Marrin Ensuring Saudi Security Through Nuclear Weapons GFIR510 2002

Nuclear Weapons To/Could Protect Saudi Security

Ensuring Saudi Security Through Nuclear Weapons Stephen Marrin

GFIR 510

Professor Redick

University of Virginia

15 April 2002

Based on an in-depth analysis of the threats that Saudi Arabia currently faces and its means of countering them, our Interagency Standing Committee on Nuclear Policy believes that Your Highness Crown Prince Abdallah bin abd-al Aziz Al Saudas the de facto monarchshould actively pursue the covert acquisition of nuclear weapons to ensure that Saudi Arabian national security is adequately provided for. Saudi Arabia compensates for its relative weaknesses in military capabilities by relying on American military power as its fundamental security guarantor against external threats, and while it reaps benefits from this arrangement it also threatens our internal political stability. Providing for regime security from threats both external and internal will require an indigenous capability that can project a force substantial enough to replace the American military and deter attack from either Iran or Iraq. In addition, the acquisition of this capability must be covert in order to prevent Israeli pre-emptive attack. The only means available that achieves all these objectives is the outright purchase of nuclear weapons.

Although our committee was not provided with information regarding any top secret special access programs, there have been many press reports indicating that Saudi Arabia has been attempting to acquire nuclear weapons since 1975. If so, these attempts clearly advance Saudi Arabian interests and we recommend that you reinvigorate them with substantial increases in funding and manpower. If the rumors of these attempts to acquire nuclear weapons are just that--rumorsthen we recommend that you begin implementing a program intended to achieve that purpose. We have the money necessary to fund this program, there are a number of countries that we could purchase nuclear weapons from outright, and if it is done with the coordination of your brother Defense Minister Prince Sultan, Saudi Arabia may be able to acquire a device compatible with either the CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles or the F-15 fighters already in our inventories.

This policy is being recommended despite Saudi membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty because of the importance of providing for our own defense and the weak sanctions we might face if we abrogate the treaty. In the end, the acquisition of nuclear weapons will advance our standing in the eyes of our people and the Arab world more generally, and provide an effective deterrent against attack. We can then finally ask the Americans to leave and go about our business of running Saudi Arabia according to Islamic law without Western interference. Even if other countries strenuously object to this nuclear acquisition there is very little they can do. The stability of the world oil market and its pricing structure rests upon Saudi Arabian productive capacity. All nations that import substantial quantities of oileven if not from uswould be affected by disruptions in our production. Therefore, while Western nations may embargo us from acquiring more conventional arms, they will not be able to stop us from selling oil nor acquiring the proceeds from the sale of this oil. In the end the most likely response of the West to a unilateral announcement of nuclear possession will be a restrained verbal objection followed by business -as-usual.

With so much to gain for Saudi Arabian national security and so little to lose, we recommend that you pursue this covert acquisition program with alacrity.

Facing Real Threats with Inadequate Indigenous Capabilities

Saudi Arabian defense requires more than just conventional military strength. It borders the Persian Gulf, a notoriously dangerous neighborhood with both Iran and Iraq presenting clear threats to Saudi national security. Both countries are hostile to the Saudi monarchyif for different reasons--and have advantages in military capabilities. In addition, Israeli over-sensitivity to the prospects of a renewed war with the entire Muslim world leads them to define Persian Gulf countriesincluding Saudi Arabiaas potential enemies, and it would behoove Saudi leaders to be wary of Israeli military capabilities.

Like Saudi Arabia, Iran is a Muslim state, yet unlike Saudi is predominantly Shia rather than Sunni. This distinction may not seem too important to Westerners unfamiliar with Muslim religious sects, but in the Persian Gulf the Sunni/Shia split is about as important as the Catholic/Protestant split was during the Reformation. Iran has demonstrated a willingness to foster the overthrow of Western-supported governments as demonstrated by its own 1979 revolution, and as such it embodies a revolutionary ideology that implicitly threatens the inherently conservative monarchy that currently rules Saudi Arabia. In addition, Iran could potentially use Saudi Arabias minority Shia population to initiate an internal insurgency and therefore must remain a concern to Saudis leaders.

