MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2017ME78Docket: Cum-15-558Argued: October26,2016Decided: May4,2017Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Majority: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Dissent: JABAR,J.

MARIEGUNNINGv.

JOHNDOEMEAD,J.

[¶1] InAugust2013,MarieGunningbroughtsuitintheSuperiorCourt

(Cumberland County) against the anonymous publisher and writer(s)

(collectively JohnDoe)ofNewsasViewedFromaCrow’sNest(Crow’sNest),

a publication distributed locally in Freeport, Maine, and accessible on the

Internet,1whichGunningclaimedhadpublisheddefamatorystatementsabout

herinseveralof its issues. AfteraCaliforniacourtquashedasubpoenathat

GunningservedontheCrow’sNest’swebsitehostseekingtoidentifyDoe,the

Superior Court (Warren, J.) dismissed her complaint without prejudice for

1Doe’sbriefstatesthattheCrow’sNestisnolongeravailableontheInternet.

2

failure to effect service on the defendants. Gunning appeals from that

judgment.ThepublisheroftheCrow’sNest(Doe#1)cross-appeals,agreeing

with the court that Gunning is estopped by the California judgment from

continuing to seek the Does’ identities, and additionally contending that

Gunning cannot force theDoes to reveal their identities because theCrow’s

Nest is both nonactionable constitutionally protected parody and protected

anonymous speech. We conclude that Gunning is estopped by the prior

Californiajudgment,andweaffirmthejudgmentoftheSuperiorCourtwithout

reachingDoe’salternativearguments.

I.FACTSANDPROCEDURE

[¶2] In 2011, Gunning ran for the Freeport Town Council and was

defeated.Oneweeklater,theCrow’sNest,whichdeclaresunderitsmasthead

that it is “a parody look at the news,” published an “Election Special” issue,

whichincludedaphotographofthe“WickedWitchoftheWest”characterfrom

the classicmovieTheWizard of Oz next to Gunning’s name, alongwith the

caption “Aka: ‘Gunner Gunning’ ‘Miss Prozac 2003,’” and several purported

quotesfromGunning.SeveralotherpeoplewithapparenttiestoFreeportwere

treatedsimilarly.Gunning’scomplaintagainstDoeallegedthreecountsoflibel

andonecounteachoffalselightandintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress

3

basedonthestatementsconcerningherinthe“ElectionSpecial”issue,aswell

asthoseappearinginfifteensubsequentissuesoftheCrow’sNest.

[¶3]GunningservedaCaliforniasubpoenaontheCrow’sNest’swebsite

host, seeking the names, email addresses, and IP addresses of anyone

associatedwiththepublication’swebsite.Does#1and#2,whofiledwritten

declarationsintheCaliforniaSuperiorCourtstatingthattheyweretheowner

and writer, respectively, of the Crow’s Nest website, moved to quash the

subpoena in that court, asserting that the Crow’s Nest was constitutionally

protected parody and that they had a constitutional right to speak

anonymously.InadecisionissuedonJanuary24,2014,thecourtgrantedthe

motiontoquash,rulingthat

[Gunning]mustmakeaprimafacieshowingoflibel....[She]failedtomakethisprimafacieshowing.TheCourtfindsthatwhilethecontentoftheCrow’sNestcouldbeseenasrudeanddistasteful,taking into consideration the context and contents of thestatementsatissue,itisaparody.ThespeechatissueintheCrow’sNest is protected under the First Amendment of theU.S.Constitution. Thestatementsarenotactionablespeechsuchthattheidentitiesofthewebsiteownerandpersonswhocommentor otherwisepublishmaterial printed in or postedonline at theCrow’sNestmustberevealedpursuanttothesubpoena.

Doev.Gunning,No.CPF-13-513271(Cal.Super.Ct.S.F.CountyJan.24,2014).

[¶4]GunningdidnotappealtheCaliforniajudgment.Threemonthsafter

thatjudgmentissued,GunningservedaMainesubpoenaonaTownofFreeport

4

employeeinordertodeposehimtolearnwhetherhewasthewriterforthe

Crow’sNest.Theemployeeobjectedtothesubpoenaandprovidedanaffidavit

averringthathehadneverhadanythingtodowiththeCrow’sNestandhadno

knowledgeofanyonewhodid. Fourteenmonthslater,theemployee,stating

thatGunningagainsoughttodeposehim,movedtoquashthesubpoenaonthe

grounds that Gunningwas collaterally estopped by the California judgment

fromfurtherdiscoveryseekingtolearntheidentitiesofDoes#1and#2,and

thathercomplaintfailedtostateaclaimthatcouldsurviveFirstAmendment

scrutiny.2Doe#1separatelymovedtoquashtheemployee’ssubpoenaand“to

barGunning from issuing anyotherprocess to compel thedisclosureof the

anonymousspeakersnamedinherComplaint,andtoenteranorderdismissing

theComplaint.”

[¶5]OnOctober22,2015,theSuperiorCourtissuedanordergranting

themotiontoquashanddismissingGunning’scomplaintwithoutprejudicefor

failuretoeffectuateservicepursuanttoM.R.Civ.P.3.3Thecourtsaidthat“[l]eft

toitsowndevices”itwould“concludethat[G]unninghassetforthaprimafacie

2Thecourtruledthattheemployee’sstandingtomakethoseargumentswasnotatissuebecause

Doe#1alsomovedtoquashthesubpoena.3AlthoughtheRuleordinarilyrequiresservice“within90daysafterthefilingofthecomplaint,”

M.R.Civ.P.3, the courtexplained thatanextensionof thatdeadlinewas implicit in itsdiscoveryordersinthecase.

