MCWP 3-22 Antiair Warfare - United States Marine Corps 3-22... · 2012-10-11 · Antiair Warfare U.S. Marine Corps MCWP 3-22 Distribution Statement A: approved for public release;

Antiair Warfare

U.S. Marine Corps

MCWP 3-22

Distribution Statement A: approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

PCN: 143 000065 00

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

23 June 2000

FOREWORD

Antiair warfare within the U. S. Marine Corps was forged in combat primarily duringWorld War II when Marine aircraft and antiaircraft artillery were stationed throughoutthe Pacific basin. Campaigns for Guadalcanal and the Marshall Islands and otheroperations shaped today's concepts. Marine defense battalions employed ground-basedair defense assets. Congressional Medal of Honor recipients Lieutenant ColonelGregory "Pappy" Boymgton, Captain Joe Foss, and other Marine aviators flew fightersweep, combat air patrol, escort, and assorted offensive antiair warfare missions. Theywere among the first aviators to perform multirole antiair warfare tasks designed toprotect friendly forces and gain air superiority.

Today's Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) has a unique antiair warfarecapability. Multimission-capable aircraft, a ground-based short air defense missilesystem, and a robust Marine air command and control system (MACCS) aretremendous force multipliers for MAGTF and joint force commanders.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-22, Antiair Warfare, focuses on thetactics, techniques, and procedures of antiair warfare operations. It details how theMAGTF accomplishes antiair warfare tasks at the operational and tactical levels of warand how antiair warfare capabilities tie into the joint force architecture and operations.From this publication Marines of all ranks and military occupational specialties willunderstand how antiair warfare operations are conducted and how they impact onMAGTF operations. Further, they will comprehend their role in antiair warfareoperations and grasp the nature and contributions of antiair warfare to combined armsoperations.

This publication supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-50, AntiairWarfare, 22 June 1994.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

J. E. RHODESLieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding GeneralMarine Corps Combat Development Command

DISTRIBUTION: 143 000065 00

Chapter 1 Fundamentals

Antiair Warfare

Table of Contents

Page

Types of Antiair Warfare Operations 1-1Offensive Antiair Warfare 1..!.Air Defense 1-1

Principles 1-2Destruction-in-Depth 1-2Mutual Support 1-2Centralized Command and Decentralized Control 1-2

Theater Air Defense 1-3Active Air Defense 1-3Passive Air Defense 1-3

Attack Operations 1-3

Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 1-3Threat Levels

Low ThreatMedium ThreatHigh Threat

Capabilities

Chapter 2 Offensive Antiair Warfare

TasksPreemptive MeasuresSuppression of Enemy Air DefensesLocal Air Superiority Measures.Reactive Measures

PrinciplesLocationDestructionDeceptionIntimidationCombined Arms

Intelligence RequirementsTypes of OAAW Missions

Surface AttackFighter Sweep

1-3

1-41-41-41-4

2-12-12-32-32-32-42-42-42-42-52-52-52-52-62-62-62-7

III

EscortSuppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Chapter 3 Air Defense

MCWP 3-22

Electronic AttackTime Critical Target Attack

SurveillanceWeapons Employment

Airborne OAAW Target...Ground OAAW Target

Request ProceduresTasking

Preplanned, Scheduled Air MissionsPreplanned, On-Call Air MissionsImmediate Air Missions

Command and Control RequirementsAssessmentCapabilities

2-72-72-72-72-72-72-82-82-92-92-92-9

2-102-11

Active Air DefenseSurveillanceWeapons Control and CoordinationDestruction

Passive Air DefenseTactical WarningsReducing Enemy Targeting EffectivenessReducing VulnerabilityRecovery and Reconstitution

PrinciplesLocationDestructionReductionConfusion

Intelligence RequirementsActive Air Defense Applications

Area DefensePoint DefenseSelf-DefenseSupporting Missions

Weapons EmploymentWeapons ManagementRequest ProceduresTasking

Preplanned, Scheduled Air MissionsPreplanned, On-Call Air MissionsImmediate Air Missions

Command and Control RequirementsAssessmentCapabilities

Iv

3-1

3-23-33-33-33-43-43-43-53-53-53-53-53-53-63-63-63-63-63-63-63-63-73-73-73-73-73-83-83-9

Antiair Warfare

Chapter 4 Command and Control

Air Control 4-1Airspace Control Methods 4-1Positive Control 4-2Procedural Control 4-2Combined Control Methods 4-2

Airspace Control Measures 4-3Amphibious Objective Area 4-3Airspace Control Area and Sector 4-3Air Control Points 4-3Ingress, Egress, and Return to Force Control Procedures 4-3Joint Airspace Control Measures 4-4

Fire Support Coordinating Measures 4-4Permissive Fire Support Coordinating Measures 4-4Restrictive Fire Support Coordinating Measures 4-4

Air Defense Control Measures 4-4Air Defense Action Area 4-5Air Defense Area 4-5Air Defense Identification Zone 4-5Air Defense Operations Area 4-5Weapons Engagement Zone 4-5Fighter Engagement Zone 4-5Missile Engagement Zone 4-5Short-Range Air Defense Engagement Zone 4-5Joint Engagement Zone 4-6Base Defense Zone 4-6Vital Area 4-6Air Direction 4-6Emission Control 4-6Weapons Control and Coordination 4-6

Relationship Between Airspace Control and Air Defense 4-7Marine Air Command and Control System 4-7

Tactical Air Command Center 4-7Tactical Air Direction Center 4-8Sector AAW Coordinator 4-8Tactical Air Operations Center 4-9Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment 4-9Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion 4-10Direct Air Support Center 4-10Marine Wing Communications Squadron 4-10Air Coordinators and Air Controllers 4-10

Capabilities 4-10

V

MCWP 3-22

Chapter 5 Planning

Deliberate Planning 5-1Concurrent Planning 5-1Parallel Planning 5-1Detailed Planning 5-2

Planning Factors 5-2Planning Responsibilities 5-2

Higher Headquarters 5-2The MAGTF Commander 5-2The Aviation Combat Element Commander 5-3The Ground Combat Element Commander 5-3The Combat Service Support Element Commander 5-4

The ACE Battlestaff 5-4Future Plans 5-4Fiture Operations 5-5Current Operations 5-5Air Combat Intelligence 5-5

The Air Tasking Order 5-6

Chapter 6 Operations

MAGTF Antiair Employment 6-1The Marine Expeditionary Force 6-1The Marine Expeditionary Brigade 6-1The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) 6-2The Special Purpose MAGTF 6-2

Air Defense Priorities 6-2Criticality 6-2Vulnerability 6-2Recuperability 6-2Threat Characteristics 6-3

Air Defense Employment Principles 6-3Mobility 6-3Weapons Mass 6-3Weapons Mix 6-3Integration 6-3

Air Defense Employment Guidelines 6-3Balanced Fires 6-3Weighted Coverage 6-3Mutual Support 6-3Early Engagement 6-3Overlapping Fires 6-4Defense-in-Depth 6-4

Selecting and Positioning Air Defense Weapons 6-4Employment of Ground-Based Air Defense Weapons 6-4

vi

Antiair Warfare

Employment of Airborne Air Defense Weapons 6-5Altitude 6-5Search Patterns 6-5Speed 6-5Formation 6-5Commit Criteria 6-5Rules of Engagement 6-5Intercept Tactics 6-5Manning and Relieving 6-5Situational Awareness 6-5

Weapon Engagement Zone 6-5Weapons Management 6-6

Air Defense Warning Conditions 6-6Rules of Engagement 6-6Identification Criteria 6-6Weapons Control Status 6-7Tactical Air Command Center 6-7Sector Antiair Warfare Coordinator 6-8Tactical Air Operations Center 6-8Weapons Platforms 6-8

Amphibious Operations 6-8Pre-D-Day Operations 6-9D-Day Operations 6-9Post D-Day Operations 6-11

Military Operations Other Than War 6-13Counterdrug Operations 6.13Enforcing Exclusion Zones 6-13Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight 6-14Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 6-14Peace Operations 6-14Protection of Shipping 6-14Strikes and Raids 6-14Show of Force Operations 6-14

Operational Maneuver From The Sea 6-14

Chapter 7 Joint Air Defense Operations

The Joint Force Commander 7-IThe Area Air Defense Commander 7-1

The AADC as a Separate Functional Commander 7-2The AADC as a Combined Functional Component Commander 7-2

The Air Defense Plan 7-2The Regional and Sector Air Defense Commanders 7-2Notional Joint Air Defense Operations 7-3The MAGTF and Joint Air Defense Operations 7-4

vii

MCWP 3-22

Appendices

A Tactical Digital Information Links A-iB Air Defense Planning Checklist B-iC OAAW Planning Checklist C-iD Glossary D-iE References and Related Publications E- 1

viii

CHAPTER 1 FUNDAMENTALS

Antiair warfare is a U.S. Navy/U.S. Marine Corpsterm used to indicate that action required to destroy orreduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missilethreat. (Joint Pub {JP] 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionaiy of Militaiy and Associated Terms) Antiairwarfare (AAW) integrates all offensive and defensiveactions against enemy aircraft, surface-to-air weapons,and theater missiles into a singular, indivisible set ofoperations. AAW, along with assault support, offen-sive air support, air reconnaissance, electronic war-fare, and control of aircraft and missiles, is one of thesix functions of Marine aviation. AAW is sometimesincorrectly considered an exclusive responsibility ofthe Marine air-ground task force's (MAGTF ' s) avia-tion combat element (ACE). Each member of theMAGTF participates directly or indirectly.

AAW serves two purposes: force protection and airsuperiority. Force protection is those actions taken toguard friendly forces from attack or disruption byenemy forces. In AAW, it concerns those actionstaken to defend the MAGTF against enemy air andmissile attacks. Air superiority is that degree ofdominance in the air battle of one force over anotherwhich permits the conduct of operations by the formerand its related land, sea, and air forces at a given timeand place without prohibitive interference by theopposing force. (JP 1-02)

Force protection and air superiority arecomplementary goals of antiair warfare. They providethe MAGTF with defense against enemy air andmissile attacks and a reasonable level of confidence somaneuver can be conducted without interference fromthe enemy's air and missile capabilities.

Force protection and air superiority actions form acycle. A strong defense against enemy air attackachieves air superiority. Forces are reasonablyprotected from enemy air and missile attack. Whattruly separates force protection from air superiority ishow the outcome is achieved.

TYPES OF ANTIAIR WARFAREOPERATIONS

In Joint Vision 2010, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs ofStaff, highlights full-dimensional protection as one ofthe four new operational concepts for future joint

forces. With the aim of defending forces, Joint Vision2010 states that this concept will be proactive,incorporating both offensive and defensive actionsthat may extend well into areas of enemy operations.

Applying this concept to AAW, we see that the intentof AAW is to protect and defend the MAGTF and itsbattlespace from enemy air and missile attack and takethe fight to the enemy. AAW is an enabler for otherMAGTF ground, combat service support, and aviationoperations. The MAGTF conducts two types of antiairwarfare operations: offensive antiaii warfare and airdefense.

Offensive Antiair Warfare

Offensive antiair warfare (OAAW) is those operationsconducted against enemy air assets and air defensesystems before they can be launched or assume anattacking role. OAAW operations in or near theobjective area consist mainly of air attacks to destroyor neutralize hostile aircraft airfields, radars, airdefense systems, and supporting areas. Examples ofthe enemy's air and missile threat include aircraft,surface-to-air weapons, and theater missiles. Todestroy or neutralize the enemy's air and missilethreat, OAAW operations target enemy air capabilitiesand infrastructure, which include not only the weaponsthemselves, but launch platforms, airfields, air defensesystems, command and control nodes, and supportfacilities. As OAAW takes the fight to the enemy, italso takes the initiative to gain air superiority whileproviding robust force protection. See chapter 2.

Air Defense

Air defense operations include all defensive measuresdesigned to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or mis-siles in the Earth's envelope of atmosphere or to nulli-f'y or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. (JP 1-02)Air defense consists of active and passive measures toprotect our forces against attack from enemy aircraftand missiles.

Active air defense is direct defensive action taken todestroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostileair and missile threats against friendly forces andassets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defenseweapons, electronic warfare, and other availableweapons. (JP 1-02)

1-2 MCWP3-22

Passive air defense includes all measures, other thanactive air defense, taken to minimize the effectivenessof hostile air action. These measures includedeception, dispersion, and using protectiveconstruction and camouflage. See chapter 3.

PRINCIPLES

The conduct of AAW is based on destruction-in depth,mutual support, and centralized command anddecentralized control. The MAGTF must apply theseprinciples to achieve and preserve force protection andair superiority to accomplish its mission. While theseprinciples are most readily apparent to air defenseoperations, they apply equally to offensive antiairwarfare operations.

Destruction-in-Depth

Destruction-in-depth consists of threat detection anddestruction that begins as far from the vital area (adesignated area or installation to be defended by airdefense units) as possible and continues as long as thethreat exists. The enemy's ability to impede theMAGTF's freedom of operations determines thedegree of threat and the depth of destruction.

In air defense operations, the senior commander, e.g.,MAGTF, area air defense or joint force, achieves thefull impact of destruction-in-depth by integrating allavailable air defense resources within his zone, area ofoperations or area of responsibility. The seniorcommander has the option of dividing the air defensearea into sectors and assigning responsibilities foreach sector. He then positions assets so that enemyaircraft and missiles encounter an ever increasingvolume of fire (both horizontally and vertically) asthey approach the vital area, and, if aircraft survive, asthey egress.

In OAAW operations, destruction-in-depth mayinvolve an expanding effort to negate the enemy'sability to deny our aircraft freedom of action. OAAWoperations may progress concentrically from our areaof operations, concentrate on a particular zone or areaor focus along a particular axis into the battlespacecontrolled by the threat.

Mutual Support

Mutual support is support that units provide each otheragainst an enemy. The decision to provide mutualsupport is based on a unit's assigned tasks, its positionrelative to other units and to the enemy, and itsinherent capabilities. By employing mutual support,the MAGTF ensures continuous engagement,improves the survivability of AAW assets, decreasesthe chances of hostile aircraft or missiles penetratingthe vital area, and increases the chance of gaining andretaining air superiority.

Units achieve mutual support by integrating,employing, and positioning AAW assets to provideoverlapping detection coverage and engagementenvelopes. Proper integration, employment, andlocation of AAW assets ensures that several AAWunits have the same assigned target within their range.This integrated and overlapping pattern of mutualsupport and continuity of engagement reducesdegradation of the AAW system that can result fromthe loss of any AAW asset.

Centralized Command andDecentralized Control

The MAGTF commander has overall responsibilityfor MAGTF aviation operations. He delegates theauthority for control, coordination, planning, andsupervising MAGTF aviation operations to the ACEcommander. Centralized command of AAW promotescoordinated operations and economy of force and aidsin integrating all AAW assets into a cohesive AAWcapability. Decentralized control allows a shorterdecision cycle and enables decisionmaking at thelowest level possible. It minimizes friendly losses andpermits subordinate AAW units to react immediatelyto an air threat unless overruled by higher authority.The MAGTF's ability to function under centralizedcommand and decentralized control provides it withan integrated air defense system (lADS) that hasminimum reaction time, maximum damage resistance,and inherent self-sufficiency.

Although a higher authority may delegate specificauthority to subordinate commanders, the higherauthority still monitors AAW units' actions. Thehigher authority only makes direct target assignmentsto units for proper fire distribution, maximumefficiency of target engagement, and to preventengagement of friendly aircraft.

Antlair Warfare 1-3

The ACE commander determines the AAW tasks hemust personally supervise and then delegates authorityfor tasks that do not require his attention. Whenexercising centralized command, the ACE commanderdelegates authority for control of various Marineaviation functions to MACCS agencies. He normallydelegates the authority for AAW operations to hissector antiair warfare coordinator (SAAWC). Foreffective decentralized control, the ACE commanderrelies on his SAAWC and subordinate commanders'judgment and their ability to understand hiscommander's intent. See the MCWP 3-25 aviationseries for more information.

Attack Operations

Attack operations are offensive operations taken byair, land, sea, space or special operations forcesdesigned to destroy, disrupt or neutralize enemy airand missile threats and communications on the groundor as close to their originating source as possible.Attack operations also destroy, disrupt or neutralizethe enemy's logistics installations that support airoperations and reconnaissance, surveillance, and targetacquisition platforms. Theater air defense attackoperations correspond to offensive antiair warfare.

THEATER AIR DEFENSE

Theater air defense is the integrated employment ofthe joint force commander's forces to destroy orneutralize enemy offensive aircraft and theatermissiles to protect friendly forces or vital interests. Itincludes the process of theater missile defense(sometimes called theater air and missile defense).Theater air defense is a joint force responsibility,includes offensive and defensive aspects, integrates alljoint force air defense assets, and establishes a jointforce command structure for its operations. The fouroperational elements of theater air defense foliow.

Command, Control, Communications,Computers, and Intelligence

Command, control, communications, computers, andintelligence (C 4!) is an integrated system of doctrine,procedures, organizational structures, facilities,communications, computers, and supportingintelligence. It provides command authorities at alllevels with timely and accurate data on friendly andenemy theater air defense actions and the data andsystems to plan, direct, and control friendly theater airdefense operations. C41 includes aircraft and missilewarning sensors and ground stations. The MAGTFperforms these procedures through the MACCS.

Active Air Defense THREAT LEVELS

Active air defense operations protect against attack bydestroying air and missile threats or airborne launchplatforms in flight. These operations may include amulti-tiered defense-in-depth against enemy air andmissile threats. Air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations assets conduct active air defense. Active airdefense operations also include electronic warfareattack operations that disrupt the enemy's remote oron-board guidance systems.

Passive Air Defense

Passive air defense measures operations reduce thevulnerability and minimize the effects of damagecaused by enemy air and missile threats. Passive airdefense includes early warning; nuclear, biological,and chemical protection measures; counter-surveillance; deception; camouflage and concealment;hardening; electronic protection; mobility; dispersal;redundancy; recovery; and reconstitution.

The MAGTF orients on the enemy to determine itsstrengths and weaknesses. Evaluating enemy aircraftand the missile threat helps determine what is neededto achieve force protection and air superiority. Thisevaluation is expressed as threat levels.

Threat levels determine the extent of AAW requiredand may help determine how the MAGTF task-organizes. The threat levels low, medium, and high aregeneral with no clear separation between each level.Levels may overlap or change based on mission,enemy, terrain and weather, troops and supportavailable-time available (METT-T). For example,enemy air defense systems that pose a low or mediumthreat to one type of aircraft may pose a high threat toanother type of aircraft. Likewise, enemy aircraft thatpose a high threat to an air command and controlagency during daylight hours may be only a low threatto the same platoon during hours of darkness.

1-4 MCWP 3-22

Based on current intelligence, determining the threatlevel helps aircrews, surface-to-air weapons operators,and MACCS operators prepare tactics for a particularsituation and environment. Determining threat levelsserves as a point of departure for estimating enemycapabilities and should not be used as the singularmeasure of the degree of AAW means required. Thethreat is normally characterized as either sophisticatedor nonsophisticated, based on the—

• Type, quantity, and quality of individual weaponsand weapons systems.

• Command and control systems used to integrateweapons systems.

• Quality of the command.• Type, quantity, and quality of training.

• Ability to conduct coordinated and sophisticatedtactics (multiaxis, diversion, deception, integrationof electronic attack).

• Navigation and air-to-ground targeting capability.

Low Threat

A low threat level allows MAGTF operations toproceed without prohibitive interference. A low threatenvironment includes small arms and mediumantiaircraft weapons and limited optical acquisitionantiaircraft artillery with no integrated fire controlsystems.

Medium Threat

A medium threat level allows acceptable exposuretime of friendly aircraft to enemy air defenses oracceptable interference by enemy aircraft to MAGTFoperations. This threat level can restrict the MAGTFcommander's flexibility. A medium threatenvironment has—

• A limited radar or electro-optic acquisitioncapability that is not supported by a fully integratedfire control system.

• A fully integrated fire control system that isdegraded due to terrain, weather or other factors.

• Low-technology theater missile capabilities.

High Threat

A high threat level exists when the enemy has an airdefense system that includes integrated fire controlsystems and electronic warfare capabilities. This threatlevel severely affects the MAGTF's ability to conductoperations. A high threat environment has—

CAPABILITIES

The MAGTF has a variety of organic capabilities toconduct AAW operations including aircraft, ground-based air defense weapons, artillery, reconnaissanceforces, and air command and control facilities.MAGTF organic AAW capabilities include both lethaland non-lethal means.

Multiple role weapons platforms and equipment suitesprovide commanders with maximum flexibility. Forexample, MAGTF fixed-wing aircraft can performoffensive AAW and air defense missions. The F/A- 18can fire a variety of air-to-air missiles, employ highspeed antiradiation missiles, and drop ordnanceagainst OAAW targets. Air command and controlsuites can coordinate and control OAAW and active!passive defense measures.

The MAGTF's AAW resources are fully capable ofintegrating with, and in some cases, providingenabling functions for, joint and multinationaloperations against enemy aircraft and missile threats.

The MAGTF does not possess an organic capability todefend itself against tactical ballistic missiles. Plan-ners must identify those assets that require protectionand then work with the other Services' air defenseplanners to ensure that MAGTF assets are protected.

With this understanding of the function of AAW and areview of some general capabilities, philosophies, andfundamentals; we can now transition to detaileddiscussions of how the MAGTF conducts AAWoperations. It should be noted that MAGTF AAWoperations will rarely, if ever, be the singular sourcefor operations against the enemy's aircraft and missilethreat. It can be expected that all military operationswill be joint operations. MAGTF AAW activities willbe conducted to support the MAGTF's single battleconcept, but to also meet the needs and objectives ofthe joint force commander.

• Command and control systems.• Mobile or strategic surface-to-air missiles.• Early warning radars.• Electronic warfare systems.• Integrated air defense/fire control systems.• Interceptor aircraft.• Mid- to high-technology theater missile capabilities.

CHAPTER 2. OFFENSIVE ANTIAIR WARFARE

Offensive antiair warfare (OAAW) reduces orneutralizes the enemy's air and missile threat before itlaunches or assumes an attacking role. In time criticaltargets, it destroys their capability to conduct furtheroperations after the weapon is launched. OAAWattacks the enemy's abilities to attack friendlyresources with aircraft and missiles and to defenditself against attack by friendly aircraft and missiles.OAAW has two purposes: to gain air superiority andprotect friendly forces.

aviation resources. System components that may beattacked in are manned or unmanned aircraft, surface-to-air weapons, theater missiles, airfields, aircommand and control facilities or the enemy'saviation supporting infrastructure.

TASKS

OAAW is the Marine Corps equivalent of Jointdoctrine's offensive counterair (OCA). See JP 3-0 1,Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.OCA is offensive operations to destroy, disrupt orneutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms,and their supporting structures and systems bothbefore and after launch, but as close to their source aspossible. (JP 1-02)

OAAW operations are characterized byresponsiveness, bold actions, and initiative to gain adecisive advantage over the enemy. They focus on aparticular function of the enemy's combat potential—its air and missile forces. Because OAAW operationsstrive to destroy enemy air and missile resources asnear to their source as possible, OAA Wis the preferredmethod of conducting antiair warfare. OAAW allowsus to take the enemy on our terms and when and wherewe choose.

OAAW operations are not specific to the MAGTF'sACE. They are a responsibility of the entire MAGTFand impact on all MAGTF operations. The MAGTFconducts OAAW operations with a variety of organicresources (aircraft, electronic warfare, artillery,surveillance, and ground forces). The MAGTF canalso request joint force, theater, and national assets,e.g., the joint surveillance target attack radar system,satellites, special operating forces, army tacticalmissile system or aircraft.

• OAAW embodies the tenets of maneuver warfaredescribed in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication(MCDP) 1, WarfIghting. It uses maneuver, tempo, andsurprise to gain physical and psychological advantagesover the enemy. It seeks to shatter the cohesion of theenemy's systems through rapid, violent actions. InOAAW, the enemy's system may include any air-oriented weapon, command and control orinfrastructure system that poses a threat to MAGTF

OAAW operations include four tasks:

• Preemptive measures.• Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).• Local air superiority measures.• Reactive measures.

Preemptive Measures

Preemptive measures attempt to weaken the enemy'sair and missile threat before he can use air and missileforces and air defense systems against the MAGTF.They are usually conducted in the early phase of anoperation but can be a continuous process throughoutan operation. Examples of preemptive measures are—

• Air strikes against theater missile systems.• Attacks against enemy command and control

facilities and surveillance systems.• Air strikes against airfields to destroy or damage

aircraft.• Air-to-air sweeps.• Air strikes against enemy aircraft supply, support,

and infrastructure.

If successful, preemptive measures allow later aviationand ground operations to proceed without prohibitiveinterference from air and missile attacks. Preemptivemeasures are further categorized as major preemptivemeasures and continuous preemptive measures.

Major Preemptive MeasuresMajor.preemptive measures are conducted by the ACEand other MAGTF combat assets. They requiredetailed planning at the highest level, i.e., theMAGTF, and allocation of the maximum number ofavailable aircraft and other assets. Major preemptivemeasures require the ACE to plan combined strikes to

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destroy or degrade the enemy's integrated air defensesystem (lADS).

Major preemptive measures are conducted for a limit-ed time and usually during the following occasions:

• During prelanding operations.• If an influx of new enemy equipment prevents or

severely limits the use of friendly air assets.

.. If an enemy lADS border is reached by theMAGTF.

• If the MAGTF augments the indigenous forces of acountry fighting against a well-established enemylADS.

• If the MAGTF commander's intent is to degrade anenemy lADS.

When planning and conducting major preemptivemeasures, MAGTF commanders must weighcompeting considerations to determine the level ofeffort used to support the operation. During the initialstages of a conflict, the need to conduct majorpreemptive measures may lead the MAGTFcommander to designate the ACE as the MAGTF'smain effort. Some considerations include—

• All available assets.• Allocating the necessary support and air defense

aircraft to support the operation.

• Allocating only those aircraft necessary for theeffective defense of ground combat element (GCE)positions.

• Developing a support plan that identifies targetsthat must be destroyed.

• Giving suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD)support requests received from the ACE to the GCEa high priority.

• Having general support artillery forces support theplan, except fires such as counter fires or finalprotective fires.

• Developing a follow-up plan to exploit vulnerabili-ties and opportunities; e.g. ground attack, follow-onOAAW operations, massed close air support, anddestruction of resupply efforts.

Continuous Preemptive MeasuresContinuous preemptive measures constitute mostMAGTF OAAW operations. There are two types ofcontinuous preemptive measures: those short of thefire support coordination line (FSCL) and thosebeyond the FSCL.

