Max Stirner and Karl Marx

7/30/2019 Max Stirner and Karl Marx

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Karl Marx and Max StirnerAuthor(s): Paul ThomasReviewed work(s):Source: Political Theory, Vol. 3, No. 2 (May, 1975), pp. 159-179Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/190930 .

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KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNERPAUL THOMASUniversity of Liverpool

EWPERSONSFAMILIARwith the wntings of Marxwoulddeny the importanceof The German deology; yet its belatedpublicationand translationhas long had the effect of obscurngmost of its contents.'It has rarelybeen readIn its entirety; the long section Marx devoted to aphrase-by-phrasedissection of Max Stirner's Der Einzige und seinEigenthum, in particular,has been almost completely ignored.2BecauseRoy Pascal's ranslationof The German deology omittedMarx'sattack onStirner, even though this section ("Sankt Max") comprisesfully three-quartersof the book Marx wrote, the erroneous belief seems to havegrown up, even among Marxologists,that "Sankt Max" is irrelevantorunimportant.This belief is not supportedby an examinationof its text."Sankt Max" is anythingbut peripheral o the argumentof the rest of TheGerman Ideology, a work whose most important themes are fullydevelopedonly in "SanktMax."Withoutan understanding f Stirner,thesignificance of The German Ideology cannot be fully grasped. Mostcommentators,regardingStirneras unworthyof attention, have failed tonotice that the Left-Hegelianshemselveshad a farhigheropinion of him.3Marx,for his part, considered Stimer's book to be the consummationofYoung-Hegelian hought, embodying and exemplifyingits worst featuresto the point of caricature. t is surprising,herefore,that "SanktMax" hasbeen subjectedto no criticalanalysis,when it is known to be the longestPOLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 3 No. 2, May 1975? 1975 Sage Publications, Inc.

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[160] POLITICALTHEORY / MAY 1975section of the majorwork in which Marxseparatedhimselfdecisivelyfromthe Young-Hegelians.The task remains both to credit Marx'scritique ofStirnerwith the importance t deserves,and to considerthiscritiqueIn itscontext. Marx considered the issues Stirner raised to be examples parexcellence of the shortcomingsof Young-Hegelian hought: "people haveonly to change their consciousness to make everythingin the world allnght." Stirnergoes even further,"believingDon Qulxote'sassurances hatby a mere moral injunction he can, without further ado, convert thematerialforces arisingfrom the divisionof labour into personalforces."4Stirner also saw revolutionin the same light as he saw faith, morality,and legality-as demandsupon the individualself, displacingits particu-larity(Eigenheit)with variousconceptions of the "true"self to which theempiricalself must aspire.Strner aimed to undermineall such demandsfor self-sacrifice by spelling out their implications. What needs to besafeguarded,on this view, is the very Eigenheiton which allknown formsof society and state had fed. Only the association(Verein) of egoists,claims Stirner, would not make the individual model himself on, andmeasure up to, something greater than himself, be it political, social,ideological, or religious.The union of egoists can be legitimized,in thiscase,only by not usurping he self-definedprivilegesof the individual,and,indeed, by positively preservingand enlarginghis self-assertivenessanduntrammelledparticularity Stirner attackedany revolutionarymentalityrelyingon moral postulates or dependent on an "ought"(Sollen) in thebelief thatevil residedandconsistedin the veryexistenceof ideals.The point here is not that StirnerconvincedMarxthatwhat passedforrevolutionaryenthusiasmamong the Young-Hegelianswasbogus.Marxby1845 stood in no need of being convincedof this. Stirner,on the otherhand, did raise the questionwhetherin succumbing o revolutionarydealsmen were simply trading one form of subjection for another, at theimmense cost of their own individuality This was one of the centralquestions to which Marx responded at great length and in great detailthroughout The GermanIdeology, where he attempted to demonstratethat communismand individuality,properlyunderstood,areanythingbutincompatible, despite Stirner's conviction that the two were incom-mensurate;and that his own critique, far fromcondemning he presentorits Young-Hegelianvindicators n the light of some abstractcategoriesorprinciples,was embodied in the real movement of history itself. Marxfurtheraimed to demonstratethat history as a rationalprocesstranscendsall purely philosophical critiques and standards,and that communismtranscends he Kantian s-oughtdistinctionthat Stirner, n his bizarreway,had resuscitated.


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Thomas / KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNER [161Marx'sargument s a powerfulone, and has long been regarded o, butwithout an adequate understandingof why he made it, and whose pointshe was meeting. That Marx'sattack on Feuerbachwas something of avolte-face in view of his earliernear-adulation f Feuerbachhas often beennoticed (although the suddennessof the transitionhas been overempha-sized);but Ithas rarelybeen recognizedthat It was none other thanStirnerwho had impelledMarx nto takingthisposition.It has rarely even been recognizedthat Stirner'sDer Einzigeund setnEigenthum itself was an attack upon Feuerbach's Das Wesen desChnstenthums,althoughthe very structure of Stirner'sbook-its division

into "theological-false" ("Der Mensch") and "anthropological-true"("Ich") parts-mirrorsand indicatesits target.So does its subjectmatter.Stirnerattemptedto meet Feuerbachon Feuerbach'sown terms: both DerEinzige und sein Eigenthum and Das Wesen des Christenthumsareconcerned with men's alienatedattributes and theirreapproprlation, othargumentsare cast in terms of autonomy This is not to suggest theiragreement.DavidMcLellanhas pointed out that Stirner's"analysisof themodernage is a sort of demonology of the spiritsto whichhumanityhasbeen successively enslaved";5 Stirner was convinced that the ultimateexpressionof such oppressive piritualitywasFeuerbach'sbook.The weakness in Feuerbach's argument that Stlrner seizes upon isrooted in Feuerbach'sconceptionof man'sdivinity,not as somethingmanhad to build or to create, but as somethingto be regainedat the level ofconsciousness. Once it is regained, man must by implication give waybeforehis new-founddivinity Stirnermaintained hat "divinity"will be asoppressiveand burdensomea taskmasteras any other spiritor collectivityto which individuals,historically,have succumbed.Accordingly, Feuer-bach's self-proclaimedatheism was half-hearted.There is much truth toStirner'saccusation. "A true atheist," said Feuerbach,"is one who deniesthe predicatesof the divine being, not the one to whom the subject ofthese predicates is nothing." Faith in an eternally present divinity iscompatible, on this definition, with true atheism;Feuerbach'ssupposediconoclasm, then, is no more than what Stirner called "a theologicalinsurrection", the relocated divine, Stirner insisted, is no less divinebecause of a change of position.6 Stirner went on to claim thatFeuerbach'scelebrated reversalof subjectand predicate-his substitutionof man for God as the agent of divinity-changes nothing;mankindas acollectivity is just as oppressive and sacred as God, because the realmdividualcontinues to be related to it in a religiousmanner.Feuerbach,extendingpredicationinto philosophicalreasoning,claimedthat "we needonly make the predicate into the subject in order to arrive at the


