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1
INDEPENDENTINVESTIGATORREPORTTO
THEOVERSIGHTANDINTEGRITYCOMMISSION
OF
INTERNATIONALWEIGHTLIFTINGFEDERATION
4JUNE20201
1Corrected as of 30 July 2020 at page 105, 106.
McLaren Independent Weightlifting Investigation
2
TableofContentsChapter1:ExecutiveSummaryofthisReport............................................................................41.1Introduction..............................................................................................................................................61.2BackgroundontheIWF.........................................................................................................................71.3CreationandTermsofReferenceoftheIndependentInvestigationintotheIWFirregularities....................................................................................................................................................71.4SummaryoftheEvidenceGatheringProcess..............................................................................111.5Witnesses.................................................................................................................................................121.6TheMcLarenIndependentInvestigationTeam’sVisittotheIWF’sOffices......................141.7OverallOutcomesoftheIndependentInvestigation.................................................................151.8Recommendations.................................................................................................................................19A.IMMEDIATEACTION.............................................................................................................................................19B.OVERALLRECOMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................................20i.ConstitutionalReform............................................................................................................................................20ii.ElectoralReform......................................................................................................................................................21iii.FinancialReform....................................................................................................................................................21iv.GovernanceReform...............................................................................................................................................22v.Anti-dopingControlReform...............................................................................................................................23
Chapter2:TheDr.AjánPresidency.............................................................................................242.1ConstitutionalStructure&HierarchyofIWF...............................................................................242.2AHalf-CenturyofUnfetteredAutonomousControl...................................................................272.3PresidentialCoercion...........................................................................................................................30i.CashControl................................................................................................................................................................31ii.RedundantTreasurer............................................................................................................................................32iii.ExclusiveFinancialControl...............................................................................................................................33iv.EBApprovalWithoutQuestions......................................................................................................................35v.Cashforvotes:RiggingElectoralCongresses..............................................................................................35vi.ThePresidentiallyAnointedExecutiveBoard...........................................................................................36vii.TheIWF’sSecretariat..........................................................................................................................................38viii.CashfromDopingFines....................................................................................................................................39
2.4InfiltrationoftheAnti-DopingControlProgram........................................................................392.5Conclusion................................................................................................................................................41
Chapter3:TheHijackingofFinancialControl.........................................................................433.1Introduction............................................................................................................................................433.2BackgroundandConstitutionalFinancialFramework............................................................433.3IllusoryReform......................................................................................................................................463.4BankAccountsandMoneyFlow.......................................................................................................47.i.TheLegacyofFlawedAccounting-MissingCashPre-2009................................................................49
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ii.TheSwissAccounts................................................................................................................................................52iii.TheFlowofFundstotheknownHungarianAccounts..........................................................................52iv.HiddenHungarianAccounts(VilagKupaandMKB)..............................................................................53
3.5TyrannyofCash......................................................................................................................................553.5.1President’sUseofCash.....................................................................................................................57i.Collectionofcash:Todepositornottodeposit..........................................................................................57ii.CountryFines............................................................................................................................................................58iii.TravelExpenses......................................................................................................................................................62iv.UnexplainedCash...................................................................................................................................................63v.CashWithdrawals....................................................................................................................................................64
3.6FinancialReporting:MisrepresentedReality..............................................................................66i.ConstructingAccountingData............................................................................................................................68ii.MisleadingtheEB....................................................................................................................................................68
3.7CrossingInternationalBorderswithUndeclaredCash............................................................693.7.1SubjectMatterExpertMoneyLaundering.................................................................................703.8FinancialMethodology........................................................................................................................713.9PrincipleOutcomes...............................................................................................................................75
Chapter4:ElectoralCorruption-CashforVotes....................................................................774.1Introduction............................................................................................................................................774.2PreparationsfortheElectoralCongress........................................................................................784.2.1TheAnointedEB................................................................................................................................................784.2.2Settingupthevotingblocwithbribes.....................................................................................................80
4.3HowaPresidencyisBought...............................................................................................................834.4Conclusion................................................................................................................................................89
Chapter5:Anti-DopingOvertheDecades.................................................................................905.1Introduction............................................................................................................................................905.2The1980s&1990s................................................................................................................................925.3WeightliftingScandalsMorphedintotheTwenty-firstCentury...........................................945.4ADirtyDecadeintheTwenty-firstCentury.................................................................................955.5LegalStructureandOperationoftheAnti-DopingCommission...........................................965.6PresidentialMeddlinginAntidoping...........................................................................................1015.6.1TestDistributionPlans.................................................................................................................1025.6.2InterferenceinResultsManagement.......................................................................................104i.DelayofResultsManagement:ACaseStudyofAzeriLifters..............................................................105ii.MissingPositivesResults...................................................................................................................................108
5.7DopingFines.........................................................................................................................................1135.8RoleofHUNADO..................................................................................................................................113i.HUNADOatHoustonWorldChampionships2015..................................................................................118ii.SuspiciousOut-of-CompetitionTestResultspriortoHouston.........................................................119
5.7Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................121
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Chapter1:ExecutiveSummaryofthisReport
KeyFindings
1. Dr. Aján’s autocratic authoritarian leadership of the International Weightlifting
Federationresultedinadysfunctional,ineffectiveoversightoftheorganisationbythe
ExecutiveBoard,whichhadanill-informedunderstandingoftheorganisation.This
was achieved through various control mechanisms. As a consequence, Dr. Aján
disabledanyoneotherthanhimselffromunderstandingtheoverallaffairsoftheIWF.
2. ThefoundationalcontrolmechanismusedbyDr.Ajánwasthetyrannyofcash.Cash
collected, cashwithdrawn,andcashunaccounted for,whichDr.Ajánwas the sole
collector.Theprimarysourcesofthiscashweredopingfinespaidpersonallytothe
PresidentandcashwithdrawalsoflargeamountsfromtheIWF’saccounts,usually
withdrawnbeforemajorcompetitionsorIWFcongresses.Itisabsolutelyimpossible
todeterminehowmuchofthecashcollectedorwithdrawnwasusedforlegitimate
expenses.TheMcLarenIndependentInvestigationTeamhasdeterminedthat$10.4
millionUSDisunaccountedfor.
3. Weightliftinghasahistoryofuseofperformanceenhancingdrugs.Over600liftersin
thepast decadehave testedpositive.WhileDr.Ajánhas impermissibly interfered
withtheIWFAnti-DopingCommission,therealproblemisthecultureofdopingthat
exists in the sport. The investigation uncovered 40 positive Adverse Analytical
5
FindingshiddenintheIWFrecords.Thisincludesgoldandsilvermedalistswhohave
nothadtheirsamplesdealtwith.ThisinformationhasbeenpassedontoWADAfor
furtherinvestigation.
4. HUNADO isnot thecauseofdopingsamplemanipulationorhiddenresults. Ithas
operated in compliance with WADA standards. The investigation found that the
procedures followedbyDopingControlOfficerBarbaraKallowere correct and in
accordancewiththeWADACode.Thesourceofantidopingissuesthathaveplagued
theIWFandsportofweightliftinglieelsewhere.HUNADOanditsDCOsarenotthe
causeof thepositive testing resultsor thealleged influenceonweightlifters tobe
tested.
5. Thefinancialrecordsareajumbleofincompleteandinaccuratefiguresdistortedby
a failuretoaccuratelyrecordcashexpendituresandrevenuesanddisclosehidden
bankaccountsbyDr.Aján.
6. The twomost recentElectoralCongresseswere rampantwithvotebuying for the
PresidentandseniorlevelpositionsoftheExecutiveBoard,despitemonitoring.Such
actionsareafundamentalviolationofthesport’sBy-LawsonDisciplinaryandEthics
Procedures.
ThisReportwillexplainthesekeyfindings.
6
1.1Introduction
On5 January2020 theGerman televisionnetwork,ARDaired theprogram“DerHerrde
Heber”(TheLordoftheLifters),adocumentaryfilmbyHajoSeppelt,NickButlerandGritt
Hartmann (the “ARD Documentary”). The documentary claimed the leadership of the
InternationalWeightliftingFederation(“IWF”),includingPresidentTamásAján(“Dr.Aján”)
participatedinorhadknowledgeofnumerousirregularitiesoccurringwithintheIWF.The
allegations related to corruption, financial irregularities, property investment, doping
controltestingandsamplemanipulationcombinedwithdopingfinepaymentirregularities.
There were also suggestions of favouritism and the deliberate undermining of certain
MemberFederationsaccomplishedthroughcronyismandnepotism.
ThisChaptercontainsasummaryoftheprincipleoutcomesoftheinvestigationconducted
bytheMcLarenIndependentInvestigationTeam(“MIIT”)underthedirectionofandbythe
Independent Investigator (“II”) appointed by the IWF’s Executive Board (“EB”) and the
Acting President, through the Oversight and Integrity Commission (“O&I Commission”).
BackgroundanddetailedfindingsoftheinvestigationareprovidedinsubsequentChapters
ofthisReport.
This Executive Summary describes the formation of the II and sets out the Terms of
Referenceandabriefsummaryoftheinvestigativemethodologyused.Thebalanceofthe
summarysetsouttheMIIT’skeyinvestigativefindingsinrespectoftheallegationsandthe
recommendationsforreform.
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1.2BackgroundontheIWF
TheIWFistheinternationalgoverningbodyforthesportofweightliftingasrecognisedby
the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”). It has had a rich and important history in
internationalsports.Itisoneoftheoldestsportingfederations,havingbeenfoundedin1905
andgovernsoneofthefoundingsportsofthemodernOlympicGames,beginningin1896.
TheIWFiscomposedof192affiliatedNationalMemberFederationsworldwide,fromfive
Continents.
1.3CreationandTermsofReferenceoftheIndependentInvestigationintotheIWF
irregularities
On22January2020theEBannouncedtheformationofanO&ICommissiontooverseean
investigationintotheallegationsarisingfromtheARDDocumentary.TheO&ICommission’s
responsibilitiesarelaidoutintheTermsofReferenceofthesamedateandassubsequently
revised in mid-March 2020. The EB concurrently suspended the powers of the then
PresidentoftheIWF,Dr.Aján,foraperiodof90daysandappointedUrsulaGarzaPapandrea
tothepostofActingIWFPresident,withdirectoversightresponsibilityfortheinvestigation.
The Terms of Reference for the Acting President included, but were not limited to the
followingresponsibilities:
1.1.8ToIWFConstitution7.1,theIWFActingPresidentsupervisestheIWFSecretariat.[…]1.1.11 IWF By-law to 4.2 (8), the IWF Acting President will propose the dates andlocationofanyIWFCongresstotheIWFExecutiveBoard.
8
1.1.12IWFBy-lawto4.2(9),theExecutiveBoardwillmonitorthefinancialoperationsoftheIWFandadvisetheActingPresidentonfinancialissues.1.1.13IWFBy-lawto4.2.1.1,points1,2,3,5,7,8,9,10,12aredelegatedinfulltotheIWFActingPresident.[…]1.1.20IWFBylawto7,point1,theIWFSecretariat(administrativeoffice)isundertheresponsibilityoftheIWFActingPresident.[…]1.1.23IWFBy-lawto11,point4,theIWFActingPresidentmanagesandsupervisestheactivitiesoftheIWFandoftheSecretariatthatadministersthefinancialactivitiesandkeepstheaccountsoftheIWF.1.1.24.IWFBy-lawto11,point5.3,theIWFActingPresidentmayauthorisedescribedexpenditureamounts.1.1.25. TheIWFActingPresidentshall, fortheavoidanceofdoubt,beconsideredtheChairoftheIWFExecutiveBoardthroughoutthemandateandwillhavethepowertocallameetingofsaidbody.1.1.26.TheIWFActingPresidentisobligedtoactinatransparentwaywiththeIWFExecutiveBoard,whohavetherighttorequestreportsoftheIWFActingPresidentatanytime.
On31January2020theEBannouncedtheappointmentofProfessorRichardH.McLaren,
O.C., lawprofessoratWesternUniversity,Canada;CEOofMcLarenGlobalSportSolutions
Inc.;counseltoMcKenzieLakeLawyers,LLPandlongstandingCourtofArbitrationofSport
(“CAS”) arbitrator, as the Independent Investigator (“II”) to conduct and chair the O&I
Commission’s investigation intotheallegationsagainst the IWFandDr.Ajánmade in the
ARDDocumentary.Tothatend,paragraph1.1.1oftheO&ICommission’sTermsofReference
statesthat:
[…]toensurethattheIWFfulfilsitsinvestigatoryobligationsunderArticle20.3.10oftheWorldAnti-DopingCode,anditscommitmenttocooperationwithWADA,toappointareputableandhighlyqualifiedinvestigatorconductafullandunfetteredinvestigationintoallanti-doping,compliance,ethicalandotherdisciplinarymattersarisingfromtheARD documentary and any other related misconduct found as the investigationcontinues,aswellas intoany further issuesof concern thatarise in relation to IWFgovernance or ethical matters within the IWF and/or otherwise in the sport ofWeightlifting that are identified in the course of the investigation (together, theMatters),inorder:
9
(a)toestablishalloftherelevantfactsinrelationtotheMatters;(b)todeterminewhetheranypersonormemberorotherbodythatissubjecttothejurisdictionoftheIWFhasacasetoanswerforbreachoftheirobligationstotheIWFinrelationtoanyoftheMatters,whetherbycontract,undertheIWFrulesandregulations,orotherwise,includingbutnotlimitedto:(i)determiningwhethertheIWFanti-dopingrulesanddisciplinaryrules,aswell as all applicableWorldAnti-DopingCodeprovisions, have beenproperly applied, leading to appropriate adjudication and subsequentconsequences, or alternatively whether any anti-doping rule violationshavebeencovereduporotherwiseimproperlyhandled(bytheIWFand/orothers);(ii)determiningwhetheranybreachesoftheIWFcodeofethicsand/orotherrulesofconducthaveoccurred;and(iii)determiningwhethertheallegedfinancialimproprietiesareamatterofmalpractice.(iv) Determining whether there was at any time, by any person, anyarrangement,collusionorotherwisepressureonanyanti-dopingagency,with specificattentionpaid toHUNADO, tomanipulate the tests of anyathlete,ornation.(v) Determining and identifying the full extent of themodus operandifound in respect of doping manipulation and those involved in suchactivity.(vi) Toidentify ifthereisanyotherevidenceorinformationrelatingtoPresidentTamasAjánand/orthoseactingwithhim,inrespectofanyoftheallegationsraisedbytheARDtelevisionstation,oranyotherformofinappropriateactivity.(vii)ToadvisetheIWFwhetheranypersonormemberorotherbodyhasacasetoanswerforabreachoftheirobligationstotheIWF.”
Dr.Aján,underpressurefromtheEB,resignedoncertaintermsfromhispositionon15April
2020. The Acting President took certain steps to terminate the employment of various
membersoftheSecretariatoftheIWFandtomovetheofficesofthefederationfromtheir
currentlocationofBudapest,HungarytoLausanne,Switzerland.
10
Working independently as the II, Professor RichardMcLarenwas supported by amulti-
disciplinaryteamwithprovenexperienceincomplexinvestigations,dopingviolations,the
interviewing of witnesses, forensic analysis, financial investigations, antidoping and
laboratoryregulationandprocesses. TheII’sTeamwasstaffedbytheChief Investigator,
Martin Dubbey and members of his staff from Harod Associates, including, Alex Miller,
HowardLeatherandGregKitsell; lawyer,DianaTesic;andforensic financial investigator,
StevenBerryman.
Professor McLaren has significant experience in the world of international sports law.
Notably, he was a member of WADA’s three-person Independent Commission, led by
foundingWADA President RichardW. Pound, QC, which exposed widespread doping in
RussianAthleticsandthecorruptionattheInternationalAssociationofAthleticsFederations
(“IAAF”),asitwasthenknown.Followingthatassignment,hewasappointedbyWADAas
the Independent Person (“IP”) to investigate the allegations of state sponsored doping
manipulation during the Sochi Games andmore generallywithin Russian sport. Martin
DubbeywastheChiefInvestigatorintheIPworkandservedinthesamecapacityintheIWF
work. Professor McLaren has extensive experience in many other international
investigationsrelatedtodopingandcorruptioninOlympicandprofessionalsport.
Throughoutthecourseofhismandate,theIIhaspersonallyreviewedallevidencegathered
bytheMIIT.
11
ThisReportwaspreparedfromthecollectiveworkoftheMIIT.Theinvestigationprocessis
outlinedandthemanysignificantaspectsthatwerestudiedandanalysedultimatelyprovide
theevidenceandbackgroundforfindingsoffact.
1.4SummaryoftheEvidenceGatheringProcess
Professor McLaren was appointed to lead this investigation to ensure an unbiased and
independentexaminationoftheevidencefromwhichthisReportwaswritten.Theobjective
was to ensure that all stakeholders could have confidence in the reporting of a careful,
thoroughandbalancedindependentassessmentofestablishedfacts.
ProfessorMcLarenandhisteamofinvestigatorsweregivencompleteautonomyonhowto
conduct the investigation; what allegations could or should be tested; and the lines of
enquirytobefollowed.ThemandatewasnotlimitedtotheallegationsdescribedintheARD
documentary. ItalsograntedtheMIITtherighttoapproachandprovideauthoritieswith
relevantinformationuncoveredduringthecourseoftheinvestigation.
Thefirstphaseoftheinvestigationconsistedofmappingouttheelementsdescribedinthe
ARDallegations.TheMIITcreateditsoverallinvestigativeframeworkbasedonboththeARD
allegations and as a result of its own lines of enquiry. The framework included an
unannounced site visit to the IWF offices in Budapest, keywitness interviews, evidence
collectionandvariousprocessingprotocols.Theframeworkwasalivingdocumentandwas
updatedasandwhennewlinesofenquirywereaddedtotheinvestigation.
12
TheMIIT collected, developed and reviewed thousands of documents, emails, laboratory
records, Doping Control Officer (“DCO”) official reports, witness statements, recordings,
photographs,conductedcyberandforensicanalysisofharddrives,andconductedfinancial
forensicanalysisofbankingandaccountingrecords.
TheIIproducedtwointerimReportstotheO&ICommissionandtheEB.Followingarequest
forextension,necessitatedbydelaysarisingfromtheCOVID-19pandemiccircumstances,
thetimeperiodfortheIItoproducethisReportwasextendedto135days.
ThisReportcontainsinformationandevidencethattheIIconsiderstobereliableandfirmly
established.What is stated in this Report is backed by an enormous volume ofmaterial
reviewedandexamined in the investigation, togetherwithover50witness interviewsof
thosewhovoluntarilycameforwardandspokewiththeMIITinvestigators.
1.5Witnesses
TheMIIT conducted interviewswith individualswhopossessed first-handknowledge or
evidence relevant to the investigation. A number of these individuals are confidential
witnesses.WhiletheCOVID-19worldwidepandemicshutdownmovementandcomplicated
theMIIT’sinterviewprocess,itquicklybecameapparentthatcertainmembersoftheEBand
PresidentsofMemberFederationswerefrustratingtheevidencegatheringmoresothanthe
ongoing global pandemic. They acted in contradiction of the Terms of Reference, which
13
requiredfullcooperation.ThetermsofreferencewerealsoexplicitontheEB’sparticipation
in,andcooperationwith,theMIIT:
“2.2.2 Each of the Members of the IWF Executive Board will provide the samecooperationtotheinvestigator.2.2.3Anyfailuretoprovidethecooperationsetoutabovetotheinvestigator,and/orany attempt to hinder or delay the work of the investigator, including (withoutlimitation) any attempt to withhold potentially relevant information, interfere withwitnessesortamperwithordestroypotentiallyrelevantinformation,willbetreatedasaseriousbreachofobligationstotheIWF.[…]”
Despite the required cooperation, only two of five Vice-Presidents, excluding the Acting
President,cameforward.TwooutofeightcongressionallyelectedmembersoftheEBand
onlyoneofthefivePresidentsofContinentalFederationscameforward,onerefusedwhen
approached.
Even more surprising was that of 20 Member Federation Presidents and/or General
SecretarieswhowerecontactedbytheMIIT,onlyfourrespondedandultimatelyonlyoneof
thoseprovidedinformationofsignificantvaluetotheinvestigation.SomeMembersactively
attempted todeceiveand frustrate the investigationprocess.Forexample,oneseniorEB
member stated that hewas unable to speak to theMIIT because he did not have phone
service.WhenitwasputtohimthatthislackofcooperationwouldbenotedintheReport,
heproducedawrittenmaterialandprovidedittotheMIIToneweekpriortothereleaseof
thisReport.
TheappetiteforMembersandstakeholdersoftheIWFtocomeforwardwaspracticallynon-
existent. Only one current athlete spoke with the MIIT investigators. The confidential
14
whistleblower hotline established at the outset of the investigation brought limited
responses.MeredaysbeforethereleaseofthisReport,intelligenceofcorruptionacrossall
levelsoftheIWFwassentthroughthehotline.Someofthismaterialhascontributedtothis
ReportandothermatterswillbereferredtoWADAandtheInternationalTestingAgency
(“ITA”).
The MIIT recognises that there are forces at work that inhibited some from providing
evidence.However,theturnoutdoesnotreflectthepassionanddesireforchangethatwe
heard fromsomewhodidcomeforward.Therewereasurprisingnumberof individuals,
includingEBmembers,whorefusedtospeakwithus.
1.6TheMcLarenIndependentInvestigationTeam’sVisittotheIWF’sOffices
The investigation team visited the offices of the IWF in Budapest, Hungary between 3-6
March2020.ThevisitwasunannouncedtoboththeIWFSecretariatandDr.Aján.TheMIIT
investigatorsontheirvisittotheIWFofficesencounteredanorganisationwiththelegacyof
onemanincontrolofeveryvitalfunctionoftheorganisationanditsSecretariatfromwho
totalloyaltywasexpected.TheindividualsmakinguptheSecretariatdidthebiddingofthe
Presidentandwereresponsivetohiseverywhimandcontrolledbyhimonfearofretaliation.
TheimpressionoftheMIITisthattheSecretariatworkedwelltogetherandsupportedeach
otherintheirvariousduties.TheActingPresidentoftheIWF,UrsulaGarzaPapandreawas
presentandaccompaniedtheMIITintotheIWF’soffices.
15
WhatbecamequicklyevidentfollowingtheonsitearrivalwasthatDr.Ajánremainedvery
much in control of the office and the Secretariat, despite the EBmotion suspending his
responsibilitiesforthedurationoftheinvestigation.Nearly45daysafterthesuspensionof
Dr. Aján’s duties, he was still carrying on with business as usual, running the office,
organisinganEBmeetingandhavingmeetingswiththeIWF’sfinancialadvisorandexternal
auditors,KPMG.
