MARITIME Security Defence

MITTLERREPORT

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MARITIMESecurity&DefenceFrom the Sea and Beyond

June 2021

MSD

• AmphibiousWarfare

• Asia‘sPowerBalance

• EuropeanSubmarines

• PortSecurity

KeyDevelopmentsin...

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1June 2021 · Maritime Security & Defence

The last decade has seen many of the foundations on which post-Cold War navies were constructed start to become eroded. The victory of the United States and its Western Allies in the unfought war with the Soviet Union heralded a new era in which navies could forsake many of the demands of preparing for high intensity warfare. Helping to ensure the security of the maritime shipping networks that continue to dominate global trade and the vast resources of emerging EEZs from asymmetric challenges arguably became many navies’ primary raison d’être. Fleets became focused on collabora-tive global stabilisation far from home and structured their assets accordingly. Perhaps the most extreme example of this trend has been the German Navy’s F125 BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG class frig-ates – hugely sophisticated and expensive ships designed to prevail only in lower threat environments.

Today, the world in which BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG and her sisters were conceived no longer exists. The idea that high intensity naval warfare has been definitively confined to the past has been shattered, first, by the emergence of China as a ‘near peer’ rival to the US Navy in the western Pacific and, subsequently, by the increasingly assertive actions of a revitalised Russia along and beyond its borders. Perspectives about the motivations of these new naval powers will inevitably differ; this edition’s article on China’s maritime expansion attempts to look at this subject from Beijing’s perspective. However, whether con-sidering the construction of new islands in the South China Sea or the support for an ally who has forced down a European airliner to seize a political opponent, this editor views the actions of these emerging challengers of the status quo as often being far from benign. The nature of the new danger to the established “rules based” world order is seemingly clear; the most appropriate way to respond is more uncertain.

Although a new age of naval rivalry is rising, the security of the arteries of maritime trade that under-pin the world economy remains crucial to potential friends and enemies alike. As demonstrated by the recent mishap to the container ship EVER GIVEN in the Suez Canal, any significant disruption to these crucial commercial links could have considerable global economic consequences. Achieving this security depends far more on naval collaboration than competition. The example of EMASOH/Opera-tion AGÉNOR in the Strait of Hormuz is a case in point. Given this reality, it seems sensible to aim for cooperation at sea where this is achievable. Efforts to achieve the resumption of joint “confidence building measures” with rival navies that have largely become a casualty of recent frictions would be one potential way forward. This need for balance is reflected in broader economic and political choic-es. Although, for example, European leaders may condemn Russian adventurism, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline still continues with its “march” across the Baltic on the way towards completion. Achieving the correct balance will never be easy.

Whilst, therefore, it may be in the West’s interests to maintain cooperation at a practical level in an ex-ample of “hoping for the best”, there is also no excuse other than to “prepare for the worst.” Essen-tially, this means rebuilding capabilities that have been allowed to atrophy in the Cold War’s aftermath and – at the same time – seeking fresh approaches to ensuring a maritime advantage. The efforts that are now underway to achieve the revitalisation of Europe’s submarine flotillas – often accorded a low priority in the post-Cold War years – is an excellent illustration of the former plan of action. This is covered in two articles in this edition.

Meanwhile new approaches to maritime superiority can take many forms. One example is the ac-quisition of more advanced systems, such as Italy’s integration of F-35B strike fighters on its carrier CAVOUR described in our interview with the Italian Navy officers leading this effort. An alternative is the fielding of entirely new technologies, typified by the autonomous ships of the type detailed in our coverage of current American and British programmes. Yet another example is the development of new operational methods and doctrines, demonstrated by the United States Marine Corps’ cur-rent adaptation to distributed naval operations in the Pacific. Again, many of these approaches have required hard choices, be they the surrender of existing capabilities to finance new equipment or the surrender of tried and tested operating concepts in favour of new methods of fighting.

These subjects are just some of the many topics of current maritime interest that are assessed in this issue of Maritime Security & Defence. As always, we hope that they will make interesting reading. Yours ayeConrad

Editorial

Hard Choices in the New Cold War Era

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2 Maritime Security & Defence · June 2021

MARITIME POLICY, STRATEGY & FORCES

6 South East Asian Navies: Challenges and Priorities Dr. Peter Layton

11 Naval Programmes in Bulgaria and Romania Eugene Kogan

16 China’s Maritime Expansion: The Perspective from Beijing

SHIP DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGIES

21 Submarine Combat Systems: Europe is Expanding its Offer Luca Peruzzi

28 European Submarines: Patience is the Key Jaime Karremann

33 All Hands off Deck: US & UK Navies Explore the Potential of Autonomous Surface Vessels

Richard Scott

38 RSS INDEPENDENCE: New Approaches to Defending the Littoral Hsing Lim

MARITIME INDUSTRY

42 The Threat of Hazmat Terrorism at Sea Anna Paternnosto

45 The Ship That Launched 1,000 Memes – and Nearly Destroyed 12% of World Trade

Dr Salvatore R Mercogliano

48 The Security Situation in the Mozambique Channel Helmoed Römer Heitman

50 The Sea in Focus – Germany's Sea Trade as an Element of a Globalised Economy Ludolf, Baron von Löwenstern

MARITIME OPERATIONS & DOCTRINE

53 A Renaissance in Amphibious Warfare Sidney E. Dean

58 The Italian Navy: Getting Ready to Operate the F-35B JSF Guy Toremans

62 MV POLARSTERN’s MOSAiC Expedition A portrait of endurance and strategic research in

the remoteness Felix Lauber and Thomas Wolf Wunderlich

66 European Maritime Engagement in the Strait of Hormuz: A Simple Mission in a Complex Area Interview with Commodore C. Fjord-Larsen

COLUMNS

1 Editorial

3 Periscope/The Watch Bill

57 Masthead

Contents

Index of Advertisers

Ak Bars 14-15

DNV 13

DSEI 3rd cover

GA-ASI 4th cover

Hagenuk 31

HGH 17

IMDS/ Laskin 30

kta Naval Systems 23

Naval Group 2nd cover

Sea Air Space 35

tkMS 29

UDT 41

USC Rubin 26-27

The Italian Navy prepares for air superiority in the Mediterranean with its new F-35B JSF

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The Philippine Navy frigate JOSE ROZAL was built in the Republic of Korea.

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United Kingdom: Competition for New Support Ships Re-launched(cw) The British Ministry of Defence has re-launched a competition to build three new Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ships to pro-vide logistical support to Royal Navy op-erations across the world. The successful

bidder for a contract with an estimated value of c. GBP1.5Bn can work in part-nership with international companies but

June 2021 · Maritime Security & Defence

Periscope

United Kingdom: Royal Navy Carrier Strike Group Deploys (cw) At the end of May 2021, the Royal Navy aircraft carrier QUEEN ELIZABETH de-parted Portsmouth, UK to lead the widely anticipated Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21)

deployment to the Indian Ocean and the Far East. The first British carrier deployment for over a decade, the group includes the Dutch frigate EVERTSEN and US destroyer THE SULLIVANS (DDG-68) as well as various Royal Navy warships. However, possibly the most interesting aspect of the deployment is the embarkation of F-35B strike fight-ers from US Marine Corps Fighter Attack Squadron 211 on QUEEN ELIZABETH for the duration of the mission, where they will operate alongside similar aircraft from Royal Air Force 617 Squadron. The pursuit of in-tegrated operations over such a sustained period by embarked carrier aircraft from two naval nations in the same air wing is unprecedented in modern times.

Argentina: Third Argentine OPV Launched(cw) STORNI, the third of the class of four Offshore Patrol Vessel 87s (OPV 87s) or-dered from Naval Group by Argentina was launched on 10 May 2021. The ship, which was partly built in Lanester, Lorient by

Kership (the joint venture between Naval Group and Piriou) and assembled in Con-carneau by Piriou Shipyards, is due to be delivered before the end of the year. Her launch follows the delivery of her sister-ship PIEDRABUENA, which was delivered on 13 April 2021 and was due to depart for Argentina as this issue went to press.

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The FSS programme replaces ships such as FORT VICTORIA, pictured here

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Australia: Second RAN Fleet Oiler Departs for Australia(cw) The Royal Australian Navy's final SUPPLY class Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment

(AOR) vessel, STALWART, departed on her long voyage to Australia from Navantia’s Ferrol shipyard on Thursday, 20 May 2021. The second of two 19,500 tonne fleet oil-ers built by Navantia, she is based on the Spanish Navy’s previous CANTABRIA and is expected to enter service before the end of the year. Her slightly older sister is already in service, having been commissioned on 10 April 2021.

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United States: US Navy Exercises Option for its Second CONSTELLA-TION (FFG-62) Class Frigate(cw) The US Navy’s Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) announced the award of a contract option to Fincantieri

Marinette Marine (FMM) to build its sec-ond CONSTELLATION Class Guided Mis-sile Frigate, CONGRESS (FF-63) on 20 May 2021. According to the shipbuilder, the value of the contract is estimated at c. US$555M. The CONSTELLATION pro-gramme was awarded to FMM in 2020, encompassing a contract for the first-in-class frigate and options for a further nine ships, as well as post-delivery availability support and crew training. The total value for Fincantieri amounts to US$5.5Bn if all options are exercised. The US Navy plans to build 10 additional vessels as part of the program, for a total of force of 20 units.

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Israel Shipyards: New Award for “Shaldag” Mk 5 Fast Patrol Boat Construction(cw) Israel Shipyards Ltd announced in early May 2021 that it had won a tender to sup-ply to supply an undisclosed East Asian Na-vy with its “Shaldag” Mk 5 fast patrol ves-sel design. The award includes the transfer of knowledge regarding the construction of the vessel, as well as the preparation of the customer’s shipyard for vessel construc-tion through an upgrade of its facilities. Al-though Israel Shipyards declined to reveal its customer’s identity, press reports suggest the award has been made by the Philip-pines, which has a previously announced requirement for eight or nine new vessels to meet its Fast Attack Interdictor Craft-Missile (FAIC-M) requirement.

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British and US Marine Corps F-35B jets on QUEEN ELIZABETH

will be required to integrate the ships in a UK shipyard. A previous international ten-der to acquire the ships was suspended in 2019 in line with a change in policy that is seeing greater emphasis being placed on building ships for British government service in domestic yards.

PIEDRABUENA pictured at the time of her delivery

The AOR STALWART pictured at her launch

A graphic of a CONSTELLATION class frigate

A “Shaldag” Mk 5 Fast Patrol Boat

4 European Security & Defence · June 2021

Periscope

NEW FROM RUSSIA: The Ultimate Minesweeper for MCM?(yl) Russian Naval shipbuilding plans for 2021 are on schedule, according to the programme programme that has pro-

HENSOLDT Australia overhauls combat IFF system of HMAS Canberra(se) The first of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN)’s IFF system’s antenna and ped-estals from CANBERRA class vessels has been overhauled at HENSOLDT Australia’s new overhaul facilities and workshops in

Canberra. This is the first of four antennas and pedestals that will undergo repair and deep level maintenance in Australia. The HENSOLDT facility already supports the IFF interrogator for the RAN and Royal Austral-ian Air Force.

Like New: First RAN overhauled antenna & pedestal, re-painted and installed on HMAS CANBERRA.

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Rolls-Royce to Supply MTU Generator Sets for US Navy Frigate Programme(se) US Navy's new frigate programme - the next generation of small surface com-bat ships - will have benefit of mtu naval generator sets from Rolls-Royce. These will be a key component of propulsion and on-board power generation for phase one of the US Navy’s Constellation (FFG-62) class frigate programme - previously known as the FFG(X) programme. The Navy Constel-lation Class Frigate is a multi-mission war-ship designed for operation in littoral and blue water environments. It will conduct air, anti-submarine, surface and electronic war-fare and information operations. The Rolls-

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Royce contract for the first shipset provides four mtu naval generator sets, each rated at 3000 kWe at 1800 rpm. The generator sets are based on the mtu 20V 4000 M53B engine and provide a total power output of 12 MW for propulsion and on-board power supply.

U212 NFS SUBS GET ELETTRONICA EW SUITE(se) Elettronica announced it will supply the Electronic Warfare (EW) suite to Italy's Navy for new submarines (U212 NFS Pro-gramme), built by Fincantieri and managed by OCCAR. This includes two suites for the first batch and two additional systems as an option for future batches.Elettronica supplies EW within the FREMM and PPA programme frameworks also man-aged by OCCAR. It aims to extend coopera-tion to EU co-funded projects.Electronic supremacy of any battlefield means dominance and prior knowledge of the electronic Order of Battle is mission criti-cal. Electro-Magnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) are a key enabler for many diversi-fied operations.

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IMMS: Dyena Systems Announces New Vessel Monitoring Solution(se) The Vessel Impact and Motion Moni-toring System (VIMMS) from Dyena Sys-tems is a direct response to the maritime industry’s require-ment to monitor crew and vessel levels of shock and vibration during high speed boat operations (HSBO) to put this in a mili-tary context. Now it is available for civilian uses (po-lice, SAR, et cetra). VIMMS includes a helm unit and two remote sen-sors for measuring acceleration: on the vessel structure and at the helmsman’s seat. Twin LED displays provides simul-taneous information on received vessel and crew impacts. Configurable settings allow the operator to set relevant thresh-olds to match LEDs response to the ves-sels expected operating conditions. Real time feedback allows the helmsman to adjust their speed or course before limits are exceeded, reducing repeated shock and whole-body vibration exposure to the crew or damaging shock impacts to the vessel and equipment.

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Terma Radar Selected for Indonesian Navy Hospital Assistance Ships(se) The latest Indonesian Navy’s Hospital Assistance Ship will have Terma’s SCANTER

The Elettronica EW Suite will provide subs with additional protection and lethality.

Latest Indonesian Navy Hospital Assistance Ship (BRS) built in Surabaya by the Indonesian state-owned shipyard PT PAL is 124 me-ters long, 21.8 meters wide, and able to host more than 600 people including crew, troops, and patients

6002 radar; delivery is planned for June 2021. Terma will deliver the radar in June 2021. Indonesia is prone to natural disas-ters and Hospital Ships are paramount to promptly ensure rescue and evacuation missions. For this specific capability, each Hospital Ship is equipped with two heli-copter landing spots, ensuring that person-nel and the patients are readily and safely moved to and from the vessel - built by shipyard PT PAL.

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Launch of the PYOTR ILYICHEV MCM ship

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Malta patrol boats P-51 and P-52, both of which were acquired by Malta from the US Coast Guard’s foreign military sales pro-gram. They also conducted hoisting opera-tions with the armed forces.

Periscope/The Watch Bill

visions for up to 40 ships and vessels, including two mine counter-measure (MCM) ships (Project 12700). The Rus-sian Navy currently operates four ships of the Project and has four more MCM ships are underway at the Sredne-Nevsky Shipbuilding Plant, part of the United Shipbuilding Corporation. At the end of April, the fifth Project 12700 Alexandrit MCM ship, called “PYOTR ILYICHEV”, was launched in St. Petersburg according to Russian Ministry of Defence sources. Another MCM vessel (MCMV) - “GEOR-GI KURBATOV” - will join the “PYOTR ILYICHEV” before 2021 ends. (Note: two more ships were contracted by the Rus-sian Defense Ministry last August at the ARMY-2020 forum.)

US Coast Guard Conducts At-Sea Exercises with Malta(se) The Legend-class national security cut-ter USCGC Hamilton (WMSL 753) conduct-ed at-sea engagements with the armed forces of Malta in the Mediterranean Sea, 17 and 20 May 2021. The Hamilton con-ducted passing and communication exer-cises on 20 May, with the armed forces of

Joint training included hoisting from one of Malta’s Agusta West-land helicopters

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United Kingdom: Royal Navy Appoints its First Female Admiral(cw) For the first time in the centuries-long history of the Royal Navy, a woman officer will be appointed to the rank of Admiral. Commodore Jude Terry has been selected for promotion to Rear Admiral; making her the most senior woman in the Royal Navy, past or present. The 47-year-old from Jersey in the Channel Islands will be promoted to Rear Admiral next year and take over as the Royal Navy’s Director of People and Training and Naval Secretary.

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Commodore Jude Terry, soon to be promoted Rear Admiral, in front of VICTORY


MA R ITI ME P O LIC Y, S TRATEG Y & FO RCE S

The result is ASEAN navies are more alike than not. Most today have a handful of

frigates or corvettes, some fast attack craft, numerous patrol boats and moderate am-phibious capabilities. The four larger navies also all have a small number of submarines with the fifth (Thailand) seemingly always on the cusp of joining the rest. The major exception to this ASEAN standard model navy almost proves the case. Thailand has a small Spanish-built aircraft carrier. Home-ported at Sattahip, the CHAKRI NARYBET accepts tourists to help pay its high operat-ing costs and, when it goes to sea, creates great regional media excitement in being so unusual. The ASEAN navies have historically been self-referential, closely following what oth-ers are doing. The region’s earlier geo-stra-tegic setting allowed this “keeping up with the Joneses” approach to force structure to develop. However, since 2012 Chinese maritime activities have become increas-ingly assertive with signs this may turn into aggressiveness. A new domestic law has been promulgated to allow the Chinese Coast Guard to fire on foreign vessels inside its infamous South China Sea nine-dash line. This law is part of China’s long-running plan to gain sovereign-ty over more than 80% of the South China Sea. This would severely diminish the EEZs made under UNCLOS rules of Vietnam, Ma-laysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines.

The navies of these five states are now in the vanguard of Southeast Asian countries in determining how to respond to the Chi-nese maritime challenge. The challenge is not a traditional great power territorial grab using military forces but instead a per-sistent nibbling away at the edges to gain incremental advances without starting a major conflict. While some People’s Libera-tion Army Navy (PLAN) warships conduct overwatch tasks, the majority of Chinese vessels involved are not the Navy’s, instead being Coast Guard ships, armed maritime militia vessels, government survey ships, oil rigs and commercial fishing vessels operat-ed by state-owned and private enterprises. Consequently, for the navies of these five ASEAN states the challenge is sovereignty maintenance rather than balancing against a superpower able to easily outmatch them. This shifts the focus more towards the constabulary end of naval taskings then war-at-sea. This helpfully simplifies the problem, as ASEAN navies traditionally have had policing roles such as countering piracy, terrorism, and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.

Of the five states, diminutive Brunei is less important in terms of influencing ASEAN naval trends. Of the remainder, mainland Southeast Asian state Vietnam is geographi-cally exposed in bordering China, although arguably this has sharpened national think-ing and its desire to toughen ASEAN’s se-curity stance. Of the maritime Southeast Asian states, Indonesia is most distant from China but dominates ASEAN politically, eco-nomically and in population; it may become the world’s fourth largest economy around 2050. Malaysia is both a mainland and mari-time South East Asian state, and is consid-ered a developed country with a regionally high GDP/capita using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) measures. Finally, the Philippines has experienced surprisingly good economic growth in the last decade but is susceptible to Chinese economic coercion and domestic political turbulence. All four of these larger navies offer insights in terms of force structure, operations and future paths, and together are broadly representative of all the region’s navies. Amongst the others, Singapore’s Navy is partly an outlier in having an ASEAN stand-

South East Asian Navies: Challenges and PrioritiesDr. Peter Layton

Surprisingly perhaps, the Southeast Asian region has a standard model navy. Several factors have created this:

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) multilateral organisation’s success in managing regional

political differences; a focus on economic growth – not military power; regional armies often receiving budg-

etary priority; limited domestic shipbuilding capabilities; a desire to keep up with neighboring states but not

surpass them; and interest in avoiding starting a regional arms race.

Au th o rDr. Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow, Griffith Asia Institute, and a RUSI Associate fellow. He has extensive defence experience and writes fre-quently on geostrategic matters, force structure issues and emerging technologies.

Indonesian Navy OPVs seen on exercises with the Royal Australian Navy. The possession of numerous patrol vessels is a typical feature of South East Asian fleets.

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MAR ITI ME P O LIC Y, S TRATEG Y & FO RCE S

ard-type force structure but being much better funded and more technologically advanced. Singapore’s (and Thailand’s) EEZ lies outside China’s nine-dash line claims and so its navy has different geo-strategic drivers. An article elsewhere in this journal issue discuses Singaporean naval matters.

Vietnam

Sovereignty maintenance in the South China Sea is more problematic than it may seem given China’s expansionist ambitions. For Vietnam this is especially obvious given the country was defeated by China in the 1974 Battle of the Paracel islands and in the 1988 Johnson South Reef skirmish in the Spratlys. The use of military force by China once again to seize parts of Vietnam’s EEZ appears quite possible. Such beliefs are strengthened when Chinese coast guard vessels ram and sink Vietnamese fishing vessels, as happened in April 2020. Consequently, today’s Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) aims to deter hostile maritime actions by being manifestly able to impose significant costs when countering grey zone activities and territorial grabs. China may be able to quickly capture islands claimed by Vietnam in a coup de main but attempting to keep them would place China’s naval, governmental and civilian shipping in the South China Sea at real risk. Implementing such deterrence draws on sea denial strategic concepts and Vietnam’s close historical relationship with the Soviet Union, and now Russia. The VPN force structure is Russian-dominated in com-prising six KILO submarines, four GEPARD frigates, five PETYA frigates, 14 corvettes built in Russia, locally and in South Korea, 26 mainly Soviet/Russian patrol craft and several amphibious vessels. Many of the

warships are new: the submarines, the GE-PARDS and many of the corvettes were de-livered in the last decade. Reportedly, there is interest in acquiring two more GEPARD frigates and MOLNIYA class corvettes. Vietnam’s Coast Guard, the largest in ASE-AN and bigger than those of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia combined, is also expanding. Over the last decade the ser-vice has acquired four locally-built Damen DN 2000 OPVs, two ex-US Coast Guard HAMLTON class cutters, an ex-Korean Coast Guard HAN-RIVER class OPV, three Damen patrol craft and 18 Metal Shark 45 patrol boats. The larger vessels are lightly armed including some with gun turrets. Six armed patrol vessels, based on the Japa-nese Coast Guard’s ASO class have recently been ordered for delivery by 2025. Future plans across this decade include two large helicopter equipped OPV’s and ten, pos-sibly Polish-designed, SAR vessels.Less obvious is the build-up underway in Vietnam’s maritime militia, estimated by some to field about 8,000 fishing boats. Concessional loans are being offered so

new-build militia fishing boats will be of steel hull construction, not the older wood-en style vulnerable to ramming.The three layers of warships, coast guard vessels and militia forces is effectively a sym-metric response to China’s grey zone tactics. Such use of combined forces was ably dem-onstrated to Vietnam in 2014 when China moved the HAIYANG SHIYOUH 981 oil rig into Vietnam’s EEZ. Returning the lesson, Vietnam now plans to flood future actively disputed areas with large numbers of mi-litia fishing vessels with crews armed with small arms, reinforced and protected by coast guard vessels able to stop any Chinese ships ramming and sinking fishing vessels, and overseen by well-armed frigates or cor-vettes able to use military force in extremis. Moreover, lurking in the background may also be a KILO class submarine. Such a concept of operations, suggests the VPN’s shortcomings. In terms of equipment, a high level of maritime domain awareness would be essential. Efforts are being made in this area with several light maritime patrol aircraft acquired, some ships now carrying helicopters and limited access to space-based sensors including the acqui-sition of a Japanese commercial synthetic aperture radar satellite. However, much more is necessary to provide timely strate-gic and tactical level situational awareness. In the same vein, Command and Control (C2) needs digitising, connectivity enhance-ments made and low-cost ways found to include the militia in C2 networks. Moreover, the large-scale new equipment acquisitions for the VPN and the Coast Guard now need to be matched by organi-sation-wide improvements in maintenance and long-term logistic support. The subma-rines and GEPARD frigates in particular are sophisticated assets with new sustainment skills necessary. There are probably also worries over whether Russia would contin-ue to supply spares for the VPN’s warships and submarines should China intercede.

The Vietnam People’s Navy has been modernising with the acquisition of ships from Russia, such as the GEPARD class frigate seen here.

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Many of the Indonesian Navy’s high end vessels originate from the Netherlands, This is Damen designed but largely locally assembled SIGMA 10514 frigate GUSTI NGURAH RAI.

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Indonesia

The Indonesian archipelago is strategically located between Asia and Australia, and between two oceans, the Pacific and the In-dian. In 2014, newly elected President Joko Widodo built on this location to propose an expansive vision of Indonesia becoming the Global Maritime Fulcrum. In his second term, this enthusiasm cooled and policy re-turned to that of a gradual development of Indonesian maritime organisations to the extent that national GDP growth al-lowed. This development focus is, though, noticeably shifting as China trespasses into Indonesia’s EEZ.

China’s nine-dash line seizes less of Indo-nesian’s EEZ than that of the other ASEAN states and, so, for a long time the issue was deliberately downplayed. In early 2020 however, some large Chinese coast guard vessels escorted Chinese fishing boats into Indonesia’s EEZ near the Natuna Islands. Indonesia lodged a formal diplomatic pro-test, dispatched ten naval ships to the area and deployed four F-16 fighters to Natuna Island. President Widodo flew in to ascer-tain the situation first hand and for a week the Chinese and Indonesian ships were locked in a standoff. The Indonesia EEZ is some 1,500 kilome-tres from China and so was previously little disturbed by Chinese grey zone activities. China’s island building has now created adjacent ports and airfields, expanding China’s maritime reach and its ability to push southward using incremental ‘salami slicing’ tactics. Recognising this, Indonesia is building a tactical level naval headquar-ters and a submarine support station on Natuna Island to improve future EEZ intru-sion response operations.

The Indonesian Navy’s (TNI-AL) fleet has been eclectically sourced as budgetary cir-cumstances have allowed. The submarine force currently comprises three South Ko-rean designed (Improved Type 209 CHANG BOGO class) boats, with the most recent commissioned being locally assembled, and one early-1980s German-designed Type 209 refitted in South Korea in 2004-2005. TNI-AL’s other “legacy” Type 209, KRI NANGGALA, was lost during a torpedo firing training accident north of Bali in late April 2021. The frigate force includes two new Neth-erlands’ designed SIGMA 10514 ships (two-thirds locally assembled) and five ex-

Netherlands Navy frigates based on the British LEANDER class. Ten guided missile corvettes are in service: four SIGMA 9113 ships and three 1980’s FATAHILLAHS, all built in the Netherlands, and three British-built ships, recently acquired when a sale to Brunei fell through. In addition there are 14 modernised for-mer East German PARCHIM class corvettes and numerous fast missile boats, includ-ing 12 FPB 57s (six Indonesian-built) and eight locally-designed CLURITs, several fitted with Chinese anti-ship missiles. The TNI-AL’s large amphibious force includes 14 LSTs, and five new MAKASSAR class, a South Korean designed Landing Platform Dock (LPD) of which three were built in In-donesia. The navy also has some 150 small patrol boats. The TNI-AL plans to acquire additional frig-ates and at least three more submarines. The latter were originally expected to be locally assembled South Korean designs. This is now uncertain, with some interest in possibly acquiring up to four TKMS Type 214 boats. There are firmer intentions to

buy four 80m OPVs, with a request for proposals issued. Behind the OPV inter-est is a desire to block the new Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA) from acquiring further large ships, instead reserving such acquisitions for the TNI-AL.Indonesia has seven different institutions undertaking various coast guard functions and together operating around 400 small-to-medium sized patrol boats. An omnibus bill, expected to be passed by the Indone-sian Parliament this year, will give BAKAM-LA the authority to coordinate the various institutions, effectively forming an Indone-sian Coast Guard. BAKAMLA was raised in 2015 and operates six medium-sized patrol vessels and four OPVs, the largest of which is 2500 tons. TNI-AL already operates an impressive Inte-grated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS) that takes data from some 18 coastal sur-veillance stations, automatic identification system sensors and 11 ship-based radars to pass to various command centres to al-low monitoring ship movements across the archipelago. Principally intended for constabulary purposes such as detecting smuggling and IUU, the IMSS has also uncovered Chinese survey ships possibly covertly mapping the Sunda and Lombok straits, important potential submarine tran-sit routes in time of conflict. Four Chinese SEA WING oceanographic research glider UUVs have recently been retrieved in Indo-nesian territorial waters.