5

caseandthatshehassubmittedevidencesufficienttosupporttheelementsof

herlibelclaim.”Thecourtfound,however,thatalthoughit“wouldbeinclined

to find that there is at least a factual dispute as to whether [one specific]

description of Gunning . . . would reasonably be understood to constitute a

parody”andthereforebeentitledtoFirstAmendmentprotection,

thecourtisnotwritingonacleanslateonthatissue....[W]hetheror not this court agrees with the California ruling, the issue ofwhetherGunninghasmadethenecessaryprimafacieshowing[ofan actionable claim] was actually litigated in California, wasdecidedadverselytoGunning,andwasessentialtotheoutcomeoftheCaliforniaaction. . . .Noappealwassought. Accordingly, theCalifornia decision is entitled to collateral estoppel effect andprecludesGunningfromrelitigatingthesameissuehereinMaine.

[¶6] Accordingly, the court quashed the subpoena and dismissed the

complaint for lack of service on the Does. Gunning appealed and Doe #1

cross-appealed.

II.DISCUSSION

[¶7]WefirstaddressthequestionofwhetherGunningisprecludedfrom

relitigatinginMainetheissueoftheconstitutionalprotectionaffordedtothe

statementsmadeabouther in theCrow’sNest. If she is, then theCalifornia

court’s determination that the statements are parody protected by the

First Amendment controls, and Gunning’s libel complaint fails to state an

6

actionableclaim.4 Inthatevent,thetrialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionin

quashingtheFreeportemployee’ssubpoena,andweneednotreachtheDoes’

contention that the statements in the Crow’sNest, if reviewed de novo, are

entitled to protection either as constitutionally protected parody or as

anonymous speech. See State v. Marroquin-Aldana, 2014 ME 47, ¶ 33,

89A.3d519(“Wereviewacourt’sdecisiononamotiontoquashforanabuse

ofdiscretion.”).

[¶8]TheCaliforniajudgmentisconclusivetotheextentthatitquashed

thesubpoenaissuedtotheCrow’sNest’swebsitehost,aresultconcerninga

discretecollateralissuerelatedtoGunning’ssuitthatshedoesnotchallenge.

SeeBakerv.Gen.MotorsCorp.,522U.S.222,233(1998)(holdingthatpursuant

totheFullFaithandCreditClause,“thejudgmentoftherenderingStategains

4 Theelementsof a libel claimare “a falseanddefamatory statement concerninganother; an

unprivilegedpublicationtoathirdparty; faultamountingat leasttonegligenceonthepartofthepublisher;andeitheractionabilityofthestatementirrespectiveofspecialharmortheexistenceofspecial harm caused by the publication.” Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME 104, ¶ 5, 752 A.2d 1189(list headings omitted). Gunning’s false light claim is similar, except that it involves propagatingdefamatoryinformationthrough“publicity”ratherthanby“publication.”Id.¶17.Ifthestatementsin the Crow’s Nest are constitutionally protected, then they are not “unprivileged,” and Gunningcannotsatisfythesecondelementofalibelclaim.SeeSimmons,Zillman&Gregory,MaineTortLaw§13-11at13-19(2004ed.)(“[Adefamation]actionthatmeetsallstatecommonlawrequirementsfor recovery may fail because a recovery for the plaintiff would unconstitutionally abridge thefreedomofspeechandpress.”).IfGunning’slibelclaimfailsforthatreason,herclaimforintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistressfailsaswell.SeeShayv.Walters,702F.3d76,83(1stCir.2012)(“TheSupremeCourthasmadeitpellucidthatafaileddefamationclaimcannotberecycledasatortclaimfornegligentorintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress.”);Aultv.HustlerMagazine,860F.2d877,880 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (“There is no independent cause of action for intentional infliction ofemotional distress based on the very same acts which are insufficient to support an action fordefamation.”),cert.denied,489U.S.1080(1989).

7

nationwide force”). Maine law, however, determineswhether the judgment

actstoforecloseGunning’sclaimsinthisState. SeeRestatement(Second)of

ConflictofLaws§95cmt.c(Am.LawInst.Supp.1989revisions)(“[L]ocallaw

oftheStatewherethejudgmentwasrendered...willbeconsultedtodetermine

whetherthejudgmentaffectstheclaimoronlysomeincidentalissue.Ifunder

thislawthejudgmentwasnotonthemeritsandsettledonlysomeincidental

issue...thejudgmentwillbeheldconclusiveinotherStatesonlyastotheissue

decidedandtheplaintiffwillremainfreetomaintainanactionontheoriginal

claim.”).

[¶9] In beginning that analysis, we have explained, applying

well-establishedlaw,that

[c]ollateral estoppel is the issue preclusion component of theprinciple of res judicata. It prevents the relitigation of factualissuesalreadydecided if the identical issuewasdeterminedbyapriorfinaljudgment,andthepartyestoppedhadafairopportunityand incentive to litigate the issue in a prior proceeding. . . . Thecourt’s conclusion that collateral estoppel applies is a legaldetermination;ourreviewofthatconclusionisthereforedenovo.

Grayv.TDBank,N.A.,2012ME83,¶10,45A.3d735(alterationandquotation

marks omitted) (emphases added); see Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie,

2003ME121,¶22,834A.2d131(statingthat“[w]ehavelongrecognizedthat

8

thedoctrineofresjudicatahastwoprongs,”including“[i]ssuepreclusion,also

referredtoascollateralestoppel,”andclaimpreclusion).

