MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION

REPORT 167

Independent investigation into the groundingof the Indian flag bulk carrier

on Minerva Reef, Portland, Victoria21 April 2001

Devprayag

Department of Transport and Regional Services

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Navigation Act 1912Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations

investigation intothe grounding of the Indian flag bulk carrier

Devprayagon Minerva Reef, Portland, Victoria

on 21st April 2001

Report No 167

November 2002

ISSN 1447-087XISBN 1 877074 10 2

Investigations into marine casualties occurring within the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction are conductedunder the provisions of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations, made pursuant to subsections425 (1) (ea) and 425 (1AAA) of the Navigation Act 1912. The Regulations provide discretionarypowers to the Inspector to investigate incidents as defined by the Regulations. Where an investigationis undertaken, the Inspector must submit a report to the Executive Director of the Australian TransportSafety Bureau (ATSB).

It is ATSB policy to publish such reports in full as an educational tool to increase awareness of thecauses of marine incidents so as to improve safety at sea and enhance the protection of the marineenvironment.

To increase the value of the safety material presented in this report, readers are encouraged to copy orreprint the material, in part or in whole, for further distribution, but should acknowledge the source.Additional copies of the report can be downloaded from the Bureau’s website www.atsb.gov.au

Australian Transport Safety BureauPO Box 967Civic Square ACT 2608AUSTRALIA

Phone: 02 6274 64781800 621 372

Fax: 02 6247 3117E-mail: marine@atsb.gov.au

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CONTENTS

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Sources of information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Devprayag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Comment and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Ship’s equipment, logs and charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Anchor watch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

The port of Portland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

The anchorage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Training and experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

The master’s statement of facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

The ship’s track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Tide and wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Charts and Sailing Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Devprayag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Figures1. Devprayag aground at Portland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv

2. Portion of chart Aus 786 (as used by the vessel) showing positions of Devprayag . . . . . . . . . . .4

3. Devprayag’s chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

4. Sketch of incident supplied by local resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

5. Devprayag: Events and causal factors chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

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FIGURE 1:Devprayag aground at Portland

SummaryAt 1950 on 20 April 2001, the Indian flag bulkcarrier Devprayag, after completing discharge ofa cargo of fertiliser at the Victorian port ofPortland, anchored off the port to prepare itshatches for a cargo of grain to be loaded atGeelong.

The anchorage at Portland is exposed to thesouth and east and, at the time of anchoring, thewind was southerly, force 3. It increased thenext morning to force 5, then to force 6 laterthat afternoon.

At 1600 on 21 April, the master, concerned thatthe vessel was yawing excessively, had orderedthe engine room to be on five minutes notice.Later that evening, the anchor dragged almosthalf a mile to the northwest before holding oncemore, but no action was taken by the ship’sofficers or the master.

By 2000 the wind was force 6/7. At 2230, theofficer of the watch observed that the anchorwas dragging again and he alerted the masterand the engine room. The master sent the mateforward to weigh the anchor, intending toanchor again at the original position.

While the anchor was being weighed, the shipwas set northwest towards Minerva Reef, alongthe Portland foreshore and, at about 2320, itgrounded on the reef.

No one was injured as a result of the groundingand no oil or other pollutant escaped from the

ship. The ship was checked for damage and nobreach of the hull was found.

The vessel was detained by the AustralianMaritime Safety Authority (AMSA) because ofthe possibility of hull damage and pollution.Four days after the grounding, the ship wasrefloated with tug assistance. It was inspectedby divers at Portland and was released tocontinue its voyage after being issued with acondition of class.

This report concludes that, among other factorscontributing to the incident:

• The master, after anchoring on a lee shore,permitted the vessel to remain at the exposedanchorage in deteriorating weather;

• The master had not noted the warning in theSailing Directions that the anchorage was notrecommended in strong E and SE weatherand,

• Priority was given to the task of preparationof the hatches for cargo rather than to thesafety of the ship.

This report recommends that:

• Mariners note the importance of usingSailing Directions when planning passages,when entering or leaving a port or anchoringin or near a port and

• That they be fully aware of weatherconditions as well as the fact that inclementweather can alter a relatively safe anchorageinto one that is unsafe.

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Sources ofInformationMaster, officers and crew of Devprayag

Portland Port Authority

Residents of the port of Portland, Victoria

Marine Board of Victoria

Australian Maritime Safety Authority

The Bureau of Meteorology, Melbourne

Acknowledgment The Criminalistics Team, Forensic Services,Australian Federal Police

Certain reproductions of chart sections in thispublication are reproduced by permission of TheAustralian Hydrographic Service.

