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A JOINT INITIATIVE OF THE HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION AND HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL PEL-033 REV: JANUARY 22, 2007 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Researcher Caroline King prepared this case under the supervision of Professors Richard F. Elmore and Allen S. Grossman. PELP cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright © 2006 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School. RICHARD F. ELMORE ALLEN S. GROSSMAN CAROLINE KING Managing the Chicago Public Schools Each child who fails is our failure. . . . We can’t ever accept that, because of poverty or social issues or family issues, our kids can’t learn. They can learn. They’ve proven it. The question is, Can we do a better job of teaching? Not just in a few schools, but in every school? Mayor Richard M. Daley With these words, Mayor Richard M. Daley opened the Chicago Public Schools’ (CPS) kick-off retreat for the new school year on August 19, 2005. The district’s senior managers and every principal were in attendance. While Daley’s remarks acknowledged the district’s progress under Chief Executive Officer Arne Duncan’s administration, they also reflected a sense of urgency about sustaining and accelerating these gains at scale. For the past four years, Duncan and his leadership team had been grappling with the challenge of managing for high performance in “every school.” Scale, however, was not the only challenge. The city’s 617 schools represented different types of schools, achievement levels, and capacities to improve teaching and learning. Duncan, a former professional basketball player, noted: “There’s no playbook for how to manage a complex district like CPS. We’re trying to keep everyone’s eye on the ball—producing better outcomes for every child.” Background Serving over 426,000 students in 511 elementary and 106 high schools, CPS was the nation’s third- largest school system in SY06. 1 The district employed 45,000 people and operated with a $4.1 billion budget. While the student body was diverse, historic economic and ethnic divisions among the city’s neighborhoods created schools that largely reflected their surrounding communities. Fully 85% of students came from low-income families. (See Exhibits 1 and 2 for CPS facts and figures.) CPS operated under a hybrid governance structure. The state legislature had turned the school system over to Daley in 1995. Daley appointed the district’s seven-member board of education and 1 SY is a PELP convention that denotes “school year.” For example, SY06 refers to the 2005–06 school year.

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Page 1: Managing the Chicago Public Schools - Harvard University · 2015. 8. 31. · PEL-033 Managing the Chicago Public Schools 4 and the schools had failed to demonstrate “academic progress”

A JOINT INITIATIVE OF THE HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION AND HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL  

PEL-033R E V : J A N U A R Y 2 2 , 2 0 0 7

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Researcher Caroline King prepared this case under the supervision of Professors Richard F. Elmore and Allen S. Grossman. PELP cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright © 2006 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School.

R I C H A R D F . E L M O R E

A L L E N S . G R O S S M A N

C A R O L I N E K I N G

Managing the Chicago Public Schools

Each child who fails is our failure. . . . We can’t ever accept that, because of poverty or social issues or family issues, our kids can’t learn. They can learn. They’ve proven it. The question is, Can we do a better job of teaching? Not just in a few schools, but in every school?

— Mayor Richard M. Daley

With these words, Mayor Richard M. Daley opened the Chicago Public Schools’ (CPS) kick-off retreat for the new school year on August 19, 2005. The district’s senior managers and every principal were in attendance. While Daley’s remarks acknowledged the district’s progress under Chief Executive Officer Arne Duncan’s administration, they also reflected a sense of urgency about sustaining and accelerating these gains at scale.

For the past four years, Duncan and his leadership team had been grappling with the challenge of managing for high performance in “every school.” Scale, however, was not the only challenge. The city’s 617 schools represented different types of schools, achievement levels, and capacities to improve teaching and learning. Duncan, a former professional basketball player, noted: “There’s no playbook for how to manage a complex district like CPS. We’re trying to keep everyone’s eye on the ball—producing better outcomes for every child.”

Background

Serving over 426,000 students in 511 elementary and 106 high schools, CPS was the nation’s third-largest school system in SY06.1 The district employed 45,000 people and operated with a $4.1 billion budget. While the student body was diverse, historic economic and ethnic divisions among the city’s neighborhoods created schools that largely reflected their surrounding communities. Fully 85% of students came from low-income families. (See Exhibits 1 and 2 for CPS facts and figures.)

CPS operated under a hybrid governance structure. The state legislature had turned the school system over to Daley in 1995. Daley appointed the district’s seven-member board of education and 1 SY is a PELP convention that denotes “school year.” For example, SY06 refers to the 2005–06 school year.