Saudi Arabia's relations with its neighbor to the east, Iraq, is based even more on traditional threats to national security. Iraq's rulerSaddam Husseinhas demonstrated that he is willing to use his forces internally to crush Kurdish opposition and internationally to obtain greater oil supplies by invading Kuwait. This ability to use force in pursuit of national aggrandizement drove American concern about Iraqi intentions towards Saudi Arabia and prompted its involvement in the Gulf War. For as long as Iraq is ruled by Saddam Hussein and his desire to acquire greater oil wealth it would be prudent for Saudi leaders to assume that Iraq presents a direct military threat to its national security.

The national security threat implied by the hostile intentions of Saudi Arabias neighbors are magnified by Iranian and Iraqi military advantages which dwarf Saudi Arabias. According to CIAs World Factbook, Saudi Arabia has a population of some 17 million people compared to Iraqs 23 million and Irans 66 million. Accordingly, the Saudi military and National Guard only have about 200,000 soldiers, while Iraq and Iran field militaries of 429,000 and 513,000 troops, respectively. Yet Saudi Arabia is some four times the size of Iraq, and slightly larger than Iran. This means that Saudi Arabia has a larger area to defend with fewer people. As a result, its military capabilities are going to be much more diffuse than its neighbors.

Finally, Israel presents an over-the-horizon threat to Saudi Arabia as well. Saudi solidarity with the Palestinian plight threatens the Israelis who have a proactive approach to defense, as their 1981 attack of Iraqs nuclear reactor demonstrates. Even though Israel is not on the Persian Gulf, it has objected to Saudi Arabian purchases of advanced weapons systems from the US in an attempt to retain a qualitative military advantage over the entire Arab world. As a result, Israeli intentions and capabilities are very much a national security concern for Saudi Arabia.

The national security considerations presented by the enmity of these three countries is compounded by the fact that Israel possesses nuclear weapons and both Iran and Iraq have pursued--and perhaps continue to pursue--programs geared to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD). According to Anthony Cordesman, Iran and Iraq are both major proliferators with chemical and biological weapons and which are seeking nuclear weapons. He also observes in another article that Saudi Arabia faces a growing threat from Iraqi and Iranian proliferation, and the risk that the use of weapons of mass destruction may shape a future major conflict in the Gulf. For purposes of this paper the specifics and status of the Israeli, Iraqi, and Iranian WMD programs are not important. What is important is that each of the three presents a strategic threat to Saudi Arabia and conventional military capabilities will not be sufficient to ensure Saudi Arabian national security from this strategic threat.

Saudi Arabia compensates for its relative weaknesses by purchasing expensive weapons systems, as the following comparison with Iran illustrates. In 2000, Saudi Arabia spent some $18 billionor 13% of its GDP--on its military, while Iran in 1999 spent some $5.8 billion, or 2.9% of its GDP. According to Anthony Cordesman, these figures are only a drop in the bucket as Saudi Arabia has embarked on a military modernization effort, spending some $300 billion over the past decade, including some $70 billion on arms from other countries. However, even though high-tech weaponry can compensate for some of its weaknesses, in the end Saudi Arabias ratio of population to territory requiring defense indicates that a reliance on its own conventional military forces would be insufficient in the face of the hostile intentions and unconventional weapons possessed by its neighbors. As a result, Saudi Arabia has had to rely on the forces of a foreign powerthe United Statesto ensure its security.

But Relying on the United States Causes Internal Problems

To compensate for its relative weakness vis a vis Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia has created a marriage of convenience with the United States. As Anthony Cordesman notes, Saudi Arabias military forces are not strong enough to defend the Kingdom from Iran and Iraq without US military aid. Saudi Arabia ensures the free flow of oil at high enough volumes to ensure low global oil prices, and in return has the opportunity to purchase the best military weaponry that money can buy and after the Gulf War has received direct military protection with the basing of approximately 5,000 troops on its territory. Yet this reliance has caused increased internal opposition to American presence and by extension the Saudi regime, especially from its Islamic extremists, and for purposes of ensuring political stability other methods to obtain national security autonomy must be considered.