Malaysia

The South China Sea separates the two halves of Malaysia, with East Malaysia’s EEZ significantly reduced under China’s nine-dash line claims. Nevertheless, Ma-laysia has studiously practised overlooking the problem, focusing instead on the eco-nomic possibilities China offers. Malaysia’s latest Defence White Paper acknowledges South China Sea issues but attributes these to great power competition. Malaysia has even avoided discussing the issue bilaterally as China has wished too, preferring to let ASEAN handle it. Malaysia is trying to steer a middle ground, hedging between the two great powers so as to gain the maximum benefits. The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) has become a casu-alty of this hedging in being poorly funded, facing real difficulties in recapitalising its aging fleet and in needing to source new ships from a diversity of sources including Western nations, China and locally. Diplo-macy and domestic factors have taken precedence over rational naval force struc-ture development. The RMN to its credit has certainly tried, devising its “15-to-5”

The Indonesian patrol vessel HIU. Several hundred patrol vessels of various shapes and sizes are operated by various Indonesian government organisations.

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Transformation Programme that advocates moving from today’s 15 ship classes down to five in the future.The RMN fleet today operates two French-built SCORPÈNE type submarines, modi-fied for the warmer, more saline waters of Southeast Asia but without the air-inde-pendent propulsion systems of later build boats. Two British-built LEKIU class frigates are in service together with six corvettes: two German built ships based on HDW's FS 1500 and four Italian-built ships based on Fincantieri’s Type 550. There are also 14 fast attack craft sourced from France, Sweden and Germany. The OPV force comprises six ships based on the MEKO 100 design with the first two built in Germany and the rest locally by the state-owned Boustead Heavy Industries Corporation (BHIC). Building the OPVs locally proved problem-atic with an 18 month delay in delivery and some politically damaging scandals. However, this was just a foretaste of to-day’s much bigger problems with the six-ship Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) acquisition. These ships based on the French GOWIND corvette design are being built by BHIC and are late and over budget. With a decision taken to stay within the US$2.1BN budget, the RMN may eventually receive only two LCSs.In contrast, the parallel purchase of four Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) from China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation has proceeded well. Two of the patrol ships have already been delivered with the other two planned for this year. The ships use a modular concept, each able to carry up to three ISO containers with mission-specific equipment. The four LMSs will be based in East Malaysia to conduct EEZ sovereignty patrols to both counter Chinese incursions and to block the Moro pirates and the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group from operating in the maritime border regions between Malaysia and the Philippines.

These new ships are all urgently needed. Of the RMN’s 44 vessels, the average age is 30 years. Fleet maintenance costs are ac-cordingly high but will not reduce unless recapitalisation is undertaken. The Navy’s budget though is at best flat, with declines in real terms in some years. In 2005, the Malaysian Maritime Enforce-ment Agency (MMEA) was established to perform coast guard duties. The Agency operates three new locally-built 1,800 ton OPVs based on Damen’s OPV1800 design, two OJIKA class OPVs transferred from the Japanese Coast Guard, two Korean-built OPVs transferred from the RMN, and nine small-to-medium patrol vessels.The challenging environment the RMN and MMEA will face in the near term in the South China Sea is exemplified by last year’s West Capella incident. The drillship, WEST CAPELLA, was contracted by Malay-sia’s national oil and gas company Petro-nas to explore in East Malaysia’s EEZ. In re-sponse, China dispatched the survey vessel HAIYANG DIZHI 8 escorted by a small flo-

tilla of coast guard and paramilitary vessels to shadow the drillship. The coast guard vessels included a 5,000 ton ZHAOLAI class ship and a smaller but better armed 2,700 ton ZHAOJUN class vessel. To counter this, the RMN sent the 2,270 ton KD JEBAT, its largest warship, and an OPV, while MMEA sent a 45m patrol vessel. Later, two USN INDEPENDENCE class littoral combat ships and a supply vessel joined the gaggle. In late April, more US Navy ships arrived to undertake training nearby; these included an amphibious assault ship, a cruiser, a de-stroyer and later a Royal Australian Navy frigate. A Chinese destroyer also cruised through the area while Vietnamese fishing vessels were at times present. The complex-ity and confusion of today’s South China Sea maritime operations is readily appar-ent.

Philippines

For several decades, the Philippines govern-ment concentrated on fighting domestic insurgencies. The Philippines Navy (PN) ac-cordingly focussed on coastal patrol, troop transport and disaster relief tasks. Howev-er, China’s South China Sea actions forced a reassessment and in 2011 a decision was taken to prioritise the PN’s needs over those of the Philippine Army. The intent was to create a modest maritime border protec-tion capability able to undertake surveil-lance, deterrence, and border patrol tasks. For this, the Strategic Sail Plan 2020 issued in 2013 envisaged acquiring six frigates, 12 corvettes, 18 OPVs, four strategic sealift ships and three submarines. Completion of this programme would effectively make the PN a standard ASEAN model navy. This ambitious plan has hit some rocks. Long term budgetary neglect means the

TUN RAZAK is one of two Malaysian Navy SCORPÈNE type submarines.

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Constriction of Malaysia’s GOWIND type Littoral Combat Ships has not gone entirely to plan.

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PN operates mainly old second-hand ships. It needs not a straight forward re-capital-isation but an expensive major rebuilding beyond the current limited defence budg-et. Moreover, the Philippine defence acqui-sition process is tedious and protracted. Lastly, shifting priority to the PN proved harder than originally envisaged as jihad-ist insurgencies worsened in the Southern Philippines. In 2017, the Army fought a five-month urban warfare campaign to retake the city of Marawi. Nevertheless progress is being made. Un-der the Sail Plan, the PN has so far gained five frigates, one corvette, and two strate-gic sealift ships; remarkably half were new-builds. Two JOSE RIZAL class frigates built in South Korea have been recently com-missioned. These are modified Republic of Korea Navy INCHEON class frigate designs and to keep costs down are fitted for but not with several combat systems. The other new-builds were for the Strategic Sealift Vessel role: two Indonesian-made LPDs based on the MAKASSAR class. The four second-hand ships were three former US Coast Guard HAMILTON class cutters that in being modernised were rebadged as frigates, and an ex-Korean POHANG class corvette. A Sail Plan 2028 is now being drafted while the older version remains guiding PN devel-opment. The next purchase should be six OPVs; probably Austal designed and built in the Philippines. After this may be two corvettes, possibly both will be donated ex-Korean POHANG class ships, and then two more new-build MAKASSAR class Indonesian-made LPDs. A contract is ex-pected shortly for eight Israeli SHALDAG Mk V patrol boats. Longer term, the PN hopes to acquire two new-build corvettes,

possibly from Korea, and two submarines, with the French SCORPÈNE class declared as meeting PN needs.The PN is being re-shaped but offshore the South China Sea remains troubled. In March, 2021 some 220 Chinese fishing ves-sels, believed armed maritime militia ships, suddenly anchored in neat rows at Whitsun Reef, a feature claimed by the Philippines. In response, the Philippines lodged a dip-lomatic protest and sent several PN ships, Vietnam despatched a GEPARD class frig-ate, the PLAN some Type 022 fast-attack catamarans while a US Navy expeditionary strike group exercised in the western South China Sea. It’s a busy sea.

Conclusion

ASEAN states only allocate limited fund-ing to their naval forces. The result is that in a war these would be one-shot navies, where submarines might be critical. For constabulary tasks though, the navies are steadily improving and they will progres-

sively irritate - but not impede - China as it expands its grey zone activities across the South China Sea. Given this, ASEAN states generally support extra-regional navies be-coming more active in the South China Sea. The US, India, Japan and Australia now exer-cise more frequently with ASEAN navies and increasingly send naval task groups through the area. France and Germany are becom-ing active while the United Kingdom’s new carrier, HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH, will de-ploy into the region later this year. Even so, ASEAN states will remain careful to placate China. After COVID-19 passes, naval exer-cises with the PLAN will probably resume while purchasing new ships and weapons from China will continue.In assessing the navies of Vietnam, Ma-laysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, their diversity of supply is striking. This may gar-ner ASEAN stronger diplomatic support in a crisis but also means few synergies are gained and economies of scale achieved. Also notable is that extra-regional countries are quite active in gifting equipment, with the US, Japan and South Korea notable in this regard. South Korea has also been very successful in selling new ships, with Japan seemingly making a breakthrough in the region with its recent sale to Vietnam. In-creasingly, making warships locally might sway a sale although, as Malaysia shows, this can be a difficult path.China’s grey zone activities are definitely impacting Southeast Asia’s navies opera-tionally. In terms of force structure though the impact has been to reinforce pre-existing concepts but not overturn them. The exception is the increasing number of OPVs, even if many are second-hand and for the region’s expanding coast guards. In the main, new warships are simply fitting in rather than triggering significant ASEAN naval re-thinking. Having some subma-rines, several frigates, a flock of corvettes and some amphibious ships remains the limit of regional aspirations. L

The Korean-built frigate JOSE ROZAL is one of a pair recently inducted into the Philippine Navy.

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The Philippine Navy LPD DAVAI DEL SUR was built in Indonesia to the MAKASSAR class design.

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The governments of Bulgaria and Roma-nia had also realised that their naval ves-

sels lacked modern capabilities, lagging far behind those of the navies of other NATO member states. As a result, the necessary funding for the procurement of new ves-sels was allocated despite the reality of the raging COVID-19 pandemic that also re-quired the allocation of extra funds. As a result, the Government of Bulgaria signed a contract with Fr. Lürssen Werft (also known as the Lürssen Group) on 12 November 2020 for two corvette-sized Multipurpose Modular Patrol Vessels (MMPVs), while the Government of Romania plans to sign a contract with Naval Group for four GOW-IND class corvettes at a not yet specified date in 2021, with deliveries scheduled for between 2024 and 2028. It should be stressed that the construction of the GOW-IND corvettes in Romania remains a top pri-ority for the current Romanian government led by Florin Citu.

Bulgaria’s MMPV Programme

The Bulgarian naval fleet is still based on Soviet-era vessels and has not been mod-ernised for decades, with most of the ves-sels having reached the end of their service lives.The Bulgarian defence budget amounted to BGN 3.53 billion (€1.80 billion) in 2019, bolstered by one off sums to support the procurement of F-16 fighters. In 2020, the defence budget was reduced to a more normal BGN 1.94 billion (€1.0 billion);

around 1.93% of Bulgaria’s GDP accord-ing to data released by NATO in October 2020. This was still sufficient to proceed with the procurement of the two Multipur-pose Modular Patrol Vessels (MMPVs) ref-erenced above. A tender for these vessels issued in April 2019 saw Lürssen selected as the preferred bidder in February 2020. Al-though, driven by the government’s finan-cial constraints, the defence budget was further reduced to 1.7% of the Bulgarian GDP in the current year, this does not seem to have impacted the MMPV acquisition.Accordingly, on 16 June 2020, Bulgaria’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) began nego-tiations with Lürssen for the construction of the two MMPVs. The new-generation corvette is to meet the country’s require-ments for anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, air-defence, peacetime maritime patrol and search and rescue operations. According to former Defence Minister Krasimir Karakachanov, “the vessels should

be built in Bulgaria. Bulgarian Navy require-ments call for the delivery of both multipur-pose vessels within five years from contract signature.” Lürssen finally signed the acqui-sition contract on 12 November 2020. The ships will be delivered between 2025 and 2026 at a cost of BGN 984 million or about €503 million including technical and crew training. The vessels are based on the Ger-man shipyard’s OPV 80 design. Bulgaria’s Defence Acquisition Directorate is the con-tracting authority for the programme.Lürssen’s subcontractor in Bulgaria will be the MTG Dolphin shipyard. MTG Dolphin is to build the hulls of the two corvettes while Lürssen is to focus on systems integration for equipment and armament. On 8 De-cember 2020, the Swedish company Saab was awarded a subcontract by Lürssen to provide the combat management system (CMS) for the Bulgarian Navy’s MMPVs. Under the contract signed by the compa-nies, Saab will be responsible for the deliv-

Naval Programmes in Bulgaria and RomaniaEugene Kogan

The procurement of F-16 fighter aircraft fleets by Bulgaria and Romania had been a top priority until the year

2019, with navy requirements coming to the fore only after completion of these programmes. And this was

despite the stormy weather brewing in the Black Sea region and the speedy rearmament of the Russian Black

Sea Fleet. These two developments have contributed to the acceleration of the modernisation plans for the

Bulgarian and Romanian naval fleets and their related procurement efforts.

Launched in 1977 at the Belgian Boelwerf shipyard, DRAZKI is an ex WIELINGEN class frigate. She was acquired by the Bulgarian Navy in 2004.

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Au th o rEugene Kogan is an Eastern Euro-pean defence and security expert based in Tbilisi, Georgia.



ery and integration of the 9LV-type CMS.Saab’s role as the CMS integrator will in-clude involvement of staff from the compa-ny’s Kockums shipyard in Malmö. The 9LV-series CMS feature an open architecture, allowing the customer to choose between a customised systems configuration and a Saab-recommended default setting. In addition to the MMPV programme, Bul-garia purchased two decommissioned TRI-PARTITE class minehunters from the Royal Netherlands Navy in September 2020. The cost of the acquisition amounted to €2.395 million. Another €2 million were spent on the reactivation and delivery of the minesweep-ers to Bulgaria, whilst a further €1.5 million will be spent on refitting the ships. Therefore, the total cost is close to €6 million.The two new minesweepers will join an-other TRIPARTITE-type MCMV purchased by the Bulgarian Navy in 2004 and refur-bished in 2009. Whether or not the above mentioned naval procurement turns Bulgaria into an emerg-ing Black Sea Guardian remains to be seen. However, one thing is for sure: things are moving slowly but they surely are moving in the right direction. The Bulgarian Navy is strengthening its naval capabilities while its crews are undergoing training for the operation of modern naval surface com-batants. As far as MTG Dolphin shipyard’s capability to design and build indigenous naval vessels without external assistance is concerned, there is still much to be desired. Under the current circumstances the desire does not match the reality.

Romania’s Defence Spending

The Government of Bulgaria’s neighbour Ro-mania appears to be taking defence matters seriously and the country is one of the ten

NATO member states that allocated more than 2% of its GDP for defence in 2020.The Romanian defence budget was US$4.68 billion or 2.03% of its GDP in 2019 while it increased to US$5.498 billion or 2.38% of its GDP in 2020. According to a press release of the Ministry of Na-tional Defence (MoND) issued in February 2021, the budget of the ministry proposed for 2021 includes funds of RON 22.746 (US$5.6 billion) or 2.04% of the country’s GDP; namely, slightly less than in 2020 but still above 2% of its GDP.

GOWIND and NSM for Romania

As a result of other high-priority procure-ment efforts such as C4I systems with ISTAR integration capacities, SHORAD-VS-HORAD systems, UAVs and the modernisa-tion of the IAR-99 trainer aircraft – all of which were approved by the Parliament in April 2021 – naval modernisation has not been accorded a high priority until recently.

However, the former Prime Minister Lu-dovic Orban said in July 2020 that “the Romanian authorities can start negotia-tions with the consortium comprising Na-val Group of France and Santierul Naval Constanta (SNC) for the acquisition of four GOWIND-type multi-role corvettes for a budget of €1.2 billion. Naval Group and SNC are expected to deliver the first vessel by 2024 and the last in 2028.”There is no doubt whatsoever that the Romanian Government’s decision to con-tract France’s Naval Group to build four GOWIND corvettes could result in its larg-est-ever military programme. Moreover, it would mark the country’s first major acquisition of modern vessels for its naval forces in 30 years. According to a state-ment by the Naval Group, “the contract includes the purchase of four new vessels and the modernisation of the country’s two UK-built T-22 frigates in addition to the construction of a maintenance centre and a training centre.”The GOWIND’s combat management sys-tem, SETIS, is based on the SENIT combat management system jointly designed by Naval Group and Thales and incorporating a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) open-system architecture. The corvettes will be armed with MBDA’s MICA VL and EXOCET missiles. Sensors include a hull-mounted and a towed-array sonar from Thales.In addition to the corvettes, the Romanian Government has approved a deal and sent a draft bill to the Parliament in January 2021 that will allow the country to buy two NA-VAL STRIKE MISSILE (NSM)-based Coastal Defence Systems (CDS) within the scope of a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme. Developed by Raytheon and Kongsberg, NSM is a sea-skimming, over-the-horizon anti-ship missile. In October 2020, the US State Department approved the potential sale after Bucharest requested the pur-chase of the two CDS.

Built by the Russian Volodarsky Shipbuilding Yard, the ZBORUL class missile corvette ROS LASTUNUL is an ex-Soviet TARANTUL-1 class with a full-load displacement of some 450 tonnes.

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An Artist impression of the Bulgarian Navy’s Multipurpose Modular Patrol Vessel

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The Government of Romania’s request to purchase two CDS extends to up to 10 Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distri-bution System – Joint Tactical Radio Systems (MIDS-JTRS). Also included are two coastal defence fire distribution centres, four launch vehicles, transport loading vehicles, a non-operational Inert Handling/Loading Missile (IHM) to train missile handling and loading/unloading, training missile and equipment spares, associated containers, training and training equipment, publications and techni-cal documentation, spare parts, and techni-cal and logistic support services.The MoND said in a statement that “the potential contract is to include 33 missiles and is cost- estimated at about US$286 mil-lion, but its precise value is to be determined when the acquisition procedure begins.” The implementation of the contract will take place between 2021 and 2024 and the mobile launcher system will be delivered in the fourth quarter of 2024.In conclusion, Bulgaria and Romanian’s naval procurement shows that their naval compo-nents, albeit belatedly, are now being taken care of by their respective governments. The scheduled improvements should take place sometime between 2024 and 2028. Until then, the current capabilities of the naval

fleets of the two countries, though limited in size, will continue to operate as before; namely, with restraint and caution. There-fore, the emergence of the Black Sea Guard-ians may well become a reality in three to seven years from today but, until then, the stormy waters of the sea remain dark and menacing. The navies of the two countries will need the full support from the navies of other NATO member states in order to maintain resilience in the Black Sea region. Per-haps, therefore, NATO can introduce a Baltic-like air-policing mission until Bul-

garia and Romania receive the MMPVs and GOWIND corvettes. In other words, due to the restrictions of the Montreux Convention, naval vessels from a mini-mum of two NATO member states will stay in the Black Sea for three weeks instead of the three month air-policing in the Baltic Sea. The rotating mission will re-assure Bulgaria and Romania and will be seen as a gesture of solidarity towards the Black Sea NATO members. This suggestion is worth discussion by the NATO member states. The sooner a decision is made, the better it will be for all involved. L

The tender for four GOWIND corvettes and the modernisation of two frigates was launched in 2016. Although Naval Group was selected as the preferred supplier in July 2019, negotiations have yet to be concluded.

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Contact us: [email protected]

YOUR RELIABLE PARTNER FOR NAVAL VESSELS

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Ak Bars Shipbuilding Corporation JSC has been operating as a major geographic clus-ter of Russian shipbuilding enterprises since 2018. Primarily established to improve the corporate direction of its various compo-nents, the group has been demonstrating strong performance in developing its busi-ness under this new structure. The com-pany’s main areas of activity encompass ship design, construction and repair, com-ponent manufacturing and electrical work, as well as training and service activities. The group’s management have the strategic objectives of expanding the geographic ex-tent of its supplier base, increasing output and boosting its work share in shipbuilding.Many people reading this article will hold the opinion that only one state-controlled corporation, USC, has a major role in ship-building within the Russian Federation, with other shipbuilding activities confined to small private yards and enterprises. This is not the case. Ak Bars Shipbuilding Corpo-ration JSC is a leading Russian shipbuilding enterprise with successful operations and dynamic development potential. Currently the largest privately-owned shipbuilding group in Russia, the corporation’s com-petencies are vast. Combining large-scale industrial operations with comparatively small businesses, our activities extend far beyond shipbuilding and repair. Other ex-amples of our undertakings include the fabrication of large metal structures, as well as metallurgy, mechanical engineering and the production of specialised instruments.Today, Ak Bars Shipbuilding Corporation is actively involved in marketing and devel-opment activities to expand its interaction

with customers and suppliers, both in Rus-sia and abroad. We are paying particular attention to the introduction of uniform work practices and standards across all our operations. This work is proceeding hand-in-hand with enhancements to the trans-parency of our financial processes and a focus on achieving new levels of corporate interaction across all our business units.Ak Bars Shipbuilding Corporation’s enter-prises have extensive experience in the de-sign and construction of ships and boats intended for a wide range of purposes and missions. We have the capability of design-ing practically any type of vessel – from a small workboat to a large aircraft carrier. Similarly, our production facilities can sup-port the production of surface ships of all types up to a length of 340 metres, a breadth of 54 metres and a total displace-ment of as much as 300,000 tonnes. We

have the slipway capacity to assemble up to 10 vessels simultaneously every year. Our corporation’s export experience is also ex-tensive, encompassing modern, innovative designs from 100 to 2,500 tonnes displace-ment. Prominent amongst our current shipbuild-ing products are:

Special Purpose Boat: Project 21980E

This boat is designed to combat the ac-tivities of saboteurs and terrorist forces in the waters and approaches to harbours and other important maritime installa-tions. Its excellent seaworthiness and modern equipment allows it to under-take a broad range of tasks typically un-dertaken by larger vessels. Boats based on this design are currently in service with

AK BARS SHIPBUILDING CORPORATIONExperience, Innovation & Potential

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The Special Purpose Boat of Project 21980E is designed to secure ports and coastal infrastructure from sabotage and terrorist attack.

Marketing Report: AK BARS


rial waters and the protection of naval bases and coastal areas. Ships based on this Project design are currently subject to serial production to meet the needs of the Russian Navy.

“Gepard-3.9” Frigate

We conclude with the “Gepard-3.9” frigate, which has already shown its export potential. At present, four “Ge-pard-3.9” frigates – which were devel-oped on the basis of the Project 11661 patrol ship – are serving as part of the naval forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The “Gepard-3.9” is a multi-purpose design that can combat surface, submarine and air-based threats, either independently or as part of a group. It can lay minefields, patrol and guard maritime borders and the exclusive eco-nomic zone, escort convoys, “fly the flag” in areas of interest and participate in a wide range of other maritime opera-tions. As a result, the design’s armament is varied and balanced.Moreover, the basic “Gepard” (Cheetah) platform can be adapted to achieve vari-ous configurations. Our customers are not limited only to the base multi-pur-pose configuration but can specify ships, for example, with enhanced anti-subma-rine or anti-aircraft weapons systems, improved shock resistance, or with a wide variety of propulsion and electronic equipment. The “Gepard” platform has also been adapted as the basis for a de-sign focused on patrolling the open seas, with greater autonomy of navigation. It is also important to note that the “Gepard” family compares favourably with many of its foreign competitors in terms of cost, allowing greater capability to be acquired for the same budget. L

them to fight enemy surface ships, dis-rupt transport communications, support ground force operations in coastal areas and even strike at important targets deep in enemy territory. The Project 21635’s capabilities are also proven. During Rus-sian military operations in Syria, Russian Navy ships of a similar design attacked ground targets of the Islamic State ter-rorist organisation from locations in the Caspian Sea.

Patrol Ship: Project 22160

This ship is designed to ensure the pro-tection of territorial waters, undertak-ing patrol duties in both closed and open seas across the entire extent of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Potential missions include the suppres-sion of smuggling and piracy, search and rescue operations in response to maritime disasters, monitoring the mar-itime environment, escorting vessels in the course of transit through territo-

the Russian Navy and the National Guard of the Russian Federation. The ongoing production of boats of this series by Ak Bars Shipbuilding Corporation demon-strates both the performance and the attraction of the design.

Project 21635 “Sarsar” Series

The Project 21635 family of ships includes a variety of small missile-armed, gun-armed and anti-submarine patrol vessels that are designed to undertake the protec-tion of territorial seas and exclusive eco-nomic zones, the defence of sea lanes, and the performance of combat missions in offshore waters. They are capable both of independent operation and integration into a broader maritime force. The Project 21635’s small dimensions al-low it to be used in a wide range of mari-time environments, including river deltas and inland waterways. In spite of their compact size, they are capable of deploy-ing powerful strike weapons that allow

New 21635 project Sarsar has been developed by the Ak Bars Corporation

“Gepard-3.9” frigates are in service with the naval forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.



The traditional mentality that land out-weighs sea must be abandoned.”

Therefore, “great importance has to be at-tached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and in-terests…” stated China’s Defence White Papers of 2013 and 2015. The People's Republic's rise as a maritime power is not dictated by desire to challenge the US for global dominance, but by the need to pro-tect the national interest by combining “coastal water defence” (jinhai fangyu) and “offshore protection” (yuanhai huwei). From the perspective of Beijing, the se-curity environment outside China has deteriorated steadily and dramatically since the US turned regional territorial disputes into global geopolitical conflicts with its so-called Pivot to Asia. Steady US encroachment into the 12 nautical mile boundaries of the Huangyan Islands (or Scarborough Atoll) in the South China Sea have increased hostile contacts be-tween the two navies and militarised bi-lateral relations.The US portrayal of China as a fearsome rival increases the military dimension of the conflicts of interest between the two countries, further strengthening China's concerns. The two countries risk being un-able to escape the Thucydides trap. In its most recent report Military and Se-curity Developments involving the People’s Republic of China published in 2020, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) assess that “the PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will…to strengthen…the PLA in nearly every re-spect”. And "China is already ahead of the United States in certain areas”. The navy is one of these. “The PRC has the largest navy

in the world, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines in-cluding over 130 major surface combatants. In comparison, the U.S. Navy’s battle force is approximately 293 ships as of early 2020.” While there’s strength in numbers, however, numbers aren’t the only factors of strength.

Beijing’s Perspective

Beijing would be deemed to lose a compre-hensive arms race with the United States in the field of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, claim Chinese analysts. China has currently no match for the up-coming COLUMBIA (SSBN-826) class of strategic nuclear submarines, whose first unit officially began construction in 2020 and is scheduled to enter service in 2031. Equally superior active offensive capabil-ity is ensured by the VIRGINIA (SSN-774) class nuclear attack submarines that are currently in service with the US Navy. They alone represent a 20-year gap with Bei-jing’s equivalents. The learning curve of the

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and of the military-industrial complex in this domain is an existential threat for China’s defence and deterrence capabilities. Conversely, the capabilities of China’s sur-face ships are generally seen as adequate, with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deploying large and medium-sized ships such as the Type 075 amphibious as-sault ships and Type 055 and Type 052D destroyers. The possible addition of new concept weapons such as electromagnetic rail guns to the 10,000-tonne Type 055 de-stroyer is a significant development. The PLAN is expected to add three aircraft carriers by 2035. They will join the Type 001 LIAONING (16) and Type 002 SHAN-DONG (17), both already in commission. Since December 2019, the SHANDONG has embarked on numerous training cruis-es. Training and time are required before the PLAN achieves mature carrier opera-tions. However, the speedy and success-ful construction of a domestic carrier is a positive sign for the future of the Chinese

China’s Maritime Expansion: The Perspective from Beijing

Under Xi's leadership, far-reaching reforms are under way to turn China into a major military power by 2050.

The role of the navy is crucial. The goal is to dissuade the US from using force through a mix of tactical ap-

proaches and data driven warfare. Especially in the context of Taiwan.

Au th o rMu Xin is an established sinologist who works as a strategy manager and consultant.

PLAN surface vessels are pictured exercising in the East China Sea in Janu-ary 2021. China is paying increasing attention to the maritime domain.

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navy. The efforts to build-up competence and technology centres are bearing fruit. “Intelligent specialisation” leads the reor-ganisation of shipyards and the industry. Despite this progress, scenarios project-ing the PLAN’s performance in an Air-Sea Battle engaging US aircraft carrier battle groups outside the Second Island Chain do not generally bode well for Beijing. [1]

Principal Naval Rivals

Japan and the US are viewed as China’s main rivals operating within the First Island Chain. The US is considered to be the main strategic threat to national unity, maritime rights, and strategic interests. In the new century, the navy's strategic objectives “should be based on the traditionally rec-ognised "coastal defence and distant sea protection", and actively evolve towards "coastal defence and distant sea protec-tion; ocean presence and bipolar expan-

sion” according to a Chinese source. The PLAN seems to be moving towards a con-cept of “Offshore Defense, Global Guard”Naval construction, supply chain capabili-ties and comprehensive procurement plans will be enhanced under the 14th Five Year Plan to ensure the PLAN has the ability, pre-paredness, and readiness to compete with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force as well as US Pacific Fleet. The ability to con-duct independent operations within and outside the First Island Chain and the ability to conduct maritime manoeuvres equiva-lent to that of the US Navy are regarded as being necessary objectives.

Changing Forms of Warfare

The nature of warfare has undergone pro-found changes. Information-based warfare is gradually replacing mechanised warfare. The future of information-based naval war-fare will be a system-to-system, system-to-

The PLAN’s first 10,000-tonne Type 055 destroyer NANCHANG is evidence of growing Chinese naval capabilities. However, the PLAN still lags behind its US rival in some critical areas.