A. IdenticalIssue

[¶10]Concerningthefirstelement,theissuedecidedbytheCalifornia

courtandthattobedecidedbyMainecourtsifGunningisnotestoppedfrom

relitigatingitisthesame—didGunningmakeoutaprimafacieshowingoflibel,

orwere the statementsmade about her in the Crow’s Nest shielded by the

FirstAmendmentfrombeingthebasisforalibelclaim.Thetrialcourtcorrectly

foundthat“GunningpreviouslylitigatedthatissueinCalifornia[.]”

B. FinalJudgment

[¶11]Gunningvigorouslyconteststhecourt’sdeterminationthat“[t]he

decision of the California Superior Court constituted a final decision on

Gunning’sapplicationforinterstatediscovery.”Nonetheless,theonlyissuethat

theCaliforniacourtwasaskedtodecidewaswhetherthesubpoenadirectedto

theCrow’sNest’swebsitehostshouldbequashed. Onceitdidso,therewas

nothing left for the California court to consider. See Fitzgerald v. Bilodeau,

2006ME122,¶4,908A.2d1212(“[A]judgmentisfinal,andnotinterlocutory,

when:(1)thetrialcourt’sactionfullydecidesanddisposesofthewholematter

leavingnothingfurtherfortheconsiderationandjudgmentofthetrialcourt;

9

and(2)nosubsequentproceedingsinthecasewillrendertheappellatecourt’s

decision immaterial.” (quotationmarksomitted)). The finalprovision in the

Californiacourt’sorderandthefinalnotationinthedocketentriesconcernthe

resolution of costs and attorney fees involved in adjudicating themotion—

indicativeofafinishedcase.

[¶12] Gunning’s argument that she isnot estoppedbecauseappellate

review of the California judgment was effectively unavailable to her is not

persuasive. She points to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28

(Am. Law Inst. 1982), which provides that “relitigation of [an] issue in a

subsequentactionbetweenthepartiesisnotprecluded...[when][t]heparty

againstwhompreclusionissoughtcouldnot,asamatteroflaw,haveobtained

reviewofthejudgmentintheinitialaction.”Thefirstcommenttosection28

elaborates:“Thereisa[n]...exceptiontotheruleofpreclusionwhen...appeal

doesnotlie[]by...extraordinarywrit[.]”Id.cmt.a.

[¶13] The Restatement limits the exception, however, in saying that

“[t]he [section28]exception . . . appliesonlywhenreview isprecludedasa

matterof law. It doesnotapply in caseswhere review is availablebut is not

sought.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, review of the order quashing the

subpoenawasavailablebyextraordinarywritpursuanttotheCaliforniaCode

10

ofCivilProcedure,5butGunningoptednottoseeksuchreview. Accordingly,

theRestatementexceptiontothecollateralestoppeldoctrinethat is invoked

whennoappellatereviewisavailabledoesnotapply.

[¶14] AlthoughGunningarguesthatshewouldhavebeenrequiredto

show“immediateharm”inordertoobtainanextraordinarywritandchosenot

tofileapetitionbecauseshebelievedshewouldhavebeenunsuccessful,itwas

fortheCaliforniacourts,andnotGunning,tosaythatthelikelyterminationof

herMainelawsuitwasnotaqualifying“immediateharm,”orthatsomeother

groundforgrantingawritunderCalifornialawdidnotapply.

[¶15] Like Gunning, the dissent goes to great lengths to predict an

adverse ruling by California’s appellate courts had Gunning pursued

an extraordinary writ. Dissenting Opinion ¶¶ 23-26. That would be an

unnecessary exercise if Gunning had requested a writ, as was her right.

SeeCal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2029.650(a) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 4 of the

2017 Reg. Sess.). In any event, we are not a California court, and it is

5TheCaliforniaCodeofCivilProcedureprovides:“Ifadisputearisesrelatingtodiscovery...any

request...toenforce,quash,ormodifyasubpoena,orforotherreliefmaybefiledinthesuperiorcourtinthecountyinwhichdiscoveryistobeconducted. . . .” Cal.Civ.Proc.Code§2029.600(a)(Deering,LEXISthroughch.4ofthe2017Reg.Sess.).Thereafter,“[i]fasuperiorcourtissuesanorder...resolvingapetitionunderSection2029.600...apersonaggrievedbytheordermaypetitiontheappropriate court of appeal for an extraordinary writ.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2029.650(a)(Deering,LEXISthroughch.4ofthe2017Reg.Sess.).

11

indisputablytruethatGunningdidnotpursuetheavenueofappellatereview

availabletoherunderCalifornialaw—thevenuethatshechose.Hadshedone

so, in addition to having a stronger argument in this appeal, that state’s

appellatecourtswouldhavehadanopportunitytoaddresswhatGunningand

thedissentcontendareseriouserrorsoflawintheCaliforniaSuperiorCourt’s

decision.SeeDissentingOpinion¶35.

C. FairOpportunityandIncentive

[¶16]GunningassertsthatalthoughinfurtheranceofherMainelawsuit

shecausedasubpoena tobeserved inCaliforniaand then fully litigated the

Does’motiontoquashit,she“didnothaveafullandfairincentivetolitigate

theissueintheCaliforniacourt”because“shehadanotheravenueavailableto

herfromwhichtoseekdisclosureoftheCrow’sNestauthors:thedepositions

thatwere being sought inMaine.” That position is counterintuitive at best.

