Maoists in India

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 8/3/2019 Maoists in India

    1/4

    Economic and Political Weekly June 3, 20062186

    GAUTAM NAVLAKHA

    The annual report of the ministry ofhome affairs (MHA) 2005-06 saysthat (n)axalismis not merely

    a law and order problem but has deepsocio-economic dimensions (p 23). Theministry of defence in its annual reportfor 2005-06 claims that left wingradicalism and extremism (is) motivated

    by prevailing socio-economic depriva-tion This gives the impression thatthe government is walking on two legs;fighting a low intensity war, as well aspromoting good governance and deve-lopment. Officials executing the policy onthe ground in Bastar district, Chhattisgarh,however, describe this to be an un-declared war.1 The language of war, ifnot a war effort is evident in the statementof the union minister of home affairs,Shivraj Patil, in the Lok Sabha onMarch 1, 2006:

    Sir 26 battalions have been given tothe states which are affected by Naxalitemovement...(which) mean 26,000 men andofficers. It is equal to an army of a smallstate(W)e have said that if they need airsupport, we will give(we are ready) tosupply medicines, supply foodgrainsrequired by the police for the purposeof evacuating injured persons or any otherpurpose.Initially they (Maoists) were

    using axes and swords. Then they startedusing pistols and guns. Then they startedusing AK 47 rifles and now they havestarted using hand grenades andlandminesYes they are also using rocketlaunchers.

    A 14-page report by Shivraj Patil to theLok Sabha on March 13, 2006, asks theaffected states not to enter into dialoguewith the CPI (Maoists) unless they giveup arms. The minister told the standingcommittee of chief ministers of 13 Naxaliteaffected states on April 13 that, local

    Maoists in IndiaTo advocate seizure of power and to work to change the worldis a legitimate project. Whether this should be through an armedstruggle, peaceful means or a fusion of all is an open question.

    But to advocate as an absolute must the disarming of peopleconcedes to the government the right to a monopoly over violence.

  • 8/3/2019 Maoists in India

    2/4

    Economic and Political Weekly June 3, 2006 2187

    the governments policy to de-populatevillages considered strongholds ofMaoists. Thus, suppression is the preferredpolicy.

    Maoist GrowthMaoist GrowthMaoist GrowthMaoist GrowthMaoist Growth

    Speaking to the standing committee ofchief ministers of Naxalite-affected states,

    the prime minister stressed that the Maoistmovement had gained in strength andspread to 160 districts all over the coun-try. This is remarkable when there is nomiddle class youth rebellion as in the 1960s.And joining them now means invitingincarceration or death. The cadre strengthof the CPI (Maoist) climbed from 9,300in 2004-05 to 10,500 in 2005-06. Reportssuggest they have a 25,000 memberpeoples militia and 50,000 members invillage level units. Weapons in their pos-session rose from 6,500 to about 7,300

    with a large quantity of explosives. How-ever, only (p)arts of 76 districts in thenine states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar,Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maha-rashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradeshand West Bengal are badly affected byNaxal violencein varying degrees.Government claims that violent activitieswere reported in 2005 from 509 out of atotal of 12,476 police stations located in76 districts in the country (MHA, annualreport, 2005-06, pp 24). While they arebetter armed than before and their cadres

    receive arms training, incidents of vio-lence were confined to just 4 per cent ofthe total police stations.

    A distinction must be drawn betweenspectacular raids such as for lootingarmouries, freeing prisoners and defend-ing what is called the janta sarkar as inBastar. The Jehanabad raid of 2005, forexample, was criticised for inviting pos-sible retaliation by landlord armies in Bihar.Nothing like that has happened so far.Instead the raid exposed the administrationas being capable of stopping landlord armies

    if it so wished. This enhanced rather thaneroded the sense of security of landlessdalit agricultural labour. The war in Bastaris altogether different. The district col-lector of Dantewada admits that theMaoists strength lies in their village levelunits which comprise the illiterate com-mon man who like others takes care of hisfamily through earning daily wages(FFR,p 11). Local CPI leaders in Dantewada alsopoint out 98 per cent of the Maoists areadivasis. For nearly three decades, Maoistshave lived, mobilised, radicalised and

    resistance, in particular, Salwa Judum,will be upscaled. The 20th meeting ofthe Coordination Centre of Naxalismconcluded that the Salwa Judum had beena huge success with 142 rallies held sofar. It was decided that it would now beconcentrated in three-four blocks, and onlyafter these blocks have been adequatelysecured and dominated by the forces that

    the movement would be taken to newareas (Economic Times, April 1, 2006).Meanwhile the affected states have beenasked to set up a unified command andundertake joint operations. Therefore,prosecution of war remains the preferredcourse of action of the central and stategovernments.