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The carriers THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN-71) and NIMITZ (CVN-68) pictured underway in the Philippine Sea. Whilst China has grown A2/AD capabilities close to home, scenarios projecting the PLAN’s performance against US carrier battle groups outside the Second Island Chain do not generally bode well for Beijing.

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system overall competition. Non-linear, non-contact and asymmetric combat characteristics are becoming more obvi-ous components. Long-range firepower strikes are crucial. Today's advanced cruise missiles can carry out long-range precision strikes against land targets from 2,500 kilo-metres, while aircraft carriers can launch attacks in waters 1,500-2,000 kilometres away. Moreover, hypersonic weapons can achieve one-hour rapid strikes worldwide. To counteract US force superiority, Beijing seeks to strengthen theatre capabilities in the First Island Chain by enhanced digital capabilities and reconnaissance, as well as by embedding Artificial Intelligence (AI) in weapon systems. The extent and role of civilian and industrial innovation in the de-velopment of China’s military capabilities is an element of concern for the US intel-ligence. The “asymmetric” PLA doctrine underpins Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) operations, a formula coined by West-ern analysts (to hinder, delay and repel a US offensive). Ideas related to A2/AD feature prominently in China’s strategy although the term has never entered PLA's jargon. The basic concept is that in future wars the PLA will have to “use inferiority to defeat superiority” (a principle of Taijiquan, also known as Tai Chi). The possibility of conducting “asymmetric” warfare depends primarily on possessing concrete combat capabilities against ex-posed enemy bases, weapon platforms and strike groups. The PLA has made great progress in this field through the develop-ment of an anti-satellite programme, cyber disruption measures and the “assassin's mace” (shashou jian), comprised of weap-ons such as supersonic missiles, drones and submarines.Officially unveiled at the National Day mili-tary parade on 1 October 2019, the Don-feng-17 is said to be China first operational

hypersonic weapon system and one of the first in the world to be put into full initial operation. Currently land-based, the pos-sibility of developing submarine-launched versions might ease guidance problems and fully exploit the Dongfeng-17’s poten-tial. Along with other prospective devel-opments, such as unmanned submersibles carrying high-explosive torpedoes, the Donfeng-17 offers the prospect of tilting the strategic balance in the Pacific Ocean. Chinese sources observe that the US is also developing similar armaments such as hypersonic weapons and electromagnetic guns. However, of the US $700 billion in American military spending in 2020, much is reserved for more traditional weapons systems such as the eleven aircraft carrier battle groups. This may come as a disad-vantage, as funding for advanced weapons research may not be as readily available.Some military experts in Beijing note that the US aircraft carrier battle groups currently operating within a 1,100 to 3,000 kilometre range of the Chinese mainland (i.e. with-in the First and Second Island Chains) are within striking distance of China’s newest missiles. This evolution is seen as proof that the PLAN is on track to ensuring national defence/deterrence. In other words, “we are moving into the right strategic direction”.

Xi’s Strategic Vision

The armed forces of advanced countries periodically formulate a National Defence Strategy (NDS). In China, the NDS lays out all-encompassing directives for the transformation of the national civilian and military industrial and defence apparatus. In the Chinese mentality, going in the right direction is more important than ac-cumulating capabilities. To adapt to the new ways, means, ends and objectives of warfare, the PLA has amended the NDS

three times since the Gulf War (1990-1), based partly on the experience of the First (2000-1) and Second Persian Gulf (2003-2011) wars. The current strategy is aimed at fighting local information-technology driven wars and emphasises the military protection of Chinese sovereignty and ter-ritorial integrity.Given reforms in the Chinese system are generally timed on a ten-year baseline, the NDS strategy may be updated again in 2025. By that date some commentators foresee that the PLAN may have three air-craft carriers forming an aircraft carrier bat-tle group formation, possibly accompanied by eight Type 055 destroyers. In addition, China's new generation of electromagnetic guns may be on board these ships, opening a new strategic epoch for the navy.In the meantime, the main objective of Xi Jinping's transformation of the PLA is to ensure immediate war preparedness (be ready to “fight tonight”). However, Xi has not forgotten the second component of warfare, identified by Carl von Clausewitz: execution.Xi NDS provides the PLA and the Party-State, as well as the nation, with the po-litical vision for strategic war planning, spe-cific objectives and the types of warfare that must be pursued. Xi’s strategy seems more of a defensive than offensive nature. Even the perceived maritime outstretch is not directly in pursuit of an ambitious great-power diplomacy, as it aims to pro-ject Beijing’s commercial interests along the new maritime and terrestrial “silk routes”. Xi’s National Defence Strategy has been profoundly influenced by the ideas of the Information Technology-Revolution in Mili-tary Affairs (IT-RMA) concept in the context of the US Pivot to Asia and its Air/Sea Bat-tle conceptualisation. The evolution of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) be-tween the US, Japan, Australian and India is another development that cannot soothe Beijing’s security concerns. It is, however, the prospect of a conflict in Taiwan that results in US involvement that is what prompted PLA strategists to develop the information technology-driv-en warfighting strategy in the early 2000s. Four principal war scenarios were identi-fied. The first is an all-out war against the American superpower.The second in terms of severity is a con-flict in the Taiwan Strait, followed thirdly by small to medium scale land or sea wars in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The fourth scenario includes low-intensity conflicts such as the war on terrorism in Xinjiang. With the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) back in power in Taiwan, the second scenario is the most realistic.

SHANDONG, China’s first indigenously constructed aircraft carrier. By 2025 China could have three aircraft carriers in service.

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The 'war-and-a-half' doctrine has been outlined as a compass to guide PLA's pre-paredness for maritime conflicts and along land borders. This doctrine is based on the ability to conduct both a military offensive (the full war) to protect China's interests in its maritime domains and defensive land campaigns (the half war), should a main-land enemy wish to take advantage of a maritime crisis. This doctrine incorporates all the relevant components of warfare in a hierarchical order

Innovation

The PLA aspires to become a digital force through the interconnection of a C6ISR structure that enables the rapid sharing of intelligence information, acceleration

of decision-making processes and smooth execution of orders. [2] This provides im-mediate knowledge of the dynamics of the battlefield, which is disseminated both ver-tically and horizontally. System integration is the driving force behind the modernisa-tion of PLA.Compared to the acquisition of expensive hardware, at the tactical level systems in-tegration is a cost-efficient “shortcut” to enhance combat effectiveness. The “Long March” towards digitalisation can be seen unfolding in a three-stage evolutionary process. Firstly, IT systems are linked to the individual platforms. By 2020 (second phase), all systems are integrated across all levels: central, theatre and weapon, by connecting their C6ISR functions. This will allow the merger of different chains of

command. In the final phase, complete in-teroperability across platforms is achieved; this should be in place by 2050. Thanks to China's massive investments in space and information technologies, according to mainland sources the PLA seems to have gone beyond the goals set by the plan. By now, the PLA may have acquired “operational big data” and “full systems integration” capabilities, allowing the in-troduction of new combat tactics.This shift is primarily aimed at compen-sating for the enemy's superiority. The Chinese focus on combatting the US Navy’s aircraft carriers is, in this sense, a typical example of asymmetric warfare: an aircraft carrier is large, slow, and argu-ably relatively undefended against rapid, precise, and intense missile attacks. The goal is to establish relative strategic parity or even temporary superiority over the US superpower in a given, predetermined, and limited geographical quadrant (for a circumscribed target and for a limited time) in order to create the conditions for a political solution.

Strategic Weapons

Another important cornerstone of Chi-na’s defence – and naval strategy – is its strategic weapons programme. By 2035, the Chinese Armed Forces could have ten strategic nuclear submarines each equipped with twelve JL-3 ballistic mis-siles (three warheads each) capable of striking the United States; a total of 120 ballistic missiles and 360 warheads. Un-der this scenario, the PLA would be able to survive a first wave of atomic attacks and retaliate.Also in 2035, the PLA will have built a Space Force and a Cyber Force. Any attack on Chi-nese territory would break the main taboos concerning retaliation in Space, as it would be considered more a form of self-defence

Xi Reform DetailsOn 23 November 2015, Xi Jinping announced a new five-year plan to reform the PLA. It is a comprehensive programme; a new chapter in the history of the PLA. Beyond a notable political dimension, which has strengthened Xi as commander-in-chief, the plan reshapes the military in terms of its organisational structure and chain of command. The reform, which mostly follows the IT-RMA hypothesis, transcends the original tri-partition of the Chinese military “revolution”, but incorporates all its compo-nents: theory, organisation and technology. However, there are some risks. All the major reforms involve some redistribution of power, which can generate dis-satisfaction and potentially affect the military’s morale.The reform aims to increase PLA combat readiness. The ability to conduct digital warfare is key. Preventing the enemy from understanding the dynamics of the battlefield is a strategic necessity, especially in the maritime domain. A Strategic Support Force (SSF) will integrate all “new types of warfare components and ca-pabilities" as well as enabling technologies of modern warfare: space, cyberspace, remote control systems. There are many instruments and tools that the PLA can use to conduct “asym-metrical” warfare, but they risk proving useless without valid nuclear (mutual assured destruction) and cyber (mutual assured interference) deterrence. Rebus sic stantibus, the PLA is unlikely to pursue war parity with the US. Its goal is to provide adequate deterrence to discourage the Pentagon from hostile military action. In case of intervention, the choice of time will likely play out as the single most important success factor for both actors.

PLAN diesel-electric submarines. The PLAN already has a large force of conventional submarines but is looking to expand the capabilities of its strategic flotilla.

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than a preventive attack. China has made clear progress in building and launching satellites: in 2014 it was the country that launched the largest number of rockets in the world.The previously quoted DoD 2020 report points out that the PRC is already ahead of the US in relation to land-based conven-tional ballistic and cruise missiles (“1,250 ground- launched ballistic missiles (GL-BMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres”), as well as integrated air-defence systems and architecture, where the PRC “has one of the world’s largest forces of advanced long- range surface-to-air systems—including Rus-sian-built S-400s, S-300s, and domesti-cally produced systems”.

Extending the Definition of National Interest

China has become the world's largest trad-ing nation, its largest oil importer and the second largest source of Foreign Direct In-vestment. With the promotion of the "Belt and Road Initiative”, China's overseas insti-tutions, personnel and assets are spreading all over the world. The depletion of global land-based resources has made the oceans an important resource space. This exten-sion of national interests corresponds to the extension of security needs. However, China has embarked on a trajectory of deep decarbonisation that will reduce the coun-try’s dependence on fossil fuels as well as on other resources. Beijing is acutely aware of the looming existential threat driven by

climate change and by the environmental crises. Resource scarcity, water poverty and threats to food supply chains are all seen as endangering national and regional stability. Global crises will only be solved through global cooperation. Xi’s foreign affairs rhetoric is based on the twin pillars of the “community of common destiny” and the “ecological civilisation”. Xi’s vision is de-fined by mutual cooperation. In Xi’s policy discourse, this is a “new” approach to in-ternational relations that supersedes the “outdated” Western model.A “community of common destiny” implies the recognition of a “community of shared interests” and a “community of shared re-sponsibilities.” The “community of shared in-terests” implies a situation of economic inter-dependence. The “community of responsibil-ity” refers to the political and security realms, or a situation of “political mutual trust.” Cli-mate change is paramount. This part of the Chinese Communist Party’s doctrine is driv-ing profound transformation of the domestic energy matrix and industrial system. In the light of these dynamics, the perception of China as a revisionist power may not be fully correct. Fears that Beijing is amassing naval power to subvert the global maritime order do not currently reflect the reality of Beijing’s objectives. From China’s first mission in the Gulf of Aden onwards, the PLA Navy has always complied with international con-ventions when engaged in naval operations outside its territorial waters. These operations have not directly translated into a strengthen-ing of China's oceanic projection. Xi Jinping sees China's transformation into a maritime power as an integral

part of the “Chinese dream” of rejuve-nation of the Chinese nation, but China will not become a global naval power in the traditional sense soon. Partly this is because – in the Indo-Pacific – China it is surrounded by naval powers (the US, Japan and India). Beijing's assertiveness is limited to the nearby seas, where its core geostrategic interests lie. Up until now, Beijing has not shown an intention to shape a new maritime order, nor of chal-lenging the United States as the super-power of the seas: unless it is existentially threatened. China will certainly increase its projection capabilities, but mainly on a geo-economic level and through instru-ments such as the 'blue economy'. It will thus become a maritime power, but not an empire of the seas. L

Notes1. The first island chain is generally de-scribed as the line of islands stretching from the Kuriles through the Japanese home islands, the Ryukyus, Taiwan and The Philippines, to Borneo. This encom-passes the regional seas of most politi-cal, economic and strategic importance to Beijing: the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. The sec-ond island chain runs from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, Guam and Palau to the Indonesian archi-pelago.2. C6ISR is commonly defined as Com-mand, Control, Communications, Comput-ers, Cyber-defence, Combat systems (C6) plus Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon-naissance (ISR).

The fourth PLAN Type 052D destroyer YINCHUAN replenishing from the Type 903 replenishment ship WEISHANHU during an Indian Ocean deployment. The PLAN has always complied with international conventions when engaged in naval operations outside its territorial waters.

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SH I P D E SI GN AND TECHN O LOGI E S

In the last 12 or so months, European shipbuilders and suppliers have reached

important milestones in submarine con-struction and in the domain of underwa-ter subsystems. The development of new conventional and nuclear submarines, as well as of air independent propulsion sys-tems, is complemented by new combat and weapon systems. In addition to im-provements in propulsion and platform designs making the new underwater platforms quieter and more versatile, recent developments in the capabilities of combat systems are key to addressing current and future operational needs and challenges.The new generation of submarines, or their latest versions, will be equipped with combat systems providing ex-panded processing capabilities. New integrated sonar systems will offer enhanced sensitivity. Together with further integration and fusion capabili-ties, this will enable deployment of a wider range of surface and underwa-ter sensors, weapons and the expected unmanned systems. The new combat systems which are under development will lead to a new configuration of a submarine’s Combat Information Cen-tre (CIC). Advanced and interchangeable operator stations, being less platform-dependent thanks to the introduction of a full suite of non-penetrating masts, will provide flexibility with respect to the positioning of the CIC inside the subma-rine. The development of future combat systems is trending towards scalable, COTS-based open system architectures. This will enable operators to avoid the limitations of proprietary products, en-able better management of equipment and software obsolescence and allow faster adaption to new technologies, such as common network and server infrastructures and enhanced protec-

tion against cyber-attack. The evolution towards machine learning and artificial intelligence will support future subma-riners in dealing with a new conception of their operational environment. Their submarine will be the central node or a part of a wider network of surveillance assets in which surface and air units – both manned and unmanned – are con-nected.

U212 NFS: New Kid on the Block

In February 2021, the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) awarded Fincantieri a €1.35Bn contract for a first tranche of two submarines (with options for an additional two), a submarine train-ing centre plus initial support on behalf of the Italian Navy. Thus, the Italian Navy’s U212 NFS (Near Future Submarine) pro-gramme will be the first in the underwater domain assigned to OCCAR. The contract

includes the design, construction, delivery and in-service support of four submarines based on an evolved U212A Air Independ-ent Propulsion (AIP) design developed by Fincantieri with an unprecedented level of national industry content. Delivery of the first submarine is scheduled for late 2027 and the second boat is supposed to follow early in 2029.The main characteristics of U212 NFS are a hull elongated by 1.2 metres, a hydrodynamically enhanced and qui-eter platform, an AIP propulsion system that includes a new energy storage and management system based on Lithium-iron-phosphate batteries, and a newly designed combat system integrating many main components provided by Ital-ian industry. The new submarine will also have a larger panoply of weapons and payloads, as it will also be fitted for deep strike cruise missiles and the integration of unmanned underwater vehicles. An advanced platform management system

Submarine Combat Systems: Europe is Expanding Its OfferLuca Peruzzi

As the conceptual approach to underwater warfare has considerably changed, submarines are no longer soli-

tary hunters but just one element of a network centric warfare connecting surface, air and subsurface assets,

manned and unmanned. MSD presents Luca Peruzzi’s analysis of the resulting changes in the combat

management systems being selected for future submarines.

U212NFS: the combat management system by Leonardo will be based on the Kongsberg MSI 90U CMS, here depicted on SCIRÈ.

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by Fincantieri Seastema, an Avio Aero steering and diving control system, and a Combat Management System (CMS) provided by Leonardo group will enable operation by a core crew of 29. Based upon the latest iteration of the SADOC CMS installed in the Italian Navy’s new surface combatants – including the new PPA, LHD and LSS – the CMS will allow further advances in the integration of the main combat systems.The open and modular architecture in-corporated in the U212NFS will ensure easy integration of third-party applica-tions such as bistatic sonar detection and remote computing. Other subma-rine mission-specific applications in-clude acoustic and enhanced real time periscope video processing. The CMS will incorporate nine dual-screen and fully in-terchangeable multifunction consoles. Embedded artificial intelligence and a multi-touch “interaction paradigm” will be a feature of the Commanding Offic-er’s station. The CMS will be accommo-dated in a rearranged and more spacious CIC positioned under a longer fin (sail). While the attack periscope will be pen-etrating, the six other electrically hoisted masts (with the option for one addition) will be non-penetrating. Antenna and sensor hoisting systems will be delivered by L3Harris Calzoni. The CMS will handle state-of-the-art communications, sensors and weapons systems including SATCOM (UHF and X-band) and other datalink systems provided by Leonardo. ELAC will provide an open architecture sonar suite while Elettronica will be contracted for the newly designed

RESM/CESM suite and L3Harris Calzoni-GEM Elettronica for the low-probability of Intercept radar (LPI). Leonardo’s BLACK SHARK ADVANCED (BSA) heavy weight torpedo (HWT), which is already available to the Italian Navy, is the centrepiece of a weapons suite which will also be upgraded with the capacity for deep-strike or over-the-horizon engagements.Being the main node of an underwater net-work linking manned and unmanned plat-forms – thus extending the navy’s overall surveillance capabilities – the new CMS will represent a “game-changer” in the global landscape of submarine combat systems. It will see its first potential additional ap-plication with the mid-life update of Italy’s U212A Batch I and II submarines.

Norwegian-German Common Design

The Norwegian and German Ministries of Defence announced in March 2021 that they had reached an agreement with ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) on the general conditions for the pro-curement of six Type 212 CD (Common Design) submarines. Four of these will be supplied to the Norwegian Navy and two to the German Navy. While already ap-proved in Norway, a German parliamen-tary decision is expected this summer. Ac-cording to TKMS, the construction of the first submarine could begin in 2023 if the contract is signed this summer. Delivery of the first submarine for the Norwegian Navy is expected in 2029, while delivery of the two boats for the German Navy is scheduled for 2031 and 2034.

According to official statements, the de-sign of the Type 212A, which has proven itself in service with German and Ital-ian Navies, will be further developed. Although little is known about the Type 212 CD’s detailed characteristics, its key features will be the integration of ad-vanced technologies that will further expand the European U212 family. Com-puter renderings show a larger platform compared with the Type U212A. New technologies could potentially include improved fuel cells and new diesel en-gines, as well as the latest generation batteries. On the tactical side, increased acoustic stealth, reduced target echo strength, enhanced sensors, special op-erations support and state-of-the-art command and control systems seem likely design requirements.Kta naval systems, a joint venture be-tween TKMS, its Atlas Elektronik naval electronic systems business unit business unit and Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace will provide the fully integrated combat system, which will be known as ORCCA. According to kta naval systems, this plac-es the Type 212 CD in the vanguard of deploying a new family of systems. Over-all, the integrated CMS will provide en-hanced flexibility regarding working ar-rangements inside the submarine’s CIC. Kta’s documentation states that the com-bat system infrastructure will feature a common and integrated approach under which any operator will be able to access any application from any multi-function console. The system will run on a com-mon network and server infrastructure and support virtualised processing and “red/black separation”.The combat system will be capable of inter-facing with and managing the whole range of underwater and above water sensors, as well as the integrated communications and navigations suites. It will perform all weapons control functions, including tor-pedo countermeasures, mine warfare, and optional medium and long-range missiles. The released renderings suggest a control room using lateral operator multifunctional consoles. These are characterised by a sin-gle large touchscreen placed vertically, and a commander station with rotating chair and integrated screens, in addition to a large wall-mounted display. As exclusive supplier to TKMS, kta naval systems is able to engage with the German submarine builder’s global customer base for orders for new construction, upgrades and ret-rofits. Kta naval systems has already per-formed detailed analysis into integrating ORCCA into a wide range of global navies that currently operate submarines.

Lateral arranged multifunction consoles with touchscreen (left and right), Commanding Officer’s station (front-center) and a large wall-mounted display.

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Tailored to master the challenges of the underwater world

ORCCA merges the submarine expertise and ingenuity of the three technology leaders who founded kta naval systems: thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, KONGSBERG and ATLAS ELEKTRONIK. This unparalleled combat system has put the operator’s needs at the heart of its design. ORCCA’s outstanding recognition abilities and the highly integrated sensor approach allow for dependable and rapid decision-making by the crew. The system is exceptionally flexible and can be integrated into any submarine platform. Today. And tomorrow. Thanks to ORCCA’s scalable, responsive and upgradable design which already looks ahead to changing operational and fighting requirements in the future.

The new combat system of kta naval systems:

ORCCA – shaping the future of command and control



France continues Underwater Evolution

In November 2020, the first of six new gen-eration SUFFREN class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN, or SNA as des-ignated by the French Navy) entered into service. The subsequent announcement of the launch of the programme for four third generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN 3G or SNLE 3G) for the French Navy in March 2021, essen-tially outlined the future composition of the components of a French underwater arm that – in some cases – will be in service up to the 2090s. Developed and built by Naval Group with the assistance of TechnicAtome with re-spect to the nuclear propulsion system, the SUFFREN class represents a huge leap in terms of capabilities and applied tech-nologies compared to previous French SSN and SSBN platforms. With a surface/submerged displacement of 4,700/5,300 tonnes and a length of 99 metres, the SUFFREN class is equipped with a new nu-clear generation hybrid propulsion system (steam/electric), a new integrated plat-form management system and an up-to-date CMS (SYCOBS – SYstème de combat COmmun Barracuda SNLE) for subma-rines. It was developed by Naval Group for both the French LE TRIOMPHANT class SSBNs and their SUFFREN class SSNs. An important characteristic is the ensemble of non-penetrating masts – amongst the first of its kind. It permits the CIC (French: PC-NO – Poste Central de la Navigation et des Opérations) to be accommodated where it fits best. This offers more flexibility com-pared to previous generations of subma-rines, where the operations room had to

be installed under the fin. Moreover, the propulsion management centre (French: PCP – Poste Central Propulsion) is posi-tioned near the PCNO, while traditionally in the past it was accommodated aft of the nuclear reactor propulsion compart-ment. Thanks to the higher automation levels of platform, propulsion and combat systems, SUFFREN has a core crew of just 63 personnel (with additional accommo-dation for specialists and Special Forces). First introduced on the last boat of the LE TRIOMPHANT class and later applied to the previous submarines of the class during their refits, the SYCOBS Combat Management System variant onboard SUFFREN class SSNs is understood to incorporate further enhancements in terms of both software and hardware. Although very little information has been released on its capabilities, further im-provements in processing, functionality, the design of human-machine interface,

and in the integration of weapons sys-tems and specific SSN requirements can be assumed. According to published videos and images, the PCNO accommodates up to ten multi-functional consoles with dual touchscreen colour displays. There is also a command-er’s station with dedicated small tactical screens. In addition, the PCNO includes a mission planning and navigation station with a large tactical smart table overlaid with touchscreen, with a further station with two consoles for diving and plat-form control sided by a mission planning area for weapons and intelligence activities. SYCOBS manages an advanced package of sensors including state-of-the-art sonar, communications and EW sites provided by Thales together with navigation equip-ment and a set of non-penetrating masts by Safran. The latter includes the Series 30 Search Optronic Mast (SOM), Series 30 At-tack Optronic Mast (AOM) and the Series 10 Compact Submarine Radar (CSR) mast.SUFFREN is the first French SSN that of-fers a long-range deep strike capability provided by the MdCN naval cruise missile supplied by MBDA. The inventory of 20 weapons also includes Naval Group’s new F21 Artemis heavy-weight torpedo (HWT), the SM39 Block 2 Mod2 anti-ship missile manufactured by MBDA, and naval mines. The submarine is equipped with the Naval Group Nemesis torpedo defensive system fitted with Canto-S decoys. Further progress in the French underwater warfare domain will be achieved with the SSBN 3G (SNLE 3G) programme, again as-signed to Naval Group together with Tech-nicAtome. The SSBN 3G will feature Naval Group’s new generation SYCOBS 3.0 CMS, which will control sensors and communica-tions. Thales will provide new generation flank arrays and bow-mounted sonars and a new towed array based on optical tech-

A concept study of the future SUBTICS suite.

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Naval Group’s SUBTICS (Submarine Tactical Integrated Combat System) as it is internationally in use.


nology (ALRO), all of which is expected to be applied to the SUFFREN class once they fall due for updating. Capitalising on the French Navy’s CMS development, Naval Group has been offering its SUBTICS (Sub-marine Tactical Integrated Combat System) suite on the export market. It is the standard for the group’s SCORPÈNE type submarines and has also been retrofitted to Swedish A12 and A17 boats, as well as to German Type 209 designs. Its latest iterations are being offered worldwide for current sub-marine tenders.

Spain re-joins the Club

After a troubled development and con-struction programme, further complicated by the pandemic, the industry team head-ed by Navantia group finally launched the first S-80 PLUS AIP submarine on 22 April 2021. According to Navantia, its first sailing is scheduled for early 2022 and the deliv-ery to the Spanish Navy in early 2023. The programme encompasses the delivery of four boats alongside a training centre that incorporates both tactical and platform simulators. Navantia based the S-80 PLUS design upon the requirement to conduct a wide range of operations, including Above Surface War-fare (ASuW) with selective land attack ca-pabilities, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Special Forces support, Intelligence, Surveil-lance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and mine-laying. A long-range submarine capable of being equipped with AIP, the S-80 PLIS is characterised by a modular design allow-ing to be customised according to potential customer requirements. With a surface and submerged displacement of, respectively, 2,695 and 2,965 tonnes, an overall length of 81 metres and a beam of 11.68 metres, the boat is larger than the U212A design but smaller than SUFFREN. A high degree of automation will allow a reduced crew of 32, with eight additional berths for Special Forc-es. The new submarine is equipped with a platform management system developed and provided by Navantia Sistemas. This operates alongside the steering and diving control system developed by Avio Aero.Based on the latest version of the SUBICS (SUBmarine Integrated Combat System) suite designed by Lockheed Martin, the S-80 PLUS’s Integrated Combat System Core (ICSC) was jointly developed by the US company and Navantia Sistemas and is structured on the use of open systems and COTS products. Designed to reduce life cy-cle costs and offer configuration flexibility for later adjustments, the ICSC consists of two redundant Navigation and Networks System Cabinets (NNSC). These feed the

network infrastructure, the navigation system and essential applications, includ-ing seven multifunction consoles and large tactical displays delivered by Sainsel. Also linked into the system are two Weapon Pro-cessor Units (WPUs), six Weapon Interface Units (WIUs), a Sonar Array Suite (SAS) and one Own Noise Monitoring in Submarine (ONMS) system. Integrating the combat system’s sensors and weapons, the ICSC enables all relevant data to be gathered, as-sessed, and displayed for offensive, defen-sive or intelligence operations. Processing navigation data from multiple sensors and distributing the essentials to the respec-tive combat system components, the ICSC also manages the submarine’s sensors and weapon suite. Important components of this suite include the sonar complex provided by Lockheed Martin and SAES, a towed array sonar sup-plied by SAES, a surface surveillance suite that includes a Kollmorgen Electro-Optical (now L3Harris KEO) optronic non-penetrat-ing mast (Model 2010 OS) and an attack periscope (Model 2010 AP) with universal modular masts by L3Harris Calzoni, the Indra PEGASO RESM suite, ARIES-S radar and Saab R4 AIS. The communications suite encompasses Tecnobit’s LINPRO proces-sor to manage tactical data through Link 11/22 and SATCOM links. The S-80 PLUS is equipped with six torpedo tubes capable of launching a Spanish Navy-selected weapon inventory including Atlas Elektronik DM2A4 SEEHECHT/SeaHake Mod 4 torpedoes, Boeing UGM-84 SUB-HARPPON Block II missiles and mines. The submarine is also fitted-for the Raytheon UGM-109 TOMA-HAWK cruise missile. An important feature of the S-80 PLUS’s propulsion system is a new Navantia AIP suite called BEST (Bio-Ethanol Stealth Tech-nologies), which is based on an Abengoa Ethanol reformer plus the Collins PEM Fuel

Cell. This will provide an underwater en-durance of around three weeks. BEST will not be available for installation in the lead S-80 PLUS submarines but will be installed in later members of the class and can be retrofitted in the earlier ones. S -80 PLUS’s modular design and the use of non-pen-etrating masts will allow the crew accom-modation to be moving from the forward section to the central areas of the hull. With past construction problems now in the past, Navantia is marketing the S-80 PLUS on the international market, including to India for the P-75I programme.