AplaintiffinGunning’ssituationwouldbeverymotivatedtolitigateamotion

that (1) presumably involved considerable time and expense to pursue;

(2) would have potentially yielded all of what she continues to seek had it

succeeded,namelytheidentitiesandcontactinformationofthewebsite’shost

andcontributors;and(3)wouldpredictablylead,ifthemotiontoquashwere

granted, topreciselywhat occurred—aneffort to collaterally estopGunning

12

from relitigating in Maine the central issue of whether the Crow’s Nest

statementswereactionableatall.

[¶17]TheRestatementprovides,inacommentcaptioned“[l]ackoffair

opportunitytolitigateintheinitialaction,”that

the court in [a] second proceeding may conclude that issuepreclusionshouldnotapplybecausethepartysoughttobebounddidnothaveanadequateopportunityorincentivetoobtainafullandfairadjudicationinthefirstproceeding.Sucharefusaltogivethe first judgment preclusive effect should not occur without acompellingshowingofunfairness,norshoulditbebasedsimplyonaconclusionthatthefirstdeterminationwaspatentlyerroneous.

Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§28cmt. j. Gunningdoesnotmakeany

“compellingshowingofunfairness”sufficientforustoconcludethatshelacked

opportunityorincentivetofullylitigatethismatterinCalifornia.

[¶18] Furthermore, incharging thatourdecision isunfair toGunning

because“weareallowingtheCalifornialawtoprevent[her]frompursuingher

defamationcaseinthisstate,”DissentingOpinion¶37,thedissentignoresthe

factthatGunninghadafullopportunitytolitigatetheissueathandinthevenue

of her choosing. Had Gunning chosen to prosecute this Maine action by

pursuingdiscoveryinMaine’scourts—forexampleifshehadsoughttodepose

13

theFreeportemployeebeforeservingasubpoenainCalifornia,6orifshehad

withdrawnthesubpoenawhentheDoes’Californiamotiontoquashraiseda

potentiallydispositiveissue—thentheSuperiorCourtwouldhavedecidedthe

Freeport employee’smotion to quash based onMaine law, and either party

couldhaveappealedanadverserulingtothisCourt.Instead,Gunningopted,of

her own volition, to litigate a substantive issue in the California courts,

presumablyhopingforafavorableresult.Afterreceivinganunfavorableruling,

andchoosingnottopursueanappealofthatruling,shecannotsimplyelectto

relitigatetheverysameissueinvolvingthesamepartiesinanotherjurisdiction,

hopeful of obtaining a more favorable result. Such is the long-standing,

well-establisheddoctrineofcollateralestoppel. SeeGray,2012ME83,¶10,

45A.3d735.

D. Conclusion

[¶19] Because the issue decided by the California court in a final

judgmentwasthesameissuethatGunningseekstohaveaMainecourtrevisit,

namelywhethertheCrow’sNestenjoysconstitutionalprotectionsufficientto

foreclose her libel claim, and because Gunning had both opportunity and

6Inthatevent,iftheDoeshadintervenedandtheMainecourtruledthatGunninghadmadeout

aprimafaciecaseoflibel,thatjudgmentwouldhavehadpreclusiveeffectinCalifornia.

14

incentivetolitigatethatissueinCalifornia,sheisestoppedfromrelitigatingit

in the Maine action. See id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion inquashing thesubpoenaservedon theFreeportemployee,or in

dismissing Gunning’s complaint for lack of service on the defendants as a

result.7 SeeMarroquin-Aldana,2014ME47,¶33,89A.3d519;M.R.Civ.P.3.

HavingconcludedthatthecourtdidnoterrinfindingthatGunningisprecluded

fromrelitigatingthedispositiveissue,wedonotaddressthequestionraisedin

the cross-appeal of whether on de novo review we would reach the same

conclusionasdidtheCaliforniacourt,andweoffernoopinionastowhether

thetrialcourtcorrectlyarticulatedMainelawconcerningtheextenttowhich

anonymousspeechisprotected.8

7 Gunningdoesnot challenge the court’s statement that, by agreement, if the subpoenawere

quashed then she “hadno furtheravenues topursuedisclosureof the identitiesof JohnDoes#1and#2.”

8Althoughthetrialcourtwenttoconsiderablelengthstosetouttheanalysisthatitwouldhaveappliedhaditbeen“writingonacleanslate”ontheissueofwhethertheCrow’sNest’sstatementsconcerning Gunning constituted actionable defamation, including citing a test articulated inDendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), thatdiscussion was dicta given the court’s ultimate conclusion that Gunning was estopped by theCaliforniadecision.WehavepreviouslymadementionofDendritebuthavenotadoptedit,andwedonotdosotoday. SeeFitchv.Doe,2005ME39,¶¶26-27,869A.2d722(“BecauseDoefailedtoraise the issue in the trial court,wedeclineat this time toconsider theextent towhich theFirstAmendment affects the consideration of motions to disclose information about anonymous ISPsubscribers.”).Thus,thedissent’sdiscussionofthetrialcourt’sDendriteanalysis,anditsdeclarationthat“wehavenotaddressedwhether theDendrite ‘heightenedburden’orsomeotherproceduralhurdleatthecommencementofthesuitwillbethelawofourstate,”DissentingOpinion¶34,simplycreateandthenattackastrawman. Seesupra¶7. Wetakenoissuewiththedissent’sappealtosovereigntywhenitsaysthat“[t]helawinthisareaisevolvingandweshouldbemakingourowndecisionastowhatisthebestpolicyforMaine,”DissentingOpinion¶39,buttoday’sopiniondoes

15

Theentryis:

Judgmentaffirmed.

