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Sustaining the Responsible Drawdown of Forces in IraqItem Unique Identification Technology
A French Logistics OMLT in Afghanistan
A Vision of Army Logistics
with 20/20 Hindsight
Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.PB700–11–02Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy
MARCh–APRIL 2011
WWW.ALU.ARMY.MIL/ALOG
TheArmy’sFunctionalConceptforSustainment —byMajorGeneralJamesL.Hodge
AVisionofArmyLogisticsWith20/20Hindsight —LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson
SustainingtheResponsibleDrawdownofForces —BrigadierGeneralGustaveF.Perna
SecurityAssistanceFromtheLogisticsPointofView —MajorDanielM.Maloney
TakingOilAnalysistoSouthwestAsia —JackieE.Carney
CentralPowerSolutionTrainingCourse —DanielR.Grachanin
JointSupplyChainArchitecture —MaryP.Fletcher
PackingtheLargestShipmentoftheIraqWar —CaptainKyleP.McNealy
VehicleRecoveryTrainingatJMRC —MajorDerekW.Hoffman
AFrenchLogisticsOMLTinAfghanistan —LieutenantColonelChristopheBarbe,FrenchArmy
OperationalMentorandLiaisonTeamsasaForceMultiplier —MajorJohnF.Jacques
ItemUniqueIdentificationTechnologyImproving AssetManagement —PabloA.BrownandJohnE.Laudan
EnablingtheResponsibleDrawdownofForces ThroughtheTheaterProvidedEquipmentPlanner —KellieWade
NowHiring:QualityNCOsNeededtoLeadSoldiers —LieutenantColonelSeanM.Herron
TrainingAmmunitionSupplySoldiersWhileDeployed —CaptainTheodoreL.Zagraniski andChiefWarrantOfficer2GaryN.Carr
PB700–11–02VOLUME43ISSUE2MARCH–APRIL2011www.alu.army.mil/alog
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Cover:Theidentificationoftheneedfora“RevolutioninMilitaryLogistics”inthelate1990sledtomajorimprovementsinforcesustainment,forceprojection,andtechnologyapplicationandacquisitionagility.Inthearticlebeginningonpage3,theArmy’sDeputyChiefofStaff,G−4,LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson,looksbackoverthelastdecadeandevaluateshowfartheArmyhascomeandwhatstillneedstobedonetoachievetheenvisionedrevolution.Technologicaladvancessuchastheverysmallapertureterminal(VSAT)haveplayedamajorroleinimplementinglogisticstransformation.Inthecoverphoto,asergeantwiththe311thSustainmentCommand(Expeditionary)performsamaintenancecheckonaVSATinSouthwestAsia.
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CleaningUpContingencyOperatingBaseAdder —SergeantJamesKennedyBenjamin,USAR
MRAP’sFutureWiththeArmy —MajorDaleB.Woodhouse
RiversofLife,RiversofDeath: TheWorldWarIMesopotamianCampaign —MichaelYarborough
CreatingaKnowledgeManagementCulture attheArmySoldierSupportInstitute —StephanD.Wilcox
RaisingMechanicSkillstoIndustryStandards —ChiefWarrantOfficer2MatthewR.McCaslin
Writingfor Army Sustainment
JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1100601
BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman
Major General James L. HodgeCommander
ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand
MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson
DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy
Lieutenant General William N. PhillipsPrincipalMilitaryDeputy
totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology
Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral
ArmyMaterielCommand
Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget
AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller
Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral
Ex OfficioColonel Gwendolyn Bingham
TheQuartermasterGeneral
Colonel Clark W. LeMasters, Jr.ChiefofOrdnance
Brigadier General Edward F. Dorman IIIChiefofTransportation
Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander
ArmySoldierSupportInstitute
Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral
ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand
Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral
ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand
ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY
Colonel Mark A. McCormickPresident
STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor
Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor
Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant
GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.
ThismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdisseminationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelop-mentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirprofessionaldevelopment.
ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:
GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy
ChiefofStaff
Official:
Army Sustainment(ISSN2153–5973)isabimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.
Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.
Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede
officialArmypublications.Themasculinepro-nounmayrefertoeithergender.
Reprints:ArticlesmaybereprintedwithcredittoArmy Sustainmentandtheauthor(s),exceptwhencopyrightisindicated.
Distribution:Unitsmayobtaincopiesthroughtheinitialdistributionsystem(DAForm12series).Privatedomesticsubscriptionsareavailableat$23.00peryearbywritingtotheSuperintendentofDocuments,P.O.Box371954,Pittsburgh,PA15250–7954,orbyvisitinghttp://bookstore.gpo.govontheWeb.Forcreditcardorders,call(866)512–1800.SubscribersshouldsubmitaddresschangesdirectlytoArmy Sustain-ment(seeaddressbelow).Army SustainmentalsoisavailableontheWorldWideWebathttp://www.alu.army.mil/alog.
Postmaster:Sendaddresschangesto:EDITORARMYSUSTAINMENT/ALU/2401QUARTERSRD/FTLEEVA23801–1705.
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heseareexcitingtimesforallthemembersofthesustainmentcommunity.Over24monthsago,theArmyrewroteitsCapstoneConcept,whichinturncreatedtheneedtorewritetheArmy’sFunctionalConceptforSustainment.Thisrewrite,andallthatitentails,isamajorpriorityfortheArmyCombinedArmsSupportCom-mand(CASCOM).
Thepast8yearshaveprovidedvaluableinsightsandobservationsconcerninghowwe,assustainers,conductsustainmentoperationsinsupportofthejointfightinthenewoperatingenvironment.TheArmyCapstoneConcept(ArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand[TRADOC]Pamphlet525−3−0)andtheArmyOperatingConcept(TRADOCPamphlet525−3−1)havechangedthepreviousdirectioninwhichtheArmywasheadingbyacknowledg-ingthatthebasicnatureofwarhasnotchanged.
Despiteouradvancesintechnology,uncertaintyremainsaconstantintheoperationalenvironment,andourdominanceaswarfighterswillcontinuetoforceouradversariestoblendinwiththelocalpopulation,causingustooperateincomplexandurbanterrain.
AsanexpeditionaryArmy,wemustbeabletodeploytothefight,operateoverextendeddistances,anddealwithanti-accessandareadenialchallenges,allwhileconduct-ingdistributedoperations.Wewillalsohavetosustainallphasesoffull-spectrumoperations,oftensimultaneously.Sustainingthefutureforceinaneraofpersistentconflict,underconditionsofuncertaintyandcomplexity,requiresanadaptiveandversatilesustainmentframeworkthatiscapableofmaintainingtheforce’sfreedomofaction.
ThenewTRADOCPamphlet525−4−1, TheUnitedStatesArmyFunctionalConceptforSustainment2016−2028, approvedinOctober2010,expandsontheideaspresentedintheArmyCapstoneConceptandtheArmyOperatingConceptanddescribesthefunctionalcapabilitiesrequiredtosustainthefutureforcewhileconductingfull-spectrumoperations.SustainingfutureArmyforcesinaustereenvironments,oftenattheendofextendedlinesofcommunication,requiresalogisticsnetworkcapableofprojectingandprovidingthesupportandservicesnecessarytoensurefreedomofaction,extendoperationalreach,andprolongendurance.
However,ifthelogisticsnetworkistobesuccessful,futureArmyforcesmustdecreasethedemand-sidecharacteristicsoftheforce.Thosedecreaseswillservetoreducethestrainandfrequencyofresupplyoperations.Insupportofthisapproach,TRADOCPamphlet525−4−1servesasafoundationforfutureforcedevelopmentpertainingtosustainmentandthesustainmentwarfightingfunction.
ConceptdevelopmentleadschangefortheArmyanddrivesthedevelopmentandintegrationoffuturecapabilities.
Italsoprovidesaframeworkforanalysis,readinessassess-ments,prioritization,andfeedback.TheCASCOMteamisconductinganumberofeffortstohonefuturerequiredcapa-bilitiesintheArmyFunctionalConceptforSustainmentbyincludingasustainmentfunctionalcapabilities-basedassess-ment(CBA)andconductinganumberoforganizational-basedassessments(ObAs).
OurCBAlooksacrossthe21functionalareaswithinthesustainmentwarfightingfunctionandidentifiesgapsandsolutionsthatenableustoaccomplishoursustainmentmissioninthemostappropriateandresource-informedmanner.Withyoursupportfromthefield,weareevalu-atingourtheatersustainmentcommand,expeditionarysustainmentcommand,sustainmentbrigade,andexplosiveordnancedisposalformationsduringtheObAstodevelopandrefinecriticalrequiredcapabilities,gaps,andsolutionsfortheArmyandthesustainmentcommunity.
However,wearenotdevelopingtheSustainmentFunctionalConceptinastovepipe.WehavesuccessfullyintegratedourconceptandCBAeffortwiththeArmyCapabilitiesIntegrationCenterandtheotherTRADOCcentersofexcellence.Thispastwinter,IhadtheopportunitytoprovideanassessmentbriefingtotheArmyChiefofStaffonourSustainmentWarfightingFunctionalConceptwiththefiveotherwarfightingfunctionstoensureanintegratedandmutualsupportingapproachtothefuture.
IforeseethegreatestimpactofthenewSustainmentFunctionalConcepttobeonourgreatestresource,oursustainmentleadersandSoldiers.Wewillemphasizeculturalawareness,operationaladaptability,andthepracticeofmissioncommandtoourSoldiersatallechelons.Well-trainedandinformedSoldierswillbeourmostversatileresource,whiletrainingandeducationwillservetocreateoperationaladaptabilityattheindividualandsmall-unitlevels.SustainmentSoldierswillbecapableofreactingtounforeseenchanges,operatinginadegradednetwork,andmakingdecisionsatthelowestlevel.
Bythetimeyoureadthisarticle,wewillhavecomplet-edourimportantworkonthecurrenteditionoftheArmyFunctionalConceptforSustainment,wewillbeabouttocompletetheSustainmentFunctionalCBA,andwewillstarttherevisionsofthenexteditionsoftheArmyOperat-ingConceptandtheArmyFunctionalConceptforSustain-ment.Throughoutourefforts,yourinvolvementhasproveninstrumentaltooursuccess,andIvalueyourcontinuedinputandlookforwardtohearingfromyouonthesevitalandimportantconceptsforoursustainmentcommunity.
Major General jaMes l. HodGe is tHe coMMandinG General of tHe arMy coMbined arMs support coMMand and sustainMent center of excellence at fort lee, VirGinia.
TheArmy’sFunctionalConceptforSustainment
by Major General jaMes l. HodGe
T
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 3
commandandcontrolcapabilityatechelonsabovebri-gadethatprovidesjoint-capableoptionstothecombat-antcommander.
WiththeArmyForceGenerationprocess,wealsochangedthewaywegenerateforces—standardizingcapabilitiesintheActiveandReservecomponentstodeliverasteadystreamoftrainedandreadycapabili-tiesandcentralizingwhatmightbetermedstrategicreachbackthroughtheintegrationofindustryandstra-tegicpartnersinthenationalsustainmentbase,allwhilehelpingtoscalebackorreducethedeployedfootprint.
The1990sVisionofLogistics2010Howdidwegettothispoint? Inthelate1990s,the
thinkingwasthatbecauseoftheexpeditionarynatureofArmyoperations—withforcesdeployedabroadforextendedperiodsoftimeinlocationswithlittleinfra-structureorlinesofcommunication(LOCs)—wewouldrequireafundamentallydifferentviewofsus-tainability.Indeed,thathasbeenthecaseinAfghan-istanandIraq.
Backthen,thepremiseofthejointoperationalcon-ceptswasthatthekeyoperationalchallengewouldbetogainaccesstoatheater,establishasustainingcapability,andestablishalogisticsfootprintthatnotonlycouldbesmallerbutwouldalsotakeintoaccountthesocialandpoliticalrealitiesofthecountrieswheretheArmywoulddeploy.That,too,hasbeenthecase.
nthelate1990s,wespentquiteabitoftimetryingtoenvisionwhatArmylogisticswouldlooklikein2010.Therewasconsiderablediscussionoftheneedfora“RevolutioninMilitaryLogistics.”Theideagainedmomentum,stronglyinfluencedbytheArmyAfterNextprojectandbytheemergingrequirementsassociatedwithsupportingthenewbrigadedesignsthatbegantodevelop.DuringhistenureastheArmyChiefofStaff,GeneralPeteSchoomakerestablishedataskforcethatwasgivenablanksheetofpaperto“revo-lutionize”logistics,leveragingalltheworkthathadbeendonetodate.
Now,lookingback10to15years,howdidwedo?Whatstillneedstobeworkedon?Andwhatdidwemissentirely?
Theeventsof11September2001,thewarsinIraqandAfghanistan,and32deploymentsdivertedourattentionfromtransformationsomewhat.However,overallprogresshasbeen,Ithink,substantial.Wehaveleveragedthegreatworkproducedinearlieryearsandincorporatedlessonslearnedfrom9yearsofcombattogiveusavery,verycapablelogisticsforce.Feedbackfromthefieldindicatesthatlogisticstransformationisworkingwell,butweknowwewillnevergetthingsexactlyrightandmustcontinuetoadapt.
Ournewcapabilitieswerenotdreamedupover-night—theyweretheresultofyearsofstudy,debate,andexperience.Furthermore,manyoftheprinciplesthatdrovestrategistsbackthengenerallyremainvalidtodayandwilldriveusinthefuture.Uncertainty,dis-order,andfluiditywillcontinuetocharacterizebattle-fields,andlogisticsmustadaptaccordingly.
Ataveryhighlevel,logisticstransformationwasaboutaconceptofsupportformodularitythatleve-ragesjointandstrategicpartners.Itcreatedmodularorganizationsthatsupportfull-spectrumoperations;enhancedourtheater-openingandforce-receptioncapabilities;anddevelopedasingleArmylogistics
AVisionofArmyLogisticsWith20/20Hindsight
by lieutenant General MitcHell H. stevenson
I
What happened to the Revolutionin Military Logistics that beganin the late 1990s? The events of 9/11and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistanintroduced barriers to some changes,but overall progress has been substantial.
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Ourgoalwasto“evolveaseamlesslogisticssystemthattiesallpartsofthelogisticscommunityintoonenetworkofsharedsituationalawarenessandunifiedaction.”Topursuethatendeavor,wesetgoalsforthreedomains:forcesustainment,forceprojection,andtech-nologyapplicationandacquisitionagility.
Force sustainment.Wewantedasinglelogisticssystemthatwouldbemorepredictiveandresponsive.Thiswastobethesinglemostimportantfactorinlay-ingthefoundationforinformationsupremacyandsitu-ationalunderstanding.
Force projection.Thefocusherewasontheneedforlighteryetmorepowerfulland-powersystemsthatwereeasiertodeployglobally,atlowercost,andwithgreaterspeed;strategicpre-positioningofequipmentandmate-rieltoreduceinitialairandseatransportrequirements;anddeploymentoftask-organized,modularlogisticsorganizationstosupportinitialcombatoperations.
Technology application and acquisition agility.Thekeyherewastheintegrationoftechnologyandacquisi-tionprocessestoworkatreducingthephysicalsizeofoursystems.Thegoalwastofindmaterialsthatarelighter,stronger,andmorereliableandconsumelessfuel,alongwithstreamliningtheprocesstoquicklyandcost-effectivelyacquirematerielandservicesnec-essarytomaintainreadiness,transitiontowar,andsus-taincombatoperations.
WhatHasComeToFruition?Let’sstartatthetop.Oneofthemostsignificant
changeshasbeenthemovementawayfromadivision-centricforcetothemodularbrigadecombatteamsandechelons-above-brigadeunitsoftoday.Modularityhascreatedamajorchangeforlogisticiansinhowweareorganizedandconductoperations.Overall,we’vedoneaprettygoodjobofadjustingtotheneworganizations;functions;tactics,techniques,andprocedures;andmis-sionroles.Combatservicesupport(CSS)withinmodu-larityhasdoneexactlywhatitwasdesignedtodo:sustaincombatoperationsintwotheaterswithoutmis-sionshortfall.
ForceSustainmentAdmittedly,wehavenotyetachievedourvisionofa
SingleArmyLogisticsEnterprise(SALE),butwearewellonourwaywithtechnologicaladvancementsthatsignificantlyimpactoperations.TheArmyMaterielCommand’sLogisticsModernizationProgramleadstheway,havingjustlauncheditsfinaldeployment.TheGlobalCombatSupportSystem-Army,whichinvolvesthereengineeringof12legacyArmylogisticsprocesses,isnotfarbehind,operatingnearitsfullfunctionalityina
limited-usertestwiththe11thArmoredCavalryRegi-mentatFortIrwin,California.WiththeSALE,wewillfinallyachieveaweb-based,integratedenterprisesolu-tionthatenablesmaterielreadinessandprovidesassetmanagementandaccountability,acquisitioncompliancy,andfinancialtransparency.
AswemovetowardrealizationoftheSALE,wecontinuetolookforwaystoreplacelegacysystemsandapplications.Inthelast5years,we’vecuttheArmy’sstandingrepositoryforinformationtechnologyinvestmentsby80percent.BycentralizingtheArmycorps/theaterautomateddataprocessingservicecen-tersatasinglesite,wereducedtheArmy’stacticalsupplysystemfootprint,reducednetworktraffic,enhancedresponsetime,andsaved115manpowerslotsthatwerereturnedtotheforcepool.
Twootherinformation-relatedtechnologieshavebeenimplementedandaregreatlyenhancingforcesus-tainment:verysmallapertureterminalsanditemuniqueidentification.
Verysmallapertureterminals(VSATs)usecom-mercialsatellitetechnologytodeliverthenetworkstowarfightingsustainmentunits.Networkcommunica-tionscannowbeprovidedforupto40tents,vans,orshelterswithina7-by7-kilometerareausingwirelessbridgingbetweennodes.AllCSSunitsnowhavecon-nectivityorganictotheirunits.VSATshavebeen,andwillremain,agamechangerforArmysustainment.
Itemuniqueidentification(IUID)representsasig-nificantstepinimprovingassetvisibilityandwillenablethelife-cyclemanagementofenditemsandmajorcomponentslikeneverbefore.Initialresultsinthe160thSpecialOperationsAviationRegimentindi-cateapotentialfora50-percentreductionindigital
Technology has transformed Army logistics. With this very small aperture terminal, warriors in remote
locations have a wireless ability to send in their or ders.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 5
arms-roominventory,issue,andreceipttimes,aswellasareductionintransactiontimesinautomatedtoolrooms,aviationlifesupportequipmentmanagement,andorganizationalclothingandindividualequipmentmanagement.(Seerelatedarticleonpage36.)
Fordeploymentandin-theaterdistributionman-agement,theTransportationCoordinator’sAutomatedInformationforMovementsSystem(TC−AIMS)isonlineandworkingwell.ThedecisiontoadopttheAirForce’sCargoMovementOperationSystems(CMOS)inplaceofblocksIVandVofTC−AIMSwillbehelp-ful.TheMovementTrackingSystem(MTS)alsocon-tinuestoevolve;itnowincorporatesanabilitytoreadactiveradiofrequencyidentificationtagsonthecargobeingcarriedbyMTS-equippedtrucks,thuseliminat-ingtheneedforfixedinterrogatornetworks.
In-transitvisibilityhascontinuedtomature.AswemovecargooutofIraq,intoAfghanistan,andbacktothecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS),we’reabletoseewherethecargoisallthetime;thatisunlikeOperationDesertStorm,wherewehadlittle-to-novisibilityofcargoshipmentsandzero“inthebox”visibility.Insomeinstances,wealsoareusingsensortechnologiestoaddresstheconditionofitems,alongwithpilferageandintrusionofcontainers.Andourcommercialcarriersareusingsatellitetransponderstoidentifyandtrackcargo.
Severalimprovementshavebeenmadeindistribu-tion.Velocitymanagementhasgonefromanideatoaroutinewayofdoingbusiness,reducingaveragecus-tomerwaittimeforoutsideCONUSairshipmentsfrom21daysin1994tojust13daysin2010.WeareleveragingtheDefenseLogisticsAgency’sforwarddis-tributiondepotstogainfurtherefficiencies.TheArmystooduptheArmySustainmentCommand,bringingtogetherthepowerofourstrategicandjointpartnersinthenationalsustainmentbaseandextendingthatpowerforwardintoAfghanistanandIraq.
Wearecollaboratingwithsystemproductmanagerstodemonstrateacondition-basedmaintenancecapabili-tytomonitorhealthindicatorsofourmorecomplexweaponsystems.We’vealreadyequippedoverhalfoftheArmy’smannedaircraftfleetwiththeabilitytocol-lectessentialmaintenancedatafromcomponentsandtransmitthatinformationoff-platform.Thusfar,thishasextendedthetimebetweenoverhaulon22parts,elimi-natedalmost5,000maintenanceevents,improvedmorethan125maintenanceprocedures,andenhancedsafetythroughavoidanceofatleastthreeclassAmishaps.
Wecontinueworkingtoimplementacommonlogis-ticsoperatingenvironment(CLOE),whichcomprisesafully-integratedsuiteofArmylogisticsinformationtechnologiesandprocessesthatfusenetwork-centricdata-sharingandsensor-basedself-reportingsystemswithintheArmy’sLandWarNetconstructinsupportofmultifunctionallogisticsoperations.
Innovationalsohasbeenbroughttodistributioninthetacticalandoperationalspacesthroughimprovedaerialresupplyoptions,includingbothhigh-andlow-altituderesupplysystems.Jointprecisionairdropsys-temsareusedat20,000feetandabove;atloweraltitudes,low-costlow-altitudesystemsareusedat150to500feetabovetheground.Testingofanothersys-tem,free-droppackaging(foraltitudesbelow100feet),isongoing.
InSoldierprotection,significantenhancementshavebeenmadeoverthepastdecade,particularlyinbodyarmor.ThesamecanbesaidforArmycombathelmetcapabilityenhancements,suchasfragmentationpro-tection,increasedSoldiercomfort,andhelmetsensorinternalmounts.
Warfighterfeedbackhasdrivenimprovementsinfieldfeeding.Wedevelopedandcontinuetoenhanceunitizedgrouprations(UGRs),simplifyingandstream-liningtheprocessofprovidinghigh-qualitymealstotheSoldierinthefield.ThefirstUGR,introducedin1995,maximizeduseofcommercialitems,significantlyreducedline-itemrequisitioning,easedpreparationandassembly,andreducedthelogisticsfootprint.
Variousimprovementshavecontinuedtothepres-ent.Forexample,in2005,wereplacedtheunitizedBration,whichhad200mealson1pallet,withtheUGR−B,whichoffers400completemeals(alsoin50-servingmodules)onapallet;thiseffortreducedtheoverallcostoftherationbyreducingcomponentsbymorethan65percent.In2007,weintroduced“UGR−Express,”acompleteself-contained,self-heatinggroupmealforupto18Soldiersoperatinginremoteareas.
Asthesefoodimprovementswerebeingmade,wealsodesignedtheFirstStrikeRation,aneat-on-the-moveassaultmealdesignedforshortdurationsof
The Army has equipped over half of its manned aircraft fleet with ConditionBased Maintenance Plus (CBM+). In this helicopter, CBM+ detected a crack along the vertical fin and a broken intermediate gearbox (IGB) mounting foot.
6 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
highlymobileandhigh-intensitycombatoperations.EachFirstStrikeRationcontainsaday’ssupplyoffood,averagingatotalof2,900calories,whileatthesametimereducingtheSoldier’sload.Oneration,inplaceofthreedailymeals,ready-to-eat,saves49percentinweight,55percentinspace,and22percentincosts.
Wealsoarelookingatimprovementsinbatteryuse.Useofrechargeablebatteriesisincreasing,withsomeunitsusingthem90percentofthetimeduringdismount-edoperations.Modularbrigadesofalltypesarenowabletoleveragemanyofthebenefitsofrechargeablebatteries,andwearenowexaminingpolicyandtrainingrecommendationsthatprovidefortheiruse,whenpracti-cal,asthepreferredmethodofpoweringenditems.
ForceProjectionItisinthisdomainthatthegreatestimprovements
haveoccurred.Wehavesignificantlyenhancedourthroughputandcapacityatpower-projectioninstallations.Forexample,whereastherailheadatFortHood,Texas,inyearspasthada4-spurrailheadwithnosupportingfacili-ties,todayithasa240-railcarrail-head,a300-railcarclassificationyard,a45,000-square-yardmarshal-lingyard,andthecapabilitytodeploy240to320railcarsperday.SimilarimprovementsattheFort
Lewis,Washington,railandlogisticsfacilityhavepro-videdacapabilitytodeploy240railcarsperday.Andtherearemanymoresuchexamples.
Atthejointlevel,wenowhavea“DistributionPro-cessOwner,”resultinginastrongerrelationshipamongtheDefenseLogisticsAgency(thesupplyarmofDepart-mentofDefenselogistics),theU.S.TransportationCom-mand,andtheservices.Theoutcomehasbeenbetterplanning,execution,andcontrolofglobaldistributionoperations.
TheC−17GlobemasterIII,themostflexiblecargoaircrafttoentertheairliftforce,hasreplacedtheC−141Starlifterasourprincipalcargolifter.Itiscapableofrapidstrategicdeliveryoftroopsandalltypesofcargotomainoperatingbasesordirectlytoforwardbases.TheC−17,designedtoprovidedirectdeliveryofcargoloads
Soldiers arrive in Pakistan aboard a C−17 Globemas ter III with supplies
in support of flood relief efforts. The aircraft is the most flexible to
enter the airlift force.
First Strike Rations contain a day’s supply of food for warfighters on the move. The rations are also half the weight and volume of three daily meals, readytoeat.
An example of the Army’s improved forceprojection capabilities is provided by the expansion of the Fort Hood, Texas, rail facility. It has gone from a 4spur railhead to today’s 240railcar railhead, 300railcar classification yard, and 45,000square yard marshal ling facility.
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toaustereairfields,hasbeenusedextensivelyinAfghan-istan.Itcanlandwithpayloadsofupto160,000poundsonaustererunwaysassmallas3,500feetby90feet.
TechnologyApplicationandAcquisitionAgilitySignificantaccomplishmentshavealsobeenmade
inthisdomain.Sensorsarebeingusedtoreportreal-timestatusofcriticalitems;diagnosticsandprognos-ticscansensependingsystemfailures,requisitionparts,andschedulerepairs;smartmunitionsareenablingmaterielmasstobedecreased;andartificialintelligenceandintelligentagentsarehelpinglogisti-cianstoperformanalyticalandjudgmentaltasks.
Inacquisitionreform,wehaveincreasedtheuseofelectroniccommerce;conductedprivatizationandout-sourcingofnon-corecapabilities;increasedtheuseofcommerciallycontractedmaintenanceandservices;andimplementedtheuseofperformanceorcommercialinsteadofmilitaryspecificationswhereappropriate.
WemadegreatprogressinhowweconductbusinessoperationsthroughimplementationoftheSin-gleStockFundandNationalMain-tenanceProgramwhileadaptingtoaMaterielEnterprisethatwillsup-portbroadereffortsthatleadtoa
balancedArmy,betterbusinessprocesses,shortercycletimes,andreducedcosts.
AtatimewhentheArmy’senergycostshavecon-tinuedtorise,wehaveembarkedonastrategytohelpachieve,overtime,lessenergyconsumption,whichwillultimatelytakefuelconvoysoffdangerousLOCs.Intheshortterm,theArmyhasdonesuchthingsasapplyingexteriorsprayfoaminsulationtotemporarystructuresinIraqandAfghanistan,whichreducesfuelconsumptionforheatingandcoolingby50percent.
Technologyalsohasimprovedthewaywaterisproducedonthebattlefield.InIraqandAfghanistan,1,500gallon-per-hourtacticalwaterpurificationsys-temsareinuse,asare125gallon-per-hourlight-weightwaterpurificationsystems.Andwaterre-usetechnologyisnowusedinallofourlaundryandshowerunits.
Forthepast5years,theArmyhasbeenabletosus-taininIraqandAfghanistangroundequipmentreadi-nessratesofgreaterthan90percent.Ourmilitaryindustrialbaseproduction,forexample,istwiceashighaspre-warlevels,anditisnowatthegreatestout-putsincetheVietnamWar.Ourdepotsandarsenalsareworldclass.Inthelast5years,theyhavewon26Shin-goAwards(whatsomecallthe“NobelPrize”forpro-ductionandmanufacturingexcellence).Theyhavereducedcosts,increasedproductivity,andgainedeffi-ciencies—allwhileourNationisatwar.
Aspartofourlogisticstransformation,wealsohavegonefromafour-leveltoatwo-levelmaintenancesys-tem,supportedandenhancedbythecreationofArmyfieldsupportbrigadesforwardonthebattlefield.It’sthesumofalltheseimprovementsthathasbeenagamechangerformaintenancesupport.
Manynewtechnologiesarebeingdevelopedtoreducedemandsonmanpower;improvetheefficiencyoflogisticssupport;andimprovereliability,maintai-nability,sustainability,andoperationalreadiness.
A mechanic at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, dismantles
an M88 recovery vehicle. Army depots and arsenals have won 26 highlycoveted Shingo Awards for
production and manufacturing excellence in the last 5 years.
The Army had spray foam insulation applied to temporary structures in Iraq and Afghanistan, which reduced fuel consumption and thereby took fuel convoys off dangerous roads.
8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
MakingTheEvolutionARevolution
Working with our partners in the Department of Defense, joint, and other service communities, the Army needs to evolve several areas to complete the Revolution in Military Logistics. They include:
Networked communications. While there are a num-ber of communications systems in the theater, no single network provides guaranteed communications for all orga-nizations. As a result, some organizations are unable to establish or maintain contact while they are on the move.
Joint distribution information systems. A variety of information technology systems are used by joint and ser-vice organizations, but many are organization-centric and do not communicate or transfer data rea dily across the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). This hinders their ability to coor dinate and control distribution operations in a holistic manner.
Distribution-based logistics. Distribution opera tions are managed by a variety of disparate joint and service organizations, and their efforts are not ade quately synchro-nized. As a result, distribution opera tions are not managed for effectiveness, stock hold ings are larger than they could be, and delays occur that adversely impact distribution.
Joint operational-level logistics command and control. No standing joint logistics organization can
command and control logistics and theater distribu tion operations at the operational level in the theater in support of the regional combatant and joint force commanders.
Integration of coalition and host-nation capabil-ities. Current and future operations increasingly in volve coalition and host-nation partners. These part ners will have requirements that need to be provided for and capabilities that can contribute to the distribu tion operation.
Intertheater airlift. The current fleet of strategic aircraft is based around the C−5 Galaxy transport and the newer C−17 Globemaster III. The increase in ex peditionary operations, often in distant and austere locations, and in future requirements for rapid inter-ventions means that the airlift capability must be ca pable of deploying and supporting a deployed force. This is likely to require an increase in the size and a change in the makeup of the airlift fleet.
Energy. More needs to be done, and is being done, in developing capabilities for energy and power sys tems that satisfy mission requirements, minimize the need to transport energy sources, and promote greater indepen-dence from vulnerable logistics resupply.
Theseincludenext-generationwirelesscommunica-tionsthatcansignificantlyenhancethevisibilityofArmyassets;roboticstechnologiesthatcanperformrepetitive,dangerous,ordifficultworkthathumanscannotperformwellorwouldnotwanttoperform;micro-electricalmechanicalsystemsthatcantracktemperature,humidity,andvibrationsotheycanmoni-torshelf-lifeandenvironmentalfactorsaffectingassets;andsuchthingsastheHellfireCaptiveCarryMonitorforAssetReadiness,whichisinusetodaybytheArmytomonitorandrecordtheenvironmentaldetailsofassetsinstorageandtransport.