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chief executive officer, tapping Arne Duncan as CEO in 2001. Each school site had an elected local school council (LSC) consisting of staff, parents, and community members. LSCs hired, evaluated, and fired the principal and approved the budget and curricula. LSCs had been in place since 1988. The Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) represented the district’s 27,000 teachers.

Duncan’s Administration

Duncan was one of the longest-serving urban superintendents in the country. Dr. Barbara Eason-Watkins, a former principal credited with turning around one of the district’s lowest-performing schools, served as chief education officer (CEdO). David Vitale, the former president and CEO of the Chicago Board of Trade, was chief administrative officer.

Reforms Duncan’s administration focused on three core strategies: advancing literacy, strengthening human capital, and providing additional learning opportunities for students. The Chicago Reading Initiative required all elementary students to receive two hours of balanced literacy instruction per day. While schools continued to choose their own reading programs—85 different programs had previously been in use across the district—CPS encouraged struggling schools to adopt one of five “district-recommended” reading programs. The district also identified two high-quality math curricula for K–5 and two for grades 6–8, as well as district-recommended curricula in math and science for high schools. District trainings were limited to these programs.

More targeted recruiting efforts now produced 10 applicants for every open teaching position, and 42% of teachers hired in SY06 held master’s degrees. CPS had created a new Office of Principal Preparation and Development and had tightened principal eligibility. LSCs now hired principals from a pool of district-approved candidates who had demonstrated instructional leadership competencies. After-school, summer school, and kindergarten options had also proliferated across the city.

Area structure Duncan and Eason-Watkins had reorganized the district from six 100-school regions to 24 geographic “areas,” which included 18 elementary (PK–8) and six high-school (9–12) areas. The number of schools in each area ranged from 18 to 44; areas with high schools and historically low-performing schools were smaller.

An area instructional officer (AIO) led each area. AIOs were charged with working with principals to improve instruction in schools and, along with LSCs, to evaluate principals. AIOs held one mandatory meeting for principals per month. As a group, AIOs met with Eason-Watkins and Chief Instructional Officer Domingo Trujillo during monthly “Area Coherence Meetings” to determine a citywide focus for the principals’ meetings. Literacy, however, was a standing focus. Each AIO designed the format and activities for his or her principals’ meetings, which ranged from two to six hours.

Each AIO was aided by a staff of three to six content coaches (e.g., literacy, mathematics), a school improvement planning coordinator, and a management support director. Coaches held area-wide trainings for teachers and worked directly in schools upon request by the AIO or principal. An AIO-led area team observed instruction in classrooms and monitored school improvement through quarterly school visits known as “walkthroughs.”

Student achievement Student performance had steadily increased under Duncan. Between 2001–2005, the percentage of elementary students meeting or exceeding state standards on the Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) increased by nine percentage points in reading and 11 points in math (see Exhibit 3). By 2005, nearly 50% of elementary students met or exceeded standards, and the

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district’s ISAT gains outpaced the state averages at every tested grade level. On the 11th-grade Prairie State Achievement Exam (PSAE)—which included reading, math, and science—31.4% of CPS students met or exceeded standards in 2005 compared with 27.2% in 2001. One-year high-school dropout rates steadily declined from 16.3% in 2001 to 10.2% in 2005.

Yet student performance levels and trends were highly variable across the district. Between 2003 and 2005, achievement on state tests rose in some areas, while it stayed flat or declined in others. Over 60% of students met or exceeded state standards in the two northernmost elementary areas in 2005; less than 40% of students met standards in seven other elementary areas.

The percentage of high-school students meeting or exceeding state standards by area ranged from 48.0% to 19.8%. Only 29 high schools had over 30% of students meeting PSAE standards. And only 12 high schools had 50% or more students earning an 18 or above on the ACT, the score needed to gain admissions to most four-year public colleges in Illinois.2

School Categories

The district’s 617 public schools reflected diverse origins, characteristics, and management. Brief descriptions of major school categories follow.3 (See Exhibit 4a for a comparison; see Exhibits 4b and 4c for performance data.)