JABAR,J.,dissenting.

[¶20] I respectfully dissent because I do not believe that a California

court’sorderconcerningadiscoverydisputeshouldbegivenpreclusiveeffect

on a defamation claim in Maine. The law addressing defamation claims in

CaliforniaandMaineisnotidentical,andbecauseofsignificantdifferenceswe

should not give deference to the California court’s order. For the reasons

discussed below, I would vacate the trial court’s decision and remand for

furtherproceedings.

I.DISCUSSION

A. RestatementofJudgments

[¶21]TheCourtreferstotheRestatement(Second)ofJudgments§28

(Am. Law Inst. 1982) to support its decision. Court’s Opinion ¶ 13. The

Restatementinfactsupportsvacationofthetrialcourt’sjudgment.Itreads:

nothavetheeffectthatthedissentfears.TheCaliforniadecisioniscontrollingonlyinthiscase,andthenonlybecausethat iswhereGunningchoseto litigate. Inthefuture, theLegislature is freetomake any policy judgment in this area that it deems fit within constitutional constraints, and,contrarytothedissent’saccusation,seeDissentingOpinion¶¶28,37,39,ourjurisprudenceremainsverymuchourown.

16

Althoughan issue isactually litigatedanddeterminedbyavalidand final judgment, and the determination is essential to thejudgment,relitigationoftheissueinasubsequentactionbetweenthepartiesisnotprecludedinthefollowingcircumstances:(1) Thepartyagainstwhompreclusionissoughtcouldnot,asamatteroflaw,haveobtainedreviewofthejudgmentintheinitialaction;or...(3)Anewdeterminationoftheissueiswarrantedbydifferencesinthequalityorextensivenessof theprocedures followed inthetwo courts orby factors relating to the allocationof jurisdictionbetweenthem;or(4)Thepartyagainstwhompreclusionissoughthadasignificantlyheavierburdenofpersuasionwithrespecttotheissueintheinitialactionthaninthesubsequentaction;theburdenhasshiftedtohisadversary;ortheadversaryhasasignificantlyheavierburdenthanhehadinthefirstaction;or(5)Thereisaclearandconvincingneedforanewdeterminationof the issue (a) because of the potential adverse impact of thedeterminationonthepublicinterestortheinterestsofpersonsnotthemselves parties in the initial action, (b) because it was notsufficientlyforeseeableatthetimeoftheinitialactionthattheissuewouldarise inthecontextofasubsequentaction,or(c)becausethepartysoughttobeprecluded,asaresultoftheconductofhisadversaryorotherspecialcircumstances,didnothaveanadequateopportunityorincentivetoobtainafullandfairadjudicationintheinitialaction.

Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§28.

[¶22]TheCaliforniadiscoveryorderagainstGunningmeetsseveralof

these exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion. First, pursuant to

17

section28(1)Gunningcouldnothaveobtainedreviewofthejudgmentofthe

CaliforniaSuperiorCourt. Next,pursuant tosections28(3)and(4),because

California applies a different burden at the threshold of a case to litigants

making defamation claims than the burden applied in Maine, a new

determination of the issue iswarranted. Finally, pursuant to section28(5),

thereisaclearandconvincingneedforadeterminationinMaineofthescope

ofFirstAmendmentprotectionwhenitconflictswithaplaintiff’srighttoseek

recovery for defamation because this conflict involves important public

interests.

B. InabilitytoSeekReview

[¶23]TheRestatementprovidesthatrelitigationisnotprecludedwhere

“[t]hepartyagainstwhompreclusionissoughtcouldnot,asamatteroflaw,

have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action.” Restatement

(Second)ofJudgments§28(1).ThoughtheCourtassertsthatGunningshould

havesoughtreviewinCaliforniaoftheordergrantingDoe’smotiontoquash,

Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 13-15, I disagree that as a matter of law review was

availabletoGunning.

[¶24] The California Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a

Californiasuperiorcourtissuesanorderresolvingamotiontoquash,“aperson

18

aggrieved by the ordermay petition the appropriate court of appeal for an

extraordinarywrit.”Cal.Civ.Proc.Code§2029.650(a)(Deering,LEXISthrough

ch.4ofthe2017Reg.Sess.);Cal.Civ.Proc.Code§2029.600(a)(Deering,LEXIS

throughch.4ofthe2017Reg.Sess.).ThecaselawinCaliforniaindicatesthat

an extraordinarywrit is difficult to obtain: “[discovery] rulings are typically

vested inthetrialcourt’sdiscretion,andevenifanabusecanbeshownit is

oftenimpossiblefortheaggrievedpartytoestablishgroundsforinterlocutory

intervention.” O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 82

(Cal.Ct.App.2006).Onlywhenanimmediateharmisthreatenedbyfailureto

grantreview,“suchaslossofaprivilegeagainstdisclosure,forwhichthereis

nootheradequateremedy,”willreviewbegranted.Id.at83(emphasisadded);

see also Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 425, 427

(Cal.Ct.App.1989)(“[W]ritreviewisappropriatewhen[a]petitionerseeks

relieffromanorderwhichmayundermineaprivilege.”).

[¶25]TheextraordinarywritrequiredforGunning’sdiscoveryappealto

moveforwardinCaliforniaisnotavailabletoherbecausesuchawritwould

onlybegrantedifthefactswereflipped—toachievethewrit,theorderwould

needtohavebreachedsomeprivilege,ratherthanmaintainedit.Forexample,

reviewbyextraordinarywrithasbeengrantedwhenacourt’sorderdenying

19

motions to quash resulted “in the production of privileged materials and

threaten[ed] theconfidential relationship”betweenaclientandanattorney.