WhatDoWeStillNeedtoDo?Despiteallthathasbeenaccomplishedsincewe
introducedtheRevolutioninMilitaryLogistics,2warsand32deploymentshavesomewhatslowedsomeofthetransformationthathadbeenenvisionedadecadeearli-er,makingthe“revolution”moreofan“evolution.”
Asprioritieschanged,theneededfundingfordevel-opmentandfieldingoftechnologiesthatwethoughtwouldbeimportanthadtobedivertedtomoreimpor-tantareas,suchasfieldingandsustainingtensofthou-sandsofmine-resistant,ambush-protected(MRAP)vehiclescriticaltokeepingSoldiersaliveonthebattle-field.So,we’renotdoneyet—notbyanymeans!Fulltransformationwilltakeagreatdealmoretime,perhaps
adecadeormore.Consequently,Armylogisticsmustcontinuallyadaptaccordingly!
AfghanistanandIraqhaveshownusthattheneedtosupportsmalldispersedunitsoversignificantdistanceswillonlygrowinimportance,aswilltheneedtoappro-priatelysizeandreducethelogisticsfootprint.Manyofourchangesrepresentparadigmchangesinhowweoperate.Theevolvingstrategicenvironmentwillposeaseriesofstrategicchoicesthatwewillneedtoexamineasweadaptthecharacteroflogistics’contributionstothefight.
Overthelastdecade,logisticsorganizations,process-es,tools,andtechnologyhavewitnessedsignificantadaptation,whichhascreatedacontinuumofmomen-tumthatmakesthenextlevelofadaptationmorereadilyapparent.Technologymaturationwillbeafactor,butourcontinuedpartneringandteamingwithindustryandacademiawillhelptoshapetheprogression,integration,andimplementationofevolvingtechnologies.Aswemoveforward,wewillcontinuetoseekcapabilitiesthatsatisfytheSoldiers’needsandhelpustobettermanagetheuncertaintythatwillcontinuetocharacterizecurrentandfutureoperations.
lieutenant General MitcHell H. steVenson is tHe deputy cHief of staff, G−4, departMent of tHe arMy.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 9
clearlyremembervisitingmyfather’sofficeasachildandseeingapictureframewiththequote,“Peo-pleworkingtogether,withoutconcernforwhowillgetthecredit,canaccomplishanything.”Needlesstosay,forthoseofusservinginIraq,teamworkandself-lessservicearethekeyvaluesthatledtoouroverallsuccessintheresponsibledrawdownofforces(RDoF).
FoundationsofDrawdownSuccessOn1September2010,followingordersfromthe
President,50,000militarypersonnelremainedinIraqinsupportofOperationNewDawn.Duringthepastyear,wehaveclosed263bases,retrogradedover1.5millionpiecesofequipment,includingover25,000piecesofrollingstock,andtransportedover100,000personnelbyrotary-andfixed-wingaircraft—remarkableaccom-plishmentstosaytheleast.
We,U.S.Forces-Iraq(USF–I),aresuccessfullyaccomplishingtheRDoFbecauseofdedicated,hard-workingSoldiers,becauseofnoncommissionedoffi-cerswhoensurethatstandardsanddisciplineremainhigh,becauseofcommandersatalllevelswhoissueclearandconciseintent,andbecauseofcivilians,bothDepartmentofDefenseemployeesandcontractors,whodirectlysupportthemissionandarereadytodowhatisneededtoaccomplishit.
WearealsosupportedbyremarkablepartnersliketheUnderSecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,Tech-nologyandLogistics;theDeputyChiefofStaffoftheArmy,G–4;theArmyForcesCommand;theU.S.CentralCommand;theArmyMaterielCommand;theDefenseLogisticsAgency;andmanyotheragencies.Together,wehavealreadyaccomplishedsomethingthatmanysaidwecouldnotdo:WehaveexecutedtheRDoFwithprecisionevenwhilebringinghomemoreequipmentandpersonnelthantheArmyhassinceleavingEuropeandthePacificafterWorldWarII.
Ourdrawdownbeganin2008afterthepeakofthesurgeoperationsandwillcontinueuntilthecomple-
tionofourmissionon31December2011,assetforthinthesecurityagreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandIraq.Thedrawdownhasbeenacontinuousprocessthatbeganafterviolentextremistsbegansteadilylosinggroundatboththeoperationalandtacticallevelsatthepeakofthesurgeoperations.Theseveredegradationofextremistviolencewasclearlyevidentinearly2009.
ThedrawdownispossiblebecauseoftheincreasedcapabilitiesoftheIraqiSecurityForcesandtheoverallimprovementofthesecurityenvironment.Thesefac-torsallowUSF–Itocontinuetotransitionfromcombatoperationstostabilityoperations.Improvedsecurityallowsforcontinuedprogresstowardalong-termbilat-eralrelationship—anenduringpartnership—withasovereign,secure,andself-reliantIraq.
OperationNewDawn,whichbegan1September2010,isaboutadvising,assisting,andtrainingtheIraqiSecurityForces,conductingpartneredcounter-terrorismoperations,andprovidingsupporttoprovin-cialreconstructionteamsandotherorganizationsastheyhelpIraqbuildcivilcapabilities.However,eventhoughOperationNewDawnhasbegun,wecontinuetosetconditionsforthefinalRDoF.
SustainmentDuringtheDrawdownOurdrawdownplanmustensurethatthecom-
manderhasmaximumflexibilitytocontrolthemea-suredpaceoftheredeploymentofU.S.forcesbasedonassessmentsofthesecurityenvironmentandtheprogressofthenewGovernmentofIraq’stransition,includingthereadinessoftheIraqiSecurityForces.
AsweareplanningforthefinalRDoF,wemusteffectivelyandefficientlyexecutedailysustainmentoperationsforaforcestructurethatconsistsofjustunder50,000servicemembersand75,000civiliancontrac-tors.TheconceptofsupportinIraqischallengingandrequiresaconstantflowofcommodities,suchasthe1.2milliongallonsofJP8fuelthatwereceiveanddistributeeverydayacrosstheIraqjointoperationsarea(IJOA).
SustainingtheResponsibleDrawdownofForces
by briGadier General Gustave F. Perna
I
Following the President’s orders to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq, U.S. Forces-Iraq has been busy closing bases, retrograding equipment, and transitioning from combat to stability operations.
10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Currently,wedistributecommoditiesovermainsup-plyroutesthatspanfromHarborGateinthenorthtoUmmQsarinthesouth(roughlyadistanceequaltothelengthofCalifornia).Undoubtedly,oursustainmentcon-voysmuststayvigilantagainstindirectfire,directfire,andofcourse,improvisedexplosivedevices.
Thecommoditiesrequiredtosustainaforcethatatonetimenumberedover200,000troopsandcivil-iansaremonumentalinnumber.Thus,theRDoFisnotjusttheretrogradeofrollingandnonrollingstock.Itisalsothe“rightsizing”ofcommoditiessothatwestillhaveenoughtosustainthe125,000troopsandciviliansremainingwithouthavingmorethanwerequire.ClassesIII(petroleum,oils,andlubricants),V(ammunition),andIX(repairparts)areverydifficultcommoditiestorightsizebecausetheyaredemandoriented.Adraw-downinforcestructuredoesnotnecessarilyequatetoaproportionaldrawdownofacommodity,andnotwocommoditiesaremeasuredinthesameway.
Class III.BulkfuelusebyU.S.andcoalitionforcessteadilyincreasedfromaninitialconsumptionof170milliongallonsin2003toapeakof1.1billiongal-lonsin2008duringthesurge.Thetotalconsumptionfor2009was853milliongallons.Attheheightofthesurge,therewerealmost30milliongallonsoffuelinstoragebagsthroughoutIraq.Onlyathirdofthatamountoffuelisonthegroundtoday.
Theexpeditionarysustainmentcommand(ESC)isresponsibleforkeepingthefuelflowingthroughouttheIJOAbybalancingthetasksofpredictingconsump-tionandorderingthecorrectamountsandtypes(JP8,diesel,orgasoline)fromthecorrectsources.ESCele-mentsreceivethefuel,conductqualitycontroltesting,storeit,andredistributeitthroughoutIraq.DuringOperationNewDawn,theanticipatedreductioninfuelconsumptionwillenableUSF–Itoremoveroughly50percentofthebulkstoragebagscurrentlyinplaceandreducefuelorderstotheDefenseLogisticsAgency.
Class V.Concurrently,thenumberofammunitionholdingareasinIraqdroppedbyovertwo-thirds,fromahighof19in2008to6in2010.In2003,therewereonly3.Oddly,thehighesttonnage(over14,000tons)ofammunitionwasin2005whiletherewereonly10storageareas.WhenUSF–Ihad19ammunitionstorageareas,only10,000tonsofammunitionwereonhand.
AsUSF–IreducestheonhandstocksofclassV,wewillreducethenumberofholdingareasproportionate-ly.USF–IammunitionmanagersworkedcloselywiththeESCtodevelopnewmodelsforclassVopera-tionalandsustainmentloads,sincenoexistingmodelsaccuratelyreflectedthecompositionoremploymentofadviseandassistbrigades(AABs)asopposedtobrigadecombatteams.Theforcemixesweredifferentbecauseofthefieldingofthemine-resistantambush-protectedvehicleandtheup-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicleinlieuofheavycombat
vehicles,andthemissionsconductedbyAABsvariedamong,andevenwithin,U.S.divisions.
Class IX.AttheheightoftheIraqsurge,over22supplysupportactivities(SSAs)operatedinIraq,stockingapproximately140,000totallinesofrepairpartsandotheritems.Becauseofthemassivereduc-tioninsupplystocks,sevenSSAslocatedatkeydis-tributionhubsremaininsupportoftheAABs.EachremainingSSAhasapproximately6,000lines—areductionofnearlytwo-thirds.TheremainingSSAswillbereducedevenfurtheraseachAABredeployswithnobackfill.
CriticaltothesuccessofclassIXoperationsfortheremainingmonthsinIraqistheabilitytodistributefromsupplyhubsto“spokes”andtopartneredbases.Thisconstantbalancingactwillbemorecompli-catedinthenearfutureasthelinesofcommunicationexpandbecausefewerassetsandunitswillbespreadoutoverthesamegeographicalarea.AcontinuedpartnershipwiththeIraqitruckingnetworkmayallevi-atesomeofthisproblembyincreasingthelocal-haulcapabilitytofillthegapinresources.
WedidmorethanjustfollowthePresident’sdirec-tiontoreducetheforcestructureto50,000personnelnolaterthan1September2010.Aswellasaccountingforandsuccessfullyretrogradingover25,000piecesofrollingstockand1.5millionpiecesofnonrollingstock,wereducedouroverallcommodityposturetobestsupporttheremainingforcesinsidetheIJOA.Thesemissionswereaccomplishedwhilesimultane-ouslyadvising,training,andassistingtheIraqiSecu-rityForces,partneringwiththemforcounterterrorismmissions,andsupportingthetransitionoftheDepart-mentofStateintothemissionlead.
ThePresidenthasmandatedthatallforces,equip-ment,andcommoditiesmustbeoutoftheIJOAby31December2011.Whatwejustdidwashard,butwhatwewilldoisgoingtobeharder.
TheUSF–IstaffandallofourpartnersarefullyengagedinmissionanalysistodeterminethebestwaytoexecutetheRDoF.Butremember,“Peopleworkingtogether,withoutconcernforwhowillgetthecredit,canaccomplishanything.”
briGadier General GustaVe f. perna is tHe coMMander of tHe arMy joint Munitions and letHality life cycle ManaGeMent coM-Mand and arMy joint Munitions coMMand. He preViously serVed as tHe director of loGistics, j–4, for u.s. forces-iraq. He Has a bacHelor’s deGree in business ManaGeMent froM tHe uniVersity of Maryland and a Master’s deGree in loGistics ManaGeMent froM florida institute of tecHnoloGy. He is a Graduate of tHe infantry officer basic course, ordnance officer adVanced course, loGis-tics executiVe deVelopMent course, support operations course, tHe arMy coMMand and General staff colleGe, and tHe industrial colleGe of tHe arMed forces.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 11
y1-yeartourinAfghani-stanasalogisticsofficerclearlyreinforcedtheimportanceofsomebasiclogisticsconcepts(suchascontrollinginven-tory,meetingoperationalrequire-ments,andtrackingdelivery)aswellasthesecurityassistanceandcooperationpracticesforsupportingourpartnersintheGlobalWaronTerrorism.
WhenIarrivedinKabul,IwasassignedtotheSecurityAssistanceOffice-Afghanistan(SAO–A),CombinedSecurityTransitionCommand-Afghanistan.Ihadnosecurityassistanceexperience,butIdidbringmorethan16yearsoflogisticsexperienceinvariousposi-tions,rangingfrommaintenancecompanycommandertosupportoperationsofficer.WhenIarrived,IwasassignedasthevehiclecommoditymanagerandtaskedwithquantifyingandqualifyingthevehiclerequirementsfortheAfghanNationalSecurityForces(ANSF)andacquiringthosevehiclestosupportthefightagainsttheTaliban.
Acoupleofmonthslaterasatransitiontookplace,theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)estab-lishedoperations,andpeoplemovedon,Ibecamethechiefoftheforeignmilitarysales(FMS)divisionresponsiblefortheacquisitionofallequipment,train-ing,andsustainmentrequirements,withabudgetof$13billion.Inthecomingmonths,myappreciationforandrelianceonmanyconceptsIlearnedovertheyearsatbrigade,battalion,andcompanylevelsaboutprocur-ing,fielding,andsustainingsystemsgrewgreatly.
DeterminingHowtoAccomplishtheMissionIhadmanyissuestocoverwhileIwasassigned
asFMSchief.ThecomponentsoftheANSF—theAfghanistanNationalArmy(ANA),AfghanNationalAirCorps,andAfghanistanNationalPolice(ANP)—
havetheirownspecificequipmentrequirementsthatsometimescrossoveramongtheagencies.Forexample,theyallrequirealighttacticalvehiclecapa-bility.Foremostineveryone’smindwasthebalancebetweenwiselyspendingthefundsatourdisposalandtheneedtogettherightequipmentprocured,intotheater,andissuedinatimelymannertoequiptheANA,AfghanNationalAirCorpsandANPaccordingtothefieldingplan.
Thissoundseasy,doesn’tit?Inmostcasesitwas.However,NATOTrainingMission-AfghanistanandCombinedSecurityTransitionCommand-Afghanistanwererequiredtofieldafightingforcewhileincon-tact.Thatiswhentheconceptof“simple”wentoutthewindow.InSAO–A,wehadtofigureouthowtoaccomplishtherequirementwhileinthefight.
DeterminingWhogetsWhatandHowMuchDetermininghowtooutfittheANSFwasacompli-
catedprocessthatstretchedacrossseveraldirectorates.TheCJ–7,astheforcegenerator,buildsthemodifi-cationtableoforganizationandequipmentor,asit
SecurityAssistanceFromtheLogisticsPointofView
by Major daniel M. Maloney
M
The author describes his experience as a logistician assigned to a security assistance office in Afghanistan.
The director of the Integration Cell, Security As sistance OfficeAfghanistan, briefs the Afghan Na tional Army G–4 on the mission of the foreign mili tary sales division of the Security Assistance OfficeAfghanistan.
12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
iscalledinDari,the“Tashkiel.”Thedocumentout-linesthepersonnelandequipmentrequirementsfromministrytocorpsandevendowntocommandoandspecialforcesunits.FortheTashkielandthesubse-quentbyproduct“AnnexK”(fieldingschedule),weinSAO–Acouldidentifynewunit-fieldingrequirementsandgaininsightintothetypeandquantityofequip-menttopurchasefortheANA.
SAO–Atooktheoperationalrequirementandmatcheditwiththeappropriateequipment.Ourmis-sionfocusedonmeetingtheoperationalrequirementandusedthefollowingconceptstoachievesuccess:o Acquiretherightequipment,training,andsus-
tainmentpackagestomeettheANSFoperationalrequirements(acquisition).
o Validateshipmentoftheequipmentandstatusoftrainingcontracts(tracking).
o AdviseandtraintheAfghansonthesecurityassis-tanceproceduresthatweusetoreducethecoalitionfootprintinthefuture(transition).
AcquisitionTheacquisitionofequipment,training,andsustain-
mentgoesbacktotheTashkiel.Whencoupledwith
onhandquantitiesandtheoperationalrequirement,theTashkielformsthegenesisoftheacquisitionprocess.SAO–AalsofoundthatworkingwithforcestructurewaschallengingbecausethenumberofANAper-sonnelgrewfrom134,000to171,000andtheANPpersonnelgrewfrom96,800to134,000.Thiscreatedachallengeinacquisitionbecausetheendstateforappropriatequantitieskeptincreasing.
Mostofthecrew-servedweaponsrequiredbytheANA(M249s,M240BsandM2s)hadtobeprocuredaheadoftheproductiontimeline.Bythewinterof2009,werealizedthatwewouldhavetodiverttheseweaponsystemsfromU.S.Armystockstosupporttheacceler-atedfieldingofnewANAunitstomeetthe171,000-manforcestructurebytheOctober2011deadline.Theproductiontimelinesforsomeofthoseweaponsystemscanbeanywherefrom12to18months.
Wecouldnotalwayspullavailablestockfromawarehousetomeetourrequirements.Requestingdiver-sionsnormallydrewinexpertisefromtheDepartmentoftheArmyG–4SystemSupportOfficeandG–8tofacilitatethediversionsandmanagethepriorities.Toidentifytherequirementsbytypeofequipmentandquantity,securityassistanceofficershadtomanagea
A “jingle” truck concludes its journey from the Port of Karachi, Pakistan, to Depot 2 in Kabul with a medium tactical vehicle purchased through the foreign military sales division.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 13
largeamountofinformationandplugintotheunitfieldingschedulethedistributionandonhandquanti-tiesofequipmentinthemaindepotsinKabul.
Oncethesecurityassistanceofficerknowswhattoorder,hemustplugtheinformationintotheAfghanistansecurityforcesfund,whichfundsour“pseudoFMS”casestobuyequipment,training,andsustainment.Theprocessiscalled“pseudoFMS”becausethemoneyforpurchasingequipment,training,andsustainmentfortheANAandANPcomesfromU.S.andcoalitiondonations.ThisisnecessarybecauseAfghanistandoesnothaveagrossdomesticproductcapableofpurchasingtheequipmentrequiredtodefeataninsurgency.
Acquiringtheequipmentisthefirststepinaphasedprocesstogettherightequipmentintothehandsofthewarfightertoensuresuccessonthebattlefield.Thetimelinessofthisprocessrequiresthesecu-rityassistanceofficertomaintainvisibilityandbeconsciousofthequantityandtypeofequipmentheisorderingandwhenitissched-uledtoarriveintheater.
SAO–AisworkinglocallytoachieveastableAfghanistanthrougheconomicdevelopment.Intheend,SAO–A’sgoalistoprovidetherightequipmentandsupporttomeetoperationalrequirementswhileincontact.Todate,wehavedonethisprudently,usingourresourcesresponsiblytooutfitanarmyandpoliceforcetofightaninsurgency.
TrackingWedevelopedwhatwascommonlyreferredtoasa
commonoperationalpicture(COP),depictingquanti-tiesandauthorizationsforequipmentgroupedintotheshoot,move,andcommunicatecategories.EachpieceofequipmentwastrackedtoshowthequantityonorderthroughFMS,whatwasonhandinKabul,andwhatwasalreadyissuedtounits.ThereportsthatfedtheCOPincludedthenetassetvisibilityreport,theCorpsInventoryManagementSystemreport,ourownFMSprocurementrecords,andtheSecurityCoopera-tionInformationPortal.
InFMS,twoprimarymeansofshippingequipmentareavailable.Sensitiveitems(weapons,radios,andammunition)areflowndirectlytoKabulInternationalAirport.Rollingstockandallotherequipmentare
usuallyshippedbysurfacefromconsolidationpointsintheUnitedStates(primarilytheDefenseDistribu-tionCenteratNewCumberland,Pennsylvania)andonwardtotheportofKarachi,Pakistan.Amixof“jingle”trucksandotherconveyancesmakesforatreacherousjourneyforthelocally-hiredtruckdriv-erswhofaceinsurgentsand,inthewinter,anearlyimpassableone-laneroadnetworkintoKabul.
TransitionAsSAO–ApreparesitsAfghancolleaguestotakeon
alargerroleintheacquisitionprocess,itisimperativetoprovidethemwithsomecommonacquisitionandsupplymanagementpractices.AlthoughcertainaspectsoftheacquisitionprocessinAfghanistanareunique,manyofthepracticesaresimilartothoseusedbytheU.S.military.Inventorymanagement,prudentacquisi-tionpracticesgroundedinmeetingoperationalrequire-ments,andaccountabilityaresomeoftheconceptsbeingpassedtotheAfghansinthetransitionprocess.
Toencouragethetransition,SAO–AstooduptheOfficeofSecurityCooperationwithadvisersspecifi-callytaskedtoprovidetheAfghanswithtoolsneces-saryforasmoothtransition.AsSAO–Acontinuestoevolve,eventuallytheentirecoalitionforcewilldrawdownandtheonlymilitaryentitytoremainwillbeSAO–A,whichwillbecometheOfficeofSecurityCooperation-AfghanistanandwillworkoutoftheU.S.Embassy.Atthattime,theAfghansshouldbedirecting,executing,andtrackingtheirownequipmentprocurement,trainingcontracts,andsustainment.Forthattohappen,itiscriticalforthesecuritycooperationpersonneltoteach,mentor,andthenstandbackandlettheirAfghancolleaguestakeoveracquisition.ItisclearthattheAfghanswishtohavethisresponsibility.
AlthoughworkinginSAO–Awassomewhatremovedfromtheworldoflogisticsstatus,fueldeliv-eries,ammunitionsupplypoints,andmaintenancereports,manysimilaritiescouldbefoundbetweentheprocessesthatguidesecurityassistanceofficersandlogisticians.Amongthesesimilaritiesareunderstand-ingrequirementsandacquisitionandmaintainingvis-ibilityofinboundequipment.Overall,acquisitionandsecurityassistanceisthecornerstoneofdevelopingourpartnersintheGlobalWaronTerrorismtoprovidenotonlyforourownfuturesecuritybutalsofortheirsta-bility,security,andprosperity.
Major daniel M. Maloney was tHe director of tHe inteGration cell, security assistance office-afGHanistan, wHen He wrote tHis article. He Holds a bacHelor’s deGree froM tHe uniVersity of tHe state of new york, reGents colleGe, and a Master’s deGree in orGanization froM tHe uniVersity of pHoenix. He is a Graduate of tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course, tHe coMbined arMs and serVices staff scHool, and interMediate leVel education.
14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
AOAP supplies and equipment are loaded on an Air Force C−5 transport bound for Southwest Asia. The PMO ensures that the labs are stocked with laboratory supplies to maintain continuous operations.
AOAP diagnostics are performed by certified evaluators. The oil analysis laboratories in Southwest Asia analyze more than 113,000 Army aviation and combat equipment fluid samples annually.
TakingOilAnalysistoSouthwestAsia
by jackie e. carney
Oil analysis can improve equipment performance and save funds. Mobile laboratories allow the Army to bring this valuable capability to the field.
inceOperationBrightStarinEgyptin1987,theArmyOilAnalysisProgram(AOAP)hasrespondedtowarfighters’needsbydeployingmobilelaboratories.AOAP’smobilelaboratoriesprovidecontinuousregionalsupportforalldeployedunitsandequipmentintac-ticalenvironments.
AssoonastheLogisticsSupportActivity’s(LOGSA’s)AOAPPro-gramManagementOffice(PMO)atRedstoneArsenal,Alabama,isnoti-fiedthatanewlaboratoryisneededtosupportacontingency,thestaffimmediatelygetstowork.Thelabsaredeployedonaveryshorttime-line,leavingnoroomformistakes.Themostrecentlabdeployment—thedeploymentofamobilecontain-erizedfacilitytoCampMarmalinnorthernAfghanistanlastsummer—providesagoodexampleofhowtheAOAPPMOrespondsquicklyandinnovativelytosupporttheArmy’sneedsinthefield.
S
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 15
WhatIsOilAnalysis?Oilanalysisisthesamplingandanalysisofoilfor
variouspropertiesandmaterialsthatindicatewearorcontaminationinanengine,transmission,orhydraulicsystem.Samplingandanalyzingonaregularbasisestablishesabaselineofnormalwearandcanindicatewhenabnormalwearorcontaminationoccurs.
TheAOAPwasestablishedandimplementedbytheDepartmentoftheArmytomonitorcomponentwearandtheconditionofoil.Adetailedanalysisofengine,transmission,andhydraulicoilsenablesthewarfightertoavoidpotentialproblemsthatmayresultinmajorrepairsandequipmentdowntime.Oilanaly-siscanreducethefrequencyofoilchangesandtheconsumptionofoil,producingcostsavingsfortacti-calunitsandpromotingconservationoflubricationproducts.
Performingoilanalysisbecomesevenmorecriti-calinthedesertenvironment,whereequipmentisexposedtomuchharsheroperatingconditionsandincreasedoperatingtempo.Theoilanalysis,whichisperformedbycertifiedevaluators,identifiesifthedrivesystemsarecontaminatedwithsandoranyotherelementsintheoilthatwillcauseexcessivewearontheirinternalparts.
LaboratoriesinSouthwestAsiaTheAOAPPMOsupportstheoperationof22oil
analysislaboratoriesaroundtheglobe.FiveoftheselabsarecurrentlyoperatinginSouthwestAsiasupport-ingOperationNewDawninIraqandOperationEndur-ingFreedom(OEF)inAfghanistan.TheselaboratoriesarelocatedatCampArifjan,Kuwait;Balad,Iraq;andBagram,Kandahar,andCampMarmal,Afghanistan.Onelab,operatingatTikrit,Iraq,wasdeactivatedon30October2010toalignwithArmydrawdownopera-tionsinIraq.
Duringtheearlyphaseofcur-rentSouthwestAsiaoperations,oilanalysissupportwasprovidedbytwomobilelaboratoriescon-figuredinsideM971semitrailervansdeployedtothetheater.Asoperationscontinued,thenumberoflaboratorieswasincreasedtofivefixedfacilitiesinadditiontotwomobileunits.Thelatestoftheselaboratories,atCampMar-mal,wasstoodupinAugust2010inresponseto“OEFPlus-upIII”requirements.
SupportingOilAnalysisOperationsTheoilanalysislaboratories
inSouthwestAsiaanalyzemorethan113,000Armyaviationand
combatequipmentfluidsamplesannually.EnsuringthatthelabsareoperatingatpeakefficiencyiscriticalandisthetoppriorityoftheAOAPPMO.TheSouth-westAsialaboratorysiteleadercollectsthereadinessstatusforeachlabandprovidesittotheAOAPPMOfieldoperationsstaffdaily.Majoremphasisisplacedonensuringthatthelabs’diagnosticequipmentiswellmaintainedandrepairedquicklyintheeventofamal-function.
ThePMOensuresthatthelabsareresourcedandstockedwithenoughlaboratorysuppliestomaintainoperations24hoursaday,7daysaweek.Eachana-lyticalinstrumentoperatinginthelaboratoryrequireschemicalsandconsumableitemstoruntherequiredtests.Thechallengeistoensurethecontinuousavail-abilityoftheseitems.
TheAOAPPMOhasanestablishedandefficientprocessforgettinglargequantitiesoflabsuppliesshippedout.Forexample,morethan2,500itemswereshippedfromRedstoneArsenalduringarecent60-dayperiod.Toaccomplishthis,thePMOreliedheavilyontheresponsivenessofRedstoneArsenal’ssupplyanddistributionandtransportationorganizationstoprocesstheAOAPshipments.
Workingwiththeseorganizations,thePMOwasthefirstatRedstonetoimplementradiofrequencyidentificationtagtechnologytotrackitsshipmentsofsuppliesandequipment.Themanagersandteammem-bersworkingintheseorganizationsunderstandtheimportanceofgettingAOAPshipmentsonthegroundinSouthwestAsiaasquicklyaspossibleandareverysupportiveoftheAOAPmission.
DeployingtheNewLaboratoryThedeploymentofthenewlabatCampMarmal
demonstratedonceagainthechallengesofdeployingamobilelaboratorytobringoilanalysistoatheaterand
The first two mobile laboratories in Southwest Asia were configured inside M971 semitrailer vans. In this photo, the first mobile lab rolls off an aircraft on its way to the theater.
16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
theAOAPPMO’ssuccessinmeetingthewarfighter’sneeds.
Theprocessbeganwhenthecommanderofthe4thCombatAviationBrigadeinnorthernAfghanistanprovidedadvancenoticeoftheneedforanewlabora-torytosupportaviationandgroundcombatequip-mentanalysisrequirementsfortheOEFPlus-UpIIIbuildup.ThetwoAOAPlabsthatwerealreadyoper-atinginAfghanistancouldnotmeetthisrequirementbecausethemountainousterrainmadeitdifficultforthebrigadetoreachthem.TheArmyMaterielCom-mandexecutionorderrequiredthenewlabtobeinplaceandfullyoperationalnolaterthan30August2010.
ThePMO’sfirststepwastodeterminethemostexpeditiousandefficientapproachtomeettherequire-ment.ThePMOworkedwiththeArmyAviationandMissileCommand,theNationalGuardBureautheateraviationmaintenanceprogram,theNavymobilefacil-ityprogrammanager,andthePrototypeIntegrationFacilityatRedstoneArsenaltoobtainandprepareamobilecontainerizedfacilityfordeployment.
Gettingavirtual“turnkey”laboratorytomeettheurgentlabrequirementwasaviablesolution.Mobilecontainerswerealreadyconfiguredtomeetelectri-calpowerandenvironmentalrequirementsandonlyneededtheinstallationofanalyticalequipmentandinformationtechnologyinterfacewiring.Oncethe
The new mobile facility was up and running at Camp Marmal on 30 August to support the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade. The PMO configured a mobile containerized facility for the lab.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 17
facilitiesweredeliveredon15July,allinternalmodi-ficationswerecompleted,diagnosticsequipmentwasinstalledandtested,operatingsupplieswereprocured,andthelabwaspackedupandmadereadyforairtransporttoSouthwestAsia.
Thelaboratorywaspickedupbyacommercialaircarrieron9AugustandarrivedatCampMarmalon15August.AnAOAPfieldingteamalsodeployedinconjunctionwiththelab’sshipment.Soldiersfromthe401stArmyFieldSupportBrigadeandthe4thCombatAviationBrigadeassistedthefieldingteaminstandingupthelabattheCampMarmalsite.Thenewlaboratorywasoperationalandanalyzingsam-pleson30August.Thiswasagreatteameffort,con-sideringthatthelaboratorywasprocured,retrofittedfortheAOAPmission,fullytested,shippedfromthecontinentalUnitedStates,andstoodupinAfghani-stantosuccessfullymeettheArmy’sexecutionorderfieldingdate.
Inadditiontomeetingthecommander’surgentneedforanewlaboratoryinAfghanistan,thePMOdiscov-eredanotherveryflexible,mobile,deployableoption
thatcanbeusedtosatisfyfutureoilanalysisoperation-alneeds.Today,thelabismeeting100percentofthe4thCombatAviationBrigadecommander’soilsam-plingrequirementsandprovidingbrigadepersonnelconfidenceintheirequipment’sabilitytosuccessfullyaccomplishassignedmissions.
