inspector (SMCI) isresponsible for t ra ining MCIs and for s tamprequirements on shipping documents. The SMCI is an

A-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

MCI who has completed approximately 20 hours ofinstruction approved by the PM with the concurrenceof the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)advisor. To qualify to train other MCIs, the SMCImust pass a written examination with standards setaccording to the approved program of instruction,complete on-the-job training (OJT), and work in thecustoms arena.

Military Customs Inspector Training

The MCI candidate must meet the required rank andgrade structure, be screened to ensure they areproperly motivated, have no record of any undesirabletraits, and possess the highest standards of personalintegrity. Candidates may be commissioned officers;warrant officers; enlisted personnel with the rank ofcorporal or above; enlisted security or military policepersonnel, regardless of rank; or DOD civilianemployees, GS-5 and above, who are U.S. citizens.

A waiver may be granted by the unified or specifiedcommander for appointment of enlisted personnelbelow the rank of corporal and other U.S. citizensemployed by the DOD as inspectors at specificlocations where need for such action can be fullyjustified. Both Department of the Navy and USCSmust approve the waiver. To be eligible for a waiver,the DOD employee must have—

l Undergone a national agency check (NAC) withinthe past 5 years, and have no break in DODemployment greater than one year.

l Undergone an updated NAC if there has been abreak in DOD employment greater than 1 year.

l Successfully completed an USCS-approved trainingcourse.

l Been recommended for appointment by both themilitary coordinator and USCS advisor assigned tothe area.

Instruction

An MCI must complete a 3-day, mission-oriented,formal customs school given by an SMCI. Theheadquarters responsible for the command’s militarycustoms inspect ions is the proponent for theinstruction. In addition, the MCI performs OJT for aminimum of 30 days, which should be conducted atthe MCI’s home station.

Subjects

The MCI i s t r a ined in acco rdance wi th t herequirements of their specific duties (e.g., passengerand baggage inspector, household goods inspector,agriculture inspector). Instruction includes, but is notlimited to, the following subjects:

l Introduction and history.l Passenger and aircraft pre-clearance.l Customs and agriculture orientation.l Art of inspection.l Restricted and prohibited items.l Exemptions.l Customs enforcement.l Military working dog support.l Illicit drugs.l Inspection workshops (OJT under supervision).l Preparation of border clearance forms.l Smuggling methods and detection techniques.

Retraining

Individuals who have not routinely performed dutiesas an MCI for at least a 12-month period, or who havereceived training in a manner other than prescribed byDOD 5030.49-R and other implementing directives,are required to retrain before being appointed as anMCI. The program manager and/or the commanderdetermine the retraining requirements. Retrainingrequirements are based on the individual’s—

l Prior experience. l Program objectives and requirements knowledge.l Proven abilities.

Appointments

After successfully completing the requisite training,the student is certified for MCI duty. The PM controlsthe number of MCIs appointed based on missionrequirements.

An MCI assigned full-time customs inspection duty isissued an official , accountable stamp with anidentifying number prefixed with a two-letter countryidentifier code. See figure A-1. Upon completion of aninspection, the MCI stamps and signs the shippingdocuments to validate the shipment.

Military Police in Support of the MAGTF _________________________________________________________________ A-3

EXAMINED/INSPECTED BY

________________________________________

MILITARY CUSTOMS INSPECTOR

NUMBER (e.g., GE 12345)

Unit or Organization and APO/FPO

________________________________________

SIGNATURE

Figure A-1. MCI Validation Stamp.

Military Customs Inspector Employment

Marines trained as MCIs perform their dutiesaccording to DOD 5030.49-R, Change 1, and otherimplementing regulations. They represent theircommanders by per forming inspec t ions andexaminations, reporting violations to their supervisor,and validating shipping documents. The MCIs areemployed to inspect DOD-sponsored cargo, militaryimpedimenta, ships and aircraft, vehicles, andpersonnel.

Department of Defense-Sponsored Cargo Inspections

The DOD-sponsored cargo is subject to inspection andexamination under U.S. Federal regulations, whichprovide that Government imports be inspected andexamined to sat isfy agricultural and customsrequirements (e.g., no contraband, no plant pests).This cargo includes—

l Military support cargo. l Cargo controlled by DOD in the interest of national

security. l Military aid cargo shipped in U.S. flag aircraft and

vessels. l Military Services exchange cargo.

Military Impedimenta Inspections

The MCIs must inspect and examine mili taryimpedimenta, which is military equipment that will beentered into the CTUS. The inspections are conductedbefore unit moves and/or at the time the equipment is

placed and secured in boxes, crates, containers, seavans, or similar receptacles for movement. Militaryimpedimenta is equipment that is—

l Owned and controlled by a unit. l Carried on the unit property records. l Moved simultaneously or in conjunction with the

unit personnel. l Used by unit personnel while participating in na-

tional emergencies, planned exercises, maneuvers,temporary duty, or permanent change of station.

Ship and Aircraft Inspections

Most ships and aircraft are required to undergopredeparture customs inspections. The commandingofficer of each military operated ship entering theCTUS is responsible for ensuring that a completecustoms inspection has been accomplished beforearrival at the U.S. port of entry. The ship or aircraft isinspected to preclude the introduction of illegal drugs,narcotics, and other contraband into the CTUS.

The inspection should be accomplished at the lastport-of-call before entry into the CTUS. This permitssupport from land-based MCI activities at the port andmaximizes effectiveness of the inspection. Theinspection may be conducted while underway if it isimpractical to conduct a predeparture inspectionbecause of mission requirements, size or nature of theship, inspection resources, or port considerations. TheMCI, or the appointed officer, will inspect as aminimum—

l Ship spaces, such as lockers, boats, cargo holds,living areas, and embarked aircraft.

l Cargo and equipment on board, to include organicequipment of units embarked.

l Postal facilities, which include post offices, postalequipment, stowage areas, and drop boxes.

Military-Owned Vehicle Inspections

Military vehicles will be denied access to CTUS untilexaminations are completed. Drug detection dogs maybe used during the military vehicle examinations,which should be conducted before shipment and in thepresence of a designated unit representative.

Personnel Inspections

On-board personnel and their baggage are inspectedbefore entering the CTUS. In preparation for clearance

A-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

at the U.S. port, personnel must complete a DD Form1854 , U.S . Cus toms Accompan ied BaggageDeclaration.