Dr.AjáneffectivelyblockedtheActingPresidentfromfulfillingherposition,grantedtoher
by the Terms of Reference, which authorised her management and supervision of the
activitiesoftheIWFandoftheSecretariat.Shedidnotevenhaveakeytotheofficeofthe
Secretariatuntilthedaybeforethevisit.Despiteassurancestothecontrary,Dr.Ajándidnot
providehersignatoryauthoritytotheHungarianOTPaccountasnecessaryfortheeffective
runningoftheorganisation.Furthermore,hefailedtomakeafulldisclosureofbankaccounts
totheActingPresidentandtotheMIIT.PerhapsthebiggestsurprisetotheSecretariatand
Dr.AjánwastheinstructionoftheActingPresidenttoallowforthedownloadoftheIWF’s
servers.
The MIIT would like to thank the IWF’s former legal counsel, Eva Nyirfa, current legal
counsel,LillaSagianddopingadministrativeassistant,RekaFoldesifortheirassistanceand
displaysofintegritythroughouttheinvestigation.
1.7OverallOutcomesoftheIndependentInvestigation
16
TheMIIThadanunfetteredmandatetofollowtheinformationwhereveritmayhaveled.
ThroughoutthecourseoftheinvestigationtheMIITheardofmanyrumoursandallegations
thatcouldnotbesubstantiated.Themajorityof rumoursrelated todopingpracticesand
cover-upsthatwereoccurringinweightliftingasfarbackasthe1980s.Theperceptionof
everyonewithwhomtheMIITspokewasthatthesportwashistoricallymiredinproblems
ofillicitdopingandfinancialmalpractice.
Consequently, itwasdecidedearlyon inthe investigationthatthefocuswouldbeonthe
periodbetween2009-2019.Thisdecisionwasmadeforthefollowingreasons.First,the
triggerevent,whichbroughtintheIWF’sfinancialreformsofthelastdecade,occurredin
2009.Second,whiletheinvestigationhasuncoveredevidenceofdopingpracticesandthe
subsequentcover-upsthereofinthe1990sandearly2000s,theIInotesthatalinemustbe
drawntodemarcatewheretheIWF’spastcannolongerhaveaholdoverthefuture.Ihope
that this report serves as that demarcation. Weightlifting must face its past and move
forward,leavingwhateverrumors,allegations,facts,andevidenceinthepast.
Finally,aneweraofaccountabilityanddopingcontrolmanagementhasalreadybegunto
takeholdwithin the IWFasa resultof theCleanSportCommissionrecommendations in
2018.In2019,theentireIWFAnti-DopingControlProgramwasoutsourcedtotheITA.Most
recently,theadjudicationoffirstinstancecasesasaresultofanallegedAnti-DopingRule
Violation(“ADRV”)havenowbeendelegatedtotheCourtofArbitrationofSportAnti-Doping
Division.Thesechangesdemonstrateasportwilling tomove forward, freeing itselfof its
conflictsofinterestandintroducingtransparentandtrustworthyprocesses.Thefollowing
17
recommendations serve to bolster the momentum that has already begun to reform an
organisationwhosereputationhasbeenseverelyandadverselyaffectedbytheactionsofa
singleindividual.
As the investigation progressed, theMIIT became aware of activities that demonstrated
possible criminal conduct,withmillions in cash unaccounted for and not entered in the
booksoftheIWF.TheMIIThowever,hasreportedseparately,onastrictlyconfidentialbasis,
totheO&ICommissiononthesematters.Afurtherreportmayfollowinduecourse.Areport
of findings in respect of antidoping controls will be filed with WADA and ITA, where
appropriate.
The ARD documentary presented specific allegations regarding the testing of the 2019
WeightliftingWorldChampionshipsheldinThailand.Asof2019,theIWFhasoutsourcedits
Anti-Doping Control Program to the ITA in Lausanne, Switzerland. It was the ITA who
preparedtheTestDistributionPlanandactedastheTestingAuthorityfortheevent.Atthe
outsetoftheinvestigation,theMIITestablishedanagreementwithBenCohen,theDirector
oftheITAthatitwouldundertaketheinvestigationofthisevent,giventhattheIWFdidnot
haveadministrativecontrolovertheirAnti-DopingControlProgramduringtheevent.The
ITAalsoagreedtoinvestigatethemattersrelatingtotheallegationsofswappingofsamples
ofMoldovanathletesasreferredtointheARDDocumentary.Mr.Cohenprovidedanupdate
totheIIon2June2020andindicatedthattheirinvestigationisincompleteandstillongoing.
18
TheMIIThasidentifiedcertainadditionalsuspiciouseventsandhasrecommendedfurther
follow-upandinvestigationbytheIWF.
Therewasacompletelackofoversightintothefinancesoftheorganisation,whichallowed
forthepossibleeffortlessflightofcapitalfromtheIWF’sbankaccountsforimpermissible
purposes. There are inadequate checks and balances, and those that do exist were not
enforced.
The IWF is an organisation in need of resuscitation and fundamental foundational
restoration.Ithasbeenheldtogetherfornearly45yearsbytheirongraspofDr.Aján,oneof
thelongestservingsportsfederationpresidents.Failurefortheorganisationtoactonthe
II’srecommendationshasthepotentialtocauseirreparableharmtoanorganisationfacing
constitutional,governanceandmembershipchallengesasaresultofhisreign.Considerable
progresshasalreadybeenmadeonrestoringtheIWF’spoorimageoframpantdoping.While
theimportantstepofseparatingtheantidopingadministrationfromtheorganisationhas
occurred,itwilllikelybetheleastoftheuncomfortablerealitiestheIWFmustface.
ThecontrolexertedbyDr.Ajánwasabsoluteandinfamous.Atamacrolevel,hemanipulated
theEB,MemberFederationsandstafftoacquiescewhateverauthoritytheymayhavebeen
abletoexertintheirrespectiveroles.TheeithertacitacceptanceorwillfulblindnesstoDr.
Aján’smethodsofcontrolhasexposedsystemicgovernancefailuresatthehighestlevelsof
theIWF.Thosewhochallengedhimwerepunishedorbullied.Anyconductatthehighest
19
levels of a federation that permits the rule by fear, deception and corruption to satisfy
personaldesires,actstothedetrimentofthesport’skeystakeholders:theathletes.
1.8Recommendations
ArisingoutoftheworkoftheMIITaretheserecommendations,whicharetiedtothe
work we undertook. They are divided into two categories: Immediate Action on
releaseoftheReportandOverallrecommendations.
A.IMMEDIATEACTION
1. Conductafull-scaleindependentforensicauditofthelasttenfiscalyears,
includinginformationuncoveredinthisinvestigationandwithfullaccesstoall accounts. In this regard, an immediate examination of the books andrecordsheld in two “safe” cupboards in theBudapestofficediscovered2weeksago.
2. AlterthemethodofvotingattheupcomingElectoralCongressandensure
effectiveoversightoftheprocess.3. ChangeallemailpasswordsusedbyeveryoneinIWF.4. Donotpermitanycashpaymentofantidopingfinesorsumsover$500USD.5. Anypaymentofnecessitypaidorreceivedincashmustbeaccompaniedby
aserialsequentiallynumberedreceiptsignedbytherecipient.Thereceiptmustbesavedtocreateanaudittrail.Twopeoplemustwitnessthereceipt,movementandbankingofcashfunds.
6. All cash received to be immediately deposited in the designated bank
account with only a small float maintained in the office for incidentalexpenses.
7. TheclosureofallbankaccountsinBudapestbanks.
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8. Jointsignaturesmustbeputinplaceandcompliedwithonallbankaccountstobeopenedorremaininginuse.
9. Hire a full-time financial accountant reporting to a revitalized General
SecretaryTreasurerposition.10. ReviewandreformthefinancialpowersofthePresident.11. Implementprofessionalelectronicaccountingsoftware.12. Takeover and continue the operation of the independent whistleblower
hotlineestablishedbytheMIIT.
B.OVERALLRECOMMENDATIONS
i.ConstitutionalReform
1. Redraft IWFConstitutiontoreducethenumberofmembersof theExecutive
Board(“EB”)andmakeitthecentrallegislativebody,insteadoftheCongress,andpassBy-Lawsbasedontheserecommendations.
2. CongressreviewsallactionsoftheEBbutonlyhaslegislativepowersinrespectoffinancesandantidoping.AllotherlegislativepowerstoEB.
3. OnlyonehalftheEBiselectedateachElectoralCongress,therebynecessitating
anElectoralCongresseverytwoyears.Serveamaximumof2terms.4. EB members to be suspended from their EB position if their National
Federationissanctionedfordopingviolations.
5. Publicize a reformed IWF Constitution and By-Laws once the initialrecommendationshavebeen implemented to establish renewed trust in thenewmanagementandadministration.
6. ProportionalrepresentationontheEBapproximatingthegenderbreakdownofthesport.
7. Reform the constitution to reserveone seaton theEB for a currently activeAthlete.
21
8. Provide for an Integrity Officer with sufficient budget to oversee the IWF’soperations.
9. AccountsandbalancestobeupdatedquarterlytotheEB.
10. IncludeintheConstitutionapositionofDirectorGeneralanddefinetheroleandresponsibilities.
ii.ElectoralReform
1. Examineonevoteforeachcountryvoting,withaviewtotheuseofaweighted
votingsystem.
2. The Integrity Officer to have sufficient budget to have effective oversight ofelectionsatElectoralCongresses.Establishindependentoversightprotocolsinrespectofelectionmonitoringandcontrol.
3. ElectionstobemonitoredbyindependentscrutineersselectedbytheIntegrityOfficer.
4. Establish a committee responsible to process applications for election of allVice-Presidents and senior positions in the IWF. Nominees be required todeclare business and property interests and how they are funded. Eachcandidate’s suitability to be an electoral candidate to be examined by theIntegrityOfficer.ThecommitteetoobtainaconfidentialpersonalreportfromtheIntegrityOfficerbeforeacandidatecanbenominatedbythecommitteeforthestatedelectoralpositions.
5. AllfirsttimeelectedEBmemberstoundergoEBeducationtrainingprogramandIWForientationandattendadirector’seducationprogramorganisedanddevelopedfortheIWF.Theobjectoftheeducationtodemonstratethedivisionbetween a director as policy maker and the management of the operation,whichisafunctionofthefull-timepaidstaff.
6. Establish and implement yearly trainingmodules onmatters of corruption,bribery,andconflictofinterest.
iii.FinancialReform
22
1. Reform Constitution to require General Secretary Treasurer financialoversight.GeneralSecretaryTreasurerresponsible for thedevelopmentanduseofBudgetformajorcompetitions.
2. Wherepossible,theGeneralSecretaryTreasurershouldbeco-locatedwiththeSecretariatwhoisresponsiblefortheadministrationofthefinances.
3. FinancialresponsibilitiesshouldberemovedfromthePresidentandvestedintheDirectorGeneraloftheorganisation.
4. EstablishanInvestmentManagementCommitteetooverseeinvestmentswithpowertohire,reviewandterminatethefinancialmanagers.ReportannuallytotheGeneralSecretaryTreasurerandtheEB.
5. Establish an internal audit committee reporting to the Director General toconductaninternalauditpriortotheexternalaudit.
6. Allnewsponsorshipandbroadcastingcontractstobeanalysedandagreedby
theEBinadvanceofimplementationorrenewal.
7. Payments to EBmembers and others receiving attendance fees bywire andtotalforeachindividualpublishedontheIWFwebsiteannually.
iv.GovernanceReform
8. Termlimitstotwoquadrennialperiodsforallpositions(refertoConstitutional
reformpoint3).ConsideragelimitsforallEBmembers.
9. IntegrityOfficertoconductduediligenceofallEBmemberstoensuretheymeetestablishedqualificationcriteria.InvestigateandreviewbackgroundofthoserunningforelectioninseniorEBpositions.
10. Review and revise the Code of Ethics; Disciplinary Code; and Conflicts ofInterestPolicytobemorecomprehensiveandoverseetheobservanceofthesamebytheDirectorGeneralandIntegrityOfficer.
11. Establish Integrity Officer with powers to investigate disciplinary codeviolationsandrecommendappropriatesanction.
12. EstablishanexternalindependentadjudicativebodytoheardisputesovertheCodeofEthics;DisciplinaryCodeandConflictsofInterestwithappealtoCAS.
23
13. AdopttheindependentlyoperatedandmonitoredconfidentialwhistleblowerhotlineestablishedbytheMIITtoinspireconfidenceinthesystem.Allegationsof malpractice,where appropriate, to be independently investigated by theIntegrityOfficer.
14. Redesign the IWF website to be a more effective communication vehicle topromoteanopenandtransparentorganisation.
15. Developanepotismpolicy.
v.Anti-DopingControlReform
The outsourcing of the administration and application of the Anti-Doping ControlProgramtotheInternationalTestingAgencyincludingresultsmanagementandfirstinstanceadjudicationbytheCourtofArbitrationforSportleaveslittlefortheIWFtodo.
16. Proscribe therelationshipof the IndependentMemberFederationSanctions
Panel to the outsourced Anti-Doping Control Program administered by theInternational Testing Agency. Decisions of the Independent MemberFederation Sanctions Panel to be determined by the internal first instanceadjudicativepaneloftheIWF.
17. TheroleoftheAnti-DopingCommissiontoberevisedanddescribeddifferentlyin the Constitution. The role is nowone ofmonitoring and reviewing on anannualbasistheoutsourcedactionsoftheITAtoensurefullcompliancewiththe WADA Code. Provide an annual report to the Executive Board on theoutsourcedinstitution’sperformance. MonitorandrespondexpeditiouslytoMember Federation complaints regarding the IWF Anti-Doping ControlProgram.
24
Chapter2:TheDr.AjánPresidency
2.1ConstitutionalStructure&HierarchyofIWF
Thesupremelegislativebodyof the IWFis theCongress(seetheattachedorganisational
chart.)TheConstitutionprovidesthatMemberFederations,intheircapacityasmembersof
theCongress,overseetheIWF,electthePresidentandmembersoftheIWFExecutiveBoard
(“EB”),supervisetheday-to-dayoperationsoftheIWFandmayissuebindingdecisions.
The Congress holds annual meetings where it must approve the annual reports on the
activities of the President, the General Secretary Treasurer, the Committees, the
CommissionsandtheIWF’sAnnualFinancialReport.TheCongressalsoholdselectionsfor
certainpositionsintheIWF.BetweenannualCongressestheaffairsoftheIWFaremanaged
bytheEBthroughtheSecretariat.
ElectoralCongressestakeplacequadrennially, intheyearfollowingtheSummerOlympic
GamesandareprecededbytheregularAnnualCongress.OnlyFullMemberswhohavepaid
their membership fee for the year by the end of March may participate or vote at the
Congress.2AttheCongressallmembersvotebysecretballotfortheelectionoftheEB,3and
seven(outofatotaloften)membersofeachCommittee.4Thetermofallelectedandnon-
electedofficialsisfouryears,unlessitconcludesearlierduetoresignationorexpulsionas
decidedbytheCongressuponproposaloftheEB.
2IWF Constitution 4.1.4. A requirement not always fulfilled and applied in reality. 3 Except for the 5 Continental Federations Presidents who are ex officio members with full voting rights. 4 IWF Constitution 8.1.2.
25
BetweenannualmeetingsoftheCongress,thedailyaffairsoftheIWFarevestedintheEB,
theoperationaldecision-makingbodythatgovernstheIWF.TheEBmayadoptormodifythe
By-Laws,theAnti-DopingPolicyandtheTechnicalandCompetitionRules&Regulations.The
EBalsoparticipatesinfinancialdecisionsbymonitoringthefinancialoperationsoftheIWF,
considering financial reports, participating in decisions involving economic deliberations
andadvisingthePresidentonfinancialissues.TheEBalsofunctionsasadisciplinarybody
andisresponsiblefordeterminingpenaltiesandsanctionsforbreachesoftheIWF’spolicies
andregulations,whichincludesitsAnti-DopingProgram.
Three Committees work under the IWF EB. 5 Each Committee consists of ten elected
members,sevenofwhichareelectedbytheCongressandthreeofwhichareelectedbythe
EB. The Chairperson of each Committee is appointed by the EB upon nomination of the
President.TheseCommitteesresearchanddeveloppoliciesandadvisetheEBandCongress
withrespecttotheirareasofexpertise.
Similar to Committees, Commissions are responsible for discrete areas that are of
importance to the IWF and the sport of weightlifting. They research, develop policies,
overseeIWFcompetitionsandeventsandadvisethedecision-makingbodiesoftheIWFwith
respecttotheirareasofexpertise.However,unliketheCommittees,Commissionsarenot
5 The Technical Committee is responsible for studying, analysing, monitoring and developing all Technical and Competition Rules related issues of the sport of weightlifting. The Coaching and Research Committee is responsible for overseeing the content and implementation of the IWF Coach Licensing program. The Medical Committee is tasked with safeguarding the health of the athletes involved in the sport of weightlifting, including monitoring the implementation of the IWF Anti-Doping Policy.
26
elected.TheyareestablishedandstaffeduponproposalofthePresidentandapprovalbythe
EB.
ThePresidentdoesnotderivehispowerfromtheConstitutionbutratherthroughtheBy-
LawsenactedundertheConstitution.TheBy-LawsprovideforthePresidenttochairtheEB,
overseetheIWF’sactivitiesandtobetheIWF’srepresentativeatmajorweightliftingand
international sporting events. The President also holds certain powers over some of the
institutions,asanexofficiomemberofallIWFCommitteesorasaconsultativeoverseerof
theCongress.
MuchofthePresident’spowerisexercisedthroughtheofficeoftheSecretariat,whichfalls
under the sole responsibility andauthorityof thePresident.ThePresidentmay staff the
Secretariatathisdiscretion inorder to fulfill itsdutiesandhas thepowertoassigneach
CommissionwithaCoordinator from the IWFSecretariat. For example, theAnti-Doping
CommissionCoordinatoristheIWF’sLegalCounsel.
The Constitution and By-Laws provide that both the President and General Secretary
Treasurer have authority over the finances of the IWF, including the signing of financial
documents.Bothpositionsareauthorized toenter intoagreementswith thirdpartieson
behalfoftheIWF.ThePresidenthoweverhasexclusiveauthorityovertheSecretariat,who
administersthefederation’sfinancialactivitiesandaccounts.
27
Likemostorganisations,thelegalstructureestablishedbytheConstitutiondoesnotconform
totheorganisation’sactualoperationsandhierarchy.TheIWF’sConstitutionistoagreat
extentafaçadeofproperlegalstructureandoperatingrules.Therealityisthatthepowerin
theIWFwasusurpedbyDr.AjánandexecutedthroughtheSecretariat,withallstaffthereof
being personally appointed by the President. He was able to establish an operating
methodology that enabled absolute authoritarian rule through manipulation of the
Constitution by use of intimidation, fear and retaliation. As a result, the constitutional
structure was warped into one that enabled his sole control. How that process was
accomplishedisexplainedbelow.Ultimately,thePresidentwasabletoconsolidatehispower
throughtheuseoffear-basedandretaliatorymeasuresagainstbothMemberFederations
andhisownstaff,andtokeepthispowerthroughmanipulatedandpredeterminedelections.
2.2AHalf-CenturyofUnfetteredAutonomousControl
Dr.Ajánjoinedthe115-year-oldIWFahalfcenturyago.Afteranearlycareerasaphysical
educationteacherandlawyer,heservedastheGeneralSecretaryoftheorganizationfrom
1975 through 2000. At this time Dr. Aján was elected President, and he occupied that
positionuntilhisresignationinApril2020.
InthemorethantwodecadespriortohiselectionhewasdefactoPresidentwithoutthetitle.
HisinfluenceasGeneralSecretaryisdemonstratedbyhismovingtheIWF’sheadquarters
fromAustria toBudapest in1982,despite the fact that the thenPresidentwasAustrian.
Throughtheyears1989to2005healsoservedastheGeneralSecretaryoftheHungarian
28
OlympicCommittee.HewasamemberoftheInternationalOlympicCommittee(“IOC”)until
2010 after which he became an Honourary Member of the IOC until he resigned his
membershipon5March2020,convenientlyprecludinghimfrombeinginvestigatedbythe
IOCEthicsCommission.Since1999,hehasbeenafoundingmemberofWADAandamember
oftheWADAFoundationBoarduntil2018.
AtthetimeDr.AjánjoinedtheIWF,weightliftinghadbeenprimarilyaEuropeansportthat
wasdominatedbytheUSSR.ItthereforehadastronginfluenceovertheIWF.Hungarywas
underSovietcontrolupuntilthefalloftheIronCurtainin1991.The30-yearperiodbefore
ascending to the presidency in 2000 is the crucible in which Dr. Aján developed his
management style and assertion of total control over all the affairs of the IWF. The
authoritarianmanagementtechniquesDr.AjánlearnedduringtheeraoftheUSSRcanbe
found to this day in his management style while operating the organization. The
relationships that evolvedbetweenDr.Aján and the sports administrators of the former
SovietRepublicsbecamehisforgedalliancesandenabledhimtoexertdominanceoverthe
IWFwhenhe stood for thePresidency in2000andchangedhisde factopresidency into
reality.
After the collapse of the Soviet era at the beginning of the 1990’s, the IOC blossomed,
enriched by television revenues and contracts, which enabled it to provide significant
financial support to its members. Upon Dr. Aján’s election as President of the IWF, the
financialresourcesoftheIWFweregrowing,attributableinmostparttothesupportbythe
IOC.Heusedhisauthoritarianwaystotakeadvantageofthesenewsourcesofrevenueand
29
gain greater control of the organization and structure of the IWF. This control of the
organisationcontinuedtothetimeoftheappointmentoftheIndependentInvestigator(the
“II”)bytheIWF’sOversight&InvestigationCommittee(“O&ICommittee”)inFebruary2020.
Dr.AjáncontrolledtheIWF’sMemberFederationsbypatronage,rewardandpunishment
using different types of manipulative controls, which guaranteed his 20-year tenure as
President.Hismanagementstyleinvolvedlimitingtheinformationprovidedtomembersof
theEB,whooperatedasapassivestampofapprovalofhismanagement,whileneverbeing
properly informed of what was going on within the IWF organization. Dr. Aján would
generouslyrewardMemberFederations thatsupportedhimandanydefianceagainstDr.
Aján’spositionwouldbemetwithanear instantaneousrebukethatcould inturnhaving
lastingconsequences.
