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Matabuena v. Cervantes [GR L-28771, 31 March 1971] En Banc,
Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no pa rt
Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of
Donation inter vivos in favor of
Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband
and wife in a common law
relationship.
They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate
on 13 September 1962. Cornelia
Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest
relative to Felix, questioned the validity of
the
donation claiming that the ban on donation between s pouses
during a marriage appli es to a common-
law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid
the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed
by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965,
the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was
made before Cervantes marriage to the
donor. Hence, the appeal. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23
November 1965 decision of the
lower court; (2) declared the
questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff
and defendant as pro i ndiviso heirs to
the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for
its appropriate disposition in
accordance
with the current decision; without pronouncement as to
costs.
1.Prohibition of donation between spouses apply to common-law
relationship While Article 133 of the
Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses
during the
marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality
require
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship, as it is contrary to public policy
(JBL Reyes, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 1954). The law prohibits
donations in favor of the other consort
and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no s e engaen
despojandose el uno al otro por
amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas ( Part IV,
Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale
Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24,
Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et
uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the s ame
prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife wi thout the benefit of nuptials. For it is not
to be doubted that assent to such
irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence
of one party over the other, so that the
danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by
Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just
that such donations should subsist, lest
the
condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be
better. So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand
that the disa bilities attached to
marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.2.Spirit of the
law Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely
literal of the
language used must be
remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. El espiritu
que informa la ley debe ser la luz que
ha
de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus disposiciones.'
It is a principle of statutory
construction
that what is within the s pirit of the law is as much a part of
it as what is wri tten. Otherwise the basic
purpose discernible in s uch codal provision would not be
attained.
3.Lack of validity of donation does not result in exclusive
right of plaintiff on property The lack of
validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in
plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior
to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by
their marriage. She is therefore
hiswidow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the
plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.
Mutuc v. Comelec GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)
First Division, Fernando (p):7 concur,
2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion Facts: The Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited
petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound
systems and loud speakers on 22 October
1970.Petitioner impugned the act ofrespondent as violative of
his right to free speech.Respondent however contended that the
prohibition
was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention
Act, which made i t unlawful for
candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample
ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets
such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like,
whether of domestic or foreign origin. It was
its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner
is the recorded or taped voice of a
singer
and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phras e
and the like.
Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase and the
like. Held: Under the well-known
principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration are applicable only to
things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred
to.It is quite
apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the
distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to
as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its di stribution.
The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition
on the distribution of gadgets of the
kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable
vote for the candidate responsible for
its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets,
mention being made of pens, lighters,
fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes,
and concluding with the words and the like.). Taped jingles
therefore were not prohibited. The
Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind
the minute resolution of 3
November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and
prohibited the Comelec fromenforcing or implementing or demanding
compliance with its order banning the us e of political taped
jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970;
without pronouncement as to costs.
City of Manila vs. Teotico City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico
and CA G.R. No. L-2305 2. 29 January
1968. Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the C A
Concepcion, J.: Facts: On January 27, 1958,
Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and
unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from
the curb to
board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell
inside an uncovered and unlighted catch
basin
or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico
suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI
Mla
complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal,
CA sentenced the City of Manila to
pay
damages. Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or
supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it
responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico. Ruling:
Decision affirmed. In its answer to the
complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned
were and have b een
constantly kept in good conditionand manholes thereof covered by
the defendant City and th
officers
concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P.
Burgos Avenue was and is under its control
and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the
defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibi lity is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality
have either "control or supervision" over
said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance
would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or
supervision."
US v. De Guzman Case No. 297 G.R . No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915 )
Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.9
FACTS: Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was
convicted of
asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life i mprisonment.
Defendant was discharged
before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to app ear
and testify as a
witness for the Government against his c o-accused. Upon
reaching the witness
stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied
ever saying
anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that
statements made by him
were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General
asks for the discharge
of the Respondent though it may result i n a palpable
miscarriage of justice,
nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly
bars a future prosecution.
ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. HELD: Sec. 19 and 20
are constitutional. There is n
provision for perjury should the
Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State.
However, looking at the
legislative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that
faithful performance is
necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure
of the Defendant in the
case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking
to appear as witness
and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived
him of the ri ght to plead
his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally,
discharge cannot be an
acquittal since it was made prior to his trial.