Saab looks to export

The Swedish defence industry headed by Saab is also looking for export opportuni-ties for its A26 family of submarines, also known as BLEKINGE class. The submarine design is proposed in three export vari-ants (Pelagic, Ocean and Ocean Extended Range), with targets including the Dutch and Polish markets. Saab’s latest SESUB 980 CMS is at the “heart” of the combat systems architecture used in the A26 and the upgraded GOT-LAND class. In order to facilitate system in-tegration, future upgrading and expansion, as well as to reduce costs, all applicable management and control systems are in-terconnected through the vessel’s General Management Services System (GMSS) and operated from common multifunctional consoles. According to Saab, this allows integrated systems, including the CMS, to be individually upgraded or exchanged, thereby greatly reducing project risks as-sociated with complex and highly inte-grated systems. This architectural solution is expected to be attractive to customers who want to see their own industries and manufacturers involved in their submarine procurement programmes. L

The Integrated Combat System Core (ICSC) is developed by Lockheed Martin and Navantia Sistemas is based on the latest version of the SUBICS (SUBmarine Integrated Combat System) suite by Lockheed Martin.

Photo: Navantia


Marketing Report: Rubin Design Bureau

This year, the Central Design Bureau for Ma-rine Engineering Rubin celebrates its 120th anniversary. It is not that long as compared to the extent of Russian history, which dates back over a thousand years. However, these 120 years encompass the entire history of Russian underwater shipbuilding, from the first submarines designed by I.G. Bubnov to today’s state-of-the-art modern strategic nuclear-powered missile carriers (SSBN). During these years our Design Bureau has changed its name more than a few times, but has always honourably and proudly ful-filled the task of securing defence capability for Russia by creating the most advanced submarines.The foundation of Rubin dates back to 4 January 1901, when the Naval Ministry of

the Russian Empire notified naval architects I.G. Bubnov, M.N. Beklemishev and I.S. Gor-yunov of their appointment to undertake the design of semi-submerged vessels. In May 1901, this group of specialists – called the Submarine Construction Commission –designed the Russian Navy’s first combat submarine. Named DOLPHIN, she marked the beginning of professional submarine project development in Russia. This stage was the starting point for forma-tion of a Russian school of submarine de-sign. Even at these earliest of stages, the designers developed a distinctive naval architectural approach, achieving optimal technical solutions for challenges related to manoeuvrability, the employment of power plants, and the launch of weapons.

Throughout the entire period of the Cen-tral Design Bureau for Marine Engineer-ing (CDB ME) Rubin’s industrial activity, its team has successfully implemented the best and most advanced design solutions. Amongst the most well-known results of our work are:• KASATKA: Our first submarine design

subject to serial production.• MINOGA: The first Russian submarine

with diesel propulsion.• LENINETS: The first Soviet-era submarine

specially equipped for minelaying.• Project 615: The first submarine equipped

with a closed-cycle diesel engine.• Project 644: The first submarine with

cruise missiles.• Project 658: The first Soviet nuclear-pow-

ered submarine with ballistic missiles.• Project 685: The submarine that has

achieved the greatest diving depth.• Project 941: The world’s largest subma-

rine.Currently, CDB ME Rubin is a diversified design agency – a leader in the field of de-veloping a wide range of high-tech marine engineering products such as submarines, technical equipment for offshore oil and gas field development, and underwater robotic systems. CDB ME Rubin is an affiliate of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, which has consolidated most of the design bureaus, shipyards and other enterprises involved in the Russian shipbuilding industry.Design work for the Russian Navy remains a priority for CDB ME Rubin. Russia's political leadership, the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Chief Command of the Navy all give the highest priority to the maintenance and enhancement of Russia’s status as one of the world’s leading blue water maritime nations.To this end, CDB ME Rubin is actively in-volved in supporting the construction of ‘Borey’ class SSBNs. Furthermore, a special focus is given to the refinement of non-nuclear submarine designs. Construction of modernised Project 636 diesel-electric submarines and delivery of these boats to the Russian Navy are now in progress. At the same time, special attention is being paid to expanding the series of advanced non-nuclear submarines of the ST. PETERS-BURG (‘Lada’) type, also of significantly up-dated design.

Rubin: A Global Brand in Submarine and UUV Design

Construction of modernised Project 636 diesel-electric submarines for the Russian Navy is currently ongoing.

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Along with the successful work undertaken towards meeting the requirements of the Russian Navy, particular attention is given to military and technical cooperation with overseas countries. CDB ME Rubin has been engaged in this activity for more than sixty years. Over 110 submarines designed by Rubin have been delivered to 15 countries. Marketing activities for the promotion of non-nuclear ‘Amur’ and Project 636 class submarines to foreign markets are ongo-ing, as is the provision of work and services aimed at ensuring post-sales support for previously delivered submarines.During the last decade, Russia has experi-enced dynamic growth in the demand for underwater robotics for military, scientific and civil engineering applications. Over this

period CDB ME Rubin – in cooperation with leading Russian enterprises and scientific agencies of various backgrounds – has ac-cumulated significant experience in the crea-tion of unmanned underwater vehicles and is continuing to accelerate its activities in this field. CDB ME Rubin currently designs un-manned underwater vehicles of all classes.During the last year, the autonomous un-derwater vehicle VITYAZ-D designed by CDB ME Rubin has dived into the Mariana Trench. The duration of the mission, exclud-ing diving and surfacing, took more than three hours. VITYAZ-D became the first underwater robot that has conquered this trench. For first time ever, a super deep-sea unmanned underwater vehicle had per-formed a multi-hour autonomous mission

at the ultimate depth of the World oceans, with its functionality being monitored by sonar communication channels. During submersion, VITYAZ-D accomplished tasks encompassing the mapping, still and video photography of the seabed, as well as sur-veying the surrounding environment.Evaluating the historical development of CDB ME Rubin, we may safely state that all our Design Bureau’s activities have been targeted on the search for solutions in the fields of science, engineering and technology and on their successful implementation in advanced designs. Our company’s main objective is to develop high-performance maritime equip-ment incorporating state-of-the-art capabili-ties to meet the requirements of both Russian and international customers.


Particular attention is being paid to expanding the series of advanced ST. PETERSBURG (Project 677 ‘Lada’) type submarines.

The autonomous underwater vehicle VITYAZ-D is the first underwater robot to conquer the Mariana Trench.



Almost all European countries that cur-rently operate submarines are plan-

ning or building new boats. Some projects are at an early stage, other programmes are well advanced. This article highlights some of the key European submarine pro-grammes.

1. The Netherlands – High, Low Costs

A programme that has been going on since 2013 is the replacement of the four Dutch WALRUS class submarines, built by the defunct Rotterdam shipyard RDM. In 2019, the first boat, HNLMS ZEELEEUW (1990), became the oldest active Dutch submarine in history. The Dutch Ministry of Defence has promised that the subma-rines will be replaced from 2028 onwards but, given the slow pace of the Dutch procurement programme in the past, this target is no longer feasible.

In line with the established procurement process, after completion of a prepara-tory phase, a dialogue phase started at the beginning of this year. Three remain-ing shipyards, Naval Group, Saab Kockums and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) are in talks with the Dutch Defence Ma-teriel Organisation (DMO). The shipyards are asked questions and are challenged to come up with proposals and solutions. All contenders have already submitted a de-sign, but those designs are still in a relatively early phase. The dialogue phase is the cru-cial phase in the selection process and also lays a foundation for the final design.

The dialogue phase must be completed by the end of 2021. However, a choice of a shipyard and a design is not eas-ily made. No fewer than six committees or teams play a role in the submarine replacement. At the lowest level is the project team. This is the only team that includes submarine experts; one level up is a working group with a former subma-riner. Next are three groups and commit-tees with an admiral, general, financial experts, as well as representatives from all other ministries. The highest subma-rine commission is chaired by the Prime Minister Mark Rutte.These committees must decide which yards are allowed to submit an offer. Ship-yards need six months or more to draft an offer for these kinds of major pro-grammes. After that, a Best And Final Of-fer (BAFO) will be requested. However, the Dutch MoD aims at a contract signature in the last quarter of 2022. So there does not

seem to be any time left in the schedule for contract negotiations.Yet, the main reason for setting up this process was the idea of reducing the ac-quisition costs of the new submarines. While the Royal Netherlands Navy is very satisfied with the current WALRUS class submarines, which turned out to be very affordable, politicians in The Hague remain fearful of reputational damage caused by over-priced submarines.Insiders who have spoken to the author criticise the focus on costs. After all, a con-tract signature is the start of a 40-year marriage between the MoD and the ship-

yard, so focusing on putting financial pres-sure on your future spouse may not be a good start.On the other hand, the demands of the Dutch Defence establishment are not in-significant. The Dutch part of the North Sea is too shallow for safe submarine operations. During the Cold War, Dutch submarines operated mainly in the Med-iterranean and the Norwegian Sea. In addition, they must be able to sail to the Caribbean islands that fall under the Dutch Kingdom’s responsibility.

Designs

The expected result is a large diesel-elec-tric submarine of about 3,000 tons that can operate far from home. The Swed-ish shipyard Saab Kockums, which is col-laborating with the Dutch yard Damen Naval, has therefore proposed a larger version of the BLEKINGE class and added their experience of the COLLINS class, as well as Dutch lessons learned from the WALRUS class. The German ship builder TKMS offers a variant of the Type 212CD.

This 212CD E (E for Expeditionary) will not only be bigger but will probably also have more compartments and more diesel generators. Naval Group (France), with Dutch partner Royal IHC, has not yet made anything public, except that the proposal is derived from the nuclear SUFFREN submarine.Insiders fear price and political pressure will ultimately outweigh the Submarine Service’s requirements. According to them, relatively little attention is paid, for example, to sensors and weapon systems. But once the builder has been chosen, the sensor and weapon system

European Submarines: Patience is the KeyJaime Karremann

Pictured is Saab Kockums' design study of the A26 or BLEKINGE class submarine – expeditionary version.

Image: Saab

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Setting tomorrow’s standards.The HDW Class 212CD submarine.


will also been more or less determined as well. It is known that the Dutch Navy would prefer the new British Sonar 2076, but this is exclusively linked to the Saab and Damen proposal.

Record Time

Once the contract is signed in 2022, there will hardly be any time left for the design-ers. The first boat will have to be built in a

record time of six years. That is faster than TKMS built the smaller Type 212A. The av-erage construction time of the completion of the first submarine of an order from the date of contract signing by the three shortlisted yards is 10 years.Another uncertain factor is the space available to the yards. This is a particu-lar concern with TKMS. All the contend-ers have offered to build the submarines in the Netherlands. Both Saab Kockums and Naval Group have attracted a Dutch partner. Two years ago, TKMS presented a plan to build its proposed submarines at the naval dockyard in Den Helder. Local politicians reacted positively, but the com-mander of the Dutch Navy has recently spoken out against submarine construc-tion at the naval base. A “Submarine Val-ley” outside the naval base is still possible, but TKMS would still lack a Dutch partner.

2. Poland

The Polish Submarine Service also has to be very patient. Poland has been planning to replace their KILO class submarine ORP OR-ZEL and the two second-hand KOBBEN class submarines for years. Several times replace-ments seemed to be visible on the horizon.

Here is a rendering of the Nowegian-German Type 212CD submarine.

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In 2016, the Polish government decided to renew the fleet and new submarines were to be commissioned in 2025. In January 2018, the Polish MoD announced that a choice from the offerings of Naval Group, Saab Kockums and TKMS, would be made that month. However, since then it has remained silent.

The KOBBEN class submarines date from 1966 and 1967, whilst the ORZEL has been sailing since 1986. It has recently come to light that the torpedo tubes of the ORZEL are no longer operational and need to be repaired.To fill the gap between these boats and the new ones, a solution seemed to come

from Sweden in 2020: the two A17 SÖ-DERMANLAND class submarines dating from 1988 were to be sold to Poland. Saab Kockums would also update the KOBBEN class submarines.Despite all these plans, it seems that no choice will be made in the short term. New submarines are not a priority, ac-cording to a tweet from Defence Minis-ter Marius Blaszczak in February. The pri-ority now lies with the MIECZNIK class coastal defence vessel. Whether Poland will buy second-hand submarines from Sweden depends entirely on the Swed-ish proposal, Blaszczak tweeted.

3. Norway and Germany

Turning to Norway and Germany, here some progress has been made finally. Both countries formally announced in 2017 that they would jointly procure submarines but had already been in talks with each other – and with the Nether-lands – for some time. Defence ministers Ine Eriksen Soreide, Ursula von der Ley-en and Jeanine Hennis, got along well and, for some time, it looked as if the three countries would jointly purchase the Type 212CD.

Breaking the surface is the first-of-class SUFFREN nuclear attack submarine.

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However, the Netherlands dropped out and Germany and Norway continued talks on a joint basis. Even though the Nor-wegian Submarine Service operates with German built boats, long negotiations fol-lowed. Proposals from TKMS were rejected several times.In March, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence finally announced that an agreement has been reached between Norway and TKMS on the submarines. Germany and Norway will also undertake the joint procurement of missiles, in addition to the development of the Future Naval Strike Missile.This does not mean that the procurement of the six submarines has been complet-ed. This summer, the German parliament must agree as well, after which the final signature can be put on the contract. The first 212CD can then be expected in 2029. The submarines will be a big step forward, especially for Norway. The ULA class sub-marines were put into service in 1989 - 1992, have a displacement of 1150 tons and do not have Air Independent Propul-sion (AIP). Nevertheless, the German Na-vy, which operates with the more modern Type 212A, will also add meaningful new capabilities with the ocean going 212CD.Not much is known about the Type 212CD apart from some basic specifications. It is expected to have a displacement of 2,400 tons, will have two diesels (instead of one on the 212A) and AIP. In addition, TKMS has paid a lot of attention to targeting echo strength: the degree to which the submarine reflects a sonar signal. That is

why a coating was chosen in combination with an angular shaped hull, possibly also using a double hull.

4. France

The replacement of the French RUBIS class submarines is in a more advanced phase. A year ago, after a three-year delay, SUF-FREN started initial sea trials. This first submarine of the BARRACUDA class, the nuclear attack submarines subsequently passed all tests. Due to the delays with SUFFREN and closure of the Naval Group shipyard for two months due to COVID-19 suppression measures, the second sub-marine (DUGUAY-TROUIN) will also arrive late: likely during the second half of 2022. The third boat, TOURVILLE, is delayed too and will be delivered early in 2024.Meanwhile, the RUBIS class submarines are still very much needed. When PERLE was badly damaged by fire in June 2020, it was feared that France would have to make do with fewer submarines until the six BARRA-CUDAs were all commissioned. However, despite the fire, the French Submarine Ser-vice turned out to have luck on its side. The forward part of the older submarine SAPHIR, decommissioned in 2019, remained in good condition even though the nuclear reactor in its aft end was no longer operational. As the damage on the PERLE was located in the forward part, it was decided to combine the two functioning parts. In February 2021, SAPHIR and PERLE were cut and, then, in April, the two “good” sections welded to-

gether. This was claimed to be a unique op-eration. Although submarines have been cut in half in the past, this has largely been to add an extra section. Incidentally, the new PERLE will also be slightly longer. She is ex-pected to return to service in 2023.

5. Spain

In Cartagena, the waiting of the Spanish Submarine Service seems to be almost over as, on April 22, the first S-80 sub-marine ISAAC PERAL was launched. She is expected to be delivered in 2023. Origi-nally, the first S-80 was to be put into ser-vice in 2011, but design errors made the submarine too heavy, which would have limited the boat's operation. The design of the S-80 was subsequently adapted and improved with help from abroad.While the S-80 submarine lacks innova-tions such as optronic masts and casings over the diesel generators that have been fitted to some contemporaries, the AIP system developed by Navantia looks very promising. This fuel cell system, which will only be ready in time for the third sub-marine, does not work with hydrogen but with an ethanol reformer. As a result, no heavy hydrogen cylinders need to be installed and there are also no logisti-cal problems with obtaining hydrogen. Above all, a reformer provides a greater range. Navantia is currently running tests on land, but before we can see the new AIP installation on board, we will, again, have to be patient. L

ISAAC PERAL, the first-of-class S-80 PLUS submarine (S-81), here floating out, is planned to conduct the first sailing in early 2022 and be delivered in early 2023.

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Over time, both commercial ships and naval vessels have embodied increas-

ing levels of automation as a means to improve safety, increase efficiency, and reduce crew size. The bridge and machin-ery control space, for example, are both areas where the introduction of automated processes and decision support means that sailors increasingly play a monitoring or su-pervisory role. For example, while modern integrated bridge systems can programme a defined course for an autopilot to fol-low, it remains necessary for an officer of the watch to be present on a ship’s bridge to maintain a look out and take appropri-ate actions in the event of encounters with other sea traffic.

The Path to Autonomy

Now, however, advances in information technology, digitisation and Artificial Intel-ligence (AI)/machine learning are paving the way for a new generation of autono-mous ships able to steer, navigate and, if necessary, make decisions about any change in control settings independent of any human intervention. And while not all autonomous systems are unmanned, the development of “un-crewed” ships imple-menting advanced “intelligent” autono-mous behaviours is increasingly the focus of attention for the maritime sector.Remote operation represents a step on the ladder towards full autonomy. In this case, a human operator remains “in-the-loop”, albeit exercising ship management and control from a remote location via a communication link. In this case, some form of AI-based planner may conduct routine operations, but remote supervisors will intervene to manage any deviations or problems. Of course, this necessarily leaves remotely controlled vessels dependent on

radio communication links which may be degraded by environment or geography, vulnerable to jamming, or potentially com-promised by cyber-attack.In a fully autonomous ship, the vessel op-erating system only requires to be given a mission or goal by the operator, with all op-erations undertaken on board without hu-man interaction/intervention. That means the ship must sense the environment, fuse sensor feeds (organic and non-organic) to build situational awareness, and then “think” for itself - by applying control and decision algorithms – so as to make deci-sions and determine actions. The ship must calculate consequences and risks, and also monitor its own heath and status.Navigation and collision avoidance is par-ticularly important for remote and autono-mous vessels given the implications for safety at sea. The ship’s autopilot must be integrated with a collision avoidance module that is programmed according to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) such that it can navigate automatically in compliance with the maritime “rules of the road”.The commercial marine sector sees huge potential in autonomous shipping. As well as reducing crewing costs, increasing safe-

ty, and eliminating the possibility for hu-man error, an autonomous and un-crewed vessel offers new possibilities with regard to the more efficient ship design (in terms of both internal volume and fuel consump-tion). Of course, the introduction of autono-mous ships into merchant marine service brings its own challenges from a legal and regulatory perspective. The operation of remotely-controlled autonomous vessels will need to be at least as safe as existing vessels if they are to secure regulatory ap-proval, the support of ship owners, opera-tors, insurers, seafarers, and broader public acceptance.Navies are also seeking to embrace and exploit the advantages afforded by au-tonomous shipping, albeit with different motives and means in mind. And while the merchant marine sector is already looking at autonomous ships of significant size and displacement, naval forces are – for the time being at least – largely focused on relatively small and agile Unmanned Surface Ves-sels (USVs) that can serve as cost-effective force multipliers with direct application to so-called “dull, dirty and dangerous” mis-sions. Examples include mine countermeas-ures, force protection against asymmetric

All Hands off Deck: US & UK Navies Explore the Potential of Autonomous Surface VesselsRichard Scott

Au th o rRichard Scott is a well-known author and commentator on naval opera-tions and technology.

Over time, ships have embodied increasing levels of automation in areas such as integrated bridge management. Advances in IT are now paving the way for a new generation of autonomous ships that can operate independent of human intervention.

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threats, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) “collect”. Autonomous ships have several attractions to the maritime commander. USVs can re-main on task well for days or even weeks at a time, offering far greater persistence than manned capabilities. Furthermore, they may be deployed into high-risk en-vironments for wide area surveillance/ISR missions in the knowledge that damage or loss will not cost human lives.Also, with manned platforms becoming increasingly expensive to build, support and crew, autonomous vessels bring the potential for increased mass, expanded footprint and improved resilience. Indeed, USVs functioning as adjuncts to crewed warships will most likely change future con-cepts of operation (CONOPS), allowing for the disaggregation and dispersal of “sen-sors”, “deciders” and “shooters” in the kill chain. This concept of distributed mari-time operations, underpinned by a mix of manned and unmanned assets, is already being avowed by the US Navy.Yet while the potential of autonomous vessels is increasingly recognised by fleet planners and capability managers, there is still a journey to travel with regard to ma-turing autonomous technologies, devel-oping robust CONOPS, and creating the overarching system architecture(s) within which USVs can interface and interoper-ate using common standards. Continued investment in Science & Technology (S&T), and the fielding of autonomy prototypes for operational experimentation, are both serving to de-risk and demonstrate capa-bility, and inform future programmes of record.

Unmanned Vision

As so often, it is the US Navy that is develop-ing the most ambitious vision of how sur-face ship autonomy will serve to transform naval operations. US Navy leadership sees autonomy, AI, machine learning and asso-ciated technologies an intrinsic part of its response to the emergence of peer threats - notably China – and the return to "Great Power Competition". In particular, the po-tential for a peer competitor to deny US naval forces freedom of manoeuvre in the Pacific is driving the service towards a larger, more distributed, and more lethal fleet.USVs are seen as fundamental to this vision given that they can be procured and oper-ated at a fraction of the cost of manned ships. Accordingly, the service’s planned Future Surface Combatant Force includes a fleet of unmanned platforms alongside a mix of manned large surface combatants and small surface combatants.

Work undertaken by the US Navy over the last five years – informed by an extensive programme of concept development, war-gaming and experimentation – has identi-fied a requirement for two different USV types - the Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MUSV) and the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) - and as part of the Distributed Maritime Operations concept. Allied to this is the development of an Un-manned Maritime Autonomy Architecture intended to promote autonomy commonal-ity, and reduce acquisition costs across both surface and undersea unmanned vehicles. Systems development and acquisition ef-forts are being managed by the Program Executive Office Unmanned and Small Com-batants in the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), specifically the Unmanned Mari-time Systems Program Office (PMS 406).The MUSV is characterised as a class 3 (be-tween 12 metres and 50 metres in length) long-endurance distributed sensing plat-form capable of autonomous navigation and mission execution. Operating as an extension of a carrier strike group or sur-face action group, MUSVs will support the navy's ability to ‘collect’ using ISR and EW

sensors, and provide/improve distributed situational awareness and sensing to the battle force.The LUSV is a larger (above 50 metres) plat-form capable of deployments and trans-oceanic transits lasting several weeks. Op-erating in support of carrier strike groups, surface action groups, amphibious ready groups, or single units, LUSVs are intended to offer a reconfigurable, high endurance platform with their own combat system (including weapon payloads).PMS 406 is leading on the acquisition of prototype vessels to support the MUSV and LUSV future programmes of record. To this end, it is working with a number of S&T organisations, notably the Defense Ad-vanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO). In addition, PMS 406 is closely aligned to the US Navy’s Surface Development Squadron 1 (SURFDEVRON). Established in May 2019 in San Diego, California, SUR-FDEVRON is steadily building up its com-plement of USVs as part of a prototyping and experimental effort designed to de-

A spectrum of aerial, surface and underwater robotic systems. Navies are seeking to embrace and exploit the advantages afforded byautonomy to perform so-called “dull, dirty and dangerous” missions.

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velop and inform the MUSV and LUSV pro-grammes. These will eventually comprise the prototype Medium Displacement Un-manned Surface Vehicle (MDUSV) testbeds SEA HUNTER and SEAHAWK; four vessels from the SCO “Overlord” programme; and the first prototype MUSV.

An Experimental Fleet

According to PMS 406, the scope and scale of research – requiring thousands of hours of on-water testing time – justifies the build-up of such a large experimental fleet. The delivery schedule to the SURFDESRON is also

intended to align with technology demon-stration exercises associated with specific capabilities. This includes evaluation of a number of different autonomy technolo-gies, different payloads, CONOPS develop-ment (including collaborative operations be-tween multiple unmanned assets operating in proximity with each other) and reliability assurance.SEA HUNTER is a 40-metre trimaran USV originally procured by DARPA under the An-

The medium displacement unmanned surface vessels SEAHAWK and SEA HUNTER sail out of San Diego in April 2021 to participate in the US Pacific Fleet’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Battle Problem 21.

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LIBBY L McCALL – also identified by the name RANGER on AIS – is part of the Strategic Capa- bilities Office’s “Overlord” programme.

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ti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Un-manned Vessel (ACTUV) project. Developed and built by a Leidos-led industry team, AC-TUV was conceived to demonstrate a semi-autonomous, ultra-long endurance surface drone able to “track and trail” quiet diesel electric submarines.However, it was recognised early on that the core SEA HUNTER platform and au-tonomy technologies were applicable to a broader range of missions and configura-tions for future unmanned maritime sur-face platforms. As a result, DARPA and the ONR in September 2014 agreed to jointly fund an extended test phase for the SEA HUNTER demonstrator. In October 2016 testing began of SEA HUNTER’s sensing and autonomy suites, and between Febru-ary and September 2017 the vessel under-took three progressively more challenging tests to integrate these suites and use them compliant with COLREGS in operationally realistic scenarios.

SEA HUNTER was transferred across from DARPA to ONR in January 2018 for fur-ther concept and technology development. SURFDEVRON took charge of SEA HUNTER from the ONR at the end of 2019. Leidos was in December 2017 contracted by the ONR to build a second MDUSV prototype, named SEAHAWK, incorpo-rating lessons learned from the original SEA HUNTER. Specific modifications in-clude an upgraded electrical system, a payload mounting system and test op-erator control station. SEAHAWK was handed over in April 2021 and will now join SURFDEVRON.The “Overlord” programme, part of the SCO's “Ghost Fleet” project, has sought to inform requirements development for the LUSV programme. Established in 2017, ‘Overlord’ has seen two existing commer-cial fast supply vessels – LIBBY L McCALL and RILEY CLAIRE – adapted for COL-REGS-compliant unmanned operations.

Phase I activity focused on autonomy sys-tem integration, demonstration of navi-gational autonomy, and hull, mechanical and electrical system reliability upgrades. Over 600 hours of autonomy testing was successfully completed during Phase I, in-cluding several long-range autonomous transits in a complex navigational envi-ronment. These completed in September 2019 with a successful demonstration of both “Overlord” vessels executing COL-REGS-compliant interactions.A follow-on Phase II has focused on the integration of government-furnished com-mand-and-control systems and payloads and more complex and challenging naval operations experimentation. Following two phases of testing under SCO oversight, the two “Overlord” vessels were transferred to SURFDESRON at the end of FY 2020.PMS 406 serves as the SCO’s execution agent for the Ghost Fleet “Overlord” ef-fort. Addressing the Surface Navy Asso-ciation annual symposium in January 2021, Captain Pete Small, PMS 406 programme manager, said the “Overlord” programme had made “tremendous strides forward in demonstrating unmanned surface vehicle technology” over the previous 12 months.In May 2020, the – LIBBY L McCALL – also identified by the name RANGER on AIS – made an extended transit from the Gulf coast to the east coast of the United States, operating autonomously over sev-en days for over 3,000 nautical miles. Last September, LIBBY L McCALL/RANGER began an extended transit from the Gulf coast, through the Panama Canal, to the west coast of the United States in sup-port of a full schedule of FY 2021 demon-strations with SURFDESRON. “This long transit was over 4,700 nautical miles total travelled, and over 97% of those miles were accomplished in autonomy mode,” Captain Small said. “The only time that vessel was not in autonomy mode was during the brief period of time it actually transited the Panama Canal. Almost as impressive was that that full transit was remotely supervised by SURFDEVRON sailors from a shore-based control sta-tion using a prototype common control systems software interface.”Arriving on the west coast in early No-vember, the LIBBY L McCALL/RANGER participated in the “Dawn Blitz” exercise in December, successfully demonstrating COLREGS compliance, station keeping, loiter and transit missions. This marked the first time an “Overlord” USV had in-teracted with actual US Navy fleet assets.The two “Overlord” prototypes will con-tinue demonstrations during FY 2021. Ac-cording to Captain Small, the intention is

C L3Harris was in July 2020 awarded a US$35M contract by NAVSEA for the detail design and construction of the MUSV prototype.