Regular district schools (280) Regular district schools were required to have elected LSCs report to an AIO and to hire certified, unionized employees. Budgets were “position-based,” meaning that roughly 80% of a school’s “general education funds” were allocated by the central office to positions based on staffing ratios (i.e., 28 students: 1 teacher and 1 engineer, per school). Principals controlled the remaining 20%, a discretionary budget of small line items for textbooks and other supplies. Total general education funds averaged $5,200 per elementary pupil and $6,500 per high-school pupil. Principals also controlled any state or federal compensatory funds (approximately $1,200 per pupil) based on the number of low-income students enrolled.

Autonomous Management and Performance Schools, AMPS (79) District schools granted 10 “autonomies” by CPS in SY06 based on high academic and operational performance. CPS identified the AMPS schools using 13 academic, operational, and compliance indicators and the chief education office’s recommendation (see Exhibit 5). The district offered AMPS status to 85 schools; 79 participated (69 elementary and 10 high schools). AMPS mostly represented the district’s highest-performing schools, although three schools that did not meet the academic criteria were also granted AMPS status. Eason-Watkins explained, “We had recruited some strong principals to challenging schools and we wanted to use AMPS as an incentive for them to stay.” Of the 10 AMPS high schools, 6 were “selective enrollment” schools that used academic criteria to admit students.

CPS probation schools (226) “Probation” was the lowest school rating under the CPS accountability system. In probation schools, less than 40% of elementary students (or 30% in high schools) met state standards and performed at national norms on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS),

2 Melissa Roderick, Jenny Nagaoka, Elaine Allensworth, et al., From High School to the Future, Consortium on Chicago School Research, April 2006.

3 The number of schools in each category is for SY06 only. The total number of schools listed in this section exceeds 617 because a school could belong to more than one category. For example, Ames Elementary was on probation and in restructuring.

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and the schools had failed to demonstrate “academic progress” as defined by the district (see Exhibit 6). The number of probation schools in an area ranged from 0 to 20.

NCLB restructuring schools (185) Schools designated as “restructuring” had failed to meet federal Adequate Yearly Progress targets in reading and math for five consecutive years. To comply with the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001, CPS would have to close or restructure the schools in SY07. One-hundred and thirty-seven of the restructuring schools were also on CPS probation.

Charter schools (35) Charter schools were managed and governed by independent organizations and were exempt from all CPS policies and initiatives. They received and controlled 100% of district dollars based on the number of students enrolled (“per pupil budgets”) and signed five-year performance contracts with the district. A 1996 state law permitted CPS to authorize up to 30 charters; 15 of the charters allowed multiple school sites. CPS had authorized 22 charters, and 35 sites were operating.

Performance schools (3) and contract schools (1 to open SY07) Performance schools were district-run and hired CTU teachers, while contract schools were run by nonprofits and were free to hire non-unionized employees. Both types of schools received per-pupil budgets, had more flexibilities than regular district schools, and signed five-year performance agreements with the district.

The district created the performance and contract school categories in 2004. That year, Daley announced Renaissance 2010 (“Ren10”), a campaign to replace the district’s lowest-performing schools with 100 new schools by 2010. Chief Officer for New Schools Hosanna Mahaley explained, “The Mayor wanted high-quality, innovative school options available in every part of the city and to offer more choice to parents. We were reaching our charter cap and the Mayor wanted to explore bold new options.”

School design teams submitted proposals to open Ren10 schools through an annual competitive RFP process which called for charter, performance, or contract school proposals only. As of SY06, the board had closed 27 schools for “chronically poor performance” and had approved 37 Ren10 schools. By 2010, an estimated 71,000 students, nearly 18% of CPS enrollment, were expected to attend Ren10 schools.

Reflecting on the diversity of public schools, Duncan said, “We’d be missing the boat if all we do is create great new schools. We’ve got to learn lessons that help us improve the whole district.”

A Strategy to Scale High Performance

Members of the CPS leadership team shared the mayor’s concern about increasing the performance of “every school.” To that end, they had been refining the district’s improvement strategy over the previous year. During the August 19, 2005 meeting, Eason-Watkins reaffirmed the district’s commitment to its three core strategies (improving literacy, human capital, and student learning opportunities) and presented a “theory of change” intended to guide the district’s work:

• Improved student learning requires improved instruction.

• Schools are the unit of change for instructional improvement, and principals are the leaders of that change.

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• Area and central offices provide critical support for instructional improvement and differentiate that support based on school performance and need.

Eason-Watkins commented, “After four years of work, we still believed that improving instruction was the most powerful way to increase student achievement, but we wanted to clarify that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model that works for 617 schools. Each principal must feel empowered to drive change and to receive the support that responds to the school’s specific needs.”