“Ourteamisveryexperienced,”explainsJoeSan-chez,LOGSA’sAOAPprogrammanager.“However,italwaysrequiresanexceptionalamountofteamworkandaveryintenselevelofefforttoprepareanddeploythesemobilelabsaroundtheglobetosupportourmili-taryoperations.”Withninesuccessfulglobaldeploy-mentsofmobilelaboratoriesoverthepast23years,includingtheCampMarmaldeployment,theAOAPPMOhasestablishedasolidtrackrecordforsupport-ingwarfighters’needs.
jackie e. carney is an arMy oil analysis proGraM specialist at tHe aoap proGraM ManaGeMent office at tHe loGistics support actiVity at redstone arsenal, alabaMa.
Shown is the interior of the new AOAP mobile laboratory facility at Camp Marmal, which meets 100 percent of the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade’s oil sampling requirements.
18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Thedeathsofseveralservicemembersasaresultisunacceptable,consideringthesimplesafetyproceduresthatcouldpreventsuchtragedies.
AddressingthePowerSafetyProblemCPSerrorsledDavidAebischer,theCommunica-
tions-ElectronicsCommand-LifeCycleManagementCommand(CECOM–LCMC)trailbosswiththe101stAirborneDivision(AirAssault)atFortCampbell,Ken-tucky,tobelievethatmanyservicemembersdonotknowhowtoemplacepowergridsproperly.Properlyinstallingpowergridscouldsavelivesandpreventelectricalfires.
AebischerpresentedanideatoCECOMInformationTechnologyFieldServiceBranch(IT–FSB)chiefBryan
ulletsandbombsarenolongertheonlyrisktobeinginawarzone.SomethingassimpleastakingashowerorwashingavehiclecanclaimthelifeofsomeonedefendingourNation.Theserou-tineactivitiescanbecomelifethreateningtoSoldiersbecauseofoverloadedcircuits,inadequateextensioncords,andimproperlyemplacedbreakerlinesinthepowersystem.SeveralSoldiershavediedfromelectro-cutioncausedbytheseproblems
ManySoldiersbelievethatsinceoutletsarereadilyavailable,sufficientelectricityisavailable.However,astechnologycontinuestoadvance,thecentralpowersolution(CPS)ortacticalpowergridsthatsupplypowertothesetechnologieshaveremainedunchanged.
B
CentralPowerSolutionTrainingCourseby daniel r. GracHanin
Soldiers from the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), learn to parallel two AN/MJQ 41B–41 60kilowatt “B” model generators.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 19
Ayertocreateapowertrainingcourseforaninfantrybrigadecom-batteam(IBCT)CPStacticalopera-tionscenter(TOC),whichwouldbetaughtbyCECOMIT–FSBpowerproductioninstructors.
CPSTrainingCECOMIT–FSBcreatedthe
2-weektrainingcoursetoteachSoldierstoinstalltheCPSproperly,basedonmanyyearsofexperiencewithpowergenerationequipmentinthefield.AebischerandAyertar-getedtheSoldierswithintheTOCfortrainingbecauseCPSinstalla-tiondoesnotfallunderanymilitaryoccupationalspecialty.
TheAmericanTradeSchool(ATS)fromSt.Louis,Missouri,hasbeencontractedtoprovidetraining
alongsidetheCECOMinstructorsduringthefirstweekofthecourse.ATSprovidesitsbestinstructorsforthistraining.AlloftheATSinstructorsareveteransandtrulyenjoytrainingtheSoldiers.
Thefirstweekconsistsofinstructionin—o Electricalsafety.o Basicelectricaltheory,consistingofunitsofmea-
surement,electricalsymbols,electricaltheory,Ohm’sLaw,electricalmath,AC(alternatingcurrent)andDC(directcurrent)circuits,single-phaseand3-phasepower,computingneutralcurrent,loadcalculation,andloadbalancing.
o NationalElectricalCodeintroduction.o Sizingconductors,ampacity,andvoltagedrop.
o Circuitbreakersandfuses,tools,andtestequip-ment(suchasmultimeter,ammeter,andgroundresistancetester).Inthesecondweekofthecourse,thestudents
receivemorehands-onexperiencewithpowerplantsandelectricaldistributionsystems.Theweekcovers—o Groundingandbondingmethods.o Preventivemaintenancechecksandservices.o Safety.o Parallelingprocedures.[Parallelinggeneratorscre-
atesabackuppowersupply.]o Troubleshooting.o Powerplantemplacement.o Powerdistributionilluminationsystemselectrical
emplacement.o Connectingthepowergrid.o Thedifferencesbetweengeneratormodels.
The1st,2d,3d,and4thBrigadeCombatTeamsofthe101stAirborneDivision(AirAssault)andthe101stBrigadeSupportBattalionhavereceivedtheIBCTCPSTOCpowertraining.ThistraininghasalsobeenprovidedtoseveralotherunitsduringtheirJointReadinessTrainingCenterrotationsatFortPolk,Loui-siana.Currently,CECOMIT–FSBisprovidingallofthetrainingduringaunit’sBattleCommandSystemofSystemsIntegrationTrainingEventI.
AnyunitcanrequestthistrainingthroughCECOMIT–FSBbycalling(931)216–9944or(270)798–9208(DSN635–9208)[email protected].
daniel r. GracHanin is a MeMber of tHe coMMunications-electronics coMMand inforMation tecHnoloGy field serVice brancH power production teaM at fort caMpbell, kentucky.
Students use a trailermounted support system tent as a classroom during their CPS TOC training. They learn extensive electrical theories and safety before engaging in the handson portion of the training.
20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
n30March2010,theExecutiveAdvisoryCom-mitteefortheJointSupplyChainArchitecture (JSCA)approvedthecommencementofphaseIIIofJSCA,arevolutionaryprogramprovidingenterprise-widevaluetothewarfighter.TheExecutiveAdvisoryCommitteeischairedbythePrincipalDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforLogisticsandMate-rielReadiness(L&MR)andtheDirectorforLogistics,J−4,theJointStaff,andincludesrepresentativesoftheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD),theservices,thecombatantcommands(COCOMs),theDefenseagencies,andweaponsystemprogramexecutiveoffices.
ThecreationofJSCAresultedfromtherecogni-tionthattheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)needstoimprovesupplychaineffectivenessandefficiencieswithintheservices,COCOMs,andDefenseagencies.Seniorlogisticsleadersacrossthestakeholdercom-munityhaveidentifiedthreecommonissuesaffectingthesupplychain.First,theDODsupplychainisnotconfigured(andtheplayersinthesupplychainarenotaligned)toachieve“enterprisewide”optimiza-tionofthesupplychainprocess.Second,theDODsupplychainlackscommonperformancemetricsthatcandrivebettercoordinationandalignment.Third,increasedemphasisontheDODsupplychainandtheneedforeffectivenessandefficienciesmakethetimingofJSCA’simplementationofgreatimportance.
OrganizationandfundingboundariesarecurrentlyhamperingtheDODsupplychainprocess.JSCAoffersameanstoknockdownthestovepipesthatinterferewitheffectivenessandefficiency.Itattemptstoincreasevisibilityofitemsintransitandininventory.Inshort,JSCAisamethodologyforlogisticsthatprovidesDODwithanenterprise-wide,end-to-endperspectiveforopti-mizingsupplychainprocessestomaintainandimprovematerielreadinessatthebestvalue.JSCAhasgainedthesupportoftheArmy’sseniorlogisticsleaders.
OriginsofJSCAJSCAisanOSDandJ−4initiativethattracesitsori-
ginstoamajorinnovationincommercialindustry:the
SupplyChainOperationsReference(SCOR)Modelcre-atedbytheSupplyChainCouncil.TheSCORisapro-cessreferencemodelthatprovidesastructuredapproachtodocumentingsupplychainprocesses.Itsfunctionistoultimatelyidentifybestpracticesandapplyriskmanagementtologisticsprocedures.TheSupplyChainCouncil,formedin1996,continuestoupdateandrevisetheSCOR,nowinversion9.0,andprovidethewidestpossibledisseminationofthemodel.
InMay2003,DODpublishedarevisedregulation,DOD4140.1−R,DODSupplyChainMaterielMan-agementRegulation,togoverntheconductofjointlogisticsforthefuture.DODDirective4140.1,SupplyChainMaterielManagementPolicy,mandatedthattheregulationwouldbeusedtoestablishtheprocessesforalllogisticsactivityinDOD.ThedirectiveanditssupportingregulationreflectedthethinkingofseniorleadersthatDODlogisticsprocesseshadtoadapttochangesintheevolvingglobalenvironmentaswellastobudgetpriorities.
Performance(intermsofmaterielreadiness)andcostarethetworecurringthemesthroughoutDODsupplychainpublications.Theyaretheindicesbywhichsuccesswillbemeasuredinimplementingprocessesandimprovingsupplychainmaterielman-agementsystems.Thegoalistohavearesponsive,consistent,andreliablesupplychainthatprovidesthehighestlevelofmaterielreadinessatthebestvalue.
In2007,theJ−4andtheOSDL&MRinitiatedthedevelopmentofJSCAasasupplychainmanagementframework.Theyrecognizedthatmanybenefitscouldbeachievedbysuccessfullycoordinatingandmanag-ingsupplychainpracticesacrossthedepartment.
TheJSCAprojectwasbrokendownintothreephases.PhaseIwasthedevelopmentofthearchitec-tureitself,inparticularthesupplychainprocessesandmetrics,andthe“buy-in”ofthekeystakeholders.ThisphasebasicallybuiltJSCAbasedonaconsiderationofexistingprocessessincetheArmy,Navy,andAirForcehadalreadyimplementedsomeoftheexistinglogisticsandfinancialsystemsoutlinedintheSCORprocess.
JointSupplyChainArchitectureby Mary P. FletcHer
O
The Department of Defense has used the Supply Chain Operations Model to develop a method for coordinating and managing supply chain practices across the Department and the services.
Thisarticleexpressestheviewsoftheauthor,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 21
PhaseIIwastheproofofconcept,underwhichoneweaponsystemwasevaluatedusingJSCAprocessesandperformancemeasurestovalidatetheefficacyoftheJSCAmethodology.PhaseIIIistheinstitutionaliza-tionphase:Weaponsystemdiagnosticswillbecon-ductedtoidentifyopportunitiesandcoursesofactiontocapitalizeonopportunitiesidentifiedinphaseII,alongwithnewlyacquiredopportunities.TheoutcomeofthisphasewilldeterminethefutureofJSCAacrossDOD.
TheSixKeyTenetsfortheDODSupplyChainTheJSCAprocessisguidedbysixmajortenets:
o InstitutionalizetheSCORModelthroughoutDODbymeansofJSCA.
o Establishoutcome-based,end-to-endperformancemeasures.
o ApproachdecisionsinawaythatoptimizesthetotalDODbudgetwhileimprovingreadiness.
o Donotoptimizethefunctionaloutputsofthesupplychainattheexpenseoftotalsystemeffectiveness.
o Createagovernanceprocessthatcanmeettheneedtofacilitate,align,andcoordinatethejoint,end-to-endsupplychain.
o Designpolicytoestablishaccountability,respon-sibility,consistency,andappropriateresourcestoensurebetterdecisionmakingfortheend-to-endsupplychain.
JSCAProcessesJSCAprovidesDODwithaprocessbywhichto
modelandadoptasnormalpracticetheperformanceelementsofthesupplychain.UsingtheSCORModel,JSCAisbrokendownintofivelevel1processes:plan,source,maintainandrepair,deliver,andreturn.Eachlevel1processhasassociatedprocesselementsthatfurtherdescribethesupplychaininastructuredman-ner.
Plan. Fiveprocesselementsconstitutetheplanpro-cessofJSCA:forecastingsupplyanddemand,identi-fyingrepairandmaintenancerequirements,planningretrogradeandredeploymentrequirements,definingsupplychainresourcesandoutputs,andplanningforinventory,warehousing,distribution,anddeployment.
Source. Thesourceprocessisbrokendownintofourprocesselements:identificationofsourcesofsup-ply,negotiationandselectionofsuppliers,receiptandverificationofmaterielandservices,andreleaseofpaymentformaterielandservices.
Maintain and repair. Thisprocessisdefinedas“theprocessofmaintainingassetsandeffectingcom-ponentrepairsattheintermediateanddepotlevelsofthesupplychain.[It]includestheutilizationandmanagementofcontractedrepairservices.”Thepro-cessisdividedintofiveprocesselements:finaliza-tionofengineering,developmentoftherepairandmaintenanceschedule,issueofmateriel,performance
ofrepairactivity,andreleaseofrepairedmaterieltoauserortoastockinglocation.
Deliver. Thedeliverprocessisconsideredthrough-outDODtobepartofthesourceprocessformaterieldeliveryfromprivatevendorsforstockageinstoragedepotstobedistributedlatertoDODcustomers.How-ever,therequisitionandorderentryprocessinitiatestheissueanddeliveryprocessforthesupplychain.
Return. Inthisprocess,thecustomerusestheplannedpolicies,businessrules,andinspectionofproductoperatingconditionsascriteriaforidentifyingandconfirmingthatmaterielisexcesstorequirementsordefectiveatspecificlocations.Italsoistheprocessofidentifyingtheappropriatesourcecontactforareturnauthorization.
JSCAMetricsMetricsformeasuringperformanceintherespec-
tiveprocessesandprocesselementsareessentialtotheJSCAprocess.JSCAstartedwiththethreecategori-calimperativesfortheDefenseLogisticsEnterprise:reliability,speed,andefficiency.Supportingmetricswereoutlinedforeachofthesethreetop-levelmetrics.Thesegroupsofmetricsevolvedintoametrics“hier-archy”thatencompassesrelevantmetricsinacompre-hensivemanner.Thepurposeofthismetricshierarchyistomeasureprocessoutcomesandenablebenchmark-ingwithinDODandbetweenDODandcommercialindustry.Cross-cuttingmetricswerealsoidentifiedtoclarifythemeasurementsofperformance.
Thetopthreeend-to-endmetricsarereliability,alsocalledperfectorderfulfillment(POF);speed,orcustomerwaittime(CWT);andefficiency,whichisequatedwithtotalsupplychainmanagementcosts(TSCMC).Allthreemetricsmustbeconsideredinbal-ancewhenleadersevaluatesupplychainperformance.Theyaredesigned,ultimately,toachievematerielreadinessatthebestvalue.
TheefforttodevelopandvalidatethemetricswasspearheadedbytheJSCAteam,ledbytheOSDL&MRandtheJ−4,andincludedrepresentativesfromeachservice’smaterielcommandandsubject-matterexpertsfromacademiaandprivateindustry.
Reliability (POF). Anorderisconsidered“per-fect”ifitisdeliveredintimetomeetthe“customercommitdate,”inthefullquantity,inthecorrectcon-dition,andwiththecorrectdocumentation.POFhasseverallevel2andlevel3metrics:ordersaredeliv-eredinfull,includingitemandquantityaccuracy;deliveryperformancemeetsthecustomercommitdate;documentationisaccurate;anddelivereditemsareinperfectcondition.POFdetermineshowreli-ablyacustomer’sorderisfilled.InSCORterms,itisa“customer-facing”metric.Itprovidesinsightintowhetherornotthesupplychaincanfulfillcustomerneedsconsistently.
22 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Speed (CWT). TheJSCAteamselectedCWTastheprimarymetrictomeasuretheDODsupplychain’sspeedinfulfillingorders.CWTmeasuresthesupplychain’sabilitytoquicklyrespondtocustomerdemand.CWTstartswhenacustomerplacesarequisitionandendswhenthecustomer’srequisitionisclosed.Thisattributeofresponsivenessisalso“customer-facing”inSCORmethodology.
CWTdetermineshowquicklytheendcustomerisserved.AnalysisofCWTisbrokenintosubsegmentsthatenableidentificationofproblemareas.UsingCWTenablesDODtobenchmark(compareitsperfor-mance)againstindustry.
Efficiency (TSCMC). TheJSCAteamselectedTSCMCastheprimaryefficiencymetric.Bystructuringthesupportingmetricstoalignwiththeprocesses,DODwillbeabletobenchmarkbothTSCMCandthesupport-ingmetricswithcommercialresults,whenapplicable.TSCMCincludestotalacquisitioncost,totaldeliverycost,totalmaintenancecost,andtotalreturncost.Thesecostsincludebothpersonnelcostsineachfunctionandmaterielcostsineachmetric.TSCMCenablesprogrammanagersandotherdecisionmakerstounderstandtheextenttowhichadjustmentstothesupplychainaffectcosts.UnlikePOFandCWT,thisattributeisconsideredtobe“internal-facing”inSCORmethodology.
Crosscutting metrics. Toaccompanythethreeproposedtop-levelperformancemetrics,theJSCAteamidentifiedfivecross-cuttingmetrics:fillrate,percentageofretailordersfilledlocally,percentageofwholesaleordersfilledlocally,forecastaccuracy,andinventorydaysofsupply.Thecross-cuttingmetricsareinterconnectedandworkacrossthereliability,speed,andefficiencymetricstohelpidentifytherootcausesofDODsupplychainproblems.
JSCAProofofConceptTheprocesses,processelements,andmetrics
constitutetheframeworkforJSCA.DuringphaseI,theteamsuccessfullyvalidatedJSCAasavaluablemethodologyformakingsupplychaindecisionswithaholisticviewofsupplychainoperations.TheEACsupportedtheresultsofphaseIandgavethego-aheadforphaseII,theJSCAproofofconcept.
TheobjectiveofphaseIIwastoapplyJSCAweap-onsystemdiagnosticstoacross-serviceweaponsys-temtoseewhateconomiesandefficienciescouldbegained.ThesepotentialimprovementswereidentifiedasoperationalopportunitiesforJSCA.
TheH−60helicopterwaschosenfortheproofofconceptbecauseitisamatureandcomplexweaponsystemthatisusedacrosstheservices.ThehypothesisoftheprojectisthatJSCAprovidesDODwithanenterprise-wide,end-to-endperspectiveforoptimiz-ingDODsupplychainprocessesthatmaintainandimprovereadinessatthebestvalue.
Inadditiontobeingajointsystem,multiplevari-antsoftheH−60havealonghistoryofbeingusedforsustainmentoverseveralyears.Asaweaponsystemwithprovensuccessinthesupplychain,theH−60waswellsuitedtoevaluatetheend-to-endDODsupplychainfortheArmyandtheNavyandthedeliverpro-cessfortheAirForceH−60programs.
TheArmywaschosenastheleadagencybecauseithastheoverwhelmingmajorityoftheH−60fleet.TheNavyhasemployedaperformance-basedlogistics(PBL)strategyforitssustainmentsupport,sophaseIIhadalimitedimpactontheNavybecauseofthedura-tionandstructureofthecontract.
ThephaseIIprocesswasdividedintotwosegments.ThefirstwastheArmydetailedassessment,consist-ingofstakeholderinterviews,datacollection,processmappings,andinventoryofrelevantpolicies.Thesec-ond,knownastheopportunityanalysis,wastheidenti-ficationofmajoropportunitiesbasedonevaluationofJSCAmetrics.TheplanwastolookattheArmyfirstandthenatthecombinedservices.
RecommendationsforImprovementsTheopportunityanalysisledtheJSCAteamtomake
severalrecommendationsforoperationalimprovements.Thefirstistoimprovedifferentiationthroughoutthesup-plychain.InitialdatacollectionshowedJSCA’spotentialforidentifyingcertainsecondaryitemsas“NMCS[notmissioncapablesupply]driver”items.[Theseareitemsinshortsupplythatstopmaintenanceworkandthuspreventsystemsfromperformingassignedmissions.]TheoverallobjectiveistoreduceCWTfortheseNMCSdrivers.
ThesecondoperationalrecommendationofJSCAphaseIIistoimprovetheclassIX(repairparts)national-echelondemandplanningforecast.Thiswillresultinamoreefficientdistributionofinventoryandwillimprovematerielavailability.Aspartofthiseffort,theArmyMaterielSystemsAnalysisAgencyisstudy-ingcommercialdemand-forecastingmodelsforpoten-tialadaptationbyDODcomponents.
Athirdrecommendation,relatedtothesecond,istoimprovecollaborativedemandplanning.TheArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)isactivelyengagedwiththeDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA)inimplementingthisopportunity.Thefocusisonimprovingtheaccura-cyofdepotpartssupportforecastsexchangedthroughnewenterpriseresourceplanningsystemsdeployedwithineachcomponent.
Thefourthandfifthrecommendationsaretobal-ancerepaircapacitywiththerestofthesupplychainandtodevelopajointapproachtothecommercialindustrialbase.TheArmyContractingCommandandtheAMCG−3reviewedpastprocurementandrepairprogramsandidentifiedcommercialvendorsforpoten-tialfuturestrategic-sourcingallianceswiththeArmy.ThisprocessisbeingexpandedtoincludeAirForce
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 23
andNavyH−60spendingdata.ProcessesdevelopedforthesetworecommendationsarebeingcoordinatedwithDLA,whichhascentralizedclassIXprocurementresponsibilityforallDODcomponents.
Thelastoperationalrecommendationistoactivelymanagethereturnprocess.TheArmyhasmadeadedicatedefforttoreducetheturnaroundtimeforunserviceableretrogradeitemsfromtheatertoconti-nentalUnitedStatesrepairdepots.TheArmyLogisticsSupportActivityhasbeenessentialindevelopingandtrackingenhancedmanagementmetricsforthiseffort.
OnechallengefacedduringphaseIIwasthequal-ityandconsistencyofthedataobtained.PhaseIIIrequiredonesetofauthoritativedata.
ThemajoroutputofphaseIIwastodemonstratethatJSCAdatacollectionandevaluationisanapproachthatcanberepeatedforotherDODweaponsystems.
ThefindingsontheH−60helicopterhighlightedtheusefulnessandstrongpotentialbenefitsoftheJSCAmethodologytoDOD.HavingimplementedJSCAonabroadscalewiththefirstweaponsystem,itwasdecidedthatitwouldbebeneficialtogoaheadwiththethirdphaseoftheproject.
JSCAInstitutionalizationPhaseIII—theinstitutionalizationphase—ofJSCA
isnowwellunderway.Threemultiserviceweaponsys-temswerechosenforthephaseIIIproject:theclose-inweaponsystem(CIWS),theC−130aircraft,andtheHellfiremissilelauncher.Duringthisphase,DODexpectstofindcontinuedopportunitiesforimprovingthesupplychainandachievinggreatervalueinthesustainmentprocess.
ThreemajoroutcomeswereexpectedduringthefirstyearoftheinstitutionalizationofJSCA—o Createafoundationbydefiningend-to-endperfor-
mancemeasures,developingbenchmarkingmeth-odologyandtools,identifyingauthoritativedatasources,andconstructingabenchmarkingdatabase.
o EstablishacollaborativeprocessfortheH−60sup-plychainandoptimizeH−60networkinventorylevels.
o IdentifyopportunitiesandrecommendchangestoimprovesupplychainperformanceandreadinessfortheHellfirelauncher,CIWS,andC−130.DuringphaseIII,theperformancemetricsthatwill
beusedtomeasure,benchmark,andanalyzetheend-to-endDODsupplychainwereupdated,refined,andvalidated.Theobjectivesofthevalidationwereto—o Selecttheappropriatemeasuresforthenear-and
mid-termimplementationofJSCA.o Define,withagreatdealofspecificity,howthe
measureswillbecalculated.o Identifytheauthoritativedatasourceandspecific
dataelementsneededfromeachorganizationtocal-culatetheperformancemeasures.
Thefinalactionsofthisvalidationworkstreamincludefinalizingmetricsanddefinitions,socializingwithExecutiveAdvisoryCommitteemembers,andpreparingmetricsforincorporationintotheBench-markingGuide.
BenchmarkingBenchmarkingsupplychainperformanceisakey
functioninphaseIIIandacriticalstepincontinuous-lydrivingimprovementstoDOD’sjointsupplychain.
Benchmarkingistheprocessofcollectingspecificsupplychainperformancedataandusingthemtocomparetheperformanceofasupplychainagainstrelativelysimilarandbest-in-classsupplychains.Togainanunderstandingofwherethesupplychainisachievingexcellentresultsandwhereimprovementopportunitiesexist,performancedatawillbecollect-edbasedonthesupplychain’sspeed,reliability,andefficiency. Datavalidationiskeytotheeffort.
StandardperformancemetricswerecarefullyselectedduringphaseIIItoenablecomparisonsamongDOD’sweaponsystems.Performanceisbenchmarkedqualitatively,quantitativelybyper-formancemetrics,andbycomplexity.Thisthree-prongedbenchmarkingapproachenablesthecollectionandanalysisofperformanceinformationatthebusinesslevel,detailedlevel,andoperationslevel.(Theoperationslevelanalysiswillassessfac-torssuchasdistribution,transportation,andmanage-mentprocesses.)Thisbenchmarkingapproachassistsinsettinggoalsandtargetsaswellasdevelopinga“scorecard.”
TheJSCAmetricsunderwentapilottestduringtheweaponsystemdiagnosticphaseofphaseIII.ThemeasureswererefinedfromApriltoAugust2010,recommendationsforend-to-endDODsupplychainmeasureswereprovidedduringJunetoSeptember,andinstitutionalizationoftheperformancemeasuresisoccurringfromSeptember2010untilatimetobedetermined.
ThePerformanceMeasurementFramework(PMF)Planconsistedofthreesteps.Firstwasthedatacollectionprocess,duringwhichabenchmark-ingquestionnairewasalsocirculated.Secondwastheanalysisprocess,duringwhichdatawerenormal-izedandcomparedwiththesamplepopulation.Thirdwastherefinementprocess,inwhichtheJSCAteamidentifiedlessonslearnedandthePMFwasrevisedaccordingly.
Ultimately,DODwillbebenchmarkingagainstcivilianindustry.Thiswillalsorequireidentificationofspecifictargetsforspecificitemsandprocesses.Doestheperformanceofagivenitemneedtobe“adequate,”inthetop10percent,or“bestinclass?”D-cellbatteries,forexample,mayhavedifferenttar-getsthanhelicopterrotorblades.
24 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Someofthecurrentlimitingfactorsareimperfectbenchmarkingwithcommercialentitiesandlackofauthoritativedatasources.Inthecross-servicerealm,managementprocessesdifferacrosstheservices(forexample,PBLversusnon-PBL),andmetricsanddataavailabilityalsodiffer.OneofthepurposesofphaseIIIistoremovetheselimitingfactors.
JointApproachfortheIndustrialBaseAnotherprojectthatemergedfromphaseIIand
isbeingimplementedduringphaseIIIisthe“JointApproachfortheIndustrialBase.”ThisinnovationhaspowerfulimplicationsformaterielreadinessandcostsavingsinDODcontracting.Thekeyelementforsuccessiscollaborationamongtheservices,defenseagencies,andothersupplychaincompo-nents,includingtheSupplyChainExecutiveSteeringCommittee.Activitiesunderwayincludeanagree-mentbetweenDLAandtheArmytocollaborateontheworkstreamanddefinetheoutcomesofthiseffort.Onefocusofthiseffortwillbedemandplan-ningaccuracy.
JointSourcingWorkinggroupTheJointSourcingWorkingGroupwillcollabo-
ratetoimproveweaponsystemreadinessthroughinformationsharing,planning,andgovernanceonend-to-endlife-cyclesustainmentactivities.Thusfar,thegroup’smemberorganizationsincludetheDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforSupplyChainIntegration(SCI);theJ−4;theDLAJ−3/4;MarineCorpsHeadquartersInstallationsandLogis-ticsDepartment;theArmyContractingCommand;AMC’sAviationandMissileCommandandCorpusChristiArmyDepot;theArmyG−4;andDefenseLogisticsAgencyAviation.
TheJSCAWorkingGroupisthesupportingandimplementingorganization.ItiscochairedbytheSCIandtheJ−4,anditsmembersaretheservices,com-batantcommands,defenseagencies,OSD,andsys-temsprogrammanagementoffices,aswellasotherfunctionalanddomainexperts.
ItisimportanttonotethestakeholderbodiesconsultedontheJSCAefforts:theSupplyChainExecutiveSteeringCommittee,theProductSup-portExecutiveCommittee,theDistributionProcessOwnerGovernance,andthelogisticscomponentorganizationsoftheH−60,C−130,Hellfirelauncher,andCIWS.
JSCAadaptsacommerciallydevelopedandacceptedoperationsreferencemodelforoperationalusewithinDOD.Althoughsomesignificantpolicyandstatutorychallengescurrentlyexistinoperatingasingle,jointsupplychainacrossDOD,JSCAhelpsleadersandpractitionerstobetterdefinethe“trade
space”whenevaluatingthecostsandbenefitsofpro-cessorconfigurationchanges.
PhaseIofJSCAsawthecreationofJSCAandtheprocessmodel.Italsoaccomplishedsocializa-tionandbuy-inacrossDOD.PhaseIIvalidatedthebenefitsofJSCAandanunderstandingofsomeofitslimitations.Itresultedindevelopmentofanapproachthatcanberepeatedforweaponsystemdiagnostics.Finally,itprovidedasummaryofrecommendationsandend-to-endsupply-chaintenets.
TheweaponsystemdiagnosticphaseofphaseIIIwillfurtherdemonstratethevalueoftheJSCAmethodologyandinstitutionalizeprocessesaswellassocializeandvalidateprimary,supporting,andcross-cuttingmetrics.Thegoalistodevelopalong-termstrategyforcreatinggovernanceofthesystem.
TheJSCAteamprovedtheutilityofJSCAbyusingittoidentifyareasofinefficiencyandopportu-nitiestocreateaneffectivesupplychain(efficiency,speed,andsupplychainreliability).Whileadditionalworkneedstobedonetoprescribespecificsolu-tionsfortheidentifiedissues,JSCAhasprovenusefulinidentifyingandprioritizingopportunitiesforimprovement.IncreasedemphasisontheDODsupplychainandtheservices’needforefficienciesandeffectivenessmakethetimingofJSCAgreatlyimportant.Finally,JSCAisdirectedtowardchangingthemindsetofDODlogisticians.
AproposedendstatefortheDODsupplychainisanestimateddeliverydatetothecustomerwithin24hoursofrequestanddeliveryofissueprioritygroup(IPG)1requisitionsanywhereintheworldin5dayswith95-percentreliability,IPG2requisitionsany-whereintheworldin15dayswith95-percentreli-ability,andIPG3requisitionsanywhereintheworldin30dayswith95-percentreliability.JSCAcanhelpmakethisareality.
Thesupportoftheservices,combatantcom-mands,anddefenseagenciesareneededtomaketheJSCAmethodologyarealityforDOD.Theresultsofimprovedmaterielreadinessatgreatervalueareanimperativeeffortinthefast-moving,rapidlychangingglobalenvironment.Bestpracticesaretheaim.Weowenothinglesstotheforce.
Mary p. fletcHer is an arMy senior fellow assiGned to tHe j−4, tHe joint staff. a 20-year Veteran of tHe air defense artillery brancH, sHe Has a bacHelor’s deGree froM tHe united states Military acadeMy and a j.d. deGree and an M.a. deGree in national security studies froM GeorGetown uniVersity.
tHe autHor would like to tHank joHn lafalce for contribut-inG to tHis article.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 25
embersofthe841stTransportationBattalionand276thTransportationDetachment(Auto-matedCargoDocumentation)loadedandtaggedthelargestsingleshipmentoftheGlobalWaronTer-rorismandtheIraqWarinlateApril2010.EquipmentconvergedonAPMTerminalsVirginiainPortsmouth,Virginia,byroadandrailtoprepareforitstransfertotheMiddleEast.Themassiveshipment,totaling1,191piecesofequipment,consistedofcontainerizedcargoandroll-ingstockofthe2dand3dBrigadeCombatTeams,101stAirborneDivision(AirAssault).