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“to show increasingly complex and long operations in concert with fleet assets.”Contracts were awarded during FY 2020 for the construction of two additional “Overlord” prototypes. These are cur-rently in construction, and will provide additional capacity for test and demon-stration events.Meanwhile, in July 2019, PMS 406 issued a request for proposals (RFP) for MUSV development. Following evaluation of four proposals, a team led by L3Har-ris was awarded a US$35M contract by NAVSEA in July 2020 for the detail design and construction of the MUSV prototype. The contract includes options for up to eight additional MUSVs, together with logistics, engineering and technical sup-port and services, which could bring the cumulative value up to US$281M.Delivery of the MUSV prototype is planned for Fiscal Year 2023. The design successfully bid by L3Harris Technologies combines the company's proprietary AS-View autonomy technology with a pur-pose-built 60-metre mono-hull platform based on a commercial offshore supply vessel. As prime contractor, L3Harris is taking responsibility as systems inte-grator while also providing the mission autonomy and perception technology; naval architecture and systems engineer-ing group Gibbs & Cox is serving as the MUSV ship design agent and engineering plant automation lead; Incat Crowther is supporting ship design activities; and Swiftships will build the MUSV prototype in Morgan City, Louisiana.As regards the LUSV, NAVSEA in Septem-ber 2019 issued a RFP for the award of mul-tiple conceptual design contracts. The RFP characterised the LUSV as “a high-endur-ance, reconfigurable ship able to accom-modate various payloads for unmanned missions to augment the Navy’s manned surface force”. Six contractor teams – led by Huntington Ingalls, Lockheed Martin, Bollinger Shipyards Lockport, Fincantieri Marinette Marine, Gibbs & Cox and Austal USA – were awarded LUSV study contracts in September 2020.

UK Technology Demonstration

While unable to match the span of re-sources available to the US Navy, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Royal Navy (RN) are also investing in develop-ment and experimentation of maritime autonomous systems. As part of this work, the MoD’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) is man-aging the Maritime Autonomy Surface

Testbed (MAST) programme in partner-ship with L3Harris.Having originally conducted MAST at-sea trials with an adapted BLADERUNNER high speed craft, Dstl let a contract with L3Harris in early 2018 for the design and build of the new testbed craft known as MAST-13. An aluminium-built, custom design based on a high speed semi-planing hull form, the 12.7-metre MAST-13 is outfitted to enable the easy integration of additional payloads: the cabin offers space for rack-mounted servers, and standard network interfaces

and power supplies allows suppliers to bring their systems on board and plug into the host infrastructure.The command and control system is based on the core ASView product previously developed by L3Harris, atop which sits the MAST Advanced Autonomy system. It is this additional autonomy module which, inte-grated with ASView, executes the higher level COLREGs and behaviours.As a testbed, MAST-13 is serving two pri-mary functions. First it is an operational demonstrator to enable the RN and Royal Marines to evaluate use cases and con-cepts of operation. Second, it establishes a baseline autonomous surface capabil-ity on top of which new functionalities can be assessed (the architecture of the system is designed to allow third-party sensors or algorithms to be easily intro-duced to permit comparative assess-ments against the baseline).A significant milestone was achieved in De-cember 2019 when MAST-13 demonstrated a fully autonomous return crossing of the English Channel. In company with a manned mother ship, the USV sailed south from the Solent to the 12-mile limit of France and back. The round trip took about five hours, and covered a distance of over 120 nauti-cal miles, with MAST-13 achieving speeds of over 30 knots. Various aspects of MAST-13’s advanced autonomy were tested, includ-ing autonomous route planning in line with

COLREGs, sea state monitoring, and the sur-veillance capability provided by an L3Harris WESCAM electro-optical infrared system.Dstl is continuing to progress MAST-13 research and experimentation activity, in conjunction with L3Harris: the craft has also participated in a number of Royal Marines’ Autonomous Advance Force exercises.In March 2021 L3Harris delivered a near identical high-speed autonomous test-bed, given the name MADFOX [Maritime Autonomy Demonstrator For Operation-al eXperimentation], to the RN’s NavyX

programme. NavyX is an accelerator pro-gramme designed to demonstrate innova-tion in autonomous systems and artificial intelligence, and to provide a route map for subsequent exploitation by the RN. While MAST-13 is being used by Dstl to test low Technology Readiness Level inno-vations, such as novel algorithms, artificial intelligence, and sensors, MADFOX will be employed by NavyX to explore operating and operational issues such as safety, regula-tory compliance, mission profiles/payloads, and integration in the wider fleet.NavyX has also received an unmanned Pa-cific 24 rigid inflatable boat developed by BAE Systems’ Maritime Services business. An adaptation of the 7.8 metre PACIFIC 24 Mk 4 used as the RN’s standard ships’ sea boat, the autonomous variant is the prod-uct of a research and development effort undertaken in conjunction with L3Harris (which is providing its COLREGS-compliant autonomous navigation software) and MSI-Defence (which has provided its SEAHAWK Multi-Weapon Station for integration). Another important strand of maritime autonomy S&T in the UK is the develop-ment of the Maritime Autonomous Plat-form Exploitation (MAPLE) information framework. MAPLE has been iteratively developed by Dstl and a QinetiQ-led in-dustry team to facilitate the integration of multiple unmanned systems into a single command information environment. L

MAST-13 is being used by Dstl to test innovative technologies such as novel algorithms, artificial intelligence, and sensors.

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Commissioned on 5 May 2017, RSS IN-DEPENDENCE is the first of eight IN-

DEPENDENCE class Littoral Mission Vessels (LMV) to enter service with the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). The contract to build the LMVs was awarded to ST Engineering (Marine) in 2013 and the ships were con-structed at the ST Engineering (Marine) Benoi Shipyard situated in the Jurong In-dustrial Area. The LMVs were the product of a joint-design by Saab Kockums AB and ST Engineering. Saab Kockums AB was also the builder of RSN’s refurbished ARCHER class submarines, and the Swedish navy’s VISBY class stealth corvettes, which formed an important reference for the LMV design. The newly built ships were intended to re-place the eleven (originally twelve) aging FEARLESS class patrol vessels which had served the Singapore Navy for over two decades. Based on official sources, four of the FEARLESS class patrol vessels will be refurbished into SENTINEL class Maritime Security and Response Vessels (MSRV) and two are currently in service to support the LMVs at the time of writing. Most of the LMVs inherited the names of their FEAR-LESS class predecessors (namely RSS IN-DEPENDENCE, RSS SOVEREIGNTY, RSS UNITY, RSS JUSTICE, RSS DAUNTLESS and RSS FEARLESS), although RSS INDOMITA-BLE and RSS FORTITUDE are exceptions to this approach. The LMV is one of three new types of surface ship that will be introduced into RSN. The other two are the 5,000 tonne Multi-Role Combat Vessel (MRCV) and the 14,000 tonne Joint Multi Mission Ship (JMMS) that will be constructed by local shipyards over the coming decade. They form part of RSN’s strategic plan to ex-pand and modernise its fleet as well as to significantly enhance the navy’s combat ca-pabilities. This includes widening the range of missions it can embark on in the future, including humanitarian roles.

Design Characteristics

Similar to the United States Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), the LMVs adopted the concept of “mission modularity” and can be easily configured to a specific mission operation requirement in a short amount of time. Each LMV is 80 meters (262 feet 6 inches) in length and 12 meters (39 feet 4 inches) in beam with a displacement of around 1,180 to 1,320 tons, depend-ing on the equipment loaded onboard. That displacement figure is greater than the combination of both FEARLESS class patrol boat and VICTORY class “light” corvette (500 and 600 tons respectively), thus leading to some military analysts and strategists to compare it with a “normal” corvette, in terms of displacement and combat capabilities.Utilising a Combined Diesel And Diesel (CO-DAD) propulsion arrangement, each LMV is powered by four MTU 20V 4000 M93L diesel engines that each produce 4.3MW (5,770 ship horse power) for a total output of 17.2MW (or 23,100 ship horse power). They can cruise at 18 knots and achieve a maximum speed of 27 knots. They have a range up to 3,000 nautical miles (5,560 kilometres). This allows the LMVs to op-

erate for an extended period of time and also to deploy beyond the littoral into the waters of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.Each LMV is managed and operated by a lean crew of 23 (down from the original 30 of the FEARLESS class patrol boats) despite its larger size. This is due to the introduction of highly advanced and automated systems to the ship, though it can carry around an additional 30 personnel for expanded or specialised missions. The Singapore Armed Forces as a whole has been facing a short-age of combat-fit professional military per-sonnel in recent years due to demographic trends. A high level of automation is there-fore sought; with a reduction of crews of future warships a major consideration for the upper echelon of Singapore’s Defence establishment. Ease of accessibility and simple maintenance were also factored in when designing the LMVs. As a result, all elements of the LMV’s Bridge, Combat Information Centre and Machinery Control Room are co-located in the Integrated Command Centre (ICC). This is different from the arrangement in the FEARLESS class ships, where these func-tions were located at separate locations or on different decks. Although this new ar-

RSS INDEPENDENCE: New Approaches to Defending the LittoralHsing Lim

Au th o rHsing Lim is a strategic consultant who advises governments and think-tanks around the world on defence, intelligence and security matters

A total of eight INDEPENDENCE class LMVs have been delivered to the Republic of Singapore Navy.

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rangement integrates the management of navigation, engineering, and combat func-tions to achieve greater operational effec-tiveness for maritime security operations, it is possible that a single hit on the ICC from hostile fire could wipe out the ship’s entire command function, incapacitating opera-tions and thus crippling the ship entirely.

Sensors

The principal “eye” of the LMV is the NS100 medium to long range Active Elec-tronically Scanned Array (AESA) 3-dimen-sional air and surface surveillance radar supplied by Thales of France. Housed in a distinctive integrated mast atop the ICC, the LMVs are among its first users. The E/F-band AESA radar uses dual axis multi-beam processing to significantly enhance the ship’s situational awareness, enabling it to identify the most prominent threats for robust weapons prioritisation in the littoral environment. Notably, it has the ability to detect a high variety of targets simultane-ously in a single operational mode.The LMV’s situational awareness and navigation are supported by the Sharp-Eye navigation radar system supplied by Hensoldt UK (formerly Kelvin Hughes). SharpEye is recognised as the world’s first affordable navigation and surface search pulse Doppler radar sensor, improving detection ranges of small targets. It con-sists of no moving components and thus requires low maintenance and has a low cost of ownership. Singapore is a tropical country and heavy rain is very common in the region. SharpEye radar is able to mini-mise cluttering within its detection range as compared to traditional radars, which

lose much of their effectiveness in severe downpours or storms.The Littoral Mission Vessels are also equipped with the indigenously developed STELOP 360 all-round surveillance system and Compass D electro-optical director. According to the developer, the former is an all-weather day & night maritime surveil-lance system capable of providing real time automatic vessel and swimmer intrusion detection and alert, maritime vessels navi-gation collision and obstacle avoidance. It is able to provide a configurable integrated maritime surveillance video and synthetic picture and incorporates a user friendly common control interface.The LMV’s unique Gun Fire-Control System (GFCS) was jointly developed by Sagem (now part of Safran) of France, which is a long-standing partner to the RSN, and the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) of Singapore. The contract to de-velop the new system was signed in Sin-

gapore during IMDEX Asia 2013. The new GFCS is based on existing GFCS currently in service with the six FORMIDABLE class frigates, and four ENDURANCE class Land-ing Ship Tanks (LSTs) of the Singapore Navy. The Sagem GFCS, capable of operating concurrently from several multi-function consoles, is integrated into the ship’s main ST Engineering supplied Combat Manage-ment System (CMS) that links the ship’s main and secondary guns, radar, optronics and navigation systems. The CMS has an open architecture that allows for easy in-tegration, ensuring flexibility and scalability for future upgrades and enhancement.

Armament

The main gun of the LMV is the highly popular and reliable OTO MELARA 76mm Super Rapid, built by the Italian defence company that now forms part of the De-fence Systems Division of Leonardo. It is able to fire at a maximum rate of 120 rounds per minute with an engagement range of up to 16 kilometres. It is capable of automatic loading via a revolving magazine which holds 80 rounds and reloading can easily be accomplished by two sailors even when the gun is firing. The 76mm OTO MELARA gun is no stranger to the RSN as it is in service with all of RSN’s current fleet of surface warships including the newly furbished MSRVs. It is worth noting that the guns on the LMV are of the traditional dome shape instead of those with stealthy external features, unlike those fitted to the FORMIDABLE class frigates. The OTO MELARA 76 mm gun can also be found on many of the newer surface combat ships of the neighboring Indonesian Navy and Royal Malaysian Navy.Complementing the 76mm gun are two 12.7mm HITROLE (Highly Integrated Tur-ret, Remote, Overhead, Light, Electrical) remote controlled weapon stations (also

The LMVs were constructed at the ST Engineering (Marine) Benoi Shipyard. This picture shows the launch ceremony for FEARLESS, the final member of the class.

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The LMVs are powered by four MTU 20V 4000 M93L diesel engines that each produce 4.3MW. Maximum speed is 27 knots.

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significantly enhanced hit probability un-der adverse combat or weather conditions. Besides an eye-safe laser range finder, the gun utilises mounted-on electro-optical and forward-looking infrared directors for day and night operations respectively. It has an automatic target tracker as well as an integrated computer to calculate firing so-lutions. The TYPHOON is particularly useful in dealing with swarm attacks by hostile el-ements using small and fast-moving boats.A noticeable weapon enhancement over the previous FEARLESS class is the LMV’s incorporation of 12 vertical launch cells armed with French-made VL MICA-M anti-air and anti-missile defense missiles. Developed by MBDA Missile Systems, the VL-MICA is an all-weather short range vertical launch surface to air missile (SAM) for point and close-area defense against a wide range of aerial threats such as air-craft, helicopters, missiles, precision guided munitions and smart bombs. The MICA system is preferred over the ASTER system which is installed on the larger FORMI-DABLE class frigate, due to the suitability of its reduced footprint for small combat ships as well as cost considerations. Despite lacking the unique combination of aero-dynamic control and direct thrust vector control commonly known as “PIF-PAF” in the ASTER system, the MICA system of-fers good capabilities at shorter ranges. The system can be autonomously guided with an extremely short reaction time and has a multiple target capability for defence against saturation anti-ship attacks. That is a major advancement as compared to the manually-operated MISTRAL man-porta-ble air defense systems (MANPADS) which was the primary anti-air weapon of LMV’s predecessors. The LMVs also features non-lethal weap-ons, including two LRAD555X Long-Range Acoustic Devices with xenon lights and two water cannon systems. The LARD500X is a low power all-weather communication de-vice which creates an instant acoustic fence using a variable beam width using clear long range directional communication to give a greater coverage. Highly intelligible voice messages can reach a distance up to 2,000 meters or a maximum range of 650 meters over 88 dB in noisy environment.One obvious absentee from the LMV’s outfit is the Leonardo A244-S Mod 1 (or Mod 3) light-weight torpedoes which were previously installed on six of the twelve FEARLESS class patrol vessels. The RSN has confirmed that the LMVs itself will be with-out fixed Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities. In their place, however, is a helipad (without hangar) that enables the operation of a mid-size helicopter such as

built by Leonardo) and a single 25mm TY-PHOON weapon station stabilised gun sup-plied by Rafael of Israel. The HITROLE is a highly versatile weapon system and allows a 7.62 mm Machine Gun or 12.7 mm Ma-chine Guns or a 40 mm Automatic Grenade

Launcher to be mounted without any intru-sive installation. The “Mini-Typhoon” gun variant selected by the RSN for its LMVs is a lightweight, stabilised remotely-controlled weapon station. It is an optimal solution for small warships like the LMVs, with a

A view of INDEPENDENCE at the time of her initial delivery. The integrated mast that houses the ships Thales NS 100 surveillance radar and other sensors is prominent in this view.

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This view of INDEPENDENCE at sea shows the large helicopter deck and the aft launch and recovery position used to deploy RHIBs and USVs.

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The PROTECTOR USV can be deployed from the LMV’s launch and recovery system.

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the Sikorsky S-70B SEAHAWK of the RSN or the Airbus Helicopters AS332 SUPER PU-MA of the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF). The S-70B is primed for anti-sub-marine missions, as it is equipped with APS 143 surveillance radar, the Raytheon AAS-44 electro-optical sensor system, a dipping sonar (L3 Helicopter Long Range Active Sonar - HELRAS) and Whitehead A244S Torpedoes. The possibility of supporting S-

70B operations will provide the LMV with a potent anti-submarine capability.The ship’s open deck can also be used to deploy unmanned systems such as the Boeing Insitu’s ScanEagle Unmanned Aer-ial Vehicle (UAV) for surveillance and the Remote Environmental Monitoring UnitS (REMUS) Autonomous Underwater Vehi-cle (AUV) for seafloor mapping, under-water surveying, search and recovery as

well as mine countermeasures operations. The LMV's launch-and-recovery system, located at the ship’s stern, can house up to two Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) o Israeli Rafael’s PROTECTOR Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV).

Conclusions

Singapore has regularly provided assis-tance to neighbouring and friendly coun-tries with its military assets, for example in response to events such as natural dis-aster and transportation mishaps, as well as on anti-piracy operations. The new warships are tasked with safeguarding the shores of the island nation, as well as conducting maritime security operations more effectively and efficiently. Flex-ibility in equipment loads means these ships can take on a wider range of mis-sions which may not have been as easily performed by its predecessors. They will no doubt become the workhorses of the Republic of Singapore Navy, shouldering the responsibility of protecting the na-tion’s sea lines of communication as well as ensuring the safe and open passage of its waters. L

The second LMV SOVEREIGNTY. The LMVs are set to become the workhorses of Singapore’s navy.

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Lim

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MA R ITI ME I ND US TRY

Beirut’s wake-up call

On the 4th of August 2020, a massive explosion shook Beirut. A thick smoke cloud surrounded the entire city turning Lebanon’s capital into a vision of “Hell on Earth”. An initial explosion and fire were followed by a devastating blast. The explosion was heard as far away as the island of Cyprus, which is located more than 200 km from Beirut. Seismographs registered waves equivalent to a 3.3 magnitude earthquake. In the apocalyp-tic and chaotic moments after the blast, many healthcare facilities and hospitals were declared “non-functional”. In ad-dition to the impact on the healthcare system and infrastructure, already under immense pressure from COVID-19, the explosion had devastating effects on housing, businesses, food, education, cultural heritage, and tourism. More than 6,500 people were injured and over 200 lost their lives. Furthermore, 300,000 people were displaced due to the de-struction and damage on housing. The blasts originated in a warehouse in the port of Beirut where more than 2,700 tons of ammonium nitrate, a chemical substance commonly used as an agri-cultural fertilizer and for explosives in the mining sector, were unsafely ware-housed. The large amount of highly ex-plosive material was stored in the port of Lebanon’s capital for more than six years after the abandonment of the cargo ship

MV RHODUS. Furthermore, according to investigations, evidence showed that the ammonium nitrate was kept in proxim-ity of a stash of fireworks. Although in-vestigations on the exact causes of the incident are still ongoing, results indicate inaction, negligence and corruption as the root causes that led to the dramatic event. The detonation at Beirut’s port re-sulted in one of the biggest non-nuclear explosions in history.

Hazardous materials Like in the case of Beirut, seaports are a vital component of a country’s infrastruc-ture, representing a lucrative source of in-come and an essential hub for the supply and storage of goods. However, amongst the goods that are regularly shipped via sea and stored at seaports are hazardous substances that require extensive secu-rity measures which are often, and for various reasons, not implemented. While the Beirut explosion itself was unprec-

edented, the events leading up to it were more common than we may think. Hazardous substances such as chemicals, radiological materials and explosives are shipped by sea daily. Every year hundreds of thousands of containers loaded with cargo are abandoned at ports all over the world. Although the transportation of hazardous materials is highly regulated, many of these reach ports through illegal routes, such as the global waste trade. Within this context, a major challenge is represented by the fact that seaborne containers cover an enormous volume of the global trade and usually undergo soft inspections, providing opportunities for illicit traffics. Most of the illicit waste is originating from Western countries and is then shipped to Asia and Africa where the prices for the disposal are much lower and the opportunities for illegal aban-donment in ports much higher. Beirut’s events should serve as a wake-up call on the vulnerability of ports to neglected hazardous materials. Even

The Threat of Hazmat Terrorism at SeaAnna Paternnosto

Recent events in Beirut’s port have drawn international attention to the urgent need for increased security at

seaports, especially in relation to the transport and storage of hazardous materials. Although the explosion

in the port of Lebanon’s capital seems to be the result of negligence, the tragic incident should draw our at-

tention on the potential threat posed by criminal and terrorist groups in ports and in the seaborne shipping

domain.

The massive explosion in the port area of Beirut injuring more than 6500 people and affecting the lives of hundreds of thousands, should serve as a wakeup call on the vulnerability of ports to neglected hazardous materials.

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Au th o rAnna Paternnosto is the Director of Governmental Affairs at IB Consultancy, an independent defence and security consultancy firm specialized in CBRNe threats. Before starting her career within the CBRNe sector, she worked at the Aus-trian Mission to NATO.

MAR ITI ME I ND US TRY


though there is no evidence of the in-volvement of terrorist groups in the ex-plosion, Beirut’s events should keep us alert about the catastrophic potential of terrorist groups getting access to large amounts of hazardous materials.

Terrorism at sea

In countries with political instability and high corruption, these dangerous sub-stances such as chemicals and radiological materials can easily end up in the wrong hands. When stored in poor conditions at ports, terrorist groups could easily get access to these materials. Furthermore, due to the relatively lax security measures on the movement of seaborne contain-ers, seaports and the maritime shipping industry remain an attractive field for ter-rorist groups, either to target or to exploit for illicit traffic. Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda have already demonstrated the potential of sea transport exploitation. In 1998 the group transported explosives to Kenya shortly before these were deployed in the bomb attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed more than 200 people. In October 2002, the French oil tanker MV LIMBURG carrying crude oil from Iran to Malaysia was hit by suicide bombers through a small boat loaded with explo-sives. After the impact, the ship caught fire and leaked large amounts of oil into the Gulf of Aden. Al-Qaeda claimed re-sponsibility for the attack. Furthermore, in March 2003, AI-Qaeda offered to in-vest hundreds of thousands of dollars in a transport company in exchange for ac-cess to containers from Pakistan to New-

ark (NJ). More recently, in April 2021, a newlywed couple was arrested at the port of Newark as they were attempting to board a cargo ship that would bring them to Yemen to join the Islamic State. For many years, the relative openness of maritime transportation has been ex-ploited by transnational criminal groups. It is now apparent that the threat poten-tial has increased even more through ter-rorism, or even worse, the link between criminal activities and terrorism.

The “nightmare scenarios”

The above listed cases are just a few ex-amples of the opportunities that mari-time transport gives to terrorist organi-

zations. Large quantities of hazardous substances such as the poorly stored ammonium nitrate at Beirut’s port and marine shipments of chemicals or radio-logical materials are potentially attractive terrorist targets. The quantities of haz-ardous materials transported on vessels and warehoused at ports are typically comparable to the amounts stored at large chemical plants and very often tran-sit (or are stored) near populated areas. If vessels and storages would be success-fully attacked and used as weapons, this could have a catastrophic impact on the population and the environment. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, around 90% of world’s trade is seaborne. Yet, of the 500 million containers shipped yearly in the trade supply chain, only 2% of them are inspected. These data demonstrate why it is of utmost importance to increase the security measures in vessels and at sea-ports. After the 9/11 attacks, most of the counterterrorism efforts were focused on the protection of airports and airplanes, and “maritime terrorism” remained a smaller area of concern. However, if we analyse some of the most “nightmare scenarios”, the need for increased atten-tion towards maritime counterterrorism efforts becomes obvious.Amongst the most commonly scenarios examined by maritime security experts and legislators are the threat of dirty bombs in containers, the attack on Liq-uified Natural Gas (LNG) takers and the attack on a passenger ferry. Terrorist attacks in ports with radiologi-cal dispersion devices (or dirty bomb),

Hazardous materials require specialised equipment to be handled and detected as well as specialised training.

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specifically the smuggling and/or deto-nation of a dirty bomb in a shipping con-tainer are recurring scenarios studied by maritime terrorism researchers. Although much attention is paid to the threat of dirty bombs, there are divergent opinions about the capabilities of terrorist groups in obtaining and handling radiological materials. Many terrorism researchers view a dirty bomb attack as likely due to

the relatively easy accessibility and lack of international control of the materi-als required to build one. Port operators have even testified before US Congress stating that they believe the use of such bombs in US ports “is just a question of time”. Although many experts consider dirty bombs as one of the most likely maritime terrorism scenarios, others be-lieve the likelihood of terrorists being able to acquire, and especially handle highly radiological material without the proper shieling is highly unlikely. A more realistic result may be a “weaker” dirty bomb, easier to handle and with less impact. Despite the different perspectives on the likelihood and the strength of a dirty bomb attack carried on a container ship, the psychological effects on the general public of the successful transportation of a dirty bomb by a terrorist organization on a container ship (even a “weak” one) would be exponential.Another scenario of concern is a poten-tial terrorist attack on a Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) tanker. A 2004 report from National Sandia Laboratories stated that a potential terrorist attack on LNG tank-ers is “credible and possible”. Further-more, the report assesses four potential

ways terrorist may target an LNG tank-er: ramming, by driving another vessel into an LNG taker; triggered explosion, through explosives such as mines; ex-ternal attack, for example through the firing of missiles; and hijacking, the most catastrophic scenario of all, involving terrorists taking control of a tanker and sailing towards a populated area and detonating the cargo. Many experts be-

lieve that the concern of an attack on a LNG taker is overestimated and that such an attack might be very difficult to accomplish. Another “nightmare scenario” related to maritime terrorism is the potential attack on a passenger ferry. In February 2004, this scenario became concrete when a bomb detonated on the ro-ro (roll-on/roll-off) ferry SUPERFERRY 14 in the Phil-ippines. The explosion of a television case containing a TNT bomb started a fire that led to the sinking of the ship. Although the blast was initially declared as being caused by a gas explosion, later inquir-ies showed evidence of a bomb planted by the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf. 116 people were killed resulting in the Philip-pines’ worst terrorist attack to date.

Conclusions

It appears that while terrorist attacks at sea may be more difficult to execute and have occurred less frequently than other types of attacks, they remain a significant threat and require continued policy ad-aptation. The significant amount of haz-ardous materials being transported on a daily basis on ships, the abandonment

of dangerous containers and the unsafe storage of hazardous substances in ports are all issues of concern in the context of counterterrorism.Developing countries, very often marked by political instability and high corrup-tion, are also the major destinations for illicit hazardous waste traffic. If laying abandoned and undetected, containers of waste can pose a significant threat. Terrorist groups can get access to aban-doned or poorly stored hazardous sub-stances such as chemicals, explosives and radiological material and use them to conduct attacks. With the global maritime trade constant-ly growing, ports become more essen-tial in national economies and undergo constant expansion, very often close to highly populated areas. Ports and ships security is therefore a matter of essential concern. Narcotics and weapons smug-gling are traditionally areas of main focus, however, the transport and smuggling of hazardous substances requires increased attention. Furthermore, the issue of haz-ardous waste tends to be seen as a mat-ter of environmental concern rather than of public security. A shift in perspective is needed in order to address the issue with the correct means. It is essential that technologies to detect chemical and radiological materials be-come basic instruments in ports and con-tainers inspection processes. Hazardous materials require specialized equipment to be handled and detected as well as specialized training. In today’s intercon-nected world in which trading routes connect every country of the world with each other, enhanced inspection of con-tainers before they reach a port should be in every state’s interest. Furthermore, capacity building programs require additional resources as they are key to the improvement of safety and security standards in maritime hubs in developing countries. It is of utmost im-portance that capacity building programs address also this issue corruption. Beirut events have highlighted the potential cat-astrophic impact of negligence and cor-ruption and has served as an eye opener on the potential scenario of terrorists get-ting access to neglected cargo.Although the international community and national governments have already taken numerous steps to improve the security of ships and ports, more needs to be done to prevent terrorists from getting access to them. A Beirut type of scenario involving a terrorist organization could have even more catastrophic con-sequences. L

First responders in Colombia – capacity building programs are key to the improvement of safety and security standards in maritime hubs.