The personnel inspection involves observation and/ororal questioning to determine the potential for customsviolations. The MCIs examine personal property byphysically opening baggage, cartons, and containersand disassembling articles to determine their contents.Examination of personnel involves the physical searchfor contraband and controlled substances.

Contraband seized by MCIs during inspections beforedeparture from the overseas port is turned over to theappropriate shore-based law enforcement agency.Contraband seized during inspections while underwayis turned over to the U.S. Customs official at the U.S.port of entry.

Cleared passengers and crewmembers may berestricted to an area that has controlled access. Accessto baggage is restricted and authorized only ifdetermined necessary. If a passenger or crewmembermust access baggage, it must be reexamined. Baggageis maintained in a sterile area separate from thepassengers.

Established and maintained by MCIs, the sterile area isan enclosed or protected area at origin or en route.This area is used to protect customs clearedpassengers, baggage, cargo, aircraft, and vehicles fromcontact with or intrusion by unauthorized personnel,plants, animal products, and pests.

Reexaminations

Although personnel, household goods, DOD-sponsored cargo, ships and aircraft, and military andprivately owned vehicles undergo customs inspectionsand examinations overseas, they may be reexamined atthe U.S. port of entry by U.S. Customs officers orrepresentatives of other Federal border clearanceagencies. These spot checks are for validatingprocedures and standards of the military customsinspection program.

The degree of the inspection is the sole prerogative ofthe border clearance official(s). Shipments arereexamined if considered suspect by either the MCI, asnoted by a red line on the appropriate DD form, or bythe border clearance officials.

Identification of Prohibited Items

The following items are identified as prohibited items:

l Controlled substances as defined by U.S. Federallaw, including narcotics, hallucinogenic drugs,amphetamines, barbiturates, marijuana, hashish,and other dangerous drugs.

l Pornographic articles, books, pictures, or films.l Articles produced in Cambodia, Cuba, Vietnam,

North Korea, or Rhodesia. Exceptions includearticles accompanied with special import licensesissued by the Department of the Treasury and itemspurchased in a U.S. post exchange, accompaniedwith a receipt.

l Goods made by convict labor, forced labor, orindentured labor under penal sanctions.

l Destructive devices (e.g., explosive caps, hand gre-nades, tear gas projectiles, and artillery simulators).

l Flammables.l White phosphorus matches.l Counterfeit currency, securities, obligations, post-

age or revenue stamps, and colored illustrations ofU.S. or foreign government postage stamps.

l Unregistered ivory.l Abortion causing items.l Lottery tickets.

Identification of Restricted Items

The following items are identified as restricted butmay be imported under the conditions specified.

Firearms, Ammunition, and Dangerous DevicesThe DOD personnel must meet requirements of theBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and theUSCS before importing firearms and ammunition.Since there are many different provisions involved, theMCI should refer to DOD Regulation 5030.49-R whenproviding personnel advice on the importation offirearms and ammunition.

Trademark ItemsThese items are produced outside the United Statesand bear marks or names that copy or simulate U.S.trademarks or trade names. A trademark item may beimported provided the article is accompanied with thetrademark or trade name owner’s written consent or ifthe trademark or trade name has been obliterated.

Military Police in Support of the MAGTF _________________________________________________________________ A-5

Foreign Reprints of U.S. Copyrighted MaterialI f t he MCI has no in fo rma t ion o r ev idenceimmediately available to indicate that the reprintswere made without the authorization from the U.S.copyright owner, the items may be imported providedthey are intended for personal use.

KnivesSwitchblade knives or any knife with a blade thatopens automatically by the action of inertia or gravityare restricted. A person who has only one arm mayimport these knives provided the knife blade does notexceed 3 inches in length.

Liquor and Alcoholic ProductsLiquor and alcoholic beverages, to include liquorcandy, may be imported provided they are hand-carried and permitted by the destination state laws.

Tobacco ProductsThese products may be imported provided they arehand-carried.

Prescription DrugsThese drugs may be imported if they are hand-carried.

Gambling DevicesThese devices must be registered with the MCI whowill determine whether the item or device is legal forimport. If considered legal, the device must beaccompanied by documentation from the FederalBureau of Investigation and the state in which thedevice is to be imported.

War Souvenirs or War Trophy FirearmsWar souvenirs must be registered with the MCI. A wartrophy firearm must also be accompanied by a DDForm 603, Registration of War Trophy Firearm, orprior proof of ownership in the United States.

CurrencyAny currency (e.g., gold, dollars, foreign) over$10,000 must be claimed on applicable DD form.

Agricultural ItemsCertain agricultural items may be imported into theCTUS only under specific conditions. In cases where apermit to import such articles is required, the permitmust be presented to the MCI at the time of theoverseas inspection. Dried, cured, or processed fruitsand vegetables (e.g., cured figs and dates, dried peasand beans) are unrestricted. Dutch bulbs in original,commercially packaged containers bearing USDA

certificate of examination are also unrestricted.Restricted plants and plant products include—

l Fresh fruits and vegetables.l Trees, shrubs, and herbaceous plants.l Loose bulbs, roots, cuttings, or other parts of plants.l Seeds for or capable of propagation.l Dried or undried grasses.l Various grains, to include hay and straw.l Plant leaves, forest litter, and soil (such as that

likely to be on vehicles, lawnmowers, and similaritems used outdoors).

Animals and Poultry ProductsWhile there are no restrictions on animal trophies thatare fully finished for display, there are U.S. Fish andWildlife Service restrictions on the importation ofmounted birds and animals. Special permission to shipthese items must be requested by the individual andgranted by USCS or authorized representative beforeleaving the country of origin. Restricted animal andpoultry items include—

l Animals.l Poultry. l Birds’ eggs.l Wild bird feathers.l Poultry products and by-products.l Animal products and by-products, including meat

extracts, secretions (e.g., milk, cheese), untreatedskins or hides, wool, hair, bone, and horns.

PetsThe pet owner must contact the local transportationoffice for specific requirements and/or restrictions onthe importation of pets, including dogs, cats, and birds.

Inspection and Clearance Waiver Requests

Redeploying or deploying units are required to meetUSDA entry requirements before the movement ofpersonnel and cargo. Units desiring USDA waivers orUSCS pre-clearance must forward requests throughthe DOD Executive Agency for Customs (HQDAWASHINGTON DC//DALO-TSP-C//).

If it is deemed impractical or uneconomical to conductinspections or clearances, the commander initiates andforwards a request for waiver of the requirementthrough the component headquarters to the DODExecutive Agency. Requests for waiver must be fully

A-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

justified and include as a minimum, informationconcerning the type, amount, and frequency ofproperty, cargo, etc. processed for the CTUS, generalinformation regarding continental United States(CONUS) destination(s), and the availability of MCIpersonnel.