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[162] POLITICALTHEORY / MAY 1975

unconcealed,pure and naked truth." Stimer believed that this positionobscuresthe need to transcend ll predication,all self-renunciation, eforeany "higherpower."All that Feuerbachhad achieved s an abstractchangein the object of self-renunciation.He does not alter its terms,which ineffect leaves self-renunciation tself strongerthan ever, as its character sreinforcedby Feuerbach's naccuratebut bombastic claimson its behalf.Feuerbach,said Stirner, s just a pious atheist.7 Feuerbachhimself, in hisreply to Stirner,admittedthat in his eyes the statement that there is noGod was only the negative form of the "practicaland religious, i.e.,positive statement"that "Man s the God," which was preciselyStirner'spoint.8Marx,of course, did not shareStimer'sbelief in the oppressive orce ofFeuerbach's relocated divinity9 But this should not blind us to thesimilarity-limitedthough this is-between the attacksof MarxandStirneron Feuerbach.There is no doubt that Marx was influencedby Stirner'sassault on Feuerback'santhropocentrismas being no more than theabstract ove for an abstract"man"at the expenseof any concernfor real,individualmen. Marx'sattacks on Feuerbach in The GermanIdeologyoften proceed from a very similar position. Marxmaintainsthere thatFeuerbach "only conceives [man] as an object of the senses, not assensuousactivity,becausehe still remains n the worldof theory [and]stops at the abstraction 'man' he never manages to conceive thesensuous world as the total, living, sensuous activity of the individualscomposing it."'l Again, in his attack on the "True Socialists," Marxextends this argument,claimingthat by castingtheirargumentn termsof"man" they return to the "realm of ideology" from the "realm ofhistory "

Stirner'saccusation that Marx was a follower of Feuerbach,thoughinaccurate,had enough bite to impel Marxto redefinehis own position.Stirner,attackingFeuerbach'snotion of "species-being"Gattungswesen)which was an expressionof empty humanitarianism,inglesout Marx'suseof this concept in Zur Judenfrage for particularattention.12 Stlrner'schoice of targetin this instancewas disingenuous.His accusationfails toperceive hat Marx's xtensionof Feuerbach'snotion of alienationInto thepolitical realm is wholly incompatible with Feuerbach'stheory Onceshifted in this way, alienationno longer requiresa mere adjustmentofconsciousnessfor its rectification.A reality such as the state cannot beabrogatedby revealingat the level of consciousnessits unsoundcharacter-although this is exactly what Stirner believed. Alien politics can beabolished only by actively transformingthe real world. The earthlyproductof alienation,to Hegelas well as to Marx, s no fiction residing n


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Thomas / KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNER [163]Feuerbach'simaginaryheaven.13 Yet Stirner'sattack on Feuerbach issufficiently insensitiveto portrayMarxunthinkinglyandinaccuratelyas aFeuerbachian,and even to pinpoint as evidenceof this the very essay inwhlch Marxhad signified and proclaimedhis liberationfrom the supine,passivematerialismof Feuerbach.It is apparentthat a re-evaluation f Stimer'sargument sin order.Notonly does Stirnerembody the worst faults of the Young-Hegeliansas awhole; Lobkowicz's point, that it was Stirnerwho impelled Marx intotakingthe position he did againstFeuerbach,againstStirnerhimself, andagainst the entire Left-Hegelianschool, is largelyborne out by a moredetailed examination of the evidence. Marx, rejecting Feuerbachianhumanism,had to avoid aligninghimself with the extreme individualismStirnerpropounded:it was Stirnerhimselfwho gaveMarx he inescapableopportunityof doing this, enablingMarxto use Stirneras the touchstoneof his critiqueof all the otherYoung-Hegelians.This explains much about The GermanIdeology that has hithertopassed unnoticed. The very opening words to the prefaceare a superblyironic-but not at all unjust-paraphraseof Stirner's argumentin DerEinzigeund sen Eigenthum.

Hithertomen haveconstantlymadeup for themselvesalseconceptionsaboutthemselves,about what they are and what they ought to be. They havearranged heir relationshipsaccordingto theirideasof God, of normalman,etc. The phantoms of their brains have got out of their hands. They, thecreators,havebowed down before theircreations.Let us liberate them fromthe chimeras, deas,dogmas, maginarybeingsunder the yoke of which theyarepmingaway Letusrevoltagainst he rule of thoughts.14Seen as a precis of Young-Hegelian deology in generaland of Stirner'sthought In particular,this opening phrase is far from inaccurate.It alsotells us what "the German deology" is andwhy thisphrasewasselected asthe title of the book.WhatdistinguishesStirner both from other anarchistsand from otheregoists is his typically Young-Hegeliannotion of the dominance ofconsciousness in history, togetherwith its Young-Hegelian orollarythatall we need to do to change reality is to masterour thoughts.ls Far fromsharingthe psychologicaldeterminismof Hobbes or Spinoza,to whom theassertive ego could act only on its own behalf, Stirner despairinglymaintained that throughout history men had submitted themselvesvoluntarily to a sequence of outside beliefs. Der Einzige und seinEigenthum is a diatribeagainstthe effects of these successive dees fixes,againstwhat Stimer's translatorcalls "wheelsin the head,"1 beliefs that


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[1641 POLITICAL THEORY I MAY 1975have worked successfully to prevent the ego's acting on Its own behalf.The autonomousindividualwas to Stirnernot a descriptivecategorybut agoal of future humanendeavorwhichhas now becomereality only amongthe outcasts of bourgeoissociety-criminals and paupers.Whathas stoodin its way is consciousness, conceived not m the Hegelian but in theYoung-Hegelianmanneras being "alien."Withoutperceivingthat Stirnerhas much more in common with the Young-Hegelians han with otheregoists, we are likely to misconstrue his argument(as have many of hislater anarchistadmirers).Stirner,for instance,did not shareMandeville'sbelief that private vices added up to public benefit; he considered anyconception of public benefit to be nonsense. Egoism,made operative,onStirner'sargument, would destroy all known forms of society Again,Stirnerattacked Fichte's "absoluteego" becauseit is a goal which mightdominate individuals,and because the goal in question concerned therealizationof rationaluniversality,a projectStirnerregardedas senseless.Stirner'sego is both individualand factitious andrulesout obligationandreciprocityin a manner recalling(if anybody) Spinoza,Der Einzige undsein Eigenthumis an inventory of obstacles to the free play of the ego,obstacles grounded in consciousness,which throughouthis argumentisawarded ypicallyYoung-Hegelianmportance.Stirnerhad recourse to a muted theory of history, implyingthat thespiritualityhe detested had had a progressiveunctionthroughouthistoryThe dominanceof concepts had made the individualmasterof his naturalenvironment,though it had done so, not for the benefit of the individual,but for its own sake.i7 Althoughthe culminationof the processwas to benot the reign of spirit but the supremacyof the assertiveego, Stirnerconsidered the historcal process itself to be the autogenesis of manpropelled by spirit. Whateverhis understandingof Hegel, a broadlyHegelianapproachto history had rubbedoff on Stirner The villainof thepiece, to Stirneras to Hegel,was Christianity Disdainfor the world andde-valuation of the individual were the idees maitresses of Christianspirituality,a characteristic xpressionof whichwas(according o Stirner)the belief of Descartes that only as mind is man alive. In loving thespiritualalone the Chrstian can love no particularperson, to the extentthat he finds himself in spirit, the individual oseshimselfin reality "Theconcernof Chnstianity is for the divine at the end of heathenism,the divine becomes the extramundane, at the end of Christianity, itbecomes the intramundane. Christianitybegins with God's becomingmanandcarrieson its workof conversionandredemption hroughall timeto preparefor God a receptionin all men andin everythinghuman,and topenetrateeverythingwith the spirit."'8 The ChristianSollen denigrates