The276thTransportationDetachment(AutomatedCargoDocumentation),11thTransportationBattalion,locatedatJointExpeditionaryBaseLittleCreek-FortStory,Virginia,tracksanddocumentscargoandprovidesterminalservicesinfixed-portorlogisticsover-the-shoreoperations.
TheMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCommand(SDDC)calledonthedetachmentbecauseofitsabilitytodeployrapidlyanditsself-sustainingperson-nelandequipmentcomposition.SDDCalsocalledonthe841stTransportationBattalion,amovementcontrolbat-talionfromCharleston,SouthCarolina,thatisdesignedtosynchronizesurfacecargomovementsandprovidetrafficmanagementandsingleportmanagementfortheDepartmentofDefense(DOD).The276thand841sthaveworkedtogetheronvariousmissionsontheeasternsea-board,includingmovementsoutofPhiladelphia,Pennsyl-vania;PortsmouthandNorfolk,Virginia;andCharleston.
The597thTransportationGroupatFortEustis,Vir-ginia,coordinatedtheoperation,whichinvolved“stuff-ing”40-footshippingcontainerswithsmallerquadrupleandtriplecontainersandplacingintrusion-detectionradiofrequencyidentification(RFID)tagsoneach40-footcontainerforshipment.
SettingUpShopSoldiersofthe276thTransportationDetachmentand
841stTransportationBattalionenteredAPMTerminalsVirginiaearlyonthemorningof26AprilandmadetheirwaytothereceivingpointoftheArmyshipment.Soldiersbegantosetuptheirequipmentandpreptheirrostersandtechnicalequipmentwhiletheywaitedforthearrivalofthefirstpiece.
The276thmadeitsdeployableoperationscenter(DPOC)thecentralofficeandinformationcenterfortheoperation.KeypersonnelandtechnicalequipmentfilledtheDPOCandprovidedunityofcommandandacentrallocationforinformationgatheringandrecording.For15daysstraight,equipmentpouredintotheterminalandthe841stand276thworkedtogethertoorganize,track,stuff,andtagtheequipmentforonwardmovement.
The841stand276thuseWorldwidePortSystem(WPS)andin-transitvisibility(ITV)technologytotrackanddocu-mentequipment.WPSallowsoceanterminalstoaccountforandtrackthemovementofcargothroughaportanddocumentcargowithmanifests,transportationcontrolandmovementdocuments,andcustomspapers.WPSprovidesregionalcommanderswiththeinformationneededtoman-agethemovementofoceancargo.
ITVtechnologyisanetworkofservers,RFIDinterroga-tors,andRFIDtags.TheITVnetworkdevelopedforDODistheworld’slargestRFIDsystem.Thesystemisdesignedtoincreaseproductivity,reducecycletimes,decreasewarf-ighterwaittimes,andincreasesupplyconfidencewhilemeetingcommanders’needsfortotalassetvisibility.
TrackingtheShipmentDuringthisoperation,eachpieceofequipmentand
containerhaditsownuniqueRFIDtag.TheSAVISensorTagST–675providesnotonlyITVofcontainerlocationsbutalsothetimes,details,andlocationsofwhencontain-ersarecompromisedduringshipment.Acompromiseisanything,includingunauthorizedcontaineropeningsandcuts,holes,orpunctures,thatcandisruptthecon-tainer’sintegrity.Eachtagisequippedwithtemperature,humidity,shock,intrusion,andlightsensors.Thetaghasac-shapedclampthatallowstheelectroniccomponentsandsensorstobehousedinsideoftheshippingcontainerwhileonlythesmallantennacasingisexposedtotheele-ments.Thisdesignreduceswearanddamagetothetag.
The40-footcontainershadtheirownuniqueRFIDdesignations,too,withthesametypeoftagprovidinganadditionaltierofvisibility.Ifanytamperingortheftoccurredduringtransit,theSDDCaswellascommand-erswouldknowwhichequipmentwasaffectedbecauseeachsmallercontainertagcorrespondedwiththetagforitsparent40-footcontainer.
Whenfullydocumentedandreadyforloadout,theshipmentconsistedof639quadrupleandtriplecontainersloadedinto40-footcontainers,464piecesofrollingstock,andeighty-eight20-footmilitary-owneddemountablecon-tainers.Attheconclusionoftheoperation,allcargowastagged,stuffed,accountedfor,andmanifestedformovementoverseastoOperationIraqiFreedom.
captain kyle p. Mcnealy is tHe coMMander of tHe 276tH trans-portation detacHMent (autoMated carGo docuMentation), 11tH transportation battalion, at joint expeditionary base little creek-fort story, VirGinia. He is a siGnal officer and Holds a b.s. deGree in electrical enGineerinG froM tHe united states Military acadeMy. He is a Graduate of tHe siGnal basic officer leader course, tHe basic airborne course, and tHe air assault course.
PackingtheLargestShipmentoftheIraqWarby caPtain kyle P. Mcnealy
M
26 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
n2009and2010,theJointMultinationalReadinessCenter(JMRC)atHohenfels,Germany,builtafacilitywheredeployingunitscangainhands-onexperiencewithtacticalrecoveryoperations.Atthisfacility,unitsrevisitthefundamentalsofrecoverywithheavyemphasisonprecombatchecksandinspections.Soldiersreceivehands-ontrainingwithdamagedvehi-clesandconductrecoveryinasimulatedtacticalenvi-ronment.ThecombatrecoverytrainingsitedevelopedbytheAdlerobserver-controllertrainer(O/C–T)teamreflectstheJMRCcommitmenttoprovidedeployingunitswithasuperiortrainingexperience.
Recoveryoperationscanplayasignificantroleinunitoperationsand,insomecases,involvebrigade-levelattentionwhentheyrequirefires,air,andbat-tlespacecoordination.Therecoverytrainingprogrambeganinrecognitionofthisandinresponsetotheneedforrecoverycrewstogainvaluablehands-onexperi-enceinarealisticenvironment.
Therecoveryfacilitytrainingphilosophyfocusesonempoweringjuniorleaderstomakecriticaldecisionsonthegroundinresponsetovarioustrainingscenarios.Thisgivesunitsthecompetenceandconfidencetoper-formthesetasksunderfirewhiledeployed.Plannerscangainvaluableexperienceinmissionplanningforeventsoutsideoftherecoveryarenaandcreatemodelstovalidatethemilitarydecisionmakingprocess.
Trainingeventsemploytheresourcescommonlyassociatedwithacombattrainingcenter:realisticandrelevantscenarios,battlefieldeffects,demandingsce-narios,highstandardsforsuccess,andtheassistanceofdedicatedO/C–Tcadre.Thisarticleexplorestheapplicationofthesefeaturesastheyapplytopreparingrecoveryteamsandunitsfordeployment.
VehicleRecoveryModelsTheJMRCmodelfortrainingrecognizestwobasic
modelsforvehiclerecovery:towandplatform.Towrecoveryinvolvesanymethodofmovingavehicleinwhichatleastoneaxleassemblyisstillincontactwiththegroundandcapableofsupportingthevehicle’sweight.Thismayincludeflattowingifenoughofthevehicle’sdrivetrainremainsintact.
Whenacrewonlypullsthevehicle,suchasduringhastyrecoveriesfromengagementareas,itiscatego-rizedastowrecoveryforthepurposeofthisdiscussion.
ThiscouldincludealargevehiclesuchasanM984heavyexpanded-mobilitytacticaltruckwreckerdrag-gingadamagedM1151high-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicle(HMMWV),evenifbothaxlesaremissing.Insuchcases,vehicletowingonlyremovesthepersonnelandequipmentfromdanger,andplatformrecoverymustbeperformedimmediatelyafterward.
Althoughtowrecoveriesmaybedeliberateorhasty,allplatformrecoveryoperationsareconsidereddelib-erateactionsrequiringcoordinationandplanning.Coordinationandplanningmaytakeplacebeforethemission.Forexample,aunitcouldincludeaspartofitsequipmentapalletizedloadsystemorloadhandlingsystemplatformandrecoveryvehiclecapableofsup-portingtherecoveryofanup-armoredHMMWV.
TheAdlerO/C–Tteamemploysseveralmethodsandphasedtrainingforunitstobecomeproficientinvehiclerecovery.Thephasesincludecomprehensionofrecoverymethodsandequipmentfamiliarization,hands-onrecoverycompetence,andexecutionofacompleterecoverymission.
LeaderDevelopmentTrainingUnitsusuallybegintrainingrecoveryoperations
withinthefirstcoupleofdaysofarrivingatJMRC.Thetrainingbeginswithaleaderdevelopmentphasefocusedondoctrineanddevelopingsubject-matterexpertswithintheunit.AdlermaintenanceO/C–Tsevaluateleaders’comprehensionofrecoverymethodsandtheirunderstandingofdoctrinebyreviewingunitstandingoperatingprocedures(SOPs)andobservingSoldiertraining.Thismethodstressestheimportanceofdevelopingconfidenceandcompetencewithintheunitthroughfoundationbuildingandtaskrepetition.
Theunit’sSOPmustaddressdoctrineandassignedtasksforallpersonnelinvolvedwithrecoveryoperations,toincludemedicalprovidersandsecuritypersonnel.Thedocumentexistsasatemplateforleaderstoplanandexecuterecoverytasksrangingfromsimple,hastyopera-tionstocomplex,deliberateoperationswhileincontactwithenemyforces.Unitleadersresponsiblefortrain-ingthestandardsintheSOPmustdisplayproficiencythroughdiscussionanddemonstrationwiththeO/C–Ts.
Thisphaseoftrainingisgroundedintheprinciplethatunitleadersaretheonesbestqualifiedtotraintheirunitsandsupportdoctrineandregulations,which
I
VehicleRecoveryTrainingatJMRCby Major derek W. HoFFMan
The Joint Multinational Readiness Center has established a program to teach unit personnel to conduct recovery operations in a combat environment.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 27
identifythecommanderofaunitastheprimarytrain-er.Throughoutthisphase,tacticalaspectsofrecovery,suchasprecombatchecksandinspections,rehearsals,andtacticalmovementskills,aredemonstratedbyunitleaders.UnitleadersalsotrainSoldiersonthebasiccomponentsoforganicrecoveryequipment,includingapplication,maintenance,andsafety.
Thebenefitsofinitiatingtrainingusingthismodelaremultifold.Leadersintheunitgainconfidenceandlearnfrommistakesinalow-threatenvironment.Soldiersgainknowledgeandappreciationforstandards.LearningfromtheirsupervisorsbuildsSoldiers’trustandconfidence.Occurringearlyinthetrainingcycle,thismodelservesasanenablerforunitstoidentifytactics,techniques,andproceduresanddevelopthemfurtherduringtherotation.TheO/C–TteamclearlyestablishesitselfasthesupporterofArmydoctrineandasourceofinformationforunits.Monitoringunitleadersthroughdirectobservation,safetyverification,andmentorshipreinforcesthisrelationship.
Unitsalsopracticefundamentalskillsearlyintherotationandbuildhabitsthatwillservethemwellthroughoutdeployment.Thisisextremelyimportantinthecurrentenvironmentofrapidturnoverandinexperi-encefoundatjuniorlevels.Oncetheunitdemonstratesathoroughunderstandingoftheprocess,itmovestomorechallengingtraininginafieldenvironment.
Hands-OnTrainingInthemaneuvertrainingarea,recoverycrewsgain
exposuretoandproficiencywithindividualandcrew
skills.Thetrainingaidesusedincludewheeledcargotrucks,“replicate”vehicles,andbattle-losscombatvehicles.Thefirsthands-onphaseoftrainingallowsunitstopracticethestepsnecessarytoexecutesafe,deliberaterecoveryoperationsinanontacticalenviron-ment.Theintentofthisphaseistoprovideunitswiththetrainingaidesandterrainneededtosuccessfullyassessandperformrecoveryoperations.
Theterrainpresentsmultiplechallenges,includingoffsetrecoveries,amirepit,andhigh-angle(upto45degrees),long,unevendraglanes.Inthisenvironment,recoveryteamscanpracticeuntiltheyreachproficiency.Theabilitytotrainonthesesimpletaskscanresultinunitsreducingrecoverytimesonactualsituationaltrain-ingexercise(STX)lanesby75percentor1½hours.
JMRCalsousesreplicatevehiclesfabricatedbyalocalvendorfromhigh-graderolledsteelforrecoverytraining.Becauseeventhemostdurablevehicleswilldegradeafterrepeatedexposuretorollinganddrop-ping,thereplicatevehiclesweredesignedtoproviderealisticframesforrecoveryteamstopracticeinextremeconditions.
ThecurrentfleetofreplicatevehiclesatJMRCincludesamine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehicleandanM1126Strykerinfantrycarriervehicle.Botharebuilttogeneralsizeandweightrequirements,withtowpointsfoundwheretheywouldbeonactualvehicles.Theyareconstructedwithweldedinteriorbulkheadstowithstandrepeatedabuse.Thesmoothexteriorconstructionensuresthatrecoverycrewssolve
Soldiers prepare to tow a disabled vehicle during recovery training at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany. (Photo by SPC Ricky Lowes, VIPERS Visual Information Personnel Team, JMRC)
28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
eachproblemusingdoctrinalmethodsandestablishedtowpoints.
JMRCprovidesunitswiththeopportunitytoworkonbattle-damagedequipmentprocuredfromtheatersofoperation.Thisprocurementwasfacilitatedwiththeassistanceofprojectmanagersandtheatertransporta-tionagencies.ThecurrentinventoryincludesMRAPvariantsandaStrykerinfantrycarrier.Thevehiclesarenotasdurableasthereplicatesystems,buttheyproviderecoverycrewswiththeopportunitytoworkaroundauthenticsystemsandevaluatecompromisedvehiclesforimprovisedrecoverymethods.
Afulldayofnoncommissioned-officer-ledtrainingatthesiteusuallyprovidesunitswithenoughtimetoensurethatcrewsreachthenecessarylevelofprofi-ciencytomoveontothenextphaseoftraining.
RecoveryMissionPhasethreeofthetrainingistheSTX,whichpro-
videsunitswiththeopportunitytoexecuterecoveryoperationsasatacticalmission.Thisphaseincorpo-ratesbattlefieldeffectsthatincludeindirectfire,small-armsharassinganddirectfire,andgroundthreats.Mountedanddismountedroleplayersprovidetheunitswiththeopportunitytoexerciseescalationofforceandrulesofengagementprocedures.
Theunitresponsetothesescenariosdrivesreciprocalactionthatmayleadtoanescalationorde-escalationoftheevent.Whenengagedbyanidentifiedenemythreat,unitsmayalsoemployairsupportandindirectfiresup-porttocounterenemyactivity.Theeffectsofbothofthesearereproducedwithsimulatedindirectfireandliveaviationassets,includingmedicalevacuationassets.Trainedandcertifiedcombatlifesaversarealsogiventheopportunitytopracticetheirskillswhentreatingcasual-ties.However,toachievesuccessinthisphase,unitsmustgivecarefulconsiderationtotheplanningprocesslongbeforeexecutingthemission.
Informationconcerningtheoperationalenvironmentisprovidedthroughtwomethods.First,unitsreceivearelief-in-placein-brieffromtheJMRCcadre.Thisinitialbriefing,givenaspartofthereception,staging,onwardmovement,andintegrationprocess,providesunitswithgeneralbackgroundinformationontheenemysituation,adjacentandsupportingunits,andotheroperationaldata.
SubsequentcomplementaryinformationisfedthroughaseriesoffragmentaryordersgivenduringtheSTX.Eachfragmentaryorderdirectsunitstoperformspecificmovementoperationswith“bepreparedto”missionsthatincluderecoveryoperations.Atthistime,unitsatthebattalionlevelimplementthemilitarydeci-sionmakingprocessandorders-generatingprocesseswhilecompany-levelunitsbeginthetroopleadingproceduresprocess.Bothordersgenerationandtroopleadingproceduresmusttakeintoaccountfactorsandvariablesthataffectthemission.
Manyrecoveryoperationsconsiderationsaresimilartothoseforstandardmovementmissions.Recoveryoperationsplannersshouldconsider—o Situationalinformationconcerningtheterrain,with
imageryandenemysituationaltemplatesandoverlays.o Missionrequirementsthatidentifytherecoverytype.o Executioninformationfortheliaisonofficerto
coordinateaviationsupport.o Passageoflines,adjacentunitcoordination,actionson
theobjective,andspecialequipmentconsiderations.o Timelineinformationthatconcernsbattlespace
ownersbutpromptstheunittomakeconsiderationsalongthe“¹/³to²/³”ruleandschedulerehearsals.
o Additionalsupportassetsthatmayincludeheavy-liftassetsorsecurityelements.
o Informationmostoftenforgottenbutveryimportant,includingfrequencycutsheetsforbattlespaceown-ers,aviationunits,higherheadquarters,andmissioncommanders;reportingrequirements;andcommand-er’scriticalinformationrequirements.
Throughouttheoperation,staffandmis-sionelementsoftheunit
JMRC observercontroller trainers instruct units on how to conduct a highangle rollover recovery. (Photo by SPC Ricky Lowes, VIPERS Visual Informa-tion Personnel Team, JMRC)
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 29
mustenforcestrictreportingproceduresinordertomain-tainsituationalawarenessforthecommanderandensurethatallpossiblebattle-fieldenablersareusedformissionsuccess.
Asunitscompletetheplanningcycle,O/C–Tscloselymonitorthematalllevels.Aunit’sabilitytomanagetimeandresourcesinordertoexecuterecoverymissionsiscriticaltoitssuccesswhendeployed.Carefulconsiderationofsyn-chronizingexpectationsandclearlydefiningrolesandresponsibilitiesbecomesessential.Commanderscannotoveremphasizeorenforcetoostringentlytheneedforprecombatchecksandinspectionsatalllevelsandatcriticaltimesoftheoperation.Unitsthatmasterthesefoundation-buildingtaskswillmostlikelysucceedandexcelinrecoverytasks.
FutureDeploymentsFuturegrowthoftheJMRCvehiclerecoverypro-
gramincludesconstructingreplicatesofotherstandardwheeled-vehicleplatforms(suchastheup-armoredHMMWV,civilianline-haultractor,andmobiletacti-calvehicle)andarmoredvehicles(suchastheMRAPallterrainvehicle).Reasonablefabricationcostsmaketheseacquisitionsfeasibleforsupportingunithomestationtrainingaswell.
Theuseofreplicateequipmentalsorepresentsanenvironmentallyresponsibleapproachthatkeepshaz-ardousmaterialsoutoftrainingareas.Evencleanedandpurgedvehiclescandamagetheenvironmentintrainingareas.Repeatedrecoveryoperationsresultinbrokenpartsandlitterthatarenotalwaysrecovered.Overtime,thiscanleadtounsightlyareasandcostlyremediation.Fabricatedreplicatesprovideaclean,durable,affordable,andresponsiveoption.
Asadedicatedtrainingfacilitywithafull-timecadreofmaintenanceexperts,therecoveryfacilityalsopro-videsalocationforunitsthroughoutU.S.ArmyEurope(USAREUR)topracticerecoveryoperationsoutsideoftheirnormaltrainingcycles.Unitspreparingfordeploy-mentorsimplydesiringtoimprovetheirskillscanusethefacilitybetweenmajortrainingevents.Partner-shipagreementsbetweenJMRCandsustainmentunitsthroughoutUSAREURarealreadybeingestablishedtomaximizethistrainingopportunity.
TheideaofprovidingrecoverytrainingatJMRCbeganafewyearsagoinresponsetobattlefieldreali-ties,buttherecoverytrainingprogramwentthroughaperiodofrapidgrowthandconceptualdevelopmentin2010.Itnowrepresentsafocusedtrainingmodelgroundedinsystemdevelopmentforallparticipantsinrecoveryoperationsuptothebrigadelevel.
TheAdlerteamcontinuestodeveloptherecoveryoperationstrainingfacilityasthepremiertrainingfacilityinUSAREURandasaconceptforotherloca-tionstoemployandreapbenefitsfrom.Thefacilityrepresentsaflexiblemodelofresourcerequirementsandintensityforunitsto“traintowin.”
Major derek w. HoffMan is a support operations obserVer-controller trainer at tHe joint Multinational readiness center at HoHenfels, GerMany.
Soldiers use a “replicate” vehi
cle to practice securing chains for recovering a vehicle. (Photo
by SPC Ricky Lowes, VIPERS Visual Informa-
tion Personnel Team, JMRC)
30 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
romJunetoDecember2008,IledaFrenchlogisticsoperationalmentorandliaisonteam(OMLT)inadvisingthe5thKandak,theAfghanlogisticsbat-talionservingthe1stBrigade,201stArmyCorps,AfghanNationalArmy(ANA).TheFrenchOMLTreplacedaU.S.embeddedtrainingteamatthebeginningof2008andretainedthefocusoftheU.S.unit’smission.TheOMLT’smissionwastoperform,sometimessimultane-ously,threefunctions:teach,advise,andtrain.
Inthisduty,theFrenchlogisticianmustbecomeamentor.ThekeytoanOMLT’ssuccessliesinchoosingmenwithadequatementalstrengthtostandalongsideAfghansoldiers—notonlyintrainingbutalsoincom-bat.Eveniffightingisnottheaimofthemission,itisaveryprobableconsequenceofthemissionofmentor-ing.Actually,inAfghanistan,Frenchlogisticianshavebeenservingas“fightinglogisticians”since2008.WithintheOMLT,everymemberoftheFrenchTrans-portationCorps,fromprivatetocolonel,iscommittedasafightinglogistician.
TheFrenchArmydeployeditsfirstOMLT(aninfantryone)in2007,andalogisticsOMLTwasdeployedthefollowingyear.Thislogisticsteamof30men(mostlynoncommissionedofficersandofficers)doesnotsupportotherOMLTsbutadvisesthe5thKandakeverydayandforeachoperation.
TheFrenchTransportationCorpshasexperienceinestablishinglogisticsbattalionsbybuildingmission-tailoredunitsoutofvariousspecialties,buttheOMLTconceptisnew.Theconceptisbasedonmilitaryassis-tancemissionsthatwerecarriedoutinAfrica,andtodaytheOMLTisthekeyelementingraduallybring-ingtheANAtoindependenceinsecuritytasks.
TheChoiceofMen:TheFirstCriterionofSuccessThechoiceofmenisincrediblyimportanttothe
missionbecausethemembersoftheteamwillspend1yeartogether(trainingforthemissionfor6monthsandcarryingitoutforanother6months).TheOMLT’scohesionisbuiltduringtheoperationaltraining,whichitselfmustbeconsideredasthefirstmission.
Duringthesemonthsoftrain-ing,whicharecrucialformis-sionsuccess,theteambuildsupitsmoralstrength.Thequalificationsrequestedfromeachindividualarenumer-ous,andtheirpsychologicalbalanceisfun-damental.Infact,theidealFrenchOMLTlogisticianmustdemonstratehardiness,afullspectrumoftechnicalcompetencies,emotionalsta-bilitywhilefacingstressfulcombatsituations,anopenmind(sinceAfghancultureiscomplex),andtheabil-itytospeakEnglishsinceanAfghantranslatorspeaksDariorPashtoandEnglishbutnoFrenchatall.Thesequalitiesmaynotexistinonesingleman.
However,inAfghanistan,thequalityoftrainingwasevidentinthecorrectnessoftheadvicegivendailytotheAfghansoldiersandespeciallyinthesuccessoftheoperationalmissions.Lessonslearnedrevealedthataperson’spsychologicalbalanceisthemostimportantqualityforacommitmentinthecontextoftheOMLT,butitisalsothemostdifficultonetojudge.
Mentoring:ANewFormofMilitaryAssistanceIncivilianlife,mentoringisanactivitycalled
coaching(eveninFrench),meaning“revitalizingan
F
AFrenchLogisticsOMLTinAfghanistan
by lieutenant colonel cHristoPHe barbe, FrencH arMy
French operational mentor and liaison teams advise and train Afghan National Army units and help them become more capable of independently securing their nation.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 31
ailingfirm.”AspartoftheOMLT,thementoringmis-sionisinnovativeandisbasedonthreetasks:o AdviseANAunitsineverydaylife,teaching,and
training.o AdviseAfghancommandersinplanningandusing
landorairsupportfromcoalitionforces.o Providethenecessarymeanstousecommandand
controlassetstoallowauthoritytobeimplementedandoperationstobecontrolled.Thedailytasksarecomplicatedbythefactthatthey
areintendedforamixofex-mujahidin,formerofficerstrainedbytheSovietsinthe1980s,andyoungpeopleinvolvedinaregulararmywhohavegoodoperationalabilitiesdespitelackingbasictechnologyskills.
AsateamleaderofthelogisticsOMLT,IdirectlyadvisedthecommandingofficeroftheAfghanlogistics
battalionandcooperatedwithhimintraininghisunitandpreparinglogisticsoperationstosupporthisinfantrybrigadeof3,000men.Eachofthe15FrenchmentorshadanAfghancounterpartineachlogisticsspecialtyofthe5thKandak,whichisessentialtoresupplyingthebrigade.ThebrigadesecuresHighway1,whichstretch-esover100kilometersoutofKabulandistheonlylogisticssupplylinelinkingthecapitaltoKandahar.
Mentoringisaboutadvising,showinganopenmind,proposing,suggesting,guiding,andlettingtheAfghanofficermakethefinaldecision.TrustbetweentheFrenchofficerandhisAfghancounterpartisfunda-mental.Thistakestimetoachieve,butthisrelationshipistheonlywaytosuccess.
TheFrenchofficermustnotbeasubstituteforAfghanauthority,orelsethemissionwillfail.Thementorisan
The 5th Kandak assembles before a major operation with its mentors in Wardak Province.
32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
adviseroratrainerbutnotasurrogate.Thefirstmonthofthemissionwasanobservationroundthatdeterminedtheresultofthemissionanditssuccess.Confidencewasgainedontheground,particularlyafter2weeksinAfghanistanwhenthefirstambushoccurredandourcapabilitiesweresuccessfullytested.
Convoys:TheFrenchTransportationCorpsatWarTheconflictinAfghanistanisawarwithoutaname
orfrontline,andlogisticianstravelacrossmanyuncon-trolledareas.TheANAisatwar,butthecoalitionforces,whichofficiallyarepresentonlyforassistance,
arenot.Theenemieshavenofrontlineandattackthelogisticsconvoysthroughoutthewholeareaofoperations.Thenotionsoffrontandreardonotexist.Itisamodernconflictinwhichlogisticianssupportthefarthestforwardoperationalbasesandensureresupplymissionsareeverywhere.
ThecurrentmissionsoftheFrenchOMLTsincludeaccompanyingthe5thKandakwhenresupplyingtheANAinfan-trybattalionsthatsecureHighway1.TheOMLTsandthe5thKandakdeliverfuel,engineeringequipment,andfoodandevacu-atethevehiclesdamagedincombat.
In6months,theOMLTsconductedabout100missionsthroughouttheprov-incesofLogar,Wardak,andBamyan.Theytraveledover100,000milesonthetrailsofAfghanistan.Themissionwasdifficult,andeachsoldierfeltthepressureofeachconvoy,whichturnedouttobecombined,andsometimesjoint,militaryoperations.Thedurationofsuchmissionsvariedfrom1dayto1week,buttheenemythreatandtheimprovisedexplosivedeviceambusheswereconstant.Thefirstenemythathadtobefoughtwastheroutine.Everyonehadtoremaincarefulfromthefirstdayofthemis-siontothelastoneandmasterthetactics,techniques,andprocedures.
WeshowedourAfghancounterpartsthateachFrenchlogisticianisafighterandthusearnedtheirtrust.Thepartnershiphasbeen
goingonfor2yearsnow.Thisexcitingmissionisagreatadventureforasoldier.Itputseveryone,whetherspecial-istorleader,privateorcolonel,intheroleofasoldierandafightinglogistician.ButthismissionisdangerousbecauseitmeansthattheFrenchsoldiersharesthedailymissionoftheAfghansoldier,whoisatwar.
lieutenant colonel cHristopHe barbe is tHe cHief of tHe frencH arMy loGistics adVanced course in bourGes, france, and a forMer loGistics operational Mentor and liaison teaM leader in afGHanistan. He Has a Master’s deGree in tHe History of international relations froM tHe uniVersity of la sorbonne in paris.
Above, a soldier in a French armored personnel carrier at the entrance to the Saalar Combat Outpost secures an area near Highway 1 during a refueling mission.
Below, a French light armored personnel carrier and two Afghan fuel tankers proceed in a convoy in the Bamiyan Mountains.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 33
perationalmentorandliaisonteams(OMLTs)are20-to25-SoldierteamscreatedunderanagreementamongNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)countriestomentorandcoachtheAfghanNationalArmy(ANA)inusingcoalition-providedbattlefieldenablers.TheJointMultinationalReadinessCenter(JMRC)atHohenfels,Germany,offersOMLTsfromallparticipatingnationstheoppor-tunitytopracticementoringandcoachingtechniqueswithANAstaffandcompanyrepresentatives.ThisarticledescribesthebasicstructureofOMLTtrainingatJMRCandsomeofthechallengesfacedduringtheOMLTtraining.
OMLTOrganizationOMLTsarriveatJMRCasacollectionofsenioroffi-
cersandnoncommissionedofficersstructuredtoplanandexecuteANAadvisorydutiesandtoassisttheANA
OperationalMentorandLiaisonTeamsasaForceMultiplier
by Major joHn F. jacques
O staffandcombatunitsinestablishingpeaceandmain-tainingstabilityintheirassignedareasofoperation.
OMLTsaretask-organizedintocompanymentorsandbattalionmentors.OMLTmentorscentertheireffortsonninemission-essentialtasksthatarepairedwithasetoftrainingobjectivesthatareassessedandevaluatedduringthetrainingexercise.AsadviserstoAfghansustainmentunits,OMLTsplayacriticalroleintrainingandadvisingunitsonhowtoprovideestimatesandcoordinateresourceswhileexecutingstafffunctions.OMLTsalsoserveastroopmentorstoensurethattheeffectiveexecutionofsecuritymeasuresenablestheemploymentoflogisticsassets.
StaffExercisesStaffexercisesfocusonbuildingacoordinatedteamto
synchronizetheresourcesneededtomeetmissionrequire-mentsthatsupportInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce
The Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany provides training for operational mentor and liaison teams from NATO countries working with the Afghan National Army.
A Slovenian operational mentor and liaison team provides security for a medical evacuation site during a situational training exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany.
34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
(ISAF)objectives.Eachstaffelementisresponsibleforcollectingdata,analyzingrequirements,andaligningresourcesinordertomeetmissionobjectives.OMLTstaffsmentortheirANAcounterpartstouseavailableassets,coordinatewithhigherlevelcommandandadjacentunits,fillvoidsinsustainmentrequirements,andsynchronizesustainmentmissions.