Much of Saudi Arabias high-technology military equipment is purchased from the United States. According to the Federation of American Scientists, since 1990 Saudi Arabia has spent $40 billion on arms from the United States, making it Americas top customer of high-end munitions. For example, in 1992 the Saudis purchased 48 F-15E bombers, and currently have the M-1A2 Abrams main battle tank, the M-2A2 Bradley armored vehicle, the F-15E Strike Eagle attack aircraft and Patriot surface-to-air missiles on order. In addition to expensive weaponry, the Saudis also have benefited from the presence of American troops on its territory. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 the United States used Saudi Arabia as its staging area to drive the Iraqis out, and have been there ever since.

While this American presence provided a security blanket for Saudi Arabia ten years ago, it may no longer serve Saudi interests. This reliance on the United States is causing a backlash among the Saudi people and was the reason for Usama Bin Ladens initial outspoken opposition to the United States. Few Americans understand the reasons for this backlash, but one observer explained it quite well by saying: The presence of US troops under their own flag in Saudi Arabia violates a cardinal Islamic principle that the kingdom has enforced since its inception in 1932, treating all Saudi territory as a mosque, based on Mohammeds deathbed injunction: Let there be no two religions in Arabia. As a result, many Saudis see the American presence as a defilement of their religion.

Saudi Arabian internal stability is threatened when people are willing to use violence to oppose official Saudi policies. Oppositionists have targeted the American military presence with the 1995 bombing of the Saudi Arabian National Guard headquarters in Riyadh which killed 8 peopleincluding 5 American military trainersand wounded many more. In 1996 a more powerful bomb killed 19 and wounded more than 100 American military personnel based in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The September 11 attacks were likely a larger and more successful version of the same sentiment behind these earlier attacks.

Cordesman has observed that Saudi Arabias strategic partnership with the (US) involves inevitable differences in national interest and culture which includes differences of opinion regarding Israel, and this just aggravates the situation. Another observer argues that: Americas insistence on imposing its will on Riyadh is fueling the anger many Saudis feel toward Washington, especially regarding its unquestioned support for Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which generates sympathy for Osama bin Laden. A survey in mid-October...showed that 95 percent of educated Saudis in the 25-to-41 age group supported bin Ladens cause. Given this sociopolitical fact, it seems unlikely that the regime in Riyadh can continue its tight military links with Washington.

Recent articles GOTOBUTTON BM_3_ in the American press indicate that an American withdrawal from Saudi Arabia may occur within the next few years. As one article notes, Some diplomats suspected that the Saudis might terminate Americas military presence in Saudi Arabia. The 5,000 American troops stationed on Saudi soil are a hangover from the Gulf War, kept there, said one high-ranking Saudi diplomat, by inertia. If the American military presence is radicalizing the Saudi populace and causing them to be willing to take up arms against the United States and perhaps even the Saudi regime, then it may be in the interest of both parties to put some distance in their strategic partnership. Yet how can Saudi Arabia best ensure its national security within such a dangerous neighborhood without the aid and assistance of the United States?

Solution: National Security Independence Through Nuclear WeaponsDue to the internal problems caused by its reliance on the American military, Saudi leaders would likely prefer to assure their security autonomously. Yet because of the population differences between Saudi and both Iran and Iraq, no matter how much money the Saudis spend on weapons systems they will never be able to match the conventional power of either state. Therefore, as is the case with Pakistan vis a vis India, Saudi Arabia could develop nuclear weapons to equalize the proverbial battlefield. And it could acquire the necessary nuclear expertise or material from other countries with its substantial buying power.