    Use and Abuse of ResourcesUse and Abuse of ResourcesUse and Abuse of ResourcesUse and Abuse of ResourcesUse and Abuse of Resources

    The forces deployed against the Maoistshave at their core 26,000 personnel of the

    central paramilitary forces (CPMF). Aspecial elite anti-Naxal force comprising11,000 personnel, currently undergoingtraining in Silchar (Assam), will be avail-able soon for deployment. The army chiefhas announced the raising of an auxiliaryforce comprising ex-servicemen in con-sultation with concerned states. Bihar,meanwhile, became the first state to beginenlisting ex-servicemen for a 5,000 strongspecial task force for anti-Naxal opera-tions. In Andhra Pradesh, the greyhoundscomprise 18,000 personnel. They are set-

    ting up two new centres in Rayalaseemaand Visakhapatnam (Newsblog:Andhracaf, February 1, 2006). Each centre is tohave 20 units and each unit is to have 35persons. Andhra Pradesh is also raisingtwo girijan battalions from agency areas,which would comprise people from tribalas well as settler communities. The Orissagovernment plans to raise a tribal force of3,000. Jharkhand is raising pahari bat-talions, apart from having recruited a specialforce of 14,000 to fight Maoists. Each stateis also being financially aided to raise India

    Reserve Battalions (IRBs). Nineteen suchbattalions have been raised until 2005 bythe nine affected states. They have beenasked to raise 19 more. They can avail theirservices and, at no cost to them, requisitionIRBs from other states such as Chhattisgarhfrom Nagaland, or Orissa from Haryana.They can also request armed policebattalions from other states. Gujarat hassent one battalion of its armed force toChhattisgarh. As part of a centrally coor-dinated plan, nine Naxal hit states willenlist about 40 villagers in each of the

    police stations, falling within 55 of theworst affected districts. Assuming thenumber to be 500 police stations, thisimplies 20,000 personnel. On April 25, theBihar government announced distributionof arms licences to help villagers combatMaoists as well as to provide arms to fivepersons in each village in Aurangabaddistrict. While the home minister of

    Chhattisgarh says we need 50 battalionsof paramilitary forces as against the 11battalions the government now has (Indian

    Express,March 26, 2006). Over and abovethese are the special police officers (SPOs)and village defence committees (VDCs).Chhattisgarh plans to recruit 10,000 SPOswho will be deployed with VDCs.

    Financial allocations also go towardsaugmenting police action. A sum of Rs 825crore has been provided every year to 55Maoist-affected districts for three yearsunder the Backward District Initiative

    component of the Rashtriya Sam VikasYojana scheme. This will be utilised tofill in the critical gaps in physical andsocial infrastructure such as buildingroads, bridges, culverts, etc, for easymovement of security forces. Naxalite-affected states have been exempted frompaying deployment charges since July 2004,thus saving Rs 1,100 crore of their revenueoutgo (Hindustan Times , February 9, 2006).Under police modernisation in 13 states,Rs 3,085 crore was spent from 1996-97 to2004-05. In 2005-06 a sum of Rs 517 crore

    was allocated. Central support for raisingIRBs have been hiked from Rs 13 croreto Rs 20 crore for each battalion, or Rs 380crore for raising 19 battalions. Further-more, employment is being created in theCPMF for youth from Naxalite-affectedareas. In 2004-05, 29,000 persons wereemployed and 18,241 more posts were tobe filled in 2005-06 (Asian Age, April 25,2006). The MHA annual report (2005-06)speaks of meeting security related expensesof the nine states including for newlyrecruited SPOs and VDCs as well as

    encouraging local resistance groups. Forthis purpose, from 1996-97 to 2005-06,Rs 160 crore has been spent. Towardsmanagement of public perception thecentre reimburses expenditure incurredon publicity material (All-India FactFinding Report or FFR, p 31). TheCRPF has a budget of Rs 50 lakh tocounter anti-establishment propaganda ofthe Naxalites ( Asian Age, January 1,2006). Finally, in Dantewada district ofChhattisgarh central funds are paying for28,000 tribals living in camps as part of