During SY06, the district took steps to enact its theory of change by setting clear expectations, providing effective and targeted support to schools, and making accountability more consistent.

Setting Clear Expectations

Five-Year District Student Outcome Goals

Based on focus groups with district leaders, school staff, students and their families, CPS established the “ultimate district goal” of “graduating all students prepared for success in post-secondary education and employment.” Eason-Watkins announced the goal at the August 19, 2005 meeting, calling it “ambitious.” Indeed, only 54% of CPS students even graduated from high school within five years. Historically, only six out of every 100 ninth graders earned a bachelor’s degree within six years of starting college.4

To measure progress toward attaining the ultimate goal, CPS established five-year student outcome goals for 2006–2010. For each outcome goal, the district established the current performance in 2005 and the 2010 goal. At the elementary level, for example, the district aimed to increase the percentage of third graders who met or exceeded state reading standards from 42% in 2005 to 70% by 2010. In the upper grades, the district wanted 80% of high-school freshman to be considered “on track to graduate” by 2010, a jump from 54% in 2005. (See the 2010 outcome goals in Exhibit 7.)

Chief Planning Officer Larry Stanton noted, “We set district- and school-level student outcome goals because we needed to define success for the district and for schools. Everyone, particularly principals, needs to know what’s expected of them so they can work toward achieving it. The goals were intended to be ambitious, but achievable.”

School Annual Performance Targets and the SIPAAA

Annual school targets In fall 2005, CPS set annual school performance targets for 2006–2010. The targets represented each school’s contribution to meeting the district’s 2010 outcome goals. Elementary schools received annual targets for the percentage of students expected to meet standards on the ISAT in grades 3, 6, and 8; and for schoolwide attendance. High schools received annual targets for the percentage of students expected to a). meet standards on the PSAE; b). be “on track to graduate”; c). graduate within five years; and d). complete high school as “college ready” (reflected in higher ACT scores).

The research, accountability, and evaluation department of CPS developed the annual targets based on a school’s prior performance. School targets for the ISAT and PSAE were set equal to the “Safe Harbor” requirements under NCLB. To make Safe Harbor, an additional 10% of students who

4 Consortium on Chicago School Research.

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did not meet state standards the previous year (e.g., 2005) had to meet standards the following year (e.g., 2006). Table 1 shows ISAT targets for three elementary schools.

Table 1 Percentage of Students Meeting/Exceeding ISAT Standards in

School2005

Current2006

Target2007

Target2008

Target2009

Target2010

Target

Elementary A 25% 32% 39% 45% 51% 55%Elementary B 47% 52% 57% 61% 65% 68%Elementary C 85% 87% 88% 89% 90% 91%

Three Elementary Schools with Different Levels of Performance

Source: CPS.

Chief Accountability Officer Dan Bugler noted, “We figured out that the district could achieve its

2010 outcome goals if every teacher helped two additional students meet or exceed state standards each year. This helped make the school targets and district outcome goals actually seem attainable.”

For the other three high-school targets (the percentage of ninth graders on track to graduate, graduation rate, and college readiness), the district set school-level 2010 performance goals. The gap between a school’s performance in 2005 and its 2010 goal represented the school’s “performance gap.” The annual targets were set so that a school was expected to close 10% of its performance gap in 2006; 20% in both 2007 and 2008; and 25% in both 2009 and 2010.

The actual size of a school’s performance gap varied by current performance levels. Lower-performing schools had larger gaps to close by 2010. Table 2 shows five-year graduation targets for three high schools.

Table 2 Three High Schools with Different Levels of Performance

School2005

Current2006

Target2007

Target2008

Target2009

Target2010

Target

High School A 27% 30% 34% 38% 44% 49%High School B 50% 52% 55% 58% 61% 65%High School C 84% 85% 86% 86% 88% 89%

Percentage of Students Graduating in Five Years from

Source: CPS.

“The annual school targets will not be used for determining probation status but we’re still

considering other ways to use the targets as a performance management tool,” explained Stanton. “We’ve gotten some push-back from schools on the targets because they do not track cohorts of students over time, which is a limitation of the current state testing system. The targets were developed to be aspirational, not to hold people’s feet to the fire.” CPS intended to refine the target-setting as “gains” data from the state test became available in future years.