Troop-AdviserTrainingTroop-advisertrainingfocusesonensuringthatdistri-
butionofsustainmentrequirementscanbeaccomplishedeffectively.OMLTadvisersinthisrolewilladviseandmentortheirAfghancounterpartsontheuseofsustain-mentplatforms,effectivesecuritymeasurestotakeduringdistributionmissions,andbattlefieldenablerstoenhancesecurity.TheymentorANAsoldiersonperform-ingmedicalandcasualtyevacuationandcommunicatingtoensuresynchronizationofunitactivitieswithinagivenareaofoperations.Theaterguidanceandcurrenttactics,techniques,andprocedures(TTP)employedbyISAFarealsodiscussedandpracticedduringthistraining.
Classroom-BasedInstructionOMLTtrainingatJMRCisbasedona5-dayperiod
ofinstructionthatsolidifiesthedoctrinallybasedapproachtomissionexecutionandalignsoperationalprocedureswithNATOstandardsandrequirements.ClassesincludetheHMMWV[high-mobilitymulti-purposewheeledvehicle]EgressAssistanceTrainer (HEAT),theEngagementSkillsTrainer2000(EST2000), theCallforFireTrainer,andtheVirtualBattleSpaceSimulator(VBS2)simuator.
HEAT.HEATisofferedasa2-hourblockofinstructionandpracticalexercise.OMLTSoldiersarebriefedbyasubject-matterexpertandthenpermit-tedtomountthesimulatedHMMWVchassisasacrew—driver,truckcommander,andtwodismounts.(Nogunnerpositionisonthetrainer.)Thisorientationemphasizesevacuatingavehiclethathasrolledover.
EST 2000.EST2000isprogrammedfora4-hourblockoforientationandfollow-onexercise.OMLTmembersarebriefedonhowtousethetrainerandtheobjectivesofemployingaccurate,coordinatedsmall-armsfireduringasimulatedsquadexercise.OMLTmembersrotatethrougheachpositiononthefiringline,includingthesquadleader’sposition.Teammem-
bersaretaskedduringtheexercisewithdirectingratesoffire,employingsectorsoffire,andmanagingsus-tainedfirefrommountedanddismountedpositions.
Call for Fire Trainer.TheCallforFireTrainerisusedfor2-hourblockstotrainandreinforcetheinte-grationandtacticalemploymentofavarietyofindirectfireweapons.OMLTmemberstraininanimmersiveenvironmentasforwardobserversandareplacedina360-degreesimulatedbattlespacewithavarietyofsce-nariosthatenablethemtoidentifyandreacttosimu-latedthreatsusingtheskillsetsthatmustbehonedtoafineedge.
VBS2.VBS2isnormallyintegratedintoasitu-ationaltrainingexercise(STX)asacommunicationsandmountedland-navigationreinforcementtool.WhenOMLTsarenotengagedinSTXtraining,OMLTper-sonneloperatetheVBS2astheywouldtheirassignedcombatplatformsandcommunicationsequipment,fur-therreinforcingindividualrolesandcommunicationsresponsibilities.TerraincanbeprogrammedintothesimulatortoreplicatetheenvironmentthatOMLTscanexpecttoencountereitherinthetrainingareaorwhiledeployed.
Duringsimulationexercises,additionalstressorscanbeaddedtoscenariosthatgobeyondwhatcanbeintroducedinthephysicaltrainingenvironment.Opposingforces,aviationassets,indirectfire,andcomplexobstaclesareemployedbytheteamofVBS2technicalcoordinators,andscenariosarecarefullycraftedtosupportspecifictrainingobjectives.
TacticalTrainingTacticaltrainingconsistsofa7-daycourseofevalu-
ationbasedoncurrentNATOdoctrineandTTPfromthetheaterandtheplannedareaofoperations.Thefirst2daysoftrainingaredoneinareplicatedtrainingenvi-ronmentasatacticalexercisewithouttroops,with1dayofconductingtroop-leadingproceduresandprecombatchecksandinspections.Thisexerciseisfollowedbyascaled-downversionoftheSTXtrainingthatwillbe
A Greek adviser mentors an Afghan National Army role player in inte
grating organic security with Afghan National Security Forces during a
situational training exercise.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 35
conductedoverthe5daysfollowingobserver-controllerandtrainerevaluationofeachOMLTteam.
ThisfirstlookateachOMLTbyitsassignedobserver-controllerandtrainerteamenablesanassess-mentoftheOMLT’sTTPandsubsequentinputtotheSTXplannerforthepaceanddifficultyoftrainingthateachOMLTwillfaceduringSTXtraining.
OMLTsarefirstbriefedonthetrainingobjec-tivesfortheparticularengagement,focusingonfourareasofconcern:counter-improvisedexplosivedevice(IED)operations,medicalrulesofengagement(whichincludemedicalevacuationprocedures),reactiontosustainedenemycontact,andsetupandoperationofeffectivetraffic-andentry-controlpoints.
Engagementsarethenresettoenableexecutionatcombatspeed.Basedonthedegreeofproficiencyexhibited,engagementscanberesettoenablefurtheremphasisonthebasicstoreachtrainingobjectivesortheintensityoftheengagementcanbeelevatedincre-mentallythroughtheuseofenablerstobuildonskillsthathavebeenmastered.
CounterIED operations. OMLTsaregivenamapindicatingenemyactivitythroughouttheirplannedroutes.Theyconductenemyactivityandterrainanaly-siswhileenroutetotheirdestination.Whentravers-inganIED“hotspot,”OMLTsmusttakeappropriateprecautionsandlocatewell-hiddenIEDs.WhentheyfindanIEDemplacement,OMLTsmustestablishproperstandoffdistance,setupsitesecurity,andsub-mitaproperlydetailedrequestforexplosiveordnancedetachmentpersonnel.Theymustalsoalertthebat-tlespaceowneroftheobstacleanditslocation.
Medical rules of engagement.Trainingmedi-calrulesofengagementinvolvesamultifacetedapproachtointeractingwithreplicatedciviliancasual-ties.OMLTsarechallengedwithanengagementthatdemandsestablishingsitesecurity,usinganinterpreter,assessingwoundsandtriage,andcoordinatingwithbattlespaceownerstocontactadditionalANAperson-neltosupplementsitesecurityandprovidecasualtyevacuation.
React to contact.OMLTsarechallengedwithamultilayered,sustainedattackfromopposingforcesconsistingofmultipleelements.InitiatedbydisablinganOMLTvehiclethatrequiresahastyrecovery,thisengagementtrainsmanywarriortasksanddrills,includingshoot,move,communicate,survive,adapt,andassociatedbattledrills.Thisscenariofinisheswithrequirementstoestablishlandingzonesandprepareandexecutemedicalevacuation.
InthepracticalapplicationofthesetrainingandskillsetsattheSTX,OMLTsprovetobeacapableforcemultiplier.WhenanOMLT’sperformanceiscomparedside-by-sidetoatypicalU.S.Armyrotation-alunit,threedistinctdifferencescometolight:o Useofinterpreters.
o Mountednavigationskills.o Employmentoftroop-leadingprocedures.
Somedifferencescanbeattributedtothesenior-ityofOMLTpersonnel,theirskills,andtheirabilitytoquicklyanalyzesituationsandintegrateavailableassets.Generallyspeaking,unitscomingfromNATOcountriesoperateundersimilardoctrinalguidanceandOMLTadvisershavetakenthetimetoresearchISAFandothertheater-relatedguidance.
WhenOMLTsareoperatingoptimally,timeisspentprovidingadditionaltraininganddisseminatinginfor-mationtotheirANAcounterparts,enablinggreatersit-uationalawarenessandintegrationofideasandtacticsbetweenunits.TheseniorityofOMLTpersonneltendstoeliminatereluctancetoemploytheassignedOMLTinterpreterandANAroleplayers.OMLTsalsospendmoretimeandenergyduringtroop-leadingproceduresthanmostU.S.units,particularlyduringorderspro-ductionandbattle-drillrehearsals.
CulminationExerciseAttheconclusionofeachOMLTrotation,aninte-
gratedculminationexercisetakesplacethatrequiresOMLTsfromeachrepresentedbranch(maneuver,fires,andeffects;operationssupport;andforcesus-tainment)toperformintegratedstaffplanninginordertoreachcommonmissionobjectives.EachOMLTisresponsibleforplanningandemployingaschemeofmaneuver,intelligencepreparationofthebattlefield,internalsecurity,exploitationofcollectedintelligence,andsustainmentoperations.
SustainmentOMLTstaffsaretaskedwithidentify-inglogisticsrequirements,performinglogisticsesti-matestomeetforcerequirements,andaligningthoserequirementsagainstavailableassets(withtheimpliedtaskofrequestingfurthersupportifassetsonhanddonotmeetmissionrequirements).OMLTtroopadvis-ersmentorandassistingeneratingandexecutinganeffectivesecurityplanduringsustainmentoperations,rangingfromestablishingrefuelon-the-movesitesandmedicalandcasualtyevacuationtoconvoysecurityoftheirdistributionmissions.
ThetrainingandemploymentofeachadditionalOMLTmeansfurthersuccessforforward-deployedforcesassecurityandsupportrequirementsforOpera-tionEnduringFreedomcontinueinthefuture.OMLTswillcontinuetodotheirpartinensuringamorereadyandcapableANAastheyworktotraintheANAintheartofsustainablelogisticsoperations.
Major joHn f. jacques is tHe senior obserVer-controller for tHe distribution coMpany at tHe joint Multinational readiness center at HoHenfels, GerMany. He is a Graduate of tHe transpor-tation officer basic course and tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course.
36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
heArmy’sweb-basedpropertyaccountabilityandtrackingsystem,PropertyBookUnitSupplyEnhanced(PBUSE),hasaugmenteditsassetvis-ibilityprocessbyincorporatinganautomatedtoolthatcantracktheuniqueitemidentifierofequipmentissuedtoSoldiers.Thisnewtraceabilitymeasureiscalleditemuniqueidentification(IUID)technology.
WhatIsItemUniqueIdentification?ThesimplestwaytounderstandIUIDistothinkofit
asagloballyuniqueserialnumber.Sometimes,onewillhearreferencetouniqueitemidentifier(UII).Techni-cally,IUIDisthesystemorprocessbywhichitemsaremarkedandregistered,whileUIIisthedatacontainedinthemarking.However,itiscommontohearIUIDusedtorefertoboththeIUIDprocessandtheUIIdataset.Unlikeserialnumbersthatmaybethesameforidenti-calitemsmanufacturedbydifferentcompanies,notwomilitaryitemswillcontainthesameUII.
WhyUseIUIDinPBUSE?UsingPBUSEtocaptureUIIdatafornewequipment
providestheArmyoveralltransparencyofthatequipment,frominitialfundingtofinalequipmentdelivery.Thisisacapabilitythatcurrentlyisbeingmanagedusingextensivespreadsheets.
Essentially,IUIDprovidesthecapabilitiestotrackcrit-icalassetsfromcradletogravebasedonthetypeofitemoritsvalue.IUIDisaccomplishedbymarkingeachquali-fyingitemwithapermanenttwo-dimensionaldatamatrixbarcodelabel.Thesepermanentmarkingswillbeusedforlogisticsandfinancialtrackingpurposes.ThedatamatrixisencodedwiththedataelementsneededtoconstructtheUII,whichisgloballyuniqueandunambiguous.
ThedataelementsrequiredtoformaUIIincludetheformatidentifier,themanufacturer’sidentification(CAGEcode),andtheitem’sserialnumber.Ifthemanu-facturerserializes[usesserialnumbers]withinapartnumber,thatdataelementwillalsobeencoded.[Acom-mercialandGovernmententity(CAGE)codeisafive-positioncodethatidentifiescompaniesthatconduct,orwanttoconduct,businesswiththeU.S.Government.]
WhatIsthePolicy?DepartmentofDefense(DOD)Directive8320.03,
UniqueIdentification(UID)StandardsforaNet-CentricDepartmentofDefense,dated23March2007,directs
ItemUniqueIdentificationTechnologyImprovingAssetManagement
by Pablo a. broWn and joHn e. laudan
T thatIUID“beusedtoenhancethecapabilitytogather,organize,andassessinformationonorganizations,mate-rielassets,people,andplacestoenabletheDoDCom-ponentstoperformtheirfunctions.”
AllArmyActivitiesMessage340/2009,ItemUniqueIdentification(IUID)CapabilitiesinProperty,dated14December2009,statesthe“UIIwillbeusedasthecommondatakeytosupportfinancial,acquisi-tion,supply,maintenance,andpropertyaccountabilitymanagementwithinourcurrentandfuturelogisticsautomatedinformationsystems(AIS).”
HowIstheUIIEnteredIntoPBUSE?ThenewfunctionalitytocaptureIUIDdoesnot
changeanyexistingPBUSEprocesses.TheUIIsup-plementsiteminformationalreadyresidentinPBUSE(suchaslineitemnumber,nationalstocknumber[NSN],andserialnumber)anddoesnotreplaceanyPBUSEdatafields.
UIIdatacancurrentlybeenteredintoPBUSEusingthreemethods.Thesethreemethodsdonotrequireuserinputotherthanscanningthebarcodelabel:o PBUSEAutomaticTransactionProcessInterface
(ATPI).o LogisticsSupportActivity(LOGSA).o PBUSEhand-heldterminal(HHT).
TheATPIprocessallowsfordataentryusinganextensiblemarkuplanguage(XML)document.ThisprocessprovidesthecapabilitytocapturemultipleUIIsonthesametransaction.TheUIIiswrittenintotheXMLdocumentatthesamelevelasserialnum-bers.Thisprocessiscommonlyusedbytheproductmanagerfornewacquisitionswhenissuingequipmenttoaunit.ATPIinstructionsandXMLexamplescanbefoundathttps://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/20987941.
LOGSAextractstheUII,NSN,andserialnumberforanassetfromvarioussources,includingtheDODIUIDregistry,andthenstoresthisinformationinitsdatabase.AnewPBUSEfunctionprovidesthecapabil-itytopullthisUIIinformationfromtheLOGSAIUIDCrossReferenceFile.
TheassetNSNandserialnumberstoredinPBUSEmustmatchexactlytotheassetrecordintheLOGSAdatabase.Whenamatchismade,PBUSEisthenabletoassociatetheUIItotheasset.Ifnomatchismade,therecordisskipped.Everynight,PBUSEwillattempttomatchexistingequipmentrecordswith
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 37
theLOGSAdatabase.ThePBUSEserialnumberrecordisnotupdatedifamatchtoanNSNandserialnumberisnotfoundorifthereisanyproblemwiththeUII.
TheHHTisacommercialoff-the-shelfscannerwithspecificPBUSEautomaticidentificationtechnology(AIT)softwareinstalled.TheHHTinter-actswiththePBUSEenter-priseserverthroughtheuseofadock-ingstationandtheAITclientonthelaptop.ThisAITfunctionpermitsuserstoperformautomatedinven-toriesandtoreceiveandscanbarcodesonincomingequipment.
PBUSEDocumentProcessingPBUSE’sdocumentprocessingfunctionenables
theusertoprocessreceipttransactions,initiatelateraltransfers(bothgainingandlosingunits),andinitiateassetadjustmentsbyusingtheHHTtoscananitem’sIUIDmarking.
SupplysergeantscannowusetheHHTtoscanUIIitems,toviewtheprimaryhandreceipt,andtoinitiatetheprocessfordocumenting—o MilitaryStandardRequisitioningandIssueProcedures
(MILSTRIP)receipts.o Lateraltransfers.o Found-on-installationitems.
OncethetransactionsareinitiatedontheHHTandaresynchronizedwiththeenterpriseserver,thesupplysergeantandpropertybookofficer(PBO)cantaketheappropriateactionsforeachtransactionthroughtheTransactionSuspenseListoptiononthePBUSEAITmenu.Unitsupplypersonnelwillreviewthesetrans-actionsbeforesendingthemtothePBOforprocess-ing.Onlyunit-initiatedtransactionsforpropertybookitemswillbevisibleatthePBOlevel.ThePBOthenhastheoptiontoview,reject,orpostthemornotifythegainingPBO.
TheDefenseacquisitionsystemwillbenefitfromtheintegrationofIUIDintoPBUSE.IUIDwillenableseamlesstraceability,financialtracking,andinteg-rityofequipment,therebyimprovingaccuracyandaccountabilitythroughoutthelife-cycleprocess,whichincludesfunding,distribution,equipmentfielding,andassetvisibility.
pablo a. brown was tHe systeM ManaGer for tHe property book unit supply enHanced at software enGineerinG center-lee wHen He co-wrote tHis article. He Holds a Master’s deGree in orGanizational ManaGeMent froM tHe uniVersity of pHoenix and a bacHelor’s deGree in business adMinistration froM liberty uniVersity. He is leVel ii certi-fied in proGraM ManaGeMent, inforMation tecHnoloGy, and life-cycle loGistics.
joHn e. laudan is a systeMs acquisition specialist workinG for software enGineerinG center-lee, wHere He is tHe project officer for tHe property book unit supply enHanced. He Holds a Master’s deGree in adMinistration froM central MicHiGan uniVersity and a bacHelor’s deGree in History froM canisius colleGe. He is leVel iii certified in proGraM ManaGeMent and in testinG and eValuation.
tHe autHors tHank cHief warrant officer 5 leslie carroll, cHris barbaGallo, lonna freeland, paul bedard, jerry GloVier, suHail ali, kelly duncan, and tony Meyer for tHeir Help in preparinG tHis article. questions about iuid and pbuse can be directed to tHe current software enGineerinG center-lee pbuse systeM ManaGer, joe burner, at [email protected] or (804) 734−7855.
IUIDMarking
38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
heaterProvidedEquipment(TPE)Plannerisaweb-basedautomationtoolthattheArmyimple-mentedinJanuary2010tofacilitaterapiddis-positionofnon-mission-essentialTPEintheIraqjointoperationsarea(IJOA).TPEPlannerautomatesthepre-viouslytime-consumingmanualvettingprocessforthe-aterlateraltransfer,redistribution,andturn-indecisions.
TPEismanagedandaccountedforbythe402dArmyFieldSupportBrigade(AFSB)andhandreceiptedtounitsintheIJOA.Aspartoftheresponsibledrawdownofforcesandthecorrelatingresponsibleresetofequip-ment,U.S.Forces-Iraq(USF–I)andU.S.ArmyCentral(ARCENT)arereleasingTPEforlateraltransfertootherunits,redistributiontootherunitsintheU.S.Cen-tralCommand(CENTCOM)areaofresponsibility,orreturntoCONUS-baseddepotsforreset.
TheManualProcessBeforeTPEPlannerwasimplemented,unitsin
IraqwouldsubmitaspreadsheetwiththeirproposedexcessequipmenttotheU.S.divisionovertheirareaofresponsibility.ThedivisionwouldinturnsubmittherequesttoUSF–I.TheUSF–IJ–4assetvisibilitysec-tionwouldcomparetheproposedequipmentliststoexistingrequirementsinIraqand,ifneeded,directthetransferofequipmentfromotherunitswithinIraq.
IftheequipmentwasnotrequiredwithinIraq,ARCENTSupportElement-Iraq(ASE–I)wouldcheckforexistingCENTCOMrequirements.IftherewerenoCENTCOMrequirementsfortheequipment,ArmyMaterielCommandlifecyclemanagementcommand(LCMC)representativeswouldprovideshippinginformationforthedepotthatcouldrepairtheequipment.
Unitspreadsheetswereprocessedintactateachlevel.OncethevettingprocesswascompletedtodecidewhetherTPEwasmissionessentialateachlevel,decisionsanddirectiveswerepublishedina
EnablingtheResponsibleDrawdownofForcesThroughtheTheaterProvidedEquipmentPlanner
by kellie Wade
T USF–Ifragmentaryorder(FRAGO).TheFRAGOpro-videdtheagreed-todispositionforallitems.Theunitcouldthentaketheequipmenttoa402dAFSBretro-gradepropertyassistanceteam(RPAT)yardandbegintheprocessofturningitin.
SettingUpTPEPlannerInthewinterof2008,AMC’sLogisticsSupport
Activity(LOGSA)beganbuildingtheTPEPlannertoassistMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq(whichmergedwithMulti-NationalForces-IraqtoformUSF–IinNovem-ber2009)inautomatingthenomination,disposition,andturn-inofTPEinordertoimprovevelocity,syn-chronization,andcentralizedvisibilityoftheprocess.
USF–IandASE–Iworkedthroughthesummerof2009totrimtimeoffthisprocess.Ultimately,disposi-tiontimewasreducedfrom19daysto7days,andtheFRAGOprocessingtimewasreducedfrom15daysto3days.Processingdispositionandbuildingreportsfromrunninglistsonspreadsheetswasverylaborintensive,andUSF–Ileaderswereskepticalthattheprocesswouldsupporttheincreasedloadthatwouldbegeneratedbytheresponsibledrawdownin2010.
Inthefallof2009,LOGSAplacedliaisonoffi-cers(LNOs)inUSF–IandASE–I,inBaghdadandKuwait,aspartoftheAMCresponsibleresettaskforce(R2TF).Theseofficersfacilitatedrequirementsgenerationandconductedproof-of-principletestingtodemonstratetheinitialoperationalcapability,training,andimplementationofTPEPlanner.TPEPlannerwasimplementedthroughoutIJOAon11January2010.
TheTPEPlannerProcessOneofthereasonstheUSF–IJ–4andASE–I
decidedtouseTPEPlannerwastostopworkingbatchrequestsandgetreal-timedispositiontotheunits.TPEPlannerstreamlinesthismanualprocess,displaysthedispositionofeachindividualitem,andpostseach
A new tool improves the disposition of non-mission-essential equipment by automating the lateral transfer, redistribution, and disposition processes.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 39
item’sstatusinthereportssectionofthetoolassoonasadecisionismade.
ThedispositionprocessforTPEPlannerbeginswhenunitsmanuallyconducttheirinternalvettingtodeterminenon-mission-essential,orexcess,equipment.Thisequipmentlistissenttothebrigadelevelmanu-allyonaspreadsheet.
ThebrigadeleadersaretheinitiatorsintheTPEPlannerprocess.BrigadepointsofcontactlogintoLOGSA’swebportal,accessTPEPlanner,andviewtheequipmentthatisontheunit’sderivativeunitidentificationcodehandreceipt.Thesedataarepopu-latedinTPEPlannerthroughadirectfeedfromProp-ertyBookUnitSupply-Enhanced.Theuserselectstheidentifiedexcessequipmentandhitsthesubmitbutton,andthedataarepostedonthedivision-levelscreen.TheU.S.divisionG-4looksacrossitsunitsanddirectsalateraltransferifoneofitsunitsneedstheequipmentorselects“turn-in”ifnooneneedstheequipment.
USF–IandASE–Ithenhavethesamedecisionpointsinthetool.WhenASE–Ideterminesthattheequipmentisnotneeded,itisconsideredexcesstotheaterneedsandthedataaresenttoboththeAMCLCMCandRPATscreens.
LCMCsuseTPEPlannertoprovidetheDepartmentofDefenseactivityaddresscodesneededtoshipitemsthatarenotessentialequipmenttotheaterneedstodesignatednational-levelsourcesofrepair.TheRPATyardpersonneluseTPEPlannertoseewhatnon-mis-sion-essentialequipmentisexpectedineachyardandtoidentifyequipmententeringandexitingtheyard.RPATyardpersonnelusethisinformationtoforecastworkloadsandtorelievecapacityfrictionpointsduringsurgeperiods.
Unlikethepreviouslymanualspreadsheetprocess,inwhichvisibilityofthedecisionsoccurredonlyafterthecorpsFRAGOwasgenerated,TPEPlannergivesvisibilityofdecisionsateachstepinthevettingpro-cess.Foritemsthatarependingadecision,usersandmanagerscanseeatwhatlevelthedecisionispendingandforhowlong.
Thelateraltransferandturn-indirectivereportinTPEPlannerpopulatesimmediatelyafteralateraltransferorredistributiondecisionismadeatanyleveloraftertheLCMCrepresentativeprovidessource-of-repairshippinginformationforitemsthataretheaterexcess.ThisgivesanyonewithbasicLogisticsInfor-mationWarehouseaccesstheabilitytoviewdispo-sitionsintheNon-SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetworktoolandreceiveinstructionsasthedecisionsaremadeinsteadofwaitingforallitemstobemovedthroughthesystemandreleasedinaSecureInternetProtocolRouterNetworkFRAGO.
TheonlinedispositionprovidedthroughTPEPlan-nerhasresultedina96-percentreductionindisposition
FRAGOs,andunitsnowreceivedispositionofitemsinanaverageof4days.
TPEPlannerTrainingandImprovementsBeforeimplementingTPEPlanner,LOGSAprovided
hands-ontrainingtoparticipantsfrom4brigades,16USF–ICorpsseparateelements,3divisions,the13thExpeditionarySustainmentCommand,andthe402d
AFSB’stheaterpropertybookofficesandRPATs.Thetrainingconsistedofa2-to-4hourblockofinstructiononhowtoapplyforandreceiveaccesstoTPEPlannerandhowtooperatescreensinsideofthetool.Deskguideswerecreatedandreleasedalongwiththeimplementationorderinpreparationforago-livedateof11January2010.
Sinceimplementation,LOGSAcontinuestoworkonemergingrequirementsfrombrigadecombatteams,U.S.divisions,USF–I,ASE–I,andthe402dAFSBandcon-tinuestoimproveTPEPlannerinordertostaycurrentwithitsusers’needs.A“projectedturn-indate”isnowavailablethatletsunitsestimatewhenequipmentwillbecomeavailableforturn-in.ThisallowsrequirementsofficerswithinUSF–IandASE–Itoprojectequipmentavailabilityforthesourcingoftheaterrequirements.Anotherrecentfeaturedisplaysthedocumentassociatedwitheithertheturn-inorlateraltransfersoviewerswillseetheactualtransaction.
TPEPlannerhasstreamlinedthedispositionpro-cessinordertofacilitaterapidprocessingofdisposi-tioninstructionswithin72hoursforequipmentthatisdeclarednon-mission-essential.ItprovidesvaluetotheArmybyautomatingthetheater’scurrentlymanualprocessusedtovetlateraltransfer,redistribution,anddispositiondecisionsfornon-mission-essentialTPE.TPEPlannerimprovesprocessvelocity,synchronizesactionsatalllevels,centralizesvisibilitybydocumentingdeci-sionsanddirectivesatalllevelsintailoredreports,andprovidesvisibilityoftheequipmentthatisdueinto,at,andleavingtheRPATyards.Theseimprovementsassistinforecastingworkload,capacity,andtransportationrequirements.
LOGSA’snextstepistoexportthistooltoOpera-tionEnduringFreedomforuseinthecombinedjointoperationalarea.
kellie wade is an aerospace enGineer in tHe propulsion oper-ability brancH of tHe aViation enGineerinG directorate, arMy aViation and Missile researcH, deVelopMent and enGineerinG center, arMy researcH, deVelopMent and enGineerinG coMMand. sHe Has an M.s. deGree in cHeMical enGineerinG froM auburn uniVersity, an M.s. deGree in business adMinistration froM texas a&M uniVersity-texarkana, and a b.s. deGree in cHeMistry froM claflin uniVersity. sHe Holds depart-Ment of defense acquisition, tecHnoloGy and loGistics leVel iii cer-tifications in systeM planninG, researcH, deVelopMent, and enGineerinG (sprde)-proGraM systeMs enGineerinG, sprde-systeMs enGineerinG, and life-cycle loGistics.
40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
NowHiring:QualityNCOsNeededtoLeadSoldiers
by lieutenant colonel sean M. Herron
oldiersarethelifebloodoftheArmy,andArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)unitsaretheheartthatprovidesSoldierstotheArmy.ThetrainingbattalionsthroughoutTRADOCareessentialtosustainingtheArmy’sabilitytofight.TheydothisbytakingAmerica’ssonsanddaughtersandmakingthemSoldierswhoaretacticallyandtechnicallyprofi-cient,instilledwiththeArmyvaluesandwarriorethos,andreadytocontributetotheirfirstassignedunits.
TrainingSoldiersisnotaneasytaskandrequiresmuchdedicationfromacadreoftop-notchSoldiers,primarilynoncommissionedofficers(NCOs).Tomeettheuniquedemandsplacedonthecadre,TRADOChasimplementedtheCadreResilienceProgramtoensurethatthecoretrainingbaseremainsstrong.
AStrongTrainingBaseThemissionofTRADOCtrainingbattalionsisto
providetheArmywithtrainedSoldiers.Theprocesstogetthemthereisnotquickoreasy.After10weeksofbasiccombattraining,Soldiersgotoadvancedindi-vidualtraining(AIT),wheretheylearntheirmilitaryoccupationalspecialties(MOSs).Oncetheyhavedem-onstratedtheirskillsbymeetingMOSqualificationstandards,passingarecordedArmyphysicalfitnesstest,anddemonstratingthebehavioranddisciplineexpectedofaSoldier,theygraduateandmovetotheirfirstunitofassignment.
Thisprocessissuccessfulbecauseofthededica-tionanddeterminationofthecadrethattrainstheseSoldiersfromwake-uptolights-outeverytrainingday.TRADOCisnotaplacewhereleaderscan“takeaknee”fromthepaceoftheoperationalArmy.Thehoursarelong,therequirementsaremany,andtheworkloadisheavy.However,TRADOCassignmentsofferthebestandbrightestleaderstheopportunityforchallenging,important,andrewardingjobsthathavealastingimpactonthefutureoftheArmy.
Justastheheartmustbestrongtopumpbloodtotheextremities,thetrainingbasemustbestrongto
S ensureanuninterruptedflowofSoldierstotheopera-tionalArmy.Inordertoremainstrong,thetrainingbasemusthavequalityNCOsasdrillsergeants,AITplatoonsergeants,andcourseinstructors.ThequalityoftheNCOhasadirectcorrelationwiththequalityoftheSoldierarrivingatthefirstunitofassignment.
TheNCOswhohavespenttimeinTRADOCassignmentsoftenfindthatthejobispersonallyandprofessionallyrewarding.Thisleadershipexperienceisdirectlylinkedtohigherperformanceinfutureassign-mentsandtheabilitytousecreativeandadaptivesolu-tionstofutureproblemsinthetacticalenvironment.AftercompletingtheirTRADOCassignments,theseNCOsreturntotheoperationalArmywithhonedlead-ershipskills,bettertime-managementandadministra-tiveskillstobemoreeffectiveandefficientintheirfuturepositions,andanewlevelofprideintheprofes-sionalismoftheArmyandtheNCOcorps.
OrdnanceCadreOrdnanceSchoolcadremembershavetheoppor-
tunitytoworkinworld-classtrainingfacilitiesandlabswithstate-of-the-artequipmentwhiletrainingfutureordnanceSoldiers.The2005BaseClosureandRealignmentCommissionReportmandatedthattheOrdnanceSchoolmovetoFortLee,Virginia.ThatdecisionallowedtheOrdnanceCorpstobringitsschoolintothe21stCentury.
TheOrdnanceSchoolcampus,nowpartoftheSus-tainmentCenterofExcellence,isdesignedtocreateacomprehensivelearningandtrainingenvironment.ItcombinesbothtechnicalandtacticaltrainingtoensurethatthegraduatingSoldiershaveearnedtherighttoweartheOrdnanceregimentalcrestandaretrulyreadytomakeapositivecontributionwhentheyjointheirfirstunits.
TheCadreResilienceProgramInearly2010,trainingbattalionstransitionedfrom
usingtheCadreWellnessProgramtotheCadreResil-ienceProgram,whichisinlinewiththeArmy’sfive
The Army Ordnance School uses the Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Cadre Resilience Program to ensure its cadre members are the best they can be.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 41
dimensionsofstrength:physical,emotional,social,spir-itual,andfamily.TRADOCcapitalizedonitsrecentlygraduatedMasterResilienceTrainerCourseplatoonser-geantstoguidethedevelopmentoftheprogram.
