Maxwell writing sample

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Daniel Maxwell

Professor Fabbe

Introduction to International Politics

20 October 2012

Question One: World War II was a continuation of WWI. Assess this statement. Do you agree ordisagree? Make sure to address the dynamics of the interwar period and utilize course theory in yourassessment.

The two world wars were, without doubt, linked by tracks of continuity; however the broader

impetus drawing the great powers into conflict were inherently separate. The arguments supporting the

continuous angle of the wars would point out that World War I had left unfinished businesses with

regard to the balance of power. In the prewar context, Germany adopted the Weltpolitik doctrine (which

would turn into an ambitious naval build-up) in response to the security limitations brought by their

geographic position. The encirclement of the Triple Entente magnified the security dilemma, as Germany

had to prepare for a two-front mobilization through the Shlieffen Plan. Likewise, the Guilt Clause that

preluded World War II restrained the sovereign power of Germany. It would appear that Germanys

aggressive conquest for naked power is the common denominator between both conflicts. What can be

seen here is several attempts of regional hegemony, which becomes a destabilizing situation in a

multipolar arrangement of power. Mearsheimer would concur, noting:

Multipolar systems without a potential hegemon, what I call balanced multipolarity, are still

likely to have power asymmetries among their members, although these asymmetries will not be

as pronounced as the gaps created by the presence of an aspiring hegemon [unbalancedmultipolarity] . (Mearsheimer, 40)

The interwar period, at the extent of balance of power theory, may have appropriately been seen as a

house of cards: the Treaty of Versailles essentially created an illusion of balanced multipolarity,

however, in hindsight, there was a creeping reality of an unbalanced multipolarity. This illusion was


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perhaps a combination of the Hitlers ability to manipulate intent (Mearsheimer) and the Western

democracies miscalculation of power balance (Jervis) . The manipulation of intent by an aggressive state

has been elaborated by Mearsheimer:

[] a state bent on aggr ession is likely to emphasize its peaceful goals while exaggerating its

military weakness, so that the potential victim does not build up its own arms and thus leaves

itself vulnerable to attack. Probably no national leader was better at practicing this kind of

deception than Adolf Hitler. (Mearsheimer, 36)

On the second point, which concerns the miscalculation on behalf of the Western democracies, ideals

surrounding liberalism took the cult of the defensive even if it meant granting discretionary

appeasements to promote short-term stability. Liberalism, as understood by Kant, compels liberal nations

to cooperate under moral obligations with the promise of perpetual peace (Doyle, 60). Yet, when

nations are guided under moral underpinnings acting through the framework of the League of Nations

there is vulnerability towards misperception of data. With a great saliency on principle, Jervis finds

psychological evidence that suggests that decision makers tend to fit incoming information to existing

theories and images (Jervis, 192). Evidence of misguided calculations of security has been confirmed by

Kissinger, noting that neither the German nor the Western European establishment believed that he

really meant to overturn the existing order, even though he announced his intensions so that effect often

enough (Kissinger, 291).

The illustrations above draw the linkages between World War I and World War II, implying that

the interwar period was an interruption of one conflict operating under the illusion of Kant s perpetual

peace. Under this postulation, the great powers were buying time per se , particularly with Hitler s

rearmament scheme. Nevertheless, the impetus which drove the international system into war vastly

differs between the contexts of 1914 and 1939. The July Crisis, which set the outbreak of World War I,

revealed an inadvertent war: whereby alliance commitments led to interlocking mobilizations, along

with the cult of the offensive as a factor, inviting confrontations. Germany had been identified as an

aggressor, particularly with a rise in militarism and expansion, in attempt to address the security dilemma


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brought by the encircling Triple Entente powers. Secondly, Kissinger suggests that the reason German

statesmen were obsessed with naked power was that, in contrast to other nation-states, Germany did not

possess any integrating philosophical framework (Kissinger, 169). The interwar period, on the other

hand, marked a second wave of German militarism; however it was driven by nationalist sentiments,

rooted in the racist Nazi ideology of Lebensraum (living space ). This was also largely contributed by

the external crisis brought by the Great Depression, where

[] economic trends were the backdrop to the rise of the Ultraright. For what was new about the

New Right was not its extreme antisocialism and nationalism, or even its anti-Semitism, but its

melding of these hallmarks of reaction with a passionate mass base that could be mobilized on the

streets and at the ballot box. (Frieden, 171)

The doctrines adopted by Western democracies would compel Allied powers to commonly oppose this

rise of Nazi fascism, as the principles underlying liberalism would be at stake. The Allied powers

responded in the name of common security, enshrined by moral obligation. In this respect, World War II

was initiated under a completely separate framework of international security a transition from mere

alliances of Realpolitik pragmatism, towards Kant s liberal internationalism with morally-engaged

republican states.

Question Three: How did ideas contribute to the outbreak of World War I and World War II? In whichconflict did ideas play a more central role? Were ideas more or less important than other factors (balanceof power, domestic politics, leaders etc.) in contributing to the outbreak of violence?