Continuous preemptive measures short of the FSCLallow OAAW assets to conduct ongoing efforts to de-stroy the enemy lADS on the friendly side of theFSCL. Thus, continuous preemptive measures requiredetailed coordination between the ACE and the GCE.Continuous preemptive measures short of the FSCLreduce or eliminate the effects of the enemy lADS onother MAGTF operations that support the GCE; e.g.,offensive air support or assault support. Although theMAGTF commander can establish no-fly zones forany threat system that could deny airspace to a specifictype of aircraft, the ACE should plan and conduct con-tinuous preemptive measures short of the FSCLagainst as many elements of the enemy lADS as assetswill allow. Such attacks reduce future needs, saturatethe enemy lADS, force the enemy to expend addition-al ordnance, and use deception to confuse the enemy.

Continuous preemptive measures short of the FSCLcan also employ ground operations. Ground operationscan include attacks by infantry, artillery, armor orspecial operations force units to destroy essentialelements of the enemy lADS short of the FSCL.Ground units can capture or destroy elements of theenemy integrated air defense system, or they canprovide terminal control for OAAW air strikes againstelements of the enemy lADS. Again, detailedcoordination between the ACE and GCE is required.

The significant differences between the two strikes liein the level of intensity, number of assets assigned tothe mission, and degree of coordination with groundforces. Continuous preemptive measures beyond theFSCL do not require coordination with the GCE butdo require cOordination with the MAGTF and withinthe ACE.

Continuous preemptive measures beyond the FSCLcan also be executed using ground operations. Groundoperations can include raids or attacks byreconnaissance, long range artillery or other units todestroy essential elements of the enemy lADS beyondthe FSCL. Large teams can capture or destroy enemyaircraft and missile capabilities. Small teams canprovide terminal control for OAAW air strikes.Resupply, linkup time with friendly forces, andwithdrawal methods are primary considerations inemploying ground units and teams conducting theseoperations beyond the FSCL.

Continuous and decisive OAAW operations againstthe enemy lADS beyond the FSCL focus ondestroying the enemy's aircraft, long-range surface-to-air missiles, and early warning systems. This allows

Antiair Warfare 2-3

medium-altitude tactics, attacks from the rear, and (ata minimum) low-altitude tactics against an enemy thatno longer has early warning capability. Continuouspreemptive measures beyond the FSCL can damage ordestroy the enemy's aircraft and surface-to-surfacemissile assets and supporting infrastructure in such away that these resources cannot bring their power tobear against friendly assets or cannot sustain air andmissile attacks.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Suppression of enemy air defenses are activities whichneutralize, destroy or temporarily degrade surface-based enemy air defense by destructive and/ordisruptive means. (JP 1-02) SEAD operations allowfriendly aircraft to operate in airspace defended by anenemy lADS. As the most commonly implementedOAAW task, SEAD can support all aviationoperations, including OAAW's preemptive measures,local air superiority, and reactionary measures. Factorsthat determine if SEAD should be used include the—

• MAGTF's mission.

• Capabilities and complexity of the enemy lADS.Effectiveness of the enemy's lADS depends on thequality and quantity of the enemy's weapons mixand ability to integrate and support its elements.

• Capabilities and availability of friendly weaponssystems.

• Ability of friendly aircrews to invade enemy airdefenses.

The ACE plans SEAD missions but the ACE and theGCE should execute SEAD together. SEAD may beapplied only at critical times that will allow theMAGTF to proceed without prohibitive interferencefrom the enemy air defense system. SEAD is designedto suppress, disrupt, neutralize, destroy or temporarilydegrade enemy air defenses in a specific area.Destruction may involve an inordinate number ofassets while suppression may be more efficient. On theother hand, the MAGTF may choose to destroy enemyassets rather than neutralize or degrade them for eachair mission. Initially, suppression, disruption,neutralization and degradation may be more cost-effective, but over the duration, a concentratedpreemptive effort by the ACE to destroy enemy airdefense assets may save the MAGTF significant time,effort, and ordnance.

SEAD is accomplished by destructive and/ordisruptive means and attacks using lethal and

• nonlethal means. These means, alone or combined,include aircraft, direct and indirect fire weapons,ground forces, and command and control warfare(both deception and electronic warfare). SEADsupports specific aviation operations and can beconducted with preemptive measures. OAAWplanning should address situations where SEADemployment is anticipated. SEAD can be employed indirect confrontation of the enemy's air defense withground forces, air forces, naval forces, and instancesinvolving command and control warfare.

SEAD can be conducted short of and beyond theFSCL and requires coordination with ground forces.An example of SEAD short of the FSCL is artilleryfires supporting a close air support mission. SEADbeyond the FSCL does not require coordination withground forces, but does require coordination with theMAGTF and within the ACE. An example of SEADbeyond the FSCL is antiradiation missile attacks insupport of an air interdiction mission.

See MCWP 3-22.2, Suppression of Enemy AirDefenses and JP 3-01.4, Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Joint Suppression of Enemy AirDefenses (J-SEAD), for more information.

Local Air Superiority Measures

Residual enemy air and surface-to-air weapons threatscan exist after preemptive measures and SEAD. Localair superiority measures prevent any residual enemyair threat from prohibitively interfering with MAGTFoperations in a specific zone of action. Local airsuperiority measures can include offensive combat airpatrols (CAPs) and sweeps, escort and self-escorttactics or aircraft countermeasures and maneuvers. Alllevels of the ACE can plan and execute local airsuperiority measures.

Reactive Measures

Reactive measures are the use of offensive firepowerin response to an immediate threat. Typically, reactivemeasures are used against time critical targets, such asattacks against a theater missile transporter-erectorlauncher following a missile launch or a pop-upsurface-to-air missile system. Targets attacked byreactive measures will likely be extremely mobile.Because time is essential when attacking these targets,planners must—

2-4 MCWP 3-22

• Minimize response time and heighten their abilityto attack by including antiradiation missiles as partof the standard loadout on capable aircraft.

• Use electronic warfare support to identif'meteorological or tracking radars which mayindicate an impending launch or attack.Divert aircraft to attack the target.Establish preplanned, on-call aircraft to attack timecritical targets.

In the case of the latter two instances, commander'sintent translated through target priorities andapportionment decisions, will be the determiningfactor as to available resources. Reactive measures arethe least preferred method of conducting OAAW, butthey are often the only available option.

transporter-erector launchers pose unique challengesto OAAW location techniques. A thoroughintelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) isnecessary for locating these lucrative OAAW targets.IPB should focus on systems' engagement envelopes,comparing the engagement envelopes and systemcapabilities with the assets they protect, and availableterrain that can be used to maximize or mask theirengagement potential. Theater missiles provide theenemy with the potential to employ weapons of massdestruction against the rear area. The high mobility ofthe theater missile transporter-erector launcher allowsthe enemy to shoot and move to hide sites extremelyquickly. For these threats, IPB should identifypotential launch sites, hiding sites, and supportinginfrastructure to expedite targeting. Additionalconsiderations for OAAW intelligence requirementsare discussed on page 2-5.

PRINCIPLES Destruction

The MAGTF conducts OAAW operations using theprinciples of location, destruction, deception,intimidation, and combined arms.

Location

Location uses surveillance, reconnaissance, andintelligence resources (including detection,identification, and evaluation) to locate high priorityOAAW targets. Information from these resourcescomplements and supplements each other, and is usedto pinpoint high priority targets quickly for scheduledor immediate OAAW missions. An example of usingan innovative means of locating enemy resources is byemploying the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). TheUAV is rapidly becoming the surveillance, recon-naissance and intelligence gathering platform ofchoice due to it's inherent low probability of detection,extended loitering time, and low attrition rate. It isespecially useful in gathering targeting informationbefore OAAW strike missions.

The ACE and the MAGTF should develop plans thatemphasize the aggressive employment of all availableair and ground sources to pinpoint highly lethal andmobile enemy systems accurately and quickly. Theseplans should also address the timely collection anddissemination of combat information on the locationof OAAW targets.

Mobile air defense systems; e.g., antiaircraft artilleryor surface-to-air missiles and theater missile

Destruction eliminates the enemy's aircraft andmissile threat at its source, preferably before it canlaunch or attack. Destruction is often preferred toneutralizing enemy air defenses or SEAD because itconserves and preserves MAGTF resources. Ifpreemptive measures destroy OAAW targets early inthe operation, the target can no longer threatenfriendly aircraft or forces. If the enemy knows theMAGTF can destroy his aircraft, theater missiles, andair defense assets at their source before they launch orattack, he may be intimidated into spreading his assetsthroughout the battlespace to protect them. He thenloses the ability to rapidly mass forces and tocapitalize on mutual support and massing of fires toprotect his assets.

Deception

Deception occurs when the enemy is misled by themanipulation, distortion or falsification ofinformation. Effective deception diverts enemyattention away from OAAW assets and their intendedtargets. Deception denies the enemy the ability to masshis forces against OAAW assets because he isuncertain when, where, and how the OAAW strikewill occur.' Deception confuses the enemy, saturateshis air defense systems with conflicting or erroneousinformation, and makes him react in a way that is notin his best interest. For example, deception can causethe enemy to expend ordnance that will assist us inlocating the enemy's weapon system; i.e., backblast,or radiate surveillance, target acquisition, and fire

S

S

Antiair Warfare 2-5

control radars, thus pinpointing them for attack. Seechapter 5 for more information.

Intimidation

Intimidation uses fear to coerce the enemy into ordeter him from action. Effective intimidation tacticscan cause the enemy to position his systems and assetsless aggressively, make him reluctant to employ hisassets, or force him to adopt complex emission controlplans. Intimidation tactics can include aggressivereconnaissance, surveillance, and location; quick,destructive reactions; -and effective deception. Theenemy's reluctance to employ his air defense systemsallows friendly aircrews to use optimum tacticswithout undue restriction.

Combined Arms

Combined arms integrates firepower and mobility toproduce a desired effect on the enemy. The effects ofcombined arms (integration) will place the enemy in adilemma by attacking with more than one combatcapability of the MAGTF.In defending againstcombined arms operations, the enemy will attempt tocounter one combat arm, which will leave himvulnerable to attack by another combat arm.Combined arms effects can be achieved by lethalmethods, nonlethal methods or a combination of both.Examples of combined arms in OAAW are artilleryand aircraft, jamming and air attack, andground attackand air attack.

Combined arms tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTP) can enhance the effectiveness of the MAGTF'scombat arms attacks against the enemy and thereforereduce or nullify his ability to conduct aviation-relatedoperations. Examples of combined arms in OAAWinclude artillery fire to suppress antiaircraft defenseswhile attack aircraft deliver ordnance to destroy theOAAW target or electronic attack to suppress theenemy's ability to detect OAAW aircraft while otheraircraft employ antiradiation missiles against thetarget. In the first example, if the enemy fails to movethe system to avoid engagement by artillery, heremains vulnerable to both artillery and aircraft attack.If the enemy moves the antiaircraft system to avoid theartillery attack, he sacrifices established cover,concealment, and the ability to employ weaponsagainst the attacking aircraft, making him highly

vulnerable to attack from the aircraft. In the secondexample, if the enemy attempts to power through thejamming, he provides a stronger signal for theantiradiation missile. If he continues to radiate in anattempt to acquire targets, he remains vulnerable toelectronic attack.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

The complexity of OAAW operations requires dedicat-ed intelligence support, including organic MAGTF in-telligence assets and nonorganic (joint, theater, andnational-level) intelligence assets. Commanders deter-mine and articulate their intelligence requirements. Asa starting point, a commander's OAAW intelligencerequirements should include a description of enemy airand missile and air defense threats, their location andstatus, reaction time for warning and direction; targetintelligence; and follow-up battle damage assessments.

Typically, as IPB is performed and the enemy order ofbattle becomes clearer, intelligence requirementschange. Once intelligence/data is received, it mustbeconverted into a usable format that contains relevantdata and disseminated to OAAW planners in a timelymanner.

The MAGTF staff coordinates the ACE's intelligencerequirements for all air-related elements of an OAAWmission. The MAGTF staff also coordinates theexecution of SEAD operations for the GCE and ACE.To stay current with OAAW operations, GCE andACE commanders should stay appraised of threatchanges, anticipate new intelligence requirements forfuture operational phases, and effectively articulatethose requirements to their intelligence personnel.

TYPES OF OAAW MISSIONS

OAAW missions will likely be preplanned, scheduledmissions but can be preplanned, on-call or immediatemissions depending on the tactical situation. OAAWmissions are surface attacks, fighter sweeps, SEADs,electronic attacks, escorts, and time critical targetattacks. See figure 2-1.

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I

Suppression ofEnemy Air Defenses

Figure 2-1. Six Type of OAAW Missions.

Surface Attack

Surface attacks destroy or disrupt the enemy's air andmissile threats by engaging the enemy's forces andsupport structure before his combat potential can bebrought to bear. Examples include missions againstairfields, surface-to-air missile sites, theater missilelaunchers' hiding sites, and aviation supply depots!points. The goal of surface attacks is to destroy theenemy's aircraft and missile capabilities while theweapons are still on the ground and to prevent themfrom launching. Likewise, attacks against the enemy'ssupport infrastructure can deny his capability torebuild, repair or sustain further air and missileattacks. Surface attacks are typically conducted in theMAGTF's deep operations area but can be conductedin the close operations area if necessary. Aircraft arenormally the MAGTF resource to conduct surfaceattacks. But, depending on the location of the targetand available assets, surface attacks may be conductedby other MAGTF or joint force resources such asartillery, land attack missiles or ground forces.

Fighter Sweep

Sweep missions are purely offensive missions used togain air superiority by seeking out and destroyingenemy airborne aircraft or other targets of opportunityin a specific area. Sweeps are often used to clearingress and egress paths to and from a target of enemydefensive aircraft and surface-to-air missile threats.Sweeps can be conducted independently or in supportof a strike package (jre-strike sweep), the latter beingconducted before strike execution. Depending on theimportance of the target and the amount of riskacceptable by the commander, the success or failure ofthe sweep can be used as go!no go criteria for thestrike package.

Escort

Escort missions support a specific mission over ornear enemy territory. Escorts may be assigned to highvalue airborne assets such as electronic warfareaircraft, airborne command and control platforms,tankers, airlift or strike packages. In strike packages,

FighterSweep

SurfaceAttack

EscortElectronic

Attack

Antiair Warfare 2-7

escorts may either precede or accompany the package.Escorts can be either attached or detached whereescort aircraft fly as part of the formation whenattached and separate when detached. In either case,the escorts' primary function is to defend the strikeaircraft against attack by enemy aircraft and missiles.The escort's mission is principally defensive, but itcan assume an offensive role if sufficient earlywarning is received to proactively attack a target or iftargets of opportunity that pose a potential threat to thesupported event should arise.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SEAD missions typically support OAAW strikepackages and close air support missions and can beexecuted by a variety of lethal and nonlethal resources.SEAD missions can be conducted as preplanned,scheduled; preplanned, on-call; or immediatemissions.

Electronic Attack

missile has been launched. Attacking theater missilesbefore they launch and attacking their supportinginfrastructure is the preferred method of conductingtheater missile attack operations.

SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance plays a key role in OAAW operations.Information from surveillance can locate and identifyOAAW targets and estimate enemy intentions. Activesurveillance includes the use of airborne or groundresources to actively search for OAAW targets. Activesurveillance resources include radars, unmanned aerialvehicles, reconnaissance aircraft or ground forces.Passive surveillance uses emissions in theelectromagnetic or infrared spectrums to locate andcategorize OAAW threats. Passive surveillance assetsinclude electronic warfare aircraft or ground stationsand satellites.

Electronic attack includes actions taken to prevent orreduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagneticspectrum, such as jamming and electromagneticdeception, and employment of weapons that use eitherelectromagnetic or directed energy as their primarydestructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequencyweapons, particle beams). (JP 1-02) Electronic attackis that division of electronic warfare involving the useof electromagnetic, directed energy or antiradiationweapons to attack personnel, facilities or equipmentwith the intent of degrading, neutralizing or destroyingenemy combat capability. Electronic attack can beused to deceive, disrupt, degrade or suppress anenemy's air surveillance capabilities, thus denying theenemy the ability to acquire and engage targets.

Time Critical Target Attack

Attacks against time critical targets are principallyreactive. They occur as a result of an unanticipatedthreat presenting itself, and because of the nature ofthe threat, present a fleeting opportunity forengagement. Examples of time critical targets includemobile surface-to-air missile sites and theater missilelaunchers. Theater missile attack operations are usedto prevent the launch of theater missiles by attackingeach element of the overall system, denying ordisrupting employment of additional theater missiles(JP 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater MissileDefense). Theater missile attack operations alsodestroy theater missile launch platforms after the

WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

Weapons employment for OAAW operations is basedon the enemy threat and target and the capabilities,limitations, and requirements of each OAAW system.Effective countermeasures, such as sweeps, air strikes,SEAD, self-protection, and deception used against theenemy threat increase OAAW operations effective-ness. Normally, employment of any resource in sup-port of OAAW is based on the mission and the target.

Airborne OAAW Target

Normally, OAAW operations employed againstairborne targets consist of sweeps. Support for sweepscan include ground- or airborne-controlledinterception/early warning systems, electronic warfareassets, and tankers. Sweeps can be employed as part ofa support element for a coordinated OAAW strikeagainst a ground target.

Ground OAAW Target

OAAW operations employed against ground targetsusually consist of aircraft organized into a strikeelement, a support element, and a command andcontrol element.

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The strike element delivers the decisive effect on thesurface OAAW target. Its purpose is to destroy orneutralize the target before enemy air and air defenseassets can launch or assume an attacking role againstthe MAGTF. The target and desired weapons effectsdictate the type, number, and weapons load of thestrike element.

The support element provides support to the strike ele-ment. It is tailored to each specific mission. The sup-port element can include electronic warfare aircraft,sweeps, close escort/self-escort aircraft, UAVs, SEADaircraft, and tankers. The enemy air and ground threatdetermines the number of electronic warfare plat-forms, CAPs, UAVs, and suppression aircraft. Tank-ers are apportioned as necessary. The support elementuses military deception to confuse the enemy air andground threat and to mask OAAW objectives.

Command and control is critical to successfulintegration, coordination, and direction of the strikeand support elements. The command and controlelement is tailored to each specific OAAW mission. Italso aids rapid assessment and evaluation of missioneffectiveness. The command and control element caninclude airborne or ground-based platforms. AnOAAW coordinator and OAAW manager can be usedto coordinate OAAW missions and integrate themwith other AAW operations.

REQUEST PROCEDURES

submitted by MAGTF units and agencies in responseto unanticipated situations are immediate requests. Apreplanned request can be scheduled to be conductedat a specific time, against a specific target, etc. or on-call, preloaded for a particular target type/target areaand placed in a ground or airborne alert status. As pre-planned requests are processed, fire support coordina-tion centers, the MAGTF force fires coordinationcenter, and intelligence sections update threat data andassignment of assets to counter each threat.

Requests for preplanned, scheduled OAAW warfaremissions identify the target, target areas or landingzone and the known or suspected enemy air defensethat may impact mission accomplishment. Requestsshould also contain the MAGTF and or GCE assetsassigned to counter the threat and coordinationinformation for artillery-provided SEAD missions.Coordination information for any MAGTF or GCEfurnished electronic warfare and intelligence assetsshould also be included.

Occasionally, the ACE requests support from theMAGTF or GCE if they have assets that cancontribute to the OAAW effort. ACE-GCEcoordination for SEAD and electronic warfarerequests can occur via the tactical air command center(TACC), direct air support center (DASC) or the GCEfire support coordination center (FSCC) interface. Ifthe GCE cannot provide support to the ACE becauseof higher priorities or limited assets, the request isforwarded by the ACE and or GCE to the MAGTFcommander for resolution.

Based on input from the GCE, ACE, and combatservice support element (CSSE) commanders, theMAGTF commander establishes request proceduresfor OAAW assets.These procedures are based onOAAW priorities and objectives. Requests for OAAWsupport are based on the MAGTF's main effort,enemy air force and air defense threat, and targetinginformation.The ACE, GCE, and CSSE submitrequests for OAAW support, including nonorganicassets, to the MAGTF commander.The ACEcommander continuously coordinates OAAW requestswith the MAGTF, GCE, and CSSE commanders,including procedures for handling targets ofopportunity, electronic warfare, and SEAD.

Requests for OAAW missions can be preplanned orimmediate. If MAGTF OAAW requirements are sub-mitted according to a plan, i.e., in advance of an opera-tion, they are preplanned. OAAW requirements

TASKING

After priorities, objectives, and requirements areestablished, the ACE commander and his staff plan theemployment of aviation assets to support neededOAAW operations. Tasking must address the needs ofsupporting assets, including electronic warfare, tanker,and airborne early warning and control aircraft.Planners should coordinate tasking to ensure effectiveuse of air and ground assets to achieve the desiredOAAW results. Tasking coordination must includeMAGTF and GCE assets that may be required tosupport OAAW operations, such as reconnaissanceunits, radio battalion, and artillery. The ACEcommander tasks ground-based ACE assets throughthe ACE operations order and specific aircraft assetsthrough the ATO.

Antiair Warfare 2-9

Aircraft missions in support of OAAW operations aretasked as either preplanned, scheduled'; preplanned,on-call; or immediate. Preplanned missions areperformed according to a program planned in advanceof operations and based on MAGTF requirements orrequests. Preplanned missions normally permitdetailed coordination.

Preplanned, Scheduled Air Missions

Preplanned, scheduled air missions allow detailedcoordination and economical use of aircraft andordnance. The ACE schedules these air missions basedon the MAGTF's OAAW needs. Missions must meetMAGTF priorities, objectives, and requirements basedon the known or suspected enemy air and air defensethreat. The ACE uses preplanned, scheduled airmissions to task aircraft to attack known enemyOAAW targets during preemptive measures andSEAD. Support assets, including fighters, tankers orelectronic warfare should be tasked. The TACCdetermines if additional SEAD support is required. Ifthe TACC cannot provide the required assets, itrequests the OCE provide SEAD support.

Preplanned, On-Call Air Missions

The ACE schedules preplanned, on-call air missions toaugment preplanned, scheduled air missions. Thesemissions focus on periods of anticipated increases inthe enemy air threat to the MAGTF. Preplanned, on-call air missions have the appropriate air-to-air andair-to-ground ordnance loaded and assume a ground(strip) or airborne alert status.

Using ground-alert aircraft for preplanned, on-call airmissions has several advantages. The TACC or itsdesignated agency, i.e., the tactical air operationscenter (TAOC) or DASC has a higher degree ofcontrol over assets. Onstation time for the aircraft ismaximized for action and mission support. Aircrewscan obtain exact target coordinates and brief tacticsand routing before they launch. The TACC can ensurethat prerequisites for mission support are available.

Using airborne alert aircraft for preplanned, on-callmissions also has several advantages. Airborne, on-call missions provide minimal reaction time torespond to a threat. Battlespace situational awarenesscan be gained from observation or from threatinformation passed by voice or data link to the aircraftfrom the TAOC. Disadvantages of airborne alertaircraft are—

• Reduced control by the TACC.• Aircrews may obtain coordinates and routing before

launch.

• Aircrews may have to brief tactics airborne whilecoordinating with other aircraft and controlagencies.

• An inability to ensure that the appropriate supportprerequisites are met.

• A limited time on station.

Immediate Air Missions

Immediate air missions may be required if high tempooperations are conducted and if enemy capabilities areunderestimated, in response to a pop-up threat or inreaction to a time critical target. Aircraft can bediverted to an immediate air mission at any time. Asalways, the decision to divert aircraft must be madewith respect to the MAGTF commander's intent andtarget priorities. Requests for immediate air missionsrequire the immediate assessment of enemy airdefenses and the establishment of SEAD supportrequirements. To speed the tasking of.aircraft, theACE predetermines and publishes SEAD supportrequirements, such as on-call SEAD packages.Identifying SEAD targets and assigning firing unitsshould occur at the lowest possible fire support.coordinator's level within the (iCE. It is preferred thatan aircrew be briefed prior to launch, but this mayincrease reaction time. If limited assets preclude theassignment of preplanned missions to cover a possiblethreat, then possible secondary missions are assignedto an aircrew. This provides advance notice andflexibility to an aircrew and the Marine air commandand control system (MACCS), and permits theoptimum use of assets for a particular mission.

COMMAND AND CONTROLREQUIREMENTS

After the airspace control plan and airspace controlorder are promulgated and the ATO and specialinstructions (SPINS) issued, the MACCS coordinatesthe execution, employment, and assessment of OAAWmissions. Command and control ties individualmissions into a cohesive operation by providingground-controlled interception, target assignment,surveillance, and coordination for air and groundassets conducting OAAW.

MACCS agencies use positive and procedural aircontrol methods to command and control OAAWoperations. The senior agency afloat or ashore hasoverall command responsibility. The ACE commander

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has centralized command and decentralized controlauthority of MAGTF OAAW assets. If tasked by theACE commander, the Marine SAAWC can exercisecontrol of these assets. OAAW coordinators andmanagers positions can also coordinate OAAW op-erations. Nonorganic assets, such as airborne warningand control system or airborne early warning andcontrol aircraft, can enhance or augment commandand control of MAGTF OAAW. See figure 2-2.

in part, such as local air superiority to enable a strikepackage to conduct its mission, which when puttogether meets the commander's overall objectives.Efficient use of resources does not automaticallyconstitute effectiveness. Efficient use of OAAW assetsmay have conserved assets for use elsewhere. Theultimate determination of whether those assets wereused effectively must be weighed as to attainment ofthe desired result.

ASSESSM ENT

Assessing the effectiveness in OAAW operations canbe determined if the commander's desired objectivehas been reached. At the operational level of war, thecommander's objective may be attaining airsuperiority. At the tactical level, effectiveness inreaching the commander's goal will likely be achieved

Tangible evidence of effectiveness can be determinedby several methods including personal reports (such aspilot reports or reports from forward observers orforward air controllers) and battle damageassessments. Personal reports can provide immediatefeedback on the observed effect on a target, but areoften subject to the individual's perspective and thefog of war. Battle damage assessments can measurethe effectiveness of ordnance delivered on a target.These methods may include personal observation or

Figure 2-2. MAGTF Command and Control for OAAW.

_____________

Control ConnectivityCoordinationIf OAAW NC Mission is in DASCs Assigned AreaIf TACC Retains Control of OAAW A/C Missions

Antiair Warfare 2-11

multisensor imagery from reconnaissance platformssuch as satellites and UAVs. Battle damageassessments can provide ample data to determine theeffectiveness of an attack, but may be subject to theinterpretation of the individual analyzing the data.

Intangible evidence can also assess the effectivenessof OAAW operations, including reports fromelectronic warfare aircraft and lack of observedaviation, ground-based air defense,or theater missileactivity. Intangible methods of measurements,although an important part of building the overalleffectiveness picture, can be misleading. Lack ofelectronic emissions from a surface-to-air missile sitedoes not necessarily mean the site was destroyed orneutralized, only that the site is no longer transmitting.Lack of aircraft activity can also be translated intopreparation for a forthcoming air attack.