© Commonwealth of Australia 1965. All rightsreserved.

Other than for the purposes of copying thispublication for public use, the chart information fromthe chart sections may not be extracted, translated, orreduced to any electronic medium or machinereadable form for incorporation into a derivedproduct, in whole or part, without the prior writtenconsent of the Australian Hydrographic Service.

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DevprayagDevprayag is a 5-hatch, geared, Indian flag bulkcarrier, owned by The Shipping Corporation ofIndia Limited (SCI). The vessel was built byDaewoo Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery Ltdin Okpo, Korea in 1986 and is classed by DetNorske Veritas (DNV).

Devprayag has a length overall of 189.00 m, amoulded breadth of 30.40 m and a mouldeddepth of 16.40 m. It has a summer draught of11.825 m and a summer deadweight of 47 349tonnes.

Propulsive power is provided by a 6-cylinderB&W 6L60MCE, slow speed direct drive diesel

engine producing 7 944 kW at 111 rpm. Thisdrives a single, four-bladed propeller, 6 000 mmin diameter.

Devprayag is equipped with a range of bridgeand navigation equipment, including two radars(a JRC JMA9000 Series ARPA and a Selesmar)and a Koden KGP-98 GPS.

At the time of the incident, the vessel had 44crew on board, all Indian nationals. Thecomplement included a master, three mates, acadet, a radio officer, a chief engineer, threeengineers and an engineering cadet.

The master and other officers were allappropriately qualified.

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FIGURE 2:Portion of Chart Aus 786 (as used by the vessel) showing positions of Devprayag

Original anchor position

2030 position

Position of grounding

ACT

NSW

NT

Qld

WA

SA

Vic

Tas

NT

NSW

ACT

Location ofincident

WARNINGNot to be used for navigaion

Narrative Devprayag sailed in ballast from Portland at1836 on 20 April 2001 after the completion ofdischarge of a cargo of fertiliser. The departuredraughts were 4.34 m forward and 6.46 m aft.

The master had sought the advice of his agentabout the vessel’s proposed schedule and hisoptions. He wished to anchor for hatch cleaningbefore continuing the voyage to Geelong to loada cargo of grain for Aden.

The agent suggested that the master drop anchorfor hatch cleaning outside Portland where, in theagent’s opinion, he would have some shelterfrom the wind and seas, whereas the anchorageat Geelong was very exposed and the holdingground was bad.

During the vessel’s departure from the berth, themaster asked the pilot to recommend a suitableanchor position. The pilot suggested a positionnortheast of the breakwater, outside the portlimits.

At 1950, Devprayag anchored off Portland,about 0.5 miles south of the 6 fathom contour,2.02 miles from the main breakwater, which wasbearing 231° (T). This position was about 1.5 miles south-southeast of Minerva Reef. Themaster, expecting strong winds, used the portanchor and 7 shackles (192m) of cable in about16 metres of water.

At 2000, the wind was from the south at force 3and the seas were slight with a low swell.Weather conditions were the same at midnight.

After the vessel was brought up to the portanchor, the GPS anchor watch alarm was set at0.3 miles.

The master’s night orders for 20 April stated thatthe standing orders were to be observed and thatthe anchor bearings and distances from the coastand the breakwater were to be frequentlychecked. The officers were instructed, if the

weather deteriorated, to get the engine ready andcall the master immediately. They were alsoinstructed to call the master at any time if theyhad any concerns.

At 0400, the next morning, the mate went to thebridge for his watch together with the cadet anda quartermaster. He noted that the vessel hadmaintained its position.

At about 0645, the cadet left the bridge to openthe hatches for cleaning. The officers’ watchroutines were changed to permit them to be ondeck for hatch cleaning while the master,assisted by the radio officer, kept watch on thebridge.

At 0800, the wind was logged as southerly,force 4 (this entry, however, was overwritten toread force 5). There was a moderate sea andswell with an overcast sky. At noon the windwas logged as southerly, force 6 with moderateseas and swell. The sky was overcast and it wasraining.

At 1415, the master decided to rest. The seniorsecond mate went periodically from the deck tothe bridge to check the vessel’s position whilethe master was absent. At 1600, the seniorsecond mate handed over the watch on thebridge to the cadet and returned to the deck.Also at 1600, the master instructed the engineroom to be on five minutes notice as the shipwas yawing excessively. At that time, the windwas logged as southerly, force 5 (overwritten toread force 6). The sea and swell were logged asmoderate and the sky was overcast withintermittent rain.