WhileeachTRADOClocationoffersuniquechal-lenges,the143dOrdnanceBattalionsuccessfullyimplementedthecomponentsoftheCadreResilienceProgramattheOrdnanceSchoolbyfocusingontheArmy’sfivedimensionsofstrength.
Physical. Thephysicaldimensiondealswithper-formingandexcellinginphysicalactivitiesthatrequireaerobicfitness,endurance,strength,healthybodycomposition,andflexibilityderivedthroughexercise,nutrition,andtraining.Inthisdimension,thecadreareaffordedtimetoconductphysicalreadinesstrainingontheirownandanyinjuredcadrememberisgiventimeandresourcestorehabilitatefromaninjury.
Emotional.Theemotionaldimensionisaboutapproachinglife’schallengesinapositive,optimisticwaybydemonstratingself-control,stamina,andgoodcharacterthroughpersonalchoicesandactions. TheOrdnanceSchoolensuresthatitprovidesthecadrewithworkloadpredictability,flexibilityfortimeoff,andminimaldisruptiontofamilylife.
Toimproveandmaintainthecadremembers’emo-tionalwell-being,thebattalioncommandsergeantmajorcontinuallyreviewsdutyrosterstoeliminateredundantduties.NCOsintheretirementprocessandwhonolongerdirectlycontactSoldiersaretheprimarystaffdutyNCOs.Thebattalionalsoconductsquarterlysensingsessionswiththecadreandusescommandclimateandequalopportunitysurveystolookforareasthatneedimprovement.Thebattalionalsoencouragescadremembers’attendanceatprofessionalmilitaryeducationcoursestoensurethattheyfollowtheiropti-malprofessionaldevelopmenttimelines.
Social.Thesocialdimensioninvolvesdevelop-ingandmaintainingtrusted,valuedrelationshipsandfriendshipsthatarepersonallyfulfillingandfoster-inggoodcommunication,includingacomfortableexchangeofideas,views,andexperiences.The143dOrdnanceBattaliondifferslittlefromoperationalunitswhenitcomestosocialactivities.Eachunitholdsholidayandteam-buildingfunctionsaswellashailandfarewells.SinglecadremembersalsohavetheopportunitytoattendeventsgearedtowardsingleSoldiers.
Spiritual.Thespiritualdimensionfocusesonstrengtheningasetofbeliefs,principles,orvaluesthatsustainanindividualbeyondfamily,institutional,andsocietalsourcesofstrength.Theunitministryteams(UMTs)inthetrainingbaseareengagedinattendingtotheneedsofthetraineesandthecadreandareacor-nerstoneoftheCadreResilienceProgram.
The143dOrdnanceBattalionUMTdevelopsactivi-tiesusingelementsofArmyculture,suchasphysical
fitness,espritdecorps,andcompetition,todrawSol-diersintothegarrisonchapelprogramandencouragespiritualgrowth.TheUMTregularlyholdstheSpiritualFitnessChallenge,whichisaseriesofarduousphysi-calfitnesseventswithafocusonspiritualstrengthandendurance.
OrdnanceSchoolcadremembersarealsogiventheopportunitytoattendprayerbreakfastsandluncheonsconductedbythebattalionandgarrisonUMT.TheseeventsremindSoldiersofsharedfaithandspiritualvalues.Asisthetradition,Soldiersofallfaithsbreakbreadandpraytogether.
Family.Thefamilydimensionisaboutbeingpartofafamilyunitthatissafe,supportive,andlovingandthatprovidestheresourcesneededforallfamilymemberstoliveinahealthyandsecureenvironment.Thecareofcadreincludescaringfortheirfamilies.The143dOrdnanceBattalionstrivestoensurethatallcadremembersandtheirfamilieshaveaccesstofamilyreadinessgroups.
ThebattalionalsooffersannualretreatsformarriedcouplesandsingleSoldiers.Inthesummerof2010,theUMTconductedamarriedcouplesandsingleSoldierretreatattheTurfValleyResortinEllicot,Maryland.Thecurriculumwasbasedoncomprehen-sivewellnessandfocusedondevelopingspiritualdis-cipline,physicalfitnessandhealth,andmentalbalanceandwellness.Thiseventincludedcadremembersandtheirspouses.
TheCadreResilienceProgramisoneofthemostimportantinitiativesthatbattalionandcompanylead-erscanoffertopromotethecadre’sabilitytogrowandthriveinthefaceofchallengesandtobouncebackfromadversity.TheOrdnanceSchooltrainingbattal-ionsremaincommittedtoimprovingSoldierandfam-ilyresiliencethroughoutthiseraofpersistentconflict.
Ittakesaspecialtypeofleadertodoajobwherethechallengesarenewandexcitingeveryday.BeingabletotrainnewSoldiersandpersonallyhaveanimpactontheArmyisexactlywhatmanytrainingunitcadremembershavewantedfortheircareers.
TheOrdnanceSchooliscommittedtonurturingwell-trained,disciplined,andphysicallyfitSoldierswholivetheArmyvaluesandwarriorethos.TheOrdnanceSchoolisagreatplacetoserveandagreatplacetobeanOrdnanceSoldier.PleasecontacttheschoolthroughtheSustainmentKnowledgeNetworkformoreinforma-tionabouthowtojointheOrdnanceSchoolranksortoaskquestionsabouthowwecanbetterserveyou.
lieutenant colonel sean M. Herron is tHe coMMander of tHe 16tH ordnance battalion, 59tH ordnance briGade. He Has a b.s. deGree froM oHio state uniVersity, an M.a. deGree in orGanizational ManaGe-Ment froM tHe uniVersity of pHoenix, and a Master of Military arts and science deGree froM tHe arMy coMMand and General staff colleGe.
42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
TrainingAmmunitionSupplySoldiersWhileDeployed
by caPtain tHeodore l. ZaGraniskiand cHieF Warrant oFFicer 2 Gary n. carr
neofthebiggestchallengesfacingcompany-levelleadersismilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)training.Withtheincreasesinoperat-ingtempo(OPTEMPO)broughtaboutbytherapiddeploymentandredeploymentofsustainmentforces,companycommanders,firstsergeants,andtheirwar-rantofficerexpertsoftenhaveagreatdealtoteachtheirjuniorSoldiersandofficersandnotenoughtimetoteachit.
Trainingdistractionsareaconstantrealitywhenalogisticscompanyofanysortmustbalancevitalgarrison-supportmissions,essentialtraining,andthemanyday-to-daytasksandrequirementsthatfaceanyArmyunit.Inevitably,eachcompany’sleadershipteammustmaketoughdecisionsaboutwhentotrain,whattoteachtheirSoldiers,andhowtoteachit.
Veryfewsustainmentunitsintoday’sArmyhavetheluxuryofconductingmethodicalanddeliberateMOStrainingwithsufficientresourcestomeetalltrainingobjectivesindetail.LogisticscompaniesacrosstheArmyoftenlackthetime,internalexperience,andtan-gibleresourcesneededtoconductcomprehensiveindi-vidualandcollectivetraining.Companiesincombatsustainmentsupportbattalions(CSSBs)inparticularlackalloftheseessentialtrainingcomponentswhileathomestationbecausetheyaredesignedtoprovidesupportatthewholesalelevel.Thesecompaniesaresohighlyspecializedandoperateatsuchelevatedechelonsthatacorpsconsistingofmorethan100,000Soldiersusuallycontainsonly1CSSBconsistingof5to7companies.
Manylogisticscompaniesalsofaceachallengeinlocatingexpertinstructorstotraintheskillsandtasksrel-evanttotheirSoldiers’MOSs.WhiletheArmysuffersnoshortageofsustainmentexperts,mostoftheindividualswhowouldbeidealMOSteachersarecurrentlyservinginIraqorAfghanistanoratotherhazardouslocations.
Thisarticleisbothasummaryandaguide.Ononehand,weintendtoprovidedetailedexplanationsoftheMOStrainingmethodsusedbythe664thOrdnanceCompanyduringOperationIraqiFreedom09−10.Thecompany’sintentwastobuildwell-roundedMOS89Bammunitionspecialists.Toaccomplishthis,thecompany’sleadersdesignedanMOStrainingprogram
O
totrainSoldiersandNCOstosafelyandconsistentlycompleteeveryindividualandcollectivetaskoftheirMOSandskilllevel.Thecompany’smethodsmaynotberevolutionarywhentakenindividually,butasfarasweknow,theyhavenotbeensimultaneouslyimple-mentedwithinasingleArmycompanyduringacom-batdeployment.
Ontheotherhand,thisarticleisofferedtoallcur-rentandfuturelogisticscompanyleaders(officer,warrantofficer,andenlisted)inthesincerehopethatbyapplyingsimilarmethods,theircompaniescanbuildwell-roundedsustainmentSoldiersthroughouttheforce.Althoughtheammunitionspecialist’sjobmaynotseemtohavemuchincommonwiththatofashower/laundryandclothingrepairspecialist,themethodsweoutlinecanbemodifiedtoprovideallforcesustainmentSoldierswiththeMOStrainingtheydemandanddeserve,eveniftheonlyplacetodosoisinacombatenvironment.
AmmunitionSupplyTrainingChallengesForanumberofreasons,MOStrainingproblems
areexacerbatedintheareaofammunitionsupplysup-port.First,ammunitionsupplyisaverysmallMOS;therearefewerthan10ammunitionsupplycompaniesonactiveduty,andfewerthan130warrantofficersareassignedMOS890A,ammunitiontechnician.
Second,ammunitionsupplySoldiersandnoncom-missionedofficers(NCOs)possesscertainskillsinhighdensitythatarehardtofindinmaneuver,fires,andeffectsandoperationssupportunits(forexample,fork-liftandrough-terraincontainerhandleroperatorquali-fications).Athomestation,thevehicleoperatorskillsoftheaverageammunitionsupplySoldierareinhigh
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 43
demand,makingitparticularlychallengingforcompanyleadersto“protect”theirtimeforMOStraining.
Third,althoughmanysustainmentunitshaveexperi-encedadjustmentstotheirmissionsetswhileathomestation,fewunitshaveexperiencedthewidespreadchangesthathaveaffectedammunitionsupplycom-panies.ManyfacilitiesinsidetheUnitedStatesthatwererunbyammunitionsupplycompaniesbeforetheGlobalWaronTerrorismhavebeentransferredtociviliancontractors.Whilethispracticehasguaranteedcontinuityofhome-stationoperationswhenanammu-nitionsupplycompanydeploys,ithasalsohinderedMOStrainingbyseparatingammunitionSoldiersfromthemostnaturalplacesandsituationsinwhichtocon-ductthattraining.
ThehighlycomplexnatureofthewarsinIraqandAfghanistanhascreatedasituationinwhichanordnancecompanycanfinditselfdoingthejobofatotallydif-ferentsortofunit.AmmunitionsupplycompanieshaveservedinbothAfghanistanandIraqinawidevarietyofjobsoutsideoftheirMOSs,includingrolestradition-allysetasideforthemilitarypolice,motorizedinfantry,transporters,andmechanics.Inafewcases,companieshaveevenreceivedchangestotheirprimarywartimemissionswhileintransittoSouthwestAsiaorduringtheirfinalprecombattraininginKuwait.Forthe664thOrdnanceCompany,theonlyammunitionsupplycompa-nybasedatFortHood,Texas,onlyourarrivalatourfinaldeployeddestinationnearAnNasiriyah,Iraq,endedourdiscussionsaboutthenatureofourwartimemission.
Takingintoconsiderationallofthesedisparatefac-tors,theaverageammunitionsupplySoldierorNCOprobablydoesnothaveenoughMOStrainingbeforedeployingintocombat.Inthe664thOrdnanceCompany,
forexample,thecompanyleadersrecognizedearlyonthatacollectivedeficitinpredeploymentMOStrainingcouldnotbemadeupsolelythroughon-the-jobtraining(OJT).BycombiningtheprinciplesofOJTwithsomeuniquemethods,however,itbecamepossibletogivemostcompanypersonnelthebreadthanddepthofMOStrainingtheywouldneedtobesuccessfulduringtheircurrentdeploymentandinfutureammunitionsupplyassignments.
TrainingInternallyAttheendofJanuary2009,the664thOrdnance
CompanyassumedresponsibilityoftheContingencyOperatingBase(COB)Adder-Tallilammunitionsup-plypoint(ASP)atCOBAdder.TheCOBAdderASPisamongthelargestammunitionsupplyactivitiesinIraq.Itdirectlysupportsnearly100customerunitsthroughanetworkofassociatedammunitiontransferandholdingpointsthroughoutsouthernIraq.TheASPalsoreceivesammunitionfromandshipsammunitiontootherammunitionsupplyactivitiesthroughoutIraq,Kuwait,andAfghanistan.
Asustainmentoperationofsuchremarkablescopedemandsasignificantamountoftechnicalknowledge,MOSskills,agility,andstaminafromtheSoldiersandleaderschargedwithrunningit.UponarrivingatCOBAdder,the664thhadplentyofagilityandstamina,butitneededMOStraininginordertobuildtechnicalknowledgeandskills.
Tobridgethegapinknowledgeandskills,wecre-atedaninnovativecross-trainingprogramforallMOS89BSoldiersandNCOsinthecompany.TheprimarypurposeofthisprogramwastoshareandteachasmuchknowledgeaspossibleamongallofourSoldiersacrossallfiveareasofASPoperations:stockcontrol,movementcontrol,shipping,receiving,andstorage.Toadministerthisprogramtothelowestpossiblelevel,thefullsupportandengagementofourNCOswouldberequired,especiallyattheplatoonandsectionlevels.
Thecompanywasfortunatetohaveahandfulofstaffsergeants(andoneseasonedsergeant)withpreviousammunitionexperiencewhenitarrivedatCOBAdder.WespreadtheirexperienceoutbyassigningthemtopositionsofresponsibilityineachofthefiveareasofASPoperations.Consequently,eachstaffsergeantpositionwasimmediatelyfilledbysomeonewhowas
Soldiers assigned to the 664th Ordnance Company demonstrate proper repackaging of munitions in an austere environment at the receiving pad of the Contingency Operating Base AdderTallil ammunition supply point near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. The photo shows Soldiers assembling and marking makeshift storage crates (background), wrapping and protecting munitions for storage (left and center), packing munitions into crates to protect them from the elements (right), and banding the crates to prevent pilferage and make handling less dangerous.
44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
generallyfamiliarwiththatarea’sjob.Insomecases,theASPevenhadanexpertintheslotwithawealthofexperiencetoshare.Thesepersonnelweremoreorlesspermanentlyassignedtotheirspecificareathroughoutthecompany’sdeployment.
Thus,nomatterwhereSoldiersworkedintheASP,aresidentexpertwouldalwaysbesupervisingthemandwouldberespon-sibleforteachingthemtheskillsneededforthatparticulararea.
Atthispoint,acasualobservercouldarguethat,thusfar,thecross-trainingpro-gramappearstobeasimpleapplicationofOJT.Therealinnovationofthecompany’scross-trainingsystem,however,camewhenwerecog-nizedthatevenwell-educatedSoldierscanfallvictimtocomplacencybyworkinginthesamejobdayinanddayout.Tocombatthatpossibility,wedecidedtorotateourjuniorNCOsandSoldiersonanoffsetscheduleamongthreeofthefiveareasoftheASP,namelyship-ping,receiving,andstorage.Theothertwoareas,stockcontrolandmovementcontrol,wouldalsoseeSoldierrotationbutofadifferentsort,aswewillexplainbelow.
Shipping, receiving, and storage training.Inship-ping,receiving,andstorage,ateamofSoldiersandsergeantsworkeddirectlyundertheguidanceoftheirstaffsergeantforapproximately3months.Duringeachrotation,thestaffsergeanttaughthisSoldiersandsergeantsthroughexample,informalinstruction,guid-ance,andformalprofessionaldevelopmentclasses.Alloftheinstructionfromeachstaffsergeantfocusedexclusivelyonhisareaofexpertiseandincludedalargeamountofhands-ontrainingworkingwithammunitionandthetoolsofthetrade.Whenitcametimetorotate,thestaffsergeantsremainedinplaceandeveryoneelseunderthemwasshiftedtoanewareaintheASP.Theentiretrainingcyclethenbeganagain.
Thisshiftofpersonnelwascarriedoutthreetimesduringthecompany’s12-monthdeployment.Thisamountedtoonecompleteround-robinrotationforevery89BSoldierandsergeantintheASP.TheASP’saccountableofficeranticipatedthatmovingeveryoneatthesametimewouldhaveanegativeimpactonthemission,sohedecidedbeforethefirstpersonnelshifttostaggertherotationscheduleforsergeantsandSoldiers.
Afterapproximately2monthsand3weeksinaparticulararea,thesergeantsrotatedinaround-robinfashiontoanotherarea.Thiswasacriticalandchal-lengingtimeforoursergeantsbecausetheywerestill
responsiblefortheactionsandaccomplishmentsoftheirSoldiersattheirpreviousstation,buttheywerealsoexpectedtobecomefamiliarwiththesupervisoryresponsibilitiesattheirnewstations.ThistransitionperiodalsoallowedthesergeantstolearnwhatwasexpectedoftheirSoldiersfromthejuniorenlistedandstaffsergeantalreadyworkingattheirnewstation.
BystaggeringtherotationofNCOsandSoldiers,thecompanyalsoalloweditsjuniorNCOstobuildtheirownknowledgebasebeforebeingexpectedtosuperviseandinstructtheirpersonnel.Afteraboutaweekofthesergeantslearningontheirown,itwastimefortherestoftheSoldierstorotate.
Ingeneral,thisstaggeredrotationschemeworkedwell.Theaccountableofficerreceivedpositivefeed-backfrombothSoldiersandNCOs.Theonlydraw-backtomovingNCOswithouttheirSoldierswasthatsomesergeantsfelttheylosttouchwiththeSoldiersforwhomtheywereresponsible.Thiswasparticularlyfeltintheareaof“Soldierissues”—ablankettermforthemanyadministrative,financial,personal,medical,andotherproblems(largeandsmall)thateveryindi-vidualhastoworkthroughfromtimetotime.
Inhindsight,webelievethatthebenefitsofstag-geredrotationoutweighedthecosts.Inthefuture,otherunitsmightbeabletomitigatethe“Soldierissues”frictionbysettingasideaportionoftheday(30to60minutes)orweek(3to6hours)forNCOswhoarelearningawayfromtheirformationstomeetwiththeirSoldiersandcatchupontheissues.
Stock control and movement control training.Meanwhile,wedecidedtominimizeSoldierturnoverinstockcontrolandmovementcontrolandreducerotationsinthoseareas.AttheCOBAdderASP,suc-cessinstockcontrolandmovementcontrolrequired
An ammunition specialist assigned to 664th Ordnance Company conducts an ammunition
inventory and updates an ammunition stores slip in a storage container at the COB Adder
Tallil ammunition supply point.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 45
patience.Ittookalongtimetomastercomplextasksandbuildstrongworkingrelationshipswithawidevarietyofpeopleoutsidethecompany.So,toreducethefrictioninherentintheturnoverofcomplex,extremelycritical,low-densityjobs,thecompanydecidedthatexposingMOS89BSoldierstostockcon-trolandmovementcontrolwasasecondaryconcern.
Thecompanyalsodecidedearlyontomaintainaone-to-onestudent-instructorratiowhenselectingindividualsforstockcontrolandmovementcontrolcross-training.SincethestockcontrolNCO-in-chargehad6yearsofstockcontrolexperienceinboththeArmyandtheNavy,thecompany’sseniorleaderswantedtoensurethatourMOS89Bsergeantsreceivedasmuchinstructionandpersonalattentionaspossibleduringtheirlimitedstaysinthestockcontroloffice.SowebroughtinourbestjuniorammunitionsergeantsoneatatimetoworkalongsideourfourMOS89A(ammunitionstockcontrol)Soldiers.
Forsimilarreasons,eachofthetwopermanentlyassignedNCOsinmovementcontrol(bothstaffser-geants)receivedonejuniorSoldieratatimetoworkforthem.Thislikewisepreservedaone-to-oneratio.ItalsoallowedcompanyleaderstohandpickthoseNCOsandSoldierswhowouldcross-trainoutsidetheirMOS.Mostrotationsthroughstockcontrollastedabout2months;movementcontrol(withasomewhatlowerOPTEMPO)sawrotationslasting3to4monthseach.
Theminimumnumberofpeopledetailedtocross-traininstockcontrolandmovementcontrolminimizeddisrup-tionofregularASPoperationssincethecompanyfirstandforemosthadtomaintainitsabilitytoaccomplishthemission.ThiswasbynomeansduetoanydeficiencyonthepartofourMOSs89BSoldiers.Althoughmanyofthemwouldhavehadnoproblemlearningthestockcontrolormovementcontroljobs,wekeptinmindthatMOS89AandMOS88N(movementcontrol)donothavetheexactsameskillsetsasMOS89B.Thatmeantthatrotatingper-sonnelthroughstockcontrolormovementcontrolwould
actuallyreducetheamountofMOStrainingthoseSol-diersreceived.Inall,aboutadozenofourmostadaptableSoldiersandsergeantslearnedabouteitherstockcontrolormovementcontrolduringourdeployment.
Theaggregateaffectofourentirecross-trainingpro-gramontheknowledgeandskilllevelofourSoldiersandjuniorNCOswaspronounced.Companymemberswithoutanypreviousammunitionsupplysupportexpe-rienceleftCOBAdderwithawidevarietyofpracti-calexpertiseandlessonslearned.Ratherthanseeingonlyaverynarrowlaneoverthecourseofa12-monthdeployment,eachindividuallefttheASPwithenoughknowledgeandskillstodoallMOS89Bjobsathisskilllevel.Thecompany’sMOStrainingprogrammettheoriginalintentandbuiltwell-roundedMOS89Bammunitionspecialists.
TrainingExternallyRatherthansatisfyingourselveswithtrainingonly
ourownpersonnel,wealsoappliedourrotationalmethodtoMOS89Aand89Bpersonnelfromotherunits.Providingtrainingopportunitiestoammunitionspecialistsandsergeantsfromotherformationswasmorethanjustaperfectchancetoimproverelationsbetweenthecompanyandourcustomerunits;italsohelpedMOS89Aand89Bpersonnelcapitalizeonarichtrainingenvironmentwithlotsofexpertiseattheirfingertips.Someofthecompany’s“students”fromoutsideunitshadbeenintheammunitionsupplyfieldforyearswithouthavingeverworkedinanammuni-tionsupplyactivityatanylevel.ProvidingMOStrain-ingtothoseSoldierswasespeciallyrewarding.Afterall,whereelsebutatanASPcouldtheyreceiveit?
ThroughregularbusinesscontactsthroughoutthesouthernhalfofIraq,logisticsleadersinotherforma-tionsbegantohearaboutthecross-trainingprogramattheCOBAdderASP.Unlikethe664thOrdnance
An ammunition specialist from the
664th Ordnance Company receives handson roughterrain container
handler operator’s training at the
COB AdderTallil ammunition supply point.
46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Company,mostunitshaveanexceptionallylowdensityoftheammunitionsupplyMOS.Mostbrigadecombatteams,infact,areauthorizedonlyasinglesectionofMOS89Bpersonnel(6to12individuals).
Beforelong,unitsoutsideourbattalionwerecon-tactingustorequestassistanceintrainingtheirMOS89Aand89Bpersonnel.Theserequestspresentedtheirownchallengesbecausenotwounitswantedtogainexactlythesameknowledgeorskills.
Generallyspeaking,theASPaccountableoffi-cerwouldmaintaincontactwiththeofficerorNCOrequestingthetraining.Therequestorspecifiedwhatskillsshouldbeemphasizedduringhisunit’straining.Oneunitwantedtoknowmoreaboutthepaperworkrequiredtoprocessammunition;anotherwantedtoexposeitspersonneltothehands-ontasksinherentintheirMOS;otherswantedtogainasmuchknowledgeofshippingaspossible.Theonlywaytoexecuteatrainingplantosatisfytherequestorwastocustomizetheexperience,sothatiswhatthe664thdid.
OurexternaltrainingprogramaccepteduptofourMOS89Aor89Bpersonnelatatime.MostofourvisitingpersonnelwereMOS89B.Eachgroupoffourvisitorsspentatotalof2weeksattheASP.Thevisi-torsweresplitupandrotatedthroughfourareas:stockcontrol,shipping,receiving,andstorage.Thestudentsspentabout3daysateachstation,buttheywerenotsimplysentoutontheirown.Eachstudentwaspairedwitha664thOrdnanceCompanySoldierorNCOofequalrankandshadowedthatpersonuntilitwastimetomoveontothenextstation.
Forexample,avisitingsergeantwouldbepairedwithaseriesofsquadleadersateachstationinordertolearnwhatwasexpectedofanammunitionsergeantduringeachtypeofoperation.Anammunitionspecialist,ontheotherhand,wasassignedasamemberofthesquadateachstation,andhewouldbetaughtwhatourjuniorSoldiersweredoingateachspot.Sometimes,rotationswereeventailoredtofitthespecificrequestsofaparticulargroupofvisitors,addingorsubtractingtimeatparticularstations.
Throughthiscreativeapproach,MOS89BSoldierswhohadneverworkedinanASPreceivedfull-immer-sionammunitionsupplytraining.Thevisitorswerenotexpectedtomeetconcretelearningobjectives;theexternaltrainingprogramwasallaboutraisingtheirawarenessabouttheirownMOSandshowingthemthebasicsofhowthetasksoftheirMOSandskilllevelwereconductedatourASP.Althoughitadmit-tedlytakesmuchmorethan3daysperstationtolearnthedetailsofthejob,ourexternaltrainingprogramofferedtheseSoldiersandNCOsthefoundationofwhatshouldbeanongoinglearningprocess.
ThetimespentbyourvisitorsattheCOBAdderASPprovidedreal-lifeexperienceinammunitionsupplyoperations.Wealsoexposedsmallgroupsofourowncustomerstoreal-worldammunitionsupply
supportinacombatenvironmentattheASPlevel.Ourvisitorsleftwithfirst-handknowledgeofhowcertainprocessesmustbestreamlined(butnotbytak-ingshortcuts)tomeetthetimestandardssetbytheArmyandtherealitiesofcombatsustainmentinIraq.
Someofourstudentswhoweresomewhatfamiliarwithammunitionsupplyoperationsattheirhomestationsevenlearnedthat,althoughanASPinIraqcannotbeaperfectmatchtoammunitionsupplyoperationsbackintheUnitedStates,itispossibletocloselyreplicatethemostessentialsafetyandaccountabilitypracticesrequiredbyArmyregulationsatanyASP,regardlessofitslocation.
Perhapsmostimportantly,wewereabletoexposeMOS89BSoldiersandNCOstothewaythatASPoperationsareaccomplishedinaforward-deployedlocation.TheresponsesofindividualswhohadthetimeandopportunitytoshadowusattheCOBAdderASPwereoverwhelminglypositive.
Trainingincombatcannotfullyreplacetrainingathome.Bytrainingincombatwiththeresourcesandexpertisethatwereavailableatthecompanylevelandbelow,the664thOrdnanceCompanybuiltanagileteamofammunitionsupplyprofessionalswhowerecapableofrunningahighlydynamicandcomplexASPinanextremelytoughenvironment.ThecompanyalsobroughteachofitsenlistedmembersuptoalevelofMOScompetencethattheycouldnothavereachedbyremaininginonlyonejobfortheentiredeployment.Ratherthanonlytrainingonepersononshippingandanotherpersononstorage,thecompanytaughtbothareas,andmore,tobothpeople.
Thecompanythususeda12-monthdeploymenttosouthernIraqtoprepareMOS89BSoldiersandNCOsforanyammunitionsupplysupportjobattheirskilllevel,regardlessofwhichpartofanASPtheymightbeassignedtonext.Throughsimilartrainingmethodsappliedbydedicatedcompanyandplatoonleadersdur-ingfuturedeployments,itwillbepossibletocreateavaluableandversatileforceofsustainmentSoldiersforthebenefitoftheentireArmy.
captain tHeodore l. zaGraniski is tHe supply and serVices officer for tHe 377tH tHeater sustainMent coMMand at naVal air sta-tion joint reserVe base new orleans, louisiana. froM july 2008 to april 2010, He serVed as tHe coMMander of tHe 664tH ordnance coMpany. He Has a b.a. deGree in History froM leHiGH uniVersity and is a Graduate of tHe field artillery officer basic course and tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course.
cHief warrant officer 2 Gary n. carr is tHe contractinG officer’s representatiVe for tHe 1st tHeater sustainMent coMMand at caMp arifjan, kuwait. He preViously serVed as an aMMunition tecHnician witH tHe 664tH ordnance coMpany and as tHe accountable officer at tHe continGency operatinG base adder-tallil aMMunition supply point. He Has a b.s. deGree in criMinal justice froM Madison uniVersity.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 47
hecombinedeffortsofU.S.SoldiersandtwolocalnationalcontractorsatContingencyOperat-ingBase(COB)AdderledtotheearlycompletionoftheCOB’sscrapmetalseparationandsegregationmis-sion.ThemissionrequiredpersonnelatCOBAddertoseparateandsortabout75acresofscrapmetalandotherdebris.ThemetalwastheaccumulationofitemsdatingasfarbackasthePersianGulfWarof1990to1991.
BreakingDowntheMissionTheprojectwasbrokendownintothreephases.In
thefirstphase,theteamidentifiedandsortedthediffer-entmaterialsatthesite.Inthesecondphase,theteamremovedallsteel,andinthethirdphase,theremainingdebriswashauledoffsitetodesignatedlocations.
Theprojectinvolvedapproximately60personnelworkingonadailybasis.TheteamwasmadeupofU.S.SoldiersandcontractworkersfromAlZaidiCompanyandRawa’aCompany,whoworkedfromMondaytoFri-day.“Towardtheendoftheproject,SoldierswouldcomeinonSaturdaysandSundaystoaccomplishthemission,”saidSergeantFirstClassJasonHellstrom,theengineeroperationsnoncommissionedofficerforthe1stInfantryDivisionandU.S.Division-South.“NoneoftheSoldierscomplainedonebit.Theywantedtogetitdone.”
CleaningUptheScrapMetalAccordingtoMajorTewannaMarks,anengineerwith
U.S.Division-SouthinIraq,“TheoriginalprojectiontocleanupAdderwasfromFebruarytoJuly[2010].”Sol-dierscompletedthemissionon25May2010,reducingthemission’scompletiontimeby60days.
Markssaidthefirsttimeshevisitedthesite,stacksofscrapmetalwerepiledmorethan12feethigh.Dur-ingtheinitialphaseoftheproject,shecheckedonthesiteacoupleoftimesaweektoensuretheoperationwasgoingwell.
Astheprojectprogressed,thepersonnelandtheoper-ationbecamemoreefficient.“Towardtheend,therewas
a2-weekperiodwhereIdidnotgoto[COB]Adder,”Markssaid.“WhenIreturnedafterthose2weeks,Iwasamazedtoseethattheareawasflatdesert.”
Hellstromsaidthatoncetheprojectwasunder-way,progresstookplacerapidly.“Whenitstarted,theprojectmovedalittleslow,”Hellstromsaid.“Aboutmid[way]totheendofFebruaryiswhentheprojectreallybegantopickup.”