Although this Interagency Standing Committee on Nuclear Policy was not provided access to any top secret special access programs, press reporting indicates that a covert nuclear weapons acquisition program may have been in the works since 1975. In 1990 a report alleged that Saudi Arabia may have received nuclear warheads from China in 1990 for its CSS-2 missiles. These charges were not highly regarded until 1994 when a Saudi diplomatMohammed al Khilewidefected to the United States and became the source for many press reports indicating that Saudi Arabia has been pursuing acquisition of nuclear weapons. In a 1998 interview Khilewi said that the Saudi Government will pay anything to acquire a nuclear capability and has spent some $7 billion to acquire nuclear armaments since 1975. The historical rationale for the program appears to have been acquisition of an Islamic Bomb to counter Israeli nuclear possession in the wake of the Arab countrys 1973 military defeat. In 1975 the Saudi government opened a nuclear research office in a secret military complex and recruited nuclear experts. After the 1979 Iranian revolutionwhich threatened the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy--the Saudi leaders decided to balance Iraq against Iran by fund(ing) Iraqs nuclear weapons development program designed to turn low-grade uranium into bomb-grade material...(and) in return Iraq agreed to give the Saudis some of the nuclear weapons it developed. According to Khilewi, At least $5 billion went for nuclear and weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq. Khilewi also asserted that Saudi Arabia tried to buy nuclear reactors from China, paid for nuclear programs in Pakistan, and in 1998 said I am sure that Saudi Arabia will ask Pakistan (for nuclear devices) and will put pressure on them to get it. Pakistan officially announced.....its intent not to transfer this technology to any country. However, I think its economic interest will cause it to rethink this issue.... And if the Saudis...fail to get nuclear arms from Pakistan, I expect them to keep trying with others.

While we cannot verify the veracity of this information without access to secret information, if true it indicates that Saudi Arabia is on the right track in terms of acquiring an independent capacity to protect its national security. This program should be re-emphasized in light of the possibility that Saudi Arabia may no longer be able to rely on American security guarantees. If, however, this entire nuclear acquisition program is a figment of Mr. Khilewis imagination, we recommend you implement a similar program regardless because: we already have the delivery systems necessary to field nuclear weapons; we have the money necessary to acquire the weapons; there are a number of possible sources from whom we could buy the weapons outright; and there is little anyone who opposes this policy could do to stop us.

Saudi Arabia Has the Delivery SystemsFor most countries the means to deliver nuclear weapons comes after their acquisition. However, while Saudi Arabia has no capability to produce its own long-range ballistic missiles, it has two existing weapons systems that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has three variants of the American-made F-15--72 F-15Ss, 67 F-15Cs, and 20 F-15-Ds--which are presumably capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

In addition, in 1986, Saudi Arabia purchased between 20 and 120 CSS-2 intermediate range missiles and nine corresponding launchers from China, according to the Federation of American Scientists. The missiles are deployed and presumably operational at two sites south of Riyadh, and their 2,500 kilometer range can reach both Iran and Israel. However, illustrating the limitations of Saudi technical capabilities, the Saudis cannot maintain or fire (the missiles) without Chinese technical support and Chinese technicians are operating the missiles under Saudi supervision.

The CSS-2s are of limited value as they are, however. Anthony Cordesman argues that there are good reasons to question the military value of such missiles as long as they are only equipped with conventional warheads. China both designed and deployed the CSS-2s with nuclear warheads, yet the Saudi missiles are loaded with 2,000 kilogram conventional warheads. Since the size of a nuclear blast is fairly large, the missiles were not designed for accuracy and are far too inaccurate to be used against any point target with either (high explosive) or chemical warheads. Cordesman observes that the missiles have the damage equivalent of three to four 2,000-pound bombs, or about the same destructive power as a single sortie by a modern strike fighter. In the end these weapons would provide better value to Saudi strategic interests if they carried nuclear warheads.