Anti-dopingcontrolprocedureswereoneofseveralmechanismsusedtoconsolidateand
holdontohis tight controlover the IWF.Atamacro level it servedasoneof thecontrol
mechanisms.Anti-dopingfines,beingpartoftherulesofcleansportintheIWF,provideda
convenient pool of cash resources that greased the wheels of consolidating the power
structureandenabledthePresident’slargessduringtheperiodexaminedbytheMcLaren
Independent Investigation Team (“MIIT”). Finally, Dr. Aján used the IWF Electoral
Congresses to strengthen his support base and power by distributing the IWF’s cash
resourcestoMemberFederationsthatpromisedtovoteforhim.Thisensuredhiscontinuing
positionofpowerasthePresident,whilepoisoningtherelationsofmembersoftheEBand
causingtheBoard’sparalysisinoverseeingtheorganisation.
30
2.3PresidentialCoercion
Dr.AjánrantheIWFasifitwashisownpersonalfiefdomorprivatecompanyoverwhichhe
hadabsolutecontrol.Hemadeallthetop-leveldecisions,staffedtheIWFSecretariatwith
Hungariannationalsandpromotedhisson-in-law,AtillaAdamfi(“Mr.Adamfi”),toDirector
General in 2014. The family circle was a tight one. The very loyal and hardworking
Secretariat,onthedirectionofMr.Adamfi,wouldefficientlyandeffectivelyadministerallof
the day-to-day operations of the IWF and execute the decisions of the President when
required.
Throughouthispresidency,Dr.AjánconsolidatedandkepthisgripontheIWFthrougha
varietyofcarefullycraftedmechanisms.Theserangedfrom:
(i) boughtelectionstoremaininpower;
(ii) completefinancialcontroloftheorganisationanditsaccompanyingbankaccounts
andrecordsincludingcashdepositsandwithdrawals;
(iii) use of administrative powers allowing for the exclusive staffing of the IWF
Secretariat;and
(iv) infiltrationoftheconfidentialAnti-DopingCommission.
Thediscussionthatfollowsdescribesingreaterdetailthepowercontrolsandadministrative
tools thePresidentused toenable theoperationof the IWFas if itwerehisownprivate
corporation.
31
i.CashControl
TheMIITanalysedthecashreceiptsissuedbytheorganisationduringtheperiodof2009-
2019inrespectofdopingfines,competitionandmembershipfeesandmultipleotherforms
ofincome,suchaslargecashpaymentsthatwereoftenmadebysponsorsatIWFeventsto
honourtheircontracts.Theprocessofissuingreceiptsandcollectingcashisdependentupon
theaccuracyandhonestyofthePresident.
AllofthesesourcesofcashwereprimarilycollectedbyDr.Aján.Hewastheonlypersonwho
controlled the receipts and deposits of cash payments into and out of the IWF’s bank
accounts.Healsowithdrewsignificantcash6amountsfromtheOTPBankandMKBaccounts.
Basedupon interviewsand records reviewed from2009 through2019, the investigation
revealsthatthesecashactivitiestotaledapproximately$27.8MillionUSD.7Fromthistotal,
theMcLarenIndependentInvestigationTeam(“MIIT”)havemadeadjustmentstoaccount
forDr.Ajánpayingoutcashatevents,anddepositsofcashtovariousIWFbankaccountsfor
example, resulting in a deduction of $17.4Million USD from the indicated total amount
above.
Basedontheavailablerecords,theMIITestablishedthatapproximately$10.4MillionUSD
isunaccountedfor.TheindividualreportsoftheMIITinvestigatorshavebeenturnedover
6 In various currencies (USD, Euros, HUF, GBP). 7 While a vast majority of the cash transactions occurred in US Dollars, cash transactions were also performed in EUR, GBP, and HUF currencies. All calculations were converted to USD based upon historic per day currency exchange rates.
32
aspartofaconfidentialpackageofreportstotheO&ICommission.Theuseandabuseofcash
isdiscussedmorefullyinthenextChapter.
ii.RedundantTreasurer
TheConstitutionprovides thatalongwith thePresident, theGeneralSecretaryTreasurer
holds a position of power and influence over the affairs of the IWF and the dual role of
administrator and financial overseer of the organisation. The reality was that the two
personswhooccupiedtheGeneralSecretaryTreasurerpositionduringDr.Aján’spresidency
weredeliberatelychosenbyhimbecauseheknewthattheirlimitations,beitknowledgeof
theEnglishlanguageoradministrativeabilities,wouldcausethemtobeineffectiveintheir
role. Thereby continuing his iron grip with little to no interference from the General
SecretaryTreasurer.Asaresult,Dr.AjánwasabletofurthercurtailtheGeneralSecretary
Treasurer’s authority. For example, theGeneral SecretaryTreasurer’s financial oversight
and reporting role as Treasurer wasmade superfluous by the President being the only
signatory to the IWF’s operating account at the OTP Bank, according to all witnesses
interviewedbytheMIIT.
ThisexerciseofauthorityiscontrarytoEBmotionsregardingextraordinaryexpenditures
above$50,000USDrequiringtwosignatories.Thetwoindividualswhoheldtheofficeofthe
GeneralSecretaryTreasurerduring2009-2019didhoweversignasdualsignatoriesofthe
IWF’sSwissaccount,ostensiblysigningbankpaymentauthorisationswithoutcompletely
knowingorunderstandingtherealpurposebehindthem.TheMIITacceptsthattherewere
33
certainly proper reasons for the bank payments, for example to cover the expenses of
runningthefederationandcostsassociatedwithantidopingefforts.However,neitherofthe
former or current General Secretary Treasurers had any insight or knowledge of what
occurredfollowingreceiptofthewiresthattheysignedfor.Thus,thebankingaffairsofthe
IWF were effectively in the exclusive control of the Dr. Aján. There was no one in the
organisationotherthanDr.Ajánwhoreviewedthebankingrecordsandhadabsolutecontrol
overthebankaccountsandrecords.Thisformofautonomousfinancialcontrolexertedby
himfurtherstrengthenedhispowers.
iii.ExclusiveFinancialControl
Dr.Aján’sinfluencelikewiseextendedtohisstewardshipoftheIWF’sfinancialresources.
Givenhissole-signatorystatusoftheIWF’soperatingaccountattheOTPBank,hewas,with
veryrareexception,theonlypersonwhomadecashdepositsorwithdrawalstoandfrom
that account.Healsokept secret theexistenceof certainbankaccounts and theiruseor
purpose.Toillustrate,duringtheMIIT’sinterviewsoftheIWFSecretariat,theEB,andthe
IWF’sfinancialadvisorandauditors,noneoftheseindividualswereawareofanyfurther
IWFbankaccountsotherthaninitiallytheUBSandsubsequentlyUBPBanksinSwitzerland,
andtheoperatingaccountattheOTPBankinHungary.EventheIWF’sdedicatedpart-time
bookkeeperwhenaskedabouttheIWFaccountsatMKB,forwhateverreason,wasunwilling
todiscuss theMKBaccountswith theMIIT.Thepart-timebookkeeperadmitted that the
official IWF financial records kept by her did not include the financial transactions that
occurredwithintheMKBaccounts.
34
InadditiontotheMKBaccounts,theinvestigationalsouncoveredasecondUSDollaraccount
attheOTPBank,namedVilagKupa.8ThisaccountwasalsonotdisclosedtotheMIIT.Several
requests weremade of the IWF to provide the bank statements for this account, which
remainoutstanding.
Theannualreportingoffinancesisthusseverelyincompleteandfactuallymisrepresented.
Thebookkeeper’srecordsformthebasisoftheinternalfinancialstatementpreparedbythe
financialadvisor,andthoserecordsdonot includeanytransactionsfromeithertheVilag
KupaorMKBaccounts.Theseflawedfinancialstatementsaresubsequentlyreviewedbythe
externalauditorsandformthebasisoftheirannualopinionontheIWFfinancialaccounting,
complyingwithSwiss law.Therefore, theEB, the IWF’sGeneral SecretaryTreasurer, the
externalfinancialadvisor,anditsexternalauditorswereunawareofthebankingactivities
andtransactionsoccurringineithertheIWFaccountsatMKB;ortheIWFVilagKupaaccount
atOTP(seeChapter3forthediscussionontheIWF’sfinances).
8There also exists a Vilag Kupa Euro account.
35
iv.EBApprovalWithoutQuestions
Dr.AjánalsousedhisadministrativeorganisationalpowerstoexerthiscontrolovertheIWF.
He took the opportunity to appoint people to roles in the organisation as a method of
administrative oversight and organisational control. For example, nowhere in the
ConstitutionisthereapositionofDirectorGeneral.ThePresidentcreatedthepostin2014.
HehadtheEBvotetoestablishthepositionandnamedhisson-in-law,Mr.Adamfi,asthe
firstDirectorGeneral.Similarly,PatrickSchamaschwasappointedin2013astheChairof
theAnti-DopingCommission.ThePresidentwasverywellacquaintedwithDr.Schamasch
throughtheirrespectiverolesintheIOC.However,nomatterhowtrustedeachofthesetwo
menmayhavebeenintheirroles,theirdutiesandresponsibilitiesweredeliberatelysiloed,
inhibiting their ability to have a comprehensive oversight of the IWF. Indeed, the same
managementstylewasexertedovertheappointmentstotheSecretariat.Theconsequence
wasthatonlyDr.Ajánhadafulloverviewoftheoperationsoftheorganisation.
v.Cashforvotes:RiggingElectoralCongresses
Dr.Ajánisfrequentlydescribedasacleverpersonandaseasonedpoliticaloperative.Hewas
asuccessfulcandidateforIWFPresidencyeveryfouryearssince2000.Hissuccessfultenure
howeverhasnotbeen theresultofa fairordemocraticprocess.Tohaveandmaintaina
strongpowerbaseandcontroloftheadministrativehierarchy,Dr.Ajánhadtoensurehis
own re-election to the office of President, together with the election of his favoured
candidatestotheseniorpositionsofinfluencewithintheIWF.Hisre-electionwasassured
throughhissupporterscausingthemanipulationoftheresultsintheElectoralCongresses.
36
Theelection results for theofficeofPresidentand including thepositionsof theGeneral
SecretaryTreasurer,1stVicePresidentandfiveVicePresidentswerepredeterminedbefore
any ballotwas ever completed. Dr. Aján bent the voting rules in the IWF’s Constitution,
permitting bribery, exchanged favours, and lavished his supporters with material
experiencestoensurehisPresidency(seeChapter4forafulldescriptionofthistopic).What
followsisasummaryoverviewofthiselectioncontrolmechanismofDr.Ajándesignedto
ensuremaximumadministrativeandorganisationalcontrols.
Theeventthatsetthewheelsinmotionforthesuccessfulre-electionasthePresidentwas
theAnnualCongress,held inadvanceof theElectoralCongress.Dr.AjánusedtheAnnual
Congress to build his allegiances by accepting latemembershippayments in cash or not
demanding thesame, in contraventionof the IWFConstitution.9In some instances, those
whoorganisedtheElectoralCongresswouldbeassuredofreceivinganEBposition.TheMIIT
has uncovered this pattern took that place in at least the two most recent Electoral
Congresses,inMoscow2013andBangkok2017.10
vi.ThePresidentiallyAnointedExecutiveBoard
Dr.AjánstrategicallyandpersonallyselectedtheseniormemberstotheEBwhohelpedhim
maintain his power. Without enquiry, the EB approved his management decisions and
9See IWF Article 2. Only Full Members who have paid their membership fees in advance of the March 31st of an election year may vote. The annual Congresses occurred in all three, 2009, 2013 and 2017 electoral congresses following March 31. 10 Though Dr. Aján ran for president unopposed in 2009, there is evidence that Aján bought votes during the 2009 Electoral Congress in Madrid for the election of his favoured candidates to the Executive Board.
37
providedlittleresistancetohiscontrolovertheEBandtheorganisation.Theseindividuals
weretypically“corruptpersonsorstatusseekers”whowerehappytoprovidehimaquid
proquoorwerecompletelyunawareofwhatthePresidentwastryingtoaccomplish.11See
Chapter 4 for a detailed description howDr. Aján ensured that his preferred candidates
wouldreceivethevotesnecessarytobevotedintotheEB.
IfanyofhischosenEBmembersstartedtodriftoutofline,hewouldwarnthemwiththreats.
Inonehistoricalinstance,hestatedtoaconfidentialwitnessthathecouldturntheirathletes’
samples“dirty,”andinanotherinstancehedeclaredtoNicuVlad,PresidentoftheRomanian
WeightliftingFederation“donotforgot,nexttimewemustdecidethecountriesinsidethe
Olympicgamesoroutside,wewilldecidewhowillbeinTokyoandwhowillnot;”aveiled
threat that the Romanian Federation may not make it to the Olympics. These warning
messagesaimedatEBmemberswerecontrolmechanismstoensureacompliantEB(seethe
Chapter5onDoping).
11 The President of a Member Federation described how Dr Aján had a former General Secretary of the federation voted in as one of the Vice Presidents of the IWF. He took advantage of his lack of understanding of the English language by this individual and knowledge of the inner working of the IWF. As a consequence, on individual on several occasions voted as Dr Aján had instructed and, unknowingly, against the interests of his federation.
38
vii.TheIWF’sSecretariat
ThePresidenthasabsoluteconstitutionalauthoritytostafftheofficesoftheSecretariatas
heseesfittofulfillthedutiesoftheIWF.Since1982,whenDr.Ajánmovedtheofficefrom
AustriatoBudapestwhileactingasGeneralSecretary,hestaffedtheBudapestofficeofthe
SecretariatexclusivelywithHungariannationals.Dr.Ajánhadcompletecontrolandpower
overeveryonewhoworkedintheofficesoftheIWFinBudapest,andtheydidhisbidding.
Since2014,duringtheday-todayoperations,theSecretariatansweredtoMr.Adamfiwho
wasbroughtonbyDr.AjántorunthesportastheDirectorGeneral.Heisatypicalsports
bureaucratrunningtheday-to-dayoperationsoftheIWFwhichincludethecoordinationof
thedifferentdepartments,executingtheEBdecisions,managingthedailyoperationofthe
Federation, and liaisingwith the IOC’s organising committees, technical committees, and
sportcommission.PriortohisroleasDirectorGeneral,hewasthecompetitionandtechnical
director of the IWF. The Anointed EB allowed the appointment despite the position not
existingintheConstitutionandtheobviousissuesofnepotism.
AsDirectorGeneral, the Secretariat reporteddirectly toMr.Adamfi, causing theGeneral
Secretary Treasurer to have a diminished position of authority and control over the
Secretariat. Interviews with various members of the EB and Secretariat reveal that Mr.
Adamfiistheeffectiveday-to-day‘activepresident’.
SecondtoMr.AdamfiwasAnikoNemeth-Mora,theDirectorofInternationalRelations.She
wasDr.Aján’s firsthire andhas remained loyal tohimever since.Other than theduties
39
associatedwithhertitle,sheexecutesthedecisionsofthePresident,andfunctionsasthe
equivalentofcorporatesecretaryoftheorganisation.SheispresentatallEBmeetings,which
arerecordedandtransformedbyherintowrittenminutes.12
viii.CashfromDopingFines
In 2005, the IWF adopted new rules in its Anti-Doping Program that imposed fines on
Member Federations for multiple positive doping results in an effort to provide a
disincentivetopotentialdopers.From2005until therulechangein2017, fineswerethe
primarymethodofsanctioningaMemberFederationfordoping,andthePresidentcollected
largesumsofcashfromthesefines.After2017,MemberFederationsessentiallylosttheir
ability to “buy” theirwayoutof a sanctionandnowhad to serveamandatoryperiodof
suspension in addition to payment of a fine. Fines however could be negotiated, and
sanctions could be suspended or delayed for favoured countries (see the discussion on
dopingfinesinChapter5).
2.4InfiltrationoftheAnti-DopingControlProgram
ThePresidentappointedtheIWF’sfirstinternalLegalCounselin2005.Thispersonalsoheld
thepositionofAnti-DopingCoordinator.Inthatcapacity,shewouldassisttheAnti-Doping
Commission with the performance of the IWF’s Anti-Doping Program. This included
12Witnesses have described how minutes of meetings have been altered after the fact to suit Dr. Aján’s position, making it appear that the EB had in fact agreed to whatever he was proposing, when in fact the original minutes show no acceptance by the EB.
40
developing the Test Distribution Plan (“TDP”), the International Registered Testing Pool
(“IRTP”), the results-management of Anti-Doping Rule Violation (“ADRV”) cases and
functioningasfirstinstanceadjudicator.
InthetimeperiodinvestigatedbytheMIIT,Dr.Ajánhadopenaccesstowhatissupposedto
beaconfidentialAnti-DopingProgram.AsmorefullydetailedinChapter5,duringthe1980s
and90seachindividualinternationalsportfederation(“IF”)recognisedbytheIOCmanaged
theirownantidopingprogramwiththeirownrespectiverules.Thaterawastheincubator
thatenabledDr.AjántobringtheIWFAnti-DopingProgramwithininhissphereofinfluence
asapartofhisoverallcontroloftheorganisationalstructure.
WiththeintroductionoftheWADACode,theworld’sfirstharmonisedcodeonthecontrol
ofPerformanceEnhancingDrugs(“PEDs”),theeraofdopingcontrolsbeingadministeredby
individualsportfederationsended.TheWADACodecameintofulleffectattheoutsetofthe
2004 Olympic Games in Athens. A different era of doping control emerged with a new
independentinternationalinstitutiontochampionthecauseofcleansportworldwide.
LikeallIFs,theantidopingcontrolproceduresoftheIWFchangedtoaccommodate:(i)the
harmonisedworld-widecodewithitslistofPEDs;(ii)theharmonisedworldwidesanctions
forviolationofthecode;and(iii)thestructuretosupportthecodethroughWADAaccredited
laboratories.AstheinstitutionofWADAevolved,itrequiredtheIWFtochangeitsmethods
of antidoping.The strengtheningofWADA triggeredDr.Aján’s lesser involvement in the
microadministrationoftheIWF’sAnti-DopingProgramandresultedinamoremacrolevel
41
of infiltration.Whilehehad toacceptcertainexternaloversight,hemaintainedaccess to
IWF’sconfidentialantidopingdepartment.
As WADA developed as an international regulatory body, a new set of evolving
manipulationshadtoputinplacetosupportthepowerandcontrolofDr.Aján.Toachieve
this end the President would manipulate Member Federations through fear, bluffs and
bravado.WhileDr.Aján’sreachoverantidopinghadconsiderablydiminishedwiththeonset
oftheWADACode,thelegendofhiscontrolandmanipulationskepthisMemberFederations
infear.Dr.Ajánwouldoftenstoketheembersofhisownlegend,forexample,bysayinghe
couldturndirtysamplescleanandcleansamplesdirty,toensurehisMemberFederations
stayedloyalandinline.
2.5Conclusion
The extent to which the President used and abused his powers granted to his office or
securedbyhimisthesubjectofthefollowingChapters.
42
43
Chapter3:TheHijackingofFinancialControl
3.1Introduction
TheMcLarenIndependentInvestigativeTeam(“MIIT”)hasreviewedthefinancialrecords
providedbytheIWForotherwiseobtainedbytheMIIT.Basedontheinformationavailable
atthistime,weconcludethat$10.4millionUSDappearstobeunaccountedforfromtheIWF
accounts.
3.2BackgroundandConstitutionalFinancialFramework
The IWF’s Constitution provides the framework for themanagement of the Federation’s
finances. At its core, it dictates that the goal of all financial operations must be for the
ultimatebenefitofthesportofweightliftingandtheIWF’sMemberFederations.Itimposes
theguidingprinciplesofaccuracy,transparency,andaccountabilityonallofficers,officials
orotherpartiesinvolvedinthefinancialmanagementandoperationsoftheIWF.13
Significant changes occurred to the IWF’s constitutional financial framework in 2009.
HistoricallyandundertheConstitutioncurrentlyinplace,theveryapexoffinancialcontrol
andmonitoringissupposedtobetheExecutiveBoard(“EB”).Itholdstheabsoluteauthority
todecideonallmattersconcerningthesportofweightlifting,includingfinancialmatters.14
The EB is required by the Constitution to approve the Budget15 , monitor the financial
13 By-Law to 11 (1.1). 14 By-Law to 4.2 (1). 15 By-Law to 11 (2.2).
44
operationsoftheIWF,considertheFinancialReports,andparticipateindecisionsinvolving
economicdeliberations;aswellasadvisethePresidentonfinancialissues.16
UndertheConstitutionthatexistedin2009andearlier,thePresidenthadsoleresponsibility
tomanage,supervise,anddecideonthefinancialandbusinessactivitiesoftheIWF.That
versionoftheConstitutionalsoprovidedforanInternalAuditorsCommittee(“IAC”)whose
three elected members required “relevant experience in bookkeeping, finance or
economics”. The IACwas responsible for performing an audit on the IWF accounts and
presentingayearlyreporttotheEBandCongress.17Noticeablyabsentfromthoseearlier
auditreportsandauditedfinancialstatementspre-2009wereanydegreeofprofessionalism
ortransparency.Accordingtoaconfidentialwitness,theyearly“audit”consistedoftheIAC
goingtoBudapest,collecting100dollarsorabottleofwhiskeyandDr.Ajánwouldsay“Here
youare,herearethebooks.Signthemandwegotodinner."
In2009,awatershedincidenttriggeredaconstitutionaloverhaulofthefinancialframework.
TheCongresselectedthreefinanciallycompetentmemberstotheIAC,whowereinterested
inconductingaproperaudit.ThisnewIACdidnotperformthetraditionallylaxauditprocess
with Dr. Aján. Instead, they requested documents, supplementary information and even
invitedaprofessionalaccountanttoassistthemincompletingtheaudit.Alloftheserequests
wereeitherdeniedorseverelyhamperedbyDr.Aján.Theireventualauditreportalleged
16 In accordance with Article 11 and By-Law to 4.2 (9). 17 IWF 2009 Constitution, Article 8.5.
45
thattherewerepooraccountingpractices,undisclosedbankaccountsandthattheIWFwas
missingmillionsofdollars.
Theuproarcausedbytheserevelationsbroughtaboutapparentconstitutionalreform.Dr.
AjánmovedtodissolvetheIACandinstallanexternalprofessionalauditorandafinancial
advisor. Constitutional reform provided for the EB to have oversight of all audits of the
Federation’s financial operations. 18 The difficulty was that despite the changes to the
ConstitutionandBy-Laws,Dr.Ajáncontinuedonashehadinthepast.HedidabolishtheIAC.
