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Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School of Medicine

Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

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Page 1: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation

CSGF Fellows Conference 2005

Sommer Gentry, MIT

Dorry Segev, M.D.,

Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D.

Johns Hopkins School of Medicine

Page 2: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

ESRD and kidney donation

• End-stage-renal-disease (kidney failure) strikes tens of thousands of people– Kidneys can no longer purify the blood

• Treatments include– Dialysis, artificial kidney support, is

extremely expensive ($60,000 per year) and debilitating

– Kidney transplantation generally restores a patient to full health

Page 3: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Deceased and live donors

• The demand for deceased donor kidneys far outstrips the supply (UNOS)– About 10,000 deceased donor kidneys per year

are transplanted– Over 60,000 patients are on the waiting list– Deceased donation is level

• Live donation is an attractive option– Operation is very safe, can be laparoscopic– About 6,000 live donations in 2003– Spouses, friends, siblings, parents, children

Page 4: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Donor Incompatibilities

• Many willing live donors are disqualified– Bloodtypes: O(46%), A(34%), B(16%), AB(4%)

• O recipients can accept only an O kidney• A recipients can accept only O, A kidneys• B recipients can accept only O, B kidneys• AB recipients can accept any kidney

– Positive crossmatch (XM+) predicts rejection

• Even blood compatible donors might have XM+• Crossmatch is difficult to predict• Highly sensitized patients almost always XM+

Page 5: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Kidney Paired Donation (KPD)

• Donations must be simultaneous

Donor Recipient

A

B A

B

ABO Incompatible

ABO Incompatible

Page 6: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Kidney Paired Donation (KPD)

Donor Recipient

A

O A

O

ABO Incompatible

Positive Crossmatch

Page 7: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Simulation and Algorithms

• Because it is critically important not to waste offers of live donor kidneys, the matching algorithm must be analyzed in advance of any national implementation

• Simulated patients and virtual exchanges can answer questions about the outcomes of a matching algorithm

Page 8: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Donor / Recipient bloodtypes

• ABO distribution(Zenios, Woodle, Ross, Transplantation 72:4, 2001)(Zenios, Management Science 48:3, 2002)

• Each recipient has up to four potential donors– Mother, father, spouse, sibling

• Bloodtypes distributed as in population– Parent has two alleles

• AA, AO, BB, BO, OO, or AB

– A child receives one allele from each parent

Page 9: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Decision tree model of family

Potential donors

Medical workup (pass 56% or 75%),

crossmatch tests (11%), bloodtyping

Incompatibledonor/recipient

pairsDirect donation

(Zenios, Woodle, Ross, Transplantation 72:4, 2001)

3584 pairs annually

No willing, medically

clear donor

Simulate until reach# of real live donors

Page 10: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Graph showing recipient/donor pairs

Donor: BRecipient: A

Donor: ARecipient: B

Donor: ORecipient: A

XM+

Donor: ARecipient: O

Pair 2

Pair 1 Pair 4

Pair 3

Node isan incompatible donor / recipient

pair

Edge connects two

pairs if an exchange is

possible

Page 11: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

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Page 12: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

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Node 22: (13 edges)Donor Type ORecipient Type AWilling to travel

Page 13: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

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Node 5: (3 edges)Donor Type ARecipient Type OWilling to travel

Page 14: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

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39Node 35: (1 edge)Donor Type ARecipient Type OUnwilling to travel

Node 6: (1 edge)Donor Type ARecipient Type OUnwilling to trade

with older donors

Page 15: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

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Page 16: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

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Page 17: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

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Maximal matching:Accept matches at random until no edges remain.