If the waiver request is approved, personnel in waivedlocations will attach the appropriate unstamped formto the shipment and annotate in the REMARKS blockthat the shipment was not inspected because itoriginated in a waived area.

Duty-Free Entry Inspections

Personal property taken out of the CTUS by the ownerand items acquired overseas for the owner’s personaluse or intended as gifts are authorized duty-free entry.This does not apply to articles taken or shipped to theCTUS as an accommodation for others or for sale,barter, or exchange. To be authorized duty-free entry,articles acquired overseas must be in the member’spersonal possession and presented to the MCI beforeshipment to the CTUS.

This exemption is applicable to U.S. Governmentmilitary and civilian employees (and their familymembers) who—

l Were on a tour of duty at least 140 days. l Have received orders or termination of assignment. l Have received a change of duty assignment.

Individuals excluded from duty-free exemptions are—

l Employees of private businesses and organizationsunder contract to the U.S. Government (e.g., RedCross, American banking facilities).

l DOD members who return to the CTUS before thesponsored member receives orders.

l Persons under research fellowships.l Peace Corps or United Nations International Chil-

dren’s Emergency Fund employees.

Violations Reporting

The MCI must report customs law and regulationviolations to the military police. If military police areperforming MCI duties, they report violations to themilitary police performing law enforcement duties.

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APPENDIX B. MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT ESTIMATE

(The following sample format may be modified as necessary to meet situational re-quirements.)_____________________________________________________________________

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no.__ of __copiesOFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMANDPLACE OF ISSUEDate/time groupMessage reference number

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT ESTIMATE (U)

(U) REFERENCES: As appropriate to the preparation of the estimate.

1. (U) Mission

a. (U) Basic Mission. State the mission and its purpose as described in the basic plan.

b. (U) Purpose of the Estimate

(1) (U) Determine if military police (MP) capabilities are sufficient to support proposed courses of action (COAs).

(2) (U) Determine which COA is most desirable from an MP support standpoint.

(3) (U) Determine what measures must be taken by the commander to overcome MP support problems and/or limiting factors in supporting each COA.

2. (U) Situation and Considerations

a. (U) Enemy Forces

(1) (U) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Reference may be made to the Intelligence Estimate.

(2) (U) Major Capabilities. Enemy tactical capabilities likely to affect friendly MP support matters.

(3) (U) Other Capabilities and/or Limitations. Enemy capabilities and/or limitations likely to affect the MP or tactical situation.

b. (U) Own Forces

(1) (U) Present Dispostion of MP Support Elements. May be shown as a situation map or an overlay appended as an annex.

B-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

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(2) (U) Courses of Action. A statement of the COA under consideration.

c. (U) Characteristics of the Area. Those likely to affect the MP support situation, such as weather, terrain, hydrography, communication routes, and local resources.

d. (U) Current MP Support Status. A brief description of the current MP support status, which includes planned or known changes before and during the period covered by the estimate. The following subparagraphs address typical MP support areas of concern. If possible, state specific quantities.

(1) (U) MP Support Organizations and Task Organizations. Each organic support organization or task organization is described using the following format:

(a) (U) Locations. May be an overlay.

(b) (U) Missions and/or Tasks

(c) (U) Task Organizations and Command Relationships

(d) (U) General Capabilities and Status. Capabilities and status are described in terms of task organization using the applicable categories listed in paragraphs (2) through (10) below.

(e) (U) Tactical Responsibilities. If any.

(f) (U) Communications and Automated Data Processing Systems Support Arrangements

(2) (U) Personnel

(a) (U) Strengths. Identify strengths of each major subordinate unit.

(b) (U) Replacements. Identify replacements on hand, replacements to be received, and the quality of the replacements.

(c) (U) Morale. Determine the level of fighting spirit, significant factors affecting current morale, religious and welfare matters, and awards.

(d) (U) Personal Services Support

(e) (U) Military Justice. Court martial and correction facilities.

(f) (U) Personnel Procedures. Significant items, if any.

(3) (U) Antiterrorism/Force Protection Operations

(4) (U) Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations

(5) (U) Area Security

(6) (U) Law and Order

Military Police in Support of the MAGTF _________________________________________________________________ B-3

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(7) (U) Internment

(8) (U) Physical Security

(9) (U) Military Working Dogs

(10) (U) Customs Support

e. (U) Assumptions. A statement of those assumptions made for the preparation of this estimate. An example of the critical assumption is the estimation of the length of time for the entire operation and for each COA (if different).

f. (U) Special Factors. Items covered elsewhere, such as state of training of MP support personnel or task organizations.

3. (U) Analysis. Each COA under consideration is analyzed, in the light of all significant factors, to determine problems that may arise, measures required to resolve those problems, and any limiting factors that may exist. Omit areas not applicable. State all considerations of the analysis that have equal effects on all proposed COAs.

a. (U) Course of Action #1

(1) (U) MP Support Organizations and Task Organizations. Each organic support organization or task organization is described using the following format:

(a) (U) Locations. May be an overlay.

(b) (U) Missions and/or Tasks

(c) (U) Task Organizations and Command Relationships

(d) (U) General Capabilities and Status. Capabilities and status are described in terms of task organization using the applicable categories listed in paragraphs (2) through (10) below.

(e) (U) Tactical Responsibilities. If any.

(f) (U) Communications and Automated Data Processing Systems Support Arrangements

(2) (U) Personnel

(a) (U) Strengths. Identify strengths of each major subordinate unit.

(b) (U) Replacements. Identify replacements on hand, replacements to be received, and the quality of the replacements.

(c) (U) Morale. Determine the level of fighting spirit, significant factors affecting current morale, religious and welfare matters, and awards.

(d) (U) Personal Services Support

B-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

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(e) (U) Military Justice. Court martial and correction facilities.

(f) (U) Personnel Procedures. Significant items, if any.

(3) (U) Antiterrorism/Force Protection Operations

(4) (U) Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations

(5) (U) Area Security

(6) (U) Law and Order

(7) (U) Internment

(8) (U) Physical Security

(9) (U) Military Working Dogs

(10) (U) Customs Support

b. (U) Course of Action #2. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.

c. (U) Course of Action #3. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.

4. (U) Evaluation. From an MP support standpoint and based on the foregoing analyses, summarize and compare the advantages and disadvantages of each COA under consideration.

