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4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
May 22, 2012
Acting Administrator Michael Huerta
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20591
Dear Mr. Huerta:
I am writing to you on behalf of the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (Alliance) to express
my concerns based on information that I have obtained from the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests that we have
made with respect to the Cape Wind project. The FAA has consistently ignored the warnings of
the local aviation community, including airplane pilots, regional airports, and airline owners
that the proposed Cape Wind project would pose unacceptable risks to the safety of local pilots
and passengers. The documents make clear that FAA has made decisions based on political
factors rather than the recommendations of the pilots, who use this airspace every day,
thereby, failing to discharge FAA’s statutory safety-first mandate. In spite of the FAA
acknowledging both radar interference to Air Traffic Control and significant adverse impacts to
Visual Flight Rule (VFR) operations, the FAA still issued its third No Hazard Determination in
2010, shortly after the Department of Interior issued its approval for Cape Wind.
In its most recent 2010 Determinations of No Hazard, the FAA erroneously focused exclusively
on whether the turbines met the technical definition of obstruction (e.g. whether they
exceeded 500 feet) without considering separately whether they would interfere with air
navigation. This flaw formed one of the bases of lawsuits by both the Town of Barnstable,
which owns and operates one of the three local airports in the area, and the Alliance to Protect
Nantucket Sound, a non-profit environmental group dedicated to the long term protection of
Nantucket Sound. In a victory for public safety, on October 28, 2011, the US Court of Appeals
vacated the FAA Determinations of No Hazard (Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. FAA, 659 F.3d. 28
(D.C. Cir. 2011). As a result of this ruling, the Cape Wind project is currently under review once
again by your agency.
Because of the Federal Court order, the FAA must now again consider the very real aviation
safety risks posed by Cape Wind’s 25 square mile wind plant proposed for an area directly in
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 2 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
the middle of a highly trafficked, low altitude flight corridor in Nantucket Sound with three
airports in close proximity. This area hosts well established VFR routes between two of the
three busiest airports in the state with 400,000 flights per year over, in, and near the project
area, with two thirds of the air traffic concentrated in the few summer months. It is also an
area of rapidly changing unique weather conditions, forcing both IFR and VFR pilots to navigate
between frequent fog and low visibility low ceiling conditions.
As you know, the Cape Wind project has been the subject of intense publicity and has received
the ardent support of both the state and federal administrations to propel Cape Wind forward.
Our review of the internal FAA documents produced in response to our FOIA requests reveals
that FAA’s Obstruction Evaluation process has also been subject to pressure from these
external sources, resulting in FAA taking inappropriate shortcuts in its review. Accordingly, the
Alliance has grave concerns that the FAA will once again attempt to rubberstamp the Cape
Wind review in spite of the unacceptable risks to aviation safety.
Specifically, the FOIA responses reveal:
1. A clear pattern of political pressure on the FAA to rush the review process;
2. Admissions of safety impacts by FAA personnel evaluating the impact of Cape Wind’s
proposed 130 turbines;
3. Failure to use appropriate procedures to resolve ambiguity and contrary opinions
regarding the effectiveness of proposed technical measures to mitigate radar impacts;
4. Relaxation of mitigation requirements in order to protect the project proponent’s
economic interests rather than the safety of the aviation community and integrity of the
NAS; and
5. A possibility of threats to national security.
Pattern of political pressure and influence
FAA emails in response to the FOIA request clearly show political pressure and White House
and Department of Energy involvement. FAA personnel openly acknowledge the political
sensitivity of the project, pressure to rush the review to meet deadlines despite the clear risks,
and difficulty to deny the project given the political pressure to promote a green energy agenda.
A December 27, 2006 email from Cape TRACON, the radar air traffic control facility for
the Cape Cod and Islands airspace, outlining its concerns states, "I will tell you that this
will have an adverse impact on our operation..." The response to this email from FAA
ASW states, "Keep in mind that if an objection is issued, it will be based pretty much on
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 3 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
your comments, so no smoke, please. Any ‘objection’ to a wind turbine project will be
scrutinized at the highest level (White House, DOE, etc.) so be thorough and exact."
(Exhibit 1)
A January 14, 2009, internal FAA email acknowledges, "The Cape Wind project in
Nantucket Sound is highly political..." (Exhibit2)
A January 20, 2009, internal FAA email states, "The cases are in a Rush Status, therefore
generally we try to turn around in a week from the date it is entered into work status.