Scholars who take a rationalist perspective suggest that World War I was simply a wanted war,

with an inevitable outbreak between the overcrowding powers of Europe . Fearon argues that the leaders

involved view war as a costly but worthwhile gamble (Fearon, 352); a theory which would manifest

throughout the chain of mobilization schedules during the July Crisis. Yet the debate remains on whether

these mobilizations were the cause of war or whether mobilizations meant the beginning of war


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whereby the alliance commitments themselves represent the cause. There was certainly an interlocking

system of mobilization plans in effect; however, the offensive strategies which were institutionally

entrenched across the great powers enabled the conflict. In this sense, there is interplay between a failure

of international arrangements and the military reality of war, with the latter point misguided by politics at

the time. This is particularly evident through Russias partial mobilization to counter Austria, which

intended to use military demonstration as an impetus for negot iation. This provoked Austria to declare

war, which caught Russia by surprise. As Ned Lebow recalls:

Russian political leaders mobilized in 1914 in the belief that mobilization would be a deterrent to

war. Neither the czar nor Sazonov believed that their action would directly trigger war.

(Trachtenberg, 200)

Moreover, th e partial mobilization scheme represents a case where structure, not motive, determined

stability (Kissinger, 193). In other words, the offensive capabilities of a potential threat place greater

weight on the security dilemma, in comparison to the defensive approach (Jervis, 345).

As mentioned earlier, offensive strategies have been embedded into military institutions across

the continent. This approach was out-of-touch with practical realities, as transformations in war

technologies favored defensive plans. Military commanders did not incorporate the lessons of the

American Civil War (1861) and Manchuria (1904) conflicts, where defense proved to be more effective.

Instead, Snyder and Evera imply that World War I had a cult of the offensive, which is a ssociated to

organizational theory (Sagan). In Europes recent memory, with the Franco -Prussian War especially,

offensive strategy had an appeal of prestige, enhancing the self-image of military officers. The French

military held the offensive a outrance doctrine, whereby long-standing professionals were kept in place of

defense reservists. The Shlieffen Plan, too, has a slat towards ideas of prestige and autonomy. Synder

elaborates on the implications of this strategy, as an institutionalized outcome:

The lesson here is that doctrines can be destabilizing even when weapons are not, since doctrine

may be more responsive to the organizational needs of the military than the implications of the

prevailing weapon technology (Sagan, 117).


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Guilt Clause (Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles).Alternatively, if liberal internationalism were to

maintain through continued US involvement, conflict would have eventually occurred as well. Kants

philosophy suggests that there are good states and bad states where only bad states, characterized

by authoritative regimes, seek conflict. If Europe were to secure a federal association of good states,

Hitlers Germany will inevitably exercise aggression.

Germany long held sentiments that it was at risk of cultural inferiority under the notions of Social

Darwinism. This idea doubtlessly brought the rise of Hitler, a politician whose career was catapulted by

the Mein Kampf, and reinforced by oratory talents. What Hitler brought to the international stage was

defiance against the Guilt Clause, and as Kissinger wrote, he ruthlessly exploited the democracies guilty

conscience about the Treaty of Versailles (Kissinger 289). This brought a series of appeasements at its

pinnacle was the Munich Agreement (1938) where international actors were perhaps nave of Hitlers

intentions to gain hegemony across the continent. Germanys occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland

would indeed be the height of appeasement, where Western democracies yielded to the idea of short-term

peace, afraid of the conflict that would ensue if Germany were to be challenged.

The cases of both world wars present a dilemma where ideas arising from the state and the

international system may be linked to the outbreak of war. This directly refers to Waltzs three images, as

the state the second image perpetuated a cult of the offensive duri ng the July Crisis; while the

society of states the third image enforced the cult of the defensive at the time of German

appeasement. The causes of World War I may be primarily attributed to the international system, with

interlocking mobilization schedules, yet the perceived valor tied the offensive (indoctrinated by the state)

became the catalyst for confrontation. In the case of World War II, there was a common turn towards

appeasement by the Western democracies perhaps derived from the shared horror experienced in the

previous conflict. Yet, it can be argued that the Guilt Clause linked the third image with the second; as

nationalized ideas of cultural inferiority leading to German retaliation sprung from the international

doctrine laid forth by the Treaty of Versailles, which maintained that Germany was responsible for the

outbreak of World War I. Henry Bull describes the nature of both the state and the international system:


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The element of international society is real, but the elements of state of war and of transnational

loyalties and divisions are real also, and to reify the first element, or to speak of it annulled the

second and third, is an illusion. (Bull, 109)

In essence, the state driven by ideas and predispositions may be naturally associated to the outbreak of

war; however, World War II reveals fractured ideas at the international scope, tainted by misperception.

Referenced authors:

John Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power" Mingst & Snyder, pg. 31

Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception" Mingst & Snyder, pg. 192

Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics" Mingst & Snyder, pg. 50

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy , Chapters 7 & 8.

James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War Mingst & Snyder, pg.349

Marc Trachtenberg, The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, Mingst & Snyder, pg.335

Scott D. Sagan, 1914 Revisited.

Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, pp. 1-15.

Hedley Bull, Does Order Exist in World Politics Mingst & Snyder, pg. 105

Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism

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Maxwell writing sample