Assessing the effectiveness of OAAW operations willultimately paint a picture for the MAGTF commander.Based on this assessment, the commander may decidethat the OAAW objectives achieved or that additionalOAAW sorties must be dedicated toward thecampaign.

CAPABILITIES

Many of the MAGTF's capabilities depend on its taskorganization.

The MAGTF has a variety of organic resources toconduct OAAW missions, including aircraft, groundforces, artillery, and electronic warfare platforms.These resources can be combined to place the targetedenemy capability in a dilemma.

From dispersed locations, MAGTF aircraft canquickly respond and mass (if necessary) to supportOAAW requirements. Aircraft response capabilitiesallow the MAGTF commander to bring overwhelmingfirepower to bear on attacking enemy aircraft ormobile air defense systems.

The variety of weapons and the type of command andcontrol used in OAAW operations enhance theMAGTF's flexibility in target assignment, weaponsengagement, and weapons control.

MAGTF aircraft can operate from forward operatingbases, aircraft carriers, and amphibious ships to extendtheir effective radius of action. Establishing forwardarming and refueling points can further assist thiscapability.

Successful employment of OAAW to protect theMAGTF has a tremendous impact on the morale of en-emy and friendly troops. The presence of friendly air-craft and the absence of enemy aircraft increase theconfidence of ground-based forces and facilitate rapidaccomplishment of the MAGTF's mission. The pres-ence of friendly aircraft can decrease the enemy's mo-rale, restrict his actions, restrict'eliminate his ability toconduct aviation operations, and restrict his ability toapply combat power. For the enemy, losing control ofthe air can be a significant factor in his defeat.

CHAPTER 3. AIR DEFENSE

J\. ir defense operations include all defensivemeasures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraftor missiles in the Earth's envelope of atmosphere, orto nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack.Air defense operations provide the basis for forceprotection against attacks by enemy aircraft andmissiles. However, air defense operations cannot beviewed as purely defensive. Integrating air defenseshelps maintain local air superiority, allowing friendlyforces freedom of action unconfmed by attacks by theenemy's air and missile forces.

Defensive counterair (DCA) is the equivalent jointdoctrine for Marine Corps air defense operations andis covered in JP 3-01. DCA is all defensive measuresdesigned to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy ornegate enemy forces attempting to attack or penetratethe friendly air environment. Examples of DCAmissions are area defense, point defense, and highvalue airborne asset (HVAA) combat air patrol (CAP).

Air defense is principally reactive. Employment of airdefense fires depends on actions by enemy aircraft andmissiles. MAGTF air defense operations use the threeprinciples of antiair warfare—destruction-in-depth,mutual support, and centralized command anddecentralized control—to provide a responsive,integrated air defense capability to protect vitalMAGTF assets.

Air defense includes active and passive measures. TheMAGTF's ACE is responsible for the coordination,control, and execution of air defense operations andprovides the preponderance of active air defenseresources. However, each MAGTF elementcontributes to the overall air defense effort throughtheir organic weapons and employment of passive airdefense measures.

The MAGTF uses a variety of assets to conduct airdefense operations, ranging from fighter aircraft andsurface-to-air weapons to air command and controlagency radars. However, due to the limited number ofMAGTF assets available for air defense operationsand the wide range of threats, air defense operationsare more effectively conducted during joint operationswhen significantly more assets are available. TheMAGTF integrates its capabilities into the theater airdefense network, and when necessary, requestsadditional air defense assets from the joint forcecommander to augment its own capabilities.

Effective air defense combines and synchronizes theactions of all available air defense assets to form anintegrated air defense system (lADS). Although theMAGTF does not have a medium-range, medium-altitude radar SAM, it can field an organic lADS of aircommand and control facilities, aircraft, and shortrange air defense (SHORAD) surface-to-air weapons,and project that capability ashore. The true integrationof air defense is through the Marine air command andcontrol system (MACCS). The MACCS—

• Synchronizes, coordinates, and controls MAGTF,other Service, and multinational air defense actionswithin a designated sector or area.

• Interfaces and shares air defense information withjoint and multinational partners.

• Coordinates joint air defense operations within asector or region.

• Acts as an enabler to coordinate air defenseoperations for a joint force within a theater or jointoperations area (under the supervision of the jointforce commander or his designated agent).

The MACCS facilitates joint/multinational air defenseoperations and participates as a contributor to the jointforce's overall area air defense plan.

MAGTF air defense assets are employed based on theintelligence estimate of the threat, air defensepriorities, AAW and air defense principles, and airdefense employment principles and guidelines.Aircraft, surface-to-air weapons, and command andcontrol agencies that make up the MAGTF's lADS,and their supporting intelligence, electronic warfare,and communications support are employed based onthe enemy air threat to the MAGTF's vital areas. Vitalareas can be areas where there are sources of strength—centers of gravity—that need to be protected fromair and missile attack or they can be a vulnerabilitythat needs additional defense to prevent them frombecoming a critical vulnerability.

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE

Active air defense uses available aircraft, air defenseweapons, and electronic warfare to achieve its goal. Itcan also employ weapons that are not typically used inan air defense role. Active air defense tasks are

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surveillance, weapons control and coordination, anddestruction.

Surveillance

Surveillance activities detect, identif', and evaluate allair tracks to provide an accurate, recognizable air pic-ture. A recognizable air picture created through inte-gration and dissemination of surveillance data allowscommanders to prioritize target engagements to assignair defense assets. Effective surveillance enables effi-cient weapons control, coordination, and employment.

The tactical air operations center (TAOC) uses its long-range radars and digital information link capabilities tocoordinate the MAGTF's surveillance operations. TheTAOC 's surveillance section detects, identifies, andevaluates air targets within its assigned sector. The tac-tical air command center (TACC) (or tactical air direc-tion center, if applicable) typically reports surveillancedata to agencies outside the MAGTF.

Terrain masking and the inherent limitations ofground-based radars to detect low-altitude aircraftrequire the TAOC's surveillance capability besupplemented. If available, airborne early warning andcontrol platforms and nonorganic systems cansupplement the TAOC and reduce or eliminate theselimitations. Other surveillance means, includingsurface-to-air weapon systems' radars and aircraftradars, must be integrated to provide the best airpicture possible.

Employment of the TAOC and airborne early warningand control systems does not guarantee that all aircraftand missiles will be detected. Visual detection capabil-ities provided by Stinger units, CAPs, other aircraft,and ground troops must be integrated on a near-real-time basis to round out the surveillance capability.

Regardless of the detection means, the target detectionreporting process must be timely to enable targetengagement. A common reference system speeds thesurveillance process. When a common referencesystem is not practical, a single reference point forreporting is paramount.

All AAW assets must have access to surveillanceinformation. The ability to inform the MAGTF ofthreat detection and potential encroachment is criticalfor force protection and engagement. Surveillanceinformation must be streamlined and rapidly passed toinitiate the appropriate response to the threat. Theability to cross-tell information from visual or manual

systems to automated agencies and vice versa must beestablished.

A redundant communications system allowsdissemination of surveillance information within theMAGTF. The communications system allowsweapons in the same vicinity to exchange detectiondata at the lowest level possible. This affords the bestreaction time without disrupting the continuousinformation flow to the TAOC, combat operationscenter, and other key information nodes. Thecommunications system must allow rapid reporting ofvisual sightings to the TAOC under any conditions atany time. The TAOC broadcasts threat information torequired MAGTF units, who in turn further monitorand disseminate the information, and take action asnecessary. The surveillance process consists ofdetection, identification, and evaluation.

DetectionDetection locates air tracks in and around the airdefense sector. Radar, weapon systems, visual meansor intelligence sources perform detection. Detectionmust occur quickly at maximum range to optimizereaction time for identification, weapon selection, andemployment.

IdentificationRapid and positive identification of all air tracks inand around the air defense sector is essential for aneffective lADS. Positive identification protectsfriendly aircraft from fratricide and allows earlyidentification, long range identification, anddestruction of enemy aircraft as far from the vital areaas possible. Identification requires a combination ofelectronic, visual, and intelligence means to beeffective. Decentralized control can streamlineidentification by delegating responsibility to aweapons system operator if organic surveillancemeans cannot provide timely identification ofunknown air tracks. Identification can also bestreamlined by using preplanned procedures andimplementing the least restrictive rules of engagement(ROE) possible.

Once the MAGTF surveillance system detects anaircraft, the system uses a process of elimination,known as an identification matrix, to identify theaircraft as either friendly or hostile. Ideally, friendlyaircraft operating in the MAGTF's sector ofresponsibility are under the control of a MACCSagency and are updated as friendly. This should aid indifferentiating them from hostile aircraft. However,

Antiair Warfare 3-3

the mission, flight profile or number of friendlyaircraft may make it difficult to maintain positive,continuous contact with all friendly aircraft in thecontrolled airspace. This difficulty is complicated bythe limited low-altitude tracking capability of ground-based radar systems and the saturation of thesurveillance system's identification capabilities.

Generally, friendly outbound aircraft do not pose asignificant identification problem because—

• They just departed from friendly airfields or shipsand have had positive contact with a controllingagency that can alert the lADS.

• Or their flight direction poses a lesser threat to theMAGTF's vital areas than aircraft approachingfrom the extremes of the MAGTF's area ofoperations.

Once an aircraft performs its mission and returnsthrough the lADS, it may present a higher threatprofile. If so, the higher threat profile complicatesidentification because—

• The aircraft's flight direction is inbound (toward avital area) and the tactics used to evade the enemy'sair defense system may be similar to the tactics usedto defeat the MAGTF's lADS.

• The aircraft may not be under positive control of aMACCS agency.

• The aircraft's mission may be forward of the FSCL,outside the MAGTF ' s area of operations or is underthe procedural control of a MACCS or other aircommand and control agency; therefore its exactlocation is unknown.

Aviation planners must use procedural controlmeasures to protect returning friendly aircraft fromhostile fires and simultaneously place them in timeand space where they can be positively identified toprotect them from friendly fires. These controlmeasures—return to force procedures, minimum riskroutes, air corridors, etc.—must be simple tounderstand and execute, and they must consider thelimitations of the MAGTF lADS. During theexecution phase, planners reevaluate ROE andidentification criteria determined during planning andestablish updated identification procedures based onthe tactical situation.

EvaluationAfter a target is detected and identified, it is evaluated.The process of evaluation further defines the air

picture. It identifies the threats by prioritizing airtracks, and the target's engagement priority isdetermined based on its immediate threat to the vitalarea. By continuously evaluating air tracks andupdating the air picture, AAW units can effectivelyapply the air defense required.

Weapons Control and Coordination

Weapons control and coordination involves selectingand assigning the appropriate weapon to a particularair track and directing, controlling, and coordinatingweapons employment. Weapons assignment dependson the identified target position and the position ofavailable air defense weapons. Through effectiveintegration and coordination, engagement andweapons use can occur across sector boundaries. Airdefense actions should focus on engaging targets thatpose the greatest, immediate threat as soon as possiblewith the first weapons system either available orcapable of destroying them. These engagementsshould occur as far from the vital area as practicalwithout compromising mutual support within thelADS. Controllers should assign mutually supportingweapons systems in case one or more of the initialengagements fail.

lADS effectiveness results from shifting from onedegree of control to another. The selected degree ofcontrol depends on the ROE, the air picture, and theability to communicate with the weapons systems. Thedegree of control can vary from centralized todecentralized. Under certain conditions, air defenseunits may conduct autonomous operations. Effectivecoordination of air defense assets must occur.

Destruction

Destruction is a process that either destroys enemyaircraft or missiles, or prevents them from completingtheir mission. Aggressive ROE and situationalawareness gained from the air picture aid weaponsemployment and destroying the enemy air threat.

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

Passive air defense reduces or nullifies the effects ofhostile air action, including theater missiles. Passiveair defense provides essential individual and collectiveprotection to friendly forces and critical assets. Pas-sive air defense is a responsibility of commanders at

3.4 MCWP 3-22

all levels. Passive air defense complicates the enemy'stargeting ability and ordnance delivery and increasesthe survivability of friendly forces under attack.

Tactical Warnings

Tactical warning measures provide timelydissemination of information on the likely orimminent threat of attack by aircraft or theatermissiles. Tactical warnings can be general warningsthat aircraft or missile launches have occurred, orspecific warnings to designated units or areas that arein danger of attack. Tactical warnings should includethe warning itself and likely targets. If the threat is atheater ballistic missile, the likely area of missileimpact as indicated by the projected circular error ofprobability ellipse should be included, and, if known,the time to missile impact or aircraft attack. Tacticalwarnings can be communicated through wide or localarea networks, radio messages, sound or visual alarms,and voice.

Reducing Enemy Targeting Effectiveness

Methods for reducing the enemy's targetingeffectiveness focus on ways to deny the enemyinformation about the location of friendly units or, ifthe enemy has that information, making targetacquisition more difficult.

Operations SecurityThe communications security, signature reduction, andsecurity aspects of operations security deny enemysensor and reconnaissance assets timely acquisitionand identification of friendly targets. Examples ofoperations security measures used for passive airdefense are: emission control measures, cover, andconcealment.

CamouflageCamouflage is the use of natural or artificial material onpersonnel, objects or tactical positions with the aim ofconfusing, misleading or evading the enemy. (JP 1-02)Camouflage disguises friendly positions from theenemy.

DeceptionDeception misleads the enemy by manipulating,distorting or falsifying friendly actions. Deceptionmisleads the enemy on location, type or intention offriendly units. Well-executed deceptive measures cancause the enemy to deplete his aircraft and missileresources by attacking false targets, missing intended

targets, and denying the enemy accurate battle damageassessment. Decoys and chaff are among the mostcommonly used deception measures.

MobilityMobility reduces vulnerability to attack by aircraft andmissiles and increases the survivability of certain sys-tems by limiting them to exposure of reconnaissanceand targeting. Mobility contributes to deception bymoving assets frequently to mislead enemy reconnais-sance efforts in locating friendly assets.

Reducing Vulnerability

Protective ConstructionProtective construction of assets reduces vulnerabilityto attacks. It limits or negates damage to friendlyresources by providing protective coverage around theresource. Protective construction may be as basic asbuilding sandbag walls around facilities or aselaborate as constructing revetments for aircraft.

Redundancy and RobustnessA way to retain combat power is to duplicate criticalvulnerabilities that are particularly vulnerable to attackby aircraft and missiles. Critical capabilities includesoft targets, such as key command and control nodes,sensors, and fixed sites such as airfields. Planning foralternate agency responsibilities, ensuring duplicationor alternate paths of communication, and preparingalternate locations for operations are ways to achieveredundancy and robustness.

DispersalDispersing assets reduces their vulnerability to attackby decreasing their concentration and making thetarget less lucrative. Dispersing assets forces theenemy to use more aircraft or missiles or conductreattacks to neutralize or potentially destroy the target.Dispersal can also mislead the enemy as to theoccupation or use of a particular location.

Nuclear, Biological, and ChemicalDefenseAircraft and missiles are among the most commondelivery methods for weapons of mass destruction.Although the best method for nullifying this threat isdestroying the weapons at their source or destroyingthe enemy's ability to manufacture the weapons,preparing for a biological or chemical attack andoperating within chemically or biologicallycontaminated areas are necessary requirements.

Antiair Warfare 3-5

Passive air defense against these weapons includecontamination avoidance, force protection, anddecontamination. Contamination avoidance includesdetecting, identifying, and reporting the presence ofnuclear, biological or chemical agents or materials.Force protection includes individual and collectiveprotection measures to negate 'or minimize the effectsof various agents or materials. Decontaminationremoves the hazards from personnel and equipment,minimizes the spread of the contaminant, and restoresnormal operations.

Recovery and Reconstitution

Recovery and reconstitution refers to the ability of aunit to be restored to a desired level of combat effec-tiveness commensurate with mission require mentsand available resources after an attack. (JP 3-01.5) Re-covery and reconstitution efforts may include reestab-lishing or reinforcing command and control; replacingpersonnel, equipment, and supplies; and repairingdamage.

PRINCIPLES

Location, destruction, reduction, and confusionmaximize destruction and minimize the effects ofenemy air and missile attacks.

Location

Locating the target is the first step in air defenseoperations. The target must be detected, identified, andevaluated prior to engagement. Surveillance,reconnaissance, and intelligence help locate targets.Information from air and ground sources complementsand supplements each other. The ACE and theMAGTF should develop plans that emphasize thevigorous employment of all available air and groundsources to locate enemy air and missile assets quicklyafter they launch or during their attack. Timelycollection and dissemination of combat information toa friendly lADS aids in locating the enemy's air threat.

Destruction

Destruction eliminates the enemy's air assets afterthey are launched or while they are attacking. Thecomplete destruction of enemy air assets is preferredto reducing or nullifying the impact of the enemy'sattacks on MAGTF operations. Detailed planning and

coordination is essential to integrating and destroyingthe enemy's air threat. The ACE coordinates and plansair defense missions between the MACCS andexisting fighter engagement zones (FEZ), missileengagement zones (MEZ), short range air defense(SHORAD) engagement zone (SHORADEZ) orwithin a joint engagement zone (JEZ). MAGTFaircraft and surface-to-air weapons support each otherto achieve complete destruction of the enemy's airthreat. This mutual support demoralizes the enemy bydiverting his attention from his primary target andreduces his ability to destroy MAGTF assets.Electronic warfare, chaff, deception, and concurrentground operations can be used in concert with theseprinciples to confuse the enemy.

Reduction

Reduction is the process of lessening, diminishing ordecreasing the size, number or effect of the enemy'sair and missile threat after it is launched or while it isattacking. By reducing the number of enemy air assetsafter they launch or before they penetrate theMAGTF's lADS and approach the vital area, theMAGTF lessens the enemy threat. Reducing oreliminating the enemy's air assets that deliverordnance increases the MAGTF's ability to survivethe attack, facilitate maneuver, and complete itsmission. The MAGTF can also use dispersion,deception, and mobility to lessen the effect of enemyair action on MAGTF operations.

Comprehensive planning and the subsequent execu-tion of that plan stress the reduction or elimination ofthe enemy's assets and their effect on MAGTF targets.Reduction and elimination must be stressed during alllevels of MAGTF planning, including down to the in-dividual Marine. Planning and execution should out-line methods of survivability (cover, concealment,camouflage and protective construction).

Confusion

Confusion is the act of throwing enemy air assets intoa state of disorder and disarray. The MAGTF attemptsto disrupt the cohesiveness of the enemy's attack bylocating, destroying, and reducing the enemy's airthreat after he launches or while attacking. Early lo-cation of enemy air assets allows the MAGTF's lADSto direct, steadily increase, and overlap its fires. Thisdestroys or reduces the enemy threat, eliminates theenemy's element of surprise, and increases the ene-my's losses. If location, destruction, and reductionsucceed, the enemy is left in a state of confusion.

3-6 MCWP 3-22

Weapons delivery and target acquisition systems aredegraded or made inoperable. The enemy then be-comes overwhelmed, distracted, and disoriented; con-centration decreases; locating a target is more difficult.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Air defense operations require diverse resources andextensive integration and coordination to functioncohesively. Air defense operations require intelligenceinformation from organic assets, MAGTF assets, andnonorganic assets to determine the scope of the enemyair threat. Nonorganic assets, including joint, theater,or national-level, may require approval at the jointforce, theater, or higher level.

Once air defense orders are issued, the MAGTF staffcoordinates and determines air defense intelligencerequirements based on the mission. The ACEcommander identifies his intelligence requirements bysubmitting information requirements. At a minimum,air defense operations require information on thethreat capabilities, description, location, status,warning, and direction of the enemy air threat fromintelligence sources.

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE APPLICATIONS

Area Defense

Area defense uses a combination of weapon systems;e.g., aircraft, surface-to-air weapons, and electronicwarfare to defend broad areas. There can bespecialized applications of area defense when friendlyassets requiring protection are spread over a largegeographical area with defmed threat boundaries.

Point Defense

Supporting Missions

Defensive counterair missions support area, point, andself-defense.

Surface-to-air missile fires defend point targets and/orvital areas from attack by aircraft and missiles.Extremely mobile or man-portable surface-to-airweapons fires are used offensively by establishingaircraft ambushes.

Small arms fires, including M- 1 6s and machineguns,are used in self-defense roles.

WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

Weapons employment is based on the air defensesectors assigned to the MAGTF and the sector'scorresponding surveillance area, destruction area, andvital area. Air defense sectors are typically designatedby the joint force commander through his area airdefense commander (AADC) if one is designated.Based on input from the aviation, ground, and combatservice support element commanders, the MAGTFcommander recommends to the joint force commanderthe air defense sectors and responsibilities to beassigned to the MAGTF.

Regardless of the MAGTF's role in the operation, itsassigned air defense sector should correspond with itsarea of operations and, depending on the air controlabilities of other members of the joint force, can po-tentially be larger than the MAGTF area of operations.The MAGTF commander (with input from the ACE,GCE, and CSSE) defmes vital areas, destruction areas,and surveillance areas within his air defense sectors.Weapons systems are placed within the air defensesector to provide an effective defense of the MAGTF'svital area. See chapter 6 for more information.

Point defense protects limited areas and is normallyused in defense of vital areas of forces or installations.

WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

Self-Defense

Self-defense allows friendly units to defendthemselves against direct attacks or threats of attackthrough the use of organic weapons and systems. Theright of self-defense is inherent to all ROE andweapon control procedures.

Weapons management is integrating and coordinatingassets allocated for the air defense mission andoperation of the MAGTF lADS. Weaponsmanagement responsibilities exist at various levelswithin the ACE, starting with the ACE commanderdown to the control agency, missile unit, or individualaircrew; e.g., TAOC, SAAWC or weapon platforms.

Antiair Warfare 3-7

See chapters 4 and 6 for information on command andcontrol relationships and air defense weaponsmanagement responsibilities within the MAGTF.

REQUEST PROCEDURES

Requests for the MAGTF's airborne air defenseresources are completed the same way as offensiveantiairwarfare sorties. Joint force sorties for airdefense are requested through the joint forcecommander or his designated agent; i.e., the AADCwho consolidates the requests and allocates resourcesfor theater air defense.

For surface-to-air missiles, coordination between therequesting unit and the ACE commander (through thechain of command) is appropriate. Requests for assetsexternal to the MAGTF are forwarded to the jointforce commander or his designated ageIt; i.e., theAADC for distribution ofjoint force assets.

TASKING

Preplanned, Scheduled Air Missions

The ACE schedules preplanned air missions based onthe MAGTF's air defense needs. These missionsprovide air defense of vital areas based on the knownor suspected enemy air threat. Preplanned, scheduledair missions also support air defense operations, suchas tanker, airborne early warning and control aircraft,and electronic warfare. Preplanned, scheduled airmissions are executed at a specific time; e.g., a CAPmission is assigned a specific launch time and time tobe on station. Preplanned, scheduled air missionsallow detailed coordination and economical use ofaircraft and ordnance.

Preplanned, On-Call Air Missions

The ACE schedules preplanned, on-call air missions toassist scheduled missions. These missions focus onperiods of anticipated increases in the enemy air threatto the MAGTF. Preplanned, on-call air missions loadthe appropriate air-to-air ordnance and assume ground(strip) or airborne alert status. Ground alert CAPaircraft provide several advantages. The TACC or itsdesignated agency, such as the TAOC, has a higherdegree of control over assets. The aircrew can obtaintarget/airborne threat location. Tactics and routing canbe briefed before launch. The TACC can also ensurethat mission support prerequisites are provided.Onstation time increases with oncall aircraft.

After priorities, objectives, and requirements areestablished, the ACE commander and his staff plan thetasking of aviation assets to support air defenseoperations. Tasking also must address the needs ofsupporting assets, such as electronic warfare, tanker,and airborne early warning and control aircraft.Planners should coordinate tasking to ensure effectiveuse of air and ground assets and aid in theestablishment of air defense through air intercept(fighter engagement) zones, SHORADEZ, anddepending on availability, MEZs for radar SAMs. Tofulfill air defense requirements, the ACE commandertasks ground-based ACE assets via the operationorder. Specific aircraft assets are tasked through theMAGTF ATO. Preplanned aircraft missions areplanned in advance of an operation, and based onprevious MAGTF requirements/requests. Preplannedmissions permit detailed coordination and can bescheduled or on-call. Aircraft tasked to support airdefense operations are assigned preplanned scheduled,preplanned on-call, or immediate missions.

Airborne alert CAP aircraft provide severaladvantages: minimal reaction time, battlespacesituational awareness gained from observation, and theTAOC providing real-time threat information to datalink-equipped aircraft. Disadvantages are a reducedability to ensure that support prerequisites are met anda limited time onstation.

Immediate Air Missions

Immediate air missions may be required if high tempooperations are conducted or if the MAGTF's lADSbecomes saturated by enemy air assets. Immediate airmissions to augment the air defense effort may involvetasking aircraft not traditionally associated with airdefense, such as AV-8B Harriers or AH-1W Cobras.

Aircraft can be diverted to an immediate mission atany time. It is preferred that an aircrew diverted to animmediate mission is briefed on the deck but thisincreases reaction time. If there are not enough assetsto assign preplanned missions to cover possiblethreats, then possible secondary missions are assigned

3-8 MCWP 3-22

to an aircrew. Aircraft eligible for airborne divertsshould include air-to-air ordnance in addition to its air-to-ground ordnance. Including guidance for divertprocedures and conditions in the MAGTF operationsorder can provide the MACCS and aircrews with somenotice and flexibility to determine which assets mayprovide the best mission results. Before aircraft arediverted, the diverting authority should ensure that themission change is in keeping with the MAGTFcommander's intent.

COMMAND AND CONTROLREQUIREMENTS

platforms conduct engagements based on theestablished weapons control status and ROE. Undercentralized control, weapons platforms evaluatetargets based on the established weapons controlstatus and ROE and then request permission toengage the target from the TAOC. Engagements areconducted only on approval or direction of the TAOCunless the target meets the criteria for self-defense.

Communications provide the means to executecommand and control of air defense operations.Communications paths between the TACC, Marineaircraft units, forward operating bases, the TAOC, andair defense platforms are critical for air defenseoperations to succeed.

Command and control coordinates and integrates theexecution and employment of air defense assets afterthe air defense plan and airspace control plan/airspacecontrol order are promulgated and the MAGTF ATOand special instructions are issued. It ties individualmissions and engagements into a cohesive air defenseby providing ground-controlled interception, targetassignment, surveillance, and coordination for CAPsand surface-to-air weapons. MACCS agencies,positive and procedural control measures, andcommunications provide the elements for commandand control of air defense assets and operations.Nonorganic assets, including airborne warning andcontrol system and airborne early warning and controlaircraft, can enhance or augment command andcontrol of MAGTF air defense assets.

The ACE commander executes command of airdefense resources in the MAGTF. The ACEcommander exercises centralized command anddecentralized control authority of MAGTF air defenseassets. He delegates the authority for supervision,management, and coordination of air defenseoperations within the MAGTF air defense sectors tothe SAAWC. The SAAWC is the MAGTFcommander's air defense battle manager but is not anair command and control agency.