However, we realize there are a lot of cases and the amount of work involved in this
particular study and the political sensitivity, we want to ensure we provide a response
that captures all anticipated adverse impact as a result of these proposals." (Exhibit 2a)
A January 30, 2009, internal FAA email states, "How are you doing on the cape wind
cases, could you let me know when you expect to be completed as OES is inquiring due
to the political sensitivity to them and our response." (Exhibit 3)
A February 6, 2009, FAA email states, "We are getting considerable pressure to get the
Cape Wind cases out on circ. I can’t do that without AF's response. It's reached critical
mass… I know you're very busy and this is not your only project, but this is very high
profile." (Exhibit 4)
Another February 6, 2009, email states, "We have heard on the media that the sponsor
is looking to move forward with construction in the next couple of weeks, given the level
and cost of the modifications involved to mitigate radar performance impacts, this could
very well be a show stopper for the proponent and we have to do everything in our
power to be prepared as this is highly political. Our response will be scrutinized by
those advocating this renewable energy resource and we must be accurate, clear and
concise with what we are providing back as to our response." (Exhibit 4a)
A June 2, 2009, email states, "This is a working group and all will be required to
participate and provide input as this is extremely political and likely to result in further
discussion and probable public inquiries." (Exhibit 5)
An April 1, 2010, states, "Could you provide some information regarding the political
implications associated with the Cape Wind project?" (Exhibit 6)
An April 13, 2010, action item states, "Request that Sheri provide political issues or
insight for Valerie and Rich" (Exhibit 7)
A May 3, 2010, PowerPoint presentation to Eastern Service Area Directors includes a
slide titled “Political Implications” which states, "The Secretary of the Interior has
approved this project. The Administration is under pressure to promote green energy
production. It would be very difficult politically to refuse approval of this project."
(Exhibit 8)
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 4 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
On May 7, 2010, an email response was sent within the FAA stating, "Who is willing to
go tell the White House that we are halting wind development because there might be
wake turbulence or microclimate effects?" (Exhibit 9)
An August 7, 2010, email states, "I think this project is going to move quickly as the
funding is coming from Cape Wind and they want to get on with installation of their
wind farm. The FAA has said that the work at Falmouth radar must be accomplished
prior to the wind turbines. All of this is being moved by politics as well." (Exhibit 10)
Admissions of safety impacts
Numerous FOIA responses express safety concerns by Cape TRACON as well as FAA personnel
involved in the review of Cape Wind. Cape TRACON’s concerns are documented over several
years, beginning in 2006 and continuing through 2010.
A December 29, 2006, email from Cape TRACON to FAA personnel outlines detailed
concerns regarding Cape Wind including impacts on low altitude flights, variation in
traffic, IFR and VFR impacts, and congestion. (Exhibit 11)
A May 4, 2009, email again from Cape TRACON to FAA includes a detailed list of impacts
at FMH and Cape TRACON including approaches, search and rescue, loss of targets, and
clutter. (Exhibit 12)
A July 17, 2009, draft memo of Cape Wind proposal options states that ASR 8 "clutter is
a major distraction to ATC. ATC flight following for non-transponder equipped aircraft
would be compromised over WT. Approximately 12% of traffic do not have
transponders." (Exhibit 13)
On February 24, 2010, When asked by FAA personnel, “When your office reviewed the
playback demo from the test that was conducted to simulate the wind turbines, what
was AT's opinion as to whether the wind turbines were going to be an issue? AT
responded on March 2, 2010, "While not the official AT response, I offer the following:
Based on what we observed in the playback test, the radar reflections of the simulated
wind turbines would exceed an acceptable level and will be an issue." (Exhibit 14)
A February 10, 2011, mitigation strategy memo regarding the FMH Reimbursable
agreement acknowledges that, "Establishment of a wind turbine project that consist of
many individual wind turbines that are closely spaced presents performance issues for
FAA radar… The effects will exist as unwanted clutter…unwanted moving targets...”
(Exhibit 15)
An October 31, 2011, email states, "I don’t think air traffic could keep a low flying
search-only VFR from running into a wind turbine." (Exhibit 16)
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 5 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
Ambiguity and contrary opinions regarding the effectiveness of proposed mitigation
Numerous emails and briefing papers released range from stating that the mitigation options
may not be effective to stating that the expected loss of detection would be moderate in the
ASR 11 replacement option and severe in the TDX 2000 option. Emails also discuss that
necessary equipment may not be available to implement the proposed mitigation measures.