5. (U) Conclusion

a. (U) Preferred Course of Action. A statement as to which COA, if any, can best be supported from MP support viewpoint.

b. (U) Major Disadvantages of Other Courses of Action. A statement whether any or all remaining COAs can be supported from MP support viewpoint citing the disadvantages that render the other COAs less desirable or unsupportable.

c. (U) MP Problems and Limitations. A statement of significant problems to be resolved and any limitations to be considered in each COA.

d. (U) Decision or Action. A statement of measures required to resolve MP support problems cited above that must be brought to the attention of the commander.

/s/ ______________________________________________

ANNEXES: (As required)

APPENDIX C. PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS

The mission, enemy or potentially hostile elements,and ope ra t i ona l env i ronmen t i n f l uence t hecomposition and employment of military police (MP)assets. The MP commander task-organizes personneland equipment for the assigned mission.

Personnel

A provisional MP platoon, with an appropriatemilitary occupational specialty (MOS) mix, shouldconsist of the personnel described in table C-1.

Equipment

Technology advances should be continuouslymonitored to ensure MP requirements are consistentwith the latest available equipment to enable rapididentification, communication, and movementthroughout the battlefield. Equipping a provisional MP

platoon to enable maximum support to the MAGTFcommander currently includes, but is not limited to,vehicles, weapons, communications gear, as well asadditional organic and external support equipment.

Vehicles

The vehicle-mounted MP team is a valuable tool forthe MAGTF commander. These teams continuallypatrol their assigned routes and areas to ensuremovement along main supply routes is continuous andto move Marines and equipment to various staticlocations in their area of operations. The followingvehicles are required to equip a provisional MPplatoon:

l MRC 145.l M 1043/4.l M 998.l M 1030.l M 101 trailer.l KLR 600 cc motorcycle.

Table C-1. Provisional MP Platoon Personnel.

MOS Billet Functions 5803 MP officer Serves as the platoon commander.5811 staff

noncommissioned officer

Serves as platoon sergeant and nonlethal weapons specialist.

5811 military police Represents basic MP community MOS.5812 military working dog

(MWD) handlerAdds depth to the MAGTF commander’s antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) posture through drug and bomb detection, static posts, observation posts/listening posts, and civil disturbance environments.

5813 accident investigator Investigates accidents involving U.S. personnel or property.5814 physical security

specialistEnhances the MAGTF commander’s AT/FP posture through proper employment of tactical barrier and entry control points, lighting, vulnerability assessments, etc.

5815 special reaction team member

Improves the MAGTF commander’s capabilities in low intensity conflicts, military operations other than war, and civil disturbances.

5819 MP investigator Provides the MAGTF commander with the abilities to properly investigate criminal activities. Included when 5821 is not available.

5821 criminal investigator Deploys on a case-by-case basis, depending on the mission of the contingency and approval of the commander.

5831 corrections specialist Deploys on a case-by-case basis, depending on the mission of the contingency and approval of the commander.

C-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Weapons

A provisional MP platoon is equipped with crew-served and individual weapons.

Crew-Served Weaponsl M-2.l MK-19.l M-240G.

Individual Weaponsl M-249 l M-203.l M-16.l M-9.l Shotguns.l M-4 (close quarters battle weapon).l Sniper Rifle.

Communication Gear

Communication equipment provides the provisionalMP platoon with a multifaceted communication abilityto meet environmental and geographical constraintsand to communicate internally with motor patrols,traffic control points, roadblocks, and checkpoints.This gear should include, but is not limited to, thefollowing:

l AN/MRC 145.l AN/VRC 88.l AN/PRC 119.l SABERS (hand-held radios).l AN/PSN 11 (precise lightweight global positioning

system receiver).l SABERS charger.l Satellite communications access.l Cellular phones.l Global positioning system.l TA 312.l OE-254.l AN/GR 39, including power source and portable

repeater for host nation support.

Additional Organic Equipment

A provisional MP platoon requires the followingorganic equipment to enhance operational capabilities:

l Infrared binoculars. l Compass.l Night vision goggles.l Heavy weapons night scopes.l M16A2 night scopes.l AN/PAQ 4 night vision sight.l Nuclear, biological, and chemical detection kits.l MK-64 mounts.l M-3 tripods.l M-122 tripods.l Vehicle-mounted power source and light systems.l Speed detection devices (radar).l Digital cameras.l Personal computer with printer and scanner.l Nonlethal capability set (consistent with current

technology), which includes: n Bullhorns.n Lighting equipment.n Siren.n Riot and crowd gear, which includes—

w Shields.w Shin guards.w Impact weapons and munitions.w Face shields.w Portable vehicle incapacitation system.w Personal restraints.

l Magnetometers.l Vehicle inspection mirrors.l Portable electronic intrusion devices.l Capability kits, which include—

n Criminal investigation division and SECRET In-ternet Protocol Router Network access.

n Accident investigation.n Corrections.n Law enforcement.n MWD, which includes—

w Drug and explosive detector kitsw External logistical support (see External Sup-

port below).l Enemy prisoner of war (EPW) (see External

Support below).l AN PIQ 5.l Handcuffs.l Leg restraints.l Flexi-cuffs.

Military Police in Support of the MAGTF _________________________________________________________________ C-3

External Support

Commanders and planners must consider externalsources of support for MWD and EPW operations.

MWD RequirementsLogistical support required for MWD employment inthe MAGTF includes—

l Portable kennels.l Veterinarian medical support.l Food and water.l Equipment that mitigates the effects of a harsh

environment. l Additional equipment required for effective MWD

capabilities employment.

EPW Equipment RequirementsMilitary police coordinate with engineers forconstruction support and with supply personnel for

construction and facility maintenance materials. Theexternal support equipment and supplies include—

l Barbed wire roll.l Concertina wire.l Engineer stakes.l Lighting.l Generators.l Mess equipment.l Water bulls.l Medical equipment.l Tentage.l Heating equipment.l Hygiene facilities.

EPW Vehicle RequirementsDuring EPW and civilian internee operations, militarypolice require external logistical support for thevehicle requirements (see table C-2).

Table C-2. EPW Vehicle Requirements.