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Thomas / KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNER [165]the individual, 9 and Stirnerneverdisagreeswith the Feuerbachianpointthat Christianity signified man's enslavementto the categoriesman hashimself created.Nevertheless Stimer believed that it was Feuerbachhimself who hadexpressed in the most extreme possible form the eminently Christianpnnclple which locates divine spirt within the individual.20 If anyindividualmakesGeist or Sollen the center of his existence,he bifurcateshimself, exalting the "better," spiritual part over the paltrierremainder.Feuerbach'srelocation of human essence is no solution, becausehumanessence, still being brought into opposition to the real individual,continues to split him into "essential" and "nonessential"selves. Ac-cording to Stimer, Feuerbachianhumanism is not the denial but theultimateexpressionof spirituality,the ne plus ultraof man'senslavementto the categorieshe has himselfcreated,and, as such, it acts as a signalforthe inevitable advent of the egoists' Vereinand for the overcomingof thestate and its morality21 As Christianity romits outset had located divineessence within the individual, Feuerbach was no more than anotherChristianphilosopher.Such a crticlsm of Feuerbachwasless unorthodoxand fanciful at the time than might initially be supposed.Indeed, it wasaccepted by many of the Young-Hegelians, o whom the really radicalcritiqueof Chnstianityhad proceedednot from Feuerbachbut from Hegelhimself.22Stirner believed that if the individual followed the commands ofconscience or vocation, thought, determininghis actions, dominated theworld. In finding himself in spirit, the individual oses himself in realityThis loss of self, however, takes different successiveforms at differenthlstorical stages, forms which runparallelto the stagesof false discoveryStirer outlines in a curious, paradigmaticsection of his book, "EinMenschensleben,"with which he sets the tone of Der Enzige.23 Oneparticularshift may be singled out as being political as well as religious.This is the shift to Protestantism.Whereasthe Catholic, says Stirner,iscontent with the carrying-outof an external command, the Protestant isuhsown Geistlicher,usinghis "internalsecret policeman,"conscience, towatch over every motion of his mind, every natural impulse. Theidividual, pan passu, becomes a politicalprotestantin relationto his God,the state.24 Liberalismentails the absence of intermediariesn politics, asdoes Protestantism in religion. Stirer's section on political liberalismclearly bears the imprnt of Marx'sZur Judenfrage;he repeatsMarx'snotion that just as religious freedom merely means that religionis free,freedom of conscience that conscience is free, political freedom meansthat the state is free. But Stirner twists this notion into a quite different


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[166] POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1975direction, "liberalism,"he says, "simply [introduced] other concepts-human instead of divine, political instead of ecclesiastical,scientificinstead of doctrinal,realconflicts instead of crudedogmasand precepts.Now nothing but mind rules the world."25 Liberalismaccentuates andinstitutionalizes he Christiandepreciationof the individual."Therightsofman have the meaning hat the manin me entitledme to this and that.I as Individualam not entitled but 'man'has the rightandentitles me."26All collectivities,all general concepts and taskstyrannize he individual othe extent that theirliberty is his slavery Withthe adventof Burgerthum,said Stirner, "it was not the individualman-and he alone is man-thatbecamefree, but the citizen, the citoyen, the politicalman, who for thatvery reason is not man." Although Burgerthumrequiresan impersonalsachliche authority, the submissivenessresultingfrom this "protestant"absence of intermediariess increasedrather than diminished.27Withoutthe denigrationof the individualfor the sake of an abstractSollen, thestate cannot subsist. The kernel of the state, in Stirner'sview, like thekernel of morality, is the abstraction "man", each validates only the"man" n the individual.It is for this reason that Stirnerproceeded to pin his hopes, not onpoliticalman, but on the man held most in contempt by the citizen-theman despisedfor having"nothingto lose," becausehe "lackssettlement"the pauper. State and citizen regardhim as shiftless and immoral,and ashavingno ties or guarantees.AlthoughStirner uses the wordproletanan,his class of paupershas nothing in common with Marx'sproletariat.28Stirnerfails to distinguishthe pauperfrom the proletarian ust as he failsto distinguishthe citoyen from the bourgeois.He does, however,specifythe opposition of these two confused categories, arguing that thebourgeoisiemaintainpauperism,which providesthem with a justificationof their own superiorposition.Thispositionis defendedby the phrasedasGelt gibt Geltung.29 The bourgeoisleuses the state to represspaupers,should these become unruly By the sametoken, as the pauperhasnothingto lose "he does not need the protectionof the statefor his nothing. "The pnnciple of the state, on this view, is the denial of individuality(Eigenheit) epitomized not only in the empty moralismwhich the statereliesupon but also in its refusalor inability to alterthe condition of thepauper. "Pauperism,"says Stirner, "is the valuelessness of me, fhephenomenonthat I cannot realizevaluefrommyself. For this reasonstateand pauperismare one and the same. The state does not let me come tomy value,and continues in existence only throughmy valuelessness;t isforeverintent upon getting value from me, i.e., exploitingme, turningmeto account, usingme up, even if the only use it gets from me consists in


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Thomas / KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNER [167]

my supplyinga proles. It wants me to be its creature.To ask the state toabolishpauperisms to askit to deny its own principle."30One of the faults of Stirner'sargumentat thisjunctureis thathe slidesfrom this proposition to the completely different idea that labour isexploited (ausgebeutet) as a spoil (Krtegsbeute) of the enemy, thepossessors,so that "if labour becomesfree, the state is lost." Laborhas anegoistic character;31 the laborer is the egoist. Stirner's fervent anduncritical belief in the materialpower of reflectivecategories frequentlyled him to suppose that disparateelements of realityare linked becausethey expresssome "pnnclple"or other.