School improvement plans CPS introduced a new school improvement planning process for 2006–2008. The Illinois State Board of Education had required school improvement plans since 1993,

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and since 1998, had allowed CPS schools to use a uniform template entitled the “School Improvement Plan for Advancing Academic Achievement,” or SIPAAA. According to Stanton, “Many of the plans were 200-page documents that did not set specific performance expectations. They mostly sat on a shelf collecting dust.”

CPS streamlined the template for 2006–2008, which included annual school targets for the first time. In January 2006, every school in CPS, except charter schools, received a 20-page, 2006–2008 SIPAAA populated with its past performance and targets for SY07 and SY08. The SIPAAA outlined a process to help each school develop a plan to achieve its targets. Stanton explained, “We wanted to provide a structure to help schools design their own roadmaps for raising student achievement.”

Each school first articulated a mission and vision. School leadership teams and stakeholders then assessed their school’s strengths and weaknesses. In an “outcome analysis,” the SIPAAA team reviewed four data sets: student outcomes, academic progress, student connection, and school characteristics.

In a “process analysis,” schools used rubrics to self-evaluate five elements associated with school improvement referred to as the Five Fundamentals of a Great School. CPS had developed the Five Fundamentals by drawing upon research on reform efforts in Chicago, Boston, and other urban districts across the U.S. The Five Fundamentals comprised:

1. Instruction: The classroom activity that directly affects student learning. Includes the capacity of the teacher, the rigor of the content, and the engagement of students.

2. Instructional leadership: The school-level activity of principals and leadership teams, including scheduling, resource management, and curriculum planning.

3. Professional capacity: The school- or district-level activity that improves instructional practices in the classroom. Includes professional development, coaching, and mentoring.

4. Learning climate: The school-level activity that promotes a safe and orderly environment.

5. Family and community involvement: The school-level activity that encourages interdependence with the community. This relationship promotes the growth, commitment, and sharing of student-learning resources.

Finally, each school defined priorities, designed curriculum and instruction interventions, and created a budget. Schools submitted SIPAAAs by April 7, 2006. AIOs approved SIPAAAs for the schools under their management. One elementary AIO commented, “This year produced the tightest alignment between schools’ plans to improve student achievement and their allocation of resources that I’ve seen during my 20-plus years as an administrator with CPS.”

Performance Contracts for All New Schools

CPS required all new charter, performance, and contract schools to sign consistent five-year performance contracts beginning in SY06. Before SY06, each new school had negotiated its own performance agreement with the district, although some schools never had an official agreement. Mahaley commented, “For the first time, we are holding all new schools accountable for the same things—improved student achievement, sound financial and operational management, and regulatory compliance—using the same metrics.”

During the five-year contract period, the district conducted yearly performance reviews at new schools. At the end of the five years, the district could renew or terminate the contract. The district

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could close a charter, performance, or contract school at any time for poor academic achievement or operational/fiscal mismanagement. The board had closed three charter schools between 1997–2006.

Eason-Watkins noted, “Over time, we hope to move more of our district schools to the performance contract model in order to facilitate a clear dialogue about expectations, accountability, and autonomy.” The district was considering asking AMPS principals to sign performance contracts; it also wanted to use performance contracts to attract high-potential principals into low-performing schools.

Providing Effective and Targeted Support

Citing a desire to “provide effective, targeted support to schools,” CPS implemented four initiatives during SY06: 1). differentiating treatment of schools; 2). clarifying the AIO role; 3). providing better student data; and 4). reorganizing the central office.

Differentiating Treatment of Schools

Duncan elaborated on the component of the district’s theory of change that called on area and central offices to differentiate support to schools based on performance and need:

Very simply, the approach is based on the reality that kids learn differently. You have to teach kids differently. And schools are no different. Schools are just one step larger than kids. Historically, though, we’ve had a communistic system. We treated all schools the same. And we treated too many, I argue, relatively poorly. You have to look at each child and each school individually and figure out what’s best for them.

CPS differentiated support to three types of schools based on performance in SY06: 1). AMPS; 2). CPS probation schools; and 3). NCLB restructuring schools. Each of these categories included elementary and high schools. Concurrently, the district designed high-school interventions that cut across all performance levels.

1) Autonomous management and performance schools (AMPS) In announcing AMPS, Duncan said, “We looked hard at all of the factors that go into creating a great school. These schools have obviously got it figured out and they have great principals. We have to build a culture of trust and give them the freedom to innovate. The best thing we can do is get out of their way.”