Vehicle Maximum Personnel Guard PlacementWheeled Vehicles5-ton semitrailer 24 captives 2 guards In front and rear of vehicle10- or 12-ton semitrailer 50 captives 4 guards In front and rear of vehiclePassenger bus 37 captives 3 guards In front and rear of vehicleRailBox car 22 captives 3 guards

1 supervisor per 3 boxcarsIn center of each boxcar inside a mesh lane

Passenger car 34 captives 6 guards1 supervisor per car

At each end of car

Amphibious VehiclesAAVTP-7 12 captives 2 guards In front and rear of vehicleMark VII landing craft 182 captives 8 guards In front and rear of vehicleL466 class landing craft 276 captives 24 guards In front and rear of vehicleUtility landing craft 425 captives 30 guards In front and rear of vehicleFoot MobileClose column 320-480 captives 40 guards In front and rear and on both flanksAircraft (for tactical evacuation within theater)C-130 81 captives 9 guards In front, rear, and middle of passenger compartmentCH-53E 41 captives 9 guards In front, rear, and middle of passenger compartmentCH-46 helicopter * 12 captives 6 guards In front, rear, and middle of passenger compartmentUH-1C helicopter * 5 captives 2 guards In front and rear of passenger compartmentUH-1H/V helicopter * 9 captives 2 guards In front and rear of passenger compartmentMV-22 18 captives 6 guards In front, rear, and middle of passenger compartment*Load limits for helicopters may change based on the weather and the expected altitude.

APPENDIX D. PHYSICAL SECURITY

The physical security program is designed tosafeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access toequipment, facilities, and materiel; and to defendagainst acts of terrorism, enemy activity, damage, andcriminal activity. The application of active and passivephysical security measures prevent or mitigate threats.A major element of the command’s antiterrorism/forceprotection (AT/FP) posture, physical security is a toolthe commander uses in a garrison or a tacticalenvironment to support the operating forces. Militarypolice trained as physical security specialists, militaryoccupational special ty (MOS) 5814, serve ascommanders’ subject matter experts.

Support for a command’s AT/FP posture and missionrequires a strong physical security program to protectpersonnel and property. The commander establishesrequirements for protection of personnel and propertyby identifying the property, including jurisdiction andboundaries; by assessing the threat; and by committingresources. Once these requirements are established,physical security personnel support the program byclassifying various security hazards and employingdetailed protective measures and management actions.

Physical security measures supplement the AT/FPprogram and enhance the overall defensive posture.Trained force protection and physical securitypersonnel, using current information and technology,can provide the commander a defense in depth (e.g.,security posts, barriers, identification controls,technology) against identified and perceived threats.Physical security personnel support the AT/FPprogram by assessing vulnerabilities and conducting aphysical security survey.

Assessment

A threat’s attack on unprotected vulnerabilities (e.g.,billeting spaces, ammunition storage areas, powerplants, motor pools) can significantly affect the

command’s mission. Physical security personnelprovide the commander a means of assessingvulnerabilities, which include the following criticalareas:

l Arms, ammunition, and explosives; field ammuni-tion supply points; and other storage facilities.

l Flight lines, expeditionary airfields, and other avia-tion assets in support of the aviation combatelement.

l Naval assets as well as piers, wharfs, port facilities,and waterfront areas used as logistical staging andpreposition areas.

l Petroleum, oils, and lubricants facilities (e.g., fueldepots, issue points).

l Command, control, communications, computers,and information facilities and infrastructure.

Physical Security Survey

A physical security survey is a systematic evaluationof a facility or activity’s overall security. Throughsurveys, physical security personnel identify securitydeficiencies and recommend active and passivecorrective measures. A physical security surveyaddresses—

l Structural design information and deficiencies suchas walls, doors, and ceilings.

l Tactical employment of physical barriers and obsta-cles.

l Preventive and compensatory security measuresand procedures.

l Employment of physical security aids, equipment,and devices (e.g., lighting, fencing, locks, key andlock control, portable electronic security measures).

l Access and control procedures of U.S. and hostnat ion civi l ian and mil i tary personnel andequipment within an area of operations.

APPENDIX E. MILITARY WORKING DOGS

Military working dog (MWD) capabilities enhance thecommander’s ability to protect forces and assets.Although MWDs are normally garrison assets, theMAGTF commander can request MWD support forcombat, combat support, and combat service supportoperations.

The Marine Corps has two types of dual-certifiedMWDs in their inventory. The drug detector dogs(DDDs) and explosive detector dogs (EDDs) are alsocertified as patrol dogs. This dual-certification enablesthe commander to employ the MWD in detector and/or patrol roles.

When combined with a military police (MP) doghandler, the MWD becomes part of a MWD team. AnMWD extends the handler’s ability beyond the limitsof human sight and hearing by detecting and locating aperson faster than a human, even when vegetation orterrain might obscure that person from humandetection.

Although MWDs are normally garrison assets, MWDteams can be assigned temporary additional duty tooperating force units during combat and combatcontingency operations. The Marine expeditionaryforce provost marshal coordinates MWD supportduring contingency and combat operations. WhileMWDs can be a log i s t i ca l bu rden , MAGTFcommanders should consider MWDs for mostoperations.

Explosive Detector Dogs

The most appropriate MWD for the operating forces isthe dual-certified patrol and explosive detector dog (P/EDD). The dual-certified patrol and P/EDD can, withadditional training, adequately perform any MWDmission except drug detection. To support theMAGTF, these MWDs must be able to—

l Detect bombs and tripwires. l Bypass enemy in bunkers and built-up areas. l Conduct flight line security patrols, enemy prisoner

of war (EPW) control, perimeter patrols, and otherappropriate missions.

Drug Detector Dogs

The DDDs can be a valuable force protection tool forthe MAGTF commander to deter drug use by Marines.Commanders should request drug detector supportwhen drug use is anticipated in future contingency andcombat operations, low intensity conflicts, extendeddeployments, or anytime Marines come in regularcontact with civilians.

Patrol Dogs

Marine Corps MWDs are trained in law enforcementpatrol functions to—

l Detect the presence of unauthorized personnel.l Alert the handler to the presence of intruders.l Attack on command.l Attack without command when the handler is

threatened.l Cease attack on command.l Search buildings and open areas for criminal of-

fenders.l Perform reliably off the leash.l Work safely and effectively around people.l Conduct mobile patrols.l Conduct dismounted patrols.l Operate or assist at fixed posts.

Organization

An MWD team consists of a dog and its handler.Three teams comprise an MWD detachment, whichcan be patrol, patrol and narcotic detection, or patroland explosives detection. With three teams, thedetachment can provide 24-hour support for a missionthat requires one MWD, or the detachment can supportup to three short duration missions. A detachment canbe attached to support—

l MP combat support or internment and resettlement.