Given these and other risks, several FAA employees recommend following the Safety Risk
Management (SRM) process for Cape Wind and describe how it was applied in the wind
turbines proposed in Anchorage, Alaska. However, it appears that it was not followed and only
the OES process was used.
On February 10, 2009, a note added to recommendations states, "Performance of the
TDX-2000 over a wind farm is unknown at this time." (Exhibit 17)
July 22, 2009, draft memo on negotiation talking points with Cape Wind acknowledges
that radar tests before construction would not be conclusive. (Exhibit 18)
A July 31, 2009, email states that the interface requirement for the TDX-2000 to an ARTS
IIE generally would require an "AIU, manufactured by Sensis Corporation. …Only five
AIU units were manufactured by Sensis, however there are no known AIU units
currently available in FAA inventory and the manufacturer has since stopped
production of the AIU” (Exhibit 19)
A November 20, 2009, draft of FAA responses to public comments states, "Investigation
has revealed a reasonable possibility that detection for an ASR 8/TDX 2000
combination may be low above the entire wind farm. It is for this reason that the FAA
is investigating replacing the ASR-8 with an ASR-11." (Exhibit 20)
A January 20, 2010, email regarding the ASR test, "There is some uncertainty regarding
the results of the test and now they are looking for a site where they can validate the
test." (Exhibit 21)
A January 29, 2010, email states, "In our constant endeavor to determine the impacts to
the ASR-8 with Wind Turbines. I have tried another test target injection to the ASR-8 in
Savannah, GA. Unfortunately I have a difference in the data of the two facilities."
(Exhibit 22)
A March 22, 2010, email states, "Who in the agency makes the decision? We gave our
recommendations. Who is the decision maker that puts the agency at risk if the TDX-
2000 doesn't work? If it doesn’t work and no provision is made for the ASR 11 then the
agency is on the hook to pay for the whole thing.” (Exhibit 23)
A March 30, 2010, email states, "As you can see, I have received contradictory advice
over whether the digitizer will or won't help." (Exhibit 24)
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 6 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
An April 1, 2010, briefing paper on negotiation talking points concerning Cape Wind
effects on FAA radar includes a table which summarizes the expected loss of detection
as “severe” for the TDX 2000 option and “moderate” for the option to replace the ASR 8
with an ASR 11. (Exhibit 25)
An April 2, 2010, email states, “I understand that you are running a SMS panel for the
Wind Turbine installation off of Anchorage. I would like to discuss with you a little bit if
you have time the SMS process for this case. The reason I am asking is that we have a
similar situation out in New England with a proposal by Cape Wind to put 130 wind
turbines off the coast of Cape Cod, MA.”…”Obviously there is risk associated with this
wind turbine installation and concern over who should be making and signing off on the
decisions in this case. I was a little reluctant at first with the SMS process but the more I
think about it the more it makes sense. Someone other than the Tech Ops local folks
should be accepting the risk and those that are impacted by those risks should also be
weighing in on the decision. In addition, it’s a good idea to look at all possible risks
associated with his proposal.” (Exhibit 26)
Another April 2, 2010, email describes the use of SMS in Anchorage and states, “The
SMS manual specifically calls out for preliminary safety analysis. I suggest that you use
that process for as long as it takes to design for minimum risk as stated in the safety
order of precedence. Gather any NAS system impacts information and the chain
reaction of events that occur from any impact and its influence on the operational
environment to assist in the development of the FAA’s plan to maintain safety or change
proposal.” (Exhibit 26a)
An April 5, 2010, FAA email recommends applying the SRM process to Cape Wind. It
states, “After further discussion with Neal and Peter, and knowing that this could delay
the determination even longer, in my personal opinion, I think that the SRM process is
needed. There are risks associated with issuing a determination on this OE (Obstruction
Evaluation) case. We certainly and to ensure that the appropriate people, at the
appropriate level of the organization have signed off on the risks associated with the
installation of these turbines.” The response states, “Thanks. I had spoken with my
Quality Control Group here and they also advised that we will need an SRMD for this.”