WhatSoldiersLeftforIraqisIttook15weeksforU.S.Soldiersdeployedtothe
baseandthetwolocalcontractorstosortthematerialsintheCOBAdderscrapyardintoafunctioningscrapseparationandsegregationarea.
TheCOBalsohasascrapsegregationandrecyclingcenterthatIraqiscanusetoemploylocalsandearnrevenue.
“Personnelon[COB]Addercanbringtheirscraptothecenterandhaveitsegregatedinsteadofjustdumpingitalltogether,”Markssaid.“Itisalegitimateoperation.Itfunctionswell.”WhenthebaseisreturnedtotheIraqis,thisprojectwillcontinuetorunandwillhelpeasethetransition.
WiththeguidanceandsupportfromU.S.Division-Southleaders(specificallyBrigadierGeneralRandalDragon,thedeputycommandinggeneralforsupport,1stInfantryDivision),themissionwascompletedfasterthanexpected.Attheendoftheproject,theprojectteamleaderreportedthattheteamhadremovedapproximately333tonsofwood,8,353tonsoftrash,and11,088tonsofscrapmetal.
serGeant jaMes kennedy benjaMin, usar, is assiGned to tHe 305tH Mobile public affairs detacHMent, 9tH Mission support coMMand, at fort sHafter, Hawaii. tHe unit is currently deployed to basra, iraq, and supports tHe u.s. diVision-soutH, 1st infantry diVision public affairs office.
CleaningUpContingencyOperatingBaseAdder
by serGeant jaMes kennedy benjaMin, usar
T
A 15week mission turned an uncontrolled dumping ground at Contingency Operating Base Adder into a functioning scrap separation area.
48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
MRAP’sFutureWiththeArmyby Major dale b. WoodHouse
incefiscalyear2006,theDepartmentofDefense(DOD)hasspentsignificantfundsonthemine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehiclepro-gram.Despitethisinvestment,DODoriginallywasnotconsideringthisvehicleaspartofitsplanforbrigadecombatteam(BCT)modernization.BudgetconstraintsandtheMRAP’sprovensuccessinIraqandAfghanistanhavepromptedDODtotakeaharderlookathowthisvehiclefitsintotheservices’future.
TheFutureCombatSystemTheFutureCombatSystem(FCS)program,launched
in2003,wasavisionformodernizingBCTswithanarrayofvehiclesandintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceplatforms.FCSwasdescribedasbeinga“systemofsystems”capableoffull-spectrumoperations.
TheMRAPvehiclewasnotpartoftheoriginalFCSprogram.AccordingtoaCongressionalResearchServicereportbyAndrewFeickert,“Mine-Resistant,Ambush-Protected(MRAP)Vehicles:BackgroundandIssuesforCongress,”in2009,SecretaryofDefenseRobertGatesdirectedtheArmytoincludetheMRAPinitsFCSplans.
ThepricetagofFCS,over$160billion,washardfortheArmytoreconcileunderbudgetconstraints,sosev-eralalternativeplanswereproposedtoreplaceit.
ThesealternativeswererevealedtoCongressinaJune2009CongressionalBudgetOfficestudy,“AnAnalysisoftheArmy’sTransformationProgramsandPossibleAlternatives.” Mostofthealternativeplanssoughttodecreasethecostoftheprogrambyincorporatingupgradedcombatvehiclesandplatformsinthecurrentfleetinlieuoffundingthehigh-pricedFCSvehicles.
FCSTransitionstoArmyBCTModernizationAccordingtoaDODpressreleasedated23June
2009,duringthebudgetaryprocessforfiscalyear2010,SecretaryGatesexpressedconcerns“thattheportionoftheFCSprogramtofieldnewmannedcombatvehiclesdidnotadequatelyreflectthelessonsofcounterinsurgen-cyandclosequarterscombatinIraqandAfghanistan.”
AnacquisitiondecisionmemorandumcanceledtheFCSBCTprogramandreplaceditwith“amodern-izationplanconsistingofanumberofseparatebutintegratedacquisitionprograms”calledtheBrigadeCombatTeamModernizationPlan.
S IncorporatingtheMRAPIncludingtheMRAPintheFCSBCTprogramand
nowtheBrigadeCombatTeamModernizationPlanwasasoundmoveonthepartofDODbothfromthebudget-aryperspectiveandfromapracticalperspectivewithinthedomainsofdoctrine,organization,training,materiel,leadershipandeducation,personnel,andfacilities.
AccordingtoFeickert’sreport,morethan15,000MRAPsarebeingusedinIraqandAfghanistan.TheMRAP’ssuccessinoperationsanditssurvivabilityfromattacksfromminesandimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)areduemainlytoitsuniquev-shapedhulldesignandarmorplating.ThisdesignisneitherradicalnornewsincetheSouthAfricanDefenseForcehasbeenusingitforyears,butincorporatingthisvehicleintoU.S.operationsisnewandcontinuestobeadevelopmentalprocess.
StaffmembersattheCenterforArmyLessonsLearnedatFortLeavenworth,Kansas,aresupportingdoctrinedevelopmentrelatedtotheMRAP.Thecen-ter’sstaffisresponsibleforcapturinglessonslearnedinthefieldandproducingwrittenproductsthatassistdeployedSoldiersandthosetrainingfordeploymentinincorporatingtactics,techniques,andprocedures.ThisdoctrinealsohelpsunitstoadjusttheirorganizationinpreparationfordeploymentandincorporatetheMRAPintotheirformations.
MoreVehiclesEqualsMoreTrainingAsunitsreturnfromdeploymentandbeginthepro-
cessofresettingforthenextpossiblemission,theuseofMRAPvehiclesinunit-leveltrainingandqualifica-tionswillbecomestandard.
AccordingtoFeickert,“TheArmyplansonallo-cating702MRAPsfortraininginadditiontothe50MRAPsalreadydesignatedfortrainingdrivers.”ThisincreaseinavailablevehiclesfortrainingwillensurethatnewSoldiersarrivingatunitsthatarepreparingtodeploywilltraininthebasicskillsetsneededtomain-tainandoperateMRAPvehicles.
TheincreaseinvehiclesavailablefortrainingwillalsoallowMRAPtrainingtobeincorporatedintoleadertrainingprograms,suchasofficerbasicandcareercoursesandbranch-specificnoncommissionedofficercourses.
The mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle has proven its worth in Iraqand Afghanistan, prompting leaders to include it in brigade combat teammodernization plans.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 49
ThenextgenerationofwarriorsandleaderswilltrainonMRAPsreturningfromtheoperationalfleet.Theonlydifferenceatthetrainingcentersistheadditionofanewsimulatordevelopedtoaddresstheshortfallinthenumberofvehiclesavailablefortraining.NowMRAPsimulatorsthatwereusedinlieuofvehicletrainingwillinsteadbeusedtopreparestudentsbeforetheygetbehindthewheel.Wehavethepersonnel;wejusthavetogetthemtrained.
FuturePlansfortheMRAPInanAugust2009CongressionalResearchService
reportontheMRAP,FeickertlaidouttheU.S.Army’splanfortheMRAP:
AsU.S.forcesbegindrawingdowninIraq,theArmyandMarinesplantoputthemajorityofMRAPsintoprepositionedstocksatvariousover-seaslocations,shipanumberbacktotheUnitedStatesfortraining,andplaceanumberintologis-ticsandrouteclearanceunits.OutoftheArmy’seventual12,000Iraq-basedMRAPs,theArmyplanstouseonly2,675inoperationalunits.
ItwouldseemthattheArmyhasanabundanceofthematerielandfacilitiesneededtoincorporatetheMRAPintofutureplans.TheproblemarisingnowisthatSecretaryGatesisdirectinganincreaseinthenumberofMRAPsslatedtoreplaceplannedFCSvehi-clesinoperationalunitsandadecreaseinthenumberofMRAPsgoingintopre-positionedstocks.
TheArmyandtheMarineCorpsareworkingtobal-ancethisguidancewiththeircurrentplans.AccordingtoFeickert,SecretaryGatesis“concernedthattheFCSprogramdidnotincludearoleforMRAPsandimplied
thatthereneededtobeagreaterroleforMRAPsintheArmy’svehiclemodernizationplan.”
Toaddresstheseissues,theArmyhasreplacedtheFCSprogramwiththeArmyBrigadeCombatTeamModernizationPlanandincludedMRAP.Justasexist-ingsystems,suchastheStryker,couldbeusedtoreplacetheagingM113fleetintheBCTs,MRAPscouldbeusedtoreplacehighlyvulnerablevehicles.Aspartofthenewplan,theMRAPwillreplacevehicles,likethemilitarypoliceup-armoredhigh-mobilitymul-tipurposewheeledvehicleandmultipurposetransportvehiclesusedforlogisticsconvoys.
DODhasspent$26.815billionontheMRAPpro-gramsincefiscalyear2006.Thissignificantinvest-mentinavehiclefamilyshouldbeincorporatedintotheArmy’sBrigadeCombatTeamModernizationPlan.AlthoughtheMRAPwasnotpartoftheoriginalFCSprogram,itsdesignbridgesacapabilitiesgapinIraqandAfghanistan.PlacingMRAPsinstoragewouldbelikeparkingallthetanksafterOperationDesertStormandthenpullingthemout12yearslaterforOperationIraqiFreedom—itwoulddecreasethevehicles’effec-tiveness.SecretaryGatesismovingtheArmyintherightdirectionbyinsistingonincorporatingMRAPsintofutureArmyplanstoupgradeBCTs.
Major dale b. “woody” woodHouse is an arMor officer and a forMer Marine and is currently attendinG tHe arMy coMMand and General staff colleGe. He Holds b.a. deGrees in GoVernMent and econoMics and is a Graduate of tHe arMor officer basic course, scout platoon leader course, field artillery captains career course, and inforMation operations qualification course. He also Has been selected to attend tHe scHool of adVanced Military studies.
Mineresistant ambushpro
tected (MRAP) vehicles are pre
pared in an Army Materiel Command fielding
area in Afghanistan before they are delivered to
Polish forces. MRAPs have
been in the Army’s inventory since fiscal year
2006 but have only recently
become a part of brigade combat
team modernization plans. (Photo
by Sharon L. Strickland, 401st
AFSB)
50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
heimportanceofriversandwaterwaysinworldhistorycannotbeignored.Theyhaveprovidedwaterfordrinkingandagriculture,actedashigh-ways,andformednaturalboundaries.InMesopotamia(modern-dayIraq),theTigris,theEuphrates,andtheShattal-Arab(whichflowsfromtheconfluenceoftheTigrisandEuphratestothePersianGulf)aretheprimaryrivers.DuringtheMesopotamianCampaigninWorldWarI,theseriversprovideddrinkingwater,facilitatedlogisticsandfiresupportactivities,anddirectlyaffectedtroopmovements.
Duringthecampaignfrom1914to1918,BritishandOttomanTurkishforcesusednewtechnologytoaugmenttraditionalwaysofoperatingwithintheregion.Riversteamers,railroads,andmotorizedvehiclesoperatedsidebysidewithtraditionalwatercraftandlandconveyances,formingalinkbetweenthepastandthepresent.
BasraTheancientportofBasra,homeofthelegendarySinbad,
haslongbeenanimportantaccesspointintoMesopotamia.SittingastridetheShattal-Arab,itprovideseasyaccesstothePersianGulffromtheinteriorandtotheTigrisandEuphratesriversfromthePersianGulf.DuringWorldWarI,forOttomansinIraqandforlocals,Basraactedasapointofentry,wheresuppliesfromtheoutsideworldwereunloadedfromoceangoingshipsandsentupriveronlocalwatercraft.
FortheBritish,thecitycontrolledoilexportsfromtheGulfregion.In1914,theoilfieldsofsouthernMesopotamiaprovidedthebulkoftheoilfortheRoyalNavy.Toprotectthisresource,asmallBritishforce,consistingmostlyofunitsfromtheBritishIndianArmy,capturedthefortatAlFaoon6November1914.Twoweekslater,theBritishcap-turedBasra.Afterthat,therewasahiatusinmajoractions.
SinbadwouldhavefoundBasrain1914littlechangedfromthedaysofthemedievalAbbasidEmpire.Thecityconsistedmostlyofsmallpatchesofhigh,drygroundsurroundedbylow-lyingmuddyareasandtheShattitself.Intherainyseason,though,eventheraisedareasflooded.Eveninidealconditions,movementwithinthecitywasdifficult.
Thedearthofmotorizedrivercraftcomplicatedmove-ment.Oceangoingshipswereforcedtoanchorinthemiddle
RiversofLife,RiversofDeath:TheWorldWarIMesopotamianCampaign
by MicHael yarborouGH
T
Geographic factors such as mountains, rivers, and climate can help or hinder military operations. A good example of this is the World War I conflict between the British and the Ottoman Turks in what is now Iraq, where rivers in the desert limited offensive flexibility but provided channels for support.
oftheriverandawaitunloadingbyacoupleofArablight-ersthatregularlyservicedonlytwoshipsevery3weeks.Wharfs,warehouses,andalltheothernecessaryinfrastruc-tureofamodernportwerecompletelylacking.
Inshort,givenitsconditionin1914,BasracouldnothavebeenaworseplacefortheBritishtobaseanarmy.However,withtheBritishArmy’sinitiallimitedobjectivesofprotectingtheoilfields,thesmallforcewassufficient.Nopreparationoreventhoughtwasgiventosupportingalargerforce.Asaresult,whentheBritishMesopotamianExpeditionaryForcebeganmajoroperationslaterinthewar,itsufferedmanylogisticshandicaps.
DrinkingWaterNeedlesstosay,thedesertconditionsofIraqmake
militaryoperationsmoredifficultbecauseoftheneedtostaynearfreshwatersources.Today,thepresenceofmotorizedvehiclesandairplanesenablesforcestobesuppliedvirtuallyanywhere.Thatwasnotthecasein1914.AlthoughcarsandtruckswereusedextensivelyineverytheaterduringWorldWarI,theyneverformedmorethanhalfofthetotalsupplytrainineventhebestsuppliedareas.
InMesopotamia,whereeverythingwasalwaysinshortsupply(forbothsides),motorvehicleswerenotevenaremoteoption.HistorianA.J.Barker,inhis1967bookThe Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign of 1914−1918,notesthatBritishplannersinIndiagavelittleconsiderationtotheneedforwatercartstoMeso-potamia.Ottomanforcesalsolackedsufficientmeanstotransportwateroverlargedistances.
Asaresult,boththeBritishandOttomanlandforceswereforcedtofollowthemadlywindingTigrisandEuphrates,exceptwherealoopintherivercouldbeavoidedbyashortmarch.Theneedtostayneartheriv-ersisoneexplanationforwhymostofthebattleswerefoughtneartherivers.Barker’sbookispepperedwithexamplesofthirstbecominganissuewhensoldiersstrayedfromtheriver.
Duringengagements,theconcernforstayingclosetowatersourceswasparticularlyserious.AtthebattleofEsSinnon28September1915,whichledtothecapture
©MichaelYarborough2011.Reproductionforpersonalandeducationalpurposesisauthorized.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 51
ofKut,BritishMajorGeneralSirCharlesVereFerrersTownshendsentsomeofhismen5to10milesawayfromtheTigristoflanktheTurkishpositions.(KutalAmarawasatownlocated100milessoutheastofBagh-dadinabendoftheTigris.)
Afteranightmarchandadayoffighting,thetroopswereexhausted,havinggonewithoutwaterexceptforthecontentsoftheirwaterbottlessincethenightbefore.Barkernotes,“Likethemen,theanimalswerenearlymadwiththirst,”andconsequentially“anumberofmulesmadeadashfortheclosestmarsh,becameboggeddowninthemud,andwerequicklysnipedbytheTurks.”
Becauseoftheinabilitytotransportsufficientwaterfarfromtherivers,mostoperationswerenotabletotakefulladvantageoftacticalsituationsfordiversionaryandflank-ingmaneuvers.
TransportationRivershavetraditionallybeentheeasiestandmosteffi-
cientmeansoftransportingbulkyshipments.MartinVanCreveld,inSupplying War: Logistics from Wallerstein to Patton,makesthepointthatin17thcenturyEuropestra-tegicmobilitywasseverelylimitedbyrivers—notbecauseofdifficultiesincrossingthembutbecausetheyweretheprincipalhighwaysforheavygoods.Theobviousfactthatriversdonotgoeverywhereacommandermightwishmeantfreedomofactionwasseverelycurtailed.
TheTigrisandtheEuphrateswerenoexceptiontothisfact,andthepresenceofmuddy,marshyterrainoutsidetherivers’immediatevicinitiesonlyincreasedthechallengeofmovingarmies(aswellasthechallengeofobtainingsuf-ficientdrinkingwater).Exceptduringtheworstperiodsoftherainyandfloodseasons,thesemarshescouldbenegoti-atedbymenandhorses,buthaulingheavyequipmentwasoutofthequestionthroughouttheyear.Inthisrespect,theBritishandOttomanarmiesmerelyadoptedlongestab-lishedmeansofmovingheavyequipmentintheregion.
Inusingtherivers,bothsidesadaptedmoderntechnol-ogytothenaturalconditions.Nativecraft,whosedesignshadremainedvirtuallyunchangedforcenturies,weresupplementedwithoil-andsteam-poweredcraftwheneverpossibleformovingmenandequipment.
Poweredgunboatsalsoformedanintegralpartofthecampaign.Gunboatsnotonlyprotectedsuppliesbutwentontheoffensive:Sinceoperationswereconfinedtotheriverbanks,theyfrequentlyprovidedfiresupportforinfantryoperations.BritishgunboatssuchastheHMSEspiegleandHMSFireflyparticipatedinmanyoffensiveactions,buttheywereoftendelayedbyhiddensandbarsandOttoman-laidriverobstructions.
Themajorrestrictingelementforbothsideswasachronicshortageofmodernboatsofeverykind.ThisshortagebecamepainfullyevidentastheMesopotamianExpeditionaryForceattemptedtomountareliefofGen-eralTownshend’sforcesbesiegedatKutinearly1916.ThelackofrivercraftmeantthattheBritishreliefwasunabletorapidlypitanoverwhelmingforceofmenandequipmentagainsttheOttomanbesiegers.
DespiteseveralvaliantattemptstobreakthroughOtto-manlines,Townshend,withhismenstarving,surrenderednearly10,000BritishandIndiansoldierson29April1916aftera5-monthsiege.Themajorityofthesecap-tivesdiedofstarvation,exhaustion,disease,orcrueltybytheirTurkishcaptors.
ThefallofKutfinallyspurredtheBritishtoaddresstheirtransportationproblemsintheMesopotamianthe-ater.Additionalmotorizedgunboatsandsupplyboatswereaddedtothefleet,andalternativesweresought—primarilyarailroadfromBasratothefront.TheOtto-manswereunabletosupplynewboatsandtheironlyavailablerailroadendedinBaghdad,sotheycouldnotreplacetheirlosses.Themostmoderntransportationtech-nologiesofthetime—automobilesandairplanes—weremostlyusedforreconnaissanceandplayedlittletonoroleinlogistics.Sorivertransportationremainedthepri-marymeansofconveyance.
OncetheBritishresolvedtheirtransportationprob-lems,theywereabletobringsuperiornumbersagainsttheirOttomanadversaries,whomtheypushedbackintonorthernIraqbyNovember1918.
RiversasTacticalBarriersTheTigrisandtheEuphratesalsoweretacticalbarri-
erstomovement.Theshortageofrivercraftandbridgesmeantcommandershadtopaycarefulattentiontohowtheydeployedtheirforcesbecause,intheheatofbattle,shiftingforcesacrosstheriverswasdifficultandtimeconsuming.Asaresult,commandersfacedchallengesincapitalizingontacticalopportunitiesandrepositioningforcestomeetunexpectedcontingencies.Althoughonlyseparatedbyariver—andashallowoneatthat—forcesonoppositesidesoftheTigrisduringcombatmightaswellhavebeenseparatedbyanocean.
DuringthebattleofEsSinn,GeneralTownshendsuc-cessfullydeceivedtheTurksintothinkinghewouldattackontherightsideoftheriverwhileheactuallyplannedtoattackontheleft.AftertheTurkshadtakenthebaitandtransferredthebulkoftheirreservestotherightandwereunabletospeedilycrossthembackover,Townshendlaunchedhismainattackontheleft.ThisforcedthemainTurkishforcetoretreattopreventbeingsurrounded.ThesegamesofdeceptioncharacterizedmuchofthefightinginMesopotamiaduringWorldWarI.
TheTigris,Euphrates,andShattal-ArabwaterwaysdefinedthebattlespacefortheBritishandOttomanforcesduringtheMesopotamianCampaignofWorldWarI.Theneedforwaterandtransportationmeantthatbattleswerealsofoughtneartheserivers.Theywere,quiteliter-ally,bothriversoflifeandriversofdeathfortheBritish,Indian,andOttomansoldiersinvolved.
MicHael yarborouGH is a Historian at tHe arMy center of Military History. He Holds a bacHelor’s deGree in History and pHilosopHy froM jaMes Madison uniVersity and a Master’s deGree in History froM GeorGe Mason uniVersity.
52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
CreatingaKnowledgeManagementCultureattheArmySoldierSupportInstitute
by stePHan d. Wilcox
hecreationofaknowledgemanagementculture,fromtheinceptiontothedeliveryofaworking,results-orientedsystem,requiresleaderinvolve-ment,customerbuy-inandsupport,andsupportfromtheArmyEnterpriseArchitecture.Italsorequiresadis-tinctculturalshiftandtheabandonmentofthetechnol-ogycomfortzoneinwhichmostpeopleareensconced.
ThecreationoftheArmySoldierSupportInstitute’s(SSI’s)knowledgemanagementculturewasnoexception.WhileSSI’svariousorganizationsworkedhardtodevelopproductsfortheirconstituentsandinnovativewaystodobusiness,informationandprocesseswerenotbeingsharedthroughoutthecommand.SSIwasalsoplaguedwithredundanciesandincompatibilities(bothinternalandexternal).Andnoteveryonesawtheneedtochange.
IdentifyingKnowledgeManagementNeedsSSI’sleaderswerecriticaltoinstitutingaknowl-
edgemanagementculture.SeniorleaderstookabroadlookacrossthecommandandrecognizedtheneedforacollaborativeenvironmentofbothexplicitandtacitknowledgeforSoldiersandcivilians.TheSSIcom-mandinggeneral,whowasdirectlyinvolvedintheeffort,identifiedthequalificationshewantedinSSI’sknowledgemanagementchief.Helookedforsomeonewithexperienceininformationtechnology,softwareapplications,andtheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)trainingmodel.
Oncetheknowledgemanagementteamwasinplace,itsfirstassignmentwastoassesscurrentsystems,processes,andtrackingmethods.Theobjectivewastoeliminateredundanciesandincreaseproductivity.Therapidassessment,whichtookapproximately30days,uncoveredmultipleissuesthataffectedday-to-dayfunctions,theintegrityoftheeducationalsystem,andorganizationalefficiency.Amongtheissueswere—o Systemsandprocessesthatwereindividual
solutionsinsteadofSSIstandardequipment,applications,orprocedures.
o Apublicwebsitethatofferedvisitorsonlygeneral
T informationandnootherbenefits.o Severalsystemsforthedeliveryofdistributive
learningthatdidnotalwaystrackstudents’officialcreditsforcoursecompletions.
o Asharedlocalareanetworkdrivethathadreacheditsstoragelimitandcouldnotbeaccessedfromoffpost.
o Uncertaintyaboutwhetherinstructorswereusingthesamecoursematerials(causedbytheuseofvariousstoragemethodsinsteadofonecommonrepository).
o Thepervasiveuseofmanualprocesses,includingprintingpapercopiestosubmitworkandadministrativeactions.
o Afailuretosharegoodsystemsamongtheindividualschoolsanddirectorates.
o Alackofmethodsforcollectingtacitknowledge.
CreatingtheKnowledgeManagementCultureAftercarefulconsideration,SSI’sleadersdecided
touseArmyEnterpriseArchitecturesystemstocon-solidatetheknowledgemanagementaspectsofallSSIunits.Bychoosinganenterpriseapproach,SSIloweredcostsandeliminatedcertainresourcerequire-ments.Mostimportantly,itcreatedasingleportalaccessiblebyallSSIorganizations.Thisconsolidationhaspaidtremendousdividendsinrecentmonths.
Theknowledgemanagementteamstartedbycon-vertingSSI’spublicwebsitestomatchtheArmystan-dardandmakingthemportalstoallSSIsystemsandprocesses.ThecommandthenselectedBlackboardasthemediumtodelivercoursetestingmaterialsandreportoninstitutionaltraining.ThecommandchosetheArmyLearningManagementSystemforalldistrib-utedlearning.
TheknowledgemanagementteamimplementedtheTRADOCSharePointsystemasthemediumforcol-laboration.Thisonechangehadthelargestimpactonthecommandandtheinculcationofaknowledgemanage-mentculture.Bycreatingacentralrepositoryforinstruc-tionalmaterialsthatisaccessibletoallpersonnel,SSI
The Army Soldier Support Institute recognized that it needed to improve its knowledge management processes and made the changes necessary to start sharing information more efficiently and effectively.
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 53
canensurethatinstructorsareteachingthesameinfor-mation.Coursedeveloperscanfieldupdatesinweeksinsteadofmonths,andSharepoint’sworkflowcapabilityreducesapprovaltimefromweekstodays.Evenuserswhoareawayfromtheofficecankeepprojectsmovingforward.
Perhapsmostimportantinaneraofconstantopera-tions,SSIcannoweasilytappeopleworldwidetocollaborateonlessonslearned—anessentialfactorinkeepingcoursematerialsandtrainingrelevant.BecausegraduatescanreachbacktoSSI,smallunitshavebegunusingthesystemasatrainingresourcewhileinthefield.
SharePointalsohelpedthecommandtorefineitsprocesses.Forinstance,throughInfoPath,SSIhasautomatedcommonactionsandrequests.AG–3tasksitenowallowsreal-timeinput.Thecommandalsoaddedaninformationtechnologyhelpdeskandtaughtself-helpstepstoreduceworkordersandimproveindividualperformance.PersonnelattendquarterlyknowledgemanagementworkinggroupstoshareideasandsolutionsthroughoutSSI.
TheSharePointsitewascreatedinMarch2009,andinitialtrainingwascompletedinApril.(Trainingfornewpersonnelornewtechniquesoccursquarterlyandisprovidedbyin-housesubject-matterexperts.)Eachdirectoratehasadministratorrightsandisresponsibleforitsownsite.Today,SharePointisthoroughlyinte-gratedintoSSIoperations,andknowledgemanage-mentisintegratedintotheSSImindset.
Knowledgemanagementisneverstatic.SSIiscurrentlyassessingitsknowledgemanagementplanagainsttheArmyLearningConcept2015andwillmodifyitasnecessary.SSIalsoisconductinganacross-the-boardevaluationtoimprovedesignsandfunctions.ThecommandwillsoondeployonSharePointatacitknowledgesystemthatiscurrentlyusedatFortBragg,NorthCarolina.
BestPracticesandLessonsLearnedBasedonSSI’sexperience,thebestpathforinsti-
tutingasuccessfulknowledgemanagementculturefollowsthesesteps:leadershipacknowledgementandbuy-in,assessmentofcurrentstatusandneeds,designofaholisticsolution,developmentofasolution,implementation,andevaluationandrefinement.Takingastepoutoforder—say,developingasolutionwithouthavingconductedathoroughassessment—increasesthechancesforanincompleteorfailedeffort.
Whenestablishingaknowledgemanagementcul-ture,knowledgemanagementmanagersandproponentsshould—o Makesuretheirleadersunderstandthepurposeof
knowledgemanagement,andbepreparedtoshowtangiblebenefitsfromknowledgemanagementinitiativesandprocesses.
o Producepolicylettersthatdemonstratetheleaders’interestintheproject,andgetthewholeorganizationonboard.
o Decideoncoresystems,andbecomeexpertatthem.(Newtoolsareablessing,butthetrainingandacceptancetimeforend-userscandefeatthepurpose.)
o LeverageArmyenterprisesolutionsbecausetheyinvolvenocosttotheorganization,makemodificationsmucheasiertoexecute,andstreamlineassistancefromotheragencies.Theenterpriseoftencanprovidetrainingandsupportpackages,aswell.
o Buildthemodelknowingthattherequirementswillchange,andusetheArmyLearningConcept2015asanexample.
o IncludenotonlyknowledgemanagementtrainingbutalsosoftwareapplicationtrainingintheSoldierandciviliantrainingplan.
o Assigntasks,responsibilities,andownershipatthelowestlevel.
o Includeeveryoneintheeffortsothatgoodideasaresharedandpoorprocessesareeliminatedbeforetheybecomecommon.
o GetthesupportofG–6knowledgemanagementchampionstoensurethattheknowledgemanage-mentcultureisdeployedinatimelymanner.
o Attendasmanytrainingseminarsaspossible,inpersonoronline.Seeingothermethodsandpracticescanonlybenefittheorganization.
o Usethefeedbackmechanismsthatareavailableineverysystemtoidentifytherefinementsthatareneeded.
o Createatrackingsystemformodificationssothatthecommanderhasaccuratedatatouseinmakingdecisions.
o Bepreparedforpushback(changeisdifficult),andbepreparedtoshow“brightspots”ofsuccess.
o Recognizeknowledgemanagementchampions.Tangibleresultsdeservetangiblerewardsandacknowledgement.Manypeoplearecompetitive;takeadvantageofthisfact.
Themetamorphosisintoaknowledgemanagementculturehasbeenfairlyquickandisdueinparttoleaderemphasis(includingacommandpolicymemorandum)andthestaff’srecognitionofthepotentialbenefits.
Knowledgemanagementisnotafad.Itisheretostay,anditisanextremelypowerfultool.SSIismoreeffectiveandefficientthaneverbefore,andithasnotyetmaximizedthebenefitsofknowledgemanage-ment.EveryleveloftheArmyandtheDepartmentofDefensemustembraceknowledgemanagement.WeoweittotheSoldiers,Sailors,Airmen,Marines,andtaxpayerstogetthemostoutofourorganizations.
stepHan d. wilcox is tHe knowledGe ManaGeMent officer at tHe recruitinG and retention scHool, arMy soldier support institute.
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RaisingMechanicSkillstoIndustryStandards
by cHieF Warrant oFFicer 2 MattHeW r. Mccaslin
ncriticalsituationswhencombatequipmentmustbereturnedtothefight,waitingonpartscanbedetrimentaltoacommander’sabilitytomaneuveronthebattlefieldandwinincombat;itcanevencostthelivesofU.S.Soldiers.TheArmy’scurrentopera-
I tionalenvironmentoftenresultsinmechanicsbeingconstrainedbyalimitedoroverburdeneddistributionnetwork,whichhasledtoshortfallscausedbylongleadtimesinreceivingreplacementparts.WiththeArmyspreadaroundtheworld,unit-levelpartsprocurement
isnotalwaysaseasyasstoppingatthenearestsupplysupportactivity.Sometimesmaintainersmustfocusonrepairingmajorassembliesandplaceastrongemphasisonproperfaultdiagnosis.
Duringthepast10yearsofcon-flict,theArmyhaslearnedhowimportantwarriortasksanddrillsareandhasreactedbyemphasizingthatallSoldiersareriflemenfirst.Wearelearningfromcurrentoper-ationsthattechnicalproficiencymaybejustasimportant.However,mechanicsarrivingatunitstodayoftenarenotcompetenttechnicianspreparedtotackleadvanceddiag-nostics,andunitsdonothavetheresourcesandtimerequiredtotraintothislevel.