E-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

l Law and order augmentation.l MP units.

Planning

When MWD teams are employed, they participate inall phases of the unit’s mission. The handler and thekennel master recommend ways to use the MWDteam. In addition to the commander’s concept andmission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops andsupport available–time available (METT-T), thehandler must consider—

l Length of tactical employment, which depends onclimate and environment.

l Location and size of area to be covered. l Condition and type of terrain. l Prevailing wind direction.

Handling Techniques

Normally, handlers are armed with a sidearm, and maycarry a weapon with a sling. These weapons areprimarily for the defense of the handler and the MWD.The handler focuses on working and controlling theMWD.

Usually, MWD teams work in front of or on the flanksof other military police or the protected facility, butnot so far that the accompanying military policecannot provide security for the team. The teams shouldbe downwind from potential location or avenues ofapproach of the person(s) to be detected. Thisimproves the chances of providing early warning. Ifthe MWD team is supporting a patrol that is movingdirectly into the wind, the team may have to move leftor right of a line of march to make use of theprevailing wind. In some cases, the MWD team cantraverse while the patrol continues on a direct route.

The MWD is rehearsed with the team or patrolmembers so everyone can get used to working with theMWD. Team members must know what to do if ahandler is seriously wounded or killed. A dog that hasworked closely with a team and has developed atolerance for one or more of the team members willusually allow one of the members to return it to the

kennel. If the MWD will not allow anyone near itshandler, other handlers must be called in to assist.

Support Capabilities

The MWD capabilities are used to support tacticalpatrols, fixed location security, EPW and civilianinternee operations, and law and order operations.

Tactical Patrol

Properly conditioned and trained MWDs enhance thesecurity posture of a tactical patrol through detectionand location of enemy soldiers.

Fixed Location Security

The MWD teams at fixed locations can often extendsecurity into or across concealing terrain. These teamswork best at perimeter posts and at posts located awayfrom distracting activity, where MWDs help deterthreats to the site. If working outside the perimeter,MWDs can detect threats before the attacker gets nearenough to compromise security.

Selection of fixed locations and limits must beadjusted for factors that affect the MWD’s ability tosee, hear, and smell. For example, lights can cause theMWD to rely more on sight than on its other senses.The MWD teams operating in lighted areas shouldpatrol varied routes, remain in shadows, or standstationary in concealed downwind positions as needed.Varied postings of a team increases deterrence byavoiding a set patrol pattern and helps keep theMWD’s interest level up. To support fixed locationsecurity, MWDs are employed—

l At access control points or dismount points to guardpersons during identification checks.

l In large enclosures that normally require manysentries for effective security.

l At posts that are secured only in periods of highthreat or where occasional random posting isneeded during inclement weather.

Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee Operations

The MWD teams offer a real and a psychologicaldeterrent against escape attempts. If an escape should

Military Police in Support of the MAGTF _________________________________________________________________ E-3

occur, MWDs can help track and capture the escapedEPW. These teams help secure EPWs—

l At collecting points. l In holding areas. l During movement. l During work details outside the fence at internment

locations. l By enhancing perimeter security at a compound or

camp.


The MWD teams may be used in either proactive orreactive operations.

Proactive OperationsIn proactive operations, MWD teams—

l Patrol assigned areas.l Conduct security checks.l Assist at roadblocks and checkpoints by providing

additional control for persons at the location anddetecting narcotics and explosives.

l Support VIP security missions with explosives de-tection and area patrolling.

l Escort funds.l Conduct searches in support of narcotics investi-

gations.l Search for and locate explosives in support of

counterterrorism operations.l Search for narcotics, ammunition, and explosives in

support of customs operations during deploymentor redeployment.

Reactive OperationsIn reactive operations, MWD teams—

l Respond to and clear unsecured buildings.l Respond to and assist in searching threatened sites

for suspected explosive devices.

Employment Considerations

Although the MWD is an asset to MP operations, itseffectiveness may be reduced by distractions,aggressiveness, weather, or environmental conditions.

Distractions

The MWD team works best in uninhabited areas. Iffriendly forces frequently distract an MWD fromresponding to the handler’s commands, the MWDsoon loses interest and reliability.

Aggressiveness

The ability to work around people without becomingdistracted or showing hostility toward strangers is akey factor in the patrol dog’s success as a lawenforcement tool. This capability is generally referredto as controlled aggressiveness. With attack-trainedanimals, this is a desirable temperament trait.Controlled aggressiveness does not mean that patroldogs lack spirit or cannot pursue and attack with vigor.Patrol dogs must be cautious of strangers and beprepared to complete each assigned task withoutregard to the danger involved. Therefore, patrol dogsmust—

l Be alert and aware without showing overt hostility. l Attack without savagery. l Obey their handlers.

Weather

During inclement weather, an MWD’s ability to detectan intrusion will exceed the detection ability of itshandler and other physical, mechanical, or electricalintrusion detection systems. In hot, humid weather, theMWD works at top efficiency for only 2 or 3 hours ata time. Depending on the conditions, the MWD mayrequire additional cool-down breaks.

The MWD works best when placed to take advantageof odors carried on the wind. When there is little or nowind, the MWD can detect intruders up to 200 metersaway using its senses of smell, hearing, and sight.Under those circumstances, the MWD may detect ascent even though the person being tracked is off toone side. As wind velocity increases, the MWD mustbe more in line with the tracked person to detect thescent. In unfavorable wind conditions, the MWD canstill detect by sound and sight, but its capabilities arereduced by—

l Noise. l Movement. l Smoke. l Dust. l Dense undergrowth.

E-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

l Heavily wooded areas. l Jungle growth.

Environment

Some environmental situations severely restrict or ruleout the use of MWDs. Before employing MWDs, thefollowing factors should be considered:

l MWD employment near petroleum, oils, andlubricants must be infrequent and brief, becausepetroleum, oils, and lubricants can damage a dog’spaws and sense of smell.

l MWDs cannot be used in areas contaminated withnuclear, biological, and chemical agents, becausethere are no protective devices for them.

l MWDs may work in open areas where riot controlagents are in use if the wind velocity is normal;however, they should be closely monitored andtaken to a veterinarian if they show signs ofdistress.

Employment

The MWD teams are frequently employed to performtasks under difficult operational conditions, whichinclude crime scene investigation, building and areasearches, as well as narcotics and explosives detection.