G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.G.R. No. 118745
October 6, 1995
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, petitioner
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.
FRANCISCO, R., J.:
It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the
weak and the underprivileged should not
be carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the
landowner whenever truth and justice happen
to be on his side.1
As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:
. . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the
deserving, whether he be a millionaire in
his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case
of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to
tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution
fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply
because they are poor, or to reject the
rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be
served, for poor and rich alike, according
to the mandate of the law.2
In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the
aforestated principles be applied in it
resolution.
Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No
118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712)
following the adverse ruling by the Cour
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion filed
by private respondents, the petitionwere ordered consolidated.
3
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on October 20, 1994, which
granted private respondents' Petition for Certiorariand Mandamus
and ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorariand
Mandamus is hereby GRANTED:
a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared
nulland voidinsofar as it provides for the
opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or
bonds;
b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediatelydeposit not
merely "earmark", "reserve" o
"deposit in trust" with an accessible bank designated by
respondent DAR in the names of the
following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in
government financial instruments within
the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:
P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap
P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago
P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;
c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners
to withdrawthe above-deposite
amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just
compensation by the proper authorities
and
d) Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediatelyconduct
summaryadministrative proceedings to
determine the just compensation for the lands of the petitioners
giving the petitioners 15 days from
notice within which to submit evidence and to 2) decide the
cases within 30 days after they ar
submitted for decision.4
Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated
January 18, 1995,5
denying their motiofor reconsideration.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were
acquired by the DAR and subjected to
transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL
Republic Act No. 6657).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with
respect to the valuation and
payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6657, private respondent
filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorariand Mandamus with
prayer for preliminary mandator
injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of
19926
and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,7and sought
to compel the DAR to expedi t
the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally
determine the just compensation of thei
properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the
amounts respectively "earmarked"
"reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw
the same.
Through a Resolution of the Second Divis ion dated February 9,
1994, this Court referred the petition to
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and
disposition.
As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:
Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) o
petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds
of Leyte and were transferred in the
names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request
of the DAR together with a
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certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and
P719,869.54 have been earmarked for
Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCT
Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and
issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the
names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES
"C" & "D") without notice to petitioner Yap and without
complying with the requirement of Section 16
(e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank
bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo,
p. 6).
The above allegations are not disputed by any of the
respondents.
Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of
Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a
parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of
18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-
60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the
name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago;
that in November and December 1990, without notice to the
petitioners, the Landbank required and
the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking
(ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the
LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least
25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October
1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the
Landbank to pay the landowner directly
or through the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of
P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992,
the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of
Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E"; Rollo,
p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the
landowners after they signed the Actual
Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay
rentals to the LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).
The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except
that respondent Landbank claims 1)
that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the
execution of Actual Tillers Deed of
Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that respondent
Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did
not collect any amount as rental from the subs tituting
beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).
Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation
(AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges
with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon
that the properties of AMADCOR in
San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215
hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an
area of 163.6189 hectares; that a
summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of
the property covered by TCT No.
34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice
to the landowner; that a decision
was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the
compensation for the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at
P2,768,326.34 and ordering the
Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said amount in
the name of AMADCOR; and that the
trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the
decision was established by adding
P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19
December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect
to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged
that the property of AMADCOR in
Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of
Deeds of Albay with an area of
1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued
covering an area of 701.8999 hectares
which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was
taken thereafter by the DAR to fix thecompensation for said land;
that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR
was
established in the amount of P12,247,217.83', three notices of
acquisition having been previously
rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)
The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except
that respondent Landbank claims
that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings
(land valuation case) despite due notice
to it (Rollo, p. 100).8
Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1990 was issued without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it
permits the opening of trust accounts by the
Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an
accessible bank designated by the DAR, the
compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are
cancelled as provided under Section
16(e) of RA 6657.9
Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the
Landbank merely
"earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation
in their names as landowners
despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the
property, the compensation must be
deposited in cash or in bonds.10
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order
No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-
making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.11
Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance
of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a
substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA
6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et
al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July
14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).12
For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of
the Certificates of Deposits was in
consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land
Registration Authority where the words"reserved/deposited" were
also used.
13
On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed
decision in favor of private
respondents.14
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent
court denied the same.15
Hence, the instant petitions.