(Exhibit 27)
An April 15, 2010, email recommends completing an SRMDM and states, “It is my
personal opinion that even an SRMDM may not be necessary however, considering the
visibility this project has received, the SRMDM would document our reasons for
considering the Cape Winds project safe and compliant with our SMS. Modification to
the ASR-8, TDX-2000 (or both) is a separate issue warranting its own SRM.” (Exhibit 28)
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 7 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
An April 22, 2010, white paper recaps an April 1 teleconference, which included the
Terminal Planning office. The white paper states, “They raised concerns over the need
to complete a Safety Risk Management (SRM) study and requested more time for that
determination to be made. There is question about whether the OES process makes up
for an SRM study, and thus, an SRM study would not be needed.” (Exhibit 29)
An April 22, 2010, memo summarizing an FAA teleconference discussion: "we are
receiving many conflicting opinions in the service Center - We hear that digitizers will
adequately address the issue. However, we hear that they won't. We hear that the OE
evaluation addresses all safety issues. However, we also hear that it doesn’t address the
clutter on the radar scope..." (Exhibit 30)
An April 28, 2010, email which states, “You people need to listen to what I and others
are and have said. That is, we will optimize the FMH ASR-8 to provide improvement to
the extent possible. We do not expect that this will be good enough to resolve the wind
turbine issues and recommend the implementation of a TDX 2000 to digitize and
provide post processing to further resolve the issue. You people cannot take the
collective word of three engineers (myself, Peter and Ernie) that the TDX 2000 will take
care of the situation. I hear the bean counters in P&R say that we must "get this right"
but nothing is a guarantee. So, if that’s the real case, then tell OE/AAA that the wind
farm is the worst thing to happen to the FAA's radar program since SBS." (Exhibit 31)
In response to the April 28, 2010, email, on May 3, 2010, the following email was sent: "I
understand your frustration. Just wanted to give you a little feedback from today’s
telecon. Tech Ops, up to Gene's level has not changed our position or
recommendations. The decision on if AT can live with the mitigations offered is not ours
to make….Maybe now that Gene has said what we’ve been saying for over a year now
someone will listen and the OES determination can move forward." (Exhibit 31a) Note
that on March 20, 2010, Cape TRACON did weigh in stating “Based on what we observed
in the playback test, the radar reflections of the simulated wind turbines would exceed
an acceptable level and will be an issue." (Exhibit 32)
An August 7, 2010, email states, "I explained that a TDX 2000 may not be available from
the FAA and that Sensis has moved on to the next generation. In any case, I do not have
the details on availability or what Sensis could provide. Just thought I’d let you know
about this.” (Exhibit 35)
Mitigation requirements favor Cape Wind economics over aviation safety
After acknowledging aviation safety impacts and expressing uncertainty regarding the
proposed mitigation options, the FAA appears to make mitigation recommendations to
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 8 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
accommodate Cape Wind’s profitability regardless of probable public safety risks. Two
months prior to the May 2010 DNH, the acting head of the Obstruction Evaluation group
stated, “Shutting them down midstream will create an undue burden on the developer and
could possibly bankrupt them." FOIA information released from the FAA clearly shows that
the FAA chose to recommend lesser cost, but less effective solutions, in order to protect the
financial viability of the developer rather than public aviation safety. Statements
throughout documents released in the FOIA process, as well as in the February 2009 Notice
of Presumed Hazard, would have required Cape Wind to cease operations if the TDX 2000
mitigation option is not sufficiently effective until an ASR 11 replaces the ASR 8 and is fully
operational. Yet, in the 2010 Determination of Hazard, this requirement is dropped. The
ensuing mitigation only requires Cape Wind to put $15 million into an escrow fund to cover
the potential cost of an ASR 11 with no requirement to cease operations, potentially putting
millions of pilots and passengers at risk for nearly a four-year period, the FAA’s estimate for
the length of time needed to implement an ASR-11.
While numerous documents discuss the ASR 11 replacement as the preferred option by FAA
personnel, the TDX 2000 option is adopted as first priority. In fact, implementation appears
to already be underway despite the fact that the FAA 2010 determination has been vacated
by the Federal Court order, in an apparent prejudgment of the outcome of the current
evaluation process.
Finally, in a July 2009 memo, FAA personnel dismiss the option of restricting the airspace to
transponder only aircraft as a mitigation option. Yet, it is a distinct possibility that the FAA
would, in fact, take this step based on the uncertainty in the effectiveness of the mitigation
options and real world examples such as Travis AFB, where an airspace restriction has been
adopted; and, in fact, the 2010 Determinations expressly contemplate the possibility of
restricting the airspace if the technical mitigation recommendations are not effective
without any indication of how the 2009 concerns were resolved.