At about 1600, the mate went to the bridge andchecked the ship’s position. He found that therehad been no change. He left the cadet on thebridge to keep the anchor watch and went downto the deck to supervise the preparation ofhatches.

The mate remained on deck until about 1830, bywhich time it was raining heavily.

The senior second mate went to the bridge at1830 where he observed that the GPS position

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was 0.37 miles from the original position. Heasked the cadet about the change and was toldthat the ship’s position was now constant. Beforeleaving the bridge, he instructed the cadet toinform the mate of any further change ofposition.

Five or ten minutes later, when the cadet noticedthat the GPS position was now 0.39 miles fromthe original position, he informed the mate. Thecadet had apparently not heard an alarm fromthe GPS to indicate that the vessel was morethan 0.3 miles from its original position.

The mate went to the bridge and, telling thecadet to monitor the GPS to see if the vesselcontinued to drag, checked the echo sounder,which was indicating 10.3 metres under thekeel. He also checked the position using theradar. At the time, the position appeared‘perfectly all right’ to him.

Just before 1900, the master went to the bridgewhere he spoke to the mate. The cadet heard themaster and mate discussing the hatch cleaning,after which, at about 1915, the master left thebridge. At about 1920 the mate, having told thecadet to monitor the vessel’s position usingradar, also left the bridge.

At 2000, the wind was from the south at force 6(the original entry had been overwritten to readforce 6/7). The cadet wrote up the deck logbookand, at about 2015, handed over the watch to thejunior second mate. The cadet informed himthat the radar distances and bearings were nowconstant, but the GPS showed that the vesselwas 0.42 miles from its original position. Thecadet also said that the mate had been informedof the GPS position and that there had not beenany alarm from the GPS.

Before he left the bridge, the cadet asked thejunior second mate to inform the master and themate if the anchor dragged any further.

The junior second mate, alone on the bridge,checked the GPS and found that the vessel haddragged 0.47 miles from the original position of

the day before. The bearing and distance of themain breakwater was now 216° (T), 2.3 miles.The distance from the nearest land was 1.4 miles. The vessel maintained this positionfor some time.

At 2230, the junior second mate noticed that thevessel was dragging anchor once more towardsthe coast and the bearing of the main breakwaterwas decreasing. He informed the master that thevessel was dragging anchor and called theengine room, telling them to get the engineready.

The master went to the bridge immediately andcalled anchor stations. At 2235, the engine roomconfirmed that the engine was ready. The mate,the bosun and the carpenter went forward andcommenced weighing the anchor at 2236, atwhich time the engine was put on ‘stand by’.

The senior second mate went to the bridge toassist and, since there was no quartermaster onthe bridge, took the helm. A quartermasterarrived about 10 or 15 minutes later and tookover the helm. The junior second mate stood bythe engine telegraph and also checked bearingsand distances on the radar, plotting positions onthe chart. Some positions were also plotted onthe chart by the senior second mate.

The first engine movement was ‘half ahead’ at2246. The ship was on a heading of 130° and, asthe anchor was being weighed, the vessel wasswinging to port. The cable was reportedlyleading initially to port but, soon after this,started to lead under the bow to starboard. Themaster ordered ‘full ahead’ on the engine for ashort period and ‘hard a starboard’ on the rudderto bring the ship’s head around to seaward.

Despite starboard rudder and the use of theengine ahead, the vessel would not, according tothe master, turn to starboard. The master thenthought that he might be able to drag the anchorsouth, away from the coast. The vessel’s headingwas now 060° and, between 2255 and 2306, hestopped weighing the anchor while the enginewas working ahead with full starboard rudder.

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There were 4 shackles of cable out as the masterattempted to turn the bow towards the south,away from the coast.

However, the vessel would still not come roundto starboard and, at 2306, on a northeasterlyheading, the master ordered the anchor to beweighed once more. The ship’s head wentfurther to port, to 030° and, in an attempt toprevent the vessel going aground, the masterordered the engine put to full astern at 2307.

At 2315 the anchor was aweigh and the enginewas still at full astern. Despite various otherengine movements, ahead and astern and use ofthe rudder, the vessel grounded at 2324.

Meanwhile, ashore, the police had beeninformed by a member of the public that theship appeared to be in trouble. This messagewas passed to Portland port control at 2310. Thelog of events maintained by the port stated that,at 2320, the vessel was believed to be aground,bearing 018° (T) from the main breakwater,distant 2.83 miles (GPS position 38° 17.9' S,

141° 38.2' E), on a heading of 270°. At 2323,port control called the vessel and was advisedthat it was aground. However, shortlyafterwards, the vessel advised port control thatthe actual time of grounding was one minutelater, at 2324.