Stirner, of course, is also incoherent in other respects. AlthoughEigenheit, which he distinguishedfrom Freiheit,32 is said to be man'sessence, it is never regardedas beingalien or oppressive n the way that allother "essential"categoriesare. Stirner shirked the issue by maintainingthat every society and every state (which he fails to distinguishclearly)exist at the expense of the individual'sEigenheit. The individual's oss ofEigenheit nourshes both state and society, each of which is man'salienatedessence, sacred(heilig) and out of reach.A corollaryof Stirner'sideology of submission s that "my own will is the state'sdestroyer"33-ananarchistposition, to be sure, but one which Stirnerhimself denied was"revolutionary" Revolutionof the type advocatedby Weitling who canbe includedwith FeuerbachandProudhonamongStirner'sbetesnoires) inStirner's view amounted to just another variant of faith, morality, anddomination, to anotherSollen displacing he individual'sEigenheitwith itsconception of the "true vocation," of the sacred, of the alien. Anysubmission to a revolutionary task must rest on men's belief in thesacredness of a precept, which is precisely what men most need toovercome. Revolutionary organization is an agency of fanaticism, ofmorality, of de-valuationof the individual.Like the state, it appealsandmust appeal to collectivity In succumbing o revolutionaryervoror ends,men are simply tradingone form of submission and self-mutilationforanother.It was at this point that Marx took issue with Stirner,no longerscornfullyand easily dismissingStirner's earning, ogic, andargument,butoutlining at great length the dangers inherent in such a false view ofrevolution.As an unremittinganarchist,Stirnerbelieved that the overcomingof thestate had to be taken, self-assertively;f freedom is simply received, itamounts to mere "emancipation."Yet Stirner believed revolutionaryactivity to be no more than yet another demand for self-sacrifice.Weltling'scommunism and Proudhon's socialism34 are as "religious" nthis sense as all previous systems demanding sacrificeof the sovereign


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[168] POLITICALTHEORY / MAY 1975individual.Stirnerattempted to resolve the tension within this extremeindividualist version of anarchism by distinguishing revolution frominsurrection,a distinction which Marx regardedas "comic." Revolution,said Stirner, is merely another "human act," a social and political actoverturningsome established order; insurrection, by contrast, Stirnerdefined as a risingof individualswithout regard o future arrangements.Whereasrevolution alms at new arrangements,nsurrection on this viewaims at our no longer letting ourselvesbe arranged. ts object is less theoverthrowof an establishedorder than the individual'sautonomousact ofelevationabove all establishedorder,including he "unionof egoists."

This "union"(Verem) is best defined in contradistinctionto the stateandits deficiencies. Stirner'sanarchismpays tributeto the Hegeliannotionof the state as the histoncal embodimentof morality;by rejectingboththe state and morality on the same grounds,Stirner underscorestheirconnection. The state to Stirner at once exercised domination andremainedan idee fixe, an "apparition"by which men are "possessed."(Stirner'scontradictoryview of the state recallsFeuerbach'sview of theway Chrstianity oppressesmankind although-or because-its content isillusory.)Consequently,Stirner'scritiqueof the state is less forceful thanthat of almost any other anarchist;his Young-Hegelianendenciesled himto play down the coerciveforce of state repression,whichplayslittle partin his argument.Stirnerlikewise says very little about forms of the state,beyond the propositions that any state is a despotism even if all mendespotize over one another, and that the liberal state reinforces thecoercive power of conscience. The liberal state itself is no more than amechanical compounding; the state machine moves the clockwork ofindividualmids, the wheels in people's heads, only so long as none ofthem work autonomously The assertion of Eigenheit, removing theindividual'sdestitutionof will, would destroythe mechanism.The idea that men obey the state because they are deluded does notlead, however, to the propositionthat the state itself is a delusion.Marx nZurJudenfragehad seen this differencevery clearly;but Stirner,who hadreadand gainedmuchfromMarx'sarticle,still believedthat the rule of thestate was a blatant,paradigmatic ase of men's being ruledby their ownillusions. His argumentis that as man is not by nature a zoon politikon,and as only the political in man is expressedin the state, politicallife is afabrication.This leads to the further proposition that law embodies nocoerciveforce-a propositionrightlyridiculedby Marx.35Anotheraspect of Stirner'scritique of politics is its lack of specificityThe state is presentedthroughouthis argumentas an agentof sacredness,of the relocation of the divine; but so is society, so is morality, so is


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Thomas / KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNER [1691revolution.There is no clear distinction even between state andsociety InStirner. Society-which is man's naturalcondition, his state of nature-isnot an illusion in the same sense as the state is, and, unlike the state,society is never linked with pauperism.Nothing in society is said tocorrespondto the internalizationof the commands of law or to the totalsurrender of man that the state requires, the taking over, by theProtestant-liberal tate, of the whole man, with all of his attributes andfaculties.Marx, on the other hand, had already recognized what Stirnerdenied-that total debasement of the individual was precisely whatalienation in the labor-process nvolved. It is for this reason that TheGerman deology concentratesmore on the social division of labor than onalienation in the labor-process.The issue in Stirner'seyes, however, wasnot society's denialof the liberty of the individual,but the state's denialof his Eigenheit. To Marx, it was evident that Stirner saw thingsupsidedown; he even proceeded from the proposition that the state, like allsacredentities, cannot subsistwithout the subject's imitedunderstanding,to the proposition that whereas society rests content with making theindividual the bondsman of another, or of itself, the state can bemaintained only if the valueless individual is made the bondsman ofhlmself!36 This againwas a point Marxhad in effect alreadyanswered nthe Economic and PhilosophicManuscrpts (1844), emphasizingnot thepolitical and moral process of self-bondagebut its economic and socialprocess.Its home is not the state, but the laborprocess.Of all forms of political organization, f we are to believeStirner,onlyhis own Vereinwould exert no moral influenceor legalconstraint.It alonewould not displace the individual'sEigenheit; the individual, indeed,would be and remainmore than the Verein.Weshouldaspire,saysStirner,not to the chimera of community but to our own "one-sidedness"andcombine with others simply in order to multiply our own powers, andonly for the duration of a given task.37 If the state "consumes" theindividual,the individual will "consume" the Verein.Smallwonder thatMarx regardedthe Verein as the "idealcopy" of Hegel'scivil society'38Stirner himself portrayedit as a "free-for-all"n which everyone shouldhave as much as he can appropriate.Over and above the reactionary andratherProudhonlan)connotations of wishing to replace"competitionofthings"with "competition of persons"(whichMarx nsistedcharacterzedthe beginnlngs, not the developed form, of competition), Stirner's"egoistical property is nothing more than ordinary or bourgeoispropertysanctified."39 Stirnerseems to be the theoristpar excellence ofwhatC. B. MacPhersonwas to call "possessivendividualism."


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[170] POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1975In the Verem, Marx goes on, "every relation, whether caused byeconomic conditions or direct compulsion is regardedas a relation of

'agreement' [and] all property belonging to others is relinquished othem by us and remainswith them only until we have the powerto take itfromthem in practicethe 'Association'reachesagreementwith Sancho(Stirner) with the aid of a stick. This 'agreement' s a mere phrase,since everyone knows that the others enter Into it with the secretreservation that they will reject it on the first possible occasion."Moreover,Stirner'sconception of "unique"property (propertynot beingmerely retained in the Verem, but perfected there, in the sense of nolonger needing any legal guarantees) eads him into contradiction.Marxparaphraseshe egoist thus:

I see m your propertysomething hat is not yoursbut mine;sinceeveryegodoes likewise, they see in it the universal, by which we arrive at themodern-Germanhilosophical nterpretationof ordinary,special,and exclu-siveprivateproperty 0What little Stirner says about the form of his Vereinlends support toMarx'saccusation that Stirnerin effect "lets the old society continue inexistence [and] strives to retain the present state of affairs," for"Sancho [Stirner] retains in his association the existing form of land-ownership, division of labour and money [and] with such premisesSancho cannot do without the state . [or] escape the fate of havingaspecial 'peculiarity' (Eigenheit) prescribed for him by the division oflabour."4Not only the Verein stands condemned in this way; Marx was alsocrtical of its basis, Stirner'segoist, who should on Stirner's ogic be animaginarybeing.42 "The ego of Stirner's,which is the final outcome ofthe hitherto existing world is not a 'corporeal individual' but acategoryconstructedon the Hegelianmethod."43Nor is thisall.