Crime Scene Investigations

Crime investigations usually involve nose work suchas tracking and building searches. Although patroldogs can perform such tasks with a high degree ofproficiency, an investigation requires the fullcooperation of all personnel at the crime scene.

The ability of the MWD team to track successfullydepends on the distribution, quality, and life of thefollowed scent, which is influenced by climate, terrain,and age of the track. Many subjects initially flee onfoot but complete their escapes in vehicles. Others fleeinto built-up areas where their scent either dissipatesor becomes mingled with other odors.

Military police should secure the crime scene with aminimum of personnel and minimize their movementin and around the crime area if an MWD is requiredfor tracking. When MWD assistance is not requestedpromptly or if the crime scene has been disturbed, the

trained patrol dogs may be unsuccessful in completingthe operational tracking requirement.

Building and Area Searches

The MWD’s capability to check buildings and openareas rapidly and thoroughly for intruders and criminalsuspects is a valuable asset to law enforcement andsecurity personnel. The MWD teams should bedispatched to every incident involving actual orsuspected burglary, housebreaking, vandalism,trespassing, or flight from a security area. Thepresence of MWDs at such scenes reduces the numberof military police required and minimizes the risks insearching for potentially dangerous offenders.

Conducting building or area searches with patrol dogteams requires organization, adherence to a prescribedplan, and the cooperation of military police at thescene. An MWD should not be used to search,especially off the leash, until military police at thescene feel certain that the area is clear of innocentpeople. Other factors to be considered include the—

l Time of day.l Evidence of forced entry or illegal presence in the

area.l Potential danger to the handler.l Type and size of area to be searched.

During building searches, accompanying militarypolice secure the building, and the MWD team entersand searches. Military police may be directed to enterportions of the building as those areas are cleared bythe MWD. When searching an area, accompanyingmilitary police should be behind the MWD team andclear of the area to be searched. Keeping nonhandlersout of the MWD’s search area reduces the distractionsfor the dog and improves its chances of catching theoffender’s scent or detecting sound and movement.Accompanying military police should be near enoughto assist the handler if needed.

Drug Detection

A DDD is trained to detect the presence of marijuanaand derivatives as well as hard narcotics (e.g., opium,cocaine, and heroin).

People, traffic, foreign odors, other animals, loudnoises, and strange objects may divert the MWD’sattention from its primary task. Basic obedience, scentd isc r imina t ion , and sys temat ic employment

Military Police in Support of the MAGTF _________________________________________________________________ E-5

techniques help reduce the impact of distractinginfluences. Proper conditioning of MWDs, such asfrequent exposure to people, traffic, loud noises, foododors, other animals, and refuse containers, preparesthem for field service. If possible, MWDs should alsobe familiarized with aircraft and gunfire.

Military police, accompanying a DDD team, mayfollow the team on its search. The military policeusually stay immediately outside the room or vehiclebeing searched, where they can observe the search andthe MWD’s responses. After completion of the DDDteam search, military police conduct a thorough,physical search of the area indicated by the DDD teamto locate and seize any evidence.

Explosives Detection

The on-site commander determines whether toevacuate an area in response to a bomb threat. Beforean EDD team conducts a building search, the buildingmust first be cleared of occupants. This procedureminimizes the distractions to the EDD team andreduces the risk to area occupants.

If the occupants haven’t searched the area, the EDDteam conducts the initial search. An advantage tohaving the EDD team conduct the initial search is thatthe handler has specialized explosive device detectioncapabilities and search techniques. If the EDD teamcompletes an initial search without detecting anexplosive device, the occupants should inspect,because they can identify items which are out of placeor foreign to the area. When responding to a bombthreat, EDD teams should conduct the followingprocedures:

l The EDD handler recommends the number ofsafety and security persons who may accompanythe EDD team into the search area.

l The handler and accompanying personnel should beprovided with protective equipment and otherequipment (e.g., flak vests, inspection mirrors).

l Accompanying personnel must be briefed on thefollowing search actions:

n Turn off any carried radios, portable phones, etc.

n Move nothing, disturb nothing, and change noth-ing during the search. If lights or appliances areoff, leave them off; if on, leave them on.

n Direct occupants to begin searching an area, sec-tion, or building as soon as the EDD team hascleared it.

n Evacuate all persons, including the search party,a reasonable time before the specified detonationtime. Keep the area clear for at least an hour pastthe threatened detonation time.

l Accompanying personnel must take the followingactions if the MWD responds:

n Notify explosive ordnance disposal immediatelyof the location of the response.

n Do not attempt to move, open, or tamper withany object suspected of being an explosive de-vice.

Transportation Requirements

Each MWD detachment, consisting of three MWDteams, requires transportation to and in its area ofoperation. Depending on the mission, the detachmentmay require additional or alternate transportation. IfMETT-T makes it preferable for military police to usecommercial vehicles, MWD teams may require similartransportation.

When performing routine law enforcement duties,patrol dog teams are normally employed as mountedpatrols or in a combination mounted and dismountedstatus. This allows them to cover large areas, to bemore responsive to requests for assistance, and toprovide greater psychological deterrence to criminalactivity. This transportation method also permits thedog handler to respond to calls that do not requirespecial canine skills and to perform traffic controlduties as required.

Several types of vehicles can be used effectively totransport patrol dog teams. These vary from four-wheel drive vehicles to modified sedans. If using aclosed vehicle, air conditioning may be needed tosustain operational effectiveness.

APPENDIX F

SECTION I. GLOSSARY

ACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation combat elementADC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . area damage controlAO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . area of operationsAT/FP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiterrorism/force protection

cc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .cubic centimetersCI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .civilian interneeCID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . criminal investigation divisionCMC . . . . . . . . . . . Commandant of the Marine CorpsCONUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .continental United StatesCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command postCSSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service support elementCTUS . . . . . . . .customs territory of the United States

DDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .drug detection dogDOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of DefenseDZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .drop zone

ECP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .entry control pointEDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .explosive detector dogEPW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .enemy prisoner of war

FARP. . . . . . . . . . forward arming and refueling pointFM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Army field manual

G-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence staff officerG-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations staff officerG-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics staff officerGCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ground combat elementGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . general purposeGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .general service

HA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .humanitarian assistanceHN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . host nationHUMINT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . human intelligenceHVT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high-value targets

IPB . . . . . . intelligence preparation of the battlespace

LMCC . . . . . . . . . . logistics movement control centerLOC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lines of communicationsLZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . landing zone