Nobody was hurt as a result of the groundingand no oil or other pollutant escaped from theship. The ship was checked for damage. Alltanks in the engine room, all ballast tanks,bilges and void spaces were sounded and thehull was found to be sound.

Following the grounding, the owners and thesalvage company negotiated the terms of thesalvage agreement. The ship was eventuallyrefloated at 1045 on 25 April using two tugsfrom Portland with the assistance of a tug fromMelbourne. After refloating, the ship wasinspected by divers whilst alongside at Portlandand then released by AMSA to continue with itspassage. A condition of class was imposed onthe vessel by DNV.

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Comment andanalysis

EvidenceInvestigators from the ATSB interviewed themaster, the mate, both second mates, the cadet,the helmsman and the chief engineer ofDevprayag.

The ship’s log books, bell and engine movementbooks were copied to assist with the investi-gation. The ship’s navigation chart was alsocopied as a replacement chart was not readilyavailable to leave on board the vessel. The ship’schart was later sent to the ATSB.

Relevant messages to and from the ship wereobtained as well as a copy of the master’sstatement of facts in respect of the grounding.Radar and GPS manuals were also used to assistwith the investigation.

Information on the weather at the time of theincident was obtained from the HarbourMaster’s office in Portland. This weather datawas downloaded from the weather station atPortland, situated mid-way along the leebreakwater of the port. The Bureau ofMeteorology had advised the Harbour Master’sDepartment that the wind recorded by theBureau at the airport was predominantly fromeast of south during the incident.

The Bureau of Meteorology provided the ATSBwith weather information from the automaticweather stations at Cape Nelson, Portland andCape Otway.

A local resident, himself a seafarer, who hadwitnessed the incident from the shore, providedthe ATSB with a diagram of the track followedby the ship, from his perspective, in the hourbefore the grounding.

The Forensic Services of the Australian FederalPolice assisted the ATSB with an examination oferasures and indentations on the navigationchart used by the ship at Portland.

Ship’s equipment, logs andchartsAll the ship’s main systems and equipment werefunctional apart from the ship’s course recorder,which was unserviceable.

Positions plotted on the navigation chart by thecadet and the second mates, as the ship draggedand grounded, had all been erased before theinvestigation commenced, the master stating thathe ‘might have been responsible’ for theerasures. This made it difficult to verify, fromthe chart, those positions or the direction inwhich the ship had dragged during the incident.

The ship’s JRC ARPA radar stores past trackinformation and evidence was provided to theinvestigation that it had, indeed, stored the ship’strack from the initial anchored position to theposition of the grounding. However, thisinformation had also been deleted. The radarhad been in use continuously since the night ofthe grounding and the removal of the track musthave been carried out deliberately.

Entries relating to the wind force in the ship’slog had been altered before the investigatorsboarded the ship. The original entries of windforce had been amended upwards. Interviewsrevealed that all the officers were aware of thecorrect means of altering a log book entry byputting a line through an incorrect entry beforeinserting the correct entry and initialling it.However, no one admitted to the alterations thathad been made in the ship’s log.

The erasing of positions on the chart and theremoval of the track from the radar as well asconflicting evidence from the master and theofficers made it difficult to reconstruct anaccurate sequence of events leading to thegrounding.

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At best, the overwriting in the log and the charterasures show unprofessional watch-keepingpractices. At worst, there was a deliberateattempt to obstruct the investigation.

Anchor watchThe ship’s anchor position was checked usingvisual bearings, radar ranges and bearings aswell as by GPS.

The anchor watch alarm was set on the GPS fora distance of 0.3 miles after the vessel wasbrought up at the anchorage. The GPS anchorwatch alarm sounds when a ship moves a presetdistance from the initial position, in this case ata distance greater than 0.3 miles. By 1830, thevessel had moved more than 0.3 miles from theoriginal anchor position and the alarm shouldhave sounded. There is no evidence that thealarm was defective, but the cadet apparentlydid not hear it.

The mate’s submission on the draft report readin part:

…At about 1835 hrs on 21 April 2001, when I wentto the bridge, the GPS position was definitely not0.39 miles from the original position but was muchless than that. The exact distance I cannot howeverrecall as the same was not recorded. Additionally,the position of the vessel as ascertained from theradar as well as on the chart indicated the vessel tobe well within its swinging circle. Obviouslytherefore the GPS alarm set at 0.3 miles did notsound and the cadet did not hear the same.