On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
the petition in G.R. No. 118745
alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to
delay the finality of the appealed
decision.16
The Court, however, denied the motion and instead required the
respondents to file their
comments.17
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring
as null and void DAR Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the
opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in
cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents
are entitled as a matter of right to the
immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in
trust pending the final resolution of the
cases it has fil ed for just compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that
the word "deposit" as used in Section
16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in
no way excluded the opening of a trust
account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of
a trust account as the acceptable form
of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR
did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate
rules and regulations in implementing the
declared policies of RA 6657.
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides
as follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands xxx xxx
xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this
Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . .
. (emphasis supplied)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only
in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere
does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be
made in any other form. If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of
deposit, that should have been made
express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared
from which it can be fairly deduced that a
"trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term "deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not
absolute. Action of an administrative agency
may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if
there is an error of law, a grave abuse of
power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or the
spirit of a legislative enactment.18
In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of
promulgating
rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the
purpose of carrying the provisions of
the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is
thus confined to implementing the law or
putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative
regulations cannot extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment,19
for settled is the rule that administrative regulation
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case
there is a discrepancy between the
basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
former that prevails.20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of
its power to enact rules and regulations
when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis
in allowing the opening of a trust
account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his
property because, as heretofore discussed
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must
be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular
Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because thes
implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of
the law. Respondent court therefor
did not commit any error in striking down Administrative
Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private
respondents are entitled to withdraw the
amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final
resolution of the cases involving the fina
valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the
negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between
the deposit of compensation unde
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as
provided under Section 1821
of th
same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner
to withdraw the amount deposited i
his behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon
by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP o
that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount
deposited in the trust account pursuant to
Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the
latter amount is only provisional and
intended merely to secure possession of the property pending
final valuation. To further bolster th
contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the
case of "Association of Smal
Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform".22
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is
divested of his property even before actua
payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of
a well-accepted principle of eminen
domain.
xxx xxx xxx
The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession
and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR o
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due
process by arbitrarily transferring titl
before the land is full y paid for must also be rejected.
Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent
court in discarding petitioners
assertion as it found that:
. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation
envisioned under RA 6657 which led the
Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in
the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of AgrariaReform (175 SCRA 343), to
conclude that "payments of the just compensation is not always
required to
be made fully in money" even as the Supreme Court admits in the
same case "that the traditiona
medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no
other" the Supreme Court in said
case did not abandon the "recognized rule . . . that title to
the property expropriated shall pass from
the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation."23
(Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling
in the "Association" case merely
recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be
undertaken under RA 6657 thereby
allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of
compensation and recognized payment
other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the
settled rule that there must be full payment
of just compensation before the title to the expropriated
property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA
6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is
unacceptable. To withhold the righ
of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited
in their behalf as compensation fo
their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's
valuation, and notwithstanding that they hav
already been deprived of the possession and use of such
properties, is an oppressive exercise o
eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private
respondents' properties was painful enough
for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by
withholding that which rightfully belongs to
private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an
authority (the "Association" case) that is
however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private
respondents, which the Court mus
rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16(eand final compensation under Section
18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to
appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is
the same, the landowner is deprived
of the use and possession of his property for which he should be
fairly and immediately compensated
Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that:
. . . within the context of the State's inherent power of
eminent domain, just compensation means no
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the paym en
of the land within a reasonable time from its taking . Without
prompt payment, compensation canno
be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer
the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss.24
(Emphasis supplied)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to
remove all legal obstacles in th
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and
clear the way for the tru
freedom of the farmer.25
But despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to
multiply and
clog the courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic
that the goal of totally emancipating th
farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must
be stressed, however, that in the
pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the
landowners is equally important because socia
justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property
owners, who under our Constitution an
laws are also entitled to protection.26
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit an
the appealed decision i s AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on l eave.
Songco, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. Nos. 50999-51000
(March 23, 1990)
FACTS: Zuelig filed an application for clearance to terminate
the services of Songco, and others, on th
ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. During the
hearing, the parties agreed that the sol
issue to be resolved was the basis of the separation pay due.
The salesmen received monthly salarie
of at least P400.00 and commission for every sale they made.
The Collective Bargaining Agreements between Zuelig and the
union of which Songco, et al. were
members contained the following provision: "Any employee who is
separated from employment du
to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off, not due to the
fault of said employee, shall receive
from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent
to one (1) month's salary per year of
service."