The ACE commander delegates the authority for real-time control of air defense assets to the TAOC. TheTACC supervises and the TAOC executes control ofthe MAGTF' s lADS. Control of air defense operationscan be decentralized or centralized. The maximumdegree of decentralized control is achieved throughestablishing effective procedural control measures,including WEZs and ROE/RTF procedures. Whenoperating under decentralized control, weapons

ASSESSM ENT

Because of the MAGTF's limited air defenseresources and the need to protect its assets, theMAGTF commander strives to be efficient with theemployment of his air defense assets. However,efficiency should not be sacrificed for the cost of lostresources. The MAGTF commander determines thedegree of risk he is willing to accept. The degree ofrisk translates into allocating air defense resources toprotect designated air defense priorities.

Although destroying the attacking aircraft or missile isusually desired, it is not the only gauge to assess theeffectiveness of an lADS. Other examples of assessingeffectiveness include—

• Turning away an aircraft before its attack throughlethal or nonlethal means.

• Deflecting a missile warhead so that it cannot reachits target or create collateral damage affecting itstarget.

• Using passive measures to cause the enemy toattack positions where there are no friendly forces.

• Demonstrating such strength and integration of airdefenses that the enemy does not attack.

There may be times when an aircraft or missile canpenetrate the air defense system and succeed in itsattack. Using the principle of destruction-in-depth, it iskey that the aircraft or theater missile launch platformbe destroyed after the attack to prevent future attacks.Attacking an aircraft during its egress from the targetarea is an air defense function. Actions against aircraft

Antiair Warfare 3.9

on the ground or transporter-erector launchers is a taskof OAAW.

defense assets is critical to deny the enemy altitudesanctuaries against the MAGTF's low altitude surface-to-air missile.

CAPABILITIES

Many of the MAGTF air defense capabilities dependon its task organization. The MAGTF possesses activeair defense weapons systems, including aircraft andsurface-to-air-missiles.

Decentralized control of air defense assets allows theMAGTF to rapidly respond to aircraft and missilethreats.

The MAGTF's organic air surveillance radars,augmented by data linked information, provide longrange air defense surveillance of the battlespace.

The MAGTF's air defense resources can integrate withjoint and multinational forces to contribute to the jointforce commander's concept for theater air defense.

The MAGTF's organic air defense assets providesflexibility with engagement of aircraft threats. Thisflexibility also provides the lADS with a capability forsustainment. (Surface-to-air missile units are notlimited by aircraft time on station restraints.)

Darkness and limited periods of visibility brought onby weather, smoke, etc., can impede effective employ-ment of optically guided air defense systems. Radarducting can have adverse affects on target acquisition.

Without a medium range, medium altitude radar SAM,the MAGTF lacks the ability to destroy enemy aircraftand missiles at medium altitudes until they are withinweapons release parameters. Augmenting joint air

As with OAAW operations, an air defense aircraft'stime on station is limited by distance to and from theirstation, station altitude, and other related factors.Tanker aircraft or employment of ground alert aircrafthelp eliminate this problem.

Line of sight is affected by the curvature of the Earthand other obstructions, such as intervening terrain.Terrain can mask areas from radar andcommunications coverage. Line of sight and terrainmasking affect all radars and certain communicationsmedia. Proper sight selection; placement of radars andcommunications equipment; and airborne radars(command and control and on-board weapons radars)can augment the MAGTF's organic ground-basedsurveillance and minimize line of sight and terrainmasking effects.

Phasing of AAW (air defense) functions ashore can be'a time-intensive process and create a greater relianceon sea-based air defense assets. Incremental phasingof control ashore and the early introduction of airdefense assets ashore can speed the process.

The enemy's use of jamming, destruction, andelectronic deception can adversely affect air defenseoperations. The enemy can employ electronic attackagainst MAGTF air defense radars; command andcontrol voice and data communications; and aircontrollers. Susceptibility to electronic attack can beminimized by understanding the enemy's electronicwarfare capabilities and training, and by employingproper electronic protection; e.g., using decoys,brevity codes, chattermark procedures or frequencyhopping radios.

CHAPTER 4. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command is the authority that a commander in themilitary service lawfully exercises over subordinatesby virtue of rank or assignment. (JP 1-02) Control isthe physical or psychological pressures exerted withthe intent to assure that an agent or group will respondas directed. (JP 1-02). Command and control is themeans by which a commander recognizes what needsto be done and sees to it that appropriate actions aretaken (MCDP 6, Command and Control). Commandand control provides unity and purpose to the myriadof actions performed by a military unit.

Command and control consists of people, information,and a support structure. Blending these elements takesadvantage of each element's attributes and builds acomprehensive picture of the battlespace. Thoseinvolved in planning and execution of AAWoperations can decide what actions will compel theenemy to do our will.

The ACE commander is responsible to the MAGTFcommander for the conduct of AAW operations. Otherelement commanders provide planning, resources, andlogistics support to the ACE commander. All elementcommanders must be involved to lend unity of effortto the MAGTF commander's single battle.

The ACE commander normally delegates authority forthe detailed planning and execution of AAWoperations to the Marine air command and controlsystem (MACCS). From his command post at thetactical air command center (TACC), the ACEcommander or his designated agent providescentralized command and decentralized control overthe execution of AAW operations.

Varying degrees of control and operations can existwithin AAW operations and depend on particularsituations. Several types of control exist that can beused exclusively or combined to achieve the desireddegree of autonomy in operations.

weapons unit to engage a particular target are aircontrol tasks. An air controller performs air controlwhen he directs an aviator to maneuver his aircraft. Amissile controller performs air control when he directsa surface-to-air weapons unit to engage a particulartarget. Agencies and individuals that perform aircontrol functions include the—

• Tactical air operations center (TAOC) and its earlywarning and control (EW/C) sites.Direct air support center (DASC).Marine air traffic control detachments (MATCDs).Designated controllers and coordinators, e.g.;tactical air coordinators (airborne), assault supportcoordinators, forward air controllers (airborne),forward air controllers, and in some instances, theaircraft flight leader.

• Surface-to-air weapons unit leaders. They performair control when they direct subordinate elements toengage a particular target.

Air control information is usually single-missionrelated. Communications occur between the aircrew/surface-to-air weapons unit and the air/weaponscontroller. Air control consists of airspace control andairspacemanagement. See figure 4-1.

Air control is the authority delegated to MACCSsubordinate elements to direct the physical maneuverof in-flight aircraft or to direct an aircraft or surface-to-air weapons unit to engage a specific target. Tasksthat maneuver aircraft or direct a surface-to-air

Airspace Control Methods

Airspace control is the authority given to a command-er to direct airspace users so that airspace is used effi-ciently and effectively. The unit commander

•••

AIR CONTROL

Measures Measures

Figure 4-1. Airspace Control Methods.

ControlMeasures

4-2 MCWP 3-22

responsible for a particular block of airspace, type ofmission, or type of aircraft has airspace control author-ity. Airspace control coordinates, integrates, regulates,and uses a defmed airspace and aids in identifying allairspace users. Coordination is that degree of authoritynecessary to achieve effective, efficient, and flexibleuse of airspace without providing command authority.Integration is the need to combine requirements for theuse of airspace in the interest of achieving a commongoal at the lowest possible level. Regulation is the re-quirement to supervise activities in the airspace to pro-vide for flight safety and denotes the authorityrequired for such safety. Identification produces time-ly engagement of enemy aircraft while reducing thepotential for fratricide.

Airspace control measures are published in theairspace control order, airspace control plan, andspecial instructions to the air tasking order (ATO).Airspace control measures and procedures aredisseminated to all airspace users and controlagencies. Airspace control does not include theauthority to approve, disapprove, deny, or delayaviation operations.

Positive Control

Positive control relies on positive tracking, direction,and identifying aircraft to exercise airspace control. Itis conducted electronically by agencies equipped withradar; identification, friend, or foe (1FF) interrogatorsand receivers; beacons; computers; digital data links;and communications equipment. Generally, two con-ditions must exist for a commander to exercise posi-tive control: the means to identify and locate airspaceusers and the ability to maintain continuous communi-cations with them. Agencies that exercise positivecontrol include the TAOC, EW/C sites, and MATCDs.

Positive control facilities are subject to attack andsabotage. They may be restricted by line of sightcoverage, electronic interference, and limitedcommunications. Positive air control agencies musthave back-up procedures to compensate for failure ofpart or all of their positive control systems.

Terminal control is the authority to direct themaneuver of aircraft which are, delivering ordnance,passengers, or cargo to a specific location or target.Terminal controllers require specialized training thatdiffers from other air controllers. The TAOC, EW/Csites, MATCDs, forward air controllers, forward aircontrollers (airborne), and other designated agencies,

units, and individuals perform terminal control ofAAW operations.

Procedural Control

Procedural control relies on previously agreed uponand promulgated orders and procedures. Included inthese orders and procedures are airspace controlmeasures, fire support coordinating measures, and airdefense control measures. Procedural control dividesthe airspace by volume and time and uses weaponscontrol statuses to manage aviation operations. It isless vulnerable to interference by electronic andphysical attack and ensures continuity of operationsunder adverse environmental conditions. It also servesas a backup system if positive control is used. TheTACC, tactical air direction center (TADC), SAAWC,TAOC, EW/C sites, DASC, MATCDs, base defensezone (BDZ), low altitude air defense (LAAD) units,controllers, and coordinators exercise proceduralcontrol in support of AAW operations.

Typically, aircraft operating in the main battle areaprovide a rapid and flexible response to meet theMAGTF maneuver forces' requirements. The freedomof movement required to conduct AAW operationsmakes individual control of aircraft extremely diffi-cult. To control and direct the movement of aircraft inthe main battle area, the MAGTF commander estab-lishes procedural control by assigning sectors of re-sponsibility for each MAGTF air defense unit andpublishing rules of engagement (ROE) that specifytarget engagement conditions. Air defense units, par-ticularly those operating in the main battle area, aremanaged by procedural control techniques to facilitatethis freedom of movement.

Combined Control Methods

In the absence of unlimited command and controlassets, the optimal method of controlling aircraft andmissiles conducting AAW operations is by combiningpositive and procedural control. Usually, proceduralcontrol is implemented to cover positive controllimitations.The vision of an established proceduralcontrol system augmented by positive controlcapabilities allows for a different combination controltechnique; i.e., positive control by exception. Underpositive control by exception, control agencies providepositive control to aviation assets not as a normalprocess but in exceptional cases where the positivecontrol agency's information is better (or morecurrent) than that of the aviation asset conductingAAW operations. See MCWP 3-25, Control of

Antiair Warfare 4-3

Aircraft and Missiles, for more information onairspace control methods.

AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES

The joint force commander may also assign an air-space control sector to the MAGTF. The MAGTFcommander is responsible for all aviation operationswithin his assigned airspace control area or sector.

Air Contro' Points

Airspace control measures exercise the proceduralcontrol measures of airspace control, air defense, andfire support coordinating measures. Used with airdefense and fire support coordinating measures,airspace control measures maximize the effectivenessof combat operations by promoting safe, efficient, andflexible use of airspace. Airspace control measures canoutline or modify hostile criteria or serve as a tool foridentifying targets and coordinating fires.

Airspace control measures are normally published inthe operation order, airspace control order, airspacecontrol plan, and special instructions to the ATO. Air-space control measures should be disseminated to theappropriate MACCS agencies; fire support coordinat-ing agencies; aircraft units; and surface-to-air weaponsunits to ensure coordination and integration of the air-space, supporting arms, and AAW operations.

Requests for establishing airspace control measuresare forwarded to the joint force commander or his des-ignated agent (the airspace control authority) for im-plementing through the airspace control order. Typicalairspace control measures used by a MAGTF follow.

Amphibious Objective Area

The amphibious objective area (AOA) is a geographi-cal area that includes the amphibious task force's(ATF's) objectives and the sea, air, and land requiredto conduct operations, secure objectives, and accom-plish the ATF's mission.The combatant commander,Service component commander or the joint force com-mander identifies the AOA in the initiating directive.As part of an ATF, the landing force (MAGTF) con-ducts aviation operations, including AAW, within theAOA by using MACCS capabilities to conduct air-space control of its aviation operations.

Airspace Control Area and Sector

An airspace control area is airspace that is laterally de-fmed by the boundaries of a component's area of oper-ations. Typically, the joint force commander assignsairspace control areas to the MAGTF that correspondto the MAGTF's area of operations. An airspace con-trol sector is a subdivision of an airspace control area.

Air control points route aircrews to their targets andprovide a ready means of conducting fire supportcoordination. They must be easily identified from theair and support the MAGTF's scheme of maneuver. Ifpossible, air control points should be used by a varietyof aircraft. The TACC determines each control point'sintended use based on the tactical situation andpromulgates that information through the daily ATO.Air control points can serve one or more functionssimultaneously. They are not specifically limited toAAW functions; i.e., multiple use control points. Aircontrol points can be designated as—

• Entry/exit.• En route.• Orbit/holding.• Contact.• Initial.• Rendezvous.• Egress control.• Penetration.

Ingress, Egress, and Return toForce Control Procedures

The most difficult aspect of air defense is planning forfriendly aviation operations that support the MAGTFbut protect it from air attack. Friendly aircraft en routeto and returning from combat missions need to avoidenemy air defense systems yet be visible to friendly airdefense systems. These control procedures must allowfriendly aircraft to move safely throughout theMAGTF airspace by utilizing predictable flight pathsfor positive identification of friendly aircraft byfriendly air defense units and agencies.

Control procedures must be disseminated to allappropriate units and agencies (MACCS agencies, aircontrollers and coordinators, aircraft, and SAW units).They must be thoroughly examined, especially for safepassage of friendly aircraft through restricted areas.Control procedures should maximize the safety of thedefended area while minimizing the possibility offratricide. When planning control procedures, theplanner must understand the MAGTF's capabilitiesand the enemy's air defense surveillance, weapon

4.4 MCWP3-22

platforms, and friendly aircraft. Ingress, egress, andreturn to force (RTF) control procedures use—

• Ingress/egress corridors and routes; e.g., low-leveltransit routes (LLTRs) and MRRs.Control points.Visual identification (VID).Tactical air navigation (TACAN) system.1FF equipment.

• Altitude and airspeed restrictions.• Lame duck procedures (when aircraft have no

communications, no 1FF, are battle damaged, etc.).• Positive control procedures.• Airspace coordination areas (ACAs).

Joint Airspace Control Measures

Effective integration of MAGTF aviation operationsin joint operations is based on coordinating altitude,high density airspace control zone (HIDACZ),restricted operations area (ROA)/restricted operationszone (ROZ), minimum risk routes (MRR), andstandard use Army aircraft flight route (SAAFR). SeeJP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control inthe Combat Zone; MCWP 3-25; MCWP 3-25.1,Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control(ICAC2); and MCWP 3-25.2, Multi-ServiceProcedures for Theater Air-Ground Systems (TAGS)Multiservice Manual for more information on jointairspace control and joint airspace control measures.

permit the target engagement beyond the line or intoan area without further coordination. An example of apermissive fire support coordinating measure is theFSCL. In OAAW, the rapid conduct of a surfaceattack against an enemy airfield or surface-to-airmissile unit lying beyond the FSCL would not requiredetailed coordination with ground maneuver units.Thus, planning and execution of the mission isfacilitated by the relatively limited coordinationrequired to conduct the surface attack.

Restrictive Fire Support CoordinatingMeasures

Restrictive fire support coordinating measures providesafeguards for friendly forces. A restrictive measureimposes certain requirements for specific coordinationprior to the engagement of those targets affected bythe measure. An example of a restrictive fire supportcoordinating measure is a no-fire area. The no-firearea serves to protect friendly resources (or otherassets) from attack by friendly forces or their affects,including OAAW missions. Permission for OAAWoperations within a no-fire area must be obtained fromthe establishing authority except in cases of self-defense. See MCWP 3-25, appendix D.

AIR DEFENSE CONTROL MEASURES

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATINGMEASURES

Fire support coordinating measures assignresponsibilities for the control officers and for thecoordination of fires with maneuver. If used properly,these measures allow a commander to open areas ofthe battlespace for rapid engagement of targets or torestrict and control fires. Fire support coordinatingmeasures also safeguard friendly forces and impactdirectly on AAW operations, especially OAAW andSEAD. See chapter 2. Fire support coordinatingmeasures are either permissive or restrictive.

Permissive Fire Support CoordinatingMeasures

Permissive fire support coordinating measuresfacilitate the attack of targets. Permissive measures

Air defense control measures refer to airspace controlmeasures that involve areas and zones usedspecifically for air defense actions. They areestablished to maximize the effectiveness of airdefense operations while minimizing interference withother operations. Air defense control measurescomplement airspace control and fire supportcoordinating measures.

Air defense control measures within the MAGTF'sairspace are normally recommended by the SAAWCto the TACC concurrently with recommendations tothe sector, regional, or area air defense commander.The area air defense commander is the establishingauthority for air defense control measures in jointoperations. He submits proposed air defense controlmeasures to the airspace control authority fordeconfliction with other airspace control measures andsubsequent inclusion in the airspace control order. Airdefense control measures follow.

••••

Antiair Warfare 45

Ar Defense Action Area

The air defense action area and the airspace above itare areas within which friendly aircraft or surface-to.air weapons are normally given preference to conductair defense operations except under specific conditions(MCWP 3-25.1). An air defense action area is anengagement area used for preference of a specificweapons system over another without excluding theother from use under certain operational conditions.From an airspace control perspective, an air defenseaction area provides airspace users with location of airdefense areas for mission planning purposes. The airdefense action area is designated by the area airdefense commander.

Air Defense Area

An air defense area is a specifically defmed airspacefor which air defense must be planned and provided(MCWP 3-25.!). it defines, in an area of operations,the area to be defended. An air defense area is aplanning (division of responsibility) aid; it is not anairspace control measure. The air defense area isdelineated by the area air defense commander.

Air Defense Identification Zone

An air defense identification zone (ADIZ) consists ofairspace of defined dimensions that require readyidentification, location, and control of airbornevehicles. This zone is normally the transition betweenprocedural control (outside) and positive control(inside) in an area of operations (MCWP 3-25.1).Typically, an ADIZ is used for sovereign nationalboundaries or in the case of areas of operations, foridentification into the rear areas.

Air Defense Operations Area

An air defense operations area is an area and theairspace above it within which procedures areestablish to minimize mutual interference between airdefense and other operations. It may include one ormore air defense areas, air defense action areas,ADIZs, or firepower umbrellas (MCWP 3-25.1). Airdefense operations areas are not used for airspacecontrol, but to aid in planning and division ofresponsibility. From an airspace control perspective,these areas provide airspace users with the location ofair defense operations for mission planning.

Weapons Engagement Zone

The weapons engagement zone (WEZ) consists ofdefined dimensions of airspace within which theresponsibility for engagement normally rests with aparticular weapon system. These include fighterengagement zones (FEZs), various types of missileengagement zones (MEZ5), and joint engagementzones (JEZs). Design of the WEZ depends on specificweapons system capabilities. The area air defensecommander defmes the WEZ.

Fighter Engagement Zone

In air defense, a fighter engagement zone (FEZ) is thatairspace of defined dimensions within which theresponsibility for engagement normally rests withfighter aircraft. FEZs are an alternative type ofengagement operation if the detailed control aspects ofjoint engagement operations cannot be met. The FEZis an air defense control measure. From an air defenseperspective, the FEZ is normally used when fighteraircraft have the clear operational advantage oversurface-based systems.

These advantages could include range, density of fire,ROE, or coordination requirements. From an airspacecontrol perspective, FEZs provides airspace users withengagement zone location for fighter aircraft formission planning. Coordination and flexibility withinthe combat airspace control system may be a limitingfactor. Surface-to-air missile systems will not beallowed to fire weapons into a FEZ unless targets arepositively identified as hostile, identified and/orassigned by a higher authority or firing in self-defense.All fires must be in accordance with the ROE. Thearea air defense commander establishes the FEZ.

Missile Engagement Zone

A MEZ is an airspace of defined dimensions withinwhich the responsibility for engagement normallyrests with missiles. In joint doctrine, MEZs are dividedinto high-altitude and low-altitude MEZs.Theprincipal differences between the two are the type ofmissile system being employed and the altitude limitsof the MEZ. The area air defense commanderdesignates the MEZ.

Short-Range Air Defense EngagementZone

A short-range air defense engagement zone(SHORADEZ) is that airspace of defmed dimensions

4-6 MCWP 3-22

within which multiple air defense systems (surface-to-air missiles and aircraft) are simultaneously employedto engage air threats.

Joint Engagement Zone

A JEZ is airspace of specified dimensions withinwhich multiple air defense weapon systems (surface-to-air weapons and aircraft) are simultaneouslyemployed to engage air threats. JEZs are highlydependent on correct differentiation between friendly,neutral, and enemy aircraft. The area air defensecommander establishes the JEZ.

Base Defense Zone

The base defense zone (BDZ) is an air defense zoneestablished around an air base (or forward operatingbase) and limited to the engagement envelope ofshort-range air defense weapons systems defendingthat base. Base defense zones have specific entry,exit, and identification, friend or foe proceduresestablished. (JP 1-02) In the MAGTF, low altitude airdefense (LAAD) assets employ at BDZs. LAADassets will integrate with the MATCD operating at theforward operating base around the BDZ. Pre-plannedBDZs are published in the airspace control plan;requests for activating these zones are made to theACE or MAGTF commander. Three critical elementsare required to establish a BDZ:

• Controlling agency; e.g., MATCD, TAOC or ajoint/multinational air traffic control system.

• Radar.• Weapons system.

Vital Area

A vital area is a designated area or installation to bedefended by air defense units. (JP 1-02) It containsfacilities, units, and installations for the MAGTF toaccomplish its mission. More than one vital area canexist, depending on the scope of the operation. Vitalareas include airfields, command and control systems,CSS units, GCE units, and the MAGTF commandelement. The MAGTF commander identifies vitalareas through his air defense priorities.

Air Direction

Air direction is the authority delegated to subordinateMACCS agencies to regulate employment of aircraftand surface-to-air weapons units to balance their

availability and priority of use. The TACC, TADC,SAAWC, TAOC, EW/C site, DASC, tactical aircoordinators (airborne), and assault supportcoordinators (airborne) exercise air direction. Airdirection achieves a balance between the MAGTF'sfinite aviation assets; e.g., aircraft, surface-to-airweapons units, and control agencies, and the ACE'saccomplishment of its mission. Ineffective airdirection results in poorly used resources andexcessive response times. A large volume ofinformation and an extensive communicationsnetwork is required for the ACE and MACCS toprovide effective air direction. The communicationsnetwork must incorporate information from the ACEand the MAGTF. Air direction tasks include—

• Developing ATOs.• Fulfilling ATO requirements; i.e., tasking aircraft to

perform specific missions.

Diverting aircraft from its original mission.Processing air support requests.

Collecting information on mission status.

Moving ground-based air defense fire units to newfiring positions.

• Adjusting mission assignments for aircraft/surface-to air weapons units due to changes in the air orground situation.

Emission Control

Emission control (EMCON) regulates the use ofelectromagnetic, acoustic, and other emitters tooptimize command and control capabilities. EMCONachieves this regulation by minimizing the detectionof AAW assets by enemy sensors and reducing mutualinterference among friendly command and controlsystems. EMCON also aids in executing a militarydeception plan.

Weapons Control and Coordination

Although the following forms of control andoperations exist for AAW operations, planners andoperators should strive to achieve decentralizedcontrol of AAW assets in most situations to allow themaximum flexibility to attack or counter threat aircraftand missile targets.

Centralized ControlCentralized control occurs when the controllingagency directs target engagements. It minimizes thelikelihood of engaging friendly aircraft while

••••

Antiair Warfare 4-7

permitting engagements of hostile aircraft but only ifspecific orders are issued to initiate the engagement.An example of centralized control is a controllingagency that requires a firing unit to request permissionto engage a target. However, even under centralizedcontrol, the right of self-defense is never denied.

Decentralized ControlDecentralized control occurs when controllingagencies monitor unit actions and only make directtarget assignments to units when necessary for properfire distribution, to prevent engagement of friendlyaircraft, or to prevent simultaneous engagements ofhostile aircraft. Decenfralized control is the normalwartime mode of control for air defense. It increasesthe chance of engaging a hostile aircraft in a high-density environment because the firing unit canengage targets without requesting permission from thecontrolling agency. Silence is consent.

airspace control procedures used in the joint force'sarea of responsibility or operations area. The area airdefense plan specifies joint force procedures forintegrating weapons and other air defense actions thatOccur within the joint force's area of responsibility orjoint operations area.

When drafting the area air defense plan, detailedengagement procedures that are integrated withairspace control measures are essential to providemaximum flexibility and responsiveness to allairspace users equally. Air defense interface is criticalto effective combat zone airspace control. (JP 3-52)Geographic arrangement of air defense weaponswithin the battlespace and procedures foridentification and engagement impact on all jointaviation operations and must be integrated into theairspace control plan. See JP 3-52, MCWP 3-25, andchapters 6 and 7 of this MCWP.

Autonomous OperationAn autonomous operation is a mode of operationassumed by a surface-to-air missile unit after it haslost all communication with its controlling agency.The surface-to-air missile unit commander assumesfull responsibility for control of weapons andengagement of hostile targets within the establishedROE. Operation orders must define specific actionsand procedures for autonomous operations.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIRSPACECONTROL AND AIR DEFENSE

The objective of airspace control is to maximize theeffectiveness of combat operations without addingundue restrictions and with minimal adverse impact onthe capabilities of any [component]. (JP 3-5 2) Thisrelationship stresses close coordination must existbetween airspace control, air traffic control, and areaair defense units to reduce the risk offratricide andbalance those risks with the requirements for aneffective air defense.

The balance required between restrictions on airspacecontrol and flexibility provided to air defenseoperations is determined by the ACE commander andbetween the airspace control authority and area airdefense commander at the joint level. Thesecommanders and their staffs design or provide input tothe design of the airspace control plan and area airdefense plan. The airspace control plan specifies

MARINE AIR COMMAND ANDCONTROL SYSTEM

The MAGTF commander normally delegates the au-thority for aviation operations to the ACE commander.The ACE commander exercises his authority throughthe MACCS. The MACCS provides the ACE com-mander with the means for effective command, coordi-nation, and control of all MAGTF aviation operationsand the effective functioning of the MAGTF's lADS.Appendix A shows various communications datalinkarchitecture that enables this process. These relation-ships are shown in figure 4-2, page 4-8.

The MACCS task-organizes its resources based on themission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops andsupport available-time available (METT-T). Althoughall MAGTF elements provide personnel and controlagencies that comprise the MACCS, the ACE providesthe majority of functionality. See MCWP 3-25.3,Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook.

Tactical Air Command Center

The TACC is the senior MACCS agency and the focalpoint for command and control of MAGTF aviation. Itis the ACE commander's operational command post.To avoid confusion with its Navy counterpart, theNavy tactical air control center, the TACC is oftenreferred to as the Marine TACC.