BankofAm.,N.A.v.SuperiorCourt,151Cal.Rptr.3d526,546(Cal.Ct.App.2013)

(quotationmarksomitted).NorwasGunningsubjecttotheimmediateharm

thatisrequiredtobegrantedanextraordinarywrit.Theonlyreviewpermitted

forthediscoveryorderwasbyextraordinarywrit,anditwas,asamatterof

Californialaw,unavailabletoGunning.

[¶26] It is unrealistic for theCourt to assumeotherwise. SeeCourt’s

Opinion¶13.Alitigantneednotgothroughalengthyandexpensiveprocess

todemonstrate something that is legally evident on its face. Wherewe can

plainlyseethatreviewofthediscoveryorderwasnotavailableinCalifornia,

pursuanttosection28(1)oftheRestatement,weshouldnotallowcollateral

estoppeltopreventGunningfromlitigatingherdefamationclaiminMaine.

C. DifferingBurdens

[¶27]TheRestatementalsoprovidesthatrelitigationisnotprecludedif

theissueisoneoflawanda“newdeterminationoftheissueiswarrantedby

differences in thequalityorextensivenessof theprocedures followed in the

two courts,” orwhere “[t]heparty againstwhompreclusion is soughthada

significantlyheavierburdenofpersuasionwithrespecttotheissueintheinitial

20

action.”Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§28(3)-(4).Here,bothofthese

exceptionsareimplicatedforessentiallythesamereason:thelawaddressing

the issue of whether or not the litigant has a “heightened burden” when

asserting a defamation action against an anonymous speaker has not

previously been decided by this Court. California, in contrast toMaine, has

adopteda“heightenedburden”standardrequiringaprimafacieshowingofthe

elements of the plaintiff’s claim in order to overcome a motion to quash a

subpoena seeking the speaker’s identity. See Krinsky v. Doe,

72Cal.Rptr.3d231,245(Cal.Ct.App.2008).ApplyingtheCalifornialawhere

imposes California’s “significantly heavier burden of persuasion” upon

Gunning.SeeRestatement(Second)ofJudgments§28(4).

[¶28] Thedraftersof thecomments to theRestatementassert that in

subsequentcasessuchas this, “themore flexibleprincipleof staredecisis is

sufficienttoprotectthepartiesandthecourtfromunnecessaryburdens.”Id.

cmt.b.“Aruleoflawdeclaredinanactionbetweentwopartiesshouldnotbe

bindingonthemforalltime,especially...whenotherlitigantsarefreetourge

thattheruleshouldberejected.Suchpreclusionmightundulydelayneeded

changes in the lawandmightdeprivea litigantofaright that thecourtwas

preparedtorecognizeforotherlitigantsinthesameposition.”Id.Allowingthe

21

California order to determine the outcome of Maine defamation claims by

collaterallyestoppinglitigationinMaineonthebasisofdiscoveryordersdelays

needed review of Maine law and deprives litigants of rights that would

otherwiseberecognized.

[¶29] Additionally,“reexamination[ofa legalprinciple] isparticularly

appropriatewhentheapplicationoftheruleofissuepreclusionwouldimpose

on one of the parties a significant disadvantage.” Id. cmt. c. This conflict

between a litigant’s right to access the courts and a defendant’s First

AmendmentrightsisanalogoustoMaine’santi-SLAPPstatute,whichimposes

a statutory burden upon those bringing claims that implicate a party’s

constitutionallyprotectedFirstAmendmentrights.See14M.R.S.§556(2016).

Inananti-SLAPPcase,uponashowingbythespeaker“thattheclaimsagainst

itarebasedontheexerciseofthatparty’sconstitutionalrighttopetition,”the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate prima facie evidence

through pleadings and affidavits that “at least one of the moving party’s

petitioning activities was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any

arguable basis in law and caused actual injury to the [non-moving party].”

Naderv.Me.DemocraticParty,2013ME51,¶¶13-14,66A.3d571;seealso

14M.R.S. § 556. This procedural hurdle placed before litigants inMaine is

22

similar to the“heightenedburden”hurdle imposedbyCaliforniaon litigants

pursuingadefamationactionagainstadefendantclaimingprotectedspeech

undertheFirstAmendment.

[¶30]Likeourjurisprudenceaddressingtheanti-SLAPPstatute,weare

facedwithaclashbetweenGunning’srighttoaccessthecourtsforredressof

grievances,andDoe’sFirstAmendmentrights.However,unliketheanti-SLAPP

protections,thereisnoMainelegislationnoranyMainecaselawimposinga

“heightened burden” upon litigants who bring defamation claims against

individualsclaimingthatFirstAmendmentprotection. Instead, there isonly

caselawinafewscatteredstatesthathaveplacedthistypeofthresholdhurdle

againstplaintiffs.Todate,wehavenotestablishedsuchahurdle,norhasthe

UnitedStatesSupremeCourt.ThereareseriouspolicyconcernsthatthisCourt

shouldconsiderpriortoplacingthistypeofobstacleinfrontoflitigants,notthe

leastofwhichiswhethersuchanobstacleshouldbeimposedbyusorbythe

MaineLegislature.

[¶31] Thepolicy concerns are significant. TheCalifornia court relied

uponKrinskytorequirethatGunningshowaprimafaciecaseofdefamation.