TheexternalprofessionalauditorandfinancialadvisorwerepersonsselectedbyDr.Aján,
whohaddemandedandreceivedthetacitapprovaloftheEBfortheirappointment.
AsthesechangeswerebeingintroducedbyDr.Aján,thenewlyelectedGeneralSecretary
Treasurer,WenguangMa,submittedtotheEBthatthe“EBpowerandfinancialmanagement
is under one person’s power, while this should be separated.” As a consequence, the
Constitution and By-Laws do not distinguish or delineate the financial responsibility
betweenthePresidentandtheGeneralSecretaryTreasurer.Assuch,theyarebothrequired
tomanageandsupervisethefinancialandbusinessactivitiesoftheIWFanddecideonits
financialmatters.19
Finally,theSecretariatisresponsibleforadministeringthefinancialactivitiesandkeeping
theaccountsoftheIWF,underandwiththesupervisionofthePresident.20Thismeansthat
18 By- Law to 11 (6.1). 19 By- Law to 11(2.3 b,d). 20 By- Law to 7 (11).
46
the IWFPresidenthas the sole authority to instruct thebookkeeper as amemberof the
Secretariat.However,therealityisthattheGeneralSecretaryTreasurerisexcludedfroma
constitutionalsupervisoryroleovertheSecretariat’sadministrationoffinancialactivities.
3.3IllusoryReform
ThereformsthattookplaceonlychangedthepaperworkoftheConstitution,whileinreality
thestatusquoremainedunchanged.AbsolutecontroloftheIWF’sfinancesremainedinthe
irongripofDr.Aján.Hecontinuedtocreateandcontrolanorchestratedfinancialreality.Not
a single individual involved in the financial administration of the organisation, from the
internalbookkeeper,theexternalauditor,thefinancialadvisor,andeventheEB,hadany
realorfactuallycompleteunderstandingoftheIWF’sfinances.Atbest,theEBonlyreceived
information in the form of progress reports or skeletal financial summaries. Dr. Aján
achievedthiscontrolandblockedtheEBthroughaseriesofmechanismsincluding,butnot
limitedto:
(i) exclusivecontroloverbankcashdeposits,withdrawalsandtransfersoffunds,
(ii) singularknowledgeofallbankaccountsoperatinginthenameoftheIWF,
(iii) dismissingchallengesforgreaterexaminationoffinancialactivities,byrelyingon
thefactthatitwasnowoverseenbyexternalauditorsKPMGandfinancialadvisor,
AlainSiegrist,andwithholdingpapers,filibusteringandrefusingtoengageindebate
onthesubject
(iv) directingandinstructingthebookkeeper’sentriesintotheIWF’sbooksandrecords,
and
47
(v) theexclusiveauthorityoverthecollectionofdifferentcashpayments,includingthe
selectivereceiptinganddocumentationofthesame.
Allof thesemanipulationsallowedDr.Aján tousurp the financialcontrol that,under the
Constitution,rightlybelongedtotheEB.Itiswhatultimatelyallowedfor$10.4millionUSD
inthepastdecadetobeunaccountedfor.
3.4BankAccountsandMoneyFlow
TheIWFgeneratesthemajorityofitsrevenuesfromitsshareoftheInternationalOlympic
Committee’s(“IOC”)distributionofbroadcastandmarketingrights.Theothermajorsources
of incomearefromsponsorshipandmarketingarrangements,dopingfinesleviedagainst
MemberFederationswhohavecontravenedthe IWF’sAnti-DopingProgram,competition
revenues,andtoalesserextentmembershipfees,accreditationfeesandmerchandisesales.
TherevenuesflowintotheIWFbankaccountsinoneoftwoways:eitherviawiretransfers
orcash.
Attheoutsetoftheinvestigation,theMIITrequestedthattheIWFSecretariatprovideafull
setofbankaccountstatementsfromalloftheIWF’sfinancialinstitutionsduringthe2009-
2019period.TheMIITwasinformedandassuredbybothseniorIWFpersonnelandDr.Aján
thathistorically,theIWFonlyhadinvestmentaccountsattheSwissbanksUniondeBanques
Suisses(UBS)andUnionBancairePrivée(UBP),andoperatingaccountsattheOTPBankin
Hungary. Based upon the subsequent financial investigation conducted by theMIIT, this
48
representationof theentiretyof the IWFaccounts turnedout tobeblatantlyandwholly
untrue.
ConsiderabletimeandeffortweretakentoobtaintheUBS,UBPandOTPbankstatements,
causingdelaystotheMIIT’sinvestigation.TheSecretariatattemptedtocomplyinatimely
fashion,howevertheinitialstatementsthatweresenttotheMIITwereseriouslyincomplete.
This made it nearly impossible to conduct the forensic tracing techniques necessary to
determinetheflowoffundsinandoutoftheaccounts.Asthestatementstrickledin,theMIIT
wasabletoperforman initialanalysis thatrevealedtheexistenceofadditionalbankand
credit card accounts that were never disclosed to investigators by anyone at the IWF.
Withoutthemissingfinancialrecords,theform,sourceanddispositionofthesefundscould
notbeproperlyandcompletelyidentified.
The diagram below demonstrates the flow of funds around IWF and cash holdings. The
paragraphsthereafterdescribehowtheflowworked.
49
-MIITMoneyFlowChart
.i.TheLegacyofFlawedAccounting-MissingCashPre-2009
Thecatalystforthefinancialconstitutionalreformthattookplacebetween2009–2011was
thewidelyreportedcomplaintbyDr.AntonioUrso,PresidentoftheEuropeanContinental
Federation,toboththeIWFandIOCthatmanymillionsweremissingfromtheIWF’sSwiss
accounts.TheIAC,ofwhichDr.Ursowasamember,inthecourseoftheirauditconducteda
reviewoftheavailablebalancesheetsandtherevenuespaidintotheSwissbankaccounts
and had determined that funds were missing from these accounts. The IOC Ethics
Commission refused to take on thematter stating that itwas an issue for the individual
federation.21
AlthoughthisperiodwasnottheMIIT’spriorityfocus,anoverviewfortheperiodfrom1992
– 2009 was undertaken to develop a baseline understanding of the universe of funds
availableatthestartof2009.TheIOCindependentlyconfirmedtotheMIITthatoverthe
periodfrom1992–2008theywiretransferredatotalof$23,255,471USDintotheIWF’s
Swissaccount22andsomesmalleramountsintotheHungarianOTPoperatingaccount.Some
smallerIOChonorariumpaymentstoDr.AjánwereadditionallypaidtotheMKBaccount.
21 CAS 2011/A/2474 Urso and Casadei v IOC. The matter was taken to the CAS, and it determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. 22The investment bankers for the IWF were originally the UBS of Zurich. The UBP Swiss account also existed prior to 2009. In 2016, UBS closed the IWF’s accounts, and all balances on investments were transferred to UBP.
50
TheIOCpaymentswerenotfullydeclaredinthebalancesheetsprovidedtotheEBatthat
time.Moreover,thereviewofEBmeetingminutesconfirmedthattheEBhadbeenawareof
the Swiss account at least since 2005 where they were discussed by Dr. Aján at an EB
meeting.NodeclarationwasmadebyhimoftheMKBaccount,operatingsinceatleast2007
andpossiblyasearlyas2000,accordingtoDr.Aján.
Separately,theIWFprovidedtheMIITwithanexpendituresheetfortheperiodof1992–
2009. These amountswere reconciledwith the balance sheets for each respective year.
TheseexpenditureamountsroughlybalancedwiththemoneywiretransferredbytheIOC.
Subsequent to the appointments of the external auditor and financial advisor, after the
ruckusof2009,theEBwasprovidedwithmoredetailedyearlyfinancialinformation.Those
recordsappearedtoshowthatthetotalinvestmentsintheSwissaccountwereconsiderably
less than the funds received from the IOC. However, the records also proved to be
incomplete, as they did not include, for whatever reason, the IOC payment for 2008.
Accounting for the error, it appears that the Swiss account reflected the correct
corresponding amounts that were wire transferred by the IOC. Therefore, Dr. Urso’s
complainttotheIOCwasfoundedonanincorrectfinancialpremise.
While the premise of the IAC’s allegations, that funds had disappeared from the Swiss
accountisincorrect,theMIIThasdeterminedthattheirsuspicionsofunaccountedformoney
islikelycorrect,butnotforthereasonstheystated.OtherthantheinitialreviewoftheIOC’s
transfersintotheIWF’sSwissaccount,theMIITdidnotconductanyanalysisonmovement
51
offundspriorto2009.However,theMIIT’sanalysisdemonstratesthattherealflightoffunds
occursnotoutoftheSwissaccount,butinstead,afterthemoneyistransferredtotheIWF
accountsinHungary.
TheSwissaccountsonwhichDr.UrsoandtheIACplacedsomuchemphasismayhavebeen
a‘red-herring’.ThesefundsaresubsequentlyallowedtocascadedownintotheHungarian
OTPaccountandappeartobeforlegitimatepurposes,whiletherealproblemexistswithin
theHungarianOTPandMKBaccounts.Todetermineifasimilarprocesswasinplaceprior
to2009,afurtherinvestigationofthesepointswithaccesstobankstatementsisrequired.
TheMIITwasnevergiventheserecords.
52
ii.TheSwissAccounts
Historically,theIWFhasheldaccountsatUBSinZurich,Switzerland(closedin2016),and
at UBP in Geneva, Switzerland. These Swiss accounts were funded solely by the IOC’s
distributionofbroadcastingandmarketing rights, andwhereapplicable,positive income
attributable to investment profits. The account also functions as a repository of the
significantandvariedinvestmentsoftheIWF.
Even thoughnosignaturecardswereprovided,witnesseshaveconfirmed that theSwiss
accountsrequiredualsignatoriesofthePresidentandtheGeneralSecretaryTreasurer.The
General Secretary Treasurer’s sole involvement into oversight and administration of the
IWF’s financeswas,upon the requestofDr.Aján, to signwire transfersauthorising fund
movementfromtheSwissaccounttotheIWF’soperatingOTPaccount.Thesignaturewas
madewithoutknowledgeorunderstandingofthereasonorpurposebehindthetransfers.
TheMIITappliedforensictracingtechniquesontheaccountsthatweremadeavailable.Wire
paymentsweretracedfromtheIOCtotheIWF’sSwissbankaccounts,andsubsequentwire
transferstherefromtotheIWF’soperatingOTPaccountinHungary.Onthelimitedmaterial
examinedpertainingtotheSwissaccountsoftheIWF,theMIITcouldnotfindanyirregular
wiretransfers,missing,orunallocatedfundsfromtheperiodbetween2009-2020.
iii.TheFlowofFundstotheknownHungarianAccounts
53
TheIWFholdstheiroperatingaccountatOTPBankinBudapestwhereithasUSDollar(USD),
HungarianForint(HUF),andvariousotherforeigncurrencyaccounts.Theonlypersonthat
hadanysignatoryrightsoroversightoftheHungarianOTPaccountwasDr.Aján.
Duringthe2009to2019period,Dr.Ajánpersonallywithdrewapproximately$12.5million
USDincashfromtheOTPoperatingaccountwithoutanycorrespondingexplanationforthe
withdrawalsintheinternalbookkeepingrecords.23Itisacceptedthatsomeofthismoney
wasusedforlegitimatepurposesincludingcostsrelatingtotherunningoftheorganisation
andcompetitions.However,thisamountofcashextendswellbeyondthenecessityofsmall
amountsofinsignificantexpenses.
iv.HiddenHungarianAccounts(VilagKupaandMKB)
Aspreviouslystated,theMIITrequestedcopiesofbankstatementsofallIWFaccounts,and
atfirstitwasbelievedtheyhadbeenproducedintheirentirety.However,duringfinancial
analysisoftheOTPBankrecords,theMIITsoondiscoveredthattheIWFhadatleasttwo
additionalaccountsatOTPBankunderthenameofIWFVilagKupa,andnumerousaccounts
atanotherHungarianfinancialinstitutioncalledMKB.Duringthecourseofinterviewsofthe
SecretariatandtheinitialinterviewDr.Aján,noneofthesenewlydiscoveredaccountswere
disclosed.
23Of this amount approximately $1.8 million USD consisted of entries that were identified as presidential honorarium payments that Dr. Aján withdrew in cash.
54
NumerousrequestsweremadeoftheIWFoverthecourseoftheinvestigationbytheMIIT
and the Acting President to provide all of the IWF’s bank statements. Only certain
transactionsrelatedtothehiddenaccountswereidentifiedinthestatementsmadeavailable,
thus theseaccountsand theircontentsandpurposeremainedhidden from investigators.
Eventually,whentheMIITspecificallyaskedforthesecretMKBaccountstatements, they
werefinallyproduced, lessthanamonthbeforetheissuingofthisReport.TheOTPVilag
Kupaaccountstatementshaveneverbeenproduced.
TheMIITfinallyreceivedtheMKBmonthlystatementsfortheperiodof2010throughearly
2020 in the finalmonthof its investigation.Thesestatementsshowthat theaccountwas
fundedwithapproximately$4.7millionUSDincashdepositsinvarioustypesofcurrencies
(USD,Euro,GBP,andHUF,convertedonaperdayhistoricbasis)andapproximately$8.5
millionUSDinelectronicwiretransfers.Thevastmajorityofthewiretransfersoriginated
fromtheIWF’sOTPVilagKupaUSDaccount.
AfterinitiallydenyingtheexistenceofanyotherIWFaccounts,besidestheoperatingOTP
accountsandtheSwissaccounts,inafollowupinterviewwiththeMIIT,Dr.Ajánadmitted
totheexistenceoftheMKBaccounts.Itssolepurpose,hepresented,wastofacilitateamore
favorableforeigncurrencyexchangerateforUSdollars.TherecordsdemonstratethatDr.
AjánwouldtransferUSdollarfundsfromtheOTPoperatingaccountorfromtheundisclosed
OTPVilagKupaaccount,andmadecashdepositstoundisclosedMKBaccount(s).TheMKB
wouldthenconvertthetransferredfundsintoHungarianForint.Thenonlyaportionofthose
convertedHUFfundswouldbewiredbacktotheIWF’sOTPHUFoperatingaccount.Once
55
theMKBHUFwireswereintheOTPHUFoperatingaccount,thefundswereusedtopaythe
localoperatingexpensesoftheIWF.
Dr.Aján’scurrencyexchangerateexplanationissupportable,buttherecordsprovethere
wasmoregoingon.Excludedfromthatexplanationwastheotherpurposeoftheoff-record
MKBaccounts,fromwhichDr.Ajánwouldmakeregularandrecurringcashwithdrawalsof
theconvertedHUFfundsthatremainedintheaccountsatMKB.During2010-2020,Dr.Aján
personally withdrew cash in local currency a total of 2,079,500,000 HUF (equivalent to
approximately$8.3millionUSD).TheundisclosedMKBaccountsandconstantwithdrawal
ofcashfromthem,furtherhighlightsthesignificantflawsinfinancialreporting,disclosure,
andtransparencyoftheIWFasawhole.
TheIWFbookkeeperadmittedtonothavingaccesstoanyrecordsof thesetransfersand
withdrawals, nor was she provided any information by Dr. Aján regarding the same.
Therefore,anyfinancialtransactionsthatwereconductedwithintheMKBorOTPVilagKupa
accountsareneitherenteredontotheIWFaccountingrecords,norsubsequentlyincluded
intheIWF’sannualfinancialstatements.ThemovementoffundsiswhyneitherKPMGnor
AlainSiegristwouldhavebeeninformedoftheexistenceorpurposeoftheMKBandVilag
Kupaaccounts.
3.5TyrannyofCash
56
Theuseofcashinanyorganisationisproblematic.Dependingonwhatisdonewithcashit
isdifficult,ifsometimesimpossible,totrace.OtherthanDr.Aján,nooversightexistedover
theuseofcashwithintheIWF,whichcausedincompleterecordsbeingmaintainedbythe
IWFbookkeeper.The IWF’scashmanagementandstandardofaccounting issurprisingly
amateurforasportsfederation.Itisabysmalatbest.
TheIWFhasseveralcashrevenuestreams.Theyaregeneratedfromdopingfines,paidfor
byMemberFederationswhohavecontravenedantidopingregulationsandsubjecttoeither
oneorbothofathleteorcountryfines.TheIWFalsocollectsaccreditationandlicensefees
fromNationalandContinentalFederationswhoorganiseandplancompetitions.Thesefees
aregenerallycollected incash.Fromtimetotime,revenues fromsponsorshipdealswith
sportequipmentmanufacturers,oilcompaniesandfoodsupplementmanufacturersarealso
collected in cash. The audit trail for all these cash transactions is a receipt, which the
Presidentwhimsicallyissuesfromabookwithtriplicatecarboncopies.
Largeamountsof thesecashrevenueshavebeencollectedbyDr.Ajánwhile fulfillinghis
Presidentialdutiesatinternationalcompetitions.Thereisnowaytodeterminewhetherthe
receiptsheissuedareforthecorrectamountofcashorifareceiptwasissuedatall.
Ananalysisofavailablecashreceiptsthatwereissuedconcludesthatduringtheperiodfrom
2009-2019,approximately$6millionUSDwascollectedincashbyDr.Aján.Inadditionto
the amount of collected cash already stated, unknown amounts of cash may have been
57
collectedbyhimorhispersonnelwithnoapplicablerecordofareceiptbeingissued.24This
istheinherentriskofcashbasedtransactions.
ThereisnowayofactuallyknowingexactlyhowmuchcashwascollectedbyDr.Ajánduring
thisperiod.Itisunknownwhetherheissuedanyreceiptatall,recordedthecorrectamount
received,orreceiptedallcashtransactions.Thenthereistheproblemasthesolereporterof
informationtothepart-timebookkeeperLiviaBudavari,whetherheinformedhertomake
abookingkeepingentry in theofficial accounting ledger.The issuingof receiptsand the
collection of cash was entirely dependent upon the accuracy and honesty of Dr. Aján.
WitnessestothisenquiryindicatedthatDr.Ajánwasincompletecontrolofcashandwould
supplysomereceiptsandnotalltothebookkeeperforentryintotheIWFaccounts.
3.5.1President’sUseofCash
i.Collectionofcash:Todepositornottodeposit
Dr.Ajánissuedatleast574cashreceiptsbetween2009-2019.Thetotalofthesereceiptsis
approximately$6millionUSD.ThereceiptbooksarenumberedconsecutivelyandtheMIIT’s
analysisshowsthattherearepotentially133receiptsmissingfrombooks,generallyheld
solelybyDr.Aján.Thehardcopyreceiptbooksfortheentireperiodfrom2009-2018have
beendestroyedbytheIWF.TheactionsofDr.AjánisanoffenceundertheIWF’sCodeof
ConductBy-Law,2.2.2(e).
24 Atilla Adamfi advised that on occasion he had collected $ 13,000 USD. On his return from abroad he turned over the cash to the President. No receipt was given to him for the money.
58
All declared receiptswere tracked to the IWF ledgers and a confirmed entrywasmade.
However, from2013onwards,noneof thedeclared receipted fundsweredeposited into
IWF’sdeclaredOTPoperatingaccount.Theonlypersonknowledgeableofwherethemoney
wentisDr.Aján.
Severalcashanalyseswereconductedtodeterminethe frequencyofwhichthereceipted
cashwasdeposited,includingdopingfines,travelexpenses,andattemptsofreconcilingthe
accountingledgeragainsttheactualbankdeposits.Theseanalysesrevealthattherewere
severedeficienciesinthemanagementanddepositofcash.
ii.CountryFines
TheMIITconductedanin-depthanalysisoftheMemberFederationswhopaidtheirdoping
finesincash.ThepurposeofwhichwastoreconciletheamountstheMemberFederations
apparentlypaidwiththereceiptstheywereissuesbyDr.Aján.Severalrequestsweremade
of 20 Member Federations who had paid their fines in cash. Out of these requests, the
ArmenianWeightliftingFederationrespondedthat theyhaddestroyedthoserecords, the
Turkish Federation provided uninformative information, the Iraqi Federation provided
limitedinformationandtheRussianFederationprovidedinformationwhereaccessible.16
otherMemberFederationsdidnotrespondatall.Theattempttoreconcilethecashdeposits
withtheoriginalreceiptscouldthereforenotbeconducted.Thus,manyMemberFederations
areindirectviolationof2.2.2and2.2.3ofthetermsofreferenceintheirfailuretocooperate.
59
TheRomanianWeightliftingFederationwastheonlyMemberFederationthatprovidedthe
MIITitsoriginalreceiptsforcashpaymentstoDr.Aján.Theexaminationoftheirreceipts
revealed unexplained anomalies. The total receipted amount of three cash payments
providedbytheRomanianWeightliftingFederationequaled$100,000USD.However, the
correspondingreceiptsprovidedbytheIWFhadcompletelydifferentamountsthanthoseof
thereceiptsprovidedtoMIITbytheRomanianMemberFederation.Thedestructionofthe
receiptbooksprecludestheMIITfromreconcilingthediscrepancies.
TheanomaliescontinuedintheanalysisoftheRussianWeightliftingFederation’s(“RWF”)
dopingfines.Inthisinstance,itisacasewherenoreceipthasbeenissuedandnorecordcan
befoundofthetransactionintheIWF’sledgers.TheMIITrequestedthattheRWFexamine
howmuchitpaidindopingfines.Itprovidedexcerptsfromitsaccountsthatshoweditpaid
theIWF$120,000USDincashovertheperiodexamined.Notraceofthesefundscanbefound
in thereceiptsor ledgersof the IWF.MaximAgapitov, thecurrentPresidentof theRWF,
describedtotheMIITthatononeoccasiontheRWF’sformerPresidentSyrtsov,travelledto
Budapestwith$50,000USDtopayadopingfine.ThisamountwaspaiddirectlytoDr.Aján.
TheMIIThasnotbeenabletolocateareceiptforthesefundsandnoentrycorrespondingto
thispaymentwasmadeintheIWF’saccountingledger.Effectively,thereisnoproofofthe
paymentwithintherecordsoftheIWF.
TheAlbanianWeightliftingFederation’sdoping finepaymentprovidesanexampleofDr.
Aján’sinsistenceontheuseofcashtopaydopingfines.Aconfidentialwitnessdescribedan
60
incident during the Rio Games where he was approached by Stavri Bello, the Albanian
NationalOlympicCommittee’sSecretaryGeneral.Mr.Belloproceededtotellthewitnessthat
hewas“veryupsetwithTamasAjánandtheIWF,thisisunacceptable,thisisanoutrage.He
[Dr.Aján]calledthePresidentofourweightliftingfederationandtoldhimthat ifyoudon’t
bringyoursuitcasewith$100,000cashtopayyourdopingfine,yourteamwillnotgotoRio
2016.”
Mr.Bellodescribedtotheconfidentialwitnessthatagroupoffourindividuals,ledbyAgron
Haxhihyseni,SecretaryGeneraloftheAlbanianWeightliftingFederation,divided$100,000
USDbetweenthemanddrovethepaymentfromTirana,viaBelgradetoBudapest.Mr.Bello
indicated to the witness that carrying such amounts of cash over the border and not
declaringitwasinviolationofthenationallawsofbothAlbaniaandSerbia.25
ExaminationoftherecordsoftheIWFindicatesthattheAlbanianWeightliftingFederation
wiretransferred$25,000USDtotheIWFonthe13November2015andthatasubsequent
cashpaymentof$73,910USDwasmadeonthe22July2016.26Thus,clearingtheirdoping
fineallowingtheirparticipationinRio.TheMIITrecoveredphotographicevidenceofthis
cashpaymenttoDr.Aján,whichtookplaceinarestaurantinBudapestinthepresenceofMr.
Haxhihyseni.AcopyoftheIWFreceiptisalsophotographedandaccompaniesthisreport.
25 https://www.iatatravelcentre.com/AL-Albania-customs-currency-airport-tax-regulations-details.htm; https://www.iatatravelcentre.com/RS-Serbia-customs-currency-airport-tax-regulations-details.htm26 Stavri Bello denied all knowledge of the payment of the fine, despite having told a confidential witness that the cash was delivered to Dr. Aján. The Albanian Weightlifting Federation initially agreed to assist the MIIT, but after several attempts to contact them refused to do so. Thus the discrepancy between the cash payment received and the $100,000 USD doping fine could not be reconciled.
61
-PhotographofDrAjánissuingacashreceipttoAlbanianWeightliftingFederation
Dr.AjánexplainedthatitwasnecessarytoallowMemberFederationstheoptiontopaytheir
fines,andotherfees,incash.Hestatedthatsomecountriesdonothavetheabilitytowire
money electronically for various reasons, political or otherwise. The MIIT’s review of
Member Federation doping fine payments disproves this theory. Only two out of 194
MemberFederationshavenotpaidviawiretransfers.Infact,evenMemberFederationsof
countrieswithrestrictedbankingsystemsorunderpoliticalsanctionsprohibitingtheiruse
oftheUSdollar,suchasVenezuelaorIran,haveallsuccessfullymadewiretransfertothe
IWF’saccounts.Anumberoffederationsafterhavingpreviouslypaidbybanktransferhave
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laterpaidtheirdopingfinesincash.Evidencesuggeststhatthemethodsusedtomakethese
paymentsaremaybeamatterofchoicebutcouldbeamatterofrequestsbyDr.Aján.
Thepracticeoftransportingcashisariskybusinesstothepersonandtotheownerthereof.
It isn’t safe,may be illegal in certain circumstances, and puts personnel at risk of theft,
embezzlementorattack.TheMIIT’smoneylaunderingexpertindicatedthatthemovement
of cash also puts the Secretariat and federation personnel at risk of money laundering
offences.
iii.TravelExpenses
Thepracticeofdoublecountingtravelcostsisacommonwaytoembezzlefundsfroman
organisation.ItappearsthatthiswasalsopracticedbyDr.Aján.TheMIITrecoveredfrom
theIWFservertwophotographsofinvoicesissuedbytheIWFforreimbursementsofservice
and travel costs. These two invoices are for the amounts of $5,536 and $6,800 USD,
respectivelyandbotharesignedindicatingthatcashhadbeenreceivedforthoseamounts,
yetnocorrespondingentryexistsintheIWF’saccountingledger.Mr.Adamfistatedthathe
collectedandpassedthecashtoDr.Aján,butcannotproveit.NoreceiptwasissuedtoMr.
AdamfibyDr.Aján.
AconfidentialwitnessdescribedanothertravelrelatedincidentwhereDr.Ajánhadpaidthe
witnessanofficialvisit,duringwhich,Dr.Ajánpresentedthewitnesswithaninvoiceofhis
airfaretotaling$14,955USDanddemandedpaymentthereof.Thewitnesswasshockedbut
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paidtheamount.AlthoughthewitnessdidnotgetareceiptfromDr.Ajánforthispayment,
theMIIThasacopyoftheinvoiceissuedfortheairfare.Mr.AdamfifollowedshortlyafterDr.
Ajánandalsopresentedthewitnesswithaninvoiceforhisairfare,whichthewitnessalso
paid.ThecompletelyinadequaterecordsofthesportdidnotenabletheMIITtoconducta
completeanalysisandevaluationofthetravelexpensestodetermine,forexample,whether
these airfare expenses were also covered by the IWF. However, these examples are
illustrativeofhowthedoublepaymentoftravelexpensescouldbeanillegitimatedrainon
theIWF’sresources.
iv.UnexplainedCash
ThereareotherexamplesofcashbeingpaidtoDr.Aján,butnotfullyexplained.InJanuary
2020, at the EB meeting in Doha, the President of the Asian Continental Federation,
MohamedYusefAlManamadethebelowcomments.TheentireEBmeetingiscustomarily
recordedbytheSecretariatandhisstatementisretrievedfromthatrecording.
Haveyouseenow.Hedon'twanttostepdown.Hedon'twantyoutobeactingpresident.He wants to control the commission and because he told he's innocent. There is noevidenceas[unintelligible03:25:17]said.No,there'sevidenceifyouwant,Icangiveyoutheevidenceforallofyou.Ihaveevidenceifyouwant,butthisisveryshamefultoshowittohimortoshowittoanyone.Ifyouwantacopyfromit,Icangiveyouacopy.Youseeit,don'ttakeanypicturefromit.Wehaveitandweknowhimverywell.Wecoverhim,it'sokay,wesupporthim,it'sokay,butweknowhim.Iknowhimverywell.Iknowhimfrom1997,not1998,1997untilnowIknowhimverywell.Wehaveeverything.Letusagreetothispoint,wecan.Ihavetwoslipsby$200,000,hereceivedfromsomebodyandIhavetheoriginal,notthefake,original.Untilheknowsthis,wedon'twanttouseitagainsthimbecausewedon'twanthimtomakeanyscandal.
Mr.AlManawascontactedon threeoccasions toprovide the “twoslipsby$200,000” to
which he was referring in the recording and explain his other comments. Mr. Al Mana
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regrettablydeclinedtheopportunitiestobeinterviewedcontrarytothetermsofreference
previouslyquoted.
v.CashWithdrawals
The IWF’s part-time bookkeeper indicated to theMIIT that she never handled any cash
collectedbythePresidentnordidshewithdrawcashfromtheOTPBank.Inheropinion,the
reason Dr. Aján’s name repeatedly appears on the OTP Bank statements for cash
withdrawalsisbecausehewastheonlyonewhowithdrewmoneyfromthataccount.She
did not includeDr. Aján’s namenext to thewithdrawals on her ledger given that itwas
obvioustoherthathewithdrewthecash.Hewastheonlypersonauthorisedtowithdraw
fundsfromtheOTPoperatingaccount.
ItwasexplainedthatsinceDr.Ajándidnotgiveherreceiptsorrecordsevidencinghowthe
cashhewithdrewwasspent,shecouldnotsubsequentlyaccountforitsuse.Dr.Ajándidnot
depositthecashhereceivedfromMemberFederationsintotheIWF’soperatingaccountat
the OTP post-2013 because it charged banking fees on both USD cashwithdrawals and
deposits.
AccordingtotheIWF’sledger,andconfirmedbybankstatements,Dr.Ajánwithdrewatotal
of$12.5millionUSDfromtheOTPoperationalaccountbetween2009-2019.Noconclusive
audit trail exists evidencing the purpose or use of those funds. The MIIT has identified
severaloccasionswhenlargesumswerewithdrawninadvanceofContinentalelectionsand
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ElectoralCongresses,whereitisallegedthatDr.AjánusedtheIWF’sresourcestobuyvotes
(see Chapter 4 on Electoral Congresses). Given that the bookkeeper was not directly
informedoftheMKBaccount,shecouldnotincludeanydepositsorwithdrawalsmadefrom
thataccountintheIWFledger.
The cash withdrawals and related bookkeeping practices have resulted in a completely
inaccurateunderstandingof the IWF’srevenuesandexpenses.Sincethebookkeeperwas
onlyonoccasionprovidedwithreceiptsdemonstratinghowthewithdrawncashhasbeen
spent, it is impossible toknowwhatpercentagewasused for legitimate IWFoperations.
Furthermore, withdrawals from the MKB account did not factor into her reporting of
withdrawalsmadebyDr.Aján.
SeveralwitnessesidentifiedthatDr.Ajánkeptthecashinasafeinhisoffice.However,on8
May2020whenhissafewaseventuallyopenedinfrontoftheIWF’slegalcounsel,Dr.Lilla
Sagi,therewasnocashcontainedwithinthesafeatall.Infact,itwascompletelyempty.
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-PictureofDr.Aján’semptysafeattheIWFofficeinBudapest
3.6FinancialReporting:MisrepresentedReality
Thefoundationofanyaccuratefinancialrecordkeepingsystemisthetruthofthebooksof
accountusedtoprovidethedatasetfromwhichthefinancialaccountingrecordsarebuilt.
Thefinancialaccountsarethendrawntogetherintheformoffinancialstatements.Itisthose
documents upon which the oversight, management and analysis of an organisation’s
financial affairs are considered. At its core, the IWF’s bookkeeping process was
fundamentallyflawed.
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Duringtheten-yeartimeframeunderreview,theIWFemployedonepart-timebookkeeper
thatworkedunderthesoledirectionandsupervisionofDr.Aján.Sherelieduponrecords
providedtoherbyDr.AjántopopulatetheIWFspreadsheetfilewiththeIWF’srevenues
andexpenses.ThisspreadsheetservedasthebasisuponwhichtheIWF’sannualfinancial
records were prepared by the financial advisor and presented to external auditor and
ultimatelytheEB.
Afterinterviewingthebookkeeper,itwasdiscoveredthattheIWFintentionallyomittedand
obscuredthousandsoftransactionswithintheIWFspreadsheetfile,theoverallneteffectof
whichconcealedmorethan$10millionUSDinunaccountedforcash.Specifically,millionsof
dollars in cash withdrawals conducted by Dr. Aján were never recorded, while certain
electronicfundstransferspaidinHungarianForintweregroupedtogether,convertedtoUSD
and recorded as cash expenditures. The cumulative effect of these confounding entries
produced an approximate difference between cash revenues and cash expenses of $10.4
millionUSDovertheperiodunderreview.Adominoeffectofaccountingreportingfailures
resulted from this flawed process of recording entries in the IWF’s books and records.
Further details of the Cash Analysis have been provided to the O&I Commission on a
confidentialbasisasdescribedintheExecutiveSummaryinChapterOne.
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i.ConstructingAccountingData
Theyearly financial statementsweredrawn from thebookkeeper’s flawedspreadsheets.
Whenthisincompleteaccountingdatasetwaspresentedtothenewindependent‘checks’on
financialimproprietyasaresultoftheerstwhileconstitutionalreforms,itwasacceptedon
face value. Therefore, the resulting financial reports were not properly informative and
thereforemisleading.ThisisCodeofConductoffenceaspreviouslysetout.
ii.MisleadingtheEB
The allegations surrounding financial mismanagement and corruption that have arisen
withintheIWF,stematleastinpartfromthetotallackofoversightandgovernanceoverthe
IWF’sbankaccounts.Dr.AjánwasthesingularpersonwithcompleteknowledgeoftheIWF’s
assets. The EBwas regularly shown incomplete, inaccurate and rudimentary documents
therebydenyingittheabilitytofulfillitsconstitutionaloversightrole.Fromtimetotimean
EBmemberwouldquestionorrequestofDr.Ajanmoreindepthexplanationsoffinances,
andtheywouldbetold“DonotaskabouttheIWFfinances.”27Indeed,therewasnofinancial
controlattheEBlevel.ThereformsoftheIWFConstitutionandBy-Lawswerecontinually
ignored by Dr. Aján and provided him the easy access to potentially acquire the funds
belongingtotheIWF.
27A confidential witness described to the MIIT that after several requests for greater detail, the EB member was told by a member of the Secretariat to refrain from asking about finances again.
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3.7CrossingInternationalBorderswithUndeclaredCash
EUregulationsrequirethatdeclarationonthetransportingofthe10,000EURormoreacross
internationalboundaries.Dr.Ajáninitiallysaidthathedidnotcarryamounts largerthan
10,000EURandifheneededtomovecashinexcessofthelimit,hespreaditamongstaff
members travelingwithhim.TheMIITnotes thatDr.AjánholdsaHungarianDiplomatic
passport and a confidential witness has attested that Dr. Aján is prepared to use its
associatedstatustoavoidsearchesbycustomsofficials.
An analysis of cash receipts has been compared against events Dr. Aján attended. The
snapshotofthisworkshowsthaton29occasionsduringtheperiod2009-2019Dr.Aján
collectedinexcessof$40,000USDatthevariousevents,totaling$3.7millionUSD,related
mainlytodopingfines.Forexample,betweenthe6-15April2013hewasattheIWFYouth
Games inTashkent.There,he issuedreceipts forthecollectionof$234,300USD,someof
which,theMIITconcedesmayhavebeenspentlocally.Giventhenatureofthecashreporting,
itwasnotpossibletoverifythebooksforanylegitimateexpenditures.
Between5-6March2014Dr.Ajánissued18receiptstotaling$444,675USDwhileattending
the South East Asian Weightlifting Congress and the Asian Junior Championships. To
transportthisamountbacktoHungarywouldhaverequiredittobesplitamong45staff.All
oftheIWFstaffinterviewedbytheMIITdeniedcarryingcashinlargeamountsonbehalfof
Dr.Aján.
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AConfidentialwitnessexplainedthatDr.Aján’snephew,AkosUmaruJolathy,travelledwith
Dr. Aján to many international competitions and was accredited as an IWF ‘financial
assistant’.Oneoftherolesofthatpositionwastotransportcashforhisuncle,Dr.Aján.
3.7.1SubjectMatterExpertMoneyLaundering
TheMIIT consulteda subjectmatterexpert inmoney launderingandprovidedhimwith
spreadsheetsoftheIWF’scashcollectionsanddeposits.Inhisexpertopinionreporttothe
IIhedescribedtheevidence“ascompletelyunbelievable”,addingthat“His[Dr.Aján’s]modus
operandiisindicativeofcashcollectionsanddeliverytohishomecountryissomethingthatI
have seenonmanyprevious occasions and I associate thismethodologyas symptomatic of
corruptionorcriminalactivity.”Itcouldbeargued,heexplained,thattheactivitybreaches
theCriminalCodeofHungaryinrespectof1.1.1Embezzlementand1.1.2Misappropriation
ofFunds.
The conclusions above are based upon many factors, which are explained within his
statement,whichhadbeenprovidedonaconfidentialbasistotheO&ICommission.Butthe
mainpointsare:
“(I)Thelackofanydeclarationsofanycash.
a. Hehasknowledgeofthecashdeclarationproceduresandthethresholdamountsbut
noevidenceofanylegitimatedeclarations.
b. Thereisacompletelackofanaudittrail.
c. Therearemuchsafer,secureandauditablemethodstomovelargevolumesofcash
usingtraditionalbankingsystems.
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d. Dr.Ajánhasreadyaccesstofederationbankaccountsbutstillchoosestohandcarry
significantcashamountsdespitethehighriskoflossordetectionbyenforcement
authoritiessuchasCustomsataborderentrypoint.
e. …
f. The complete recklessness of hand carrying cash in these volumes without any
travel,personalorbusinessinsurancetocovertheamountsincaseoflossortheftis
intheexpert’sview,implausible.”
3.8FinancialMethodology
Thedevelopmentofabaselineunderstandingofthetypesofrevenuesandexpenseswithin
the organisation was the starting point of the investigation. This was accomplished by
downloadingtheFinancialReportsavailableontheIWFwebsite.Analysisof thesepublic
documentsprovidedawindowintothevariousassetsheldbytheIWFandideasastowhere
otheraccountsmightpossiblyexist.
The IWF provided the MIIT records of annual financial statements, which were then
compared against the public financial reports. In parallel, an analysis of the minutes of
various Congresses and EB meetings was conducted to anticipate and record financial
matters being discussed. Extracted from these analyseswere records related to interest
earned,balancesintheSwissaccounts,dopingfinerevenues,bankcharges,dopingcontrol
costsandotherexpensesoftheIWF.
AnanalysisoftheyearlyKPMGAuditReportsfollowedtodetermineiftheexternalauditors
hadidentifiedanyissuesorproblemsinthecompletionoftheirannualaudits.
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The compiled data from all of the above analyses instructed the investigators how to
structurefutureinterviewsandformedthethemesunderwhichquestionsweredeveloped.
Interviews were conducted with the external auditors and the IWF’s Financial Advisor
during a site visit to the headquarters of the IWF in earlyMarch. Both KPMG andAlain
Siegristlimitedthetimeavailabletobeinterviewed,resultinginsignificantlyabbreviated
and therefore, incomplete interviews.28Thepart-timebookkeeperwasnoticeably absent
from the headquarters, and access to herwas blocked. TheMIITwas granted access to
interviewheroveramonthlater, followingthesitevisit.Theinternalaccountingrecords
wereprovidedtotheMIITinadvanceofherinterview.
Asdescribedearlier,theIWFinternalaccountingspreadsheetspreparedbythebookkeeper
wererudimentaryinnatureandscope,resemblingasimplegeneralledger.Theinformation
from these spreadsheets was sorted and filtered using different variables. Financial
transactions of interest or out of the ordinary amountswere identified and extracted to
createtheMIIT’sownworkingdocuments.Ananalysisoftheindicatedaccountingcodeswas
alsoconducted.Avastmajorityofthelargecashwithdrawaltransactionsthatappearedon
theIWFspreadsheetdidnothaveanassociatedaccountingcode.Thesetransactionswere
laterdeterminedtobethecashwithdrawalslistingDr.Ajánasthetransactor.
28 When approached by the MIIT at a later date, KPMG would not provide information or interviews without the team signing a document that would have rendered any information gleaned unusable. Needless to say, the MIIT did not accept their terms, additional auditor documents were not provided, and a second interview was never carried out.
73
ThisworkwasconductedastheMIITwaitedfortherequestedbankrecordstobeproduced.
Uptothispointnoactualbankrecordshadbeenexamined.ItwaslateMarch,nearlyamonth
aftertheMIITfirstrequestedthebankstatements,thatitwassuppliedwiththefirstactual
bankrecordsfromtheSwissUBSandUBPaccountsandtheOTPBankinHungary.TheUBS
recordswereeithermissingorvirtuallyuseless.Themajorityof therecordsconsistedof
year-end summaries of investments without individual transactions of deposit and
withdrawals. Only a single year of the UBS accounts was usable. The OTP statements
however,provedusefulindevelopinganunderstandingoftheflowoftheIOCfundsoutof
that particular account. Together with IWF spreadsheet, the MIIT was able to reverse-
engineertransactionsoriginatingfromtheUBSaccount.DespitetheMIIT’smultiplerequests
fortheUBSaccountmonthlystatements,thesewereneverprovided.Therefore,notracing
wasconductedonthisaccount.
AforensictracinganalysiswasconductedagainsttheSwissUBPrecords.Inadditiontothe
investment and trading activity, theUBP statements evidenced thewire transfers of IOC
revenuepayments intotheaccountandsubsequentsmalleramountwiretransferstothe
IWFOTPUSDaccountinHungary.
Four thousand pages of OTP bank and credit card statements from 2009 - 2019 were
reviewedandanalysed.Theserecordswerecross-referencedwiththeearlieranalysisofthe
IWF spreadsheets. The review and analysis focused on cash deposits and withdrawals,
intrabanktransferstootherOTPaccountsandcreditcards,identificationoflegitimateIWF
operating expenses, tracing of interbank wired funds to determine the existence of
74
undisclosed IWFaccountsand theoverall sourceanduseof funds todeterminepossible
indiciaof corruptionandmoney laundering. In addition, several analyticalprojectswere
completedtosupporttherestoftheinvestigation.Theseincludedcashtransactions,doping
finepaymentsfromIran,cashpaidforvotesatElectoralCongresses,movementofIOCfunds
totheIWF,IWFsupportanddevelopmentfunds,IWFofficials’creditcardusage,antidoping
relatedpayments to the IndependentTestingAgency (“ITA”), fundspaid toanotherwise
unknownlegalcounsel,Dr.BanosCsaba(Karoly),researchingcashreceiptstobankrecords,
research related to an IWF bank account in Colorado, USA, and Dr. Aján presidential
honorariumpayments.
Theforegoingconductedanalysesrevealedtwoaccountsthatwereneverdisclosedtothe
MIITbyanyonewithintheIWF.OneisaUSDaccountatOTPBankunderthenameofIWF
VilagKupa.AnalysisofthisaccountwasnotpossiblesinceitwasneverprovidedtotheMIIT,
despiteitsmultiplerequests.
InearlyApril,theMIITadvisedtheIWFthattheyknewabouttheexistenceofaccountsat
theMKBBank.Itwasonlyon8May2020,lessthanamonthbeforethisReportwasdue,that
the IWF finallyproduced theMKBrecords.Those recordswereanalysedusing the same
procedures that had been applied against the OTP accounts. None of the MKB banking
transactions are explicitly recorded in the IWF’s books of account. Another flaw in the
processofkeepingbookrecordswasrevealed.Theundisclosed,andthereforeunaccounted
forMKBtransactionsleftaninexplicablerecordinthepreparedfinancialstatements.This
furtheraggravatestheflawedrecordingsystemdiscussedearlier.
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3.9PrincipleOutcomes
Theoveralloutcomeofalloftheforegoingworkisreflectedinthetableonthenextpage.It
showsthat,basedontherecordsavailabletotheMIITatthistime,thereisapproximately
$10.4millionUSDincashthatcannotbeaccountedfor.
Asof3June2020,theIWFhasfailedtoprovidecompletefinancialrecordsfor2009through
2019. Until all relevant records are provided for analysis by the IWF and Dr. Aján, the
‘Unaccounted For Cash’ amount indicated in the table below will have the potential to
increaseordecrease.
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IWFCASHREVENUES(2009through2019)
CASHFEES&FINESCOLLECTEDATCONGRESSES,TOURNAMENTS,etc.
(PerIWFbookkeepingrecords)
6,156,733
CASHWITHDRAWNFROMIWFOTPACCOUNTS
(ValuedinUSD)
12,571,609
CASHWITHDRAWNFROMIWFMKBACCOUNTS
(ValuedinUSD)
9,128,608
27,856,950
IWFCASHEXPENDITURES(2009through2019)
EXPENSESPAIDINCASH
(PerIWFbookkeepingrecords)
11,040,438
CASHDEPOSITEDTOIWFOTPACCOUNTS
(ValuedinUSD)
1,668,610
CASHDEPOSITEDTOIWFMKBACCOUNTS
(ValuedinUSD)
4,743,974
17,453,022
UNACCOUNTEDFORCASH
TOTALCASHREVENUES
27,856,950
TOTALCASHEXPENDITURES
(17,453,022)
TOTALUNACCOUNTEDFORCASH* 10,403,928
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Chapter4:ElectoralCorruption-CashforVotes
4.1Introduction
Dr.AjánhassustainedanirongripontheIWF’selectoralresultsforatleastthepastdecade
ofhis20-yeartenureasthePresident.OneofthefundamentalconclusionsfromtheMcLaren
Independent InvestigationTeam(“MIIT”) is that thepresidentialandotherelections that
tookplaceduringtheperiodfrom2009-2017wereastonishinglybriberyprone.Corruption
wasrifewithrampantcronyismandoutrightbribery.Thebuyingofvoteswasaccomplished
through individuals acting on behalf of the President as “vote brokers.” A confidential
witnessdescribedthebriberyapproachtohiminahotelroomafterthemidnighthourbya
thenseniormemberofoneoftheContinentalFederations.Herequested$5,000USDbased
on an alleged prior agreement to support the “African countries”. The request was
dismissed.
Dr.Ajánalwaysmaintainedacadreofindividualsclosetohimthroughtheappointmentof
friendsandassociateswithoutproper regard to theirqualifications.Witnessesdescribed
suchindividualsasthe“President’sTeam”.Theywere,ineffect,thePresident’scronies.They
wereoftenmembersoftheExecutiveBoard(“EB”)andIWFhierarchywhosoughtstatusfor
themselves or quid pro quo favours for their support and the status of being on the
President’sTeam.From time to time, generous supportpaymentswerebestowedonhis
cronies, some of whom would have received cash for votes. Typically, some of these
individualswouldactasthevotebrokers.Throughthem,thePresidentwasnotonlyableto
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distancehimselffromthedirtybusinessofexchangingmoneyforvotes,butalsocoordinate
aboughtandpredeterminedelectionresultbyleveragingtheseindividuals’alliesandtiesto
their own continental Member Federations. The President’s political prowess and clout
amongMemberFederationsresultedincorruptedandundemocraticelectionsthatMember
Federationsseeminglyacceptedasthenorm,despitetheirprotestationstothecontrary.This
ChapterdescribesthemethodsbywhichDr.Ajánwasabletosustainthisultimatecontrol
overtheIWFtoensurehisownre-electiontotheofficeofPresident.
4.2PreparationsfortheElectoralCongress
4.2.1TheAnointedEB
Dr.Aján’spowerbaseandcontroloftheSecretariatandtheEBoftheIWFweredependent
onhisownre-electionaswellastheelectionofhisfavouredcandidatestoseniorinfluential
positionswithintheinternationalorganisation:theGeneralSecretaryTreasurer,the1stVice
Presidentandtheother5Vice-Presidents(the“AnointedEB”).Hewouldthenexploithis
croniesintheoperationoftheIWF.TheConstitutionrulesareexplicit:membersoftheEB
are to be elected, except for the 5 Continental Federation Presidents who are ex officio
members, but with full EB voting rights. The election of the Anointed EB however was
neitherfairnordemocratic.InadvanceoftheElectoralCongress,Dr.Ajánwouldevaluate
andpersonallyselectthememberstotheEBthatwouldformhisteam,strategicallychoosing
individualsthatareeither“corruptandstatusseekers”orcompletelyunawareandoblivious
to what he was trying to accomplish.29 On at least one occasion an individual from the
29 See footnote in Chapter #2 footnote 10.
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Anointed EBwas untruthfulwith theMIIT as to his accepting and giving of bribes. This
processformaintainingpowerwasreplicatedateachofthe2009,2013and2017Electoral
Congresses. Evidence of this process has been corroborated through both witness and
documentaryevidence.The integrityprovisionsof theCodeofEthicsarehighlydeficient
becausethebuyingofvotesisnotanoffence.Howeverthebehaviourofvotebrokersisin
violationofsection1.4.1oftheIntegrityprovisions.
Dr.Aján’s influencewasnot limited to selecting the seniorpositions for the “elected”EB
members. His influence could also affect the elections of the Continental Federations’
Presidents. Members of Dr. Aján’s team would travel to the Continental Federations’
electionsandworkasvotebrokers,bribingmemberstovoteforaspecificindividual,who,
ifsuccessful,wouldtakeupaseatontheEBasaContinentalFederationPresident.Thus,the
buyingofvoteswasnotlimitedtothequadrennialElectoralCongresses(discussedbelow)
but existed as a pattern of systemic behaviour that was accepted throughout the
organisation.
WithDr.Aján’sTeamstackingtheseniorEBpositions,hecouldleveragethosealliancesfor
votesattheElectoralCongressandensurecomplianceoftheEB.Asaresult,membersonthe
EBwould intentionallynot fulfill their critical responsibilities of approving Presidential
actions, reviewing and assessingmanagement plans, including committee appointments,
financesandthedopingprogram.WithoutresistancefromhiscroniesontheEB,Dr.Aján
was able to assert and maintain his complete control over the organisation. More
importantly, his re-election,whichwaskey tohis control,was assured throughhis team
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causingthemanipulationoftheresultsintheElectoralCongressesoftheIWF.Thisisthe
patterntheMIIThasuncovered.Amoredetailedreportofthisprocessandtheeventsinthis
ChapterwasdraftedbytheMIITandhasbeengiventotheO&ICommissiononaconfidential
basis.
4.2.2Settingupthevotingblocwithbribes
ParalleltoDr.Aján’sstrategicselectionofhisAnointedEBwastheprocessofensuringthe
availabilityofcashforbribesandvotingmembersattheElectoralCongresses.TheAnnual
Congress,whichalwaysoccurspriortotheElectoralCongress,iswherethegroundworkis
ostensibly laid.During these election-year annual congresses, theMIIT’s analysis of cash
receipts, cash withdrawals, and IWF internal spreadsheets show a flurry of activity
surroundingcashpaymentsofbothcurrentmembershipfeesandthoseinarrears.Onits
face,theactivityseemsinnocuous.However,thetimingofthepaymentsturnsaseemingly
innocentmembershippaymentintosomethingmoreillicit.
OnlyFullMemberswhohavepaidtheirmembershipfeesbytheendofMarchintheyearof
the Electoral Congressmay participate and vote (see 2.1 of Constitution). However, the
AnnualCongresses tookplaceafter theendofMarch inallof the200930,2013and2017
electionyears.Therefore,astrictapplicationoftheConstitutionwouldhaveprohibitedlate
payingmembers fromparticipating and voting in theElectoral Congresses.Nevertheless
they did vote. The majority of such members who paid late were members of the
30 While Dr. Aján ran unopposed during the 2009 election, the process of strategically selecting and voting in his cronies to senior EB member positions through bribes occurred.
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Weightlifting Federation of Africa or Asian Weightlifting Federation. 31 To build his
allegiancesandensurehehadthenumbersinhisvotingbloc,Dr.Ajánactivelysubvertedthe
rulesofvotingsetoutintheConstitutionandacceptedlatemembershippaymentsincash
or,insomeinstances,didnotdemandthematall.32SuchconductisnotaviolationofBy-Law
12,clearlydemonstratingthenecessityofsignificantrevision.
AttheElectoralCongressesvotebrokershadfundsintheirpossessiontoencouragevoting
forthePresident.TheformerGeneralSecretary,Mr.MaWenguangstatedthatDr.Ajánwas
abletousethefullweightoftheIWFresourcestogetre-elected,whileopponentshadtouse
theirownlimitedpersonalresources.TheonlypersonwithexclusivecontroloftheIWFbank
accounts,collectionandhandlingofcashmembershipfeesandmemberdopingfines,and
the ability to withdraw cash from the IWF bank accounts was Dr. Aján. Documentary
evidencesupportedthroughwitnesstestimony,indicatesthataconsiderableamountofcash
wasspentatthe2013Moscowandlaterthe2017BangkokElectoralCongressesinorderto
guaranteevotesforDr.Ajánandhisteamthroughbribes.
Dr.Aján’spresidencywassecuredbypayingMemberFederationscashbribesrangingfrom
$5,000-$30,000USDtovoteforhimandhisteamofcronies.Thefinancialforensictracing
oftheIWFbankaccountsshowthatthatthePresidenthadthetotalof$405,000USD33and
31 At the 2017 Annual Congress in Bangkok, numerous African nations (including Congo, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda) paid their IWF annual membership fees of $500 in cash. The annual membership fees paid by the African Member Federations were all for prior years. While many of these same federations voted in the Electoral Congress, their membership fees due for 2017 were not paid until 1 June 2017. 32 Minutes of the 2009 Electoral Congress confirm that 129 National Federations were given voting rights but according to the IWF’s accounting records only 90 federations had paid any membership fees in 2009, with many of these paying for historic years only, not including payment for the election year.33 On 22 April 2013, Dr. Aján withdrew $182,000 USD from the OTP account. On 15 May 2013, in the days leading up to the IWF Electoral Congress in Moscow, the President withdrew another $223,000 USD.
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$218,000USDavailabletohimatthetimeoftheMoscowandBangkokElectoralCongresses,
respectively.34TheMIIThasspokentoseveralconfidentialwitnessesregardingtheevents
leading up to the vote during these Congresses. The oral evidence provided by these
witnesses is corroborative with the MIIT’s forensic financial analysis of the IWF bank
accounts.SeeChapter3forthedetaileddescriptionsurroundingDr.Aján’scontroloverthe
financesoftheIWFincludingthebankaccountsandhandlingofcash.
With the cash available to the vote brokers for distribution at the election and the
circumventionoftheConstitutiontoensurethenumbersavailabletocreateabribedvoting
bloc,Dr.AjáneffectivelysafeguardedhisPresidencyduringtheperiodexaminedbytheMIIT.
Thefollowingsectiondescribeshowtheelectionwasboughtinpractice.Onceagain,thereis
greaterdetailintheMIITinvestigatorreportprovidedconfidentiallytotheO&ICommission.
34 Tamas Aján would personally withdraw amounts from the Hungarian OTP USD account. There is no corresponding reference or notation in the IWF’s accounting ledgers that records the purpose of the withdrawals preceding the Electoral Congresses. The MIIT notes that some, but not all, of this cash was used to pay attendance fees and other costs of the Congress.
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4.3HowaPresidencyisBought
Preparations to ensure an electoral victory for Dr. Aján and the Anointed EB members
commencebydraftingalistof‘preferred’candidatestofillthetoproleswithintheEB.This
listincludedthenames,allocatedpositions,countriesandtowhichContinentalFederations
these individualsbelong,withsomeof the lesserEBpositionsremainingblank.TheMIIT
identifiedtheprocessthroughtheforensicexaminationofAtillaAdamfi’sharddriveswhere
theevidencewasretrieved.TheevidenceconsistsofoneversionoftheAnointedEBlistand
asecondslightlyvaried35versionofthesame,photographed1monthand3daysinadvance
of the 2017 election, respectively. Thus, evidencing this process and revealing that the
resultsoftheelectionwerepredeterminedwellbeforeanyvotingtookplace.
OncethefuturemakeupoftheAnointedEBandDr.Aján’steamwasfinalised,theselistswere
convertedinto,whattheMIITlabeled,anaidememoire:adocumentcreatedtoensurethat
thosedelegateswhohadbeensubjectedtothebribery,didnotmakeanymistakesinthe
votingboothwhenenteringtheirchoicesontheballots.Theaidememoirewasforwardedto
thebribedvotingbloc.It indicatedthetopeightseniorEBmemberpositions(Dr.Ajánas
Presidentand theother sevenseniorEBroles).Thesepositionswere listedon2 slipsof
paper and next to each position was printed the names of Dr. Aján and his preferred
candidates.Tofurtherensurethattherecouldbenodoubtastohowthebribedvotingbloc
shouldvote, inthefinalcolumntitled ‘VOTE’,aprinted ‘X’wasplacedagainsteachofthe
candidates’names.Thenamesenteredontheaidememoireforthetopeightpositionswere
35 There was only a single name that differed between both versions.
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notonlysimilartodraftlistsextractedfromMr.Adamfi’sharddrives,butmoreimportantly,
alsomatchedexactlythefinalballotresultaspublishedsubsequentlybytheIWF.Seephoto
below.
-Photographofthe“aidememoire”retrievedfromtheIWFservers.
Throughinterviewswithconfidentialwitnesses,theMIIThaslearnedthattheAsian,African
andOceanicMemberFederationsweretheswingvotes,whichDr.Ajáncouldinfluenceand
bribe.Forexample,inthe2013electiontheAsianfederationsvotedagainstDr.Ajánwhile
theOceanicfederationsvotedinfavour.However,in2017Dr.AjánsecuredhisPresidency
through an agreement with certain African and Asian federations, who were originally
standingagainsthim.Thebribesrangedfrom$5,000-$30,000USDpervoteand,specificto
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the2017election,memberswerelavishedwithtripsonprivatecruiseshipsandstaysin5-
starhotelspriortotheelection.Asaresult,Dr.AjánwaselectedasthePresidentforanother
4-yeartermtoendin2021.HisresignationinApril2020broughtthattermtoanend.
TheMIIT’sdocumentaryevidenceindicatesthatthedelegationofbribedofficialshadpassed
throughDohaon27May2017travellingasagroupwithQatarAirlinestoThailand.Upon
theirarrival,thisbribedvotingblocwasdriventoadifferenthotelfromtheonewhereall
othermembers attending the Congresswere staying. For the 2017 Congress, the bribed
voting blocwas kept quarantined from the rest of the Electoral Congress until the very
morningoftheelectiontocurbanypossibilityofthemembersswitchingtheirvoteatthe
lastminute.ThemorningoftheelectiontheywerebussedtothehotelwheretheElectoral
Congresswastakingplace.Theirquarantinehoweverincludedaperdiem,dinnersandatrip
onacruiseboatinBangkok.
The bribed voting bloc, armed with their personal aide memoire, was instructed to
photograph their completed ballot thereby evidencing for whom they voted. Therefore,
establishingtheirentitlementtoabribe.AconfidentialwitnessprovidedtheMIITwiththe
photographhehadbeensentofadelegatephotographinghisballotpaperwithamobile
phone.Together,twoconfidentialwitnessescorroboratedthatcameraflashescouldbeseen
comingfrominsidethevotingbooths.Aphotoofthisprocedureisincludedbelow.
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-Photographofamemberatthe2017ElectoralCongressphotographingtheirballot.
Whilethebriberyremainedaconstantatthe2009,2013and2017ElectoralCongresses,the
processofcashdistributionbythevotebrokersandthemethodsofensuringthatthebribed
votingblocvotedasdirected,evolvedthroughouttheyears.Earlier,anhonoursystemwas
applied,butitwasdiscoveredthatsomemembers,havingbeenswayedintheirvote,were
usingerasableink,oraskingforasecondballottochangetheirvotesaftertakingapicture
asproofoftheirsubmittedballot.Thisresultedinachangeinthevotingprocedureinthe
2017election,requiringtheuseofaninkstampratherthanapentomarktheballot.
Oncetheballothadbeensubmittedandthephotohadbeenverifiedasacorrectballotby
thevotebroker, thedelegatewouldreceivetheircashpayment. Inprioryears,witnesses
describedthatthevotebrokerwoulddeliverthepaymenttothehotelroomofthemember
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who had been bribed. 36 In 2017 however, witnesses observed delegates queuing in a
corridor at the hotel following the vote to get their promised cash. The vote broker
distributingthe$5,000USDcashbribefromabaginhispossessionin2017wassaidtobe
MajorGeneralIntaratYodbangtoey,the1stVicePresidentoftheIWF.37Manywitnesseswho
spoke to the MIIT stated that it eventually became common knowledge among all the
CongressmemberswhichgrouphadbeenboughtbyDr.Ajánandthathewouldwinbefore
theballotswereevencounted.Indeed,Dr.AjánwaselectedastheIWFPresidentineachof
the2013and2017elections,aswerehispreferredcandidatesfortheseniorEBpositions.
AconsequenceofthesecorruptedelectionswasthatcandidatesstandingagainstDr.Aján
would have a false sense of security and purpose that perhaps they could dislodge his
dynasty.Onewitnessadvisedthatthenightbeforethe2013voteatapproximately1:00am,
a delegation came to his hotel room requesting that he withdraw his nomination. The
delegation,whichhadpreviouslyagreedtosupportthecandidate,indicatedthatsomething
hadchanged.Theymadeitcleartothewitnessthattheycouldnolongerworkwithhimand
hewouldnotgettheirvote.Inanotherinstance,awitnesswhowasstandingforaposition
ontheEBalsoindependentlydescribedthesameapproachhavingbeenmadethenightprior
to the 2017 election. According to thewitnesses, it appeared that theirminds had been
changedandtheyhadalldecidedtovoteforsomeoneelse.Itthenbecameobviousthatthey
36 In one instance, a vote broker knocked on the hotel room door of the President of Bahrain’s National Olympic Committee, mistakenly thinking he was part of the African delegation and handed him an envelope with $30,000 USD. The mistake was quickly realised and no payment was turned over to the person whose identity was mistaken. 37 Major General Intarat Yodbangtoey was overheard by confidential witnesses telling the Ugandan Weightlifting Federation’s President Salim Musoke Ssenkungu that the money had run out and that he would have to come back later. Mr. Ssenkungu responded by saying “I want my money now; I've voted for you."
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hadresolved toelectDr.Ajánandhis team.Despite theirwarningof failureandensuing
embarrassment,bothwitnessesrefusedtowithdrawfromthepresidentialraceandtheEB,
respectively.Afterthevoteswerecounted,Dr.AjánstillremainedtheIWFPresidentandhis
AnointedEBwaselected.
ThegeneralacceptanceoframpantbriberyatElectoralCongresseswasunderscoredbyan
email chain retrieved from the IWF’s servers by theMIIT. Following the 2017 Electoral
Congress,correspondenceexchangedbetweentheIWFDirectorGeneral,Mr.Adamfi,andan
assistantofaContinentalFederationPresidentfurthersupportedtheMIIT’sevidenceofcash
forvotesatthemostseniorlevelswithintheIWF.Intheexchange,Mr.Adamfiquestioned
the Continental President’s motives for continuing to support Dr. Aján’s opponent, Dr.
AntonioUrso,giventhathehadlosttoDr.Ajánin2013andagainin2017.Theassistantto
the Continental Federation’s President replied that in addition to issues surrounding
financialsupportfortheContinentalFederation,theContinentalFederationPresidenthad
beenofferedabribeinreturnforsupportingDr.Aján,andthatthiswasagainsthisprinciples.
Mr. Adamfi forwarded the correspondence to Peruvian’s Weightlifting President, Jose
Quinones, whose single-sentence response was “You offer him a bribe?” This response
elicitedwhatappearstobea‘tongueincheek’responsefromMr.Adamfistating,“Iwassure
itwasyou….forvotestoAntonio:)”.
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4.4Conclusion
The extent of vote brokering at Electoral and Continental Congresses demonstrates a
shocking and scandalous level of institutionalised corruption. The members of the
organisationseemtoacceptitaspartofthecultureoftheIWF,andlittle,ifanythinghasbeen
done to stop these corrupt practices. Unfortunately, those positioned, and oftentimes
required,tostampoutcorruptionarethebeneficiariesofthisinstitutionalisedcorruption
andshowlittleinclinationtodoso.Finally,theemailsshowthejocularwayinwhichsenior
membersoftheIWFthinkofandrefertothevotebrokeringandbriberypractices.Whilenot
partoftheinvestigationoftheMIIT,therearesuggestionsthatthepracticesdescribedinthis
ChapterhavecontinuedatthePanAmericanFederationelectionsinFebruaryofthisyear
after the investigationwas launched.The IWFneeds fundamental reformand rebuilding
fromthefoundationsupwardstoaffectashiftinculture.Theobjectiveshouldbeafairand
democraticelection,freeofbriberyandfavouritism.
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Chapter5:Anti-DopingOvertheDecades
5.1Introduction
Weightliftinghasbeenvulnerabletotheallureofperformanceenhancingdrugsthroughout
itshistory.Thesportrequiresperfecttechnique,whichisimportant,butphysicalstrengthis
paramount.Likeathletesinmostsports,weightliftershavetriedtocircumventthephysical
limitations of their bodies by succumbing, knowingly or not, to performance enhancing
drugs (“PEDs”) since the earliest Olympic Games. Their apparent drug of choice being
strengthbuildingsteroids.
TheARDdocumentarythattriggeredthisinvestigationisnotthefirsttimethatweightlifting
hasfounditselfatthecenterofdopingallegations.Dr.Aján,inhiscapacityaseitherGeneral
SecretaryorPresident,haspresidedoverthemanydecadesofdopingscandalsthathave
affected the sport. The McLaren Independent Investigation Team (“MIIT”) investigated
allegationspresentedbyboththeARD’sdocumentaryandotherwitnesses.Theseincluded
accusations that results of positive tests had been intentionally delayed, hidden or
manipulatedinordertoprotectcertain‘favoured’athletesorcountriesfromdetectionand
punishment.ThesesupposedlyfavouredcountrieswerethosewhosupportedthePresident
andwouldallegedlyalsobenefitfromeitherlessout-of-competitiontesting(“OOC”)and/or
knowingthedatesofOOCtestsinadvance.Itwasallegedthattheywereabletocircumvent
thenormaldopingcontrolproceduresthrougheitherpaymentofbribestoDopingControl
Officers (“DCO”), theSampleCollectionAuthority (“SCA”), and/or the IWF itself, perhaps
witharrangementsmadeorcondonedbyDr.Aján.
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Dr.AjánwasamemberofWADA’sFoundationBoardsinceitsinceptionin1999wherehe
helpedshapetheorganisationandtheWADACode.HisinsideknowledgeofWADAhasbeen
thesourceofmuchspeculation.ItwasallegedthatfromthispositionwithinWADAhecould
exerthispowerovertheAnti-DopingProgramoftheIWF.Beforetheexistenceofthe2004
WADACode,Dr.Ajánmighthavehadtheabilitytopersonallyaffectthedopingprogram.38
However,asWADAdevelopedastheinternationalregulatorybody,theabilityofthesport
togovernitsownantidopingprogramwassignificantlyreduced.Thenewrealityofaglobal
antidoping regulator severely restricted Dr. Aján’s potential capabilities to manipulate
antidopingintheIWF.