At about 1900 hrs on 21 April when the mastercame on the bridge, he was first shown the vessel’sposition both on the radar as well as on the chartand the master himself verified the same. It wasonly after that, other issues including hatch cleaningwere discussed. Had the vessel’s position beensignificantly different from her original position atthat time, the same would have definitely beennoticed by the master. Prior to leaving the bridge,the master ordered the cadet to monitor the vessel’sposition frequently.

…In all probability the vessel’s position might haveshifted to more than 0.3 miles sometimes after 2000

hrs during which time, the GPS alarm might havesounded.

It is possible that the anchor watch alarm wasnot correctly set. Setting the anchor watch alarmis done in two stages. The anchor watch alarmrange is first set, then the alarm itself is set.However, the senior second mate, who set theanchor watch alarm on the GPS, did give theinvestigators the impression that he was familiarwith the procedure for setting it up.

It is not likely that the alarm would have failedto sound after the vessel dragged beyond thelimits set by the senior second mate.

The alarm should then have sounded contin-uously until it was cleared or cancelled. Pressingthe clear (CLR) button would have stopped thesound of the alarm. It is possible that the cadetsubconsciously silenced the alarm using theclear button and did not recall the alarm goingoff.

Regardless of alarms, however, by 1830 it wasclear that the vessel had dragged almost 0.4miles and the cadet advised the mate of thisshortly after 1830. The mate checked theposition, stating that it appeared ‘perfectly allright’.

Shortly after 2000, the junior second mate foundthat the vessel had dragged almost half a mile.Despite this, no action was taken until 2230,when the vessel started dragging again and themaster was informed.

The port of Portland The port of Portland services the region’sagricultural industry, mainly grain, cattle andsheep, the forest product industry, the Portlandaluminium smelter and fertiliser production. Theport, which has six shipping berths, is describedin the Sailing Directions as a sheltered all-weather port, enclosed by two breakwaters. TheLee Breakwater gives protection from the northand the Main Breakwater from the E.

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However, the Sailing Directions describe theanchorage thus:

Portland Bay affords good anchorage with holdingground of limestone ledges, full of holes filled withsand, blue clay or limestone pebbles and issheltered from all except SE winds.

Vessels awaiting a berth may find safe anchorageoff the port of Portland about 11⁄2 miles NE of MainBreakwater.

…The holding ground is good with excellent shelterfrom the W but anchoring is not recommended instrong E and SE weather as there may be aconfused sea and swell.

Weather The Bureau of Meteorology had issued a highseas weather warning for Metarea 10 at 0039UTC 21 April 2001. The message stated that

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FIGURE 3:Devprayag’s chart with anchor and other positions prior to grounding erased and overprinted when vessel refloated

WARNINGNot to be used for navigaion

there was a gale warning for the southeasternarea, covering the area within 38S141E,38S160E, 40S160E, 40S141E and 38S141E.The forecast was for E/SE winds of 30/40 knots,very rough seas and a moderate to heavy swell.

The forecast for 0700 UTC 21 April 2001contained the same warning.

The area covered by the forecast includedPortland. The master of Devprayag should haveknown that E/SE gales were forecast withaccompanying very rough seas and moderate toheavy swell and taken appropriate precautionsfor the safety of the ship and its crew.

Weather data for Cape Nelson, about 8 milessouth west of the ship, was obtained by theATSB from the Bureau of Meteorology.According to the data, at 1130 on the day thatthe vessel grounded, the wind at Cape Nelsonwas from 140° (T) at an average speed of 22knots, with gusts of 29 knots. At 1600, the windwas from the same direction at 23 knots withgusts of 32 knots. At 2000 the wind was from160° (T) at 32 knots with gusts of 41 knots and,at 2330, just after the vessel had grounded, thewind was from 130° (T) at 27 knots with gustsup to 39 knots.

The anchorageSCI’s Shipboard Safety Management SystemManual, under Anchor Watch, states in part:

• There shall be one officer in charge of the naviga-

tional watch in the wheelhouse while the vessel is at

anchor, to ensure the vessel is maintaining her

position. In addition, there shall be a seaman on

watch at all times, when the vessel is at anchorage.

• Master shall assess the prevailing situation at the

anchorage and decide on notice to be given to

engine room for availability of main engines.

• The officer-in-charge of the navigational watch

shall verify the vessel’s position frequently by all

possible means and ensure that vessel is not

dragging anchor.

• Should the weather deteriorate the master mayconsider paying out more cable to ease the strainand main engines may also be used to ease thestrain on the cable.

• The officer in charge of the navigational watch shallverify that the anchor is holding and the cable is notslipping by close observation of anchor bearings. Ifthere is doubt that the vessel is maintaining itsposition, the officer in charge of the navigationalwatch shall:

- Inform the master

- Inform the engine room

- Call anchor stations

- In congested anchorages, keep an adequate numberof fenders ready and rigged.

• Under heavy weather conditions or when threatenedby a storm, the master shall consider picking up theanchor in good time and clear the anchorage area. Itwould be safer to head into the sea and swell inopen waters.

• Master shall be notified if the officer in charge ofthe navigation watch has doubts about the shipdragging anchor or if visibility deteriorates.

• Ship’s position circle, showing maximum reach ofthe vessel as she swings around at change of tideand exact position of the anchor is to be charted onthe largest scale chart available.

The master had anchored on a lee shore and hehad permitted the mate to be on deck. At 1600,he had arranged for the engine to be ready atfive minutes notice because the vessel wasyawing excessively.

According to the Admiralty Manual ofSeamanship, Volume 3;

If it is expected that a ship will have to ride out astrong and prolonged gale both anchors should beused and they should be let go in such a way thatwhen the ship is riding to the cables the anglebetween them will be about 20°.

…To check a yaw, the second anchor could bereleased when the ship reaches the limit of her yawto the side which is furthest from the first anchor.

The master did not consider the use of a secondanchor.

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His main concern seemed to be the necessity toget the hatches prepared for the next cargo. Hedid not appear to foresee that he had very littlemargin for safety in the exposed position wherethe ship lay.

The International Association of ClassificationSocieties Requirements concerning Mooringand Anchoring (IACS Req. 1994/Corr.95)makes the following statement regarding thedesign of anchoring equipment:

A1.1.2 The equipment is therefore not designed tohold a ship off fully exposed coasts in roughweather or to stop a ship which is moving ordrifting. In this condition the loads on the anchoringequipment increase to such a degree that itscomponents may be damaged or lost owing to thehigh energy forces generated particularly in largeships.

The master had received warning of gales fromthe E/SE and very rough seas. This warning andthe warning in the Sailing Directions of theunsuitability of the anchorage under suchconditions should have alerted him to the needto clear the anchorage in good time.

Training and experienceThe master had started his career at sea in 1960as a cadet. After obtaining a second mate’scertificate, he joined SCI as fourth mate andsailed with the company as third mate andsecond mate. He obtained a mate’s certificate in1968 and, after sailing as second mate for afurther year, was promoted to mate. During thistime, he sailed on general cargo ships andtankers. He obtained a master’s certificate in1972 and sailed as mate for three years beforehe was promoted to master in 1975. Heremained with SCI until 1978, sailing ongeneral cargo ships, before joining overseascompanies with whom he also sailed as masteron general cargo ships and car carriers. Herejoined SCI as a contract master in 1998 andhis previous command to Devprayag had alsobeen a bulk carrier.

The mate had started his career at sea with theIndian Navy in 1976 where he specialised inanti-submarine warfare until 1997. In 1995, heobtained a master class 1 certificate and joinedSCI in 1997. Since then he had sailed as mateon four bulk carriers, including 15 months on asister ship of Devprayag. He had joinedDevprayag at Geelong on 12 April.

The senior second mate had joined SCI as acadet in December 1995, sailing on a sister shipof Devprayag and on tankers, before he obtainedhis second mate’s certificate in 1999. He hadsailed on Devprayag since January 2000 assecond mate and would have completed therequired sea time for a mate’s certificate sixweeks after the grounding.

The junior second mate had joined SCI as acadet in 1996 and, after sailing on bulk carriersand tankers, had obtained his second mate’scertificate in September 2000. Devprayag washis first ship as second mate. He had been onboard since 30 November 2000.

The trainee navigating officer cadet on boardhad joined SCI in 1997 and, prior to joiningDevprayag, had sailed on a tanker and a generalcargo ship. He had completed the writtenexamination for a second mate’s certificate andwould, after completion of the required sea time,appear for the second mate’s oral examination.

The master’s statement of factsIn a report to the company, the master statedthat there was a duty officer on the bridge foranchor watch at all times.

When the senior second mate relieved themaster for a rest at 1415 on the afternoon of thegrounding, he was not able to maintain acontinuous anchor watch on the bridge. He wentto the bridge twice to check the position of theship, otherwise he was on deck to check on thepreparation of the hatches.

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The master’s statement contained theinformation that, at 2030 on the night of thegrounding, he had checked the position andradar distance personally and found that thevessel was maintaining its position.

At 1830, however, the senior second mate hadbeen to the bridge where he noticed that theGPS position was 0.37 miles from the originalposition. The senior second mate drew thecadet’s attention to the fact that the vessel haddragged and, a short time later, the cadetinformed the mate of the dragging.

Whether or not the master did check theposition is not clear and could not be substan-tiated as the positions on the chart had beenerased and no other record of positions wasmaintained.

There is no evidence that the mate told themaster, during their discussion on the bridge atabout 1900, that the vessel had dragged. TheInspector is satisfied that the vessel had draggedalmost half a mile by 2030.

Given the number of years that the master andmate had been at sea, their lack of appropriateaction to prevent the grounding was notconsistent with their training and experience andshowed a lack of effective communication.

The ship’s track The master seemed unable to turn the ship’shead to starboard. According to him, the vessel,while dragging towards the northwest, wasturning to port, despite the rudder being hardover to starboard. It took the ground aft, thenswung round to port, grounding over its fulllength and settling on a heading of 270°.

The senior second mate who took the wheelwhen the engine was put on ‘stand by’ at 2236recalled that the heading was then about 070°.There are inconsistencies in his recollection ofevents and there are differences in his account

from that of the master. However, he recalls thathe put the wheel hard over to starboard and thevessel went to starboard slowly, so that, when hehanded the wheel to the quartermaster, theheading was about 075°. He was of the opinionthat there was no difficulty in turning thevessel’s head to starboard and that the ship’shead went to the south and then further around,to the west before the grounding.

A local resident, a qualified professionalfishermen, who is also a maritime trainingcoordinator with the TAFE college in Portlandand Warrnambool and a marine investigator forthe Marine Board of Victoria, witnessed thegrounding. He sent the ATSB a sketch of theincident as he saw it. His sketch (attached atpage 15) and explanation indicate that, after hefirst sighted the vessel at 2252, the vessel haddragged northwest, through a gap in Minervareef. According to him, the vessel steered anortheasterly course, parallel to the reef and thecoast, before turning south, when its sterngrounded on the reef. The vessel’s bowcontinued to turn to starboard and eventually,Devprayag lay almost abeam to the wind,aground along its length, on a westerly heading.

With the positions on the chart being erased, thedeletion of the track on the radar and withoutthe assistance of a course recorder trace, it is notpossible to reconcile the differences in theseaccounts.

Tide and windAt 1830 on the 21st, after the initial dragging ofthe anchor had been noticed, the ship was justsouth of the 6 fathom contour. High tide atPortland was predicted at 0002 on 22 April at0.77 metres and the set of the tide wouldaccentuate any drift caused by the wind. Theship was left with very little margin for furtherdrift and, while the anchor was being weighed,the ship was set by the wind and tide to thenorthwest as the chain was shortened. The shipwas in ballast and would have made consid-

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erable leeway due to its shallow draft and thelarge area of ship exposed to the wind. By thetime the ship had weighed anchor it waspossibly inside the line of Minerva reefs,grounding as the master attempted to turn it toseaward.

Charts and Sailing DirectionsThe chart covering this area (Aus 786) was asmall scale chart (1:150 000). There was a largescale chart (Aus 140) covering Portland harbouron a scale of 1: 10 000 but this did not extend tothe edge of the anchorages or out into PortlandBay where the ship grounded. The ship’s initialanchor position was outside the limits of thelarge scale chart so the position was plotted onthe smaller scale chart. The relative scales mayhave made the initial dragging, prior to 1830,appear less serious to the cadet and the mate,when the positions were plotted on the chart.

At the time of the incident, a new chart with alarger scale and different border locations was

being prepared by the Hydrographic Office. Thenew chart, Aus 140, was published on 30 March2001 and is divided into two parts. One partnow covers the harbour and out to the portlimits at 1:10 000 scale and the other coversPortland Bay at a scale of 1:100 000. Both ofthese are now metric charts.

Sailing Directions are indispensable companionsto charts. They include information not includedon a chart such as descriptions (includingphotographs) of the best approaches to harbours,harbour facilities, anchorages, local history,rules, regulations, and table of distances.

In the case of Devprayag, the master had notread the advice in the Sailing Directions and didnot appreciate the danger to which the ship wasexposed in the prevailing weather conditions.

Other groundings have been caused as a resultof advice in the Sailing Directions not beingread or understood, notably the Torrey Canyonoff the Scilly Isles, UK, on 18 March 1967.

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Position 2/2300 when vessel struck reef

Position 3/2315 vessel stopped

Position 4/2345 final position Position 1/2252 first sighted

Gap in reefReef

Drag

ged

anch

or fr

om th

e So

uth

Vessel’s track

Dutton Way rock wall

Outer reef

Inner reef

N

S

W

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Resident’s viewing position

Dutton Way Road

Resident’s house

House

600

met

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Anchor position ofDevprayag

FIGURE 4:Sketch of incident supplied by local resident

Not to scale

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FIGURE 5:Devprayag: Events and causal factors chart

Incident Conditions Events

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ConclusionsThese conclusions identify the different factorscontributing to the incident and should not beread as apportioning blame or liability to anyparticular individual or organisation.