  • 8/3/2019 Maoists in India

    3/4

    Economic and Political Weekly June 3, 20062188

    empowered the tribals to set up their owngovernance. What began in the early1980s as a campaign against forest, rev-enue and police departments and money-lenders started to address internal contra-dictions in adivasi society, including landownership. (FFR, pp 10-11). And theMaoists took up issues of fixing prices forforest produce, the most important being

    raising of prices of tendu patta from Rs 2for 100 bundles (of 100 leaves each) in theearly 1980s to Rs 80 for the same by mid-1990s. The janata sarkar runs schools,health system, rural credit and seed bank,small irrigation projects, etc.2 They havealso introduced social reforms, pushedgender sensitive reforms within the adivasisociety including inside families(newsblog: Naxalwatch, February 2, 2006).Evidence for changes brought about bythem is available in a rather striking manner.The prime minister gave away the first

    R N Goenka Award in the categoryUncovering India Invisible to C Vanajafor her article inAndhra Jyothi of April 10,2005. That was an account of the develop-ment work undertaken by the parallel

    Maoist government in Dandakaranya!( Economic Times and The Tribune,April 14, 2006).3 Against this background,the district collector of Dantewada iscategoric: To end the problem ofNaxalites it is not enough to kill Naxalitesbutto crush and destroy their systemoperating at the village level (FFR, p 33).Thus, in the war in Bastar one side is bent

    on destroying the janata sarkar and theother determined to defend it from beingdestroyed.

    Elsewhere, in spite of extraordinaryefforts to stem their growth, Maoists haveshown perseverence. The anti-Naxal cam-paign is said to have been most successfulin AP. The Maoists retreated from NorthTelangana and took roots in coastal Andhra(Hindu, April 1, 2006). In north Bihar, arelatively new area compared to centralBihar, the MHA accepts that they enjoylocal support (Asian Age, April 11, 2006).

    Maoists are helping people to tide overacute water scarcity in Gaya district ofcentral Bihar. After three consecutiveyears of scarce rainfall, water shortagewas expected. While the administration

    slept, the cadres are digging wells, payingfor repairs of hand pumps, installingnew ones, getting well-to-do farmers touse diesel pumps to create water reservoirfor village use, as well as ensuringequitable distribution of water (Jansatta,April 14, 2006). Thus, the Maoists posea challenge unlike anything posed by otherinsurgences.

    Faulty DataFaulty DataFaulty DataFaulty DataFaulty Data

    The statistics churned out by the homeministry on Maoist violence are in any casemisleading. For instance, the Maoists assertthat in Dantewada district alone they haverecorded 31 instances of rape by securityforces or the Salwa Judum betweenJanuary and October 2005. Six of thesewomen were raped and killed. (FFR, p 19).And the police refused to record this. InMankelli village in Bijapur block, villag-

    ers were afraid of filing complaints againstthe security forces and the Salwa Judum,fearing a backlash from them (FFR, p 26).Besides, the data does not show whetherthe Maoists who were killed were armed

    Call fCall fCall fCall fCall for Por Por Por Por Paperaperaperaperapersssss

    Conference on Multidimensions of Urban Poverty in India, jointly organised by Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research

    (IGIDR), Mumbai, and the Centre de Sciences Humaines (CSH), New Delhi, on October 6th and 7th, 2006 at Indira Gandhi

    Institute of Development Research, Mumbai.