Since every individual s altogetherdifferent from every other, it is by nomeansnecessary hat what is foreign,holy for one individual houldbe so foranother individual: it even cannot be so. St. Sancho could at most havesaid: for me, St. Sancho, the state, religion, etc. are the alien, the HolyInstead of this, he has to make them the absolutely Holy, the Holy for allindividuals. How little it occurs to him to make each "unique" themeasure of his own uniqueness, how much he uses his own uniqueness as ameasure, a moral norm to be applied to other mdividuals, like a true moralist,forcing them into his Procrusteanbed is already evident.44


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Thomas / KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNER [171Again, as Stirner'shistoricalstagesand conditions are the embodimentof ideas, the success of the egoist can consistonly in "overcomingdeas."

Marx insists that "for Stirner, right does not arise from the materialconditions of people and the resultingantagonismof people againstoneanother but from their struggle against their own concept which theyshould 'get out of their heads'" without ever touching the world itself.This means that Stirner "canonizes history," transforminghistoricalconditions into ideas, "[seizing] everythingby its philosophical ail,"and"takingas literal truth all the illusionsof German peculativephilosophy;indeed, he has made them still more speculative. Forhim, there existsonly the history of religionand philosophy-and this exists only for himthrough the medium of Hegel,who with the passageof time has becomethe universal crib, the reference source for all the latest Germanspeculators about principles and manufacturersof systems." History isfalsified and mystified; "individuals are first of all transformed into'consciousness'and the world into 'object'therebythe manifoldvarietyofforms of life and history is reducedto a different attitude of conscious-ness."45 Stirner,"a clumsy copier of Hegel"who "registers gnoranceofwhat he copies," outlines, in "Ein Menschensleben"and elsewhere,successivestagesof consciousness,each of which confronts a ready-madeworld. Such a picture, to Marx,was quite opposed to Hegel'sapproach.Hegel had never confronted any historical period with so simplistic amethodology and neverhad forcedhistory to conform to his designin thisway 46 Marx'sconception of praxis, indeed, a conception derivedfromcertainaspects of Hegel's conceptionof the will, amountsin this light to atransformationof a Hegelian approach against the msensitivity of theYoung-Hegelians, articularlyFeuerbachand Stirner.At the stage in Marx's development indicated by the "Theses onFeuerbach," onsciousness s not something oundbut somethingmade.Hisattack in the "Theses on Feuerbach" s directed,by implication,againstStirneras well as Feuerbach,as Stirner too ascribedconstitutivepower toconsciousness.Indeed, for all the bombast and accuracyof his attack ofFeuerbach, Stirner himself falls prey to this typically Feuerbachianshortcoming.

Becausethe holy Is somethmgalien,everythingalien is transformed to theHoly;and becauseeverythingHoly is a bond,a fetter,allbondsand fettersaretransformed nto the Holy By thismeansSt. Sanchohasalreadyachieved heresult that everythig alien becomes for him a mereappearance, mere dea,againstwhich he frees himselfmerelyby protestingagainst t.47


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[172] POLITICALTHEORY / MAY 1975This is precisely the chargeMarx made againstFeuerbach-that his ersatznotion of alienation, from which Marxhad dissociated himself in 1843,invites no more than a contemplative and supine response. StirnercriticizedFeuerbach'sdependenceupon generalitieswith no meaning, ike"man," but Marx recognizedthat Stirnerwas dependent upon them inmuch the sameway Stirner,Marxpoints out,

constantly foists "man"on historyas the sole dramatispersonaand believesthat "man"has madehistory Now we shall find the samethig recurrig inFeuerbach,whose illustions Stirner aithfullyaccepts n orderto build furtheron theirfoundation. If Stirner eproachesFeuerbachor reachingno resultbecause he makesthe predicate nto the subjectand vice versa,he himself isfar less capable of arrivingat anything, for he faithfully accepts theseFeuerbachianpredicates, transformedito subjects, as real personalitiesrobbingthe world. he actuallybelieves in the domination of the abstractideas of ideology in the modernworld, he believes that in his struggleagainstconceptions he is no longer attackingan illusionbut the real forcesthat rulethe world.48

Thusit shouldnot surpriseus that Stirner"waxesindignantat the thoughtof atheism, terrorism,communism,regicide,etc. The object againstwhichSt. Sancho rebels is the Holy; therefore rebellion(insurrection) doesnot need to take the form of action for it is only the 'sin' againstthe 'holy' "49 and can, like Feuerbach'smmanence,be carried orwardatthe levelof ideas.

Again, it should not surpriseus that once Stirnermovesawayfrom thelevel of ideas he makes seriousmistakes.Marxfrontally attacks Stirner'snotion of the egoistic characterof laborfrom a histoncal point of viewThis is why so much of the argumentof The GermanIdeology wasconcerned to outline capitalism'sfetters upon self-activity Because thedivision of labor transformswhat were personal powers into materialpowers, the history of developmentof the productiveforcesof individualscannot be equated with the history of those individualsthemselves, letalone their "consciousness."Only in Germany-which was industriallyunderdeveloped,and where ideologues inhabiteda peculiarworld of airyfantasy-would this not be obvious. Laborcan become the reapproprlatedpower of the individual,the outgrowthof his individuality,but not undercapitalism."Theall-rounddevelopmentof the individualwill only cease tobe conceived as ideal, as vocation, etc. when the impact of the worldwhich stimulates the real developmentof the abilities of the individualcomes under the control of the individuals hemselves,as the communistsdesire."50 Marx, in such passages, is not dismissingindividuality as apnnciple but defending it againstStirner'smisconceptions.Whatever heshortcomingsof Stirner'sdiscussion,it did raisethe issueof the supposed


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Thomas / KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNER [173]threat to individuality posed by the communists,whom Stirner includedprominentlyamong the moralistshe was attacking.The crucialpoint hereis not only that Stirnerhad forced this issue on to Marx'sattention, it isalso that Marx need have framed his rejoinders in the way he didthroughout The German Ideology only in response to Stirner ToFeuerbach, who cast his argumentsin terms of large-scaleabstractions("species," "consciousness"), ndividualismwas not an issue.This, indeed,was true of the Young-Hegelians nd "TrueSocialists" in general (not tomentionHegelhimself);but to Stirner-and Marx-it was central.The significance of Stirner's egoistic anarchism in provoking andshapinga detailed and theoretically mportantresponsefrom Marxhas toolong been overlooked. The point aboutMarx'sdirectresponseto Stirner snot so much that MarxregardedStirner as a threat, but that, needing todissociate his theoretical position and perspective from the Young-Hegelians and their touchstones, Stirner and Feuerbach, Marx fullyappreciated the significance of the issue of individualismvis-a-vis com-munism raisedby Stirner,to the extent of meetinghis presentationpointby point. This helps explain why The German Ideology aimed todemonstrate that men's social relationsand productivepotential take onan existence independent of their bearers,men themselves;and that thisdivislon is reproduced in microcosm as a division within the individualhimself, whose powers are expressed socially as somethingalien. But thequestion remains: how are individuals in such a debilitated state toemancipate themselves?Once raised, this query cast doubt on the entireYoung-Hegelianperspective;linking Stirner'segoistic anarchismwith itsLeft-Hegeliancontext in a dramaticway, it enabled Marxto attack Stirneras a surrogate of the Left-Hegelianoutlook. The question is the veryquestionthat TheGerman deology soughtto answer.Stirner'scntique of communismstands condemned because

the communistsdo not put egoism agaist self-sacrifice,nor do they expressthis contradiction theoretically they demonstrate the material basisengendermgt, with which it disappears f itself. The communistsdo notpreachmoralityatall, such as Stirnerpreaches o extensively. [they] by nomeans want to do away with the "private ndividual" or the sake of theself-sacrificingan. 51Stirnerarguedthat laboris egoisticwhen, in capitalistsociety, it cannot

even be personal, when "the domination of material conditions overindividualsand the suppressionof individualityby chancehas assumed tssharpestand most universalform," when the division of laborentails themost complete dependenceof workerupon worker.Labor,far from beingegoistic, has "lost all semblance of life-activity and only sustainslife by


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[174] POLITICALTHEORY / MAY 1975stunting it individuals must appropriate the existing totality ofproductive forces not only to achieve self-activity but also merely tosafeguard heir very existence. Theappropriation f the totality of theinstrumentsof productionis, for this very reason,the developmentof atotality of capacities in the individualsthemselves."52 The point Marxproceeds to make againstStirnerat thisjuncture is that privatepropertyand the division of labor "can be abolished only on condition of anall-rounddevelopment of mdividuals,because the existing characterofintercourseand productiveforces is an all-roundone, andonly individualsthat are developing in an all-round way can turn them into freemanifestationsof their lives."5 The individualcan be conceived as beingopposed to the collectivity only if he is conceivedmysticallyas "unique"andhis historyas that of his self-estrangement.Whileit is true thatMarx'sblisteringcritiqueof Stirnerhas its placenotonly in the history of socialismbut also m the historyof invective,Marx nhis extended and unjustly neglected critique did not rest content withindicatingthat, becauseof his Young-Hegelianbelief in the material orceof reflective categories,Stirnersucceeds only in paintinghimself into acorner. Marx also, within this critique, redefined his own ideas aboutindividualityvis-a-visStirner'ssolipsism.One recent commentator,whoregardsDer Einzige und sein Eigenthum, "the testament of a dissentingintellectual,"as "a sociologicaldocument of the firstorder,"ventures heopinion that "Marx,who was well aware that 'revolutionbegins in thermndof intellectuals',did not accord this credit to Stirnerbecause at thistime (1845-6) he was already thinking in terms of classes and not ofmdivduals."54 In fact, Marx,who did not think that revolutionbeginsinthe mind of anyone, far from neglecting"the individual" or "theclass,"was attempting throughout The German Ideology to examine theirrelationshipin capitalist society-thanks in no small measureto Stirnerhimself.

NOTES1. Dunng Marx's ifetimeonly the fourthchapterof the "St. Bruno" ectionofThe German Ideology was published, as the "Obituary to M. Hess" m theWestphalischer ampfboot, August-September, 847 Engelshad publishedMarx's"Theseson Feuerbach"m 1888, but TheGermandeologyitself waspublishedn theSoviet Union only in 1932 (in German)and m 1933 (in Russian).Roy Pascal's

severely shortened translationof The GermanIdeology into English, (London:Lawrenceand Wishart,and New York:InternationalPublishers, 938 et seq.), wasnot succeededby a completeEnglish ranslationuntil 1965: KarlMarx ndFnedrichEngels,The German deology, ed. S. Ryazanskaya,London:Lawrence ndWishart,1965).


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Thomas / KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNER [175]2. Sidney Hook's From Hegel to Marx, (New York and London, 1936), devotesa chapter to Stirner, but fails to explain why Marx devoted the best part of a major

work to attacking Stirner. It remained to be shown that there is much more toStirner's effect on Marx than his attack on "sickly altruism," but, of more recentworks, R. M. Tucker's Philosophy and Myth m Karl Marx, (London: CambridgeUmversity Press, 1967), does not mention Stirner, and Shlomo Avineri's The Socialand Political Thought of Karl Marx, (Cambridge University Press, 1969), does notdiscuss Stirner. Nicolas Lobkowlcz, in Theory and Praxis: History of a Concept fromAristotle to Marx, (Notre Dame, 1967), notes Stirner's influence on the evolution ofMarx's thought and suggests that it was Stirner who indicated to Marx the pitfalls ofFeuerbachian humanism, forcing Marx to define his own position, not only againstFeuerbach but also against Stirner himself. This suggestion, as we shall see, is largelyaccurate. (Cf. also Maximilien Rubel, Karl Marx: Essai de biographie intellectuelle,Paris, 1957, p. 226, for a similar view.)3. The myth that Stirner moved merely "on the fringes of Hegelian circles"(James Joll, The Anarchists, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964) badly needsputting to rest; its origin is probably the doggerel written by Engels, slender groundsmdeed for such a statement, especially as Marx had very different opmlons aboutStirner from those of Engels. Engels, in a letter to Marx (November 19th) in 1844,compares Der Einzige to Bentham's egoism and argues that it must "glelch mKommumsmus umschlagen"; only a few trivialities, Engels continues, need to bestressed against Stirner, "but what is true m his principles we have to accept."(Marx-Engels, Werke, Berlin: Dietz, XXVII, p. 11, cf. MEGA III/1, pp. 6-7.) Marx'sreply has not been preserved, but m a later letter (January 20, 1845) Engels comesround to Marx's viewpomt on Stirner and says that Hess had also. The dates ofEngels' letters suggest that both he and Marx, who was m Paris, read Stirner mmanuscript. For further details cf. R.W.K. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist: MaxStirner, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 101-125, for an excellent andbalanced discussion.