The district granted the 79 AMPS schools the ability to exercise 10 “autonomies,” such as opting out of the area structure or the district’s new teacher-induction program. The principal could select as many of the 10 autonomies as desired. (See Exhibit 8 for a list of AMPS autonomies and the schools’ choices.)

Fifty percent of AMPS schools opted out of the area structure. Out-of-area AMPS schools lost all access to the area staff, coaches, and professional development. These principals did not have to attend area principals’ meetings, report to an AIO, or hold walkthroughs with the area team. AIOs no longer evaluated these principals; the district was in the process of identifying an alternate evaluator.

In-area AMPS schools still reported to and were evaluated by their AIO. These principals attended area principals’ meetings and, depending on the AIO, held area walkthroughs. They were able to request support from AIOs and area coaches and to send teachers to area trainings.

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Two AMPS principals reflected on their decisions:

I relish autonomy, but I didn’t want to jump out of the area this first year of AMPS. My AIO is very supportive and the professional development is valuable. As long as I can use the area supports to continue building the autonomy and capacity of my staff, I’ll stay.

I left the area because the AIO was controlling. And everything offered by the area was “one-size-fits-all”—the principals’ meetings, the professional development for teachers, the walkthroughs. If differentiated instruction is our goal for students, why not do it with us?

Concurrently, CPS eliminated one elementary area and one traditional high-school area in SY06. As a result, some AIOs took in additional schools and watched their caseload grow, particularly when AMPS schools elected to remain in the area. For example, an area in which 100% of AMPS schools stayed and merged with a closed area grew from 22 to 34 elementary schools from SY05 to SY06. The AIO said, “I think the AMPS schools stayed because they get good support from all area staff, especially my coaches. But I have to be careful because the strong schools would snatch up all of my coaches’ time if we let them!”

An AIO in which 86% of the area’s AMPS schools opted out of the area commented:

At first I was upset. It felt like we were rewarding the principals who had been the most resistant to anything from the central office or the area, because in terms of absolute test scores, they were at the high end of the district. But most of these schools had been making little to no gains; the schools’ performance had flat-lined. Maybe the AMPS schools will work harder this year to increase achievement because they cannot blame anyone else for holding them back.

Melissa Megliola, a former private sector consultant, managed AMPS with assistance from retired CPS principal Anthony (Tony) Jelinek. Megliola described her role: “My first goal is to make sure AMPS schools are kept in the loop. We have to ensure that life does not feel worse for them. My second goal is to advocate for AMPS schools within the central office so that they can exploit their autonomies in new and creative ways.”

One elementary principal reflected on AMPS midway through SY06:

The biggest difference under AMPS is that I don’t have to hide anymore if I’m doing something “out-of-the-box” to better support my teachers and students. But some of the central offices still don’t understand that as AMPS schools, we’re allowed to do things differently. Fortunately, Melissa and Tony are there whenever we need someone to run interference.

All AMPS schools were given two years before their AMPS status would be reevaluated. Megliola explained, “We were asking schools to take new risks with us. We did not want anyone to fear being penalized if performance went down as a result.” The criteria for admitting additional schools into AMPS were still being discussed, but Megliola imagined adding 5 to 15 schools per year.

The district intended to give AMPS schools more budgetary flexibility in SY07. Instead of receiving position allocations, AMPS schools would receive the dollars to cover the cost of an average district salary for each position previously budgeted to the school (known as “lump-sum budgeting”). The principal could then spend the dollars as he/she chose, as long as the school hired enough teachers to maintain class-size ratios as specified under the CTU contract.

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2) CPS probation schools Probation schools were treated differently in two respects. First, under board policy, CPS could assign an interim principal to any probation school if the previous principal had been removed due to poor performance.

Second, AIOs were given control over the probation schools’ discretionary budgets in SY05. That year, the central office paid for a lead literacy teacher (LLT) in every probation school, and every school (depending on the amount of discretionary funds available) was required to pay for a second LLT, as well as reduced class size in grades 1–3, full-day kindergarten, and district-recommended curricula for literacy and math at specific grade levels. In the summer of 2005, Stanton’s team held focus groups with AIOs and principals. Participants said that “uniform school improvement requirements were not effective” and stressed the need for flexibility to adapt strategies to local school conditions.5

In response, the curriculum offices designed Instructional Support Options (ISOs). ISOs were “packages” of interventions that individual schools could choose from in developing their 2006–2008 school improvement plans. Acting Math and Science Curriculum Officer Mike Lach explained, “ISOs are a menu of curriculum and instructional supports, such as materials, positions, and professional development. A school can choose a ‘fully loaded’ package or select items a-la-carte style. The idea is to help principals and AIOs select which interventions best fit a school’s needs.”