    Deadline for submission of paper/extended abstract of 1500 words: July 31st, 2006Email address for submission: [email protected]@[email protected]@[email protected]

    Researchers are encouraged to submit original papers based on rigorous case studies and/or empirical or theoretical research

    work with an India focus. The organising committee wishes to reach a balance between research on large cities and metropolises

    and that on small and medium towns. Papers assessing the impact of public policies and specific programmes are also welcome.

    The identified sub themes are:

    (i) Characteristics and determining factors of urban poverty (at the national scale or at a city scale, links with size of cities,

    role of migration, structure of labour markets etc)

    (ii) Access to social (health, education) and physical (water, sanitation) infrastructure

    (iii) Inequalities in access to credit markets

    (iv) Formal and informal housing markets

    (v) Urban Livelihoods

    Further information is available on the website of the institutes:

    http://www.igidr.ac.inhttp://www.igidr.ac.inhttp://www.igidr.ac.inhttp://www.igidr.ac.inhttp://www.igidr.ac.in and http://www.csh-delhi.comhttp://www.csh-delhi.comhttp://www.csh-delhi.comhttp://www.csh-delhi.comhttp://www.csh-delhi.com

    All submissions will be refereed and authors will be informed on the status of their papers no later than August 18th. Authors

    of accepted papers are requested to send the final version by September 15th. Since we are able to provide only limited

    travel support, authors are encouraged to seek their own travel funding. Outstation participants will be provided with

    accommodation at IGIDR. For further information, please send an email to [email protected]@[email protected]@[email protected]

    Postal Address: Attn: S. Chandrasekhar & Marie-Hlne Zrah

    Organising Committee, Multidimensions of Urban Poverty in India,

    Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research,

    Gen A. K. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon (E), Mumbai 400 065, India

  • 8/3/2019 Maoists in India

    4/4

    Economic and Political Weekly June 3, 2006 2189

    or unarmed. And whether the civilianskilled were SPOs or members of VDCs.Not much is known about the nature of theincidents. For example, the union homesecretary pointed out that if instead of four-year data if just first quarter figures for2005 were compared with that of 2006then the pictures is that there were 475incidents in the first quarter of 2005 com-

    pared to 391 in 2006. The number ofcasualties goes up from 114 to 157.Remove Chhattisgarh from the data, andthe picture changes: In contrast to 97incidents in the first quarter of 2005, thisyear there were 162. And as opposed tonine deaths last year, including threesecurity force personnel, in the first quarterof 2006, 105 people, including 27 securityforce personnel, were killed. What, how-ever, the home secretary did not share wasthat this increase in incidents and deathsis linked to initiation of the local resis-

    tance, the Salwa Judum, since June 2005in one Bastar region, which since December2005 has become worse. The fact-findingreport by the PUDR team says that theSalwa Judum leadership represents thosesections of tribal and non-tribal societywho have been adversely effected by theMaoist policies, e g, those in traditionalpositions of authority within the village,those whose lands have been redistributed,those traders whose profits have been hitby the struggles over tendu patta and forestproduce, etc (FFR, p 15). One Salwa

    Judum leader has been indicted by theCentral Bureau of Investigation for lootingthe forest. Another allegedly murderedhis teacher (FFR, p 29). Such personsspearhead violent government-funded andorganised attacks against the Maoistmovement (FFR, pp 32-33). And there isa pattern in evicting people from theirvillages. Sometimes the entire village isevacuated; in other instances, only a fewfamilies are moved out. A meeting isannounced to be held in a targeted village.On that date, a Salwa Judum crowd accom-

    panied by security forces descends on thevillage and asks people to come to thecamp and sangham members to surrender.If villagers show reluctance, they are attac-ked, their belongings looted, houses burntand some people either lynched or killedby soldiers (FFR, p 35). Those killed inthe attacks are said to have been killed bythe Maoists while those arrested are shownas Maoists, both to enable claiming ofcompensation or awards as the case maybe. Ex-gratia payment of Rs 1.5 lakh isgiven to next of kin victims of Maoists

    violence. In the case of Maoists arrested,a reward of Rs 2 lakh and Rs 1 lakh foran AK 47 is available. (Jharkhand has gonea step ahead and announced a reward ofRs 25 lakh for villages which organisesurrender of Naxalites.) This commerceenables the blaming and hunting of Maoists.Against this background the appointmentof K P S Gill of Punjab as security advisor

    to the Chhattisgarh government is only totake the war notch higher. Forty years oflow intensity warfare has seen them emerge,in the prime ministers words, as the singlebiggest internal security challenge.

    Arresting DevelopmentArresting DevelopmentArresting DevelopmentArresting DevelopmentArresting Development

    When the central government speak ofMaoists obstructing development, such asin tribal areas, it means the Maoists pre-sence obstructs corporate exploitation ofminerals, forests, water and land resources

    of adivasis. Corporations come with capi-tal intensive, low job creating investments,which necessitates import of skilled labourfrom outside and token employment forlocals as members of an unskilled lowwage labour force. The National MineralDevelopment Corporations Kirandul andBacheli mines, in Dantewada district ofMP do not employ local people (FFR, p 8).The entire iron ore mined here is exportedthrough a dedicated railway line toVisakhapatnam and exported thence toJapan. To ensure smooth passage for

    expropriation of land, the poor are nowbeing offered equity of 5 per cent in bigprojects. In what could be a precursor ofthings to come, a mining summit organisedby the Federation of Indian Mineral Indus-tries on February 9 and 10 at Bhubaneswarargued for demarcating mining tracts inrevenue records and for keeping themoutside the Scheduled Tribe (Recognitionof Land Right) Bill 2005 (Times of India,April 4, 2006). This would enable corpo-rations to escape opposition put up by localcommunities. Not that gram sabhas, noti-

    fied under the Panchayat Extension toScheduled Areas Act 1996, are able to stopcorporations from taking over their lands.By simply doctoring gram sabha records,consent can be manufactured. In Nagarnar(district Bastar) the state government usedviolence against protestors, and resolu-tions that were unfavourable to the govern-ment, were simply replaced by pro-(NMDCrun steel) plant resolutions in the (gramsabha) book (FFR, p 8). This was doneas well in Kocheipadar gram sabha inRayagada district of Orissa where consent

    for the Alcan-Hindalco project was forciblyacquired (Times of India, April 4, 2006).A note prepared by a member of the Plan-ning Commission, B Mungekar, showsthat between 1951 and 1990, 40 millionpeople were moved out or displaced inrural and urban India. Of these 40 per centwere tribals. And only 25 per cent of thosedisplaced have been rehabilitated (Times

    of India, March 27, 2006).

    Final PointFinal PointFinal PointFinal PointFinal Point

    Politics is a struggle for power. Toadvocate seizure of power and to work tochange the world is a legitimate project.Whether this should be through armedstruggle, peaceful means or a fusion of allis an open question. But to advocate as anabsolute must the disarming of peopleconcedes to the government the right toa monopoly over violence, and a free run

    to exploiters and oppressors. Neverthe-less, the question of means and ends areimportant. In the sense that whatever bethe form of struggle, it has its dos anddonts. Armed struggle does not mean alicence to loot and kill. Between the twoextremes of valorising war and abhorrenceof war lies a middle ground of social reality,which accepts that internal war cannot beprevented until governments opt for apeaceful resolution of conflicts. Whatpolicies or changes are being introducedthat restore to people their right to live in

    dignity and freedom? Why should peoplewait patiently for a change in their liveswhile the prosperity of the already privi-leged rises exponentially? By all meansfault the Maoists for their shortcomingsand crimes. But respect them for fightingagainst exploitation and oppression, whichrefuses us the luxury of ignoring the plightof the sovereigns.

    Email: [email protected]

    NotesNotesNotesNotesNotes

    1 Peoples Union for Democratic Rights, When

    the State Makes War on Its Own People, All

    India Fact Finding Report, April 2006, p 28.

    2 Safarnama; Jangalnama: Bastar ke jangalon

    mein by Satnam, New Vista Publication,

    Delhi, 2006.

    3 In his speech the prime minister told the

    journalists, I submit to you that a journalism

    of courage also implies taking sides. Objectivity

    does not imply neutrality. It implies respect for

    truth and facts and willingness to take positions,

    however, contrarian or contentious. If only his

    government would practise what prime minister

    espouses.

    -29