4. The GermanIdeology, 1965, p. 23; p. 304.5. David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, (London: Macmillan,1965), p. 121.6. Feuerbach, Samtliche Werke, ed. F Boline and W Jodl (Stuttgart, 1959) VI,p. 26; Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum, (Leipzig: Wigand, 2nd ed., 1882),pp. 29-30. A recent selection in English is The Ego and His Own, ed. John Carroll,(London: Cape, 1971).7. Feuerbach, m "Vorliufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie" (1842): "Wirdiirfen nur immer das Prddikat zum Sublekt und so als Sublekt zum Object undPnnzip machen-also die spekulative Philosophie nur umkehren, so haben wir dieunverhuiillte,die pure, blanke Wahrheit." (Alfred Schmidt, ed., Ludwig Feuerbach,Anthropologischer Materialismus: Ausgewahlte Schriften, Europa, 1957, Bd. I, p.83.) Cf. Stirner,Der Einzige, p. 189.8. Feuerbach, Samtliche Werke, VII, pp. 294-310, passim; Stirner, op. cit., pp.351-352.9. Marx never disagreed with Feuerbach's compensatory theory of Christianity,if his otherwise remarkable silence on this issue suggests agreement with Feuerbach'smain point that the attributes of man are projected onto the figure of the divinity, sothat what man lacks m fact he achieves iin fancy, that the vacuity of the real worldand the plentitude of God are one and the same, that only indigent man needs an


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[176] POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1975opulent God, who emerges and is defined by man's real exigiency See NathanRotenstreich, Basic Problems in Marx's Philosophy, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill,1965), p. 14. Marx, however, taking his cue from the early (pre-1843) writings ofBruno Bauer, never believed that all men had to do, par consequant, was to reclaimtheir "essence" at the level of consciousness, as any such consciousness must itself beas distorted, dissonant, and subhuman as the image of God projected. Feuerbach'sGod by contrast was harmonious and superhuman. The basic point that an act ofconsciousness will change nothig unless consciousness itself undergoes a changeunderlies Marx's extension of Feuerbach in Zur Judenfrage-a basic point that (toname but one recent commentator) Althusser in For Marx, (New York: Vintage,1970), completely fails to see.10. The German Ideology, op. cit., pp. 58-59. This led Marx to separate himselfsharply from Feuerbachian humanism and naturalism. (Cf. The German Ideology,ibid., pp. 520-530.) "Feuerbach," said Marx, " never speaks of the world of man,but always takes refuge in external nature, and moreover in nature which has not yetbeen subdued by men. But every new invention made by idustry detaches anotherpiece from this domain, so that the ground that produces such Feuerbachianpropositions is steadily shrinking." (Ibid., p. 55.) Feuerbach idolized natural man tothe extent, as Marx realized, of criticizing anything unnatural as alien. Marx's ownposition was very different; for an excellent discussion of it, cf. Alfred Schmidt, TheConcept of Nature in Marx, trans. Ben Fowkes, (London: New Left Books, 1971),passim.11. The German Ideology, pp. 501-502.12. Stirner, op. cit., p. 179; but cf. ibid., pp. 110, 114.13. This entails that the "change of elements" to which Althusser refers, "theabandonment of the philosophical problematic whose recalcitrant prisoner Feuerbachremained," (For Marx, p. 48), takes place not in 1845 but in 1843, whenMarx wrote Zur Judenfrage. Althusser overlooks completely the significance ofMarx's shift in 1843; the state was in 1843 seen as alienation become reality andobjectivity Gegenstdndlichkeit). Althusser recognizes the terms of the distinction, butnever draws the obvious conclusion. (Cf. ibid., p. 46.)

14. The German Ideology, p. 23. It is evident that in The GermanIdeology Marxwas already seeking to discredit false ideas of alienation; but it is frequentlyoverlooked that it was these false ideas of alienation that Marx was to castigate m theManifesto of the Communist Party (III, c) as the "alienation of Humanity " Marx inthis passage of the Manifesto was not turning against or abandoning his own theoryof alienation, as some have supposed; attention to the text m question reveals that hewas criticizing the use of the term "alienation" as a catch-all category This is not theway Marx himself had used the term in the Manuscripts of 1844.15. The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 63.16. Stirner's own term was "die Sparren."

17 "I receive with thanks what the centuries of culture have acquired for me; Iam not willing to give up anything ot it; I have not lived in vain. The experience thatI have power over my nature and need not be the slave of my appetites need not belost upon me; the experience that I can subdue the world by culture's means is toodearly bought for me to be able to forget it. But I want still more." (Der Einzige, p.344.) One of the few recent commentators to deal with Stirner is quite wrong msaying that "Stirner was very weak on history, as he had no room to allow for alustorical development, whether of world-spirit, self-consciousness, or class struggle."


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Thomas / KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNER [177](David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, London: Macmillan, 1965, p.119.) Stirner allowed for the development both of world-spirit and of self-con-sciousness; Marx, his acutest critic, thought Stirner had "cribbed" his history fromHegel.18. Stirner, op. cit., p. 375.19. Marx of course never disagreed with this. "The social principles ofChristianity preach cowardice, self-contempt, debasement, subjugation, humility, mshort, all the properties of the canaille, and the proletariat, which does not want tobe treated as canaille, needs its courage, its consciousness of self, its pride and itsmdependence far more than its bread." (Marx-Engels, Werke, Berlin: Dietz,1956, VoL IV, p. 200.) Stirner thought that only the canaille could be free of theseadverse effects of Christianity20. Stirner, op. cit., pp. 35-36.21. Although Stirner proclaimed that the coming of egoism was a historicalnecessity, he was a critic of teleology, particularly Aristotelian teleology, which, hebelieved, split existence from calling and the individual as he is from the idividual ashe should be. That men believe m various vocations and tasks is a part of theiralienation. Any "end," externalized or self-imposed, is an alien and oppressive Sollento which men have enslaved themselves. Men are not "true men" when they fulfillthemselves or perfect themselves. They are true men from the start. Marx, on theother hand. to whom certain individuals had very definite material tasks, andmankind a definite end, saw Stirner's attack on vocation, framed m terms ofconsciousness m a world dominated by the division of labor, as both false andconservative. Attacking the idea of vocation as "holy," says Marx, "is merely anapology for the vocation forced on every mdividual the all-round development ofthe individual will only cease to be conceived as vocation when the impact ofthe world which stimulates the real development of the abilities of the individualcomes under the control of individuals themselves, as the communists desire." (TheGermanIdeology, pp. 315-316, cf. p. 65.)22. Engels' Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophyimplies that the publication of The Essence of Christianity m 1841 introduced theYoung-Hegelians to a radical critique of religion, but this is simply untrue. Thecritique of religion was regarded as part of the inheritance and the transmission ofHegelian philosophy, not just by the Young-Hegelians but also by the Prussmangovernment, as is attested by the activity of its censors and the fate of Bruno Bauerafter he publicly broke with Christianity, using Hegel to justify this step. What reallydistinguishes Feuerbach is that he was the only Young-Hegelian to discuss religionwithout discussing the state. That Engels' account of the supposedly dramatic impactof Feuerbach was "completely at variance with the facts," (David McLellan, op. cit.,pp. 93-94), is borne out by the teachings of Hegel, who believed that "religion ispnncipally sought and recommended for times of public calamity, disorder andoppression. people are referred to it as a solace in face of wrong or as hope mcompensation for loss. religion may take a form leading to the harshest bondage."(Philosophy of Right, Section 270; Knox translation, Oxford University Press, 1962,p. 165.)23. McLellan, (op. cit., p. 119), is again quite mistaken m saying that "at thebeginning of (Der Einzige) we are offered two entirely different schemata ofhistory," as Stirner propounded them as different perspectives on the same process.24. Stirner, op. cit., pp. 90-92; ibid., pp. 107-109.