One elementary AIO explained the shift: “The budget approval process for probation schools was more of a negotiation this year. I sat with each principal and we assessed what was working and what was not. I did not completely throw out the guidelines from last year because in many cases they were effective, but each school was able to adapt and adjust rather than follow a set of rules.”

3) NCLB restructuring schools NCLB required districts to ensure that after a sixth year of missing Adequate Yearly Progress, a restructuring school enacted one of five plans:

! Reopen as a public charter school.

! Replace all or most of school staff who were relevant to the school’s failure to make AYP.

! Contract a third party to operate the school.

! Turn the operation of the school over to the state.

! Implement any other major restructuring of the school’s governance arrangement that makes fundamental reforms to improve academic achievement.

The Illinois State Board of Education ruled out state takeovers, and the district’s charter cap limited that option. Given these constraints, CPS designed several options for its 185 restructuring schools.

Forty-four restructuring schools implemented one of the following “centrally directed initiatives”:

• Close and reopen in the future under Ren10 (10 schools).

• Assign high-potential “turnaround” principals (2 schools).

• Share management responsibility with CTU for five years, with schools adopting comprehensive school reform models and piloting peer evaluation for teachers (8 schools).

5 CPS Instructional Support Options for Elementary and High Schools, 2006, p. 4.

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• Partner with one of three external instructional improvement providers: America’s Choice, Strategic Learning Initiatives, or Learning Point Associates (24 schools).

In the other 141 restructuring schools, AIOs were asked to work with principals during the SIPAAA process to identify interventions that would enhance student achievement and satisfy the law’s requirements. AIOs were given responsibility for developing school-by-school plans that were then reviewed and approved by the CEdO. Plans had to be supported by data, both performance and qualitative data collected by the AIO through ongoing work in the schools. School plans called for staffing changes, new literacy programs, or changing the school’s grade configuration, among other interventions.

4) High schools Two major efforts to improve support to high schools were underway:

Area 25 for small high schools Between 2001 and 2003, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and local Chicago foundations awarded CPS $25 million to open 32 small high schools by 2007. Five low-performing high schools would be converted into 20 autonomous small high schools, and 12 new start-up small high schools would be created. An intermediary, the Chicago High School Redesign Initiative (CHSRI), formed to channel the funding and help manage the effort.

Twenty-four small high schools (23 regular, 1 charter) had opened by SY06. These small schools enrolled fewer than 500 students and typically formed around a theme, such as medicine or the arts. Small schools received start-up funding and an additional $300 per pupil each year.

Also in SY06 CPS created a special area, Area 25, for the district’s small high schools. Before that, small high schools had been interspersed across the six different high-school areas. Cynthia Barron, a high-school AIO since 2002, moved to head up Area 25. She commented:

Small high-school principals are unique. They’re very entrepreneurial, but they have a wide range of instructional knowledge and leadership skills. They also face unique challenges as they are each building a new school vision, staff, and structures. Area 25 was created to meet these unique needs. We want to provide the best support we can to these schools so that they are successful and [so] the larger system can learn from their innovations.

High-school transformation In April 2006, CPS launched a $75–$100 million effort to strengthen high-school education, known as the “High-School Transformation” project. Some aspects applied to all high schools in the district (regular district, small, charter, probation, etc.), such as a new high-school scorecard. The scorecard reported school performance in four areas: student outcomes, academic progress, student connections, and school characteristics. In each area of measurement, schools also received a ranking against all other schools in the district. (See Exhibit 9 for a sample scorecard.) There were separate rankings for selective enrollment versus non-selective high schools.

Commenting on the new scorecard, Chief Officer for High Schools Dr. Donald Pittman said:

We’re sending a clear message about what high-school principals should be focused on. For the first time, we’re recognizing the “value-add” of each school—student gains—in addition to absolute performance. And we’ve been able to identify some areas in which charter and other new schools are outperforming district schools. Too often in the past, we’ve launched new initiatives without a mechanism to evaluate [whether] they are any more effective than the old way of doing things.