A February 12, 2009, email clearly states, "Either mitigation option would be required to
be funded through a reimbursable agreement with the proponent, implemented and
operational prior to construction associated with the Cape Wind project. If option 1 is
chosen and performance is not acceptable to AT, the proponent agrees to immediately
cease operation and mitigate the impact by funding and exercising Option 2. " (Exhibit
34)
The February 13, 2009, Notice of Presumed Hazard further states, “The mitigation
resolution would need to be implemented and operational prior to construction of the
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 9 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
Cape Wind project. The proponent would need to agree to immobilize all wind
turbines, and as part of the reimbursable agreement, to fund the replacement of the
ASR-8 with an ASR-11 system if the external digitizer is installed and it is found that its
performance is not acceptable to Air Traffic Control.” (Exhibit 35)
A July 17, 2009, draft memo of Cape Wind proposal options includes prioritization of
mitigation options starting with ASR 11, then with TDX 2000. A flight restriction
boundary is dismissed as "general mitigations not candidates for consideration" and
"restriction of airspace not supported by user communities." Discussion of TDX 2000
option states, "loss of some detection is a trade-off for significant reduction in clutter."
(Exhibit 13a)
A July 22, 2009, draft memo on negotiation talking points with Cape Wind proposes the
ASR 11 as the best mitigation option. It also clearly requires shutdown of Cape Wind
turbines if Cape Wind chooses the TDX 2000 option and it doesn’t work. The memo
states, "This would necessitate all outstanding Cape Wind turbines construction
activities to cease and existing wind turbine operations be shut down and blades
locked in place until the proponent can procure, install and commission an ASR-11 into
the NAS." The memo also states, "The proponent may still have to default to option 1
after executing part or all of option 2, if option 2 does not successfully mitigate the
effects. This would translate to loss of revenue because the wind turbines would have
to be shut down and the project would need to be put on hold until successful
mitigation measures are in place." (Exhibit 36)
An October 1, 2009, FAA email states, "A cease construction and immobilization of
wind turbine blades clause will be included in any negotiation. This clause would
become effective in the case where mitigation measures are not effective." (Exhibit 47)
An October 22, 2009, email states, "Note that these conditions do not guarantee final
acceptance of the wind farm by the FAA. If the wind farm is installed and there is an
unacceptable impact to NAS operations, then the FAA will require that the wind farm
cease operations until the impact can be remedied, at no cost to the FAA." (Exhibit 38)
A February 1, 2010, email recommends the ASR 11 over the TX 2000 option. It states,
"Because of the much greater resolution and post processing capabilities provided by
the ASR 11, I believe this solution would produce the best results with regard to
preservation of true search target detection and false search target elimination."
(Exhibit 39)
A March 22, 2010, email states, "I think the agency needs to make a decision. Is it the
TDX-2000 or the ASR-11? If it’s the TDX-2000, then that's what it is. If it is the ASR-11,
then there will have to be a cost shared agreement with the FAA sharing the expense. It
gets problematic to say let's try one thing and if that does not work, we'll stop
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 10 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
everything and revert to plan B. Once development starts on a wind construction site,
you can't shut them down when all their resources are allocated for the project and
equipment. Shutting them down midstream will create an undue burden on the
developer and could possibly bankrupt them." (Exhibit 40)
Another March 22, 2010, email states, "That’s a good question. OE does not make the
decision, I would think it would be up to the technical office that evaluated the radar,
My point here is you can’t say well go with one thing, but if we figure out later it is not
going to work, we'll shut you down while we work on something else. Whatever course
of action the agency wants to follow should be worked out in the negotiation
proceedings with the Cape Wind folks. They may be agreeable to an ASR-11 cost
sharing agreement if the TDX-2000 doesn’t work in a specified time frame, but will not
agree to shutting down construction." (Exhibit 41)
An April 1, 2010, briefing paper on negotiation talking points concerning Cape Wind
effects on FAA radar: "If the TDX-2000 option is selected and does not provide sufficient
primary detection above the turbines, an ASR-11 replacement would be required for the
FMR ASR-8. In this situation, the FAA will reserve the authority to execute in part, or in
whole, until an ASR-11 can be installed and commissioned to replace the FMH ASR-8,
the following options: 1. Issue a Determination of Hazard for all wind turbines in the
Cape Wind project. 2. Immediately prevent additional wind turbines from being
erected in some, or all area of the opposed wind farm. 3. Demand that the blades of
some, or all, of the existing wind turbines be locked in place until the proponent can
procure, install, and commission an ASR-11 into the NAS. The time frame to accomplish
this would vary depending on the procurement option pursued, however, at a minimum,
it would take 3-4 years from the date the Cape Wind project is stopped." (Exhibit 25a)
A May 3, 2010, PowerPoint presentation to Eastern Service Area Directors includes a
slide titled “Worst Case Scenario” that states: "The FAA will not be able to see primary
targets in the vicinity of the wind farm and may have to issue a NOTAM advising pilots
that it cannot provide advisories in the area of the wind mills. Primary IFR aircraft may
be required to navigate on the victor airways that go around the wind farm. Airspace
design might require slight modifications." A “Technical Recommendations” slide states
"As a final resort, revise the Cape TRACON airspace and procedures to restrict air traffic
in the wind turbine area to only aircraft with beacon transponders." (Exhibit 8a)
A January 27, 2011, email in reference to the 2/13/2009 NPH requiring shutdown states,
" If such language is in the reimbursable agreement - or would be in a reimbursable
agreement if one is signed by the FAA and Cape Wind - then that would take care of the
argument that once the turbines are installed, it would be too late, if the ASR-11 (as well
as the TDX-2000) do not work." The 130 Determination does not state that this type of
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 11 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
language would need to be in the reimbursable agreement. "FAA folks: Can we assume
that the language would be included in a written statement so that (1) construction of
the turbines could not begin before the TDX-2000 was installed and operational and (2)
if, after construction, the TDX-2000 does not suffice, that Cape Wind would
immobilize all turbines and fund the replacement of the ASR-8 with an ASR-11?"