Saudi Arabia Has the Money

Although growing domestic needs limit the funds which could be devoted to this program, it clearly benefits Saudi Arabias national interest and deserves a share of the countrys substantial economic resources. Saudi Arabia has the largest reserves of petroleum in the world, according to CIAs World Factbook, and as a result is the worlds largest exporter of petroleum. This oil production provides Saudi Arabia with a relatively large amount of money, estimated at $62.6 billion in 2000. However, large population growth and a substantial social welfare network has led to a drop of 20% of its GDP between 1980 and 1995. In addition, lower oil prices combined with the $60 billion cost of the Gulf War have led to large budget deficits for the past several years, according to the Federation of American Scientists. They add that in May 1995 the State Department acknowledged that the economic downturn in Saudi Arabia is undermining political stability....as the Saudi government is cutting back popular public subsidies for gas, electricity and water in an effort to redress the deficit. As a result, although Saudi Arabia may not have the resources it once did to throw at specific projects, the importance of obtaining security independence requires freeing up enough money to adequately fund a nuclear acquisition program.

Purchasing Weapon PossibleAcquisition of nuclear weapons could take a couple of different pathways. First, an indigenous program could build the weapons from scratch developing Saudi expertise along the way. However, the reality is that it lacks the science and technology infrastructure necessary to build a nuclear weapon. There is an Atomic Energy Research Institute at the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology, but a review of its website does not state that it has any research reactors. According to CIAs World Factbook Saudi Arabia gets 100% of its energy from fossil fuels, and as a result does not have a civil nuclear power program. As a result, it lacks any indigenous nuclear expertise derived from a civil program. Yet even if the purchase of scientific expertise and research facilities from overseas were possible to build this indigenous capability, the research nuclear reactors would come under substantial scrutiny from international observers, preventing a weapons program from remaining covert for long. The program must remain covert in order to prevent an Israeli strike analogous to their strike on the Iraqi reactor as well as international pressure from the United States and others to suspend the program.

The acquisition program most likely to be successful in actually obtaining nuclear weapons and doing so covertly would be one pursuing their outright purchase. While Iraq seems like an unlikely source for nuclear weapons given the events of the past 12 years, Pakistan now seems a good country to court as does China, Russia, and perhaps even South Africa.

Saudi Arabia acquired the CSS-2s from China in the 1980s and may be looking to upgrade them soon. The CSS-2s are reaching the end of their operational lifetime, and according to Anthony Cordesman Saudi Arabia has now begun to seek a replacement for them. He observes that it is not coincidental that Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultans visit to China in late 2000 included a visit to a missile factory. If China is willing to risk the wrath of countries intent on preventing the proliferation of WMD, as it appears to have been in the case of both Pakistan and Iran, then perhaps Saudi Arabia may be able to strike a deal with China for a few weapons.

If China is unwilling to sell Saudi Arabia some nuclear warheads, Pakistan may be willing. Cordesman notes that Saudi Defense Minister Sultan also visited Pakistan and these visits indicate that the Saudis may be looking at Pakistani missile programs and possibly even Pakistani nuclear weapons. Later he notes that Prince Sultan and other Saudi military officials have toured Pakistans nuclear weapons facilities. Even though Pakistani officials denied Saudi attempts to purchase nuclear weapons, Pakistans perennial cash flow problems may provide Saudi Arabia with leverage necessary to acquire the weapons at some point in the future when the Pakistani government is strapped for cash.

In addition, both Russia and South Africa may provide opportunities for Saudi Arabia to purchase nuclear weapons. Concern about the potential for loose nukes in Russia also presents an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to find someone willing to sell a nuclear warhead for a large amount of money. Finally, the defunct South African nuclear program may provide Saudi Arabia with an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons while simultaneously solidifying ties. South Africa demonstrated it was capable of developing a nuclear program covertly, and Saudi Arabia has cooperated with South Africa in the recent past by facilitating the Libyan handover of the Pan Am 103 suspects. Saudi Arabia has the desire to acquire nuclear weapons and the money to purchase cooperation, and South Africa is one of a number of states that has the capability to provide it should they be willing to take the heat internationally. This heat, however, is likely to be minimal for Saudi Arabia.

Most Opposition Will be Impotent

While there may be many people who would disagree with a decision for Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, there is little anyone could do to stop us.