MAGTF. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine air-ground task forceMCDP . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publicationMCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military customs inspectorMCM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Manual for Courts-MartialMCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps orderMCRP . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps reference publicationMCWP . . . . . . Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary forceMETT-T . . . . . . mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

troops and support available–timeavailable

MEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unitMMSO . . . maneuver and mobility support operationsMOOTW . . . . . . . . military operations other than warMOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military occupational specialtyMP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military policeMPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military police investigatorMSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . major subordinate commandMSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . main supply routeMWD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .military working dog

NAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . national agency checkNBC . . . . . . . . . . . . nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCIS . . . . . . . . . Naval Criminal Investigative ServiceNIWIC. . . . . . . . . . . . . Nonlethal Individual Weapons

Instructors CourseNLW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nonlethal weapons

OJT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .on-the-job trainingOMFTS . . . . . . . . . operational maneuver from the seaOPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operational planning team

P/EDD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . patrol/explosive detector dogPM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . provost marshal

RAOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .rear area operations centerRAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rear area securityROE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rules of engagement

S-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence staff officerSJA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .staff judge advocateSMCI. . . . . . . . . . . . senior military customs inspectorSOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . status-of-forces agreementSOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .standing operating proceduresSPMAGTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . special purpose Marine

air-ground task force

TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . traffic control pointTHREATCON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . threat condition

UCMJ . . . . . . . . . . . Uniform Code of Military JusticeUSCS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Customs ServiceUSDA . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Department of Agriculture

VIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . very important person

F-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

civilian internee—1. A civilian who is internedduring armed conflict or occupation for securityreasons or for protection or because he has committedan offense against the detaining power. 2. A term usedto refer to persons interned and protected inaccordance with the Geneva Convention relative to theProtection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12August 1949 (Geneva Convention). (JP 1-02)

contraband—Material, goods, plant and animalproducts, or pests, and articles prohibited entry intothe customs territory of the United States, includingcontrolled substances, as identified in 21 U.S.C. 812,and restricted items when the conditions of therestriction have not been met. (DOD 5030.49-R)

controlled substance—1. A drug or other substance,or immediate precursor included in Schedule I, II, III,IV, or V of the Controlled Substances Act. (JP 1-02)

customs territory of the United States—The 50States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico (19U.S.C. 1202). Not included are American Samoa,Guam, Johnston Island, Midway Island, Virgin Islandsof the US, Wake Island, or the Panama Canal Zone.Also called CTUS. (DOD 5030.49-R)

defense in depth—The siting of mutually supportingd e f e n s e p o s i t i o n s d e s i g n e d t o a b s o r b a n dprogress ively weaken a t tack, prevent in i t ia lobservations of the whole position by the enemy, andto allow the commander to maneuver his reserve. (JP 1-02)

force protection—Security program designed toprotect Service members, civilian employees, familymembers, facilities, and equipment, in all locationsand situations, accomplished through planned andintegrated application of combatting terrorism,physical security, operations security, personalprotective services, and supported by intelligence,counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02)

forward arming and refueling point—A temporaryfacility, organized, equipped, and deployed by anaviation commander, and normally located in the mainbattle area closer to the area of operation than theaviation unit's combat service area, to provide fuel andammunition necessary for the employment of aviationmaneuver units in combat. The forward arming and

refueling point permits combat aircraft to rapidlyrefuel and rearm simultaneously. Also called FARP.(JP 1-02)

high-value target—A target the enemy commanderrequires for the successful completion of the mission.The loss of high-value targets would be expected toseriously degrade important enemy functionsthroughout the friendly commander's area of interest.Also called HVT. (JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—Ananaly t ica l methodology employed to reduceuncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, andterrain for all types of operations. Intelligencepreparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may berequired to operate. The data base is then analyzed indetai l to determine the impact of the enemy,environment, and terrain on operations and presents itin graphic form. Intelligence preparation of thebattlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB.(JP 1-02)

l o w i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t — P o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r yconfrontation between contending states or groupsbelow conventional war and above the routine,peaceful competition among states. It frequentlyinvolves protracted struggles of competing principlesand ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges fromsubversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by acombination of means employing political, economic,informational, and military instruments. Low intensityconflicts are often localized, generally in the ThirdWorld, but contain regional and global securityimplications. (JP 1-02)

passage of lines—An operation in which a forcemoves forward or rearward through another force'scombat positions with the intention of moving into orout of contact with the enemy. (JP 1-02)

physical security—That part of security concernedwith physical measures designed to safeguardpersonnel; to prevent unauthorized access toequipment, installations, material, and documents; andto safeguard them against espionage, sabotage,damage, and theft. (JP 1-02)

Posse Comitatus Act—Prohibits search, seizure, orarrest powers to US military personnel. Amended in

Military Police in Support of the MAGTF _________________________________________________________________ F-3

1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increasedDepartment of Defense support of drug interdictionand other law enforcement activities. (Title 18, “Useof Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus” - UnitedStates Code, Section 1385) (JP 1-02)

rear area—For any particular command, the areaextending forward from its rear boundary to the rear ofthe area assigned to the next lower level of command.

This area is provided primarily for the performance ofsupport functions. (JP 1-02)

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network—Worldwide SECRET level packet switch network thatuses high-speed internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information Systems Networkcircuitry. Also called SIPRNET. (JP 1-02)

APPENDIX G

REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

International Agreements

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,

12 August 1949Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick

in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick

and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949

United States Statutes

United States Code Title 18, Section 13, Federal Assimilated Crimes ActUnited States Code Title 18, Section 1385, Use of Army And Air Force

as Posse ComitatusUnited States Code Title 19, Section 1202, Tariff Act of 1930Uniform Code of Military JusticeManual for Courts-Martial

Department of Defense (DOD) Regulation

5030.49-R Customs Inspection

DOD Directive (DODD)

2310.1 DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Other Detainees

Joint Publication (JP)

1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP)

1-2 Campaigning

Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP)

4-11.8C Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees

Navy/Marine (NAVMC) Publication

2927 Antiterrorism/Force Protection Campaign Plan

Marine Corps Order (MCO)

P5580.2 Marine Corps Law Enforcement

U.S. Army Field Manuals (FMs)

5-34 Engineer Field Data19-40 Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons90-40 NLW Multiservice Procedures for the Tactical Employment Of Nonlethal

Weapons

Documents

MCWP 3-34.1 Military Police in Support of the MAGTF 3-34.1 Military... · Recommendations should include the following information: l ... execution of military police operations regarding