McDonald v. spring Valley, 120 N.E. 476, 2 ALR 1355

FACTS: The seven-year-old minor Margaret McDonald was injured in June of 1916 in a building constructed by

the city as a place of amusement. The minor lost her third finger in her left hand. In March 1917, with the assistance

of her next friend Patrick McDonald , she filed a statement in the city offices stating the time, place, and other

details of her injury. The minor filed a suit in trespass alleging that the city's negligence led to the loss of the third

finger of her left hand. The city demurred to the minor's suit on the grounds that the minor did not comply with

required notice of her injury within six months. The jury in the trial court entered judgment for the minor, but the

appellate court reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant, a minor by her next friend, may sought review of the order of the Appellate Court

for the Second District (Illinois), which entered judgment in favor of appellee city.

HELD: On review, the court reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

The court held that the statute in question was a general statute, which was to be read in conjunction with rules of

law that had become well established. One such rule of law was the rule that the status of a minor was recognized at

law as being different than that of an adult. Extrapolating from that reasoning, the court ruled that the notice statute

was intended to apply only to those who were mentally and physically able to comprehend and comply with its

terms.

It cannot be controverted that a minor is incapable of appointing an agent or an attorney, and it can not be

successfully contended that the statute can be complied with by the filing of the required notice by the father, mother

or some friend of the child as next friend. While the parent of a minor is its natural guardian he cannot be said to be

the agent or attorney for the child. A child with a meritorious cause of action but incapable of initiating any

proceeding for its enforcement will not be left to the whim or mercy of some self-constituted next friend to enforce

its rights.

The declaration disclosed that appellant was mentally and physically incapable of giving the notice required by the

statute, and she therefore did not come within the provisions of this statute as properly construed.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court affirmed.