Throughthecourseofitsinvestigations,theMIITfoundthatmanyoftheaboveallegations
wereunsubstantiated.Instead,whatDr.Ajánappearstohavedoneisleveragetherumours
and storiesofhisdopingmanipulations to instill a senseof fearofwhatcould happen if
Member Federations challenged his authority. Dr. Aján’s image and reputation was his
weaponoftyrannyandthesourceofthefearofretaliation.Thus,thelegendofhispower
grewovertimeasthosewithintheorganisationfueledits flamesandrefusedtoaccepta
muchdifferentreality.
38 There is much spoken about the incident where Dr. Aján provided advanced notice to the Greek Weightlifting
Federation in 1997. While visiting Corfu, Greece the President wrote on a napkin the dates of three future out-of-competition doping tests and provided it to the Greek Federation’s President. See the discussion in section 5.2 related to doping in the 1990s.
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Theperiodunderinvestigation,between2009–2019,wastheworstdecadeofdopingthe
sportofweightliftinghaseverexperienced. Therewere58weightliftingpositivetestson
theretestingofsamplesfromtheBeijingandLondonOlympicGames.Atthetimeofthose
announcements in 2016 it was also learned that there were 24 positive results at the
Houston World Championships in 2015. Over the decade there have been at least 615
confirmed Anti-Doping Rule Violations (“ADRVs”). Throughout this time Dr. Aján, was a
proud member of the WADA Foundation Board, boasting about his clean sport while
presidingoveroneofthedirtiestdecadesinthesport’shistory.
This chapter describes a brief historical perspective to provide context for the present
difficultiesofdopingcontrolinweightlifting.WhatfollowsistheMIIT’sinvestigativeresults
intoallegationssurroundingDr.Aján’stransgressionsandmanipulationsoftheAnti-Doping
ControlProgram(“ADCP”)oftheIWF.
5.2The1980s&1990s
These two decades might be characterized as the wild west of doping in many sports,
includingweightlifting.Antidopingregulationswereeithernonexistentorintheirinfancy.
Becauseeachsportadministereditsownparticularantidopingregime,theregulationsthat
did exist were highly inconsistent between sports. Inconsistencies in the rules for drug
testingandanalysisofspecimenswerealsoprevalent.Themostnotableincluded:
(i) prohibitedsubstancesinonesportthatwerenotprohibitedinothers;
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(ii) inconsistentsanctionsappliedtoPEDsuseviolations(forexample,penaltyforuseof
the sameprohibited substancevaried frompublicwarnings to lifebans fora first
offence);and
(iii) unannounced,OOCtestingappliedinsomecountriesandinternationalfederations
andnotinothers.
Theonlysportingbodywithsomeconsistencyandrationaletoitsantidopingruleswasthe
MedicalCommissionoftheIOCwhohadjurisdictionoverantidopingattheOlympicGames.
Duringthe1980sandthe1990sweightlifterswereconsistentlybreakingWorldandOlympic
records, a fact that did not go unnoticed by the IOC.Dr.Ajánwas theGeneral Secretary
throughout this period and became an IOC member in 2000 (see Chapter 2 on his
Presidency). Following the 1988 Games in Seoul, where Hungary, Korea and Bulgaria
withdrew their weightlifting teams after a string of positive doping results, the IOC
threatened to ban the IWF from theOlympic programuntil it could prove itwas taking
doping control seriously. 39 The IOC’s early warning triggered a move by the IWF to
restructureitsweightclassesin1992,eliminatingquestionableWorldandOlympicrecords.
Thechangetookeffectatthebeginningof1993.Afurtherandsimilarrestructuringoccurred
in 1997. Dopingwas so pervasive in the 1990s that had the IWF not acted, the records
establishedduringthatperiodwouldlikelyremainunbrokenuptothepresent.
39https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/23/sports/sydney-2000-weight-lifting-drug-scandal-goes-bulgarian-team-ousted-games.html
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5.3WeightliftingScandalsMorphedintotheTwenty-firstCentury
Themeasures of previous decades to reset the playing field did little to stop thedoping
activity leading up to the Olympic Games in 2000, 2004 and 2008. The Bulgarian and
Romanianweightliftingteamswereexpelledfromthe2000OlympicGamesinSydneyfor
dopingandtheBulgarianswereforcedtoreturntheirmedals.Atthe2004SummerOlympics
in Athens, a Greekweightlifterwas stripped of hismedal for taking banned substances.
Bulgaria,arepeatoffender,wasforcedtowithdrawitsentireweightliftingteamfromthe
2008BeijingGamesafter11athletestestedpositiveforsteroids.Meanwhile,Greeceonly
sentfourweightlifterstotheBeijingGamesafter11weresuspendedfordopingpriortothe
Games.40ThecallsbecameevenmoreshrillanddemandingfortheIOCtodropweightlifting
fromtheOlympicprogram.
Prior to 2005, there was a single person coordinating the organisation’s Anti-Doping
Program.AsthenewWADACodestartedgeneratingmoresophisticatedrequirements,an
in-house lawyer was hired for the first time in 2005. This person took over as the
CoordinatoroftheAnti-DopingCommission(“ADC”).In2008,NicuVlad,thePresidentofthe
Romanian Weightlifting Federation, was the Chairman of the IWF’s ADC, preceding the
appointmentofPatrickSchamaschin2013.In2006,HungarycreateditsownNationalAnti-
DopingAgency(“NADO”),theHungarianAnti-DopingGroupNon-ProfitLtd(“HUNADO”).41
40 Hungarian Anti-Doping Group Non-profit Ltd (“HUNADO”) DCO Barbara Kallo conducted the doping control mission where these positive samples were collected.41HUNADO’s constating documents state that it was created in 2006. It became operational in 2007. Up until that point there was a department within the Ministry of Sport that performed that anti-doping control. That department was eventually re-modeled to become the independent NADO.
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5.4ADirtyDecadeintheTwenty-firstCentury
Littleprogresswasmadefollowingtheembarrassmentsoftheearly2000s.Theperiodfrom
2009-2019isoneofthedirtiestperiodsinthesport’shistory.Itcontinuedthepatternof
negativeresults fromthedecadebeforeandbroughton itsownuniquecontributions. In
November 2015, the IWFheld itsmarquee event, theWorld Championships inHouston,
Texas. It has the regrettable and unfortunate distinction of being the dirtiest World
ChampionshipsintheIWF’shistory,withanunprecedented24positiveADRVs.Justasthese
results were beingmade known in early 2016, the IOCwas ramping up its retesting of
samplesfromthe2008and2012Olympics.Dr.AjánhadpreviouslypromisedcleanOlympics
in2008and2012.TheIOC’sretestingmadethosestatementsringasournotewithnearly
60weightliftersbeingfoundtohavecompeteddirtyateitherorboththeBeijingandLondon
Games. The sport is second only to Athletics 42 for having the greatest number of dirty
athletesattheOlympicGames.
Onceagain,theIOCreactedtotheseabysmalstatistics,threateningtheremovalofthesport
fromtheOlympicprogram.TheCleanSportCommission(“CSC”)establishedin2017atthe
behestof the IWFPresidentwasaneffort torespondto the IOC’spressuresarising from
thesedespicableresults.ThemovetoestablishtheCSCstavedoff,atleasttemporarily,the
threattothesport.TheCSCReportconcludedthatthedopingproblemsinthesportwere
42 See the WADA Independent Commission Report in 2015 examining the Anti-Doping antics in Athletics.
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concentratedinahandfulofhigh-riskcountries,wheredopingissystemicacrossallsports.
PartoftheCSC’srecommendationswastooutsourcetheADC’sresponsibilities.In2019,the
International Testing Agency (“ITA”) took over the test distribution planning, sample
collectionandresultsmanagementofcases,andearlierthisyeartheCourtofArbitrationfor
Sports Anti-Doping Division (“CAS ADD”) was appointed to perform first instance
adjudicationofresultsmanagement.ThesefindingsandchangeswerewelcomedbytheIOC
andhaveensuredweightlifting’sparticipationuptoatleasttheOlympicGamesscheduled
forParisin2024.
5.5LegalStructureandOperationoftheAnti-DopingCommission
The IWF ADC is a standing body within the organisational structure of the IWF. It is
responsiblefortheadministrationoftheIWFADCPandisrequiredtomeetbiannually.Its
responsibilities includecreatingandpopulatingtheInternationalRegisteredTestingPool
(“IRTP”)43anddevelopingtheyearlyandmonthlyTestDistributionPlans(“TDP”).
UndertheConstitution,eachCommissionisassignedaCoordinatorfromtheIWFSecretariat
whoisexclusivelyappointedbythePresident.TheCoordinatorfortheADChas,sinceatleast
2005, been the legal personwithin the Secretariat (the “AD Coordinator”). The role and
powersofanyCommissionCoordinatorarenotsetoutintheConstitutionortheBy-Laws.
43Where words are capitalised in this chapter it is either because they are defined terms in the WADC and its accompanying International Standards or they are required to be capitalised in ordinary English language usage.
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The ADC is composed of the Chair and two other appointedmembers. The Constitution
provides that the President recommends and the EB approves the appointment of the
membersandtheChairperson.Dr.AjánhasappointedandanointedtheChairpersonandthe
EBhasconfirmedtheappointments,withoutactiveenquiry.In2012,theEBapprovedthe
President’sappointmentofDr.Schamasch,44theformerIOCMedicalDirector(1993-2012),
as theChairpersonof theADC.45Heheld that positionuntil 15April 2020whenhewas
dismissed following Dr. Aján’s resignation. In accordance with the Constitution, the
ChairpersonissolelyentitledtosignallagreementsconnectedwiththeADCP.
ThefunctionoftheADC,withtheassistanceoftheSecretariat,isto“advise,assistandsupport
theIWFADCoordinatorintheimplementationoftheIWFADProgram.”TheADCPrequires
that the Secretariat “together with the AD Commission manages and monitors the IWF
ADP”. 46 The AD Coordinator holds particularly important role in the oversight and
implementationoftheADCP.Onthefrontend,theADCwill“directtheIWFADCoordinator
regardingtheIn-CompetitionandOut-of-CompetitionTestingProgram”,whileontheresults
managementside,theADCoordinator“…shallinformtheChairpersonoftheADCoftheclosed
ResultManagementprocesses”.47Theunderlinedphrasemeansthatupuntilthepointthat
thecaseisclosed;itremainsconfidentialtoeveryoneexceptfortheCoordinator.Therefore,
44 Dr. Schamasch held appointments with Russian Athletics Federation; Russian Biathlon, International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF). 45 According to the IWF’s website, the 1st official meeting of the Independent IWF Anti-Doping Commission was held on 29 January 2014 in Budapest in presence of Dr. Patrick Schamasch, Dr. Michael Petrou, Dr. Monika Ungar and Dr. Magdolna Trombitas. 46 By-Law 7.11 to the IWF Constitution. 47 By-Law 6.1.2 to the IWF Constitution.
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theADCoordinatoristheonlypersonthatoughttohaveacompleteunderstandingofthe
applicationandresultsoftheADCP.
TheADCineffectshouldfunctionasanindependentbodyexecutingtheIWF’sADCP.Under
the current and previousWADA Code (“WADC”), the IWF must be able to perform the
following:
(i) planandimplementaTDP48fromgatheredintelligence;
(ii) engageintargettesting;and
(iii) conduct investigations into anypossibleADRVs.49TheWADC requires that all
Anti-Doping Organisations (which include International Federations) “have
policiesandproceduresinplacetoensurethatantidopingintelligencecapturedor
received is handled securely and confidentially, that sources of intelligence are
protected”… and that the intelligence is “used and disclosed only for legitimate
anti-dopingpurposes.”50
On the instruction of the Chairperson of the ADC, representing the IWF as the Testing
Authority,HUNADOplayedakeyoperationalroleintheimplementationoftheADCPasthe
SampleCollectionAuthoritychosenbytheIWFtoconductthevastmajorityof itstesting
48 The contents of the TDP is the responsibility and duty of the Testing Authority (IWF) in accordance with the ISTI. A Doping Control Officer plays no role in the selection of who is to be tested. 49 WADC (2015 version) Article 5.50 ISTI, 2018 para 11.2.2 Anti-Doping Organisations shall have policies and procedures in place to ensure that antidoping intelligence captured or received is handled securely and confidentially, that sources of intelligence are protected, that the risk of leaks or inadvertent disclosure is properly addressed, and that intelligence shared with them by law enforcement, other relevant authorities and/or other third parties, is processed, used and disclosed only for legitimate antidoping purposes.
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missions.TheADCoutsourcedthefunctionsofsamplecollectionandsubsequentsendingof
samplestoaWADAlaboratoryforanalysistoHUNADOonitsformationin2007.Theroleof
HUNADOwas the subject of commentary by the ARD’s documentary.51The operation of
HUNADOisdescribedingreaterdetailbelow.
Following the receipt of a WADA accredited laboratory notification that a weightlifting
athlete has produced an adverse analytical finding (“AAF”), atypical finding, or adverse
biologicalpassportfindings,theADConbehalfoftheIWFisrequiredbytheWADACodeto
investigate the results52anddetermine if anADRVunder theCodehasoccurred. If so, it
proceedstoproposetheapplicablesanctionontheathlete,whothenhasrightsofappeal.53
ItwaswellunderstoodbymembersoftheIWFinterviewedbytheMIIT,includingtheformer
ADCChairperson,thepastandpresentADCoordinators,andDr.Aján,thattheADCshould
functionasanindependentandautonomousbodyoftheIWF.Ultimately,theintegrityofthe
ADCPandconfidentialitythereofiscriticaltoitssuccessfulimplementation.
5.6TheIWFasTestingAuthority
51 The response of HUNADO to the allegations may be found in the Internal Audit Report dated 20 April 2020 and available at https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-uqW6MEJQ33efDZlCPJnteOa2MMvjobB?usp=sharing. Accessed 30 April 2020. 52 WADC Article 7.4 & 7.5. 53The AD Coordinator is the legal person in the Secretariat. As the legal counsel they would look at the information they had, including a response by the athlete and any aggravating circumstances and then decide on the sanction period. They are both the prosecutor and the judge in the process when those functions are required. The assignment of all functions to the ITA has terminated this dual role of the legal counsel who were also regarded by some members of the IWF EB as harsh in their sanction determinations. For example, one Member Federations was upset about a 2.5 year ban of one of their athletes.
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TheMIIT reviewed and analysed the IWF’s instructions as the Testing Authority on the
mission’s instructions it issued to HUNADO. The purpose was to establish whether any
evidenceexistedtosupportallegationsthatthefederationitselfwascomplicit inanyofa
range of potentially corrupt activities that would enable ‘favoured’ athletes and/or
federationstoavoidADRVsanctions.
Theanalysisinvolvedexamining:
(i) whetherincertaincasessamplemanipulationtookplaceeitheratthepointoftesting
orlaterinthesamplingprocess;
(ii) whethertherewasadvancednotificationofout-of-competitiontesting;
(iii) whattheinstructionsweretotheSCAonthemissionorders;
(iv) whattheinstructionsweretotheWADAaccreditedlaboratories;andfinally,
(v) shouldalltheotheroptionshavefailed,whetherthereweredelays,manipulationor
disappearanceoftheresultsmanagementofpositivesamples.
TheMIITobtainedevidencefromvarioussourcestotesttheselinesofenquiry.Itrequested
documents from the IWF andHUNADO, aswell as theWADA accredited laboratories at
Cologne,MontréalandRome.InterviewswereconductedwiththedirectorofHUNADO,Dr.
AgnesTiszekerandHUNADODopingControlOfficer(“DCO”)BarbaraKalloaswellaswith
Hans Geyer, the deputy head of the Cologne laboratory. WADA’s ADAMS database was
reviewed, which revealed that the instructions to both the HUNADO and the WADA
accreditedlaboratoriesfollowedallproperprotocols.TheproceduresfollowedbyMs.Kallo
asDCOwerealsoconfirmedtobecorrectandinaccordancewiththeWADACode.TheMIIT
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did not interview any other DCOs, but was satisfied that Dr. Tiszeker and Ms. Kallo
performedtheirdutiestothestandardsrequiredbytheWADACode.
Theareasofconcern,however,weretheabilityofDr.Aján,inhisroleasthePresident,to
gainaccesstotheADC’sconfidentialinformation,whichcouldbeusedinsomecapacityto
giveadvancenoticeofOOCtestingandmanipulatetheresultsmanagementofcases.These
areasaredescribedingreaterdetailinthefollowingsection.
5.6PresidentialMeddlinginAntidoping
While themajorityof theallegations theMIITexaminedproved tobeunsubstantiated, it
realisedthat,inthecourseoftestingthoseallegations,thereweretransgressionshappening
quiteapartfromtherumoursbeingrepeatedbymembersoftheorganisation.Thebehaviour
ofDr.Aján iswhat theMIIT refers togenerally as “meddling”.ThePresidentwouldgain
accesstotheconfidentialandindependentfunctioningoftheADC,inordertofrustrateits
operations. This action is a breachof the confidentiality provisions of the confidentiality
provisionsofBy-Law12ofthedisciplinaryandethicsproceduresat1.5.1and1.5.2.
The sourceof any abuseor improper conduct in the applicationof theADCPof the IWF
beginswiththepowerofDr.AjántoinfluencetheADCPasitappliestoMemberFederations.
AsdescribedinChapter2,Dr.Ajánusedhisthreatsofantidopingmanipulationtoexerthis
poweroverMemberFederations.HeleveragedthispowerbyusingtheADCPasavehicleof
controlandtyrannywithintheoverallIWForganisation.DespitetheoperationoftheADCP,
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theIWFisatthemercyofitsMemberFederationswhomaycarryouttheirowndomestic
controlsofweightliftingwithintheircountriesandatnationalcompetitions.54
Dr. Aján’s controlwas, in part, backstopped by the IWF’s Constitution,which creates an
appointment structure that is oneof grace and favour at thebehest of thePresident.He
staffedtheSecretariatathisdiscretion,whichincludedthelegalpersonwithinit.Dr.Aján
appointedthelegalpersonintheSecretariattotheroleofADCoordinator.Thatpersonwas
thenseconded to theADCandgivenapivotal role incarryingout the instructionsof the
presidentiallyappointedChairperson,Dr.Schamasch.TheEBintheory,functionsasacheck
onalltheseappointmentsbyitsapprovalrole.However,therealityisthattheEBexercised
noeffectiveapprovalcontroloverappointmentsofeither theChairperson, theother two
members of the ADC, or its Coordinator. It simply accepted the appointments Dr. Aján
presented.
5.6.1TestDistributionPlans
Asdiscussedabove,WADAmandatedthatallinformationandintelligenceheldbytheADC
should remain confidential and only disclosed for legitimate antidoping purposes. In
particular,theOOCTDPisaconfidentialdocumentrestrictedincirculationandwhichisonly
supposedtobeknowntotheADC,whocreatesitonayearlybasisandupdatesitmonthlyto
54The Egyptian Weightlifting Federation was suspended in 2019 following an internal investigation which revealed
that coaches were supplying their junior and senior female lifters with steroids on a regular basis. See https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1088667/egyptian-coaches-jailed-over-doping.
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administertheIWF’sADCP.Theconfidentialityofthisdocumentisparamountinorderto
executealegitimateantidopingprogram.
Dr.Aján’smeddlingintheaffairsoftheADCfrustratedtheconfidentialfunctionbelonging
totheIWFADCinviolationofthepreviouslydiscussedconfidentialityprovisionsinBy-Law
12.TheIWF’sfirstinternallegalcounsel,MonikaUngarsharedwiththeMIITthatDr.Aján
hadknowledgeof,andaccessto,theannualTDP.HewouldregularlydemandtoseetheTDP
and its updates. With the evolution of the WADA Code and with each successive legal
counsels’ knowledge and appreciation of how important the TDP was to the successful
functioning of a legitimate ADCP, Dr. Aján’s ability to have access to the TDP became
restricted.55Thisenragedhimandhemadecontinuousattemptstoregainhisaccess.
EvidenceprovidedbyEvaNyirfa,theADCoordinatorfromtheyears2015-2017,detailed
howDr.AjánwantedtoknowwhereandwhentheADCwasgoingtotestandwhatNADOit
would deploy. These requests happened continuously, creating a constant pressure to
provide the OOC TDP. While the IWF President liked to emphasize publicly that the
antidopingprogramwasindependent,hedidnotmincehiswordswhenhetoldDr.Nyirfa
that he, as the President, had the real authority and could not care less about how the
antidopingprogramwassupposedtofunction.
MostofthetimethelegalcounselswouldrefusetoprovideDr.AjánwiththeTDP,bysaying
“No,wearenotprovidingit[TDP].”However,onatleasttwooccasionsthepressurebecame
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sointensethatinordertodiffusethetensionandresistthepressure,Dr.Ajánwasprovided
withaversionwherethetestingdatesoftheTDPweremodified.Thelegalcounselchanged
thedatesindicatedontheTDPbutleftthecountrylocationandtheSCAintact.Whilethe
OOCTDPdidnotcontain thenamesofathletes, sufficient informationremained toknow
whatcountriesweretargets.
5.6.2InterferenceinResultsManagement
Several witnesses described instances where the President interfered or attempted to
interfereintheresultsmanagementofcases.Forexample,Dr.Ajánregularlydemandedthat
thelegalcounsel’sadjudicationofthepositivecasesresultingfromtheBeijingandLondon
samplereanalysisbediscussedwithhim.Thisperiodwasincrediblyembarrassingforthe
IWF as the reanalysis of samples eventually concluded that 58 weightlifting athletes
competingateitherthe2008and/orthe2012GameshadpositiveAAFs.Hewouldthreaten
herrightfulnoncompliancewithdismissalinanattempttoinfluenceherdecisions.These
detailspromptedtheMIITtoexaminefurtherthepossibilityofDr.Aján’sinterferenceinto
theresultsmanagementprocess.
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i.DelayofResultsManagement:ACaseStudyofAzeriLifters
IntheforensicexaminationoftheIWF’sservers,theMIITdiscoveredapreviouslydeleted
letteraddressedtoDr.AjánfromtheAzerbaijanMinisterofSport,whoisalsotheAzerbaijan
NationalOlympicCommittee’sVicePresident,dated2016.56TheletterthankedDr.Ajánfor
delayingthesuspensionsofcertainAzeriweightliftersthathadtestedpositiveforPEDsso
thatitwouldnotinterferewiththeIslamicGamesthatwereheldinBaku.Thisdiscovery
prompted the MIIT to examine in greater detail the circumstances surrounding these
delayedsuspensions.ApatternquicklyemergedshowingthattheIWFdidnotnotify18Azeri
athletesoftheirrespectiveADRVsformonthsfollowinglaboratorynotificationofthesame
totheIWF, thusallowingtheseathletestocompeteand insomeinstanceswinmedalsat
variouscompetitions,includingtheWorldChampionshipsandtheBakuGrandPrix.