Only 10 of 40 patients get a transplant

Page 18: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

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Maximum cardinality matching:Paths, Trees, and Flowers, Edmonds (1965)

14 of 40 get transplants

Page 19: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Maximizing # of transplants

• First-Accept method finds maximal matching– When an incompatible pair arrives, search the

entire current list for a feasible trade, and if one is found, perform that exchange

• Maximum cardinality matching method– Over the entire pool, periodically choose the

exchanges that result in the greatest benefit– Combinatorial explosion: for 100 donor/recipient

pairs, there are millions of possible matchings, for 1000, there are 10250

– Edmonds’ algorithm finds, efficiently, the exchanges that yield the maximum number of transplants

Page 20: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Flexibility: edge weights• All exchanges are equal, but some

exchanges are more equal than others– Bonus points for disadvantaged groups, like O

patients, the highly sensitized, or those who have been waiting a long time

– Points to reward clinical predictors of good outcomes: HLA antigen mismatch

– Patient priorities: donor age versus different transplant center

• Maximum edge weight matching problem: find the matching that maximizes the sum of the included edge weights (Edmonds, 1965)

Page 21: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Advantage of Optimization

• First-Accept and Optimized matching algorithms tested– 30 simulated pools of 4000 patients– First-Accept averages

• 1673 transplants

– Optimized averages• 1891 transplants

(Segev, Gentry, et al., Journal of the American Medical Association, 2005)

Page 22: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

PKE pool size advantage

0

5

10

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30

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40

45

50

100 500 1000 5000 100 500 1000 5000

# Donor/Recipient Pairs

% M

atch

ed

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

HL

A M

ism

atch

First-Accept Optimized

Page 23: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Minimizing travel outside region

0

10

20

30

40

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Fir

st-A

Op

timiz

ed

Fir

st-A

Op

timiz

ed

Fir

st-A

Op

timiz

ed

Fir

st-A

Op

timiz

ed

Fir

st-A

Op

timiz

ed

None Sens Only Sens+10% Sens+25% All Travel

%Must Travel

%No Travel

%Must Travel

%No Travel

42.7% 42.0%

Page 24: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Financial benefit to mathematical literacy

• Long wait times on dialysis are extremely expensive

• $290 million saved over dialysis using any form of paired kidney donation

• $50 million additional saved over dialysis using maximum edge weight matching for paired kidney donation

(Segev, Gentry, et al., Journal of the American Medical Association, 2005)

Page 25: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

• Maximum edge weight does not necessarily yield a maximum cardinality matching

• We use a 100 point bonus for all edges, then differentiate between edges in the range of 0-10 points – within .4% of the size of maximum cardinality

matching, with vastly reduced travel requirements and HLA antigen mismatch

Edge weight points system

100

10 10

Page 26: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Alternative optimal matchings

• Roth et al. have suggested using maximum node weight matchings– Advantage: all maximum node weight matchings

are also maximum cardinality matchings– Disadvantage: node weights can not capture

priorities we wish to place on particular exchanges, like a very good compatibility match, or an exchange between patients at the same hospital that does not require travel

(Roth, Sonmez, Ünver, Pairwise Kidney Exchange, working paper, 2005)

10

10 20

20

Page 27: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Waiting times and accumulation

• Pairs that do not match will accumulate– Waiting list like that for deceased donors– How will the waiting list evolve? How long

will patients wait?

• Iterated optimization rather than static– As the waiting list grows, so do

computation times for the optimal solution

• Currently purchasing a Linux cluster for embarassingly parallel Monte Carlo simulations

Page 28: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Unmatched after paired donation: 52%# Pairs dO dA dB dABrO 214 849 293 50rA 26 155 23 90rB 14 22 39 62rAB 1 7 5 6

(Gentry, Segev, Montgomery, Am. J. Transplantation, 2005)

# Pairs dO dA dB dABrO 657 1066 354 51rA 257 429 174 107rB 83 175 91 72rAB 12 27 17 11

All incompatible donor / recipient pairs

Page 29: Maximizing Kidney Paired Donation CSGF Fellows Conference 2005 Sommer Gentry, MIT Dorry Segev, M.D., Robert A. Montgomery, M.D., Ph.D. Johns Hopkins School

Deceased donation requires a simpler optimization than KPD

Deceaseddonorkidney

Recipients

12

8

7

10

4

10

6

0

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2

3

45

67

8910111213

1415

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28 29 30 31 3233

3435

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10 10

21

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10

32

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21

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2121

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6

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