(Exhibit 42)
A May 3, 2011, email states, "If further study finds that the construction of the Cape
Wind project would produce a substantial adverse effect on aviation due to radar
interference/degradation, funding through a reimbursable agreement with the
proponent would be required for either mitigation option (external digitizer or
replacement ASR 11). The mitigation resolution would need to be implemented and
operational prior to construction of the Cape Wind project. The proponent would need
to agree to immobilize all wind turbines and, as part of the reimbursable agreement, to
fund the replacement of the ASR-8 with and ASR-11 system if the external digitizer is
installed and it is found that its performance is not acceptable to Air Traffic Control."
(Exhibit 43)
On July 20, 2011, an email exchange gives approval to install the TDX-2000 at FMH.
This project is ranked as highest priority for the Terminal Infrastructure Board for
FY2011. One of the emails states, “We planned to use ASR-8 SLEP funds to implement
the solution, subject to review and approval by Finance. The Terminal Directors
concurred with our proposed solution and funding approach" (Exhibit 44)
Possibility of threats to national security
Several emails shortly before the FAA issued a DNH express concern that the Cape Wind
turbines may pose threats to national security. It is unclear whether the proper agencies
addressed this issue especially given the scenario that aircraft operating without a transponder
could remain unseen.
An April 1, 2010, emails questions, "Has anyone checked to see if we have any national
security issues if we filter primary data out around the windmills that are in the middle
of the bay along the coast?" (Exhibit 45)
April 5, 2010, email states “Tech Ops would not coordinate security issues under the
Obstruction Evaluation either. Based on our study it is possible that a plane without a
transponder could essentially not be picked up over the wind farm." (Exhibit 46)
A May 3, 2010, PowerPoint presentation to Eastern Service Area Directors includes a
slide titled “National Security Issues” which states, "The masking of primary RADAR data
along the coast may have national security implications." (Exhibit 8b)
FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 Page 12 of 12
4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601
▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725
www.saveoursound.org
a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization
Conclusion
The FOIA documents obtained clearly show that the FAA’s own experts, including ATC, have
determined that the Cape Wind’s 44 story, 25 square mile wind plant would have an adverse
effect on the 400,000 annual flights a year that traverse this airspace, and that the effectiveness
of the proposed mitigation options are uncertain at best. It is also clear that the wind plant will
endanger not only the well-established low altitude VFR routes, but the multi-class commercial
flights operating in this already compressed airspace, with the very strong possibility that ATC’s
ability to manage the NAS in this area will be put at risk.
The FAA’s own internal emails and memos, combined with years of testimony previously
provided by some of the world’s leading radar experts in conjunction with objections by the
regional airport managers, ATC managers, AOPA and airline operators, as well as a Court order
vacating the most recent FAA DNH, indicate a pattern of the FAA succumbing to political
pressure with suboptimal decisions leading to serious public safety risks. The FAA needs to
uphold its responsibility to protect the local aviation community and must render an
unconditional “Determination of Hazard” for the 130 turbines proposed for Nantucket Sound.
Sincerely,
Audra Parker
President and CEO
Cc: Sheri Edgett-Baron, Manager, FAA Obstruction Evaluation Group