Internally, most possible sources of opposition are impotent. Saudi Arabia is a monarchy in which the Al Saud ruling family makes the key decisions with minimal public input. Consensus within the royal family can be obtained if Crown Prince Abdallah works with his brotherand main rivalDefense Minister Prince Sultan. Both Princes have been involved in Saudi security policy for decades; Crown Prince Abdallah at the head of the National Guard and Prince Sultan at the head of the military. Although Prince Sultan has usually chosen to support pro-American policies, at least once in the past he was amenable to pursuing independent policies when he purchased the CSS-2s. Notably, in 1999 Prince Sultan was asked about nuclear weapons and responded by saying we are a nation working for peace but we reserve the right to defend our country. We work towards procuring weapons necessary to protect our country. If these two Princes can both agree that a covert nuclear acquisition policy is in Saudi Arabian interests then most of the power centers within the country will be behind it as well.

In comparison to the royal family, most other actors in Saudi Arabia are powerless. Scholars at the National Defense University (NDU) assessed that public opinion in Saudi Arabiawould not be a constraint on government efforts to proliferate by acquiring nuclear weapons. Public opinion does not have a significant impact on Saudi defense policy decisionmaking. Nor does the Al Saud decisionmaking depend on the positions of the military, energy bureaucrats, or consultative councilits mostly powerless version of a legislature. The only other domestic constituency that might have an impact is the conservative Islamic clerics, yet the NDU scholars noted that the Islamistsaccused the government of military weakness and of relying on the United States to defend the homeland of Islam. They called for the development of a domestic arms industry, more cooperation with other Muslim countries in weapons development, and a more independent and self-reliant defense strategy. In other words, the most powerful domestic constituency would likely support the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Regional actors such as Iran, Iraq, and Israel might have greater objection to Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, they have little recourse other than direct military action or unilateral sanctions because of their own WMD programs. For years Saudi Arabia has been calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East in which all states would accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards, but all of these calls have come to naught. In the face of continued Israeli failure to subject themselves to IAEA safeguards and the likelihood that both Iraq and Iran will continue to pursue their respective nuclear programs, it may be time to abandon the calls for a NWFZ and instead embrace the fact that Saudi Arabia may need its own nuclear deterrent to prevent attack in the future. These regional actors may complain, but due to their own failures to abide by the non-proliferation norm there is little they could do diplomatically. Israel may be willing to use military force to destroy our program, but that is why it must remain covert for as long as possible. In addition, any Israeli attack upon Saudi Arabia would severely disrupt world oil marketsand as a result the US would oppose itand therefore Israel may think twice about attacking even if they wanted to. This US insistence on low oil prices above all else would also require it to continue to provide a security blanket for us from the opposition of regional actors such as Iraq and Iran.

International opposition would most likely come from most vociferously from Europe, Asia and the United States. Saudi Arabia is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it signed in 1998 to ease concern over their purchase of long-range Chinese ballistic missiles. However, the treaty itself contains no sanctions that would impact Saudi Arabia. The Western industrialized countries--which benefit most from the treaty--would be least amenable to its abrogation, yet NDU scholars concluded that the strongest of these countriesthe United Stateswould have little ability to restrain (Saudi) efforts to acquire new nonconventional weapon systems. This is likely because of US dependence on low oil prices and the role of Saudi Arabia as guarantor the global oil supply. In the past Saudi Arabia has pursued policies at cross purposes with those of the United Statessuch as its purchase of the CSS-2s and recent visits to Pakistans nuclear plants--and yet US support continued. Protestations from the United States will roll off the back of Saudi policymakers, so secure in their control of an American vulnerability that they are not likely to listen to US admonishments regarding the dangers of becoming a proliferator, according to NDU scholars. That Saudi Arabia supplies an even greater proportion of oil to Europe and Asia indicates that those countries may also protest but are even less likely to implement policies that could impede continued oil supplies.