4-8 MCWP3-22

TAOC MATCD

______

ForEW/C Base

Defense

________ ________

V

LAAD Units

_______ ________

Other Air Defense Units

Coordination— Command

Figure 4-2. Marine Air Command andControl System.

The TACC consists of three mutually supporting,cross-functional operational organizations supportedby a centralized intelligence organization. The TACCdoes not provide facilities for all ACE staff functions.It provides a facility for the ACE commander and staffto plan and execute MAGTF aviation and aviationsupport operations. TACC organizations are—

. Future plans.• Future operations (future operations).• Current operations (current operations).• Air combat intelligence (ACI).

Future plans conducts aviation and aviation supportplanning for the next MEF mission change. Futureoperations develops future ATOs and preparesoperation orders or fragmentary orders for the nextACE mission change. Current operations executes thedaily ATO and assesses its effectiveness. ACI isembedded within the TACC. Timely and tailored andfused intelligence is integral to the functioning offuture plans, future operations, and current operations.ACI is the focus of all aviation intelligence activitiessupporting the ACE. It produces and disseminatesaviation-specific all-source intelligence, includingassessments of adversary capabilities andvulnerabilities, target analysis, battle damageassessment (BDA), and the current status and priorityof assigned targets to assist in execution day changes.See MCWP 3-25.4, Marine Tactical Air CommandCenter Handbook, and chapter 5 of this MCWP.

Tactical Air Direction Center

A TADC can be established by the commander,landing force (CLF) during amphibious operations. Itcoordinates between MACCS agencies ashore and thecommander, ATF's (CATF's) Navy tactical air controlcenter afloat. Once the CLF is ashore and ready toassume control of aviation operations and airspacemanagement functions, the CATF transfers control ofall aviation operations within the AOA to the CLF.The CLF's Marine TADC then becomes the MarineTACC ashore, and the Navy's tactical air controlcenter reverts to a Navy TADC. The Marine TADCnormally mirrors the Marine TACC in organization,facilities, and capabilities.

The essential difference between the Marine TACCand TADC is the amount of responsible airspace andthe scope of assigned tasks. A TADC is typicallyassigned specific aviation operations tasks in thelandward sector of the AOA. A TADC may bedelegated the authority to coordinate landward sectorair defense operations, OAAW operations or both. SeeNWP 3-09.11, Supporting Arms in AmphibiousOperations, and chapter 6 of this MCWP for moreinformation on passage of control ashore.

Sector AAW Coordinator

The SAAWC is the MAGTF commander's air defensebattle manager. The ACE commander determines theextent of his authority. The SAAWC coordinates andmanages all active air defense weapons (aircraft andsurface-to-air weapons) within his assigned sector. Inamphibious operations, the Marine SAAWC may alsobe known as the landing force SAAWC.

The SAAWC does not exercise real time control ofaviation operations. His responsibilities focus on coor-dinating and planning air defense and some OAAWoperations. Within these guidelines, the SAAWC andhis staff typically provide the interface between TAOCcontrollers and the ACE commander's battlestaff.

Normally, the Marine SAAWC's operations facilitycollocates or integrates with the TAOC to provide theSAAWC and his battlestaff with a greater capability tocoordinate with the TAOC. Representatives fromvarious units of the Marine air control group and theACE battlestaff also man the Marine SAAWCoperations facility. See MCWP 3-25.6, Sector AntiairWarfare Coordinator Handbook.

ACECommander

TACC

MMT DASC

DASC(A ASE

FAC(A) TAC(A)

ASC(A) htH_TACP

HST

Antiair Warfare 4-9

SAAWC functions in AAW operations typicallyinclude—

• Managing air defense resources, including aircraftand surface-to-air weapons within his assignedsector.

• Managing airborne tankers.

• Recommending air defense control measures to theTACC, airspace control authority, and regionallareaair defense commander, as appropriate.

• Recommending employment of AAW resources tosupport future operations.

• Recommending air defense warning and weaponsrelease conditions to the TACC and/or area airdefense commander.

• Recommending air defense priorities to theMAGTF commander via the ACE commander.

• Launching alert aircraft or diverting airborneaircraft to attack time critical targets, whenauthorized.

• Functioning as a sector or regional air defensecommander for theater air defense operations, whendirected.

Tactical Air Operations Center

The TAOC is subordinate to the TACC. It is theprimary AAW agency within its assigned sector. TheTAOC, along with the SAAWC and his staff, mayperform alternate TACC functions (current operationssection only) for limited periods.

The TAOC provides positive airspace control,management, and surveillance for its assignedairspace. Personnel detect, identify, and control theintercept of hostile aircraft and missiles by aircraft andsurface-to-air weapons. They also provide en route airtraffic control and navigational assistance for friendlyaircraft. The TAOC has three types of organicsurveillance radars: the AN/TPS-59, the AN/TPS-63,and the ANIMPQ-62.

The AN/TPS-59 radar provides long-range airsurveillance for the TAOC. It operates in the followingmodes.

Theater Ballistic Missile ModeThe radar can detect and track the launch of theaterballistic missiles out to 400 nautical miles and ataltitudes over 500,000 feet without external cueing.The AN/TPS-59 also provides data on launch and

impact circular probability ellipses, projected missiletrajectory, and missile time to impact.

Air Breathing Target ModeThe AN/TPS-59 can track traditional air breathing tar-gets out to 300 nautical miles and up to 100,000 feet.

Combined ModeThe combined mode tracks air breathing and theaterballistic missile targets; the former atdistances to 300 nautical miles and altitudes to 80,000feet for air breathing targets.

The AN/TPS-63 radar provides mid-range (up to 160nautical miles) two-dimensional radar coverage. It isusually used as an early warning or gap filler radar.

The AN/MPQ-62 continuous wave acquisition radar(CWAR) provides close-in, low-altitude, two-dimensional radar coverage. The CWAR is typicallyused with ground-based data link (GBDL) to provideearly cueing to LAAD.

The TAOC shares the air picture built by its organicradars with data link-equipped aircraft, missile units,MACCS, and joint air defense agencies and facilities.See appendix A for further information on digital datalinks. For units not capable of receiving informationvia data link, the TAOC provides voice reports(manual cross-tell) for early warning and situationalawareness.

The TAOC detects, identifies, and controls interceptsfor air defense operations within its assigned sector. Itprovides close, broadcast,tactical or data link controlto DCA missions and assigns targets to surface-to-airweapons units. For OAAW missions, the TAOC canprovide control for sweeps and escort missions androuting or coordination for SEAD or surface strikes.With information from the AN/TPS-59 radar, theTAOC can provide organically-derived location datafor the guidance of aircraft conducting theater ballisticmissile attack operations. See MCWP 3-25.7, TacticalAir Operations Center Handbook.

Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment

The MATCD is the principal MACCS organizationresponsible for terminal air traffic control. It uses itsorganic radars to provide airspace control,management, and surveillance within its designated airdefense sector. The MATCD contributes to theMAGTF's lADS by exchanging air traffic control

4-10 MCWP 3-22

information with command and control units by digitaldata link and voice reports (manual cross-tell). TheMATCD is normally responsible for activating adesignated BDZ and providing early warning andcueing to surface-to-air weapons units within theBDZ. See MCWP 3-25.8, Marine Air Traffic ControlDetachment Handbook.

Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion

The LAAD battalion consists of a headquarters andservice battery and two LAAD firing batteries. TheLAAD battalion uses the Stinger missile to provideclose-in, low-altitude air defense of forward combatareas, installations, and vital areas. It also providessurface-to-air weapons support for units engaged inspecial operations and independent operations. TheLAAD battalion typically establishes a combatoperations center collocated with the SAAWC'soperations facility.

The AN/UPS-3 tactical defense alert radar is organicto the LAAD battalion. It has a short-range (10nautical miles), low-altitude (under 10,000 feet), earlywarning, alerting, and cueing capability. The firingsection employs the AN/UPS-3.

LAAD units are usually assigned in general support ofthe MAGTF or in direct support of a specific unit.Depending on its size, a LAAD unit can provide bothgeneral and direct support close-in air defense by task-organizing its assets. In general support, LAAD unitstypically receive tasking from the MAGTFcommander via the ACE commander and arepositioned to provide close-in, point defense ofMAGTF vital areas and or designated maneuverelements. In direct support, LAAD units providedefense of those resources designated by the supportedunit commander. See MCWP 3-25.10, Low AltitudeAir Defense Handbook, and MCWP 3-25.11, LowAltitude Air Defense Battalion Gunner's Handbook(under development).

Direct Air Support Center

The DASC is subordinate to the Marine TACC. Itdirects aviation operations that directly support groundforces. It may be ground-based (DASC) or airborne(DASC[A]). The DASC coordinates the execution ofpreplanned air support; responds to requests forimmediate air support; and controls and directs closeair support, assault support, and certain airreconnaissance missions. It provides up-to-dateinformation on friendly assets and the scheme of

maneuver as well as OAAW coordination, routing,and targeting. The DASC normally collocates with thesenior FSCC within the GCE to coordinate direct airsupport missions with other supporting arms. TheDASC does not have organic sensors to track aircraft;it uses procedural control. The DASC can provideground-based air defense units and surface-to-airweapons systems with the location of friendly aircraft.It can also coordinate with forward air controllers andthe fire support coordination center for SEADmissions. The DASC may be the designated controlagency for OAAW missions, including time criticaltarget missions, conducted in or near the proximity offriendly troops. See MCWP 3-25.5, Direct Air SupportCenter Handbook.

Marine Wing Communications Squadron

The Marine wing communications squadron (MWCS)provides communications support and coordination forthe ACE and the MACCS. It also provides interagencycommunications to establish and maintain anintegrated MACCS, thus linking elements of theMAGTF's lADS.

Air Coordinators and Air Controllers

Ground-based and airborne coordinators andcontrollers; e.g., forward air controllers; forward aircontrollers (airborne); tactical air coordinators; andstrike control and reconnaissance missions cancontribute significantly to the overall AAW effort.They help control OAAW strikes and defensivecounterair missions; conduct visual surveillance, andprovide intelligence input. See MCWP 3-25.3 formore information.

CAPABILITIES

Command and control is a force multiplier. However,in AAW, it carries specific capabilities and limitations.

The command and control agencies that performAAW functions are not limited in performing singletasks. The TAOC, DASC, and others perform aircontrol and air direction functions that impact on allfunctions of Marine aviation.

Air command and control capabilities can be easilytask-organized to perform very specific missions or tocover a broad range of requirements, including


providing joint force enabling functions for area airdefense coordination. The ability to scale-up or scale-down capabilities provides a flexible option to thejoint force commander for the capability he needs toadd to his area of responsibility.

The principal command and control agencies thatperform control and direction of AAW operationshave organic, redundant communication means,including voice and data communications usingvarious carriers.

The TACC and TAOC can interface and share air de-fense information with joint and multinational partnersvia digital data links and voice communications.

Redundant capabilities in the air command and controlsystem allow continuous operations to support AAWand other aviation operations.

The ACE has a robust communications capability butlimited organic satellite communications equipment. Itis often necessary to facilitate communications and

liaison with joint force air command and controlagencies and commands. This limitation can beminimized by proper prioritization of the MAGTF'slimited satellite communications resources.

The MACCS 's ground-based radars are susceptible toline of sight acquisition caused by terrain features andcurvature of the Earth. Optimizing radar siting for cov-ering the designated surveillance area and augmentingradar coverage with gap filler/early warning radars andairborne radars can minimize this limitation.

Passing AAW-related information and receiving radardata depends highly on the electromagnetic spectrum.AAW command and control systems are susceptible toelectronic attack (jamming) and electronic warfaresupport (deception, intrusion, and interference)operations. Effective training in recognizing andacting on electronic warfare actions, along with properemployment of active and passive measures; i.e.,electronic protection, deception, and operationssecurity can minimize or negate enemy electronicwarfare affects.

CHAPTER 5. PLANNING

Pianning is the art and science of envisioning adesired future and laying out effective ways ofbringing it about. (MCDP 5, Planning) It is a processthat requires a number of ongoing, iterative,interdependent activities. The ongoing planningprocess requires plans to build on itself.

The MAGTF conducts planning to orient itself onfuture objectives. Planning forces MAGTF personnelto project their thoughts forward in time, focus on theenemy, anticipate actions and reactions, and assessrisk. Proper planning can help seize the initiative,assist in time-sensitive decisionmaking, simplifycomplex situations, and generate tempo.

The commander's intent and planning guidance are es-sential to the creation of plans. His personal, active in-volvement in each step of the planning process ensuresclear understanding of his vision and desired end statewhile ensuring the plan built supports the MAGTF'ssingle battle concept. AAW planning supports—

• Deep operations to shape the battlespace andachieve battlespace dominance.

• Close operations to engage in decisive combat.

• Rear operations to provide force sustainment.

Effective conduct of antiair warfare operationsrequires integrated planning at all levels and with eachMAGTF element. The MAGTF commander relies onthe expertise and advice of element commanders andtheir staffs to help determine the MAGTF's AAWconcept of operation. ACE, GCE, and CSSEcommanders; their staffs; and their subordinateelements must understand the MAGTF commander'sguidance and intent. To achieve unity of effort, theMAGTF commander must clearly outline AAWplanning responsibilities. However, all commandersare responsible for the planning and execution ofpassive air defense measures. See MCDP 5 andMCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process.

DELIBERATE PLANNING

AAW operations must be carefully and deliberatelyplanned to achieve the desired degree of air superiority

and force protection required by the MAGTF. Thethree planning frameworks in figure 5-1 are used toconduct timely and thorough deliberate planning.

Concurrent Planning

Concurrent planning is planning accomplishedsimultaneously by two or more echelons of the samecommand or by corresponding echelons of differentcommands. Subordinate commanders can startconcurrent planning based on information announcedbefore written planning documents are issued.Planning memorandums, warning orders, and outlineplans are other ways to disseminate fragmentaryplanning information. This dissemination allowssubordinate commanders to start concurrent planning.

Concurrent planning can avoid the long, detailed plan-ning process that can occur if essential information isstalled in lower command echelons. To control con-current planning, subordinate commanders must havea clear understanding of the commander's intent (atleast two echelons above the subordinate commander).

Parallel Planning

Parallel planning results from close and continuouscoordination between corresponding units. AAW'scoordination requirements, interrelationship ofassigned tasks, and complex support requirementsmake parallel planning essential. Basic AAWdecisions are determined based on a commonunderstanding of objectives and procedures obtainedfrom the free exchange of information among units.Mission-type orders, clear commander's intent, andcontinuous liaison provide an atmosphere conduciveto parallel planning.

Figure 5-1. Deliberate Planning.

5-2 MCWP 3-22

Detailed Planning

Detailed planning is required at all levels, although itsextent is situation-dependent It should promoteflexibility. Planners should foresee likely possibilitiesand develop pians that respond to changing conditions.

• The requirements for air, naval, and artillery firecontrol for SEAD.

• All-weather operations.• Airspace control.

PLANNING FACTORS PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

The MAGTF commander should consider manyfactors when developing planning guidance. Thesefactors reflect METT-T and the commander's intentbased on the MAGTF 's concept of AAW operations,and provide a framework. Factors that should beaddressed are—

• The quantity and capability of enemy offensive anddefensive air weapons, including theater missiles(both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles) andelectronic warfare assets, the latter with particularregard to electronic attack and electronic protectioncapabilities.

• The terrain within the AOA.• The anticipated duration of operations.• The ATF's AAW plan for ship-based radar surveil-

lance and weapons projections ashore.• The air defense sectors, subsectors, and procedures

established by the ATF commander, navalexpeditionary force (NEF) commander or the jointforce commander based on air defenseresponsibilities.

• Integrating MAGTF AAW assets with naval, jointor coalition forces.

• The characteristics of, defmition of, and proceduresfor the destruction, vital, and surveillance areas.

• Availability, capability, and integration of MAGTFAAW assets.

• The plans to land MAGTF antiair warfare units inrelation to their proposed locations.The time and conditions for phasing control ashore.Centralized command and decentralized control. -Integrating AAW warfare operations withsupporting arms fires.Weapons employment and ROE.Aerial refuelers.The means and procedures to warn all ATF and LF(or MAGTF) units of the impending air attack.

• The land-based air defense system's ability tosupport forces afloat.

The Marine Corps planning process is driven by top-down guidance, the single battle concept, andintegrated planning. Applying these tenets to the sixwarfighting functions, the commander and his staffstrive to achieve unity of effort and effectiveintegration of combat power.

Higher Headquarters

Initially, AAW planning, including coordinating all airdefense weapon systems and electronic attack, is theresponsibility of higher headquarters. Depending onthe type of operation and command relationships,higher headquarters can be the joint force orappropriate naval commander.

Higher headquarters concentrates on the general con-ditions required for AAW planning. General condi-tions are based on the level of command and varyaccordingly; e.g., if the joint force commander's mainfocus is on the campaign, subordinate commanders fo-cus principally on the conduct of operations that sup-port the campaign. In battles and engagements,commanders plan AAW operations against enemy ca-pabilities that will shape the battlespace, achieve bat-tlespace dominance, and influence future operations.Responsibilities may include—

• Establishing and'disseminating appropriate ROE.• Coordinating plans for early warning and air

surveillance.• Determining AAW priorities.• Establishing appropriate AAW sectors.• Establishing AAW restricted areas.

The MAGTF Commander

The MAGTF commander directs MAGTF operationsin support of the joint force commander's campaign.The MAGTF commander directs the planning ofAAW operations to shape the battlespace and achievebattlespace dominance. He tasks his staff to plan

••

•••

Antiair Warfare 5-3

AAW operations to support MAGTF operations. Hetasks subordinate commanders to conduct AAWplanning in support of deep, close, and rear operations.Both the MAGTF staff and subordinate commandersand.their staffs conduct AAW•planning based on theMAGTF commander's mission, commander's intent,main effort, air defense priorities, and other guidance.MAGTF AAW operational planning isolates, shapes,and prepares the battlespace for future operations andprovides for the force protection and air superiorityrequired to conduct deep, close, and rear operations.Responsibilities include—

Coordinating MAGTF intelligence planning.

Translating information requirements into collec-tion tasks for agencies both within and external tothe MAGTF.

Providing initial and periodic assessments of enemyair defense capabilities.

• Identifying MAGTF or LF requirements and capa-bilities needed to conduct AAW.

• Informing higher headquarters; i.e., the joint forcecommander, NEF commander, and CATF ofMAGTF AAW requirements and capabilities.

• Establishing AAW priorities among the ACE, GCE,and CSSE including identifying vital, destruction,and surveillance areas.

• Issuing offensive AAW and air defense objectivesin the initial MAGTF planning guidance.

• Ensuring AAW is available and allocatedsufficiently in quantity and type to establish aneffective, land-based, AAW system ashore.

• Acting on requests for organic and nonorganicsupport that include—

Organic electronic warfare support.Signals, human, and imagery intelligence sup-port from national- and theater-level intelligencecollection assets.

• Supporting arms support.

• Organic communications support that connectsnational- and theater-level intelligence collectionassets and the MAGTF.

• Intelligence.• Employment and integration of other Service,

theater, and/or national assets to support or aug-ment early warning, surveillance, and control ofAAW operations.

• Addressing early movement of AAW units ashoreduring the assault in the landing plan.

• Establishing land-based early warning and targetacquisition means ashore.

• Establishing the necessary AAW control agenciesashore.

The Aviation Combat ElementCommander

The ACE commander conducts AAW operations insupport of the MAGTF. The ACE commander directshis staff and subordinate commanders and their staffsto plan AAW to support the MAGTF's deep, close,and rear operations. Appendices B and C are detailedchecklists to ensure every significant planningconsideration is covered. AAW planning is based onthe MAGTF's mission, commander's intent,designation of the main effort, air defense priorities,and other guidance. The MAGTF commander maydesignate the ACE as the main effort to conduct AAWoperations (especially during the initial stages of aconflict) or to conduct other shaping efforts whereAAW efforts could play a large role.

The Ground Combat Element Commander

The GCE commander uses combined arms to conductground operations that support the MAGTF com-mander's plan. GCE operations include deep, close,and rear operations. AAW provides force protectionand air superiority for the GCE to conduct ground op-erations. The GCE commander and his staff must pro-vide input during the planning of AAW operations.

The MAGTF's size and the level of threat imposed byenemy air and air defense assets determine the GCEcommander's involvement. The GCE commander'sneeds can encompass air defense and OAAW areas ofconcern. Responsibilities include—

• Developing intelligence requirements for AAWoperations and submitting them to the MAGTF G-2.

• Recommending to the MAGTF commander andcoordinating with the ACE commander on—

• Developing OAAW and air defense objectives.• Developing OAAW target priorities and proce-

dures.

• Developing air defense priorities with respect totheGCE.

• Identif'ing vital, destruction, and surveillanceareas.

• Developing the preliminary AAW plan.

•

•

5-4 MCWP 3-22

• Determining the GCE's AAW requirements dur-ing planning and execution.

• Developing procedures to monitor AAW opera-tions.

• Developing procedures to process and dissemi-nate air defense targets of opportunity and air as-sets information.

• Helping the ACE commander develop proceduresto rapidly attack/engage enemy air and air defensetargets of opportunity discovered by the CSSE.

• Providing periodic evaluation of the impact ofenemy air and air defense capabilities on CSSEobjectives.

• Helping the ACE commander develop proceduresto rapidly attack/engage enemy air and air defensetargets of opportunity discovered by the GCE.

• Providing periodic evaluation of the impact ofenemy air and air defense capabilities on GCEobjectives.

The Combat Service SupportElement Commander

The CS SE commander conducts operations that pro-vide essential logistics functions, activities, and tasksthat support and permit force sustainment of theMAGTF. Force sustainment supports deep, close, andrear operations. AAW operations provide force protec-tion and air superiority for the CSSE to conduct logis-tics operations. The CSSE commander and his staffmust provide input to AAW planning. The MAGTF'ssize and the level of threat imposed by enemy air de-fense and OAAW assets determine the CSSE com-mander 's involvement. Responsibilities include—

• Developing intelligence requirements for antiairwarfare operations and submitting them to theMAGTF G-2.

• Recommending to the MAGTF commander andcoordinating with the ACE commander on—

• Developing OAW and air defense objectives.• Developing offensive antiair warfare target pri-

orities and procedures.• Developing of air defense priorities with respect

to the CSSE.• Identifying vital, destruction, and surveillance

areas.

• Developing the preliminary. antiair warfare plan(includes air defense and OAAW).

• Determining the CSSE's antiair warfare require-ments during planning and execution.

• Developing procedures to monitor AAW opera-tions.

• Developing procedures to process and dissemi-nate air defense targets of opportunity and air as-sets information.

THE ACE BATTLESTAFF

The TACC is where the ACE commander and staffplan and execute AAW operations. The ACEbattlestaff consists of three mutually supporting cross-function operational work sections supported by acentralized intelligence center called air combatintelligence (ACI).

The ACE 0-3 is the direct representative of the ACEcommander in the TACC. He is responsible for theoverall functioning of future plans, future operations,and current operations. The ACE G-2 has staffcognizance over all ACE intelligence activities,including ACI and the intelligence watch sections infuture and current operations.

Future Plans

Future plans is responsible to the ACE G-3 foraviation planning in support of the next MAGTFmission change. Future plans—

• Maintains liaison with MAGTF future plans.• Conducts deliberate planning for MAGTF opera-

tion plans and follow-on missions associated withthe current operation.

• Develops aviation courses of action for eachfollow-on MAGTF mission under development.

• Develops aviation estimates of supportability foreach follow-on MAGTF mission underdevelopment.

• Develops and refmes operation plans and ordersassociated with each follow-on MAGTF mission.

• Provides detailed deployment, employment, mobili-zation, and sustainment plans for follow-onMAGTF missions.

• Prepares course of action brief andlor supportabilitydecision briefs.

• Helps future operations after the ACE support plantransitions to the operational planning team foroperation order/frag order detailed preparation.

Antiair Warfare 5-5

Future Operations

Future operations plans for those activities directedagainst an enemy when detailed planning must beaccomplished and aviation resources allocated. Futureoperations builds the next air tasking order (ATO)using preplanned requests and planning andcoordination information from the ACE headquartersstaff, MAGTF headquarters, and the joint forcecommander's staff. Future operations coordinates withcurrent operations to determine any requirements tocontinue or extend the efforts of the current battle.Future operations—

• Maintains liaison with MAGTF future operations,force fires, and the joint air operations centercombat plans division.

• Plans and produces the next ATO using approvedplanning guidance.

• Develops ACE operation orders/frag orders basedon support plans prepared by future plans.Administers the ACE targeting board.

Formulates current plans outside the ATO cycle butwithin the current operation order/frag order.

• Plans and coordinates changes to the airspacecontrol order and air defense plan.

• Develops ACE's air apportionment recommenda-tion.

• Directs, coordinates, and supervises the develop-ment and forwarding of the ACE commander's crit-ical information requirements.

• Provides the ACE operational planning team'snucleus.

• Coordinates with current operations and develop-ment of ATO.

Current Operations

Current operations coordinates and executes thoseactivities directed against an enemy when planninghas been completed and resources committed. Thisperiod is normally 24 hours. It includes all on-goingoperations conducted by the ACE in support of theMAGTF, such as current aviation operations insupport of deep, close, and rear operations. Currentoperations personneLexecute the current ATO. Itscrewmembers interface directly with subordinateMACCS agencies such as the TAOC, DASC, andMATCDs to ensure ACE capabilities are managed andemployed in accordance with the ACE commander'sintent. Current operations crewmembers coordinatewith and receive information from TACC future

operations to assist in directing and controlling currentoperations. Current operations—

• Maintains liaison with MAGTF current operationsand the joint air operations center combatoperations division.

• Manages the execution of the ACE operationsorder/frag order.

• Manages the execution of the current ATO.

• Assesses and adjusts current ACE operations basedon changes in MAGTF guidance or the status offriendly and enemy force situation.

• Analyzes and interprets battlespace events as theyrelate to MAGTF aviation operations.

Air Combat Intelligence

ACT provides timely, tailored, and fused intelligenceto future plans, future operations, and currentoperations. It is the focus of all aviation intelligenceactivities supporting the ACE. It produces anddisseminates aviation-specific all-source intelligence,including assessments of enemy capabilities andvulnerabilities, target analysis, battle damageassessment, and the current status and priority ofassigned targets.

ACT is responsible to the ACE G-2 for producing anddisseminating aviation-tailored all-source intelligencerequired for decisionsmaking during the planning andexecution of MAGTF aviation operations. ACTextends and complements, but does not duplicate, theefforts of the MAGTF G-2 all-source fusion center.See MCWP 3-25.4. Some specific ACT tasks are:

• Maintain liaison with the MAGTF G-2 operationssection, the joint air operations center intelligencedivision, and other designated intelligenceactivities.