Krinsky, in turn,relieduponDendrite International, Inc.v.Doe,775A.2d756

(N.J. Super.Ct.App.Div.2001);Doev. Cahill, 884A.2d451 (Del. 2005); and

23

HighfieldsCapitalManagementL.P.v.Doe,385F.Supp.2d969(N.D.Cal.2004),

among other cases, to hold, after a thorough analysis ofmethods bywhich

courts in several jurisdictions balance the competing rights of access to the

courts and First Amendment protection, that California will require a

primafacieshowingbeforeallowingdiscoverytoproceedindefamationcases

againstanonymousspeakers.Krinsky,72Cal.Rptr.3dat241-46.TheKrinsky

courtundertookaCalifornia-specificassessmentofthecaselaw,notingthatit

wasaddressing “Californiasubpoenas”and that “specificDendrite criteria to

defeataprotectiveorderormotiontoquashmaylikewisebedependentonthe

differentpleadingandmotionproceduresacrossstates.”9Id.at244.Thecourt

evenpointedoutthatincertainstatesthesecondDendritecriterionwouldbe

“essential,”whereasinotherstates,itwouldbe“superfluous.”Id.

9 It is worth noting that the Dendrite court’s analysis emphasized that “New Jersey’s State

Constitutionaffordsevengreaterprotectiontopersons’rightstofreespeechthandoes[the]federalConstitution....”DendriteInt’l,Inc.v.Doe,775A.2d756,765(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2001).Othercourtshavethereforeapplieda“heightenedburden”toplaintiffsindefamationcasesbasedonstateconstitutionalprotectionsthatmayormaynotbecoextensivewiththeconstitutionalprotectionsguaranteed by the Maine Constitution, see id. at 766—protections that the Court here does notaddress.

24

[¶32]Weshouldengageinourownassessmentofwhethertoimposea

“heightened burden” in defamation claims against anonymous speakers

assertingFirstAmendmentprotection.10

D. PublicInterests

[¶33]Finally,theRestatementprovidesthatrelitigationisnotprecluded

when“[t]here isaclearandconvincingneed foranewdeterminationof the

issue. . .becauseofthepotentialadverseimpactofthedeterminationonthe

publicinterestortheinterestsofpersonsnotthemselvespartiesintheinitial

action.”Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§28(5)(a).

10Inthiscase,theMaineSuperiorCourtmistakenlyconcludedthatMaineandCalifornialaware

identical, imposing a “heightened burden” on litigants pursuing a defamation claim against ananonymous defendant. The court attempted to define the issue before it by stating that “[t]hemotionstoquashbeforethecourtturnonwhetherGunninghasmetherburdenofdemonstratingentitlementtoproceedwithdiscoverywhenherrightsareweighedagainstwhattheLawCourthasstated as ‘the recognized right to anonymous speech,’” citing to our decision in Fitch v. Doe,2005ME39,¶26,869A.2d722.

InFitch,however,DoeandamiciurgedtheCourttoadoptthe“heightenedburden”testenunciatedin Dendrite, and the Court declined to address the question because Doe failed to raise a FirstAmendmentissueinthetrialcourt.Id.¶27.AstheCourttodayacknowledges,Court’sOpinion¶18n.8,wehaveneverheldthatDendriteisthelawinourstate,orotherwiseindicatedthatDendriteoranysimilar“heightenedburden”wouldcontrolcasesinwhichaplaintiffseekstobringadefamationcase.

Itisthereforeinappositethat,relyingupontheelementsfromDendrite,whichtheCaliforniacourt

did not even cite, the Maine Superior Court would conclude that because “one of the essentialDendriterequirements”—whetherGunningestablishedaprimafaciecasesufficienttosupportherlibelclaim—was fully litigated inCaliforniaanddecidedadversely toGunning,collateralestoppelprecludesGunningfromrelitigatingherclaiminMaine.

25

[¶34]InMaine,wehavenotaddressedwhethertheDendrite“heightened

burden”orsomeotherproceduralhurdleatthecommencementofthesuitwill

bethe lawofourstate.11 EventhoughtheMaineSuperiorCourt in thiscase

indicated thatGunninghadpresented a prima facie case, theCourt today is

preventing Gunning from proceedingwith her defamation claims because a

CaliforniacourtinterpretingCaliforniastatelawconcludedthatpursuanttoan

analysis applied uniquely in California—which the Krinsky court found

“unnecessary and potentially confusing,”Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244—

Gunninghadnotpresentedaprimafaciecase.Thisisnottheapproachthatwe

shouldtake.

[¶35]AlsoconcerningistheCaliforniacourt’sconclusionthatthespeech

at issue was parody and therefore protected by the First Amendment,

renderingthespeechnotactionable.12Whatconstitutesparodyincludesfactual

determinations best left to a jury. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,

11TheCourtstatesinitsopinionthatifGunninghadlitigatedthemotiontoquashinMaineand

theMainecourthadruledthatGunninghadmadeoutaprimafaciecase,thatjudgmentwouldhavepreclusive effect in California. Court’s Opinion¶ 18& n.6. This argument ismisplaced becausepresently,underMainelaw,Gunningwouldnotberequiredtoestablishaprimafaciecasebeforeproceedingwithdiscovery.

12 The Court states that the claim for defamationwas for Doe’s comparison in newsprint of

Gunningwith the“WickedWitchof theWest” fromTheWizardofOz,aswellasacaptionstating“Miss Prozac 2003.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 2. The article concerning Gunning also contains amoreblatantlydefamatorystatement:“Rumorscontinuethat,Marieissufferingfromabipolardisorderwithacutedepressionandparanoia,amplifiedbysubstanceabuse.”