The one large risk of pursuing policies inconsistent with American anti-proliferation preferences is that the United States could suggest that it would not continue as arms provider, protector, trainer, and technology maintainer for the Saudi military's conventional forces, particularly in the Kingdom's air defense systems. Such hints, coupled with a U.S. reaffirmation of its security commitments in the region, would weigh heavily on the internal Saudi arms debate, according to NDU scholars. For this reason the preferred source of nuclear weapons would be China. China has an advanced weapons infrastructure and could be willing to supply us with conventional weapons should the Western sources dry up.

Nuclear Weapons: The Best Way to Ensure Saudi Security

It seems counterintuitive to argue that weapons can make one safer, yet it seems to be the case that Saudi Arabia would be more secure from both external threats and internal challenges to its political stability if it were able to acquire nuclear weapons. This paper has argued that such acquisition is desirable, and more importantly, feasible.

In August 2001, Crown Prince Abdallah sent a letter to President George Bush saying that it is time for the United States and Saudi Arabia to look to their separate interests. Those governments that dont feel the pulse of the people and respond to it will suffer the fate of the Shah of Iran. To ensure that Saudi Arabia looks after its own interests it has to be willing to demonstrate independence and a willingness to take risks. According to a scholar at NDU,

from (the Saudi) perspective, the acquisition of nuclear weapons and secure delivery systems would appear logical and even necessary. Saudi Arabia has demonstrated its independence from the United States before by acquiring the CSS-2 missiles, and now these missiles could provide the impetus to acquire a whole new class of weapons. If a nuclear acquisition has not been implemented yet, it is time to begin one.

Anthony Cordesman has observed that a few Saudi planners do advocate buying modern missiles and arming them with nuclear weapons. They feel that buying long-range missiles without such weapons has little purpose. It is unclear, however, that such thinkers as yet have any broad support. Our Interagency Standing Committee on Nuclear Policy is here to tell you that this policy does in fact have widespread support. Covert acquisition of nuclear weapons is not just popular because we say it is; rather it is popular because it is the best way to ensure Saudi Arabian national security.

CIA World Factbook. 2001. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sa.htm

Russell, Richard L. A Saudi Nuclear Option? Survival. Summer 2001. Vol. 43. Issue 2. 71.


Cordesman, Anthony. The US and Saudi Arabia: A Key Strategic Partnership. CSIS. 1 Feb 2002. p.2.

Cordesman, Anthony. Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century: Introduction, Issues, and National Dynamics. CSIS. 28 Dec. 2001. p 9.


Cordesman. Saudi Arabia Enters 35.


US Arms Clients Profiles: Saudi Arabia. Federation of American Scientists. Oct. 2001. GOTOBUTTON BM_1_ http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/saudi_arabia.htm)

Hiro, Dilip. Saudis: US Go Home? The Nation. 11 March 2002. Vol. 274. Issue 9.

US Arms Clients ProfilesSaudi Arabia. GOTOBUTTON BM_2_ http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/saudi_arabia.htm)


Hiro, Dilip. Saudis: US Go Home? The Nation. 11 March 2002. Vol. 274. Issue 9.

In particular, see: Hersh, Seymour. Kings Ransom. The New Yorker. 22 Oct. 2001. GOTOBUTTON BM_4_ http://www.newyorker.com)

Thomas, Evan and Christopher Dickey. The Saudi Game. Newsweek. 19 Nov. 2001.

See Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. June 2000. It lists the following articles: Marie Colvin, "How an Insider Lifted the Veil on Saudi Plot for an Islamic Bomb," Sunday Times, 7/24/94. Steve Coll and John Mintz, "Saudi Aid to Iraqi A-Bomb Effort Alleged," Washington Post, 7/25/94. Paul Lewis, "Defector Says Saudis Sought Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 8/7/94. "Saudis Said To Have Aided Iraq's Nuclear Program," Christian Science Monitor, 7/25/94.

Quoted from: Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. June 2000. GOTOBUTTON BM_5_ http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/saudi.htm. This statement was in reference to: Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "Do Saudis Have Nuclear Weapons?" Washington Post, 12/12/90, p. G15.

Mohammed Al Khilewi: Saudi Arabia is Trying to Kill Me. The Middle East Quarterly. September 1998. ; Hersh, Seymour. Kings Ransom. The New Yorker. 22 Oct. 2001.