Based on the evidence available, the groundingoccurred because of a combination of thefollowing factors.

1. The master had anchored on a lee shore andpermitted the vessel to remain at the exposedanchorage in deteriorating weatherconditions.

2. The master had not noted the warning in theSailing Directions that the anchorage atPortland was not recommended in strong Eand SE weather.

3. Insufficient notice was taken of the galewarning for the area.

4. Advice in the company’s safety manual, toconsider picking up the anchor in good timeto clear the anchorage when threatened byheavy weather or storm conditions, was notheeded.

5. Priority was given to the task of preparationof the hatches for the next cargo, rather thanto the safety of the ship.

6. The master was not informed immediately at1830, when the senior second mate realisedthat the vessel had dragged. There was a lackof bridge resource management principles inthat the mate and other officers offered noadvice to the master in respect of leaving theanchorage.

7. It is unlikely that the master personallychecked the position at 2030. Had he doneso, he would have realised that the vessel haddragged almost half a mile from the originalanchor position.

8. The small scale chart in use might havecaused the mate and the cadet to underes-timate the significance of the distance thatthe vessel had dragged at about 1815.

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The Inspector recommends that mariners notethe importance of using Sailing Directions whenplanning passages, when entering or leaving aport or anchoring in or near a port.

The Inspector also recommends that mariners befully aware of weather conditions and the factthat inclement weather can alter a relatively safeanchorage into one that is unsafe.

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Recommendations

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SubmissionsUnder sub-regulation 16(3) of the Navigation(Marine Casualty) Regulations, if a report, orpart of a report, relates to a person’s affairs to amaterial extent, the Inspector must, if it isreasonable to do so, give that person a copy ofthe report or the relevant part of the report. Sub-regulation 16(4) provides that such a personmay provide written comments or informationrelating to the report.

The final draft of the report, or relevant partsthereof, was sent to:

The General Manager, The ShippingCorporation of India Ltd, the master, mate, bothsecond mates and the cadet of Devprayag.

A submission was received from the mate,which is reproduced in part in the report.

A submission was also received from TheShipping Corporation of India Ltd. Theirsubmission, reproduced in part below, stated:

Your detailed report enabled us to arrive at thecauses which led to this mishap. We have advisedour fleet of vessels to be more careful whenanchoring close to land or in proximity to a buoyedchannel.

Masters have been cautioned that tasks such as thecleaning of holds should not distract them frommaintaining navigation watches.

In addition to the guidelines in the company’s safetymanagement manual, they have also been advised:

• To plan and study passages from berth to berth

• To select anchoring positions clear of shoals andnavigational hazards, with appropriate depths forships’ drafts

• The Master and navigating officer willdetermine and chart the vessel’s position duringpilotages and chart the position prior to thepilot’s departure

• To take into account the existing weatherconditions and, in case the weather deteriorates,to maintain continuous weather messagewatches. Frequent weather observations are tobe made, recorded and logged. If the needarises, to put the main engine and other essentialmachinery on stand-by or at very short noticefor any possible manoeuvring. The main engineand other machinery are not to be immobilisedat anchorages unless there is fair weather, thevessel is anchored away from hazards, there isno berthing program and the master hasinformed port control, the owners andcharterers.

• Certified officers are to keep a stringent anchorwatch aided by a lookout and a quartermaster.The vessel’s position is to be checked frequentlyusing all available navigational equipment,supervised by the master. The bridge is not tobe left unattended or without the presence ofcertified officers. While determining the ship’sposition, the position and distance of otheranchored vessels and navigation marks must bechecked frequently. The VHF must be kept onat the channels prescribed for the port.

We are quite positive that the mishaps encounteredat Portland can be averted in future.

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DevprayagIMO Number 8321072

Flag India

Classification Society Det Norske Veritas (DNV)

Ship Type Bulk Carrier

Builder Daewoo Shipbuilding, Okpo, Korea

Year Built 1986

Owner The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd (SCI)

Gross Tonnage 28 739

Net Tonnage 15 763

Summer Deadweight 47 349 tonnes

Length overall 189.00 m

Breadth moulded 30.40 m

Depth (moulded) 16.40 m

Summer Draught 11.825 m

Engine B&W 6L60MCE

Crew 44 (Indian nationals)

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Devprayag. 11.02