• Prepare ACE intelligence estimates and intelligencesummaries.

• Direct, coordinate, and supervise the developmentand forwarding of ACE priority intelligencerequirements and other intelligence requirements.

• Prepare and implement the ACE organic intelli-gence collection plan, including planning and coor-dinating unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)operations.

• Direct, coordinate, and supervise the productionand dissemination of all-source intelligence to theACE commander, staff, and subordinate units.

5-6 MCWP 3-22

• Direct, coordinate, and determine ACE require-ments for maps, charts, graphic aids, and imageryproducts, and supervises distribution.

• Coordinate intelligence support for ACE survival,evasion, resistance, and escape requirements, andarrange for and coordinate dissemination of weatherdata for the ACE.

THE AIR TASKING ORDER

The ATO is generated by the ACE commander inMAGTF operations and the JFACC in jointoperations. The ATO tasks and disseminates targetsand specific missions of projected sorties, capabilities,and forces to components, subordinate units, andcommand and control agencies. It normally providesgeneral and specific instructions; e.g., call signs,targets, and controlling agencies.

The ATO may include the airspace control order orissued separately. It also includes special instructions(SPINS). SPINS provide amplifying notes, importantdetails, and changes. The ATO, airspace control order,and SPINS provide operational and tactical directionat appropriate levels of detail. The level of detailshould be explicit when forces operate from differentbases and multi-component andlor composite missionsare tasked. Less detail is required when missions aretasked to a single component or base. See JP 3-52.Each ATO covers a 24-hour period. See figure 5-2.There are usually four ATOs at any given time. Theyinclude the ATO—

• Undergoing assessment (yesterday's plan).• In execution (today's plan).• In production (tomorrow's plan).• In planning (the following day's plan).

Because input to the joint ATO must be provided 3 to4 days in advance, the ATO can represent only a start-ing point for daily flight operations. It is impractical topredict every need in advance. The MAGTF com-mander must have the flexibility to launch or divertany aircraft to complete the mission, even if this re-quires short-notice deviations from the ATO.

The air tasking cycle is the key aviation planning toolregardless of the size or type of operation. It providesplanners with a process that most efficiently and effec-tively supports MAGTF operations with available avia-tion assets. This cycle produces the MAGTF ATO and!or air plan. The six-phase joint ATO cycle is describedin JP 3-56.1, Command and Control for JointAir Op-erations. The MAGTF six-phase air tasking cycle isdiscussed in MCWP 3-2, Aviation Operations. The re-vised MAGTF six-phase air tasking cycle retains thenecessary steps of the previous four-phase cycle but ismore compatible with the joint ATO cycle. This pro-gression is essential for Marine aviation to function inthe joint arena, particularly if the ACE commander isdual-hatted as the JFACC. The six phases of theMAGTF ATO cycle are command aviation guidance,target development, allocation and allotment, tasking,force execution, and combat assessment.

ACEStaff

Figure 5-2. MAGTF Six-Phase Air Tasking Cycle.

ACECommander

Phase ICommander

Phase V

Sauadronl ForceMissionCommander Execution

Phase V

ACE CommanderATO/Air Plan!Special Instructions

CHAPTER 6 OPERATJONS

An operation is a military action or the carIying outof a strategic, tactical, service, training oradministrative military mission; the process ofcarrying on combat, including movement, supply,attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain theobjectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02). Insupport of U.S. military operations, Marine forces areorganized and equipped specifically to meet therequirements of expeditionary operations. (MCDP 3,Expeditionary Operations). Expeditionary operationsare military operations conducted by an armed force toaccomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.Expeditionary operations involve projecting a forceinto a crisis or conflict by establishing forward bases(land- or sea-based) from where military operationalpower can be brought to bear on the tactical situation.Expeditionary operations are temporary in nature.They are conducted with the intent of withdrawingfrom the foreign country after the specific task ormission has been accomplished.

• A Marine aircraft wing with squadrons of fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft that conduct all AAWmissions.

• Short-range surface-to-air missile systems for airdefense against aircraft.

• A MACCS that can execute centralized commandand decentralized control of AAW operations (in-cluding air command, direction, surveillance, andcontrol) and integrating MAGTF AAW operationswith those of the joint or multinational force.

The MEF is an enabler for certain joint force function-al requirements. In AAW operations, capabilities in-clude performing as the joint force air componentcommander and hosting his associated command post,i.e., the joint air operations center; and coordinatingjoint force air defense operations as the area air de-fense commander (AADC) or as a regional or sectorair defense commander (SADC) under the AADC.

The Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MAGTF ANTIAIR EMPLOYMENT

The MAGTF is the Marine Corps' primary tactical or-ganization for conducting missions across the spec-trum of military operations. Each MAGTF has acommand, ground combat, aviation combat, and com-bat service support element. Each element contributesdirectly or indirectly to the MAGTF's AAW opera-tions. Regardless of the MAGTF's task organization,each MAGTF element commander is responsible forconducting passive air defense operations.

The Marine Expeditionary Force

The Marine expeditionary force (MEF) is the principalMarine Corps warfighting organization. It is usuallyemployed in support of larger crises or contingencies.It is capable of missions across the range of militaryoperations, particularly amphibious assault andsustained operations ashore in any environment.

The MEF's AAW resources enable it to perform allmissions as described in chapters 2 and 3, and fullyintegrate into the aviation operations and air defensearchitecture of a joint or multinational force using thecommand and control structure described in chapter 4.The MEF's AAW resources normally include—

The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) is the mid-sized MAGTF normally employed to conductoperations that bridge the gap between our principalwarfighter (the MEF), and the MEU. The MEB isnormally a self-contained operating force capable ofmissions that require sustained operations for up to 30days. The MEB is capable of conducting independentamphibious assault operations, maritimeprepositioning force (MPF) operations or operate!serve as the advanced echelon of a MEF.

MEB AAW resources can be task-organized toperform many of the missions as described in chapters2 and 3, and integrated (to a lesser degree than a MEF)into the aviation operations and air defensearchitecture of a joint or multinational force. This isaccomplished by using task-organized portions of thecommand and control structure described in chapter 4.MEB AAW resources normally include—

• A composite Marine aircraft group (MAG) task-organized with fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft toconduct OAAW and air defense missions.

• A short range surface-to-air missile detachment forair defense against aircraft.

• A MACCS capable of executing centralizedcommand and decentralized control of AAWoperations critical to the MAGTF. This MEB C2system may be task-organized to perform functions

6-2 MCWP 3-22

as the JFACC and AADC if required to integratewith a joint or multinational force.

The Marine Expeditionary Unit(Special Operations Capable)

The Marine expeditionary unit (special operationscapable) (MEU[SOC]) is the standard forward-deployed Marine expeditionary organization. It isnormally used as a self-contained operating forcecapable of missions of limited scope and duration, andmay act as a forward-deployed extension of the MEF.AAW capabilities typically include—

• A composite squadron of fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft that conduct limited OAAW and air defenseoperations.

• A reinforced short-range surface-to-air missilesection.

Because of its limited size and scope of its operations,the MEU(SOC) relies on the NEF to fill most of itsAAW requirements. The NEF typically provides forair defense of the MEU(SOC) and its accompanyingamphibious ready group and OAAW resources fromnaval surface fire support and carrier-based aircraft.The NEF provides the majority of command andcontrol to the MEU(SOC).

The MEU(SOC) contributes to NEF AAW effortswith its infantry, artillery, aircraft, and surface-to-airmissiles. Its aircraft and man-portable surface-to-airmissiles can augment the amphibious ready group'sair defense efforts during emergency defense.

The Special Purpose MAGTF

The special purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) conducts aspecific mission that is limited in scope, focus, and of-ten in duration. The SPMAGTF may be a force of anysize, but is normally small. SPMAGTF AAW capabil-ities are specifically tied to its task organization.

In determining his air defense priorities, the MAGTFcommander evaluates his assets and determines therelative importance of each asset to the MAGTF'sability to accomplish its mission. The supporting airdefense unit commander balances his force availabilityagainst the MAGTF commander's list of critical•assets. Beginning with the most important asset, theair defense unit commander determines, based on hisexperience, the assets his forces can defend. Then herecommends to the MAGTF commander, via the ACEcommander, that these assets receive air defensepriority. The following factors determine the relativeimportance of an asset and its need for air defense.

Criticality

Criticality is the degree to which the asset is essentialto mission accomplishment. If prioritizing, assets arecategorized as those that—

• Prevent mission accomplishment if damaged.

• Interfere with the immediate accomplishment of themission if damaged.

• Interfere with the eventual accomplishment of themission if damaged.

• Slightly restrict the mission accomplishment ifdamaged.

Vulnerability

Vulnerability is the susceptibility of a nation ormilitary force to any action that reduces or eliminatesits will or desire to fight. Vulnerability also includesthe susceptibility of a system; e.g., a command andcontrol system or an lADS to actions that degrade itseffectiveness. Useful factors to determine an asset'svulnerability include—

• The mission.• Hardness (resistance to destruction or degradation).

• Mobility (if it can disperse or displace to anotherposition while protected by other air defenseweapons).

• Passive air defense protection ability.

AIR DEFENSE PRIORITIES Recuperability

Once air defense priorities are assigned to MAGTFassets, the assets are defended in order of priority bythe supporting air defense units.

Recuperability reflects the degree an asset can recoverfrom inflicted damage. Recuperability is expressed interms of time, equipment, manpower, and ability toperform its mission.

Antiair Warfare 63

Threat Characteristics

Threat characteristics determine which weaponprovides the most economical active air defense of aMAGTF asset. Threat characteristics include targetinginformation provided by intelligence estimates, pastenemy attack methods, enemy location and strength,type of enemy aircraft and ordnance, and enemydctrine.

Once the MAGTF commander has established his airdefense priorities, air defense employment principlesand guidelines provide the basis for employment of airdefense weapons in the MAGTF's lADS.

Integration

Integration is the close coordination of effort and unityof action that results from the efficient blending ofindividual air defense systems. It conserves fires andeliminates unnecessary multiple engagements of thesame target by different assets. If the MAGTF lADS isto support the battle for air superiority, it must beintegrated into MAGTF operations. Command andcontrol provides the means to coordinate and controlthe MAGTF lADS.

AIR DEFENSE EMPLOYMENTGUIDELINES

AIR DEFENSE EMPLOYMENTPRINCIPLES

Air defense employment principles provide an lADSthat prevents enemy air attacks from interfering withthe MAGTF's mission.

Mobility

Mobility is crucial to air defense. The MAGTF's airdefense systems must be highly mobile and rapidlydeployable to provide continuous protection formaneuver elements and provide self-defense.

Weapons Mass

Weapons mass allocates sufficient air defenseresources to defend priority MAGTF assets or areasadequately. Weapons mass is achieved byconcentrating ground-based and airborne air defenseassets on and around a vital area to defend it fromenemy air attack. The ability to mass weapons dependson effective command and control.

Weapons Mx

Weapons mix blends aircraft, SAWs, and small armsto achieve a balanced, complementary air defensesystem that complicates the enemy's ability to attackthe MAGTF. Weapons mix offsets the limitations ofone air defense system with the capabilities of another,strengthens the MAGTF's lADS, and degrades theenemy's ability to respond.

Air defense employment guidelines aid commandersin tailoring the air defense of a specific MAGTF. Thesize, shape, and inherent air defense assets of theMAGTF determine the guidelines for employment.

Balanced Fires

Balanced fires result from positioning air defenseassets so they can provide equally defensive fires fromall directions. Balanced fires take on added importancewhen faced with a 360 degree threat from enemy airattack.

Weighted Coverage

Weighted coverage results from concentrating airdefense weapons toward known enemy locations,unprotected unit boundaries.or likely enemy attackcorridors or routes.

Mutual Support

Mutual support results from positioning individual as-sets so they deliver fires into dead zones that surroundadjacent assets. Mutual support enhances defensivesurvivability. The required maximum distance be-tween thr defense units and assets to achieve mutualsupport varies depending on the type of air defenseweapon and the speed and altitude of the threat.

Early Engagement

Early engagement is the engagement of aircraft beforetheir release of ordnance at the maximum range ofsurveillance and weapons systems. Air defense assetsshould be positioned far enough from the defended

6-4 MCWP 3-22

asset or area to allow engagement of enemy aircraftbefore they deliver their ordnance. The distancebetween the defended area and the defending assetswill vary. The enemy threat, ordnance, deliverymethods, and the type of MAGTF air defense assetsdetermine the distance between the defended area andthe defending assets.

Overlapping Fires

Overlapping fires occur when individual air defenseunits' engagement zones overlap. Overlapping firesreduce the possibility of enemy aircraft slippingthrough the MAGTF's air defense without beingengaged by at least one air defense unit.

• Available ordnance.• Likely avenues of approach.

Anticipated rates of attack.

Time lapse between target detection and intercep-tion.

• Communications requirements.• Airspace, air defense, and fire support coordinating

measures.

Defense-in-Depth

Defense-in-depth results from positioning air defenseassets so enemy aircraft meet an increasing volume offire as they approach a defended asset or area. TheMAGTF lADS maximizes the effects of defense-in-depth by integrating and coordinating all air defenseweapons.

SELECTING AND POSITIONINGAIR DEFENSE WEAPONS

Force protection considerations are critical duringMAGTF operations. The MAGTF's mission, taskorganization, concept of operations, and theanticipated threat are the principal factors thatdetermine the weapons to protect the MAGTF fromaircraft and missile attacks. Other factors to considerto determine the number and disposition of ground-based and airborne air defense weapons systemsinclude—

Availability of fighters and fire units.Terrain (topography and accessibility).Type of defense.Coverage by other air defenses.Nature of the enemy threat (ground-based andairborne).

• Coverage and limitations of ground-based radarsand adjacent fighters and fire units.

• Minimum safe intercept point for each type ofthreat.

• Enemy weapons delivery technique.• Attack altitude and speed.

Surface-to-air weapons provide the groundbased airdefense of the MAGTF's lADS. Positioning ground-based air defense weapons is affected by the type of de-fense desired and specific system site considerations.

Point defenses are usually located in the MAGTF'srear area to achieve balanced fires, early engagement,destruction-in-depth, and mutual support. Normally,point defenses do not have enough assets to provideweighted coverage in more than one direction and stillpr9tect the defended asset from attack from anunexpected direction.

Air defenses are usually located in a forward zone toachieve destruction in-depth, mutual support, earlyengagement, and weighted coverage. Normally, areadefenses do not attempt to achieve balanced fires.Area defenses are designed to prevent penetrationfrom the rear, and they usually provide defense in-depth along expected avenues of approach. If a limitednumber of air defense systems are available, areadefenses may be forced to forego early engagementalong more than one threat axis to achieve continuouscoverage over a broad territory.

Stinger elements must consider friendly positions andensure that requirements in their sites do not exceedthe bounds of the supported unit's security area. Toavoid revealing friendly force locations to the enemy,supported units may restrict areas where Stinger weap-ons can be fired. Each Stinger unit commander, downto and including team leaders, must coordinate withsupported or adjacent friendly forces' firing site re-quirements and support the friendly scheme of maneu-ver. See MCWP 3-25.10 for details on Stinger sites.

Considerations for the location of man-portableStingers include—

••

EMPLOYMENT OF GROUND-BASEDAIR DEFENSE WEAPONS

•••••

Antiair Warfare 6-5

• Enemy air threat, including air delivery methodsand tactics.

• Mission and disposition of the defended unit(s)!installation(s).

• Commander's guidance concerning elements orinstallations to be defended and their order ofpriority.

• Capabilities of other MACCS agencies to provideintegrated air defense and early warning.

• Stinger weapon system capabilities and limitations.• Availability of firing and alternative firing posi-

tions.

• Location and coverage of other air defense means.• Clarity of fields of fire.• Dispositionlcontrol procedures while embarked.

Search Patterns

Search patterns should be tailored to anticipate threattactics and TAOC, surveillance gaps.

Speed

CAP aircraft speed should be based on threat and timeon station requirements.

Formation

Synchronized, single, night, and all-weather CAPsrequire special consideration. Refer to appropriateNaval air training and operating proceduresstandardization (NATOPS) manuals for more details.

Commit Criteria

EMPLOYMENT OF AIRBORNEAIR DEFENSE WEAPONS

Commit criteria should be established within theconfmes of mission requirements and ROE.

Rules of EngagementAircraft manning combat air patrols (CAPs) are theairborne air defense weapons of the MAGTF's lADS.In the MAGTF's lADS, CAP is the maneuverelement. CAP employment, positioning, and tacticsmust be considered to optimize CAP effectiveness inthe MAGTF's lADS. Fighter/radar CAP capabilitiesare flexible and blend with the principles ofdestruction-in-depth and mutual support. Destructionin-depth normally places the fighters forward ofground-based air defense weapons in the MAGTFintegrated air defense system as the first line ofdefense. Weapon engagement zones are placed in linewith the threat axis to allow CAPs to continuouslyengage threat aircraft during their ingress and egress.

Placement of CAPs should facilitate engagement ofenemy aircraft as far from the vital area or defendedasset as practical. This may or may not correspond tothe maximum surveillance range of the TAOC'sradars because of terrain masking and airspacelimitations. CAP engagements should occur before theenemy reaches its weapons release point. This requiressome form of extended range combat air patrols andexpanded air intercept zones, which extend wellforward of the forward line of own troops.

Altitude

ROE should be established during the planningprocess and continuously evaluated to provide fighterswith the oppOrtunity to use offensive tactics.

Intercept Tactics

Aggressive tactics should be used to destroy enemyaircraft, break up strike packages, and negate theeffects of enemy fighters.

Manning and Relieving

Defense conditions and available assets determine theCAP manning plan. Procedures should be establishedfor sufficient lADS coverage.

Situational Awareness

Communications flow between lADS control agenciesand weapon platforms should be determined andtransmitted to all potential users to facilitatesituational awareness.

WEAPON ENGAGEMENT ZONE

An altitude should be high enough to provide low-altitude surveillance coverage denied to TAOC radars.

Establishing weapon engagement zones is imperativeto protect MAGTF vital areas. The MAGTF

6-6 MCWP 3-22

commander uses the weapon engagement zoneconcept to defme zones of responsibility to a weaponssystem; e.g., aircraft or surface-to-air weapons.Weapon engagement zones enhance weapons systemscapabilities and offensive tactics (fire and maneuver)by fighters. If possible, the MAGTF commandershould select recognizable terrain features to defme aweapons engagement zone. A weapon engagementzone should offer—

Well-defmed responsibilities for all weapons.

telligence and early warning threat surveillance withinthe weapons engagement zone is present. Ground orstrip-alert aircraft may be used to meet the air defenserequirement within the weapon engagement zones.Dedicated on station aircraft may be required to ensurethe integrity of the MAGTF lADS if timely intelli-gence and surveillance are unavailable.

WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

. Concentration of firepower.

• The ability to use offensive tactics for radarfighters.

• Ease of command and control• Less restrictive weapons engagement conditions.

Each weapon system; e.g., Stinger or F/A-18 hasspecific requirements for optimum location andemployment. The ACE commander must determinethe number and location of air defense assets foreffective air defense of MAGTF air defense sectorsbased on input from the TACC, SAAWC/TAOC, andGCE and CSSE commanders. Number, location, andcomposition of aircraft for CAP stations to defendagainst the enemy threat in fighter engagement zonesmust be determined. The ACE commander, with inputfrom the SAAWC, determines the number of aircrafton station, ground or airborne alert and the aircraft'ssecondary air defense mission. He also determines thenumber, location, and composition of surface-to-airweapons needed in the missile engagement zone todefend against the enemy threat.

Weapon engagement zone activation and deactivationprocedures must be clearly outlined for adequate airdefense coverage of the MAGTF's air defense sectors.Normally, the SAAWC or TAOC is tasked withactivation/deactivation responsibility. Activationoccurs as surface-to-air weapons or aircraft becomeoperational and assume responsibility for air defenseof a particular weapon engagement zone; i.e., fighteror missile engagement zone. A weapon engagementzone is deactivated if a surface-to-air weapons unit isdegraded, destroyed or inoperable because ofmaintenance or if aircraft cannot provide coverage in afighter engagement zone. When part of or an entireweapon engagement zone is deactivated, anotherweapon engagement zone is normally activated toprovide air defense coverage in that area.

Minimal, dedicated, full-time aircraft may be requiredon station in the weapon engagement zone if timely in-

Weapons management is integrating and coordinatingassets allocated for AAW missions and specificallyoperation of the MAGTF's lADS. Weapons manage-ment responsibilities start with the ACE commanderand extend to the individual aircrew/missile unit; i.e.,TAOC, SAAWC or weapon platforms.

Air Defense Warning Conditions

Air defense warning conditions indicate a degree ofair raid proba bility. They are passed by the senior aircontrol agency to all MAGTF elements. Warningconditions may differ between areas of the battlespacedue to the tactical situation and localized enemy airthreat. The three air defense warning conditions are—

• Red - attack by hostile aircraft is imminent or inprogress.

• Yellow - attack by hostile aircraft is probable.• White - attack by hostile aircraft is improbable.

Rules of Engagement

ROE are directives issued by competent militaryauthority which delineate the circumstances andlimitations under which United States forces willinitiate and/or continue combat engagement with otherforces encountered. (JP 1-02) As this relates to theACE, ROE identify the exact conditions under whichaircraft and missile batteries may engage a target(airborne or on the ground). Equipment, discipline,and principles for the employment of MAGTFaviation under the different ROE do not change. Whatis mitigated is the degree of force applied. ROEalways allow the right of self-defense.

Identification Criteria

Identification criteria are closely related to ROE.While identification criteria describe the conditions todeclare unknown personnel or equipment as either

Antiair Warfare 6-7

friendly or hostile, ROE cannot be applied untilidentification occurs. Generally, it is more difficult todistinguish hostiles from friendlies (or unknowns) inMOOTW than in combat. This difficulty results inmore restrictive ROE. There is an inverse relationshipbetween the ease of identification and therestrictiveness of ROE.

Weapons Control Status

Weapons control statuses define the restrictions onfiring air defense weapons for a particular area andtime period. Weapons control statuses may vary toapply only to specific aircraft, weapons systems ortargets, e.g., assigning a status of weapons free againstall targets with ballistic trajectories and weapons tightagainst all air breathing targets for all ground-based airdefense units. Weapons control statuses follow:

• Weapons free - fire at any target that is notpositively identified as friendly.

• Weapons tight - fire only at targets positivelyidentified as hostile in accordance with prevailingtarget identification criteria.

• Weapons hold - do not fire except in self-defense orin response to a formal fire control order.

Tactical Air Command Center

The ACE commander and battlestaff provide overallcoordination and management of the weaponsplatforms allocated for the air defense mission. TheACE commander coordinates weapons managementwithin the TACC via watchstanders from futureoperations and current operations. The TACC initiatescoordination with a Marine aircraft group, Marine aircontrol group, forward operating bases, and the jointforce.

Ordnance availability; fuel availability orconsumption; time on station of committed aircraft;and aircraft launch, recovery, and turnaround priorityare time-sensitive issues requiring coordination andmanagement among the members of currentoperations. Through its management of the currentATO, current operations also has the authority tocancel, divert or change missions to meet the needs ofthe current situation.

Current operations maintains situational awareness oneach offensive AAW and air defense sortie. Membersof the current operations section achieve situationalawareness in part by establishing close and continuous

communications with each Marine aircraft group andforward operating base's air boss. The air boss is theindividual at the MAGTF controlled forwardoperating base responsible to the TACC fordecentralized coordination and execution of the airdefense fragmentary order. He coordinates with andbriefs each air defense aircrew before they launch anddebriefs them upon recovery. He prioritizes ordnanceloading and fueling of air defense aircraft. Based onthe forward operating base's base defense zoneprocedures, the air boss establishes launch/recoverypriorities with the MATCD or Marine air trafficcontrol mobile team. The air boss concept may or maynot occur at a joint task force/host country-controlledair facility.

In addition to coordination with the Marine aircraftgroups and the air boss, current operations also buildssituational awareness through coordination with theSAAWC, TAOC, MATCDs, and joint force airdefense agencies. Situational awareness is enhancedthrough activation and maintenance of digital datalinks with naval, joint, and multinational air commandand control agencies. Members of current operationsnormally perform the data link interface coordinationduties for the MACCS.

Based on recommendations from subordinate MACCSunits and the situational awareness gained from thepreviously described sources, the TACC may directthat aircraft be diverted from their scheduled missionsto meet immediate needs for higher priority threats;i.e., time-sensitive targets. The TACC directsestablishing air defense warning conditions for theMAGTF and weapons release conditions for aircraftoperating within the MAGTF's assigned air defensesector as shown in tables 6-1 and 6-2, page 6-8.

Future operations conducts detailed planning andcoordination to build the next ATO. Future operationsconducts direct coordination with the ACEcommander and ACE operations officer to determinethe allocation of ACE resources needed for futureAAW operations. Future operations also coordinateswith naval and joint force aviation to determineneeded up-front sorties for air defense, airreconnaissance, and air interdiction missions.

Current and future operations maintain close andcontinuous liaison with the joint force's J-3, JFACC,and AADC as needed. This ensures that the TACC andthe SAAWC receive the status of joint force sortiesavailable to support the MAGTF's current and futureoperations.

6-8 MCWP 3-22

Table 6-1. Weapons Release Conditions.

Weapons ControlStatus

Description

Free Engage all aircraft not positivelyidentified as friendly.

Tight Engage any aircraft positively identi-fled as hostile.

Hold Do not open fire or cease fire on air-craft currently engaged.

Do not fire except in selfdefense orin response to a formal fire controlorder.

Table 6-2. Air Defense Warning Conditions.

Red Attack by hostile aircraft is immi-nent or in progress.

Yellow Attack by hostile aircraft is probable.

White Attack by hostile aircraft isimprobable.

station assets. The TAOC also establishes follow-on!replacement weapons platform requirements.

Weapons Platforms

Personnel manning weapons platforms (aircraft andStinger teams) are responsible for conserving andmanaging fuel and ordnance to increase a platform'sperformance. Weapons platform operators providetheir equipment/system state, fuel state, and weaponsstate to the TAOC's weapons section. If the TAOCbecomes a casualty and no alternative ground agencycan perform integrated weapons management, seniorplatform personnel may manage similar assets withinaWEZ.

Basic considerations to determine threat levels,positioning weapons, and exercising command andcontrol are essential to understanding AAWoperations. The rest of this chapter covers the types ofoperations normally conducted by MAGTF's and howAAW contributes to the MAGTF commander's singlebattle concept.

Sector Antiair Warfare Coordinator

The SAAWC and his staff interface with the TAOCcontrollers and the ACE commander's battlestaff. TheSAAWC is the ACE commander's air defense battlemanager. He coordinates and manages all active airdefense weapons (aircraft and surface-to-air weapons)within his assigned sector, and functions to the extentof the authority delegated to him by the ACEcommander. The TACC plans, allocates, and providesassets to the SAAWC to manage and commit tocurrent AAW operations. In turn, the SAAWCprovides recommendations for detailed planning offuture operations to future operations. When delegatedthe authority by the ACE commander, the SAAWCcan divert aircraft to attack offensive antiair warfaretime critical targets and to respond to immediate airdefense requirements. When authorized by the ACEcommander, the SAAWC can establish air defensewarning conditions within his designated sector.