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The grounding of MV EVER GIVEN from 23 March to 29 March 2021 captured

the world’s attention. Many people asked, how could such a modern and large vessel find itself with its bow rammed into Asia, its stern aground on Africa, and its mid-ship astride one of the major maritime choke-points in the world? Amidst all of this, ships traveling between Europe and Asia piled up in the anchorages off Port Said and Suez, hoping that the Suez Canal Authority, and eventually SMIT Salvage, could clear the con-tainership and allow a resumption of normal trade. Her removal after six days opened the floodgate of vessels looking to traverse the canal and resume the international flow of goods and allow military vessels – such as the USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER (CVN-69) Carrier Strike Group – to perform their missions. But behind the veneer of memes and jokes the grounding of EVER GIVEN ex-posed the fragile nature of global trade and the maritime infrastructure that supports it.

The Ever-Growing Containership

One of the many questions asked follow-ing the event concerned the size of EVER GIVEN. At 1,300 feet in length, 200 feet across, drawing nearly 48 feet of water, with a deadweight capacity of 200,000 tonnes, and capable of carrying 20,000 Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs), she is one of the largest ships in the world. Part of a new generation of Ultra Large Con-tainer Ships (ULCSs), these behemoths were ushered into the world when Maersk Lines introduced their new TRIPLE E class in 2011. Touted for their economy of scale, energy

efficiency, and environmentally improved, the ships were 1,309 feet long and 193 feet wide, and they could not transit the Panama Canal – including the new lane opened in 2016. They were capable of speeds of 22 knots and could carry 18,000 containers. By comparison, when the first container-ship, SS IDEAL X, was introduced in 1956 by Malcolm McLean, she could only carry 58 boxes. A little over a half a century later, this had expanded over 300-fold. This was necessary as world maritime trade boomed from 880 million tonnes in 1956 to 8,775 million tonnes in 2011. Today it peaks at over 11 billion tonnes daily. Container ships not only carried more cargo, but they improved all aspects of the process, from loading, to movement via truck or rail, to ports, stowage aboard ships, offloading,

and transportation to the consignee. Dur-ing World War II, an American Liberty ship had the ability to transport 10,000 tonnes of cargo. It would take days, or even weeks, to individually load, block and brace individual cargo within the holds of the ships. Sailing at a speed of 11.5 knots, once they arrived, it took nearly as much time to unblock and un-stow the cargo. The TRIPLE E's could move twenty times the cargo, faster and more efficiently with a fraction of the crew. It is difficult to definitively answer the question if the ULCSs were built to support the increase in world trade, or if the ULCSs facilitated the growth themselves. Prior to the Triple Es, McLean, and his com-pany Sea Land, along with Maersk, continu-ally pushed the envelope of containership construction. In 1972, McLean introduced

The Ship That Launched 1,000 Memes – and Nearly Destroyed 12% of World TradeDr Salvatore R Mercogliano

Au th o rDr Salvatore R Mercogliano isa former merchant mariner, having sailed and worked ashore for the Mili-tary Sealift Command. He is an asso-ciate professor of history at Campbell University and an adjunct professor at the US Merchant Marine Academy.

The EVER GIVEN seen here blocking the Suez Canal.

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the SL-7s, which at 33 knots were the fastest cargo ships in the world. Unfortunately, the timing for their operation coincided with the OPEC embargo and the skyrocketing cost of fuel. This ultimately led to Sea Land selling the ships to the U.S. Navy for conversion into Fast Sealift Ships. Today the eight ships, ap-proaching their 50th anniversary, remain as elements of the aging Maritime Administra-tion Ready Reserve Force. Maersk adopted a more conservative approach to speed and focused on carrying capacity with the introduction of their L-class in 1980. At 24 knots and able to carry 3,400 containers, almost three times that of the SL-7s, the Ls marked the first of several innovative jumps in containership size over the next few dec-ades. Ironically, the L-class would also end up with the US Navy after the Persian Gulf War when converted into the SHUGHART class roll-on/roll-off ship for the Military Seal-ift Command.Concurrently, McLean, then at the helm of United States Lines in the early 1980s built a dozen large vessels intended to inaugurate an around-the-world service. Capable of carrying 4,258 boxes, the Econships built by

Daewoo in Korea were the flagships of the American merchant marine, but suffered from one serious shortfall. Learning his les-son from the SL-7, McLean opted for fuel efficiency and carrying capacity over speed. The ships were agonisingly slow at 16 knots. A new competitor, Evergreen Marine, ap-peared on the scene and offered a similar around-the-world service, with both east and westbound service, and faster vessels. This trade-off between cargo capacity and speed could only be overcome by increas-ing the overall size of the vessel. Maersk ac-complished this by introducing the R-class in the early-1990s (6,000 TEUs), the S-class in the late-1990s (8,000 TEUs), the E-class in the mid-2000s (12,500 TEUs) and then the TRIPLE E's in the early 2010s (18,000).The roll out of the TRIPLE E's was a master performance by Maersk. They invited the world’s maritime press and influencers to Korea for the launch of MAERSK McKIN-NEY MOLLER. Concurrently, the Discovery Channel developed a multi-episode series on the vessel. Maersk even had fellow Dan-ish company Lego unveil a set featuring the vessel. The construction of the 20 vessels al-

so highlighted another vital aspect of world maritime infrastructure: shipyards.When Malcolm McLean built his SL-7s, he went overseas to Germany and the Neth-erlands since he did not want to be con-strained by construction and differential subsidies available under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Similarly, he built the Econships in Korea. Most Maersk ships were built in their own yard in Denmark, Odense Steel Shipyard, but following the global re-cession of 2008, Maersk closed the facility. In February 2011, Maersk contracted with Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineer-ing to build 10 ships for US$1.9 billion. A few months later, in June, they exercised an option for an additional 10 for a similar price. MAERSK McKINNEY MOLLER was handed over to the company from Daewoo on 2 July 2013. The last of the twenty, Mathilde Mae-rsk, followed on 30 June 2015. A total of 20 ships were launched in two years and four months, a mindboggling delivery schedule.A look at a list of the ULCSs reveals that they follow the trend of world ship construction today where more than 90% of all com-mercial ships are built in either Japan, the Re-public of Korea, or the People’s Republic of China. Except for the Philippines, with about four percent, the remaining six percent is spread around the world with no other na-tion having a single percentage of construc-tion. In many ways, the demise of commer-cial shipping in the United States and across Europe, along with the economic recession of 2008, and the need to further expand on the size of ships like the TRIPLE E's, pro-moted the shipbuilding race between these three East Asian countries. Like the Dread-nought race of the early twentieth century, these three nations are aligning their ship-yards into larger entities to outbid, out pro-duce, and outlast those of their neighbours.In 2015, Maersk followed up with Daewoo and ordered eleven 2nd generation TRIPLE E's, each capable of carrying over 20,000 con-tainers. Passing that mark led to a full-on competition between the major carriers, including COSCO, Evergreen, ONE, CMA CGA, Mediterranean Shipping Company and HMM, fielding 77 ships, with follow-on orders on the book for an additional 56 ULCSs with ships capable of carrying up to 24,000 boxes included in the mix. Of the nine major container lines, which possess 82.7% of the world container capacity, none are American-owned or flagged and are structured into three large alliances – 2M, The Alliance and the Ocean Alliance – that dominate the world’s trade routes.As the vessels continue to grow, the infra-structure to support them must adjust to accommodate them. Along the East Coast of the United States, cities and states un-

A satellite image, taken 25 March, shows parts of the traffic jam adjacent to the Suez Canal caused by the EVER GIVEN's obstruction.

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The head of the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) Osama Rabie checks the situation and the circumstances in person.

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dertook massive dredging projects to allow entry of these larger containerships, but not the ULCSs as they could not navigate the new lane of the Panama Canal. This required dredging down to 50 feet and in the case of New Jersey, raising the height of the Bayonne Bridge to permit vessels to pass underneath. That cost was borne by the citizens of those communities for ships registered and owned overseas and cargo being distributed throughout the nation. The chasing of infrastructure goals might have been what caught up with EVER GIV-EN in the Suez on 23 March.As the ship headed north that morning in the lower section of the Suez, her size and dimensions provided little clearance with the bank and bottom. Sailing at a high rate of speed, almost 13 knots, the ship could have experienced squatting where the stern sinks down lower in shallow water at speed. Ad-ditionally, if she came too close to one of the

banks, suction could have pushed off the bow, while sucking in the stern. The reports of high winds that day would have been an issue with a surface area equivalent to a 14-story building a quarter of a mile long. Other factors, such as the introduction of new Very Low Sulphur Diesel fuel in 2020 has caused engineering issues in many ves-sels and could have contributed to a poten-tial engine casualty. Plus, there is always the possibility of pure human error that might have contributed to the closing of the canal for almost a week.

Broader Implications

Regardless of the cause, the closing of the canal marked an important event not just in the world economy but the shipment and protection of trade. While the event was over quickly, a long-term closure, such as what happened during the Suez Crisis or the Six Days War, would have global ramifi-cations. The vulnerability of the chokepoint to an accident, and now the efforts by the

Egyptians to extract US$916 million from Evergreen for the event, is likely to cause companies and nations to reconsider their use of the canal. One nation looking at the incident in a positive light is Russia. Their at-tempts to entice cargo into the Arctic and utilise the Northeast Passage seems now to appear as a more viable solution, although some firms, such as MSC, indicate they are not interested.For China, their concern over the closing of their sea lanes of communication has been the paramount reason for the growth of the PLA Navy and their efforts to develop bases in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, astride their major trade routes. Taking the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan literally, they realise that the role of the military is to sup-port their economic endeavours, protect the supply of raw materials – such as bulk mate-rial from South America, Africa, and Australia – and exports of their finished products.

It is noteworthy that while China has ap-peared to have learned this lesson from his-tory and the recent past, the United States fails to heed this concern. America lags in infrastructure, as the repeated announce-ments by presidents of infrastructure bills and programs indicate. The current backlog of containerships off the West Coast, par-ticularly the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are not so much an issue with the ports but the ability to get the cargo off the terminals via road and rail and into the interi-or of the United States – that was the precise issue that Malcolm McLean attempted to alleviate with the advent of containerisation in the 1950s.The military learned this lesson during the Vietnam War, when Sea Land was con-tracted to provide eleven containerships to alleviate a similar backlog of breakbulk ships. The commercial sector viewed the success in the Vietnam War as validation. In the Persian Gulf War, while ammunition was shipped much as the Phoenicians did in ancient times – in separate bundles and

packages – the Military Sealift Command contracted with seven American firms to ensure there was enough container capac-ity between the continental US and South-west Asia to support military forces. A little over a decade later, with the adoption of the Maritime Security Program to ensure that a fleet of US flagged vessels were available, along with the vast networks of many of the companies, such as Maersk, American ships were able to sustain Department of Defense forces throughout the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.However, today the infrastructure and trade of the United States is in peril. Failure to incorporate the commercial maritime sector into national defence planning doc-uments and provide visible and vocal sup-port is undercutting the industry. Ships that make up the afloat prepositioning force, the surge sealift, and the domestic Jones Act fleet need replacement as they are ag-ing. Investment into national shipbuilding would have an impact on military vessel construction by employing more workers into this industry instead of the boom-and-bust cycle which requires repeated training and loss of experience. An examination of Chinese shipyards reveals commercial ships being built alongside new frigates, destroy-ers, and aircraft carriers.It is strange to see the world’s fleets building vessels larger than FORD (CVN-78) class car-riers and competing in trade that at one time was being battled over by national fleets. Today, international corporations, with ships flying the flags of open registries, dominate the world’s oceans but with little means of protection. This is readily apparent to the In-dian crew, on-board the Taiwan-based MV EVERGREEN vessel, managed by a German firm, with an American classification soci-ety, owned by a Japanese company, with insurance in Great Britain, and trapped in Egyptian waters. That is the situation facing world trade and maritime infrastructure today that is largely absent from most military and na-val discussions but essential to the world’s economy and the military’s logistics. Fail-ure to invest in domestic infrastructure and trade will place nations at the mercy of forces beyond their control. While that may be sufficient for many nations, any country wishing to be considered a sea power should heed the words of Mahan, as recently recapped by Andrew Lambert in “What is a Navy For?” and consider, “What is a Merchant Marine For?” L

This article was originally published by US-based Center for International Mari-time Security (CIMSEC) and provided to MSD as a courtesy.

The EVER GIVEN blocked the Suez Canal for six days.

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The Mozambique Channel has begun to draw attention as a result of the

expanding Ansar al Sunna insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province of northern Mozambique, particularly because of the threat to the major offshore gas projects. The insurgents’ use of boats has already been noticed. So far, these have only been used for attacks on Mocimboa da Praia and islands off the coast. There is, however, clearly a risk to offshore gas fields, as hap-pened off Nigeria, as well as a risk of piracy to fund the insurgency. The possibility of wider maritime terrorism on behalf of the

Islamic State, to which the insurgents claim links, cannot be discounted.The Cabo Delgado insurgency has devel-oped from minor attacks on villages and along roads to the occupation of Mocim-boa da Praia in 2017 and 2020, which the

insurgents are still holding at the time of writing. In March 2021 they also seized and, for a while, occupied Palma, adjacent to the Total gas facility at Afungi. That led Total to withdraw pending the provision of ef-fective security, putting the entire project at risk. The Mozambique security forces have proved too weak, ill-trained and ill-equipped to counter the insurgency and the govern-ment remains coy about accepting help, prioritising sovereignty while the insurgency grows. It did contract the Russian Wagner Group, which withdrew after suffering casu-alties, and the South African Dyke Advisory

Group. However, its forces were too weak to contain the insurgency, although they did rescue civilians at Palma. Finally in April Mozambique agreed to ac-cept a Southern African Development Community (SADC) ‘technical team’ to as-sess possible military assistance. That team recommended deployment of a light infan-try brigade of three battalions (620 troops each), two special forces squadrons, an en-gineer squadron and support elements. Air support would need to comprise two attack helicopters, two armed and two utility heli-copters, two light UAVs and four transport aircraft. A maritime element of two frigates with organic helicopters and UAVs, a sub-marine and a maritime surveillance aircraft to interdict supply routes and disrupt mari-time crime would also be required. Strange-

ly, there was no mention of communications intelligence or inshore forces. No decision had been taken by mid-May 2021. Meanwhile Mozambique agreed on 10 May to accept a 60-strong special forces training team from Portugal. The European Union is also considering deployment of a military training mission, which would ab-sorb the Portuguese contingent. The Mozambique Channel is a choke point that was long overlooked, partly because there is the shorter route using the Suez Canal, and partly because ships can go around Madagascar. But it carries some

30% of world tanker traffic, as well as car-go between South America and the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and western India, giving a daily average of some 60 tankers and cargo ships in the Channel or its approaches. The Channel is also critical to Mozambique and to South Africa, with most of the latter’s imported oil moving through the Channel as does its trade with the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and the western seaboard of India. Apart from seaborne trade there are valuable fish stocks, par-ticularly tuna in the northern part, where international fleets take some 10,000 tons annually. The Channel is also a narcotics route, with cannabis, heroin and crystal methamphet-amine moving from Asia to Mozambique in dhows and larger cargo ships. Transhipped

The Security Situation in the Mozambique ChannelHelmoed Römer Heitman

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The boarding team from SAS DRAKENSBERG is ready to go.

Au th o rHelmoed Roemer Heitman is an independent defence analyst based in Pretoria, South Africa.

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to small craft off the coast, the narcotics move overland to South Africa and onward to Europe. To give just one example, on 21 January 2021 the French frigate NIVOSE found 417 kg of meth amphetamine and 27 kg of heroin aboard a dhow. This is not new. In 2012 a dhow supposedly fishing in the channel was boarded by the South Afri-can Navy’s SAS DRAKENSBERG and found to have only unused nets aboard, clearly having been about other business. Cocaine also moves through Mozambique. One ship en route from West Africa to Mozam-bique was shadowed by a South African frigate but dumped its illicit cargo before being boarded. At least 45 kg of cocaine later washed up on beaches.The Mozambique Channel first drew in-terest in late 2010, when Somali pirates attacked several ships in the northern approaches and the northern part of the Channel, which triggered patrols by the South African Navy. Somali piracy has, for now, been largely suppressed. However, there is the risk of people in the impover-ished coastal regions of Mozambique and Madagascar turning to piracy for income, as could the insurgents in Cabo Delgado. The coastlines of both countries are well suited to such activity and the Channel has internal choke points around the Co-moros, Mayotte and the Glorioso Islands in the north, Juan da Nova in the centre near its narrowest – 140 nm – section, and the Bassas dos India reef and Europa Island in the south.Of most immediate concern from the mari-time perspective, is the insurgents’ use of boats at Mocimboa da Praia and in raids on offshore islands. They are also reported to have captured some larger boats that at-tempted to rescue people off the beach at Palma in March 2021. This presents a risk of piracy to fund the insurgency and of mari-time terrorism or guerrilla operations similar to those of the Movement for the Emanci-pation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta Avengers, as well as to the at-tacks in waters around Yemen. That threat would be exceedingly difficult to counter in

the confines of the Channel, particularly as both coasts are under-policed and none of the littoral countries have effective navies. Even Tanzania to the north has only a very small navy of coastal craft and no maritime aircraft, while underfunding has left much of the South African Navy tied up along-side, and the SA Air Force without proper maritime patrol aircraft.The pirate attacks of late 2010 led to SA Navy patrols in the northern part of the Channel from January 2011, under the terms of an agreement with Mozambique and Tanzania. Those patrols were initially conducted by frigates with SUPER LYNX helicopters and the combat support ship SAS DRAKENSBERG with ORYX helicop-ters. Special Forces and Maritime Reaction Squadron teams were embarked for board-ing operations and to follow up suspicious activity ashore. The ships also carried Mo-zambique Navy liaison officers. The ships were supported from a forward base established at Pemba, where the SA Air Force stationed a C-47TP maritime surveillance aircraft and sometimes a Cessna CARAVAN fitted with an optronic turret for coastal surveillance. The SA Na-vy on at least one occasion also deployed a submarine to develop the intelligence picture, particularly monitoring activity at night. She called at Pemba during her pa-trol, causing considerable unease among those engaged in illicit activities, given that they had no way of knowing where she might be once she was back at sea. While these patrols involved small forces

– usually one ship and one aircraft – in a large area, they had a real impact. In 2012 the then Chief of the Mozambique Navy remarked to the Chief of Staff of the SA Navy that general maritime crime in the Channel had decreased dramatically since the inception of the patrols. However, by 2013 tight funding limited SA Navy operations, with former strike craft deploying instead of frigates and the base at Pemba being closed. More recently the patrols have become sporadic as the stretched South African defence budget keeps the navy’s ships alongside, and with-out air support since the closing of the for-ward base at Pemba.The patrol arrangement was in any event weakened by not including Madagascar and Comoros – more for lack of authority to act in their waters than for any participa-tion by their very small forces. It also left out France, which also has possessions in the Channel. The French Navy carries out oc-casional patrols in the Channel depending on available resources. Looking forward there is a clear case for preventative patrolling of the Mozambique Channel to avoid having to deal with more complex piracy and maritime terrorism threats later. But given the weakness of re-gional navies and the lack of maritime sur-veillance aircraft, there are real limits to what they can do, even assuming better funding of the South African Navy and Air Force. Perhaps it is time for the major maritime trading nations to join in a patrol system or to assist regional countries with appropri-ate equipment and funding. India has set an example, entering into an agreement with France in 2020 to conduct maritime air surveillance by P8I patrols in the western Indian Ocean, including the Mozambique Channel. But occasional missions by a mari-time patrol aircraft will not suffice; what is needed is a standing presence. Properly funded, the South African Navy and Air Force could provide that, and it would be in South Africa’s own interest. As this is unlikely to come about in even the medium term, so security in the Mozambique Chan-nel will be left up to others. L

A boarding party from a South African frigate is observed approaching a Namibian trawler in the Mozambique Channel.

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Boarding party from SAS DRAKENSBERG checking a dhow that claimed to be fishing but had only unused nets and no fish aboard.

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Almost 90 per cent of world trade is con-ducted by sea. The Covid 19 pandemic

has not changed this, even though the volume of world trade shrank by as much as a third due to the interruption of supply chains. In addition to the trade in consumer goods, the international energy trade is also mainly carried out by sea and around a third of freight volume is accounted for by crude oil alone. If crude oil is the blood of the world economy, then shipping is its circula-tory system.

Compelling by Numbers

With 1,061 ships on the basis of the nation-ality of their owners, Germany had numeri-cally the largest container fleet on 1 January

2020. Its 2,715 merchant ships represented the fifth largest fleet in the world on the same basis in 2019. Globally, the world’s merchant fleet has over 55,000 seagoing vessels whilst world container throughput increased by 1.9 per cent over the course of 2019 to reach a total of 694 million Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs). Fifteen million of these passed through German ports, with Hamburg in the lead. With some 9.3 million containers handled, the ancient Hanseatic city ranked 17th in the world. The maritime sectors of shipping, seaports (with their hinterland connections), ship-building and the associated supply industry are of outstanding importance to Germany. Of these, shipping is the core industry in the German maritime cluster, generating a

turnover of around €50Bn each year and employing up to 400,000 people.Passenger shipping is also growing strong-ly also, even though Covid-19 deeply cut volume. There are currently around 6,500 passenger ships worldwide. Of these about 450 are cruise ships, owned by an indus-try dominated by a little over 50 shipping companies. International shipping is based on a net-work of strategic alliances between trans-

nationally operating major shipping compa-nies, port companies and states. These alli-ances are also crucial for the infrastructure of global communication. For example, the internet, which is often cited as an example of the innovative power of private compa-nies, is largely based on a state-subsidised network of submarine cables.

Global Free Trade and Free Sea Lanes

As is well known, China’s industrialisation is based on the import of raw materials. For example, the country absorbs two-thirds of global iron ore exports, much of which come from Australia and Brazil. And – like Japan and South Korea – China is also de-

pendent on oil from the Gulf region. Given this situation, it would be logical – for ex-ample – if trade routes between the Persian Gulf and East Asia were controlled by the Gulf States or by China. However, they are currently in the US’ hands. The US guards the most important sea routes to the East and maintains numer-ous military bases in the Gulf to secure its regional supremacy. Control of the world’s sea routes remains the responsibility of the

Au th o rCaptain (Reserve) Ludolf Baron von Löwenstern, German Navy, entrepreneur, co-founder and chairman of the European Strategic Institute, is an expert at the German Maritime Institute, and a special rep-resentative of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

The Sea in Focus – Germany's Sea Trade as an Element of a Globalised EconomyLudolf, Baron von Löwenstern

The importance of the sea for the globalised economy can hardly be overestimated.

A strong navy is needed to protect vital sea routes.

Gigantic container vessels are used for logistic transports of Chinese goods to Europe.

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states – unity is the exception rather than the rule.Hoping that everything will be better un-der a Biden presidency is not enough. The US has long-held, fixed, geo-political and geo-strategic goals that might not coincide with European interests. For example, the Biden presidency continues to: oppose the Nord Stream 2 Baltic Sea pipeline; demand achieving agreed levels of defence spend-ing by NATO members; and, if interpreted correctly - want the maintenance of an even greater distance from China. However, the world is complicated and de-mands leadership. Without US intervention, Islamic State (Daesh) cannot be defeated; and, without its European presence, Russia remains a threat. Many Asian states also want more American involvement in their region as a counterbalance to China.The US published its new maritime strat-egy on 17 December 2020 under the title “Advantage at Sea”. The focus is on China and Russia as the “two greatest threats to

Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The RCEP agreement reduces tar-iffs, establishes uniform rules and facilitates supply chains. Before the Covid-19 crisis, RCEP states accounted for 29 per cent of global trade volume – slightly less than the EU’s 33 per cent. Experts expect the share of the RCEP community to continue to rise. In short, the Europeans are not catching up, but falling further behind. Increasingly, Europe lacks geo-strategic independence from the rest of the world.

Between the Frontlines of Global Politics

Germany and the EU are global maritime players in trade, so they find themselves be-tween the frontlines and in a geo-politically and geo-economically precarious position. Relations with the United States have been strained and the relationship with China is also in question. Moreover, there is often much dissent within the EU community of

US Navy. Of its eleven aircraft carriers, four usually operate in the world regions most important to the USA: Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf. In 2018, the US Navy declared the Indian Ocean and the Pacific as a unified area of operations as part of attempts to integrate India into the alliance against China’s military and maritime he-gemony in the region. The importance of a maritime power rises and falls with its presence at the straits or so-called bottlenecks of the main shipping routes. These include: 1) the Strait of Gi-braltar and the Suez Canal, which connect the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean; 2) the Strait of Malacca be-tween Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula as a connection between the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean; and, 3) the Strait of Hormuz at the exit of the Persian Gulf, through which a quar-ter of global oil trade passes. It is an open question who will control these straits in the future as China continues on its way to becoming the world’s number one eco-nomic power.

China's Growing Importance

The centre of gravity of world politics is certainly shifting from the West back to Eurasia and from the Atlantic to the Pacific; and it is China that is playing the central role in this.China increases its claim as a superpower geo-politically and mili-tarily, expanding its fleet to secure sup-ply routes and prevent containment by US bases and allies. In days gone by, the Silk Road – or, more precisely, the Silk Road System – was China’s artery to the rest of the “Known World”, i.e. the ancient empires of the Greeks and Romans that once formed Europe. The Silk Road’s new successor is the Belt and Road Initiative, beginning in 2012 with the Trans-Eurasia Express, a goods train connection between Duisburg, Germany and the central Chinese trading metropolis of Chongqing. It runs through the mid-dle of the Eurasian continent with a journey time of 16 days. A desirable side effect of these revitalised land routes is that they can-not be blocked by warships.Last November, China concluded the world’s largest free trade agreement with 14 Asia-Pacific states. The Regional Com-prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) covers 2.2Bn people and about one third of the world’s economic output. China en-gages with the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN - Vietnam, Singa-pore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar, Brunei, Laos and Cambodia), and key US regional allies of

The DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69) carrier strike group transits the Strait of Gibraltar in March 2021. The importance of a maritime power rises and falls with its presence at the straits of the main shipping routes.

The clash of containers: trade rivalry between the United States and China is a fact of life in the 21st Century.

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dealing with the many challenges it faces when securing the global sea routes and can use military force to protect national and European interests if necessary. Vice Admiral Rainer Brinkmann, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and Com-mander of the Fleet and Support Forces, recently summed the situation up as fol-lows: “Global economic interdependen-cies – and our vulnerability to disruptions of a rule-based order – give rise to the indispensable need to contribute to inter-national crisis management. The global deployment of our armed forces must be taken into account in planning if we want to protect ourselves against crises rever-berating from the periphery to the cen-tre of Europe…Against the background of the emergence of new geopolitical centres of gravity in the Asian region, we will have to think more intensively than before about the organisation of burden sharing between Europeans and Ameri-cans. As Europeans, we will have to take on more tasks around the European and African continent in the course of a shift of American engagement to the Asia-Pacific region. Yes, we (might) even have to make a solidarity contribution in the Asian re-gion for our American partners.”

A Geo-Political Perspective

Discussions of geo-politics are too often conducted with all kinds of dubious meta-phors, which include “the international community” or even “global free trade”. A term like the “liberal international order” only makes sense if one reads it as being synonymous with American power and capital interests. If one analyses the work-ings of an international system like that of maritime trade, then one will discover a different world. Namely, the harsh realities of controlled sea lanes, alliances between oligopolistic companies and governments, quasi-colonial military dependencies, and imperial surveillance techniques. Despite all these nationalist overtones, many problems can no longer be mastered at the level of nation-states. Therefore, the EU must form its own consensus vis-à-vis actors such as the US, China and India. By formulating its own interests and express-ing them clearly. Left on their own, Ger-many and the other European states are not even remotely capable of asserting themselves in order to be accepted as geo-political players. The EU must learn the language of power. If we accept uncertainty, change and an ex-traordinarily high level of dynamism as the determinants of our time, then we will find ways and means to shape them. L

up and securing central technological ca-pacities in Europe.The maritime space continues to be of high geo-strategic as well as of high geo-economic importance the in 21st century. Including overseas territories, the EU has a coastline of 89,000 km and an Exclusive Economic Zone of over 25Mn square kilo-metres. Moreover, 90 per cent of external trade and 40 per cent of the EU’s internal trade is conducted by sea, while about 80 per cent of Europe’s oil and natural gas production comes from the North Sea, the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. As the most populous country and the larg-est economy in the EU, Germany should make a significant contribution to setting the EU’s long-term course. Germany’s de-pendence on foreign trade is obvious, and it needs a strong navy that is capable of

the era of global peace and prosperity”. Particular importance is attributed to com-petition with China due to its growing eco-nomic and military strength, its increasing aggressiveness and its apparent intention to dominate regional waters as its own, reshaping the international order in its fa-vour. The strategy document further states: “Until China chooses to act as a responsible actor rather than use its power to advance authoritarian interests, it poses the most comprehensive threat to the United States, our allies, and all nations that support a free and open system.” The document notes that the services need to work together today to make preparations for a high-end war with China. However, just as impor-tantly, they also need a strategy and the right tools to counter the day-to-day com-petition posed by China, even in grey areas.