Goldman, Jason D. Diplomatic Renegade. Washington Ripple. Nov. 1994 (vol. IX, issue 1) http://www.rescomp.wustl.edu/~ripple/issues/9.1/jason.html)

Goldman. Diplomatic Renegade.; Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation Newsletter. Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton. Number 27, 1994. p. 23.

Goldman. Diplomatic Renegade.

Mohammed Al Khilewi: Saudi Arabia is Trying to Kill Me. The Middle East Quarterly. September 1998.

Reference to Chinese acquisition attempt in: US Arms Clients Profiles: Saudi Arabia. Federation of American Scientists. Oct. 2001; GOTOBUTTON BM_9_ Mohammed Al Khilewi: Saudi Arabia is Trying to Kill Me. The Middle East Quarterly. September 1998.

Cordesman, Anthony. Saudi Military Forces Enter the 21st Century: Ch. XIV. Proliferation and Saudi Missile Capabilities. CSIS. 24 Jan 2002. 46.

See: McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle Air Superiority Fighter. http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/fighter/f15/index.shtml

Cordesman, Anthony. Saudi Military Forces Enter the 21st Century: The Saudi Air Force. 4 April 2002. 3.

Saudi Arabia. Federation of American Scientists. Sept 1996. GOTOBUTTON BM_;_ http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/saudi.htm)

For satellite imagery of a Saudi CSS-2 missile base, see:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/facility/al-sulayyil-imagery.htm

Cordesman. Saudi Military ForcesProliferation. 46.


Saudi Arabia. Federation of American Scientists. Sept 1996. GOTOBUTTON BM_;_ http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/saudi.htm)

Cordesman. Saudi MilitaryProliferation. 46.

Cordesman. Saudi MilitaryProliferation. 21.


US Arms Clients Profiles: Saudi Arabia. Federation of American Scientists. Oct. 2001.

Atomic Energy Research Institute. http://www.kacst.edu.sa/en/institutes/aeri/index.asp



For Pakistans denial, see: Pakistan Denies Saudi Attempt to Own Nuclear Weapons. Arabic News. 7 Aug. 1999. http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/990807/1999080717.html

Why Libya Wants In. Time. 27 March 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. June 2000. It cites Al Hawadeth. 10 Sept 1999. http://www.ain-al-yaqeen.com/issues/19990910/feat4en.htm

Schake, Kori. N and Judith S. Yaphe. The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran. Institute for National Strategic Studies: National Defense University. 2001. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair64/McN64ch03.html

Ibid.

The Nonproliferation Review. Winter 1996. 150; Shobokshi, Fawzi. Statement of Amb. Fawzi Shobokshi to the United Nations before the third session of the preparatory Committee for the 2000 review Conference on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 14 May 1999. HYPERLINK "http://www.un.int/saudiarabia/shbkshi.htm" http://www.un.int/saudiarabia/shbkshi.htm; Saudi Arabia Advocates a Nuclear-Free Mideast. The Monthly Newsletter of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington DC. June 1995. http://www.saudiembassy.net/publications/june/advocates.html

US Arms Clients Profiles: Saudi Arabia. Federation of American Scientists. Oct. 2001.

Schake, Kori. N and Judith S. Yaphe. The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran. Institute for National Strategic Studies: National Defense University. 2001.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Schake, Kori. N and Judith S. Yaphe. The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran. Institute for National Strategic Studies: National Defense University. 2001.

Much more on the logic of a Saudi/China strategic relationship in: Russell, Richard L. A Saudi Nuclear Option? Survival. Vol. 43. No. 2 (Summer 2001). 74.

Second Thoughts on Two Islamic States: Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Economist. 10 Nov 2001.

Russell, Richard L. A Saudi Nuclear Option? Survival. Summer 2001. Vol. 43. Issue 2. 73.

Cordesman. Saudi Military Forces. 49.

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Documents

Marrin Ensuring Saudi Security Through Nuclear Weapons GFIR510 2002