Moderncomputerizeddieselenginesarenotjustintrucks.TheyarethedrivingforcebehindtheArmy.Computer-controlledenginespowerourgenerators,transporta-tionequipment,fightingvehicles,materials-handlingequipment,andmarineequipment.Dieselengines
The Army needs mechanics with skills beyond those taught in advanced individual training. Private-sector certification programs offer a solution.
An Army mechanic assigned to the 1st Battalion, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, checks the engine fan on a highmobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle while working in the motorpool vehicle maintenance section at Multinational Base Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan. (Photo by TSgt Michele A. Desrochers, USAF)
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movetheArmy.Theseenginesarenottheblacksmokepuffersofagenerationago.
ManyoftheArmy’scurrentengineshaveadvancedmechanismslikestackedpiezoelectricwafersintheirinjectionsystems,variablegeometryturbochargers,andaccelerometerpilotcontrolunits.Thesemodernenginesarecomputer-controlledmonsterswithsignificantcapa-bility.Buttheyrequireatechnicianwhoiswelltrainedtoservice,maintain,andtroubleshootthem.
TheNeedtoIncreaseProficiencyAstheArmysettlesintothemodularforcestructure,
mechanicsfromseveralmilitaryoccupationalspecial-ties(MOSs)havebeenstreamlinedintoa“super”mechaniccalledthe91B,wheeledvehiclemechanic(MOS91B).TheArmymechanichasbecomeamul-ticapablemaintainerwhoisrequiredtotroubleshootusingadvancedonboarddiagnosticsandincreasinglycomplex,interconnectedvehiclesystems.
Yearsago,aSoldierwithabasicunderstandingofenginetheorycouldrepairahigh-mobilitymultipur-posewheeledvehicle.Withtoday’sequipment,aSol-diermustbeaproficienttechnicianwhounderstandshowinformationisbeingfedintothecomputerfromseveralsensorsandwhoisfamiliarwiththedifferentvehiclesystemsthatcouldcreatethesymptomheisdiagnosing.
Modernvehiclescanhaveasmanyas50micropro-cessorsonboard.Themodernmaintainermustbeabletousesophisticateddiagnostictrouble-codescannersandtheninterpretandapplythedatageneratedbythescannerstorepairtheequipment.Onthebattlefield,maintenanceSoldierswithouttheseskillslimitopera-tionsinaustereconditionsbyextendingdown-timescausedbyimproperlydiagnosedfaults.Thisisaseveredetrimenttocommanderswhoneedtheirstate-of-the-artequipmentreturnedtothefightquickly.
Civiliantradeschoolsformechanicsare1to2years;theArmyisgraduatingmechanicsevery13weeks.ItistimefortheArmytorevolutionizetechnicaltrainingtomeettheneedsofthecombatantcommander.
ArmyVocationalTrainingDuringfiscalyear2009,theArmyconducted
theArmyVocationalTrainingProgram(AVOTEC).ThroughAVOTEC,aSoldiercouldattendtrainingatacivilianvocationalortechnicalschoolandpursueanon-degree-relatedcertification.AVOTECcouldbeusedasamodelforafuturemulticapable,“maintainer-warrior”advancedindividualtraining(AIT).
ManyofthecertificationsofferedthroughAVO-TECwereintheautomotivetechnicalfield.Thesecivilianprogramsuseabuilding-blockapproachthatstartswiththefundamentalprinciplesofsystemoperationandprogressesgraduallytocomplexdiag-nosticandserviceprocedures.Thecoursescoverthelatestdevelopmentsintheautomotivefield,includinganonboarddiagnosticssystem(OBDII),enhancedemissionstesting,misfiremonitoring,andantilockbrakingsystems.
AVOTECalsooffereddieselcertificationthatcov-eredindepthinstructionondieselenginetheoryanddesign,engineperformance,lubricationsystems,induc-tionexhaustandafter-treatmentsystems,hydrostatictransmissions,heavy-dutytorqueconverters,powertrainprinciples,antilockbrakingairsystems,andmuchmore.
AutomotiveServiceExcellenceTheNationalInstituteforAutomotiveService
Excellence(ASE)isanonprofitorganizationthatadministersexamsthatstressknowledgeofjob-relatedskills.ASE’stestsareindustry-drivenandaregroupedintospecialtiesthatcovervirtuallyeveryon-highwayvehicleservicesegment.
AlthoughASEcertificationisavailabletoSoldiers,itisnotwidelyusedorpursued,eventhoughtheArmypaysformostofthecredentialingcosts.ASEtestsaredesignedtoguaranteeamechaniciscompetenttoperformtospecificstandardsestablishedbytheentireautomotiveindustry.Soldierswhoworkonthesamelevelofcompli-catedequipmentasciviliantechniciansshouldmeetthatminimumstandard.However,mostSoldiermechanics,ifforcedtotakethetests,wouldnotbeabletopass.
AVOTECwasorganizedaroundtheASEautomo-biletestareasandcorrelateddirectlywithstandardssetbytheNationalAutomotiveTechniciansEducationFoundation(NATEF).TheAVOTECcurriculumwasdesignedtoeducateamechanictothecompetencylevelrequiredtobeabletoefficientlyandaccuratelydiagnosemodernequipment.Uponcompletion,stu-dentsreceivednationallyrecognizedcertificationfromcommunitycollegesandtechnicaltradeschools.
AVOTECPossibilitiesWhileAVOTEClasted,itwasverysuccessfuland
manyArmymechanicsreceivedcertificationintheirfield.TheprogramlostfundingfromCongressinfiscalyear2009,butthelessonlearnedwasthatthistypeof
The Army mechanic has become a multicapable
maintainer who is required to troubleshoot using
advanced onboard diagnostics and
increasingly complex, interconnected vehicle
systems.
56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
tradeschooltrainingshouldbeintegratedfullyintotheArmy’strainingprogramformechanics.Thiswouldben-efittheArmyinseveralways:o Soldierrecruitingincentivesfortechnicalfields
wouldbeincreasedbecause,whileintheArmy,theSoldierswouldreceiveaccreditationthatwouldcorrelatedirectlytothecivilianworld.
o TheArmycouldrelylessoncontractorstoprovidemaintenancesincetheirownmechanicswouldhavetheexpertiseneededtorepairmodernequipment.
o Commanderswouldenjoyincreasedreadinessratesbecauseofproperfaultdiagnosis.
o Maintenancecostswouldbereducedasaresultofincreasedtroubleshootingaccuracy.Theadditionalcostsforthespecializedtraining
couldbeoffsetusingadistance-learningprogram.Tra-ditionaltradeschoolintheautomotivefieldisatleast1yearlongandoften2years.TheArmycouldreducethistimebyusinganonlineclassroom.Studentsofdistancelearninghavecomparabletestscorestoclass-roomstudents,andthestudent-to-instructorratiocanbeincreasedgreatlyonline.Byusingadistancelearningprogram,in-classtimecouldbereducedbyasmuchas50percent.
Dailyhomeworkusingthevirtualclassroomtosupplementandreinforcetrainingobjectiveswouldincreaseknowledgeretentionandcontributetoreducedtrainingtime.AcombinationofNATEFstandardsandtrade-school-styletraining,supplementedwithhome-workinanonlineclassroom,couldcreatea6-monthtechnicalschoolthatproduceshighlyqualifiedmechanics.
CertifyingMechanicsasTrueTechniciansToensurethatmechanicsarepreparedtorepair
modernequipment,certificationshouldbeanAITgraduationrequirement.ASEcertificationisathird-party,unbiasedendorsementthataSoldierhasclearlydemonstratedproficiencyinasubjectarea.Instruc-torsteachthesubjectratherthanthetest,andstudentsgraspaconceptratherthantestanswersbecausetheyhavenoforeknowledgeofthetestquestions.ToreachtheproficiencylevelrequiredtopassASEexams,Sol-diersalreadyinthefieldwoulduseavirtualclassroomtotakecourseslikethoseprovidedbyAVOTEC.
AlongwiththeASEcertification,anapprenticeshipprogramshouldbedevelopedwiththeU.S.Depart-mentofLabor.Withthisprogram,onceinthefield,mechanicswouldlogtheirhoursworkingin16dif-ferentareas,suchasenginesandbrakes.Dependingonthetechnicaleducationlevelandexperience,eachmechanicwouldlogfrom2,000to8,000hoursofhands-onworkinordertocompletetheprogram.Non-commissionedofficerswouldserveasexperiencedandskilledjourneymenwhoteachthepracticalskillsthatarelearnedonthejob.
Theschoolhousetrainingwouldbefollowedupinapracticalwayusingastructured,systematicprogramofsupervisedon-the-jobtraining.Theloggedhourswouldbeverifiedbythesupervisor,whowouldalsomonitortheSoldiers’proficiencyineacharea.Uponcompletionoftheprogram,theSoldierwouldreceivehisjourneymanmechanic’slicensefromtheDepart-mentofLabor.ThiscertificationisclearlyidentifiedandcommonlyrecognizedthroughouttheindustryandwouldvalidatetheSoldier’sskillset.
Usingthird-partyaccreditationtocertifythatSol-diersarepreparedforwhattheywillfaceinthefieldisnotanewidea.ArmynetworkoperatorsandmedicsbotharerequiredtoreceivecivilianaccreditationinordertobeMOScertified.Ithasproventoworkwell;ourmedicalfacilitiesandsystemnetworkscontinuetobethebestofanyArmyintheworld.
Oneunit,the551stInlandCargoTransferCompanyinKorea,adaptedacertificationprogramattheunitlevel.Thecompanyhad11Soldiersenrollintechnicalcertificationcoursesand15signupforASEtesting.Usingweeklystudygroupstohelpthemprepare,20percentofthemechanicsearnedASEcertifications.Undertheapprenticeshipprogram,3SoldiersreceivedDepartmentofLaborcertificationsand15areactivelyenrolled.
Acertificationprogramsimilartotheoneusedbythe551stInlandCargoTransferCompanyneedstobephasedintoAIT.Theprogramwouldalsoserveasaruletomeasuremaintenancecollectivetasksinsupportofaunit’smission-essentialtasklist.Itwouldtake2to4yearsforeachmechanictologtherequiredhands-onhoursineachworkareaandcompletethejourney-man’scertification.Thesetaskscouldbetrackedandusedtogaugethemaintenancesection’sabilitytosup-porttheunit’smission.
After10yearsofcombat,unitsarelearningthattheirmechanicsneedtofocusasmuchonMOSskillsastheydoonwarriortasksanddrills.CommandersonthegroundneedtechnicallycompetentSoldierswhomeettheneedsofourverycomplexcurrentoperationalenvironment.Theunit-levelArmylackstheresourcestotraintothisproficiencylevel.Main-tenancetrainingintheArmyneedstobemodeledaftertheindustrytrainingsystemandmeetNATEFstandards.Itistimeforamuch-neededoverhauloftheArmy’smaintenancetrainingprogram.
cHief warrant officer 2 MattHew r. Mccaslin is tHe bat-talion Maintenance officer for tHe 4tH battalion, 1st special forces Group (airborne), at joint base lewis-MccHord, wasHinGton. He is a national institute for autoMotiVe serVice excellence certified tecHnician witH a Vocational certification as a Modern autoMotiVe tecHnician, and He is a journeyMan certified truck MecHanic witH tHe u.s. departMent of labor.
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The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What We Can Do About It. JoshuaC.Ramo,Little,BrownandCom-pany,NewYork,2009,279pages.
JoshuaC.Ramo’sbook,The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What We Can Do About It,hasbeengivenconsid-erableattentionwithintheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommandforitsprojectionofaglobalfuturechar-acterizedbyacceleratinganduncontrollablechange,surprise,andunpredictability.Ramocontendsthatthe“AgeoftheUnthinkable”willbearevolutionaryeraofsurpriseandinnovationwheresmalleventscanhavemomentousconsequencesfortheglobalcommunity.
Tosurvivethisage,Ramosuggeststhatwewillneedtothinkandactlikerevolutionaries,orelsewewillbecomevictimsoftherevolution.Ramo’sidealrevolutionariesarequick-thinkingandfast-actinginsurgentswhowageconstantwaragainstanarrayofever-presentthreatstotheirexistence.“Newworld”thinkingdemandsacceptanceofthebasicunpredict-abilityofthecomingglobalorderand“junking”ofthetraditionalnoncreativethinkingreminiscentofthe“oldworld.”
FundamentaltoRamo’snewworldthinkingistheadoptionof“deepsecurity,”arevolutionary“wayofseeing,thinking,andactingthatacceptsgrowingcomplexityandceaselessnewnessasgivens.”Deepsecurityhasthreeelements:nonlinearthinking,con-text,andresiliency.Nonlinearthinkingisthemostcriticalelement,sinceaccesstotheothertwo(con-textandresiliency)dependsonone’swillingnesstothinkinanonlinearfashion.
Whilelinearthinkingderivesfromthescientificmethod,criticalthinking,andthelogicalapproachthatvaluesobjectivity,nonlinearthinkingisrelativetoone’spointofviewandmovesinmultipledirec-tionsfrommultiplestartingpoints,eschewingthepossibilityorthenecessityofobjectivity.Ramoasso-ciateslinearthinkingwithhierarchicalorganizationswheredecisionsandinformationoriginateatthetopandmovedownwardverticallyandnonlinearthinkingwithdiversity,globalization,multiplepointsofviews,andhorizontal“flattenedorganizations.”
Ramocontendsthattherewillbe“norightfinalviewoftheworld.”Likeotherscaughtinthepost-moderntrap,Ramoleaveshisreaderswithnogoodreasontobelievehisview.Infact,thisstatementcon-stitutesthegreatparadoxofhisbook.Theefficacyofnonlinearthinkingdecreasesinrelationtotheaccep-tanceofRamo’slinearthought.
InregardtotherelationshipbetweentheUnitedStatesandIran,Ramomaintainsthat“swarming
itwithdifferentpolicies,presentsaradicallynewkindofdiplomaticpressurethatisbothresponsiveandflexible,thatdoesn’tcountonanycertainties.”Statementslikethisconvincereadersthat“nonlinear-ity”istheresultofRamo’sdesiretodrawacrowdratherthanagenuineformofpsychosocialbehavior.IfIranianpoliciesarenotaftersomecertainty,whybother?Oncethereaderblowsthroughthepoppsy-chology,Ramoissimplypresentingdifferentstrate-gies,eachofwhichbegsforsomemeasureoflinearcertainty.
Ramostatesthatresiliencywilldefinesecurityinthe21stcentury.Insteadofthelinearapproachthattriestoanticipateeverypossiblecontingency,aresilientnonlinearapproachensuresadaptabilityandsurvival.Resilientpeopledevelopstrong“immunesystem[s]”thatenablethemto“bounceback”fromthechaoticandindeterminatenatureofthenewage.Theyareamoralandbelievethereisnoonerightwayofthinkingordoing.Changeforthemisconstantandawasteofenergytoresist.Theyreadythemselvesforatimewheneveryonewilllivebytheirownrulesorbeforcedtolivebytherulesofsomeoneelse.
IfRamo’snihilisticvisionofthefutureholdstrue,thenonresilientwillbecomethewreckageofbygonecivilizations.Forthemorehopeful,Ramofailstosubstantiatethepremiseofhisbook—thatthereissomethinguniquelyspecialaboutthenewage.Muchofthestrengthofhisargumentliesinanecdotalevi-dencegeneratedtoconvincereadersthatheisawiseandtenuredworldtravelerwhohastalkedtotherightpeople.
Lineartruthbetold,strandsofRamo’sthoughtcanbetracedbacktotheintellectualmoodattheturnofthe20thcenturyamongSocialDarwinistslikeWil-liamGrahamSumnerwhomadeglibassertionsaboutthe“survivalofthefittest”andthesappyintentofCongresstointerferewiththelibertyofmineopera-torsemploying10-year-oldboys.HenryAdams,Sum-ner’smorethoughtfulcontemporary,worriedaboutthe“lawofacceleration”thatwaswhirlingsocietyoutofcontrolandcausingittobreakintoanincalcu-lablenumberofpieces.Hethoughtitmight“requireanewsocialmind”toputitallbacktogether,buthesawnothingtosuggestthemindwouldnotreact.Hewascertain,however,that“itwouldneedtojump.”
Theminddidjump,andthereisnogoodreasontobelieveitwillnotdosoagain.Ramoisnotthefirsttoexperiencetheconfusionanduncertaintyofaworldinrapidorevenunpredictabletransition,norwillhebethelast.
stepHen e. bower, pH.d., is tHe coMMand Historian at tHe arMy soldier support institute at fort jackson, soutH carolina.
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58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
FunctionalArea90OfficiallyReplacedbyLogisticsBranchasPartofLogisticsOfficerChanges
On14September2010,theArmyG–1publishedNotificationofFutureChangeO–1010–02,“DeletionofFunctionalArea(FA)90(Logistics);Establish-mentofBranch(BR)90(Logistics)andRevisionofBranch88(TransportationCorps),Branch91(Ordnance),andBranch92(Quartermaster)”toDepartmentoftheArmyPamphlet611–21,MilitaryOccupationalClassificationandStructure.
Thisnotificationofficiallyestablishesthedocu-mentationoflogisticianpositionsandisanongo-ingaction,continuingfromtheestablishmentoftheLogisticsbranchon1January2008.
Thesignificantchangeslistedinthisnotificationincluderevisingtheareaofconcentration(AOC)specificationsfor90A(Logistics).Allcaptaintocolonelpositionsdocumentedinauthorizationdocu-mentsastransportation(88A,88B,88C,and88D),ordnance(91A),andquartermaster(92Aand92F)willbetransferredtoAOC90Awiththecurrentbasicfunctionalbranchlistedasthesecondarycodeeffec-tiveonandafter1October2011.Thisisforallcom-ponents.
PersonnelinthegradeofcaptainwhocompletetheCombinedLogisticsCaptainsCareerCourses(CLC3)(ActivedutyorReservecomponentcourses)willbetransferredtoAOC90AandwillretaintheirbasicbranchastheirsecondaryAOC.
Transportationpersonnelinthegradeofcap-tainwhohavenotcompletedCLC3oranylogisticsReservecomponentcaptainscareercoursewillbereclassifiedtoAOC88AintheinterimandthenwillbereclassifiedtoAOC90Awithbranch88asthemilitaryoccupationalspecialtycodeuponcompletionofoneofthetwoabovecourses.
Anotherprovisioncallsforallremainingperson-nelinthegradesofmajorthroughcolonelwhoarecurrentlyclassifiedastransportation,ordnance,andquartermasterofficerstobereclassifiedtoAOC90AandretaintheirbasicbranchasthesecondaryAOCpositionofthemilitaryoccupationalspecialtycode.Thisactionwillbecompletednolaterthan30Sep-tember2011andincludesallcomponents.
Fortheremainingtransportationofficersinthegradeoflieutenant,AOCs88B(trafficmanagement),88C(marineandterminaloperations),and88D(motor/railtransportation)aredeletedandalloffi-cerswillbetransferredtoAOC88A(transportationgeneral).
Quartermasterofficerspecificationsfor92A(quar-termastergeneral)willalsoberevised.ThenoticedeletesAOC92F(petroleumandwater)andestab-lishesR8,petroleumandwater,asaskillidentifierassociatedwithAOC90A.Thealreadyexistingskill
identifiersR9,aerialdeliveryandmaterielofficer(rigger),and4V,mortuaryaffairs,willtransfertobeassociatedwithAOC90Aaswell.
Therefore,effective1October2011,allauthoriza-tionsforlogisticsofficersinthegradesofcaptainthroughcolonelwillappearonauthorizationdocu-ments(tablesoforganizationandequipmentortablesofdistributionandallowances)as90A.
Requirementsforfunctionalpositionswillremain.However,afunctionalbillet,suchasamaintenanceofficer,willbelistedontheauthorizationdocumentas90A91.Theauthorizationforapetroleumopera-tionsofficerwillbedocumentedas90A92R8.
Formoreinformation,contactLieutenantColonelKimberlyDarbyattheLogisticsBranchProponencyOffice,ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommandandSustainmentCenterofExcellence,bycalling(804)734–0315.
ArmyHospitalShelvesPaperProcessesforDigitalSupplySysteminAfghanistan
InAugust,the31stCombatSupportHospital(CSH)atCampDwyer,Afghanistan,becamethefirstArmyfacilityinSouthwestAsiatousetheDefenseMedicalLogisticsStandardSupport(DMLSS)sys-tem—anautomatedmedicallogistics(MEDLOG)systemusedtosupportinventorymanagementandpropertyaccountabilityinmedicaltreatmentfacili-ties.ThesystemwasemplacedwiththehelpoftheDMLSSfieldingteam,composedofrepresentativesfromMedicalCommunicationsforCombatCasualtyCare(MC4)andthe6thMedicalLogisticsManage-mentCenteratFortDetrick,Maryland.
DMLSSprovidedtheCSHbettervisibilityandmanagementofitsmedicalsuppliesandsupplychain,aswellasthecapabilitytoprocessthousandsoftransactionselectronically.Withthisnewsystem,the31stCSHimproveditsbusinessprocessesandshelvedoldmethodsthatusedpaperforms.
SergeantFirstClassEnocSantos,amemberoftheDMLSSfieldingteam,saidthatprocessesweremuchdifferentbeforeDMLSS.“Everymorning,medicalpersonnelthroughoutthehospitalandremoteloca-tionshand-carriedordersonpaperformstothemedi-calsupplysection,”Santossaid.“Cliniciansfilledtheordersbywalkingtheaislesliketheywereataneigh-borhoodgrocerystore.Theypulledtheitemsorderedandadditionalsuppliesjustincase.Ifawardranlowonsupplies,someonewalkedtothemedicalsupplysectiontorestock.”
Thesteadystreamofcliniciansthroughthemedi-calsupplysectionmadestockmanagementdifficult.Interruptionscauseddelaysinreorderingsupplies,
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andMEDLOGpersonnelregularlywalkedtheaislestoupdatethelevelsofprovisionsonhand.
BeforeimplementingDMLSS,theMC4teamcon-ductedawall-to-wallinventorythatfurtherprovedtheneedforadigitalmanagementsystem.Theremotetreatmentfacilityhadenoughmedicalsup-pliesonhandtofillordersfordozensoftreatmentfacilitiesthroughoutAfghanistan.
AftertheinstallationofDMLSS,ordersweresub-mittedelectronically.Inoneweek,theunitdigitallyprocessedmorethan1,500transactions,comparedtotheapproximately900ithadaveragedbeforeusingDMLSS.
Thesystemenablesanewproactivebusinessmodelthatallowscustomersinremotelocationstoreceivesuppliesdirectly.Previously,theCSHreceivedorders
andthenroutedsuppliesforwardtotheselocations.ThischangereducedtheinventorystoredbytheCSH.
WithDMLSSempoweringhospitalwardstomanagetheirownstockwithoutvisitingthesupplysection,userscanfocusmoretimeonpatientcare.DMLSSalsoprovideswardstaffwiththecapabilitytosearchelectronicallyforsuppliestoborrowfromotherhospitalwardsifordersaredelayed.
Commandersresponsibleforsupplymanagementandoversighthavealsogainedanadvantagethroughbettervisibilityoftheglobalsupplychain.DataenteredintoDMLSSfeedsintotheJointMedicalAssetRepository.Itservesastheroll-upreportingtoolformedicalsupplymanagement,similartohowtheJointMedicalWorkstationhelpswithmedicalcaresurveillance.
NewWarfighterTrainingSupportPackagesAvailableFromtheArmySoldierSupportInstitute
TheArmySoldierSupportInstitute(SSI)atFortJackson,SouthCarolina,hasreleaseditsfirstthreewarfightertrainingsupportpackages(WTSPs)oncollectivetasks:“PlanTheaterPostalSupport,”“PerformDisbursingOperations,”and“ConductCasualtyOperations.”
TheWTSPsareavailableonS1Netathttps://forums.bcks.army.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=1128699;FinancialManagement(FM)Netathttps://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/622772(underFMTraining);andattheArmyTrainingNetwork(ATN)websiteathttps://atn.army.mil.
TheseWTSPsprovidebasicknowledgeofmaildelivery,financialdisbursingoperations,andcasualtyoperations.Thetrainingmaterialswithineachpackageincludethecollectivetasks,supportingindividualtasks,lessonplans,MicrosoftPowerPointslides,practicalexercisesandsolutions,handouts,andreferencematerials.IndividualsmustbeArmyKnowledgeOnlineaccountholdersinordertoaccessthesetrainingmaterials.
InJanuary2010,theSSITrainingDevelopmentDirectorateembarkedonamissiontodevelopWTSPsfortheAdjutantGeneral(AG)andFMcollectivetasks,withtheobjectiveofprovidingstandardizedtrainingproductsforallAGandFMunitstouseinconductingsectionandteamtraining.“PlanTheaterPostalSupport”and“PerformDis-bursingOperations”wereselectedasthefirstWTSPstobedeveloped,basedonfeedbackobtainedfromfieldunitsduringtheSilverScimitar
pROFESSIONAL DEVELOpMENT
trainingexerciseandaDecember2009FMTrainingSummit.
TheseWTSPscanbeusedcollectivelyorindividuallytoassistAGandFMSoldiersingaining,maintaining,andimprovingtheirtechnicalproficiencytoperformtheindividualandcollectivetasksrequiredtoaccomplishtheirwartimemission.
WTSPsareintendedtosupplementtheunits’approvedcombinedarmstrainingstrategy.BecauseWTSPshavenosetsequenceormandatedrequirementtotheWTSPs,unittrainersandleadersshouldfirstassessthetrainingstatusoftheirtraineestoselecttheappropriatestartingpointandtopicsfortraining.
OneattributeoftheseWTSPsthatishelpfultoReservecomponent(RC)unitsistheestimated“academichours”providedforeachlessonplanandallocatedbytrainingsessions.AlthoughRCunitsusethesamecombinedarmstrainingstrategyasActivecomponentunits,theseallocatedacademichourscanserveasaguidelineforschedulingtechnicaltraining.RCunitsmustacknowledgewhentheymayrequireseveraldrillperiodstocompleteaspecifictask.
TheSSIstaffcontinuestoworkonfutureWTSPs,including“CasualtyLiaisonTeamActivities,”“ProvidePostalServices,”“PerformTransientPersonnelAccountability,”and“ConductCommercialVendorOperations.”AstheWTSPsbecomeavailable,theywillbepostedinboththeFMandS1NetandontheATNnetwork.
FormoreinformationonSSIWTSPs,[email protected](803)751−8287.
60 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
“TheuseofDMLSShelpsseniorleadershiptobettermanagetheglobalMEDLOGefforts,”Santossaid.“Sincecommandershavevisibilityoftheentiresupplychain,theycantakeactiontorectifyavarietyofissues,rangingfromtransportationproblemstomovingcriticalsuppliestoanotherpartoftheater.”
OperationVictorySweepContinuesEffortsToUseArmyResourcesWisely
TopurgeexcessequipmentfromCampBasra,Iraq,andreallocateittofillneedselsewhere,the1stInfantryDivisionandmobileredistributionteamsiniti-atedOperationVictorySweepon1November2010.CaptainDavidShaffer,thesupplyandservicesofficer-in-charge,saidthedivisionaccomplishedthemissionbyreevaluatingunits’excessassetsandreducingthenumberoffuturesupplypurchases.
“VictorySweepisacontinuationelementofOpera-tionCleanSweepOne,”Shaffersaid.“It’satheater-widemissioncomprisedofmobileredistributionteamsinspectingandconsolidatingallexcesssuppliesatindividualsites,thenreintegratingthemforforwardmovement.”
AccordingtoSchaffer,inlessthanaweek,theredistri-butionteamatCampBasrawasabletoclear45contain-ersandreintegratednearly$200,000worthofsupplies.
RedistributionteamsbeganthefirstVictorySweepoperationsinApril.“InApril,wedrewexcesspropertyfromtheentirebaseandprocessedseveralcontainersfulltothebrimof[vehicleequipment],rangingfromnutsandboltstoaxlesfortacticalvehicles,includ-ingafewengines,”observedCaptainAndreaSo,thelogisticsofficerofHeadquartersandHeadquartersBattalion,1stInfantryDivision.“Itreturnedmorethan$5million…tothesupplysystem.”
Theearly2010missionandaSeptembermissionreenteredassetsintothesupplysystemvaluedatnearly$7.5million,accordingtoSo.Itemsnotneededongroundwillbeshippedtowarehouses,whichmaybe
The 319th Transportation Company noncommissioned officerincharge of the mobile redistribution teams for Operation Clean Sweep inspects excess supplies with a chief petty officer from Riverine Squadron 1 in Basra, Iraq, on 4 November. (Photo by SPC Raymond Quin-tanilla, 305th MPAD)
AUSAToHostInstituteofLandWarfareSustainmentSymposiumandExposition
TheAssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmy(AUSA)InstituteofLandWarfareSustainmentSymposiumandExpositionisscheduledtobeheldfrom10to12May2011attheGreaterRichmondConventionCenterinRichmond,Virginia.Formoreinformationortoregister,visittheAUSAwebsiteatwww.ausa.org.
Upcoming Event
MARCH–ApRIL 2011 61
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beginwriting,reviewapastissueofArmy Sustainment;itwillbeyourbestguide.Thenfollowtheserules:oKeepyourwritingsimpleandstraightforward(tryreadingitbacktoyourselfortoacolleague).oAttributeallquotes.oIdentifyallacronyms,technicalterms,andpublications(forexample,FieldManual[FM]4–0,Sustainment).oDonotassumethatthosereadingyourarticlearenecessarilySoldiersorthattheyhavebackgroundknowledge
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usedtofillrequisitionselsewhereinIraqorAfghani-stan.ItemsnotserviceablewillgoforrepairsortotheDefenseReutilizationandMarketingOffice.
VictorySweepnotonlyre-allocatesresources.AccordingtoSo,VictorySweepisalsopreparingthebasesinU.S.Division-SouthforeventualclosureandtransfertotheGovernmentofIraq.
TeamAidsCampBuccaBaseClosureAbaseclosureassistanceteam(BCAT)comprising
logisticianstrainedinbaseclosureprojectspreparedthe1stInfantryDivisiontohandoverCampBucca,
Iraq,totheIraqigovernment.TheBCATworkedwiththeengineersandlogisticsshopstoanswerquestionsfrommilitaryunitsandciviliancontractorsregardingaccountabilityandequipmentandinfrastructure.
Tasksincludedintheclosureweremovementoftroopsandcivilians;initial,preliminary,andfinalstageplanningbybaseenvironmentalspecialists;athoroughinventoryofmilitary-andcontractor-ownedequipment;andthereductionoffood,laundry,andInternetservices.
TheCampBuccabaseclosurebeganinApril2010withthetransferoftheTheaterInternmentFacility.Thebasewascompletelytransferredtothegovern-mentofIraqinDecember.
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ISSN 2153–5973DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYARMY SUSTAINMENTUS ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY2401 QUARTERS ROADFORT LEE VIRGINIA 23801–1705
Official Business
o TheArmyOutofBalanceo ClassIV:FromManufacturertoFOBo SuppliesFromtheSkyo The307thBSBandIraqiArmyLogisticso ExpandingLogisticsCapacityo SustainmentBrigadeForwardMedicalOperationso SpecialOperationsLogisticsSupporto The1stSustainmentBrigadeSustainmentOperationsCentero BuildinganAircraftWhileinFlighto WhyLogisticiansFailatKnowledgeManagemento NorthernDistributionNetwork
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