The European Union

With more than 500 million inhabitants, the EU internal market is the largest com-mon economic area in the world in terms of gross domestic product. As an associa-tion of states, the EU is the largest pro-ducer of goods and, together with the United States and China, is one of the largest trading powers in the world. In the competition for future technologies with China and the USA, Europe needs a strategic industrial policy that goes be-yond national special interests and devel-ops approaches to promote companies in key sectors and keep them in Europe. This is not a matter of nurturing individual na-tional champions, but rather of building

The US Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard released a new tri-service maritime strategy in December 2020.

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A SEA LYNX helicopter of the German Navy during a boarding operation. Will the German Navy soon protect sea lanes of communication to Asia?


MAR ITI ME O PERATI O NS & DOC TR I NE

Amphibious warfare has come under in-creased scrutiny in recent years. While

there have been small-scale landings in re-cent decades, the last major amphibious assault was conducted during the Korean War. Today, American and European ma-rines tend to be airlifted into theatres of op-eration, and deploy hundreds of kilometres inland. Some critics have even advocated abolishing amphibious units or reducing and incorporating them into the army.However, this negative atmosphere is changing. Taking only the United States Marine Corps (USMC) as an example, the force is reducing personnel but investing heavily in modernisation and new op-erational concepts that will reinvigorate amphibious capabilities. European navies retain their own marine corps and naval commando units, while Russia and China rely on them for offensive operations in the Black Sea and Arctic or for a potential inva-sion of Taiwan. The demise of amphibious warfare seems a thing of the past.

US Marine Corps – New Strategies for a Changing Environment

As USMC Commandant General David Berger put it last year, the Corps is return-ing to its maritime roots, and operationally integrating much more closely with the US Navy (USN). An experimental regiment is currently honing new concepts of opera-tion to enhance mobile warfare capabilities in the littorals and against near-peer adver-saries. The USMC reorganisation is to be completed by 2030.The catalyst is clear: an increasingly as-sertive China is threatening US allies and partners in the western Pacific. Contain-ing China has become the top strategic objective of the United States, on par with containment of Russian aggression in the European theatre. China’s expansion of armed forces, development of force projec-tion assets (including long-range missiles, aircraft carriers, and long-range combat aircraft), and military occupation of artificial islands in the East and South China Seas all converge to create a potent Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial (AA/AD) capability. This in turn will make it increasingly difficult for US armed forces to attack mainland Chi-nese positions without significant risk to ships or aircraft.

To counter this development, the Pentagon is enhancing the US capability for large-scale or distributed joint operations, with each service bringing in unique capabilities. The USMC is expected to make a signifi-cant contribution to supporting the other services, and to achieving strategic and tac-tical objectives.

Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations in the Western Pacific

Any future war between the United States and China would likely be fought in and around the littoral waters and island chains of the western Pacific, an area well suited

for amphibious operations. The new Ex-peditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept gives the USMC a central wartime role in this region.The new operational concept calls for the USMC to conduct a so-called “island hop-ping” campaign as part of a greater joint campaign. Small, highly mobile USMC units, operating in a dispersed manner, would penetrate the opponent’s outer defensive ring to land on inhabited or uninhabited islands and atolls around the East and South China Seas. Here they would conduct quick strikes against Chi-nese forces, then relocate quickly – within hours or days – to evade counterattack. These coup-de-main strikes could be

A Renaissance in Amphibious WarfareSidney E. Dean

U.S. Marines with 3rd Marine Regiment scope out their terrain duringan amphibious assault exercise. The USMC is investing heavily in modernisation and new operational concepts that will reinvigorate amphibious capabilities.

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The EABO concept could see USMC units establishing short term airfields for refuelling and re-arming F-35 strike fighters.

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aimed against Chinese garrisons on the islands, especially against missile-artillery, air-defence or radar positions constituting enemy AA/AD assets. Alternately, these USMC units could establish short term airfields for refuelling and re-arming F-35 strike fighters; this would significantly ex-tend the range of the ship-borne aircraft, and permit airstrikes to be launched from unexpected directions. These USMC units will also be equipped with land-attack missiles, anti-ship missiles, air and missile defence weapons, and/or electronic-war-fare/cyberwarfare systems. Using these temporary footholds to attack Chinese shore bases, warships and aircraft, they will establish their own AA/AD zones blocking passage of Chinese vessels and aircraft, and create uncertainty among en-emy forces. In addition to conducting their own offensive operations, these ground units will also conduct threat and target reconnaissance for US and allied aircraft,

ships and submarines. This new opera-tional capability to control chokepoints, in-hibit enemy access to the high seas, or even deny the enemy the use of the littorals is a core goal of the EABO concept and the enhanced USMC-Navy expeditionary inte-gration.

Marine Littoral Regiments

To implement the EABO concept (and max-imise its overall amphibious capabilities) the USMC is reorganising with the goal of en-hancing mobility. All armoured battalions and heavy artillery batteries are being elimi-nated. Three new formations designated as Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) are being established. These units will be specifically trained and equipped for mobile offensive operations in the littorals and on island ar-chipelagos. The final structure of the new type of unit is still being devised. Initial planning

points to a strength of circa 1,800-2,200 Marines, augmented by a small number of US Navy sailors in support and special-ist roles. Primary subordinate units of the MLR will be the Littoral Combat Team, the Littoral Anti-Air Battalion and the Littoral Logistics Battalion. The Combat Team will be centred on an infantry battalion, en-hanced by smaller support elements and a long-range anti-ship battery. Missions will be executed by small component units op-erating in a distributed manner rather than by regiment or battalion strength units; depending on the mission and operational environment, deployed forces could be as small as a reinforced platoon, or as large as a company. The exact composition of an operational unit will depend on the mis-sion. Overall, platoon-level units are being tasked with missions previously assigned to the company level, adding considerable responsibility to individual soldiers as well as unit leaders.The MLR will be significantly smaller than the current standard USMC infantry regi-ment (3,400 personnel), but it will incor-porate some elements not integrated into the current units. This includes the low-level air defence, which is increasingly vital to combat UAVs and cruise missiles. The first permanent MLR is expected to stand up during Fiscal Year 2022, and be based in Hawaii. Two additional regiments are planned, and will likely be stationed in Ja-pan and on Guam.

Testing and Experimentation

The USMC is currently focused on refining the EABO doctrine a, having published a “Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Ad-vanced Base Operations” in 2019. This preliminary guideline will be revised and refined to accommodate lessons learned during field experiments to be conducted over the next two years. The next iteration of the manual is formally planned for 2023. A major early test of a typical EABO sce-nario was conducted during Exercise Noble Fury conducted in October 2020. During this test, a 100-strong unit of the 2nd Marine Regiment captured an airfield on the Japa-nese island of Ie Shima. High Mobility Artil-lery Rocket System (HIMARS) artillery was flown in by C-130 and deployed in a simu-lated anti-ship role. After firing its volley, the artillery was immediately taken aboard the C-130s and flown out before the firing posi-tion could be targeted. The infantry unit re-mained on the island to further support 7th Fleet operations, evading opposing force units until evacuated via CH-53E helicopter. One month earlier, the Hawaii-based 3rd

Marine Regiment – a subordinate unit of

Marines “seize” a small airfield at the Ie Shima Training Facility, Okinawa, Japan, as part of an EABO exercise in December 2020.

US Marines prepare to extract from Ie Shima, Okinawa, Japan during the Castaway 21.1 exercise. The use of light, highly mobile forces is key to the EABO concept.

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the Okinawa-based III. Marine Expedi-tionary Unit (MEU) – was designated the formal testbed unit for MLR organisation-al structure and operating tactics; it will be officially reflagged as the 3rd MLR this year. The experiment is scheduled to run through 2023 to determine in detail what organisational and tactical aspects will or will not work in an operational context.The regiment participated in two joint force exercises conducted on Hawaii and Okinawa in March of this year – Spar-tan Fury and Castaway. The test scenario distributed elements of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) over a total of five islands to simulate the presumed operating scenario in a war with China. Command and control, logistical sustain-ment, and operating tactics of the dis-tributed unit were all scrutinised. Overall the proposed EABO/MLR formations and tactics proved successful. The next step is testing the unit and the EABO concept as part of the bilateral Ex-ercise Talisman Sabre 21 to be conducted in Australia this summer. This is the first of several exercises to be conducted to-gether with allies throughout the Indo-Pacific region over the next 12 months. “What we want to try to do is open the aperture to bring in our allies and part-ners because they’re very excited about these concepts and I think they also ap-preciate the need to operate this way in this current environment,” said Colonel Michael Roach, commanding officer of the 3rd Marine Regiment, during a USNI News interview in April. Future exercises will also be conducted on a larger scale, covering greater distances and a larger number of islands.

Training Reform

While the EABO concept is still being re-fined, USMC infantry training is already being adjusted to reflect the renewed emphasis on amphibious operations. The pilot programme was launched in January at the School of Infantry – West (Camp Pendleton, California), followed in April at the School of Infantry – East (Fort Geiger, North Carolina). The new (and experimen-tal) 14 week infantry course is five weeks longer than before. It adds curriculum el-ements designed to optimise Marines for the new focus on littoral warfare and to prepare them to face near-peer opponents. Additions include enhanced “aquatic con-fidence” training to ensure that combat-quipped personnel can reach shore if they disembark from a vessel which cannot beach; reduction of electromagnetic signa-

ture to reduce the likelihood of detection/location; and training on a broader array of weapon systems, reflecting the need for smaller units to conduct a broader array of tasks. Marines are also being prepared to operate independently and without backup for prolonged periods, if necessary (“task-based operations” requiring lower-echelon leaders to execute mission orders without upper-echelon guidance). The infantry school’s new capstone scenario deploys trainees to an advanced expedi-tionary base environment where they must independently conduct representative mis-sions – and survive – for five days.

Technology for EABO

The USMC is acquiring new technology suited for the future warfare scenarios. The focus includes long-range precision strike options, platoon and squad level un-manned surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, and new mobility platforms.To implement the sea denial strategy which constitutes one of the core missions under EABO, the USMC plans to acquire truck-mounted anti-ship missiles. The most promising concept to date consists of a re-configured and optionally unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) mounting the Kongsberg NAVAL STRIKE MISSILE, a sea-skimming and stealthy precision weapon with a nearly 100 nautical mile range. The vehicle would be capable of mounting dif-ferent missile systems as well, maximising flexibility for the tactical units. One major concern is in-theatre transport. Mobility and speed are the keystones to the entire EABO concept. Future plans in-clude procurement of Light Amphibious Warships (LAW) for troop transport, and long-range unmanned surface vessels for resupply, reconnaissance, and potentially

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The USMC test fires a truck mounted variant of the Kongsberg NAVAL STRIKE MISSILE. Such equipment is crucial to new sea denial-based amphibious strategies.

The USMC is experimenting with a wide range of robotic systems as it modernises for the latest iteration of amphibious warfare.



as weapons platforms. However, neither vessel category is expected to be opera-tional in sufficient numbers for years to come. Interim solutions include high speed ferries such as the USN’s Expeditionary Fast Transport catamarans, and the leasing of commercial high-speed, shallow draft transports.

Traditional Amphibious Operations

While the USMC is being given a major role for operations in the Indo-Pacific region, and EABO is considered a key element for a future major war, the Corps is not plac-ing all its eggs in one operational basket. The USMC currently has nine active duty infantry regiments, only three of which are to be converted to LMRs. Some of the re-maining units are being trained for Arctic

operations, to defend Alaska and northern Europe against potential Russian incur-sions. The Virginia-based Expeditionary Strike Group 2 (ESG 2), a joint Navy-USMC operational command, is particularly ori-ented toward operations in the European, African, and Middle Eastern theatres.Larger scale amphibious landings also re-main a vital capability of the USMC. The past few years have in fact seen a renewed emphasis on this skill set, which atrophied during the nearly twenty-year engagement of the Marine Corps in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ship-to-shore manoeuvres against de-fended beachheads are increasingly being incorporated into USN-USMC exercises. Here, too, the Navy and Marine Corps are modernising to reflect new tactical realities. The USMC is introducing the next-genera-tion Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), which is expected to attain full operational

capability in 2028. It replaces the nearly 50 year old Amphibious Assault Vehicle, and features Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) level occupant protection. The US Navy continues to modernise its amphibi-ous warship fleet. Future vessels of the AMERICA (LHA-6) class amphibious assault ships will be equipped with a well deck for launching ACVs as well as LCACs (Landing Craft Air Cushion), reflecting the increased emphasis being placed on enhancing tradi-tional amphibious assault capabilities.

European NATO Amphibious Forces

The United States is far from the only nation setting stock in amphibious forces. A good dozen European NATO members maintain some form of marine corps/naval infantry force or a corresponding army amphibious group, including five with a brigade-sized force. International cooperation and train-ing are routine within NATO, especially among the alliance’s smaller marine forces.Six European nations – France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the Unit-ed Kingdom – as well as the US participate in the annual flag-officer level Amphibious Leaders Expeditionary Symposium (ALES). These meetings serve to improve interoper-ability, command and control, and force in-tegration of NATO’s amphibious forces, in order to enhance collective defence at the Major Joint Operation plus (MJO+) level. A 2019 study commissioned by US Marine Forces Europe/Africa concluded that NATO (including NATO Europe) maintains consid-erable amphibious capacity, but is still not integrating and coordinating sufficiently to maximise these forces’ contribution to deterrent and combat operations. “Exist-ing national and bilateral brigade-size Am-phibious Task Groups (ATGs) maintain the requisite shipping, connectors, and land-ing forces to conduct multi-brigade opera-tions, but further evolution of candidate C2 (Command and Control) constructs are required to realise this capability and en-hance interoperability among ATGs,” the report found. As a positive note, “there is an emerging consensus around a baseline C2 structure – termed the centralised Am-phibious Task Force (ATF) – for NATO am-phibious operations in an MJO+ scenario. This construct, developed by ALES stake-holders, offers a mechanism to leverage NATO's amphibious capacity by aggregat-ing national and bilateral capabilities into a coherent C2 structure.”The report did note an across the board atrophy of knowledge and experience in large-scale amphibious operations among all the nations’ services. Recommendations

Many European NATO partners maintain a significant amphibious capability. Here, the Dutch 21st Raiding Squadron trains in assaulting a port target.

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include revising current operating doctrine or developing new doctrine tailored to multinational amphibious opera-tions above the brigade level. The study also advised aug-menting centralised ATF staff and devising a long-term training plan aligned with NATO's exercise programme.

Opposing Forces

Potential opponents of the US and its allies also support major amphibious forces, and assign them critical aggres-sive roles. Russia’s Naval Infantry (Morskaya pekhota Rossii) currently comprises some 35,000 personnel organised into 10 mechanised amphibious brigades or regiments and two full-strength special operations or reconnaissance brigades, augmented by cadre units. At least one brigade is assigned to each major fleet (Pacific, Northern, Baltic and Black Sea), and is capable of joint operations with the combat fleet as well as with combat aviation. Moscow is currently enhanc-ing its amphibious capabilities with an eye to operations in the Arctic, Baltic and Black Sea theatres. With regards to technology, major modernisation ef-forts include the Project 23900 LHD type amphibious assault ship and the VPK-7829 BUMERANG amphibious assault vehicle. According to various reports by the TASS news agency, the 204 metre long Project 23900 vessels will displace between 25,000 and 30,000 tons. They will accommodate 900-1,000 marines and 75 vehicles. The flight deck can operate up to 16 helicopters and four armed reconnaissance UAVs, while the well deck holds four LCACs. Two ships are currently being built in Crimea. Unlike the French MISTRAL class amphibious assault ships Russia had originally ordered, the Project 23900 will be capable of Arctic Ocean operations, enhancing Moscow’s offensive capabilities against Norway, Iceland, and Alas-ka. The BUMERANG amphibious infantry fighting vehicle is currently undergoing testing. It can be armed with ei-ther a 30mm or 57mm gun, with an unmanned anti-tank variant available. According to TASS, it can operate in Sea State 3 and features 12 hours endurance in water, which would enable it to debark an amphibious vessel more than 100 kilometres offshore, increasing the odds of landing undetected.China’s amphibious capabilities include two People’s Lib-eration Army divisions (a total of six manoeuvre regiments plus combat support), an amphibious armoured brigade, plus a 10,000 strong Marine Corps with two amphibious brigades. Amphibious transport capabilities include eight Type 071 amphibious transport docks, approximately 50 landing ships and more than 70 landing craft. A new class of Type 075 amphibious assault ship is also currently being introduced into service. Supported by missile artillery and combat aircraft, these units form the key to any future invasion of Taiwan, and present a considerable resource for contesting US, Japanese and Australian forces in any western Pacific island campaign.Of course various US allies in the Asia-Pacific region, in-cluding Australia, Japan and South Korea maintain re-spectable amphibious capabilities as well (the Republic of Korea or RoK Marines have a strength of 29,000, con-stituting the largest amphibious force outside the major powers). Whether in the Atlantic, the Arctic or the Indo-Pacific realm, amphibious forces are enjoying great inter-est within their respective military establishments, and promise to play significant roles in future conflicts. L

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Italy’s participation in the Lockheed Mar-tin F-35 LIGHTNING II Joint Strike Fighter

programme is the result of a strategic vi-sion that, through several parliaments, has been considered as the best platform to satisfy the operational needs of the Ital-ian Armed Forces. The Italian involvement in the F-35 programme was initially deter-mined in 1998 with a US$10M contribution to the F-35 JSF Concept Demonstration Phase. Subsequently, in April 2009, Parlia-ment approved the acquisition of both F-35A and F-35B fighter aircraft variants. It was originally planned that 69 F-35As and 62 F-35Bs would be acquired but this was later cut to 60 F-35As and 15 F-35Bs for the Aeronautica Militare and 15 F-35Bs for the Marina Militare. The navy’s first F-35B was delivered on 25 January 2018. Escort-ed by a F-2000A Eurofighter TYPHOON, a KC-767 tanker for in-flight refuelling and a C-130J configured with an oceanic search-and-rescue capability, the aircraft took off from the F-35 Final Assembly and Check Out Facility at Cameri, Italy on 1 February and landed the same day at the Naval Air Station of Patuxent River in Maryland, US. After being submitted to the Electromag-netic Environmental Effects certification at the Battlespace Simulation Test Center, the aircraft flew to the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) in Beaufort, South Carolina where it was assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 (VMFAT-501) of the Marine Corps' F-35B Training Center. On 13 June 2019 the second F-35B left Cameri to join the first aircraft. The navy will receive its third F-35B in June 2021. In order to enable its current aircraft car-rier, ITS CAVOUR, to operate F-35B JSFs, the Italian Navy had to submit the carrier to substantial modifications. A major task

was the application of a non-skid thermally protective deck coating capable of with-standing the extreme temperatures ema-nated by the F-35B’s engines. The solution involved the spraying of Thermal Metal Spray (TMS), a combination of aluminium and titanium, capable of resisting tempera-tures of up to 1,500 °C. All areas of the flight deck involved in F-35B activities, such as the landing spots, the entire runway and the ski-jump, have been coated with this TMS. Other works included the installation of metal reinforcement structures under-neath the landing spots, modifications to the ammunition and spare part compart-ments, upgrades of the aviation support facilities, the installation of additional guid-ance lights, a Special Access Program Facil-ity (SAPF) locker for the management of classified information, an increase in the aviation fuel storage capacity by approxi-mately 300 m3 and enhancing the thick-ness of the insulating material of the ceil-ings and bulkheads in all the compartments

up to two levels below the flight deck to ensure greater crew comfort. Having successfully completed a 17-month overhaul on 6 May 2020 and regained her operational readiness, the Italian Navy’s flagship sailed from her homeport of Taran-to on 28 January 2021 for a three month deployment to the US East Coast. Initially planned for November 2020, the deploy-ment was delayed until end-January 2021 due to the Covid pandemic. This deployment – and the introduction of the F-35B – comes at an important time for the Italian Navy. 2021 marks the 160th An-niversary of the Marina Militare, the 10th Anniversary of ITS CAVOUR as the navy’s flagship and the 30th Anniversary of the Gruppo Aerei Imbarcati ‘Wolves’. MSD spoke with Rear Admiral Placido Torresi – Commander Italian Naval Avia-tion – and Captain Giancarlo Ciappina – Commanding Officer ITS CAVOUR – about the transition to F-35B operations.

The Italian Navy: Getting Ready to Operate the F-35B JSFGuy Toremans

The Italian Navy is in the midst of renewing its tactical air component – the Gruppo Aerei Imbarcati (GRUPAER)

“Wolves”. The 17 McDonnell Douglas HARRIER AV-8B Plus jump jets are being replaced

by 15 Lockheed Martin F-35B LIGHTNING II Joint Strike Fighters (F-35B JSFs).

Au th o rGuy Toremans is a freelance naval journalist based in Belgium.

ITS CAVOUR pictured exiting the dry dock at Taranto whilst in the course of undergoing modifications to make her suitable for F-35B operation.

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MSD: Admiral Torresi, what are the major challenges in preparing GRUPAER to oper-ate the F-35B?RADM Torresi: First, allow me a brief di-gression to highlight the importance of the conversion of our fixed wing air component to these 5th generation multi-role aircraft that will form the main weapons systems of our carriers (Ed. ITS CAVOUR and ITS TRIESTE). The F-35B incorporates the most modern technologies currently available, such as its intrinsic stealth design, integrat-ed avionics, advanced radar, and unparal-leled sensor and data-processing systems. The aircraft are even capable of merging all data gathered by their on-board sensors and automatically forwarding these data to command and control nodes, as well as to the maintenance and logistic supply chains. The transition from the HARRIER AV-8B Plus to the far more capable F-35B is, indeed, quite demanding. Fortunately, I can count on very motivated and profes-sional personnel. Our goal is to have this transition completed by 2024. The major challenge, from an operational point of view, is to balance the number of person-nel allocated to the F-35B programme and those remaining in the AV-8B Plus line in order to maintain the operational readiness of the GRUPAER. Another issue involves the reassessment and adjustment of our training programs. Our pilots and technical personnel must master new competencies in order to be able to employ the aircraft to its fullest potential. In my opinion, this calls for a change of mentality.

MSD: I dare suppose you have to introduce new procedures and tactics to operate the F-35B?RADM Torresi: Obviously, the arrival of the F-35Bs fundamentally alters the meth-ods by which we will conduct our air op-erations at sea. The arrival of the F-35Bs calls for the review of our procedures and concept of operations in order to allow us to exploit the jets’ technical superiority, as well as how to handle its highly classified information and equipment. Switching to this new aircraft requires our pilots to learn numerous new concepts, procedures and techniques.

MSD: What criteria did prospective pilots have to comply with in order to get se-lected to fly the F-35B and when did their training commence?RADM Torresi: The first batch of pilots chosen to make the transition to the F-35B are highly qualified AV-8B Plus pilots who gained a lot of experience during numer-ous exercises – and even in real combat missions while embarked onboard the ITS

GARIBALDI and ITS CAVOUR (Ed. For ex-ample during Operation Unified Protector off Libya in 2011). They are trained at US Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 (VMFAT-501) based at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Beaufort on South Carolina. Their training takes between 12 and 18 months. As of today (Ed. March 2021) we have five pilots training in the USA. The very first pilot qualified to fly the F-35B completed his training in September 2020 and upon his return in Italy he was appointed as commander of GRUPAER and is now in charge of coordinating the squad-ron’s transition.

MSD: What are the different phases pilots had to go through to be qualified to fly the F-35B? RADM Torresi: Their training consists of two main phases. The first one involves fa-

miliarisation with the aircraft, the so-called Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals, with classroom courses, technology-driven aca-demics (Ed. internet, satellite broadcasts and audio and video conferences) and training flights with the Northrop T-38 TAL-ON aircraft. Then they commence to train in the F-35 Full Mission Simulator, starting with the basics of taking off and landing, then continuing across the full spectrum of missions with each session gradually in-creasing in difficulty. Thereafter they start basic flights with the F-35B. This phase cul-minates with passing the Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardisation check flights –called the NATOPS Check. Having successfully passed NATOPS, the pilots are qualified to fly the F-35B and start the second phase, during which they have to perform different tactical flight mis-sions. I cannot divulge details but this phase is quite similar to the one that they went through as AV-8B Plus pilots. From this year onwards, our new pilots coming out of their jet training will learn to fly the F-35B as their first fighter jet. Their training starts at the US Navy Flight Schools, where they will fly in a T-6A TEXAN II tur-boprop aircraft of Training Air Wing Five at NAS Whiting Field in Milton, Florida. Then then go for advanced training on the T-45C GOSHAWK aircraft. Upon their graduation as naval aviators they will commence train-ing on the F-35B. Of course, all pilots will have additional training to prepare them for future tasks that they will have to un-dertake, especially from aboard the aircraft carrier.

MSD: Can you provide some details about the F 35B simulator?RADM Torresi: Due to the ever increas-ing complexity of aircraft, and the associ-

The F-35B has a huge advantage over enemy aircraft. Barely detectable by an adversary’s radar systems, it can penetrate hostile environments and evade the most advanced enemy defences.

Rear Admiral Placido Torresi – Commander Italian Naval Aviation



ated costs of building and operating these innovative aircraft, synthetic training is of utmost importance, not in the least to save on operating costs and but also to cut air-craft’s actual flying times. Our pilots are ex-posed to any type of air and surface threat, with scenarios that would be difficult, or even dangerous, to undertake when flying in a real jet. The simulator allows them to get as familiar as they can before actually start flying in an F-35B.

MSD: Given the intensive and demanding training programme, have there been any drop-outs amongst the pilots? RADM Torresi: We did not have any drop-outs. Due to our pilots’ previous qualifica-tion on the AV-8B Plus jets, and their sig-nificant amount of flight hours, our pilots readily assimilated all the new material. It is also the case that flying such an innovative aircraft makes them highly motivated and proud. Flying an F-35B is the “icing on the cake” of any pilot’s career.

MSD: I suppose that the technical person-nel also had to receive training in the US?RADM Torresi: Yes. Being a fundamen-tally different jet, the F-35Bs’ maintenance is completely different as well. After an initial theoretical and virtual maintenance course at the Integrated Training Center at Eglin Airforce Base in Florida, the engi-neers and technical support personnel join VMFAT-501 in Beaufort for their “on the job” training, tailored according to their respective speciality, such as propulsion systems, avionics, etc. The large number of flights conducted with the F-35B at the MCAS ensures that our personnel can carry out a wide range of maintenance activities on the aircraft and, as such, gain excellent hands-on experience.

Upon completion of her post modernisa-tion work-up period ITS CAVOUR sailed from Taranto Naval Base on 28 Janu-ary 2021 for her “Ready for Operations” campaign. We asked Captain Ciappina what was on the agenda upon leaving her homeport.

Captain Ciappina: After leaving the “Mar Grande” in Taranto we completed a two day cycle of training activities that focused on air operations, and training serials, with particular emphasis on air-defence. This short training programme allowed us to at-tain our Carrier Qualification (CQ) and Deck Landing Practice (DLP) certifications. We performed day and night flights with two SH-90 and two SH-101 helicopters as well

as the AV-8B Plus Harriers. The programme also presented the opportunity to prepare my flight deck personnel for the upcoming trials with the F-35B and enhance overall coordination between our Combat Infor-mation Centre, Flight Control and Bridge teams. After this exercise, we commenced our preparatory training ahead of the de-ployment to the United States to conduct the initial integration trials for the F-35B. After a brief stop at Rota Naval Base in Spain on 2 February 2021 we crossed the Atlantic. Prior our arrival at Norfolk Naval Station on 13 February 2021 we exercised with the US Navy’s destroyer STOUT (DDG-55), F/A-18 Super Hornets from GEORGE W. BUSH’s (CVN-77’s) Carrier Air Wing 7 and a P-8 POSEIDON MPA of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 11.