26

501U.S.496,522(1991)(statingthatwhen“[a]reasonablejurycouldfinda

materialdifferencebetweenthemeaningof[apublished,written]passageand

[a] tape-recorded statement,” the falsity of the published passage is a jury

question);Nike, Inc.v. “JustDidIt”Enters.,6F.3d1225,1232(7thCir.1993)

(discussingseveraltrademarkparodycasesinwhichsummaryjudgmentwas

vacatedbecause“[t]oomanydisputedfactsrequire[d]atrialforresolution”);

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 317-18, 320

(4thCir.1992)(holdingthatafederaldistrictcourtjudge“improperlyassumed

the jury’s role of determining” whether a t-shirt depicting a beer can was

parodywhenthedistrictcourtgrantedentryofjudgmentnotwithstandingthe

verdict, because “the jury was uniquely positioned to make the critical

determination in that regard”); San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior

Court,21Cal.Rptr.2d464,468(Cal.Ct.App.1993)(“Itisnotforthecourtto

evaluate the parody as to whether it went ‘too far.’”); Kiesau v. Bantz,

686N.W.2d 164, 177 (Iowa 2004) (“To be a parody, the jurymust find the

alteredphotographcouldnotreasonablybeunderstoodasdescribingactual

facts...oractualevents....”),overruledonothergroundsbyAlcalav.Marriott

Int’lInc.,880N.W.2d699,708&n.3(Iowa2016).BecausetheCaliforniacourt

enteredintoitsownassessment,basedonreviewoftheparties’movingpapers,

27

ofwhetherthespeechconstitutedaparody,therebyreducingamixedquestion

of fact and law intoaquestionof law, theCalifornia court’sdiscoveryorder

shouldnothavepreclusiveeffectonthelitigationoftheissueinMaine.

[¶36] Furthermore, the Maine Superior Court stated that it believed

Gunninghadestablishedaprimafaciecaseofdefamationandthattherewasa

genuineissueoffactastowhetherDoe’sspeechconstitutedparody,butitfelt

compelledtocollaterallyestopGunningfromlitigatingtheissuebecauseofthe

Californiacourt’sdiscoverydecision.Unlessanduntilweimposea“heightened

burden”on litigants claimingdefamation, a jury, rather thana court, should

determinewhetherDoe’sspeechwasparody.Becauseofthestatusofthelaw

inMaine,theissuesintheCaliforniacourtarenotidenticaltothosebeforethe

courtinMaineanddonotwarrantpreclusiveapplicationofcollateralestoppel.

[¶37]DespitetheMainetrialcourt’sindicationthatGunningmayhave

satisfiedthe“heightenedburden”standard,weareallowingtheCalifornialaw

topreventGunningfrompursuingherdefamationcaseinthisstate.Mainehas

neverruledthatthereisa“heightenedburden”foraplaintifftomakeaprima

facieshowingofdefamationbeforeproceedingwithaclaim.Adecisionofthis

magnitude should not be decided by simply deferring to a California trial

court’s imposition of a “heightened burden” on a discovery order. See

28

Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§29(7)(Am.LawInst.1982)(statingthat

apartyshouldnotbeprecludedfromrelitigatinganissuewhen“[t]heissueis

oneof lawand treating itasconclusivelydeterminedwould inappropriately

foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon

whichitwasbased”).

[¶38] “Decisions of this sort demonstrate that res judicata, as the

embodimentofapublicpolicy,must,attimes,beweighedagainstcompeting

interests, andmust, on occasion, yield to other policies.” Spilker v. Hankin,

188 F.2d 35, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1951). “[W]hen as here private litigation has

extensiveimplicationsofpublicimport,theruleofresjudicataorestoppelis

notallowedtostultifyreassessmentofthepriordecision.Thepublicinterest

supersedestheprivateinterest.”Griffinv.StateBd.ofEduc.,296F.Supp.1178,

1182(E.D.Va.1969).BecausethepublicinterestinMainecourtsestablishing

our own framework for balancing the rights at stake in this case outweighs

Doe’sinterestinnotrelitigatingtheissueofwhetherDoe’sspeechconstitutes

defamation,IcannotjointheCourt’sdecision.

II.CONCLUSION

[¶39]Therearesignificantissuesintoday’ssocietysurroundingsocial

media,blogs,andclaimsof“fakenews.”Thelawinthisareaisevolving,andwe

29

shouldbemaking our owndecision as towhat is the best policy forMaine.

Furthermore, as was done by the Maine Legislature with our anti-SLAPP

statute, the Legislature should determinewhether any “heightened burden”

should be imposed upon litigants at the filing stage. This important policy

decisionshouldnotberesolvedbyadiscoveryorderinCalifornia.

[¶40] IwouldvacatetheMaineSuperiorCourt’sdecisionandremand

thecasesothatitmayproceedasanyotherdefamationcasefiledinaMaine

court.

Gene R. Libby, Esq., Tara A. Rich, Esq., and Tyler Smith, Esq. (orally), LibbyO’BrienKingsley&ChampionLLC,Kennebunk,forappellantMarieGunningSigmund D. Schutz, Esq. (orally), Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP,Portland,forappelleeJohnDoeZacharyL.Heiden,Esq.,AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofMaineFoundation,Portland,PaulAlanLevy,Esq.,PublicCitizensLitigationGroup,Washington,DC,andGeorgeJ.Marcus,Esq.,Marcus,Clegg&Mistretta,P.A.,Portland,foramicicuriae Public Citizen, Inc., and American Civil Liberties Union of MaineFoundationCumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2013-359FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY