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Mapping Conflict Motives: Katanga Update: December 2007- May 2008

Steven Spittaels & Filip Hilgert

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EditorialResearch and editing: Steven Spittaels & Filip Hilgert Lay Out: Anne Hullebroeck

Antwerp 25 juni 2008

Caption photo Front Page: A graveyard on the premises of the Ruashi Mine near Lubum-bashi, 2008 (Photo: IPIS)

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the following partner organisations for their contributions to the research:

Asadho/katanga•

Padholik•

Promotion des populations Indigènes (PPI)•

And one other organisation•

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Table of Contents

Introduction 4

The FARDC and the ‘brassage’ process 5

The North 6

Presence of armed groups 6

Motives of armed groups 6

Presence of FARDC 6

Motives of FARDC 7

The Copperbelt 8

Presence of armed groups 8

Presence of FARDC 8

Motives of FARDC 8

The Centre 10

Presence of armed groups 10

Motives of armed groups 10

Presence of FARDC 10

Motives of FARDC 11

The East 11

Presence of armed groups 11

Motives of armed groups 11

Presence of FARDC 12

Motives of FARDC 12

Conclusion and recommendations 13

New maps 14

Annexe; List of abbreviations 15

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IntroductionIn this second update there are two central issues.

A first is the precarious security situation in the North of the province. The Northern territories of Nyunzu and Kalemie are becoming more and more of a lawless frontier land where greed motivated ex-Mayi-Mayi combatants and the FARDC are both lingering in mining areas.FARDC units, instead of protecting the DRC territory and its population, continue to commit grave Human Rights violations while profiting from mineral exploitation and trade. The former Mayi-Mayi show a renewed activism because of the imminent formation of a new FARDC ‘Border Guard Brigade’. This Brigade will be composed of ex-Mayi-Mayi and therefore it gives them a new reason of existence.

A second is the security hazard of radioactive minerals in the South. In the Copperbelt, the State presence is much stronger and the security situation has improved. Until now, there have only been a few limited incidents with groups of artisanal miners (whose position and existence is under strain because of the industrialisation of the mining sector). However, serious security risks remain, not the least the Katangese uranium. Radioactive heterogenite is stockpiled and transported throughout the territories of Mutshatsha, Lubudi, Kambove and Kipushi (Lubumbashi). The level of radiation coming from these minerals is sometimes extremely high.

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The FARDC and the ‘brassage’ processAs a result of Regional Commander General Padiri’s initiative to gather the ‘lost Mayi-Mayi1’, a new FARDC Brigade – the so-called Border Guard – is to be created in the North of the province. The Brigade should be composed of and led by former Mayi-Mayi fighters who have not taken part in any DDR programme. The composition of the Brigade is problematic, as to both the leadership and the rank and file.

The leadership is disputed between the ‘lost Mayi-Mayi’, led by Chief Kameko, and Tango Fort, an integrated Mayi-Mayi leader. The first group claims the commander should be chosen from those war chiefs that never entered any DDR process, but Mufu III, Padiri’s envoy for the operation, puts forward Major Tango Fort as the most suitable candidate2.

The problems with the integrated Mayi-Mayi go beyond the leadership question and Tango Fort. More and more of the integrated Mayi-Mayi want to reconsider their choice to re-enter civilian life because they claim the advantages they received were insufficient3. Another difficulty in getting together the bulk of the troops lies in some serious ethnic tensions. Leaders of both the Pygmy and Bakalanga ex-combatants have called upon their followers to remain in the region and consequently not to leave for Kalemie where the Brigade should be formed. They distrust each other and believe they should remain with their people to protect them against ‘the others’4.

1 Spittaels S. & Hilgert F. Mapping Interests in Conflict Areas: Katanga. Update: September-November 2007. IPIS report, January 2008, p. 4. 2 Research report by local partner, February 2008.3 OCHA, Situation Report. 27 February- 4 March 2008. 4 Research report by local partner, March 2008.

The titles in the left column refer to the map that should be consulted while reading the text

ETHNIC

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The NorthPresence of armed groups

The ‘lost Mayi-Mayi’ and other candidates for the Border Guard Brigade should gather in Kalemie for it is there that the unit will be formed. However, many of the ex-combatants hang about the mining areas of Northern Katanga or set up their camps in the near vicinity. Reportedly, even Colonel Mufu III, who is supposed to coordinate the whole operation, is lingering in the mines and has taken an interest in the newly discovered coltan mine of Kilunga5. Besides Mufu III, also his confidant Tango Fort is a regular visitor of the mines. Tango Fort even has two permanent representatives at the mine of Kisengo, namely the Majors Malandala and Ntatala6.

Motives of armed groups

Bearing in mind the previous paragraph, it needs little explanation that the ex-combatants are mostly interested in profiting from the natural resources. Moving forward the process of gathering all popular defence forces into a Border Guard Brigade seems only of secondary importance. This image is strengthened by a series of extortion incidents in which ex-combatants are involved. The most striking phenomenon is the creation of improvised and illegal makeshift prisons at mining sites. In such cells the ex-combatants lock up and often torture civilians. The detainees are only released from their custody after paying a ridiculously high fine. One officer, Major Ntatala, a confidant of Colonel Tango Fort, even used his own bedroom as a prison cell7.

In the mining area of Kilunga, villagers have complained about cases of harassment committed by troops under the command of Mufu III8.

Presence of FARDC

The security situation in the North of the province is worsening. The area is more and more characterised by a worrying degree of lawlessness. The present FARDC troops are supposed to secure the area and protect the population against remnants of the former Mayi-Mayi militias, but they act oppositely. The most striking phenomenon that illustrates this development are a series of mass prison breaks in the Northern territories. During several recent incidents at both the Kongolo and Kalemie prison, large groups of prisoners managed to escape, often with the complicity of FARDC soldiers taking care of the security at the prison.

As little as they seem to care about the general security of the population, as much are they involved in mining business. The coltan mine of Kisengo remains the most important pole of attraction (BOX 1).

5 OCHA, Situation Report. 6-12 February 2008.6 Research report by local partner, March 2008.7 Research report by local partner, March 2008.8 Research report by local partner, March 2008.

MAYI-MAYINATURAL RESOURCES

FARDC

INCIDENTS

INCIDENTS

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BOX 1: Internal FARDC struggle over Kisengo

As described in the previous update report, the Kisengo mine is controlled by FARDC soldiers who commit serious human rights abuses9. These FARDC soldiers originate from different units who are all present in the area. First it was soldiers from Kongolo that arrived at the site. Kisengo borders the territory under the command of the military base in Kongolo headed by Captain Mamadou10. On different occasions the soldiers from Kongolo have clashed with soldiers from Kalemie. Noteworthy are a series of violent incidents in November 2007 when a magistrate was sent to Kisengo by the Military Justice garrison in Kalemie following a series of complaints by the local population. The magistrate arrested several of the ‘Kongolo soldiers’ – one of them for firing a rocket in the town centre – but his authority was not accepted by Mamadou whose troops liberated all the detainees by force.

It is not clear whether the actions of the Military Justice unit were only well-intended and devoid of any self-interest because several Military Justice elements from Kalemie have been implicated in illegal mining themselves. In the ‘100 kilo’ mine near Mayi Baridi, for example, another mine close to Kisengo, they have organised exploitation at night through forced labour11.

Besides the infantry soldiers from Kongolo, the Military Justice soldiers from Kalemie and the Congolese Navy, which were already mentioned in the previous update, currently also many ex-combatants hang about the site. Many of them wear uniforms and use FARDC badges to indicate their ‘self-proclaimed’ ranks. Tango Fort, for example, goes around in an FARDC officer’s uniform with the insignia of a Colonel and has an escort of 5 armed men12.

Motives of FARDC

The FARDC soldiers in the North are still interested and implicated in the coltan mining business. They are still a liability to the local population and, instead of getting better, the situation seems to get worse. In the past months there have been several reports on killings, armed robbery (mostly of minerals) and other acts of severe aggression.

The mines in the North do not only attract large numbers of artisanal miners and abusive security services13. The last two years, several small mining companies have bought exploration permits for concessions in the region. These operators do not limit themselves to mere exploration but are actively involved in exploitation, in contravention of their contracts. Mining companies active in the area include: Katanga Metal Company (KAMCO), TSM Entreprise, SK Mineral SPRL, Kasai Mining and Exploration LTD, Katebe Leila and SOCOMIN14. The last two companies frequent the Kisengo site. More than 95% of the minerals from Kisengo and Northern Katanga in general are transported to Bukavu where they cross the border with Rwanda and Burundi15.

9 Spittaels S. & Hilgert F. Mapping Interests in Conflict Areas: Katanga. Update: September-November 2007. IPIS report, January 2008, 11p. 10 Early 2008, Mamadou was summoned to Lubumbashi because of the persistent problems with his troops. 11 The case came to light when in December 2007 a mine cave-in at night resulted in the death of 6 miners. The other miners tried to avenge the death of their companions but the soldiers escaped after firing in the air. 12 Confidential written FARDC source, 2008. 13 Even the DGM has arrived in Kisengo and has set up a roadblock where it demands ‘taxes’. 14 Research report by local partner, January 2008. 15 Research report by local partner, January 2008.

INCIDENTS

NATURAL RESOURCES

INCIDENTS

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The CopperbeltPresence of armed groups

Although no Mayi-Mayi movement was ever active in the Copperbelt, many ex-combatants currently reside in the area. Most of them work as artisanal miners in the copper and cobalt mines.

Presence of FARDC

The FARDC presence in the Copperbelt has been strengthened. A second Battalion of the 65th Brigade has been sent to Kolwezi.

Motives of FARDC

One explanation for the FARDC reinforcements in Kolwezi could be merely the return to the situation before the ‘brassage’ process, when the whole 65th Brigade (4 Battalions) was deployed in the area between Kolwezi and Dilolo.

Another possible explanation is the tense situation among artisanal miners in this area. On several occasions, large groups of artisanal miners have clashed with the PNC and other security services. Incidents have happened both in the vicinity of Kolwezi and in Likasi. In one case, a march of miners from Kamatanda in the town centre of Likasi, the protest resulted in the death of a 15 year old boy. A panic broke out when the police fired their guns in the air as a response to stone throwing by the protesters16. The protests usually start when artisanal mining sites are closed or when miners are forced to leave their site because of exploration or industrial exploitation. The miners count a considerable number of ex-combatants among their ranks, which makes them a force to reckon with.

However, the FARDC are not directly involved in dealing with the miner protests. In fact they should not be, because it is not their task. Moreover, if they would ever intervene, they certainly would not need a force of two Battalions (more than 1000 soldiers).

Another current issue that could explain the FARDC reinforcements is the renewed attention for the Katangese uranium deposits. A geological layer containing radioactive material runs from Shinkolobwe, near Likasi, to Kalongwe (65 km south of Kolwezi and close to the Zambian border). There are three major mines along this axis but uranium can also be found in areas outside these mines and even beyond the above-mentioned axis. In the past 10 years, a lot of radioactive minerals have been dug up in Katanga. In an earlier report on Katanga, IPIS has described how until 2004, 6000 artisanal miners were working undisturbed on the site of Shinkolobwe alone17. In 2004 the mine was officially closed by presidential decree but small-scale mining activities continued at least until May last year and probably later18. Radioactive heterogenite has been sold, traded and stocked during all those years and it is impossible to trace where all of it ended up.

Existing evidence and recent incidents both point to the conclusion that the situation is alarming and that the environmental and security consequences might be incalculable if no proper action is taken in time (BOX 2).

16 Research report by local partner, April 2008.17 Spittaels S., & Meynen N., Mapping Interests in Conflict Areas: Katanga. IPIS report, June 2007, pp. 23-24. 18 Ibidem.

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BOX 2: Recent incidents indicating the extent of the uranium problem in Katanga

A preview of an environmental cataclysm was shown in November last year, when 17 tons of radioactive minerals were dumped in the Mura river at 10 km from Likasi. The uranium came from three trucks, owned by the companies Chemaf, Magma and Louis Kyombo. On their way from Kolwezi they were stopped and controlled by the anti-fraud brigade of Likasi19. When they were taken to the office of the public prosecutor, the order was given to destroy the minerals at the closed mining site of Shinkolobwe20. Somehow, though, they never arrived at their destination and the minerals were dumped into the river Mura instead. It has to be noted that the Mura is one of the sources for the running water system of Likasi.

In the aftermath of the previous incident, the provincial governorate sent a commission to companies and warehouses throughout the Copperbelt. 43 places were investigated and in 24 of them levels of radioactivity were found beyond what is legally allowed21. The highest level measured was almost 100 milliröntgen per hour22, equal to 1 millisievert per hour, which is 300 times the amount of radiation allowed by Congolese law23. Coincidence or not, these readings came from the Magma company, one of the three trading companies of which a truckload was dumped in the Mura river. Other major transgressors with readings above 10 milliröntgen per hour were Crested Mining in Kolwezi and Dynamic, Congo Minmet and Sayona in Likasi24. Even in Lubumbashi radioactive minerals were found.

In the framework of the provincial commission, in November 2007 alone, 100.000 tons of nuclear material were returned to Gecamines and several businesses were (temporarily) closed. It has to be noted that radioactive materials are also stored in homes, offices and even schools throughout the whole area.

Besides the measures taken by the governorate, the security at Shinkolobwe has reportedly been tightened and is again entrusted to the Presidential Guard25. If this will result in effectively stopping all mining activities, remains to be seen.

At least one unit of FARDC soldiers in the Shinkolobwe area does not operate there to prevent the uncontrolled dispersion of radioactive minerals but to profit from them. An intra-FARDC incident in March 2008 clearly illustrates this. In the vicinity of Camp Mura, on one of the transport routes from the Shinkolobwe area, FARDC soldiers under the command of a certain Captain Igwabi set up a roadblock to levy a tax on mining products in exchange for a right of passage. When this came to the ears of the Military Justice in Likasi, they sent a unit to put 19 Radio interviews with Didace Pembé, the Congolese minister of the environment and Thierry Michel, Belgian journalist, November 2007. 20 Ibidem. It is not the first time that the site of Shinkolobwe would have been used to dump uranium from elsewhere. In the past, radioactive material from the Musonoi mine (very close to Kolwezi) was sent to Shinkolobwe too. 21 Confidential written source. 22 100 milliröntgen, the equivalent of 1 millisievert, is the amount of radiation a civilian in Belgium may be ex-posed to without having to undergo a medical checkup. By way of comparison: on average, a person exposed to 10 millisievert/year has 5% more chance of developing some sort of cancer (telephone interview conducted by IPIS with employee ‘Federaal Agentschap voor Nucleaire Controle’, June 2008). A person working at the Magma minerals stocks would reach this amount in two days. 23 Confidential written source.24 Conficential written source.25 Ehrenkranz A., Keeping Watch Over Remote Uranium Reserves. In: Newsweek, 30 May 2008.

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an end to the initiative. However, an exchange of fire between the two units broke out, resulting in the death of the Military Justice unit’s leading inspector26.

Apart from the uranium, in the first months of 2008 the FARDC continued to figure in several security incidents related to the (illegal) trade of other natural resources. Even in the Copperbelt, the least lawless part of the province, it seems Congolese army officials are still implicated in the mining business.

The CentrePresence of armed groups

The Mayi-Mayi map shows that small groups of ex-Mayi-Mayi fighters are spread all over the sectors of Kiona Ngoyi and Balomotwa in Mitwaba territory.

It is difficult to gather information on the precise number and positions of such small bands. The Katangese territory is vast and in many places almost inaccessible. But it is reasonable to assume that the large dispersion of groups of ex-combatants is not limited to Mitwaba and that the same situation exists in several other territories of Central, East and North Katanga27.

Motives of armed groups

The remnants of the Mayi-Mayi militias occupy themselves with either mining or agriculture and fishing. Some of them are still involved in poaching too. In general, the Mayi-Mayi still seem to live off the land, pursuing their survival but little more. However, two marginal comments need to be made. Firstly, artisanal mining in Mitwaba is small in scale but should not be underestimated. Approximately 2000 miners work in the cassiterite mines near Mitwaba (BOX 3)28. Consequently, a well-positioned Mayi-Mayi would be able to make good money in the mining business. Secondly, conflicts over customary power continue within the territories of the Upemba region29. Some of them involve ex-Mayi-Mayi leaders, for example Mvwende who was rewarded with a position as traditional chief in exchange for his role in fighting the RCD. To what extent the rank and file of the ex-Mayi-Mayi bands continue to play a role in these customary conflicts and whether they are a primary motivation for their existence, remain questions for further research.

BOX 3: The Mitwaba cassiterite mines

That the Mitwaba mines have potential for profit is further illustrated by a recent visit to the area of investors. In May 2008, the former mines of the Entreprises Minières Congolaises (EMC) were prospected by four people, among whom one Asian, who arrived by plane30. The group did not speak to any civilian authority. They did speak to the commander of the 63rd Brigade, asking him to empty the buildings he and his soldiers were occupying. While visiting the EMC sites where ‘creuseurs’ (artisanal miners) were working, the delegation announced it wanted

26 Research report by local partner, April 2008.27 It has to be taken into account, however, that tradition and mysticism are strong in the surrounding area of the Upemba Lake. Considering the mystic background from which many Mayi-Mayi movements in general are created, it is possible that the phenomenon is more persistent in Mitwaba than in other areas.28 Research report by local partner, May 2008. 29 These conflicts sometimes lead to very serious human rights incidents, especially in the territory of Malemba Nkulu (incidents map). 30 Research report by local partner, May 2008.

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the miners to leave when the time for exploitation would have come31.

The further development of this case may lead to social unrest and even to violent protests, similar to those that took place further down south.

Presence of FARDC

The largest military presence in Central Katanga is found in the army base of Kamina. Kamina is a major centre for ‘brassage’ and hosts soldiers from different Congolese provinces. In the past years and months, the cycle was completed three times. Currently, soldiers are waiting for the start of the fourth. The concentration of these different soldiers, who sometimes have to wait unemployed for a very long time, has led in February 2008 to an evening and a night of virtual warfare in the vicinity of the army barracks32. The problems had started during a game of soccer that degenerated into a taunting contest and finally a gunfight with a group of ex-CNDP fighters on one side and a group of commandos on the other33. The confrontation resulted in 32 injured and the ex-CNDP elements leaving the army base.

The EastPresence of armed groups

In Kizabi, a village near Pweto in the direction of Moba, a band of ex-Mayi-Mayi fighters decided to flex its muscles. At the beginning of April, they demanded the departure of all state services in the area34.

In the North-East of the province a certain group is active that is not a militia but has a very combative attitude. Since August 2007, when civilians in Moba attacked a MONUC compound to protest against the return of Banyamulenge refugees to the area, it has become clear that an influential anti-Tutsi movement exists in the (North-) East of the province. The spearhead of this strong and well-connected ‘lobby’ of opponents of the Banyamulenge return is formed by SOCITANG, a coordinating body of the civil society in the Tanganyika district.

Motives of armed groups

Since there are no reports of major human rights incidents (with FARDC involvement) in this area, it is not convincing that the Mayi-Mayi started their revolt to protect their people from the state agents. It is more likely that the ex-combatants wanted to create themselves a reputation, or maybe they were after some sort of income.

The drivers of the SOCITANG group are clearly ethnic35. In January 2008, a whole

31 Ibidem. 32 A ‘brassage’ cycle can only start when 4000 soldiers have gathered. Some soldiers have to wait for 6 months and more before they can start their training. A second group lingering at the army base out of neces-sity are those that have finished the process but await deployment. 33 Radio Okapi, Mutinerie à Kamina: qu’est ce qui s’est réellement passé?, 19 February 2008.34 OCHA, Situation Report. 9-15 April 2008.35 If the return of the Banyamulenge would hurt the personal or business interests of some people in Tanganyika is a question that should be studied on a detailed map.

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delegation of SOCITANG was flown to the Goma peace conference to bring across the message that the Banyamulenge cannot return to Katanga because they cause war and suffering36. According to observers, their discourse at the Goma conference was more extreme than the interventions of the delegations from the Kivu provinces. The plane was chartered by the Congolese Minister of Transport and Communication roads Charles Mwando Simba (on his own account)37.

Presence of FARDC

The Eastern part of Katanga, as it is described in the mapping reports, is controlled by the 62nd Brigade of the Land Forces of the FARDC. The 62nd Brigade is based in Pweto but also patrols the territory of Moba. On the coast of Lake Tanganyika, 200 km South of Moba, a Navy unit is stationed in the Moliro military base. The 24th of March, the soldiers of this base started a mutiny because of salary arrears. For two days the soldiers left their army barracks and occasionally shot a few rounds in the air38.

Motives of FARDC

The mutiny of the Navy soldiers did not degenerate. There was no pillaging, no violence and, consequently, nobody got hurt. This is surprising, considering the circumstances, and it proves that there was no hidden agenda behind the (deplorable) course of action the marines took. Two weeks later, it would become clear that the money for paying the soldiers had disappeared39.

36 Research report by local partner, February 2008.37 Interview conducted by IPIS with MONUC official in Antwerp, June 2008. 38 Radio Okapi, Les militaires tirent pour réclamer leur solde, 26 March 2008.39 Radio Okapi, Force Navale, la paie de Février portée disparue, 10 April 2008.

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Conclusion and recommendationsThe security situation in the East and the Centre of the Katanga province is relatively calm. In fact, the most important security incidents in those areas, the shoot-out in Kamina and the vehement protest against the possible return of Banyamulenge refugees, are directly related to the conflict in the Kivus.

The South and North seem to differ as night and day. Northern Katanga is becoming more and more of a lawless frontier land controlled by armed men (in different uniforms). In the past months, the situation has deteriorated because currently the Mayi-Mayi militias can operate freely under the argument of forming the ‘Border Guard Brigade’.

In the South, on the contrary, the presence of the State is becoming clearer every day. It was feared that the expulsion of artisanal miners from certain sites could lead to a chain of violent incidents, but all in all the consequences have been limited. Possible future security hazards remain, not the least of which is the Katangese uranium.

There is little evolution in the motivations of the armed groups operating in the Katanga province.

On the positive side, the two full Brigades that are still deployed only figure in few of the Human Rights incidents. However, many FARDC units, especially in the North, are still operating from the wrong motives. Instead of protecting the DRC territory and its population, FARDC soldiers (and officers!) from different units continue to commit grave Human Rights violations while enriching themselves in mining areas. The deployment of FARDC soldiers is all too often linked to the presence of minerals.

The ex-Mayi-Mayi of the area continue to be driven by survival motives, which is well illustrated by their positions in the Mitwaba area. However, in the North of the province, greed motives play an important role too, and have led to a renewed activism within their ranks.

Recommendations:

With respect to the FARDC motives

A sharp curb has to be put on some FARDC units, especially in the • North of the province.Arrests and prosecution are needed to show to misbehaving FARDC • units that there is no more impunity. In this respect, secure detention facilities are a prerequisite. There can be no FARDC discipline without regular payment of • salaries. A new positioning of the different FARDC units throughout the whole • province should be determined with the aim of keeping the units away from mines and mineral trade.The most ill-reputed units (the Kongolo Brigade!) should be sent for • ‘brassage’ immediately and replaced by integrated forces.

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With respect to the motives of the ex-Mayi-Mayi combatants

The 6th Military Region should clearly state which groups of ex-• combatants it will recruit the Border Guard Brigade from. The Border Guard Brigade should be created as soon as possible.• The Border Guard Brigade should not operate in the vicinity of Kilunga, • Kisengo or any other mines in the area. When the recruitment process of the Border Guard Brigade is closed, • a deadline should be set for the remaining (ex-) Mayi-Mayi who have not disarmed. Those who fail to disarm before this deadline should be outlawed and actively hunted down by a specialised FARDC unit (possibly composed of former Mayi-Mayi, similarly to the unit used in the South Kivu province to attack the ‘Rastas’). National and international efforts should be concentrated on reintegration • projects.

New mapsIPIS has published an updated version of the FARDC and Mayi-Mayi maps.

For this update, because of the preponderant role of natural resources as a motivating factor for the armed groups and the FARDC, we decided to produce a web map combining the maps ‘Conflict actors’ and ‘Natural resources’. On this map, only the most important minerals were now selected and a layer ‘Fourth category natural resources’ was created to replace the ‘Other resources’ with their generic symbol.

The new Incidents map shows the important security incidents involving armed groups or FARDC for the period November/December 2007 to April/May 2008.

For reasons explained above, in this update our information on positions and incidents of the Mitwaba territory is more detailed than that of the other Katangese territories.

On all the maps secondary rivers (streams), minor roads and the limits of sectors/chiefdoms were added.

Due to the lack of reliable and complete cartographical data, the location of the following places is approximate: Kisengo, Kilunga (‘Natural resources’ and ‘Incidents’), Kintya (‘Incidents’), Shamwana (‘Mayi-Mayi’). Information regarding other places that could not be located was attached to the capital of the territory, or to a known place close-by.

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Annexe: List of abbreviationsCNDP Congrès National pour la Défense du PeupleDDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DGM Direction Générale de MigrationEMC Entreprises Minières CongolaisesFARDC Forces Armées de la Republique Démocratique du CongoIPIS International Peace Information Service MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the CongoOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsPNC Police Nationale CongolaiseRCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la DémocratieSOCITANG Société Civile du Tanganyika