MSD: Once at Norfolk Naval Station what was on the programme?RADM Torresi: As you know the goal of this “Ready for Operation” campaign, which will last three to four months in to-tal, is to put ITS CAVOUR through an in-tensive test period, called the First of Class Flight Trials-Fixed Wing (FOCFT-FW). This is aimed at the integration of the F-35B and certifying ITS CAVOUR to operate our own F-35Bs. The campaign kicked-off with a 10 day preparatory phase at the naval base. Personnel from the F-35 Patuxent River In-tegrated Test Force or ITF (Ed. the organi-sation responsible for analysing the flight trials) embarked on board and assisted the crew and flight deck personnel with the preparations for receiving the F-35B. ITS CAVOUR then sailed from Norfolk on 28

Picturered here is Capt Giancarlo Ciappina (left) – the Commanding Officer of the ITS CAVOUR.

On 1 March 2021 two specially instrumented American F-35Bs belonging to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron VX-23 from Naval Air Station Patux-ent River landed onboard ITS CAVOUR for the very first time.


February to commence her four weeks of at sea tests. Captain Ciappina: During the period alongside at Norfolk Naval Station, we per-formed several activities in preparation of our scheduled “at sea” trials. Some 173 en-gineers, technicians and bridge operators from the ITF came on board. They assisted my crew during their familiarisation of the necessary skills to support the forthcoming operations with the F-35B, such as move-ments on the flight deck and in the hangar, take-off and landing signals, and simulated crash and salvage procedures, as well as procedures for other emergencies. The flight deck was kitted out with telemetry and data recording equipment, as well as specially-de-signed LED-lighting to aid the planned night time landings. Once this equipment was in-stalled, the ITF team carried out several tech-nical tests, including the fly-over of an F-35B while we were still in the harbour in order to test communications and calibrate telemetry reception. This fly-over allowed us also to calibrate our Joint Precision Approach and Landing System, which had been installed during ITS CAVOUR’s major overhaul.

MSD: What test and trials are on the agenda during the four weeks at sea?RADM Torresi: We needed to test both the aircraft and ship during intensive tests in or-der to certify that ITS CAVOUR is ready to operate the F-35B. On 1 March 2021 two specially instrumented American F-35Bs be-longing to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron VX-23 from Naval Air Station Patuxent River landed onboard for the very first time. From then on the test flights proceeded in incre-mental steps and in a wide range of load, motion, wind, and environmental condi-tions. After completion of all scheduled tri-als ITS CAVOUR returned to Norfolk to allow the Integrated Test Force team to analyse all the collected data and issue an Interim Flight Clearance (IFC), declaring ITS CAVOUR safe to operate F-35Bs autonomously. Captain Ciappina: The purpose of our “at sea” phase was to verify the technical and structural compatibility of the F-35B and the suitability of on-board arrangements and supporting equipment. The most impor-tant activity was calculation of the F-35B’s operational limits. The first week was used to generate all necessary flight test data and environmental parameters to develop the op-erating bulletin for the forthcoming flights. In the following weeks we carried out multiple ski-STO (ski-Short Take Off) and VLs (Vertical Landings) during both day and night opera-tions with “clean wings” Then, on 14 March, dummy stores were put underneath the

aircraft wings. The ship’s crew was also put through general tests such as maintenance and inspection activities related to the air-craft; chaining, refuelling and defuelling the aircraft; practising taxiing, take-off and land-ing evolutions; connecting and disconnecting bomb; as well as Logistical Test and Evalu-ation trials such as performing a simulated Lift Fan Removal and Replacement using the ship’s nitrogen generating plant.(Ed. Shortly after our interview ITS CAVOUR returned to Norfolk on 26 March, having successfully completed all the planned tests.

In all the two F-35Bs carried out over 50 flight missions, some 120 vertical landings and as many short take-offs with and with-out the use of the ski jump).

MSD: When will the first Italian F-35Bs start flying from ITS CAVOUR?RADM Torresi: During the first half of April, ITS CAVOUR is scheduled to operate with US Navy MV-22 OSPREY aircraft in order to define their flight clearance onboard. Thereafter our own F-35Bs and pilots will embark onboard for about one week while ITS CAVOUR is sail-ing in the vicinity of Beaufort. This period will allow our pilots to conduct their carrier quali-fications. Moreover, give standardised NATO procedures, our pilots will be qualified to land on board any carrier within the Alliance that operates the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter.

MSD: What is next on the agenda?RADM Torresi: ITS CAVOUR is scheduled to return to Taranto by the end of April 2021. After some well-earned leave, we will com-mence a cycle of training activities to in-crease our operational capabilities, working

towards ITS CAVOUR’s Initial Operational Capability. We are already planning to land onboard HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH later this year and we are also looking into possible interactions with the US Navy. Based on the F-35Bs’ current delivery rate, we expect ITS CAVOUR to reach her “Initial Operational Capability” by the end of 2024, when we will have eight F-35B aircraft and 12 quali-fied pilots. Her “Full Operation Capability” is anticipated to be achieved when all fifteen F-35Bs have arrived. So there are still a few more years to go.

MSD: I suppose the deployment delivered far more than the initial integration of the F-35Bs with ITS CAVOUR. What is your overall assessment so far?RADM Torresi: Being a decisive force multiplier, the F-35B greatly enhances the potential of our carrier with capabili-ties that are essential in both today’s and tomorrow’s conflict scenarios. Thanks to its stealth features and its particularly advanced sensors, the F-35B is able to deliver a huge advantage over potential enemy aircraft and to penetrate a hos-tile environment saturated with anti-air defences. This significantly enhances our capabilities to control a wide area of sea and airspace. The campaign also provides new perspectives for co-operation with our allies. Combined with the mobility, flexibility and autonomy of ITS CAVOUR, the F-35Bs will set a new standard in the Italian Navy and the Italian Armed Forces in general.

The Interview was conducted by Guy Toremans.

ITS CAVOUR also conducted tests with MV-22 OSPREY tiltrotor aircraft during the course of her US deployment.



The Mission

Promoted as the largest polar expedition in history, MOSAiC – the Multidisciplinary drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate – was organised by an international consortium of leading polar research insti-tutions led by the Alfred Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Re-search (AWI). The expedition was charged with making the most intense observations ever undertaken at the Arctic – arguably, the epicentre of global warming – with the aim of gaining a better understanding of a broad spectrum of factors impacting climate change. Uniquely, the expedition took 389 days in the region, thereby experiencing an unprecedented full polar winter on site. PO-LARSTERN drifted 3,400 km on a zigzag-ging course, covering a distance of 1,923 km in the process. 2 floes were used. 337 scientists and experts and 105 crewmem-bers of Polarstern were part of MOSAiC. 20 countries or respectively 37 nationalities were involved. More than 80 institutes par-

ticipated in the mission. Around 150 people were ‘on site’ at any given time. In addition, there were hundreds of people on the sup-ply vessels and on land who supported MO-SAiC‘s research and logistics. The mission’s total budget was in excess of €140M, with operating costs (excluding instrumentation and research personnel) estimated at circa € 200,000 per day.

Mission Challenges

POLARSTERN has carried out numerous missions to the Polar Regions in the near 40 years since she was delivered in 1982. She can not only navigate safely in the pack ice zone but can also easily break through 1.5 metres of ice and through more by ramming. Nevertheless, the conditions in-

MV POLARSTERN’s MOSAiC ExpeditionA portrait of endurance and strategic research in the remoteness

Felix Lauber and Thomas Wolf Wunderlich

In September 2019 the German research icebreaker POLARSTERN departed Tromsø in Norway to commence

a year-long mission drifting in the Arctic ice. Facing some of the world’s harshest, fastest-changing and most

dangerous climatic conditions in one of its most remote locations, the ship’s crew and scientists must have

felt some of the same excitement and trepidations experienced by the Arctic explorers of yesteryear as they

embarked on their lengthy mission. MSD presents some of the implications of a voyage into ice, light,

darkness and … seclusion.

Au th o r sFelix Lauber served in the German Navy before he had a short time on merchant vessels. He joined the re-search fleet of the shipping company Laeisz. After three years on Research Vessel METEOR and since then tenyears on the Polar Research and Sup-ply Vessel POLARSTERN.Thomas Wolf Wunderlich a qualified engineer in nautical science/maritime transport. After a start on container ships, he switched to RV POLARSTERN to become one of the responsible captains. In the MOSAiC expedition, he administered leg 4 and 5.

POLARSTERN firmly embedded in the floe – October 2019.

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Alfred Wegener InstituteAs a Helmholtz centre for polar and marine research the Alfred Wegener Institute works in the cold and temper-ate regions of the world. The institute was named after the German polar ex-plorer who discovered the continental drift, Alfred Wegener. It is a foundation under public law and member of the Helmholtz Association - the largest sci-entific organisation in Germany. The in-stitute was first launched in 1980 with only a handful of employees - today that number has risen to more than a thousand. Although based in Bremer-haven, it also operates other facilities in Germany: Potsdam, Helgoland and Sylt.



herent in the MOSAiC mission presented new dangers for this mature ship and her experienced crew. An expanded time in shipyard hands was therefore required before MOSAiC commenced to allow the necessary modifications to be made for extended Arctic operation. Amongst the most significant of the many challenges faced on the MOSAiC expedi-tion were:

Temperatures: The vessel, her crew and the embarked scientists were exposed to lengthy periods of extremely low tempera-tures to an extent rarely experienced be-fore MOSAiC. Temperatures ranging from -30°C to below -40°C were encountered for many weeks at a time. Although PO-LARSTERN is capable of sustained opera-tions down to -50°C, wind chill tempera-tures as low as -70°C made it dangerous

to venture outside. Severe storms also in-hibited operations outside the vessel, chal-lenging the ship’s physical endurance and the mental toughness of her personnel.

Remoteness: POLARSTERN operated at distances of c. 1,500 km to the nearest hu-man settlement in the course of MOSAiC. This figure might seem completely normal to the average seafarer. However, PO-LARSTERN’s most northerly position was 88°36’ N during the Arctic winter, a fact inevitably drawing attention to the difficul-ties involved in handling any emergency in a situation that might well be beyond the capacity for external assistance. Certainly, when a vessel is encased in ice and unable to move under the envelopment of a se-vere winter storm, the practical remoteness felt by its personnel was more than usually pronounced. Delays to crew or researcher

repatriation, deliveries of supply and the provision of other support could last for weeks. The remoteness highlighted the re-ality of being stranded and the fact that the expedition was essentially at the mercy of “winter impassability”. Supply and Sustainment: A major con-sequence of the climatic conditions and remoteness inherent in MOSAiC were practical difficulties associated with sup-ply and sustainment. The necessity for frequent resupply was reduced by careful advanced preparations to assess precisely what would be required and “stuffing” stores to their full capacity. In addition, care was taken to ensure POLARSTERN’s “residents” would have enough vital sup-plies to survive the winter as a failsafe against support vessels being unable to deliver what was needed. However, re-supply and crew changes both remained essential to mission success and unexpect-ed events were to impact how these were performed.

Rosmorport’s ice breaker the KAPITAN DRANITSYN closing for first resupply in December 2019.

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June 2020: Arctic Summer – MOSAiC’s team witnesses the floe’s starting disintegration.

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MV POLARSTERN

Type: Icebreaker, Re-search vessel

Tonnage: 12,614 GT

Displacement: 17,300 tonnes

Length: 117.91 m (386 ft 10 in)

Beam: 25 m (82 ft 0 in)

Draught: 10.7 m (35 ft 1 in)

Installed power: 14,120 kW (18,940 hp)

Speed: 15.5 knots

Capacity: 124

Crew: 44

Owner: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung

Operator: Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI)

Manager: Reederei F. Laeisz GmbH

Port of registry: Bremerhaven, Ger-many

Ordered: 28 August 1980

Builder: Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, Kiel and Nobiskrug, Rendsburg

Laid: 22 September 1981

Launched: 6 January 1982

Completed: 8 December 1982



For example, the use of partner vessels from China and Sweden was planned as part of resupply operations but these ar-rangements had to be changed due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. Fortu-nately, vessels from Alfred Wegener In-stitute and Rosmorport – as well as other German vessels – performed their missions successfully. In total, seven ships were en-gaged in supply operations, transporting thousands of tonnes of fuel, large quan-tities of provisions, spares and scientific equipment and hundreds of personnel.In spite of the ultimate success achieved, the uncertain supply situation certainly

had the potential to have a material im-pact on morale as supplies dwindled in the face of logistical and climatic challenges. POLARSTERN might have been a modern ship operating in the 21st Century but sup-ply remained as much of a challenge for MOSAiC as it did for previous generations of Arctic explorers.

Mission Highlights

A Successful Start: The Russian icebreaker AKADEMIK FEDOROV accompanied PO-LARSTERN from the departure port of Tromsø, assisting her in searching for a suitable ice floe to “park”. This was se-lected on the basis of scientific require-ments, navigational fundamentals and the reality of conditions on the ground. The need for ice thick and stable enough to establish a floating base camp around the ship was a particularly important re-quirement. POLARSTERN was refuelled by AKADEMIK FEDOROV and final sup-plies and heavy equipment such as snow-tractors were transferred. In mid-October 2019 AKADEMIK FEDOROV departed,

leaving POLARSTERN drifting alone and firmly embedded in the floe for the fol-lowing months.Initial Resupply: The first resupply opera-tion was undertaken by Rosmorport’s ice breaker the KAPITAN DRANITSYN in December 2019. The Russian ice breaker experienced some difficulties reaching POLARSTERN due to adverse weather conditions that tested the limits of its technical capacity, running constantly at full power for two days to cover the final 50 nautical miles to the German ship’s position. Indeed, the KAPITAN DRANIT-SYN’s crew joked that MOSAiC would

now take place with two ships because they would probably get stuck in the ice too! There was some seriousness behind the humour, as the Russian ship’s crew were aware that this was a potential dan-ger on the following resupply mission in the face of deteriorating winter condi-tions.The initial resupply operation was con-ducted bow to stern, making best use of limited crane capacity. The exchange of around 100 personnel and the supply of fuel and provisions took five, long and exhausting days. KAPITAN DRANITSYN made her way back to Tromsø to prepare for the next resupply voyage, leaving PO-LARSTERN to commence the MOSAiC mission’s second phase. By this time, PO-LARSTERN had advanced 200 km on the floe, with a total distance of 720 km cov-ered due to the zigzag nature of the drift. Around 20 terabytes of data had been collected by the ship’s scientists.Lucky for a Second Time: In the course of KAPITAN DRANITSYN’s second voyage to POLARSTERN, climatic conditions deterio-rated further. The voyage to the ship took

five weeks rather than the envisaged ten days in the face of thick ice flows. KAPI-TAN DRANITSYN’s own fuel supplies were depleted to the extent that arrangements had to be made for her refuelling on the return voyage. Nevertheless, the Russian icebreaker reached the floe in which PO-LARSTERN was embedded at the end of February, mooring around half a mile from the German research vessel in the same ice floe. Provisions and crew were trans-ferred by snow tractors, making the end of the mission’s second phase. During this time, on 24 February 2020, POLARSTERN had drifted to position 88°36’ N, just 156 km from the North Pole and the furthest north a vessel had ever ventured during the Arctic winter.When Plan B Fails: The next scheduled re-plenishment and crew transfer was due to take place early in April. This was due to take place by aircraft, with helicopters in place as back-up. However, the unexpect-ed arrival of the global pandemic and the paralysis of international travel meant that these arrangements were no longer pos-sible. Moreover, the collapse of the airstrip prepared on the strip further complicated matters. POLARSTERN was left to fend for herself until another alternative could be arranged.Various options – including bringing for-ward the next resupply mission sched-uled to be performed by the Swedish icebreaker ODIN – had to be discounted. Ultimately it was decided to interrupt the mission and POLARSTERN made an unplanned voyage to undertake refuel-ling, resupply and personnel exchanges with two German vessels in the waters off Svalbard, some eight weeks later than planned. Autonomous measuring devic-es were left on the floe for the month the ship was away. Whilst the mission had been interrupted, these arrangements ensured POLARSTERN was ultimately able to return to the floe to complete the expedition’s objectives.A Safe Return: POLARSTERN’s return to the ice floe in June 2020 started a new chapter. The MOSAiC team could witness the natural end of what had become their home for several months. The floe’s disintegration lasted for sever-al weeks until the end of July 2020. The crew’s depression was tangible when the floe broke. A new phase started: all the base’s remaining equipment had to be collected, including scientific devices that had been deployed in the wider area around the floe at the expedition’s beginning. Their positions were known and had followed the same direction of drift as the main flow.

December 2019: The POLARSTERN photographed here enveloped in an Arctic winter and shrouded in total darkness.

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By mid-August, the final supply run was completed by the Russian icebreaker AKA-DEMIK TRYOSHNIKOV in the drifting ice of the Greenland Sea. After staying in the area of the MOSAiC floe for another couple of days for final measurements PO-LARSTERN made her way further north and reached the North Pole on 19 August 2020. Choosing a new floe and setting up scientific equipment close to the pole, measurements continued through to 20 September 2020. The time came to return home to Bremer-haven. After 389 days – of which ten months were spent embedded in the floe – the period of isolation ended when the ship docked on 12 October 2020.

Lessons Learned

The extended duration of the MOSAiC expedition resulted in several lessons be-ing learned that could have significant value for future missions in an area of increasing strategic importance.

Vulnerabilities whilst operating in Heavy Ice: Equipped with a Polar Class 2 (PC2) hull, POLARSTERN’s main vulner-abilities are her two propellers, thrusters, rudder and the various sounding devices attached to her keel. Although ice pres-sure in excessive amounts was experi-enced, the hull coped exceptionally well with these challenges and even the ship’s paint refused to move. However, ice ac-cumulation in the propeller’s Kort nozzles and the thrusters were problematic and caused minor damage. The heavy ice in which the vessel was embedded for sev-eral months would probably have been too great for conventional icebreakers to withstand. Although the ice floe was thick and strong, attempts to build a runway for air support and emergency response proved problematic due to ongoing movement, storms and ridging.

Difficulties operating in Low Tem-peratures: POLARSTERN’s Polar service temperature is -40° C, with operations in temperatures below that figure rated as service in adverse conditions. Danger to the ship could occur at temperatures below -53° C, the steel-built limit. How-ever, the lowest temperature measured was -42° C and then only for a short time.Low temperatures did affect fire-fighting equipment. Foam will freeze immediately at -40°C and fall as snow, although a fluid core will reach the potential fire. After use, the foam system will be out of action due to rapid icing. Mobile fire-fighting equip-

ment driven by CO2 will not work at all, Firefighters need a safe place for donning their equipment and cannot use breathing apparatus in unsheltered areas as the air in the cylinders can be cooled to such an extent that it could freeze their lungs.Lifeboats needed thorough heating and davits manual care. CO2-inflated life vests would not work and life rafts had to be heated due to their CO2 inflation system. Even the ship’s outer illumination had to be adjusted, with regular bulbs dealing with the extreme temperatures best. Cranes and hydraulic systems all have temperature limits, which rarely exceed -30° C. Under these conditions most wires are also at the limit of their flexibility also. The effects on machinery installations were mitigated by adjust-ment of the ventilation system, mostly by reduction of the fresh air intake.

The list of dangers, the impact on particu-lar equipment and potential mitigation measures is long and extremely specific. The impact of Adverse Weather: Rapidly changing weather conditions occurred hand-in-hand with changes to the ice. During stormy phases, wind chill temperatures dropped to -70° C, visibility reduced and ridges occurred. However, the major threat was the pe-riod after a storm, when the pressure on the ice reduced and cracks opened. Some equipment was lost in these con-ditions and scientific arrangements had to be rapidly rearranged by all available personnel.

Communications Problems: A sense of remoteness was exacerbated by the low quality of communication. All available means – including Kepler, the brand-new Iridium Certus system and the Pactor ra-dio modulation mode – never reached

the levels achievable by the cheapest na-val communications systems in civilised latitudes. However, POLARSTERN’s use of fibre optic-based compasses and satel-lite-based sensors meant that navigation was not a problem.

Issues related to Extended Darkness: Illumination was restricted in order to reduce the impact on natural conditions and associated scientific measurements. Psychologically, the effects of permanent darkness observed with respect to mis-sion personnel included tiredness, faster exhaustion and a negative impact on mood. People who managed to perform well in these conditions encouraged that of others. ‘Radio MOSAiC’, a broadcast from the ship to the floe containing news, food menus and music was anoth-er motivating feature. Darkness provided

beautiful imagery but enlarged the threat posed by polar bears due to the increased risk of close contact. Other concerns such as navigation on a floe or working in the darkness proved to be of lesser concern than expected.

Climatic Change: Observations sug-gested significant reductions in the qual-ity, thickness and coverage of the Arctic ice were observed. The melting process was rapid after the beginning of the summer season. The route by which the North Pole was reached were known as previous areas of old ice through which navigation would be almost impossible. However, in 2020, ice was not an ob-stacle. POLARSTERN could sail from the North Atlantic to the North Pole in five days with interruption or any reduction in performance. It remains to be seen to what extent the ice can solidify again in the next winter season. L

POLARSTERN was up to 1,500 km from the nearest human settlement.

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MSD: Concerning the situation in the Strait of Hormuz: What is your threat or risk as-sessment?Commodore C. Fjord-Larsen: The situa-tion is relatively calm, and it appears that the various actors are acting professionally and within their normal operational pat-tern. But as we recently saw with the in-cident relating to MV HELIOS RAY, it is a complex area where incidents can happen at short or with no notice. Due to this com-plexity, assets from AGÉNOR are operating with a de-escalatory posture. Our meas-ured naval presence is aimed at having a deterrent effect on any illegal activity that may place obstacles in the way of the free movement of shipping.Operation AGÉNOR aims to enhance mari-time awareness and security in the region in full compliance with the UN's Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and with respect for the regions territorial waters and airspace. It is an operation with a “light footprint”. We are not here to “fix the situation”, nor es-tablish sea control in the traditional sense

European Maritime Engagement in the Strait of Hormuz: A Simple Mission in a Complex Area

MSD 1-21 provided insights into the EMASOH/Operation AGÉNOR from the bridge of a Danish frigate participating in the European Maritime Surveillance Mission in the Strait of Hormuz. We continue to look further into this maritime security initiative in which Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal are participating. Maritime Security & Defence spoke with Commodore Carsten Fjord-Larsen before he handed over responsibility as Force Commander to his Danish compatriot, Commodore Anders Friis. The change of command ceremony was held 17 April 2021 at the Headquarters in the French military base in Abu Dhabi.

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Commodore C. Fjord-Larsen led Operation AGÉNOR as Force Commander from 13 January 2021, during which time four destroyers and frigates and three maritime pa-trol aircraft successively provided reassurance to merchant shipping.

COVID procedures were followed throughout the Change of Command Ceremony on 28 Aprl 2021 in Abu Dhabi.



of a maritime operation, but to provide assurance through a de-escalatory pres-ence. But operating in this complex area, where minor incidents can escalate quickly, requires continuous surveillance. Conse-quently, monitoring maritime activities is a pre-requisite in order to have an up to date picture of what is happening and to detect any anomalies.MSD: What are the Commodore's final conclusions on EMASOH? Perhaps you could start from a European perspective?Commodore C. Fjord-Larsen: It is a quite simple mission in a complex area. The core of the mission is to reassure maritime shipping. We are not here to point fingers towards spe-cific actors. The need for an independent, un-biased assessment of the situation in the area is important for EMASOH as a European-led mission. It is my firm belief that we are doing the right thing with Operation AGÉNOR. I think that the diplomatic route, supported by our military de-escalatory posture, is the most effective way to obtain good results in the long run. Through this posture, we aim to contribute to stability and reduce the risk of misperceptions and misunderstandings. Any enduring easing of tensions can, in my eyes, only be reached through diplomacy. Of course, we always try to make improvements to the way we manage the operation. But the basis is reassurance through a de-escalatory posture.We are eight European countries who know each other from NATO – but this is neither a NATO mission, nor an EU mission nor a UN mission. As participating countries, we are on our own. But this operation does show shows the possibility for inter-operational European teamwork in a complex area.

MSD: What are your final conclusions on EMASOH from a Danish (national) point of view?Commodore C. Fjord-Larsen: It is not new for Denmark to lead international naval forc-es. Denmark is the world's fifth-largest ship-ping nation. Therefore, it is also a core task for the navy to help ensure the free move-ment of shipping – and we have both the skills and experience to lead international forces in this task.From August to December 2020, Denmark contributed the frigate IVER HUITFELDT and her crew – including also a Seahawk heli-copter and soldiers from the Military Police

and Maritime Special Forces – to AGÉNOR. Denmark has also contributed staff officers to the operation since its establishment in January 2020.These previous contributions, of course, give us a first-hand impression of what the area of operations is like, and these, together with the knowledge we gain from the French headquarters, are es-sential building blocks in solving the task. Moreover, the fact that we are pulling our weight in this way allows us to build credibility with respect to Denmark’s ef-forts towards assuring the free flow of commerce at sea.

A French naval photographer takes still photos as part of observation operations.

Observation by helo and Eyeball Mark I


MSD: A number of other national and international naval operations with more or less the same objectives are ongoing in the same areas as EMASOH. How effective is cooperation with them?Commodore C. Fjord-Larsen: I think that freedom of navigation is a focal point for all the operations you mention. My focus is solely on EMASOH and oper-ation AGÉNOR. Eight European countries have given us a task. That is my priority. As a natural part of our work, we ex-change information and attempt to avoid any friction with other regional organisa-tions and operations as we go about our mission of reassuring shipping.

MSD: What is your assessment or per-spective on the incident of MV HELIOS RAY? Could EMASOH forces do anything in that? If not, why not?Commodore C. Fjord-Larsen: At the time of the incident, our assets were not in the area. But of course, if any ship or seaman is in some kind of risk or danger, we are committed to assist and help according to the international laws at sea. Incidents like this happen with no warn-ing and without any possibility of pre-dicting where and when it is going to happen. After the incident, our maritime patrol aircraft managed to get photos of the vessel. Beyond this evidence of the physical damage, we are not able to make any further assessment of the incident.

MSD: Could you please explain the way that EMASOH operates? How is the po-litical guidance that you operate under translated into practical tasks such as es-corting, inspection and shadowing?Commodore C. Fjord-Larsen: Eight European countries provide support to EMASOH. This is comprised of two ele-ments: a political or diplomatic track and a military track, called Operation AGÉNOR.

The political track is led by a Senior Ci-vilian Representative (SCR). Actually, this is the Danish Ambassador to Libya, Julie Elisabeth Pruzan-Jørgensen.The SCR and political representatives from the eight countries gather regularly at both levels – the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Ministries of Defence. They discuss and assess the region's situ-ation and subsequently issue guidelines for EMASOH.At the operational level, Operation AGÉ-NOR is led by a French Operation Com-mander from his Operational Headquar-ters, OHQ. The Operation Commander is currently Rear Admiral Jacques Fayard. At the tactical level, there is a Task Force (TF 474), currently led by the Danish Force Commander. TF 474 assets operate within the framework of several tactical docu-ments and are further directed and guided by day-to-day messages. The Staff of the Commander of TF 474 is in direct contact with TF 474 assets 24/7/365, thereby be-

ing able to respond swiftly to any activity in the operational area. Since our juridical basis is UNCLOS, we do perform escorts or inspections. We conduct reassurance by means of a measured naval presence. If a specific merchant ship reaches out to us, we can be present in order to monitor and to report the vessel's free movements. But when one of our assets sees a ship from one of the contributing countries, we send them a call, telling who we are and that we will be in the area.

MSD: Is this a suitable set-up?Commodore C. Fjord-Larsen: It is my firm belief that we are doing the right thing with Operation AGÉNOR. I think that the diplomatic route, supported by our military presence which is de-esca-latory in our attitude, is the most effec-tive way to obtain good results. I have a well-functioning and relevant dialogue on both the political and diplomatic level. And, I think this is an essential pillar of the EMASOH mission.We do our best with the assets at hand. My focus is getting maximum effect out of the assets assigned to this operation. With the number of units currently being rela-tively small, our tactical possibilities are somewhat limited and, as such, require a dynamic and flexible approach. Obviously, I would like to see more assets joining the operation in order to maintain maritime awareness and provide assurance. How-ever, it is up to the participating countries to decide how they plan to contribute.

This interview was conducted byHans-Uwe Mergener.

Surveillance at sea is often compared to looking for a needle in haystack because miniscule targets are sought while a vast surface.

A French MPA helps to provide complete situational awareness for EMASOH.

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