Tactical Air Operations Center

The TAOC performs real-time control of fighteraircraft and surface-to-air weapons. By using systemstate, fuel state, and weapons state, the TAOC controlsmissile units and aircraft committed to a weaponengagement zone. The TAOC provides the TACC andSAAWC with the current status of committed/on-

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Amphibious operations are attacks launched from thesea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships orcraft involving a landing on a hostile or potentiallyhostile shore. (JP 1-02) Amphibious operations aredesigned and conducted to prosecute further combatoperations; obtain a site for an advanced naval, land orair base;deny use of an area or facilities to the enemy;or to fix enemy forces and attention, providingopportunities for other combat operations. JP 3-02,Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, providesthe overarching doctrine for conducting amphibiousoperations. Assaults, raids, demonstrations, andwithdrawals are types of amphibious operations. Otheroperations may be conducted by amphibious forces,e.g., NEOs and humanitarian assistance.

Forces assigned to conduct an amphibious operationtask-organize as an amphibious force. Theamphibious force is normally part of a larger NEF.The amphibious force is composed of Navy andMarine Corps forces.

Force protection for the amphibious force duringmovement to the operational area is a high priority.AAW operations conducted by naval forces provide

Antiair Warfare 6-9

the required force protection and achieve airsuperiority for the landing force to project combatpower ashore. The Navy is responsible for AAWduring movement of the landing force to theoperational area. Landing force aviation and Navyaircraft operating from supporting aircraft carriers andair defense-capable ships provide air defense weaponsplatforms and capabilities. Landing force assetsaboard amphibious ships support the Navy's pointdefense for the ships; e.g, AV-8s, air-to-air capablehelicopters, and Stinger teams.

Since Navy and Marine Corps units have organic avia-tion, they work in concert to support the amphibiousforce. Landing force assets can enhance or augmentNavy antiair warfare assets, but potential loss or ex-penditure of fmite landing force resources may affectthe MAGTF's ability to accomplish objectives ashore.

Although the amphibious assault is the principal typeof amphibious operation, anitair warfare actions willnormally follow a similar pattern despite the type ofoperation. AAW operations that support amphibiousoperations are grouped into pre-D-day, D-day, andpost-D-day (if the MAGTF is established ashore)operations. AAW assets require careful planning.Training and rehearsals can ensure that personnel andequipment meet combat readiness requirements.

Pre-D-Day Operations

Depending on the threat, pre-D-day AAW operationsmay include neutralizing or destroying enemy airdefense, aircraft, airfields, supporting infrastructure(including command and control), and theater missilecapabilities. Pre-D-day offensive antiair warfareoperations achieve the air superiority for the MAGTFto conduct operations. They shape the battlespace forthe main assault and create opportunities for theMAGTF commander to exploit during the mainassault. The Navy normally controls the airspace andmay be tasked as an area air defense commander for aspecific region or sector during pre-D-Day amphibiousoperations. The MAGTF commander provides anitairwarfare support to the Navy commander during thisperiod. Landing force assets may be tasked to provideemergency defense of the amphibious ships.

D-Day Operations

AAW operations on D-day and beyond are gearedtoward maintenance of air defense and air superiorityfor the MAGTF's operations ashore, whether an

assault, raid or NEO. The critical part of this phase isthe actual landing of the MAGTF ashore. Antiairwarfare operations initiated during pre-D-day shouldcontinue as preparation of the landing area continues.Aviation, naval surface fire support, sea-basedsurface-to-air weapons systems, and infantry weaponsprovide most of the antiair warfare fires until artilleryand ground-based air defense assets have landed andare operational ashore.

The Navy normally retains controls of the airspace andair defense operations and the Navy tactical air controlcenter. Navy, Marine Corps and joint antiair warfareassets are integrated to maintain air superiority.

Air defense capabilities are normally established andbuilt up ashore. Capabilities include ground-basedsurface-to-air weapons, aircraft, surveillance assets,and command and control agencies. After landingforce (MAGTF) assets and units are establishedashore, transfer of specified operations may pass fromthe Navy to the MAGTF. If the MACCS is establishedashore, the MAGTF may assume control of theairspace and air defense for its area of operations.

Initial Air Defense Capability AshoreInitially, aircraft operating from supporting aircraftcarriers or forward operating bases provide airborne airdefense ashore. Stinger teams operating in direct sup-port of the ground combat element are the first groundair defense capability established ashore. Stinger teamssupporting the assault unit may initially collocate andcoordinate their activities with forward air controllersto deconflict supporting friendly aircraft from enemyaircraft. Deconfliction and coordination of air defenseaircraft (operating feet-dry) and direct support Stingerassets occur between air warfare commander and theStinger unit commander. Established return-to-forceprocedures and ROE must be briefed in detail and un-derstood by all air defenders and fixed-wing and rota-ry-wing aircrews. See figure 6-1, page 6-10.

The Stinger team's section leader, located in the as-sault unit's fire support coordination center, supervisesand controls the Stinger teams. The senior Stingercommander ashore establishes communications withthe Stinger sections ashore and with the Navy tacticalair control center. The unit commander afloat provideshostile early warning alerts to Stinger sections andteam commanders ashore. The senior Stinger com-mander ashore provides threat, engagement, and statusinformation to the unit commander afloat.

6-10 MCWP3-22

Air Defense Buildup AshoreAs the landing force's follow-on GCE and CSSEresources phase ashore, additional air defense assetsalso phase ashore as soon as possible. The GCE'sfollow-on infantry, artillery, and armor units may beaccompanied by additional Stinger assets assigned ineither general or direct support and light armoredvehicle (air defense) variants to provide air defense forscreening forces. The CSSE may also have Stingerassets assigned in direct support. General supportStinger assets establish a comprehensive low-altitudeair defense of the force beachhead and integrate withthe assault force's direct support Stinger assets. Theplatoon commanders of Stinger assets in generalsupport coordinate their activities with the Stingercommander located with the TACC afloat. The seniordirect support Stinger commander may integrate hisforces with the DASC after it phases ashore andbecomes operational. This integration providescomprehensive and timely deconfliction andcoordination of friendly aircraft and enemy aircraft.

During the buildup of MAGTF air defense ashore,Marine wing communication squadron detachments,Marine wing support squadrons, and Marine air trafficcontrol detachments establish forward operating basesashore. Forward operating bases allow MAGTFaircraft (including antiair warfare-capable platforms)

to establish forward bases ashore. As forwardoperating bases are established ashore and LF aircraftbegin using the forward operating bases, ground-basedair defense assets must provide air defense. Once theforward operating base is operational and MAGTF airdefense assets are available, a forward operating basedefense zone must be established and coordinated withthe airwarfare commander. See figure 6-2.

The early introduction of Stinger sections and an earlywarning and control site from the TAOC ashoreextends shipboard weapons employment, radarsurveillance, identification, and coordinationlcontrolcapabilities. The Stinger section, if provided with anacquisition radar, and the early warning and controlelements provide initial engagement, early warning,cueing, and surveillance capabilities against the enemyaircraft and missile threat. The TAOC 's early warningand control site also initiates data link connectivitywith ATF and other air defense units.

Data between the early warning and control site's ra-dars and Navy capable platforms is also exchangedthrough the cooperative engagement capability (CEC).Over the CEC link, radar data is shared between sen-sors. This shared data provides a composited, nearlycontinuous track on all aircraft and theater missiles de-tected by sensors. CEC significantly increases the en-gagement envelope of ground- and surface-based air

Figure 6-1. Notional Initial Air Defense Capability Ashore Laydown.

AEW/C CAP

SAAWC (Backup)

SAAWC (Sea)

1TACC


defense weapons by providing the weapon systemswith fire quality control data from nonorganic surveil-lance sources. This data provides weapon systemswith the potential to engage and fire on targets outsidethe radar horizon of their own sources.

With the introduction of the early warning and controlsite ashore, general support Stinger platooncommanders/section leaders may collocate atcommand and control nodes to facilitate exchange ofsurveillance/identification information with the earlywarning and control site, landward SAAWC, and theTACC afloat.

The ACE commander, normally through the MarineSAAWC/TAOC, activates missile engagement zonesas operationally required. Control agencies must coor-dinate flight paths to prevent landing force aircraftfrom penetrating a missile engagement zone unless ab-solutely necessary. Typically, activating a missile en-gagement zone changes RTF and ROE procedures inthe initial assault phase. All control agencies, control-lers, and aircrews must adhere to the new procedures.

As additional general support Stinger assets moveashore, remaining TAOC equipment and personnelphase ashore. Liaison is established with the landwardSAAWC to coordinate MAGTF AAW operations.Once the TAOC and Stinger assets are operational,they establish and maintain the required voice anddigital information links with the landward SAAWC.

Post D-Day Operations

Depending on the type of operation, the MAGTFcommander establishes air control facilities ashore asrequired by transferring control ashore. Thesefacilities provide increased surveillance, quickerresponse to air defense threats and offensive antiairwarfare targeting, and extend the ATF's weaponscontrol capabilities. Initially, air control agenciesashore operate as an adjunct to agencies afloat. Aircontrol agencies ashore assist as needed and monitorair control aspects (including communicationscircuits) directly related to their tasking. As theMACCS becomes functional and able to assume

AEW/C

Figure 6-2. Notional Air Defense Buildup Ashore.

CAP

LAADFOB

GBAD jJ7SAAWC (Backup)

SAAWC (Sea)

TACC

6-12 MCWP 3-22

greater airspace control responsibilities, the Navy mayincrementally pass control of some parts of theoperation to the MAGTF. The decision to phaseashore all or parts of airspace and air defense control isbased on the mission, the type of operation beingconducted, the ability to establish agencies ashore, thetactical situation, and the MAGTF commander'srecommendation to phase functions ashore. During thephasing of airspace and air defense control ashore,Navy control units afloat monitor the progress ofassumption of air control responsibilities ashore, andcan act in a backup or alternate role if required. Seefigure 6-3.

Once the DASC is ashore and operational, control ofoffensive air support and assault support aircraft phas-es ashore. As part of its offensive air support controlresponsibilities, the DASC may also process immedi-ate requests for attacks against time critical targets andSEAD missions in support of OAAW operations.

With the introduction of ground-based air defense as-sets and the early warning and control site ashore, airintercept zones and fighter engagement zones are alsoestablished for aircraft and missile intercept zones;missile engagement zones are established for surface-to-air missile units. As the MAGTF's lADS of inter-locking engagement zones is established, a change ofRTF and ROE procedures may occur. Once the TAOCis ashore and operational, control of air defense of thelandward sector (including theater missile defense)phases ashore to the landing force SAAWC.

Before transferring control of air operations to theMACCS unitsashore, the MACCS must establish anintegrated and comprehensive surveillance plan for theMAGTF. Surveillance resources are employed ashorebased on their capability and coverage. The Marinecontrol group commander, staff, and subordinate unitcommanders must thoroughly analyze the surveillancerequirements of the MAGTF's sector of responsibility.They must address terrain and its masking effects,threat axis of attack, and available surveillanceresources. They must also identify the—

• Location of the TAOC and its radars, the earlywarning and control site, and gap-filler radars.

• Ability of Marine air traffic control radars atforward operating bases to augment the surveillancesystem and base defense zone concept.

• Location of Stinger units in general and directsupport.

• Orientation of aircraft weapon engagement zones.Resources used in weapon engagement zonesshould provide specific airborne surveillance orweapon capabilities in a sector that othersurveillance sources cannot see.

Marine air control group planners must also identify tothe ACE commander any other specific requirementsof aircraft surveillance capabilities; e.g., airborne earlywarning and control and surface-to-air weapons.

A complete and effective surveillance system isrequired for effective integrated air defense. Once thesystem is established, the TAOC 's surveillance sectioncoordinates surveillance information. The surveillancesection coordinates input from the TAOC ' s sensorsand all other surveillance sources. The surveillancesection identifies detected air tracks and uses organicand remote sensor data and data link information tobuild a complete and comprehensive air picture. Thisair picture is used by the ACE commander and thelADS to gain situational awareness of ongoingaviation operations.

The SAAWC, collocated with or in the TAOC, mayassume some current operations functions of theMATCD as TADC equipment and personnel phaseashore. Once phased ashore, the SAAWC manages theMAGTF's AAW assets and coordinates landward airdefense, AAW and other air operations as requiredwith the Navy TACC.

The SAAWC is the MAGTF commander's air defensebattle manager. He commits AAW resources tomissions tasked by the MAGTF or ACE commander.The Navy's air warfare commander must coordinatewith the MAGTF or ACE commander to requestsupport. Only the MAGTF or ACE commander hasthe authority to commit MAGTF aviation resources.

As the MATCD becomes operational, it establishesthe required communications with the DASC, TAOC,forward-based landing force aviation units, and theNavy tactical air control center. The MAGTFcommander can request that control of the airspace betransferred ashore. If approved, the MATCD thenbecomes the TACC, and the Navy tactical air controlcenter becomes a TADC. Only one TACC is active inan operational area at one time.

Antlair Warfare 6-13

AEWIC CAP

MILITARY OPERATIONSOTHER THAN WAR

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) areoperations that encompass the use of militarycapabilities across the range of military operationsshort of war. These military actions can be applied tocomplement any combination of the other instrumentsof national power and occur before, during, and afterwar. (JP 1-02)

MOOTW and conventional warfare share similarities.Both involve demonstrations of political resolve and,when necessary, the use of force to complete amission. Both are inherently conducted in support ofnational objectives. War is conducted to achievenational objectives through large-scale, sustainedcombat; MOOTW are conducted to deter war andpromote peace.

AAW operations are conducted in MOOTW as well asin war. The MAGTF uses the same resources in bothsituations. Although tactics may be the same, ROEwill be the principal guideline for the degree thatAAW is employed in MOOTW.

JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations OtherThan War, describes many types of MOOTW; thetypes having AAW roles follow.

Counterdrug Operations

Air defense surveillance radars track aircraft or airdefense aircraft intercept and identify aircraftsuspected of transporting drugs.

Enforcing Exclusion Zones

Air defense aircraft and radars can enforce no-flyzones.

SAAWC (Backup)

Figure 6-3. Transfer of Control Ashore.

6-14 MCWP3-22

Ensuring Freedom of Navigationand Overflight

AAW aircraft provide escort or enforce freedom ofnavigation activities in international airspace as recog-nized by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Show of Force Operations

Aircraft demonstrate U.S. resolve through highvisibility operations to diffuse potentially hostilesituations.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

AAW resources provide air defense for security oflanding zones and MAGTF assets.

Peace Operations

Peace operations encompass both peacekeepingoperations and peace enforcement operations. AAWoperations enforce peace treaties, cease fires or furtherenable the forcible execution of peace operations.

Protection of Shipping

AAW aircraft can provide CAP or escort for U.S.ships operating in international waters.

Strikes and Raids

AAW operations can damage, seize or destroy anobjective for political purposes. AAW assets provideescorts for these strikes and raids, conduct SEAD orattack weapons of mass destruction facilities.

OPERATIONAL MANEUVERFROM THE SEA

Operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) is theMarine Corps' operational concept for the 21stcentury. OMFTS is not a tactic but a mindsetregarding how MAGTFs will fight tomorrow's wars.OMFTS focuses on using sea, land, and air asmaneuver space and maneuver and tempo to exploitenemy weaknesses and attack their center(s) ofgravity. Under OMFTS, Marine forces will conductamphibious operations and sustained operationsashore to support national policy. However, themethodology used in conducting OMFTS will differsignificantly from our amphibious doctrine of today.

To transition from today's tactics to tomorrow's,methods and technologies needed to make operationalmaneuver from the sea a reality need to beinvestigated. The outcome of this investigation willhopefully enable the development of the tactics,techniques, and procedures needed to fighttomorrow's wars.

CHAPTER 7. JOINT AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS

Joint air defense operations protect the joint force as awhole or as components from attack by hostile aircraftand missiles. The range of weapons systems, theability to cross boundaries between component areasof operation, and the speed associated with air andmissile attacks make joint air defense a responsibilityof all components of the joint force. The intent ofjointair defense operations is to successfully negate attacksby enemy aircraft and missiles by providing aseamless, fully integrated air defense system. METT-T is used to detennine the extent to which air defenseintegration is accomplished, the employment of airdefense systems, and the area of air defense coverageafforded by joint force resources.

THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

The joint force commander (JFC) is ultimatelyresponsible for air defense of the joint forces.Normally, he has two options for delegating authorityfor the coordination of joint air defense operations: tohis staff or to a functional component commander.

The JFC's staff is normally used to coordinate joint airdefense operations when a conflict or situation is oflimited duration, scope or complexity. When the JFC 'sstaff is used to coordinate joint air defense operations,he may elect to centralize planning and coordinatingfimctions within the staff while retaining the ability todirectly task joint force air defense capabilities andforces. The JFC's staff functions to the extent of theauthority given by the JFC.

The JFC's choice to use his staff for coordinating jointair defense operations is influenced by his span of con-trol, the duration and scope of operations, and the de-gree of centralized planning and control needed toconduct effective air defense operations. The com-plexity of the operations is the primary considerationfor the JFC in determining if his staff has the ability tocoordinate joint force air defense operations. When thecomplexity of coordinating joint air defense opera-tions exceeds the scope and capabilities of the JFC'sstaff, the JFC will designate a functional componentcommander to coordinate joint air defense operations.A functional component commander promotes unityof effort and increases the JFC's span of controlthrough delegation of authority. The functional com-

ponent commander normally designated is the area airdefense commander (AADC).

THE AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER

The area air defense commander is normally the com-ponent commander with the preponderance of air de-fense capability and the command, control, andcommunications capability to plan and execute inte-grated air defense operations. (JP 1-02) The AADC isan individual; i.e., position, not an air command andcontrol agency. The JFC defines the support relation-ship between the AADC and supporting commanders.All components will provide representatives to theAADC 's headquarters to provide specific weapon sys-tems expertise as well as broader mission expertise.The AADC normally exercises operational controlover forces assigned or attached to him and tacticalcontrol over other military forces and capabilitiesmade available for tasking. Responsibilities betweenjoint air defense and joint airspace control are inher-ently interrelated. The JFC normally designates thesame individual as AADC and airspace control author-ity. AADC responsibilities include—

• Assessing the enemy order of battle and situation.• Developing and executing the joint air defense plan

(a detailed plan to disseminate timely air andmissile warning and cueing information tocomponents, forces, allies and coalition partners,and civil authorities), as appropriate.

• Developing and implementing identification andengagement procedures and ROE that areappropriate to the aircraft and missile threat.

• Coordinating air defense operations with othercomponent commanders.

• Ensuring timely and accurate track reporting amongparticipating units to provide a consistent commonoperating picture.

• Establishing air defense regions or sectors toenhance decentralized control of joint air defenseoperations.

• Establishing air defense warning conditions andweapons release conditions for the joint operationsarea.

• Publishing technical and tactical operational datamessages or operational task link messages forcoordination of air defense and data link operations.

7-2 MCWP 3-22

• Performing the duties of the 'airspace controlauthority when directed by the JFC.

Relationships with other component commanders andthe AADC are established by the JFC. The JFCnormally establishes AADC command relationships asshown in figure 7-1.

Figure 7-1. Options for AADC Designation.

The AADC as a Separate FunctionalCommander

The JFC may designate the AADC as an individualwho has no other functional commanderresponsibilities. The AADC reports directly to the JFCrelative to joint air defense matters. The AADC wouldalso coordinate with other Service and functionalcommanders, including the JFACC, on area airdefense. This arrangement is most beneficial when it isanticipated that functional responsibilities will passfrom one component to another, such as the passing ofAADC functions from afloat to ashore.

The AADC as a Combined FunctionalComponent Commander

The JFC may designate one individual as the AADCand another functional component commander; e.g.,the AADC as the JFACC. This individual performs theduties as the AADC and the JFACC, although theresponsibilities of each functional area are separate butinterrelated. The individual commander may use oneor two staffs to fulfill dual responsibilities. Thisarrangement is most beneficial when high tempo, highintensity air and air defense operations facilitate unityof effort and enhance coordination between joint airand air defense operations.

THE AIR DEFENSE PLAN

The AADC, with the support and coordination of theService and functional commanders, develops,

integrates, and distributes a JFC-approved joint airdefense plan. It integrates the active air defensecapabilities of the joint force's components to providea responsive air defense system that will achieve bothoperational and tactical objectives. The air defenseplan reflects the priorities established by the JFC.Because air defense, airspace control, andmanagement functions are inherently interrelatedareas, the air defense plan and the airspace controlplan should be developed in tandem to avoid conflicts.Some items addressed are—

• Sensor employment.• Identification procedures.• Engagement procedures.• Airspace control measures pertaining to air defense.• Weapons control procedures.• Weapons system employment.• Tactical interface design; i.e., TADIL.• Dissemination of early warning.

THE REGIONAL AND SECTOR AIRDEFENSE COMMANDERS

To enhance his ability, the AADC, in coordinationwith other component commanders, may recommendestablishing air defense regions to the JFC. Airdefense regions may be further subdivided into airdefense sectors. The number of air defense regions andsectors will vary depending on geographical, political,and operational factors; e.g., friendly forces,geography, threat, and concept of operations. Aregional air defense commander (RADC) is designatedto coordinate air defense activities within each region.A sector air defense commander (SADC) is designatedfor each air defense sector. Responsibilities of bothcommanders may include, but are not limited to—

• Coordinating air defense actions between regionsand sectors.

• Evaluating the results of engagements within theirregion or sector.

• Forwarding observations and results of engage-ments within their region or sector to the AADC.

• Requesting from the AADC or directing, when au-thorized, changes to the air defense alert and weap-ons release conditions commensurate to the threat.

• Requesting additional air defense assets from theAADC when necessary.

JFC

AADC

[FC1

AADC/JFACCj

JFC

rJFACC]

AADC

Antiair Warfare 7-3

The AADC provides RADCs with—

• Guidance and direction for air defense warningconditions and weapons release conditions.

• Changes to ROE.• Allocation of additional air defense resources as

necessary or as available.• Requests for additional airborne air defense assets

from the JFACC.

NOTIONAL JOINT AIR DEFENSEOPERATIONS

The area, regional, and sector air defense commanderscan coordinate active air defense operations at the

lowest level. This concept of centralized command—exercised through the AADC—and decentralizedexecution—exercised through RADCs and SADCs—promotes coordinated operations and economy offorce while allowing decisionmaking at the lowestlevel. Reaction time to the threat is enhanced and thelikelihood of fratricide is reduced. See figure 7-2.

Based on the JFC '5 air defense priorities, the AADCbuilds an air defense plan designed to optimize thejoint force's air defense capabilities against enemy airattack. When employing his available air defenseresources, the AADC considers factors such as mutualsupport and destruction-in-depth to maximizeengagement opportunities and protection of forces.

The AADC's air defense resources include aircommand and control agencies, surface-to-air weapon

p1

/

\ /

Figure 7-2. Notional Joint Air Defense Organization.

7-4 MCWP 3-22

systems, and air defense aircraft. The AADC reviewsair command and control agencies' locations to ensureoverlapping air surveillance coverage of the jointoperations area, thus enhancing mutual support andincreasing opportunities for detecting threat aircraftand missiles. The AADC determines the positioning ofthose surface-to-air missile systems specificallydesignated for joint theater air and missile defense.The employment plan for components' surface-to-airmissile systems is normally factored into the overalljoint air defense plan to determine gaps in air defensecoverage and to identify shortages in resources.

The JFACC allocates a percentage of aircraft to per-form air defense missions based on the JFC's appor-tionment decision. The AADC typically allocates airdefense missions to each RADC to perform air de-fense activities within each region. RADCs, in turn,distribute air defense aircraft to subordinate SADCs,depending on the anticipated need for air defense air-craft within their sectors. SADCs further distribute airdefense aircraft to control agencies within their sector.It is the responsibility of controlling agencies to exe-cute the air defense mission through the coordination,control, and integration of aircraft and surface-to-airweapon systems under their direction.

THE MAGTF AND JOINT AIRDEFENSE OPERATIONS

control all facets of joint air defense. The Navyprovides a sea-based command and control capabilitythat is best suited for maritime operations, but can alsoprovide joint air defense coordination functions in thelittorals. The Air Force's capabilities are land-based,focused on high-tempo, extended duration air defenseoperations in support of a major theater campaign. TheMAGTF can perform joint air defense coordinationfunctions in both littoral operations and sustainedoperations ashore. The MAGTF's expeditionarynature and orientation on the littorals are definingfactors that planners must comprehend when assigningthese functions to the MAGTF.

The MAGTF's ability to perform AADC functions isbest described as an enabling or pass-throughcapability. The MAGTF is well-suited to function asAADC in littoral operations for limited time.Examples of the MAGTF performing AADCfunctions include—

• The planned passage or transition of AADCfunctions from a sea-based facility to a shore-basedfacility (or vice versa)—similar to phasing controlashore—with the intent of the MAGTF passingthose functions to another Service at a later time.

• Or, if an unplanned transition, where the AADC isunexpectedly unable to perform its functionsbecause of a catastrophic action that significantlycurtails the ability of the primary AADC to performits functions.

The MACCS is the principal conduit, which theMAGTF integrates with the joint air defense network.The senior agency of the MACCS, the tactical air com-mand center (TACC), plans and coordinates MAGTFair defense operations with the AADC. The SAAWCassists in the near-term coordination and managementof MAGTF-organic and joint force air defense resourc-es allotted to the MAGTF by coordinating with the ar-ea, regional or sector air defense commander, asappropriate. The TAOC is the MAGTF's principal airdefense agency responsible for the real-time executionof air defense operations. The TAOC, through theSAAWC, coordinates its activities with adjacent sectorand regional air defense control agencies.

Currently, three Services have the command andcontrol capabilities to perform area, regional or SADCfunctions: the United States Air Force, United StatesNavy, and United States Marine Corps. Capabilitiesare based on each Service's organic ability tocommunicate, surveil, coordinate, and command and

If designated as the AADC, the commander, MarineCorps forces may delegate the authority for air defensecoordination to the MAGTF commander, who maydelegate that authority to the ACE commander.

The ACE commander, acting as the agent for theAADC, uses a joint staff whose composition isrepresentative of the joint force to plan, manage, andcoordinate joint air defense operations. The TACCmay host the AADC's staff, providing the necessaryvoice and data communications resources andplanning tools to coordinate joint air defenseoperations. The TACC's battlestaff is responsible forthe coordination and execution of MAGTF aviationoperations and should not be considered a part of theAADC's joint staff. However, it is likely that TACCcrewmembers will be used to augment and providesubject matter expertise to the AADC's staff

The MAGTF's ACE does not have the resources toperform area air defense functions for extendeddurations or in support of large scale theater

Anflair Warfare 7-5

operations without significant communications andpersonnel support. The requirement for the TACC toremain expeditionary should be considered whendetermining the scope and duration for MAGTFdesignation as the AADC.

Like the AADC, regional and sector air defense com-manders are managers of air defense assets. TheMAGTF possesses a robust capability to function asregional and sector air defense commanders in bothamphibious operations and sustained operationsashore, with regional and sector air defense coordina-tion activities falling well within the scope and capabil-ities of the MAGTF's existing air defense architecture.

The SAAWC, as the MAGTF's air defense battlemanager, is the most likely candidate to performRADC or SADC functions. Like the AADC, regional

and sector air defense commander positions are jointforce billets. Joint staffs separate from the MAGTF airdefense staff should coordinate region and sector airdefense operations. If designated as the MAGTF'sagent to perform regional or sector air defensecommander functions, the SAAWC should ensure thatliaisons from affected joint and multinational forces beincluded in his staff to facilitate planning andcoordination of air defense operations.

As a RADC, the MAGTF's agent coordinates air de-fense operations directly with the AADC. As a SADC,the MAGTF's agent coordinates sector air defensewith the RADC. Assuming these joint force responsi-bilities creates a requirement for dual reporting of airdefense activities, one through joint reporting chan-nels, and the other through the MAGTF's.

APPENDIX A. TACTJCAL DIGITAL INFORMATION LINKS

tactical digital information link (TADIL) is a JointStaff-approved, standardized communications linkthat transmits digital information. Current practice isto characterize a TADIL by its standardized messageformats and transmission characteristics. TADILsinterface two or more command and control orweapons systems via a single or multiple networkarchitecture and multiple communication media forexchange of tactical information. (JP 1-02)

In AAW operations,TADILs share air track mforma-tion to build a comprehensive picture of the current airsituation in a near real time basis. TADILs used by theMACCS in air defense operations follow.

TADIL-C is also known as Link 4A. It is an unsecure,time-division digital data link conducted between anair defense controlling unit; e.g., TAOC or airbornewarning and control system (AWACS) andappropriately equipped aircraft. Information exchangeat 5,000 bps can occur in one of three modes: full two-way (ground to air to ground), one way air to ground,or one way ground to air.

TADIL-A

TADIL-A is also known as Link 11. It is a secure,half-duplex (poll-response) netted digital data link thatuses parallel transmission frame characteristics andstandard message formats. TADIL-A uses a rollcallmode under the control of a net control station (amachine function). The net control stationsynchronizes the track reporting of link participatingunits. Information is transmitted at either 1,364 or2,250 bits per second (bps) over a high frequency (HF)or ultra-high frequency (UHF) carrier. TADIL-A isnormally used to exchange data between airborne, sea-based, and ground-based air defense units.

TADIL-J is also known as Link 16. It is a secure, high-speed digital data link. It uses the joint tacticalinformation distribution system transmission (JTID 5)characteristics and protocols, conventions, and fixed-length message formats defined by the JTIDStecimical interface design plan. TADIL-J is intendedto replace or augment many existing TADILs as thejoint standard for data link information exchange.Information is passed at one of three data rates: 26.88,53.76 or 107.52 kilobits per second. TADIL-J deviceswill be located in ground, airborne, and sea-based airdefense platforms and selected fighter aircraft.

NATO LINK 1

NATO Link 1 is a point-to-point digital data link thatsupports NATO air defense ground environment oper-.ations. It functions similarly to TADIL-B, but tracknumber assignments differ and Link 1 is unencrypted.

TADIL-B is also known as Link 1 lB. It is a secure,full-duplex, point-to-point digital data link conductedbetween two reporting units. Data is simultaneouslyreceived between reporting units. Operations arenormally conducted over multichannel radio, satellitecommunication, telephone lines or cables.Information is transmitted at 2,400, 1,200 or 600 bps.TADIL-B is generally limited to providingconnectivity between ground-based units.

ARMY TACTICAL DATA LINK-i

Army tactical data link-l (ATDL-l) is a secure, full-duplex, point-to-point digital data link thatinterconnects tactical air control systems and Army orMarine tactical air defense oriented systems. Ittransmits at the rate of 1,200 bps.

TADIL-C

TADIL-J

TADIL-B

A-2 MCWP 3-22

GROUND-BASED DATA LINK MAGTF TADIL CAPABILITIES

Ground-based data link (GBDL) is a simplex or half- Table A-i shows TADIL capabilities of variousduplex digital data link used by air defense units. It MAGTF agencies and weapons platforms.enhances the combat effectiveness of remotelyemplaced LAAD gunners by providing them with alow-to-medium altitude air picture and weapons Figures A-i and A-2 show interfaces and connectivitycueing from sensors feeding targeting information to options for MACCS to interface with joint andthe MACCS. multinational forces.

Table A-i. MAGTF TADIL Capabilities.

TACC TAOC EW/C MATCD LAAD F/A-18

TADIL-A

TADIL B

TADIL C

TADIL J

LINK 1

ATDL-1

GBDL

Antiair Warfare A-3

Figure A-i. Data Link Interfaces (TACC-Emphasis).

TADIL S

TADIL C

A-4 MCWP 3-22

Figure A-2. Data Link Interfaces (TAOC-Emphasis).

TADILC

APPENDIX B. AIR DEFENSE PLANNING CHECKLIST

This checklist helps form information requirements,plan an overall air defense strategy, and apply tacticsand techniques for air defense operations above theMEU level.

GENERAL MISSION OVERVIEW

• Theater missile engagement envelopes and tactics:• Training and readiness.• Sustainability/logistic support.• Enemy troop concentrations (e.g., FEBA area).• Organic air defense capability.• Surface-to-surface threats.

Electronic Order of Battle• Air defense strategy.• Mission statement.• Tasking and general requirements.

THREAT ANALYSIS

• Electronic attack/electronic protection capabilities.• Radio electronic combat assets/locations.• Defensive electronic attack capabilities.• Electronic attack/electronic protection tactics.• C2 nets (filter centers, links, and control points).• Early warning and acquisition systems numbers,

types, locations, coverage, and detection range.

Air Order of Battle

• Aircraft numbers, types, and locations.• Aircraft range and time on station.• Air-to-ground weapons (standoff capability).• Air-to-air weapons (defensive electronic attack

capabilities).• Night and all-weather capabilities.• Navigation systems.• Targeting information required.• Tactics (ROE, identification criteria, RTF ingress/

egress routes, formations, escort tactics, and attackprofiles).

• Self-protection capabilities.• Maximum sortie rates.• Electronic attack/IR countermeasures capability.• Training and readiness.• Sustainability/logistics support.

Ground Order of Battle

Enemy Command and Control

• SAM/antiaircraft artillery control (location).• Ground-controlled intercept facilities (location).• SAM/CAP/strike coordination.• Theater missile control (location).• RTF procedures.• ROE.• Training and readiness.• Identification criteria.

Enemy Logistics Support

• Airfields (location).• Support facilities (maintenance depots; ammunition

dumps; petroleum, oils, and lubricants).• Means of supply.• Lines of communications.

• SAM systems, locations, and numbers.• Antiaircraft artillery systems, locations, and num-

bers.• SAM/antiaircraft artillery engagement envelopes

and tactics.• Theater missile systems, locations, and numbers.

INTELLIGENCE

• Intelligence collection assets tasked.• Intelligence disseminated to air defense planners!

controllers.

B-2 MCWP 3-22

AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA/AREAOF OPERATION DESCRIPTION

• Non real-time track reporting (visual).• Evaluation criteria.• Surveillance sectors.

• Sector of responsibility.• Vitalldestructionlsurveillance areas.• Zone defense grid.

ROE

• Standing.

• Supplemental.

AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS

Methods Available

• Electronic warfare.• Communications jamming.• Radar jamming.• Deceptive jamming.• Deception.• Aircraft/ordnance.• Decoys.• Chaff.• Stinger (MANPADS/Avenger).• Radar SAM.• MACCS.

Considerations

• Missile intercept/engagement zones.• SHORAD engagement zones.• Air intercept zones/fighter engagement zones.• Visual CAP locations.• Radar CAP locations.• Stinger locations.• Tankers.• Airborne early warning and control aircraft.• Aircraft/ordnance availability.• Surveillance capability.• Defense conditions.• Weapons control statuses.• Radar control procedures.• Threat axis.• AAW fragmentary orders and call signs.• Additional missions.

Surveillance Coordination

Specific Control Procedures

• RTF ingress/egress routes and procedures.• Lame duck procedures.• 1FF/selective identification feature.• Radar fighters.• Visual CAP.• Stinger.

• Lost communications procedures.

Identification Authority

Identification Criteria

• Not identified as friendly/visually identified ashostile.

• Flight characteristics/flight profiles.• Pop-up.• Electronic attack detected.• Attacking friendly assets.• Mode I, II, Ill, and IV.

Weapons Control and Management

• Radar-equipped CAP.• Visual CAP.• Stinger.• Radar SAM.• Casualty procedures.

Aerial Refueling Plan

• Track location.• Assets.• Mission priorities.

What-ifs for Major Weapons SystemDeficiencies

• Digital information link configuration. Mission and Tasking Reviewed

APPENDIX C. OAAW PLANNING CHECKLIST

This checklist helps form information requirements,plan an overall OAAW strategy, and apply tactics andtechniques for OAAW operations above the MEUlevel.

GENERAL MISSION OVERVIEW

• OAAW strategy.• Mission statement.• Tasking and general requirements.

THREAT ANALYSIS

Air Order of Battle

• Aircraft numbers, types, and locations.• Air-to-air weapons (defensive electronic attack

capabilities).• Night and all-weather capability.• RTF ingress/egress routes and formations.• Training and readiness.• Sustainability/logistics support.

Ground and Missile Order of Battle

• SAM systems, locations, and numbers.• Antiaircraft artillery systems, locations, and

numbers.• SAM/antiaircraft artillery engagement envelopes

and tactics.Theater missile systems, locations, and numbers.Theater missile engagement envelopes and tactics.Training and readiness.Sustainability/logistics support.Enemy troop concentrations (e.g., FEBA).Organic air defense capability.Surface-to-surface threats.

ElectroniC Order of Battle

• Electronic attack/electronic protection capabilities.• Radio electrothc combat assets/locations.• Defensive electronic attack capabilities.• Electronic attack/electronic protection tactics.• C2 nets (filter centers, command and control links,

and control points).• Early warning and acquisition systems numbers,

types, locations, coverage, and detection range.

Enemy Command and Control

• SAMlantiaircraft axtillery control (location).• Location of groundcontrolled intercept facilities.• SAM/CAP coordination.• Theater missile control (location).• RTF procedures.• ROE.• Training and readiness,•. Identification criteria• lADS capabilities procedures, and effectiveness.

Enemy Logistics Support

• Airfields (location).• Support facilities (maintenance depOts; amniunition

dumps; and petroleum, oils, aid lubricants).• Means of supply.• Lines of communications.

INTELLIGENCE/TARGETING

• Collection assets tasked.• Targets prioritized.• Weapon assets allocated (weaponeering).• Assessment plan developed (planning, execution,

post-strike phase).• Intelligence disseminated to mission commanders!

planners.

C-2 MCWP 3-22

• Intelligence preparation of the battlespace preparedfor potential theater missile transporter-erectorlauncher hide sites.

• Mission planning feedback.

• Execution.• Assessment of effectiveness.

OAAW STRIKE PLANNING OAAW OPERATIONS

Preemptive Measures

• Tasking based on intelligence.• Integration ot7coordination with the targeting se-

quence.

• Integration with SEAD and local air superioritymeasures.

• Assignment of mission commanders.• Allocation of weapon assets (weaponeering).

Initiation of planning.Scheduling and coordinating with other Marineaviation functions; e.g:, offensive air support,assault support, and electronic warfare.

• Mission planning feedback.• Execution.• Assessment of effectiveness.

SEAD Measures

• Coordination with GCE.• Tasking based on intelligence.• Integration with preemptive and local air superiority.• Assignment of mission commanders.• Allocation of weapon assets (weaponeering).• Scheduling and coordinating with other Marine

aviation functions; e.g., offensive air support,assault support, and electronic warfare.

• Mission planning feedback.. Execution.. Assessment of effectiveness.

Local Air Superiority Measures

• Tasking based on intelligence.• Integration with preemptive and SEAD measures.• Assignment of mission commanders.• Allocation of weapon assets (weaponeering).• Initiation of planning.• Scheduling and coordinating with other Marine

aviation functions; e.g., offensive air support,assault support, and electronic warfare.

Methods Available

Groundlnaval fires.Electronic warfare.Communications jamming.Radar jamming.Deceptive jamming.

• Deception.• Aircraft/ordnance.

Decoys.MACCS.Chaff corridors.Antiradiation missile support:• Self-launched.• Standoff planned.• Standoff targets of opportunity.• Close-in planned.• Close-in targets of opportunity.

. Direct attack:• Bombs/rockets.• Cluster bombs.• Precision-guided weapons.

• Avoidance.• Night attack.

Self-Defense Measures

For friendly aircraft, adherence to:

• Safe passage corridors.• Altitude and speed criteria.

Preconditions for Air Attack

• Target geographically located via electronic, visualor photographic reconnaissance or by probingdefenses:• Emitters turn on to electronically locate.• Sites shoot to visually locate reconnaissance.

S

••••

••

••••

Antiair Warfare C-3

• Targeted for antiradiation missile (enemy emitterup) accomplished by—• Simulated attacks.• Real attacks.

• Jamming assets:• Support OAAW strikes for the preemptive plan.• Operate randomly for no specific air mission, but

operate concurrently with ground fires to effectdeception.

• Support deceptive air strikes.• Support CAS strikes.• Electronically locate threats.

Deception Assets

. Tactical air launched decoys (TALD).UAVs.Other aircraft. These aircraft can be directed by theDASC to contact the OAAW manager. Theirmissions should be anticipated and supported byelectronic warfare. Deception aircraft fly at mediumaltitude to the edges of enemy envelopes. Aircrewsare given the prebriefs required to fly these profiles(intelligence and procedures). Deception aircraftcan be fragged for a deception mission as a follow-on to CAS or any other mission if assets permit.

Purposes of Deception Assets

• Cause the enemy to expend missiles and emit.• Locate enemy sites.• Deception for other strikes.

AIRCREW TACTICS—LOCATION

Visual Methods (Organic)

• The aircrew observes the system or launches madeby the system.

• Ground troops observe the system and providelocation information.

Electronic means

• EA-6Bs indicate the presence of a system within acertain radius.

• Aircraft radar homing and warning gear indicatesthe presence of radar systems.

AIRCREW TACTICS—ATTACKTACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

• Direct attacks flown without support.

• Low-altitude attacks use terrain to conceallmaskattack.

• Medium-altitude attacks use precision-guidedweapons (laser/TV).

• Target marking (as in CAS missions), if possible.• Direct attacks flown with antiradiation missile sup-

port. Antiradiation missile can be directed againstcovering or targeted system.

• SeIf-antiradiation missile support provided by theattacking aircraft. Critical timing is easily coordi-nated using this method.

Standoff Antiradiation Missile Support

• Scheduled:

Critical timing is required between aircraft.• The system must emit or missiles may be wasted.

• On-call:• Enemy system must shoot.• Package normally consists of four aircraft: one

EA-6B acting as manager, one antiradiation mis-sile/rocket standoff attack aircraft (ironhand),and two iron bombers.

• Immediate:• Short time of flight required if shot is to cover

aircraft in the system's envelope.• If OAAW operations support CAS, place antira-

diation missile on station to react to threats,backed up by iron bombers if possible.

APPENDIX D. GLOSSARY

SECTION I ACRONYMS

AADC area air defense commanderAAW antiair warfareACA airspace control authorityACA airspace coordination areaACE aviation combat elementACM airspace control measureACO airspace control orderAIZ air intercept zoneAOA amphibious objective areaATDL Army tactical data linkATO air tasking order

BDZ base defense zone

CAP combat air patrolC2 command and controlCATF commander, amphibious task forceCEC cooperative engagement capabilityCLF commander, landing forceCSSE combat service support element

DASC direct air support centerDASC(A) direct air support center (airborne)DCA defensive counterair

EMCON emission controlEW/C early warning and control

FAD fighter air directionFEBA forward edge of the battle areaFEZ fighter engagement zoneFFA free-fire areaFSCL fire support coordination lineFSCM fire support coordinating measure

GBDL ground based data linkGCE ground combat element

HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone

lADS integrated air defense systemIcu interface coordination unit1FF identification, friend or foe

infrared

JFACC joint force air component commanderJEZ joint engagement zone

D-2 MCWP 3-22

LAAD low-altitude air defense

MACCS Marine air command and control systemMAGTF Marine air-ground task forceMATCD Marine air traffic control detachmentMEB Marine expeditionary brigadeMEF Marine expeditionary forceMETT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops

and support available - timeMEU Marine expeditionary unitMEU(SOC) Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)MEZ missile engagement zoneMIZ missile intercept zoneMOOTW military operations other than warMRR minimum-risk routeMWCS Marine wing communications squadron

NCTR non cooperative target recognitionNFA no-fire area

OAAW offensive antiair warfareOMFTS operational maneuver from the sea

PIRAZ positive identification and radar advisory zone

RADC regional air defense commanderRADCON radar controlRFA restrictive fire areaRFL restrictive fire lineROA restricted operations areaROE rules of engagementROZ restricted operations zoneRTF return to force

SAAFR standard use Army aircraft flight routeSAAWC sector antiair warfare coordinatorSADC sector air defense commanderSAM surface-to-air missileSEAD suppression of enemy air defensesSOA state of alertSPINS special instructionsSPMAGTF special purpose Marine air-ground task force

TACC tactical air command centerTADC tactical air direction centerTADIL tactical digital information linkTAOC tactical air operations center

WEZ weapon engagement zone

D3 MCWP3-22

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

active air defense — Direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify or reduce theeffectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. Itincludes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, electronic warfare, and other availableweapons. (JP 1-02)

air control — The authority to effect the maneuver of aircraft. The elements of aircontrol are: air control agency, air controller, airspace control, operational control,positive control, procedural control, radar control, and terminal control. (MCRP 5- 12C)

air defense — All defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft ormissiles in the Earth's envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectivenessof such attack. (JP 1-02)

air direction — The guidance and supervision which a commander employs to focus hisresources on mission accomplishment. Air direction occurs as a sequence of thefollowing activities:

1. apportionment (Air) — The determination and assignment of the total expected aireffort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various airoperations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time.

2. allocation (Air) — The translation of the air apportionment decision into totalnumbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or task.

3. tasking — The process of translating the allocation into orders and passing theseorders to the units involved. Each order normally contains sufficient detailedinstructions to enable the executing agency to accomplish the mission successfully.

4. fragmentary order — An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on aday-to-day basis, that eliminates the need for restating infonnation contained in a basicoperation order. It may be issued in sections. (Extract from MCRP 5-12C, under"Marine air command and control system".)

air superiority — That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over anotherwhich permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and airforces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.(JP 1-02)

airspace control authority The commander designated to assume overallresponsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace controlarea. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02)

antiair warfare — A U.S. Navy/Marine Corps term used to indicate that action requiredto destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. It includessuch measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air andair-to-air missiles, electronic attack, and destruction of the air or missile threat bothbefore and after it is launched. Other measures which are taken to minimize the effectsof hostile air action are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (includingelectronic), and mobility. (JP 1-02)

D-4 MCWP 3-22

area air defense commander — Within a unified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for airdefense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander withthe preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, andcommunications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations.Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, tothe area air defense commander's headquarters Also called AADC. (JP 1-02)

combat air patrol — An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, over the forceprotected, over the critical area of a combat zone, or over an air defense area, for thepurpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their target.(JP 1-02)

command — The authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercisesover subordinates by virtue of rank and assignment. (JP 1-02)

command and control — The means by which a commander recognizes what needs tobe done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken (MCDP 6, Command andControl)

commander, amphibious task force — The US Navy officer designated in the initiat-ing directive as commander of the amphibious task force. Also called CATF. (JP 1-02)

commander, landing force — The officer designated in the initiating directive for anamphibious operation to command the landing force. Also called CLF. (JP 1-02)Control - (Needs the defmition)

control — The physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure thatan agent or group will respond as directed. (JP 1-02)

counterair — A US Air Force term for air operations conducted to attain and maintain adesired degree of air superiority by the destruction or neutralization of enemy forces.Both air offensive and air defensive actions are involved. The former range throughoutenemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of the friendly forces. Thelatter are conducted near or over friendly territory and are generally reactive to theinitiative of the enemy air forces. (JP 1-02)

destruction area — An area in which it is planned to destroy or defeat the enemyairborne threat. The area may be further subdivided into air intercept, missile (long-,medium-, and short-range), or antiaircraft gun zones. (JP 1-02)

electronic attack — Actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of theelectromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and em-ployment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primarydestructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). (JP 1-02)

fighter engagement zone — In air defense, that airspace of defmed dimensions withinwhich the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighteraircraft. Also called FEZ. (JP 1-02, under "weapon engagement zone")

joint engagement zone — In air defense, that airspace of defmed dimensions withinwhich multiple air defense systems (surface-to-air missiles and aircraft) aresimultaneously employed to engage air threats. Also called JEZ. (JP 1-02, under"weapon engagement zone")

Antiair Warfare D5

joint force air component commander — The joint force air component commanderderives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exerciseoperationalcontrol, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinatecommanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normallydesignate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air componentcommander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normallythese would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, andtasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the jointforce commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Servicecomponent commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint forceair component commander will recommend to the joint force commanderapportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also calledJFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint theater missile defense — The integration of joint force capabilities to destroyenemy theater missiles in flight or prior to launch or to otherwise disrupt the enemy'stheater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive passivemissile defense; active missile defense; attack operations; and supporting command,control, communications, computers, and intelligence measures. Enemy theatermissiles are those that are aimed at targets outside the continental United States. Alsocalled JTMD. (JP 1-02)

Marine air command and control system — A system which provides the aviationcombat element commander with the means to command, coordinate, and control all airoperations within an assigned sector and to coordinate air operations with otherServices. It is composed of command and control agencies with communications-electronics equipment that incorporates a capability from manual throughsemiautomatic control. (JP 1-02)

missile engagement zone — The airspace of defined dimensions within which theresponsibility for engagement normally rests with missiles. Also called MEZ. MEZsmay be designated within the missile intercept zone. (MCWP 3-25)

offensive antiair warfare — Those operations conducted against enemy air assets andair defense systems before they can be launched or assume an attacking role. Offensiveantiair warfare operations in or near the objective area consist mainly of air attacks todestroy or neutralize hostile aircraft, airfields, radars, air defense systems, andsupporting areas. Also called OAAW.

passive air defense — All measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize theeffectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. Thesemeasures include camouflage, concealment, deception, reconstitution, redundancy,detection and warning systems, and the use of protective construction. (JP 1-02)

planning — The art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effectiveways of bringing it about. (MCDP 5)

point defense — The defense or protection of special vital elements and installations;e.g., command and control facilities and air bases. (JP 1-02)

sector antlair warfare coordinator — An individual designated by the aviation combatelement commander to function as his air defense battle manager. He functions to theextent of authority delegated to him by the aviation combat element commander. The

D-6 MCWP3-22

sector antiair warfare coordinator is responsible for coordination and management of allactive air defense weapons (aircraft and surface-to-air weapons) within his assignedsector. Also called SAAWC. (MCRP 5-12C)

suppression of enemy air defenses — That activity which neutralizes, destroys, ortemporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptivemeans. Also called SEAD. (JP 1-02)

surface-to-air weapon — A surface-launched weapon for use against airborne targets.Future developments in air defense systems may lead to the employment of weaponsother than missiles. Examples include rockets, directed-energy weapons, and airdefense guns. (JP 1-02)

tactical air command center — The principal U.S. Marine Corps air command andcontrol agency from which air operations and air defense warning functions aredirected. It is the senior agency of the U. S. Marine air command and control systemwhich serves as the operational command post of the aviation combat elementcommander. It provides the facility from which the aviation combat elementcommander and his battle staff plan, supervise, coordinate, and execute all current andfuture air operations in support of the Marine air-ground task force. The tactical aircommand center can provide integration, coordination, and direction of joint andcombined air operations. Also called Marine TACC. (JP 1.02)

tactical air operations center — The principal air control agency of the U. S. Marineair command and control system responsible for airspace control and management. Itprovides real time surveillance, direction, positive control, and navigational assistancefor friendly aircraft. It performs real time direction and control of all antiair warfareoperations, to include manned interceptors and surface-to-air weapons. It is subordinateto the tactical air command center. Also called TAOC. (JP 1-02)

theater missile — A missile, which may be a ballistic missile, a cruise missile, or an air-to-surface missile (not including short-range, non-nuclear, direct fire missiles, bombs orrockets such as Maverick or wire-guided missiles), whose target is within a giventheater of operation. (JP 1-02).

vital area - A designated area or installation to be defended by air defense units.(JP 1-02)

weapon engagement zone — In air defense, airspace of defined dimensions withinwhich the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particularweapon system. Also called WEZ. (JP 1-02)

weapons of mass destruction — In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of ahigh order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy largenumbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, butexcludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is aseparable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)

APPENDIX E. REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Joint Publications (JPs)

0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations3-01 Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats3-01.4 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression

of Enemy Air Defenses3-0 1.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War3-52 Joint Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP5)

1 Warfighting2 Intelligence3 Expeditionary Operations4 Logistics5 Planning6 Command and Control

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP5)

3-2 Aviation Operations (under development)3-16 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination

(under development)3-22.2 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses3-25 Control of Aircraft and Missiles3-25.1 Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control (ICAC2) Manual3-25.2 Multi-Service Procedures for Theater Air-Ground Systems (TAGS)3-25.3 Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook3-25.4 Marine Tactical Air Command Center Handbook3-25.5 Direct Air Support Center Handbook3-25.6 Sector Antiair Warfare Coordinator Handbook3-25.7 Tactical Air Operations Center Handbook3-25.8 Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment Handbook3-25.9 Low Altitude Air Defense Handbook3-25.11 LAAD Gunnder's Handbook (under development)5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process5-1.1 Aviation Planning

Naval Warfighting Publication (NWP)

3-09.11/ Supporting Arms in Amphibious OperationsMCWP 3-11.1

E-2 MCWP 3-22

Miscellaneous

Joint Vision O1O.From the Sea

Forward...Frorn the SeaMarine Corps Concept Paper, Operational Maneuver From the SeaMarine Corps Concept Paper, Ship to Objective Maneuver

Documents

MCWP 3-22 Antiair Warfare - United States Marine Corps 3-22... · 2012-10-11 · Antiair Warfare U.S. Marine Corps MCWP 3-22 Distribution Statement A: approved for public release;