The timeline of Valentin SnejevHristov, aBulgarian bornAzeriweightlifter, illustrates a
particularly egregious case of delay. The athlete had tested positive following an in-
competitionsampleheprovidedon9April2013attheEuropeanChampionships.Helater
providedanOOCsampleon19June2013,whichalsoproducedanAAF.Despitehavingbeen
informedbytheCologneLaboratoryoftheAAFon4July2013,theIWFdidnotimmediately
notifytheathleteoftheresult.HethencompetedintheWorldChampionshipsinPolandon
20 October 2013, and at the Azeri organized Baku IWF Grand Prix and 2nd Baku
InternationalCup,heldonthe6December2013,wherehewonagoldmedal.TheIWFfinally
notifiedtheathleteoftheAAFandcorrespondingprovisionalsuspensionon11April2014,
56This information was updated 30 July 2020 to reflect that the letter was sent from the desk of the Azerbaijan Minister of Sport, who was also at the time the Vice President of the Azerbaijan National Olympic Committee.
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withthesuspensionbeginning9April2013.Thiswasnearlyafullyearafterheprovidedhis
firstpositivesample.
TherewerediscrepanciesidentifiedduringtheforensicexaminationoftheIWF’sservers,
relatingtothenotificationlettersenttotheathlete,whichwasdated18November2013.57
Had the athlete been legitimately notified of the AAF on that date, he should have been
subject to a provisional suspension, precluding him from competing at the Baku
competitions. The metadata of the document properties however evidences that the
document was actually created on 20 January 2014, two months after the purported
notificationdate.InadditiontoHristov,fourotherathletes’hadthesamediscrepanciesin
thenotificationletterprocess,whereitwascreatedafteritwasdated.Thisdiscrepancycould
notbeexplainedbyDr.Ungar, theADCoordinatorat the timeand sheequallyhad little
recollectionofthesepositivecases.
According to the letter sent toDr. Aján from theAzeriMinister of Sport andNOC’sVice
President,itappearsthatnotificationofthese18athletes’AAFsweredeliberatelydelayed
andplannedtobereleasedatsomepointfollowingtheBakuGames.Thisintentionaldelay
allowedthese18athletestocompeteinvariouschampionships,distortingthecompetition
resultsanddenyingotherathletestheopportunitiestolegitimatelycompeteandwinmedals.
See graphic timeline entitled ‘Azerbaijan 18’ showing the gap between the test date and
initial notification is set out below. The MIIT confirmed that the IWF was the Testing
Authorityforallthesecases.
57These same discrepancies were identified in the notification letters for an additional 5 Azeri weightlifters.
107
108
TheMIITinterviewedDr.MonikaUngarwhowastheADCoordinatoratthetimeof
this incident.Shecouldnotexplainhowthesedelaysinresultsmanagementcould
haveoccurred.Whenshewasaskedif theAzerishavebeenshownfavoritism,she
replied“theyarenotmyfavourites.”WhenaskedwhetherAzerbaijanwasafavourite
ofDr.Aján’s,shehadnoresponse.
ii.MissingPositivesResults
TheMIITrecoveredfromtheIWF’sservers,aspreadsheetthathadbeensenttothe
IWFfromWADAidentifiedanumberofantidopingcasesthatpotentiallyremained
unresolved. The document entitled “IWF pending 2009-2013” listed 109 samples
whichhadproducedanAAFandappearednottohavebeenfinalizedandtheresults
subsequentlyuploadedtoADAMS.
ParalleltothisdiscoverytheMIITwasprovidedwithanemailfromSeptember2016,
sentfromWADAResultsManagementtoMs.Nyirfa,theIWF’sADCoordinatorand
legal counsel. The email related to45outstanding casesbetween2009and2014,
whereitagainappearedthatnodecisionhadbeenrenderedandrelatedresultsnot
uploadedinADAMS.AnumberofthesamplesfromboththeWADAspreadsheetand
theemailsrelatedtoTurkishweightlifters.TheMIITconductedananalysisofallthe
outstanding cases to establish whether the recorded AAFs had been properly
finalisedandwhererequired,asanctionapplied.Whileitwasabletoreconcilemany,
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theTurkish, and someother cases remainedoutstanding and triggered amore in
depthreview.
TheMIITrequestedtheassistanceoftheIWFSecretariat,HUNADOandtheWADA
accredited laboratory in Cologne, to provide documents surrounding five testing
missionsbetween2010and2012wherethese26outstandingTurkishsampleswere
collected.58TheIWFsearcheditsownrecordsandthoseofADAMSforthesesamples.
TheresultsestablishedthattheAAFshadbeenrecordedagainsttheathletes’names
andnofurtherentrieshadbeenmadeineithertheIWFrecordsorADAMSdatabase
toindicatehoworwhethertheresultsmanagementhadbeencompleted.
The IWF Secretariat member who performed the search alerted the MIIT to the
possibility that these initial AAFs may have been the result of national missions
conductedbytheTurkishWeightliftingFederationratherthantheIWF.Therefore,
althoughtheIWFshouldhavebeennotified,itwasnotitsresponsibilitytoupdatethe
detailsonADAMSdatabase.Dr.Ungar59,theIWF’sADCoordinatorandlegalcounsel
atthetimeofthesesamplereportingissues,echoedthissentiment.Herrecollection
wasthattheseweremissionsthattheIWFagreedtoconductonbehalfoftheTurkish
Weightlifting Federation. She believed a notation on the mission instructions to
HUNADO would so indicate. Therefore, these missions would be considered a
5821 athletes provided these 26 samples. 59 She also denied any knowledge of, or involvement in any corrupt practices that, should they prove to be IWF missions, prevented the AAF results from being properly logged in the records and the relevant sanctions being implemented against the athletes and if appropriate, the national federation.
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nationalmission,theresultsofwhichwouldnotnecessarilyberecordedbytheIWF,
unless the results of the mission were notified to it by the national member
federation.
The MIIT subsequently received the laboratory documentation from the Cologne
Laboratorywhere the Turkish samples had been tested. It confirmed that all the
samples had produced an AAF and that the resultswere notified to the IWF and
addressedtoDr.Aján.HUNADOprovidedthemissionorderrequestforthemission
where the vast majority of positive samples were collected. The mission order
request confirmed that the IWF had indeed been the Testing Authority for that
particular mission. Indicated on the bottom of the request however, was a
handwrittennote“forTUR”.60
Thespecific recollectionofDr.Ungar, theADCoordinatorwho issued themission
ordertoHUNADO,appearstobeconfirmedbythemissionrequest.TheIWFisinfact
the Testing Authority regardless of what is written on the mission order or the
agreementmadebetweenitselfandtheTurkishFederation.ThereforetheIWFbares
anequalresponsibilitywiththeTurkishFederationtofollowtheresultsmanagement
ofthesepositivesamplesor,attheveryleastrequirethenationalfederationtodothe
same. This inaction by the IWF caused some devastating consequences to
international competitive results since most of these athletes would have likely
servedsuspensionsasaresultoftheirAAFs.
60 The mission however was paid for by the IWF.
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Toillustrate, twohighprofileTurkishlifterswereamongthe21athleteswhoalso
providedasampleresultinginanAAFduringanOOCteston3September2010.Both
athleteswentontocompeteattheWorldChampionshipsinAntalya,Turkeyon17
September2010andsubsequentlyattheEuropeanChampionshipsinKazan,Russia
inApril2011.Oneofthem61wongoldonbothoccasionsandtheotherwonsilverat
the World Championships. 62 The athletes retained their medals from these
competitions. A timeline is attached below, showing how both in and out-of-
competitiontestingwasinterspersedwithattendanceatcompetitions.
61The athlete later provided a positive OOC sample on 26 October 2011, for which she received a 2-year ban. 62 Both athletes were also found guilty of doping in 2016, when their Beijing 2008 samples were found positive during the IOC reanalysis.
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InadditiontotheTurkishexamples,theMIIThasidentified41hiddencasesand10
possibleothercaseswheretheAAFshavenotbeenfollowedthrough.Thesecases
havebeenforwardedtoWADAforinvestigation.
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5.7DopingFines
TheIWFhashadvariousdifferingrulesovertheyearsthatpermitfinestobeimposed
onathletesandcountries.63Thosefinescanbepaidbywireorincash.Thisaspectof
theADCPextendsfurtherpowertoDr.Ajánwhenthefinesarepaidbycash.Heisthe
onlypersonwhoreceivescashfines,withsomerareexceptionswhenothermembers
ofstaffactedonhisbehalf.IthasbeenestablishedduringthisinvestigationthatDr.
Aján is the sole person making all cash deposits into the IWF’s Bank accounts.
Between 2009 - 2019 the amount of doping fines collected by wire transfer is
approximately$4.9millionUSD,and incash isapproximately$3millionUSD(see
Chapter3forfurtherdiscussion.)
5.8RoleofHUNADO
TheHungarianAnti-DopingGroupNon-profitLtdwasestablishedin2006asalegal
entity and began operations in 2007. Since that time it has been recognized as
compliantandregulatedbyWADA.HUNADOisaserviceproviderthatiscontracted
byaTestingAuthoritytocollecturinesamplesontheirbehalf.HUNADOhasbeenone
of the SCAs for the ADC of the IWF, in their capacity as the Testing Authority. It
performedinaccordancewiththeWADConbehalfoftheIWF,whoissuedthemission
instructions. HUNADO was guided exclusively by the Testing Authority’s mission
ordersandcouldnotactbeyondthoseboundaries.HUNADOcouldalsoact,addidact,
from time to time, as the Testing Authority of NationalMember Federations and
63The MIIT confirms that the Azerbaijan Weightlifting Federations paid $500,000 USD in 2014.
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majoreventorganisersoftheIWF.TheMIITconcludesthatHUNADO,initsposition
asSampleCollectionAuthority,hasnoinfluencetodeterminewhichweightliftersare
tobetested.
The allegations relating to HUNADO’s complicity in sample manipulation either
throughexternalpressureorfinancialincentiveshasbeeninvestigatedbytheMIIT.
InterviewswereconductedwithAgnesTiszeker,HUNADO’sDirectorandMs.Kallo,a
senior DCO within the organisation. Following the ARD’s documentary, HUNADO
commissioned a comprehensive internal audit of its operations to establish the
veracityoftheallegationsmadeagainstthem.64Thisreporthasbeenreviewedbythe
MIITandanalysedagainstwitness testimonyanddocumentaryevidenceobtained
fromvariousothersources.Itisathoroughdocument.
Therearecurrently45DCOswhocouldbeassignedbytheHUNADODirectortoa
specificmission.TheARD’sdocumentaryfocusedononeperson,Ms.Kallo,whothe
MIIThas since interviewed. It is satisfied thatother thanmeetingasnecessary to
performherroleasaDCO,shehasnoconnectionswithDr.Ajánandnoattemptshave
beenmadebyhimtoinfluenceherinthecourseofcarryingoutherworkasaDCO
forHUNADO.Ms.KallohasapermanentjobinthehealthcarefieldinBudapestand
actsasaDCOonacontractbasisasneeded.Thereasonsheisstaffedonmanyofthe
HUNADOmissions for the IWF fordoping controlpurposes isbecause she speaks
64See Internal Audit Group Report: “Conducted on the Basis of the Claims Concerning HUNADO in the Documentary Film ‘Lord of the Lifters’/’Herr der Heber’”. 20 April 2020.
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Russian, English, German, Polish, and some Italian and Spanish as well as
understandingalloftheSlaviclanguages,duetohermothertonguebeingPolish.
TheMIIThasnoevidencethatanyoftheother45DCOswhocouldbeassignedby
HUNADOtocarryoutanIWFmission,engagedinconductnotcompliantwiththeir
obligationsundertheWADACode.Inreachingthisconclusion,theMIITnotesthat
HUNADODCOshaveattendedthesummerOlympicGamesinbothLondonandRiode
Janeiro. They have partnered twice with United States Anti-Doping Authority
(“USADA”) since the partial assignment with them at Houston 2015, and most
recentlyatLosAngelesin2019.Furthermore,theyhavebeentheDCOsinattendance
ateventshostedbyHungary(includingtheFINAWorldChampionshipsin2017,the
EOCEYOF2017andtheGAISFWorldUrbanGames in2019).Noneof theseevent
organisershavereportedanymisconducttotheMIIT;norcouldwefindanyevidence
ofsuchmisconductfromopensourceenquiries.MIIThaveconcludedthatthereisno
evidence available to suggest that HUNADO’s DCOs misconducted themselves in
contraventionoftheWADACodewhileactingastheSCAonbehalfoftheIWF.65
Taking all the abovepoints into account, it is the opinion of theMIIT, thatwhilst
rumourscontinuetopersist,thereisnoavailableevidencetosupportanyallegations
of HUNADO’s complicity in sample manipulation. Indeed, it is clear that some
65A very late arriving piece of intelligence regarding direct observation of sample swapping at the World
Cup in Georgia in 2019. The information will be passed to WADA. It was too late in the investigation for the MIIT to examine the evidence.
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information thatwas used as the foundation of the allegations against them,was
twistedtosupportanarrativeuponwhichthereislittleornobasisinfact.66
Overall,theMIITfoundHUNADOtobecooperative,fullycompliantandhelpfulwith
theseinquiries.AsignificantamountofassistancewasrequestedofthembytheMIIT
to complete its investigation to which they fully cooperated. The information
providedbyandthequestionsansweredfrombothDr.TiszekerandMs.Kallowas
found to be beyond reproach. Over the years, HUNADO has been responsible for
collectinghundredsofsamplesthatprovedtobepositive.Theirsystems,structures
andrecordkeepingwerefoundtobefullyinorderasprescribedbyWADAstandards.
IthasbeensuggestedthatthereissomethingextraordinaryinthefactthatHUNADO
iscommissionedby theADChairperson tocarryout inexcessof75%of the total
missions requested by the IWF. While the MIIT did not attempt to examine the
validityofthepercentageitdoesnotethattherearemanyvalidreasonsforthistobe
thecase67withoutraisingsuspicions.
The MIIT is satisfied that the IWF’s extensive use of HUNADO was based on a
combination of language skills, knowledge of the sport and value for money. No
evidence was found to contradict this. Questions surrounding the rumours and
storiesregardingallegationsofHUNADO’simproperbehaviourwereansweredtothe
MIIT’ssatisfaction.Furthermore,itisacceptedthatHUNADOwasnotinfluencedin
66 See the Internal Audit Report, supra, at 4.1.9 and 4.1.10. 67 See the explanations in the Internal Audit Report, supra, at parts 4.1.3 through 4.1.5.
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anyway byDr. Aján and that no personal relationships existed between him, Dr.
TizekerorMs.Kallo.
TheMIITconcludes that there is absolutelynoevidence to indicate thatHUNADO
determined who was to be tested. It acted strictly on the mission instructions
receivedfromtheTestingAuthority.Ifthereistobeanyselectivityastowhoistested
itonlyappliesinanarrowsetofcircumstanceswhiletheyaretestingin-competition
samples.68
It has been further suggested that samples collected in the field are sent to the
laboratoryviatheHUNADOofficeinBudapest,theinferencebeingthatmanipulation
of thecollectedsamplescouldoccuronsite. DCOswhohaveobtainedsamples in
certainEasternEuropeancountries,arerestrictedinshippingthecollectedsamples
by courier directly toWADA accredited laboratories. Some of their national laws
prohibit the movement of biological specimens outside its borders. In those
circumstances,andatsomepersonalrisktothemselves,theDCOswouldbringthe
samplesbacktoBudapestwiththem.Thesampleswouldbebrieflystoredinasealed
refrigerationareaattheheadofficeofHUNADO,beforebeingforwardedtoaWADA
accreditedlaboratorywhich,inthecaseofIWFmissions,wasfrequentlytheCologne
Laboratory.While therewouldbeanopportunity tomanipulateasample in these
68The in-competition TDP requires the DCOs to test 1st, 2nd, and 3rd place finishers. In addition, 4th place is typically tested. This accounts for approximately half of the tests. The remaining half are a combination of the Testing Authority specifically requesting certain athletes be tested and the HUNADO’s discretion to ensure that each country attending is represented equally in the tests.
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circumstances,thesecurityandotherintegritymeasuresimplementedbyHUNADO
makeithighlyunlikelyinthemindoftheMIITthatanythingillicitoccurred.Thereis
certainlynoevidenceorsuggestionthatthiswouldbethecase.`
i.HUNADOatHoustonWorldChampionships2015
Thiseventappearstobeawatershedinthesagaofweightliftingpositiveresults.A
totalof24athletestestedpositiveattheevent.Dr.Ajánhadbeenreluctanttohold
theWorldChampionshipsintheUnitedStates.DragomirCioroslanwasinstrumental
in finding new sponsors for the Local Organising Committee to host these
championships, after a fake bidding process described by a confidential witness
pushed the cost of the event to over $1.2 million USD. That sum was triple the
$400,000USDotherhostcountrieshadpaidinthepast.IntherushfortheIWFshare
ofthemoney(competitionfeesaresplitbetweentheIWFandtheeventorganising
committee),Dr.AjántriedtoensurethatHUNADOandUSADAwouldshareequally
the role of SCA. This was not satisfactory to USADA. Ultimately, after lengthy
discussions and positioning andwithWADA’s intervention, the Sample Collection
Authority was designated to by USADA with HUNADO DCOs involvement being
limited to technical advice, athletenotificationand translationwhereneeded.The
TDP for Houston was entirely created by the IWF as the Testing Authority. The
contractcalledforthetransportofurinesamplestotheMontrealWADAaccredited
laboratoryandbloodsamplestotheSaltLakeCityWADAaccreditedlaboratory.
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TheMIITinterviewedUSADAofficialsconcerningHouston2015.Thatorganisation
washighlyco-operativeandprovidedemailsandnegotiationdocumentsinthelead-
up to the event and all documents relating to the antidoping control process at
Houston.TheMIITreviewedthoroughlythecircumstanceleadinguptoandatthe
competitioninHouston.WefindthattherewasajointeffortbetweenHUNADOand
USADAandthepositivetestingresultswereaproductofthatjoint-effortandnotthe
solesuccessofUSADAorillustrativeofadeficiencyintheoperationofHUNADOas
hasbeenalleged.Indeed,USADAwassufficientlysatisfiedwiththejointventurethat
they have partnered with HUNADO for subsequent events, including The World
ChampionshipsinAnaheimin2017.TheMIITnotesthatthepositivetestsatAnaheim
in2017resultedinonlyfourpositivetests,althoughmanycountrieshadbeenbanned
from participating because of prior positive results. The joint venturing between
USADAandHUNDAOcontinuestothisday.
ii.SuspiciousOut-of-CompetitionTestResultspriortoHouston
The underlying problem which has been flagged regarding the 24 positives at
Houstonisthefactthatmanyofthe24athletesthattestedpositivein-competition
hadundergoneOOC testinga relativelyshort timebefore theevent.69Manyof the
OOCsamplecollectionswereconductedbyIDTM.Allofthoseathleteswhosetests
werepositiveatHouston,werecleanintheirOOCtestscarriedoutbytheCologne
69The vast majority of the athletes tested positive for the anabolic steroid, Turinabol, and mainly represented Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Moldova, and Belarus.
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Laboratory,whichcarriedoutafull-menuanalysisagainsttheirsamples.70Thevast
majorityofthe24athletestestedpositivefortheanabolicsteroid,Turinabol.
ItisapparentthatthoseOOCtestscollectedpriortoHoustonaredubious.Whenput
toDr.Geyer,theDeputyHeadoftheCologneLaboratory,heconfirmedthat itwas
highlyirregularthattheywouldhavetestedcleanpriortotheeventandpositiveat
theeventinsuchashorttimeframe.Indeed,headmittedthatthestatisticsworried
himsince itwasColognewhoconductedthesampleanalysisontheOOCsamples.
TestsonsamplestakenbothatHoustonandOOCweresubsequentlyre-analysedby
the Cologne Laboratory. Their analysis confirmed that their testing capability to
detectthelong-termmetabolitesofTurinabolwas,atthattime,moresensitivethan
theMontréalLaboratory, and certainlymore than sufficient tohave identified the
AAFs in the OOC samples. The heads of Montréal and Cologne Laboratories are
thereforeunabletoexplainwhatmayhavehappened.
TheMIIThasnotbeenabletoestablishhowthesesignificantdiscrepanciesinthein-
competition and OOC test results could have occurred. The working hypothesis
providedtotheMIITbyDr.Geyer is that themanipulationofsamplesoccurredat
somestageduringthein-the-fieldOOCtestingprocess.Themostlikelyexplanationis
thaturinehadbeenswapped.Indeed,asaresultofhisre-analysisofHoustonsamples
70 Azeri Athletes Silviya Angelova, Valentin Snejev Hristov, Elkhan Aligulizadi, Intigam Zairov, Firidun Guliyev were all positive at Houston, and were a part of the delayed 18 Azeri samples in 2013. All five athletes produced AAF’s when analysed by the Montreal Laboratory. They were subsequently banned from competition for periods ranging from four to eight years.
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and out-of-competition samples, the Cologne Laboratory found that samples
providedbytwoMoldovanathletesindicatedthattheDNAintheOOCsamplewas
nottheirs.TheMIITmakesnofindingshereandleavesittothetwolaboratoriesand
WADAtoexaminethisissuemorethoroughly
5.7Conclusion
AlloftheinadequaciesoftheIWFoperationsoftheADCPhavebecomehistorical.In
arecentpressreleasebytheActingPresidentUrsulaPapandrearecentlysaid:
“[i]nadesiretodecreasetheperceptionorpotentialinterferencebytheIWFinanyand
allantidopingprocesses,theBoardhasvotedunanimouslytohandovertheappointing
of all members of both the Anti-Doping Commission and the Member Federations
SanctioningPanel.Discussionsandanagreementarestillpending.Theseactionsbythe
Board exemplify the intent and desire to achieve external and independent bodies’
involvementinourantidopingefforts.Toconclude,yesterdaywesignedtheagreement
withCASADDtohearanddecideantidopingcasesasafirstinstanceauthorityupon
writtendelegationofpowersfromtheIOC,ITA,andotherWADAsignatories.”