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[178] POLITICALTHEORY/ MAY 197525. Ibid., p. 9926. Ibid., p. 325.27 Ibid., pp. 112-114.28. Stirner included criminals and free-wheeling intellectuals among his so-called

proletariat which, in Marx's words, "consists of ruined bourgeois and impoverishedproletarians, of a collection of ragamuffins, who have existed in every epoch. Oursaint (Stirner) has exactly the same notion of the proletariat as the 'good comfortableburghers'," (The German Ideology, pp. 216-217), i.e., that they are sunply canaille.29. McLellan Is once agai clearly wrong m drawing a parallel between thisutterance of Stirner's and what Marx believed. As is evident from his critique ofProudhon-the "French Feuerbach"-to Stirner it meant that the bourgeoisie, likethe property which defines it, rests on a legal title given by the state. To Marx, thestate rested on a legal title given by the bourgeoisie.30. Stirner, op. cit., p. 119.31. Ibid., pp. 119, 128.32. "Freiheit ist die Lehre des Christenthums," (ibid., pp. 160-161). Eigenheit isrendered as "ownness" by Stirner's translator, "peculiarity," by Marx's. Neither isreally adequate to express Stirner'smeaning, which was closer to "individuality "33. "Der eigene Wille meiner ist der Verderberer des Staats." Stirner's celebrateddefense of crime, which follows from this, emphasizes not the acquisition of goods orpleasures exterior to the self, but the assertion of the self against any moral code, mthis case the legal code of the state. This makes sense only if we assume with Stirner,and without Marx, that the law has binding force as a matter of fact simply becausemen believe it to be binding. Paul Eltzbacher points out that Stirner's constantpreoccupation was to undermine such beliefs by spelling out their implications,(Anarchism, trans. S. T. Bymgton, London: Fifield, 1908, p. 100), but he constantlyignores Stirner's own Young-Hegelian belief in the material power of thought. HenrArvon, who is well aware of Stirner's Young-Hegelian context, believes that ordinarycrimiality, undertaken m ignorance of the need to assert individuality against amoral code, is not necessarily covered by Stirner's defense of crime, (Henri Arvon,Aux Sources de l'Existentialisme: Max Stirner, Pans: P.U.F., 1950, p. 108). Nowhere,however, does Stirner disapprove of any crime undertaken for any reason.34. Marx was not quite right in sayig that Stirner "takes as communism the ideaof a few liberals tending towards communism." (The German Ideology, p. 222).Proudhon was anything but liberal.35. It is not difficult, however, to find contemporary echoes of Stirner, whoseridiculous argument on the state recently has been trotted out again. "In everyinstitution in our society," says David Cooper, "people must be helped to realize thatthe power of the ruling elite and its bureaucracy is nothing, nothig but their refusaland externalized power. Then it is a matter of recuperation of this power, and therecuperative strategy is quite simple; act against the rules, and the act itself convertsthe illusory power in them into real power in us." (The Death of the Family, NewYork: Pantheon, 1970, p. 78.)

36. Stirner, op. cit., p. 228; pp. 199-200.37 Ibid., p. 318, p. 322.38. The German Ideology, p. 224.39. Ibid., p. 409; p. 400.40. Ibid., p. 445. Cf. p. 224: "Stirner foists on to communism the conceptionof need held by the present-day bourgeois in his demand to have as 'nuch as he iscapable of appropriating." The same conception informs the Verein.


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Thomas / KARL MARX AND MAX STIRNER [179]41. Ibid.,pp. 437, 439.42. Ibid.,p. 127 Seepp. 310-315.43. Ibid., p. 205. This is revealed m the opening paragraph f Der EinzigewhereStirnermaintamed hat just as God is said to be his own cause,the individualshouldbe his own cause. " we see,"saidMarx,"whatholy motivesguideSt. Max(Stirner) n his transitionto egoism. if (he) had looked a little more closely atthese various'causes'and the 'owners'of the causes,e.g., God, mankind,truth,hewould have arrivedat the opposite conclusion;that egoism,based on the egoisticmode of action of these persons, must be just as imaginaryas those personsthemselves." bid.,p. 123.)44. Ibid.,p. 30745. Ibid.,p. 345;p. 296,pp. 182, 196.46. Ibid.,p. 180;p. 132; see Marx'sdiscussion,bid.,pp. 183-187.47. Ibid.,p. 304.48. Ibid.,pp. 255-256.49. Ibid.,p. 325.50. Ibid.,pp. 315-316.51. Ibid., p. 482; McLellan, op. cit., p. 135), followig Sidney Hook, thinksthat Marx'sattacks on anything based on morality or love was due to Stirner'sruthlesscriticismsof such notions.ThroughoutThe Germandeology,however,MarxcriticizedStirnerhimselffor beingan arch-moralist: tirner'sconstantsideswipesatProudhon's"moralism"are for this reason vitiated and disingenuous.Marx'sown"Anti-Proudhon" hePoverty of Philosophy,was by contrastto be self-consciously"scientific."52. The Germandeology,p. 83.53. Ibid., p. 483 (emphasismine). McLellan,misunderstandinghis, assertsthatMarx'swell-knownpassagedescribinghow m communistsociety the idividual can"hunt in the morning, ish in the afternoon,rearcattlein the evening,criticizeafterdinner"(The German deology, pp. 44-45) was a parodyof Stirner!In fact, Marxtook this idea with the utmost seriousness,opposing he fixation of congealed ocialactivity ito an occupational r6le that becomes a material force oppressig itsidividual occupant. This is an idee maftresseof The German deology whereMarxwas advocating what modern sociologists (with a certain lack of grace) call

"role-congruence"; ore specifically,Marxwaspropounding 6le-congruencehathehad actuallyobservedamongworking-men evolutionaries.Cf.ShlomoAvmeri,TheSocial and Political Thoughtof KarlMarx, CambridgeUmversityPress, 1970, pp.140-141.) " with a communist organizationof society, there disappears hesubordinationof the artist to local and nationalnarrowness,which arisesentirelyfrom divisionof labour,and also the subordination f the artist to somedefiniteart,thanks to whichhe is exclusivelypainter,sculptor,etc., the verynameof his activityadequately expressing the narrowness of his professionaldevelopment and hisdependenceon divisionof labour.Ina communist ociety thereare no paintersbut atmost people who engage n painting amongotheractivities." TheGerman deology,pp. 431-432.)54. Eugene Flelschmann, "The Role of the Individualin Pre-revolutionarySociety," in Z. A. Pelzynski,ed., Hegel'sPoliticalPhilosophy, CambridgeUniversityPress,1971), p. 225.

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Max Stirner and Karl Marx