Other aspects of the transformation project were designed with an opt-in implementation model. Over a three-year period, 50 of the district’s high schools would be chosen to adopt the project’s “instructional development systems.” For each core subject (English, math, and science), participating

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schools would choose one of three “packages.” Each package provided a standards-based college preparatory curriculum, materials, and assessments; professional development and coaching for teachers; and implementation support for principals. Through a RFP process, the district had selected external vendors to help build the packages.

Any high school, except charters, could apply to participate. CPS reported that 40 high schools applied for the first implementation year, known as “Wave 1.” The district chose 14 schools based on leadership strength and teacher buy-in. These Wave 1 schools would begin implementing their selected packages in SY07, starting with 9th grade classrooms. The 14 schools ranged from high- to low-performing. Additional classrooms and new high schools would be added in SY08 and SY09.

Assistant Director for Planning and Development Angus Mairs explained, “We’re not going to force this on high schools that feel better off without the district’s support. We hope that over time, if these approaches are as effective as we designed them to be, more and more high schools will voluntarily adopt them.”

Clarifying the Area Instructional Officer’s Role

Originally, AIOs were expected to spend 60% of their time improving instruction and 40% resolving schools’ operational issues. Starting in SY06, AIOs were expected to spend 70% of their time working with principals to improve instructional leadership; 30% identifying, developing, and placing new principals; and 0% on school operations (see Exhibit 10). Six new business service centers (see p. 13) were being created to help pick up AIOs’ operations responsibilities. Chief Instructional Officer Trujillo explained the rationale behind the AIO role clarification:

We need AIOs to have the time to assist principals to obtain and align the resources that they say they need to be successful. Too often, AIOs find themselves taking on non-instructional issues because we at central office make too many demands of them. If the task is not an instructional one, we must find another mechanism for working with schools. And with 50% of our principals eligible to retire by 2010, we want and need AIOs to groom our next school leaders and advise LSCs on hiring.

An elementary AIO who had served in the position since its inception commented, “The clarification renewed my focus on instruction. I’m more likely to delegate non-instructional tasks or push back on the central office if they are asking me and my staff to spend time on something that would pull us away from our work in schools.” She continued, “But, there’s always challenges. Things always crop up—like parent concerns or an LSC that won’t meet to approve a budget item.”

The focus on the AIO role coincided with the first significant wave of AIO retirements. Eighteen AIOs had occupied their positions since the area structure was created. Five AIOs would retire in June 2006. An additional five were expected to retire at the end of SY07.

Remarking on the retirements, Janet Knupp, director of a Chicago-based venture philanthropy that made investments to strengthen CPS leadership, observed, “The retirements give the district an opportunity to find the people who fit the newly clarified expectations. A deeper issue remains, however. Is an AIO’s job doable? Is it really possible to effectively support more than 20 schools? If it’s an impossible task, the system may only be setting the AIOs up to fail.”

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Providing Better Student Data

CPS took steps to strengthen the district’s and schools’ capacities to assess student performance over time in SY06. Previously, the district relied solely upon the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) to measure individual student growth. However, the ITBS was not aligned with the Illinois state standards or the ISAT and PSAE state assessments. The district discontinued the ITBS in SY06.

Benchmark assessments CPS mandated two new commercial “benchmark” assessments in reading: the Dynamic Indicators of Basic Early Literacy Skills (DIBELS) and Learning First. DIBELS assessed first-graders’ readiness to read and would be expanded to grades K–2 in probation schools. The Learning First assessment was administered three times per year (October, January, and May) in grades 3–8 and was aligned with the Illinois standards and the ISAT’s format and content. The district provided each school with results by student, teacher, grade, and school within 10 days.

Eason-Watkins instituted new “Quarterly Progress Updates” with AIOs to track the results of district schools on the new benchmark assessments. She and Trujillo’s team met with three to four neighboring AIOs at a time. AIOs discussed area performance trends and their efforts to help schools identify and target teachers’ and students’ weaknesses based on results. Commenting on the new meetings, one elementary AIO reflected, “These are problem-solving meetings. Barbara asks tough questions about how we are helping our principals use the data to design professional development for teachers or make curriculum changes based on the results.”

All schools, except charters, had to administer DIBELS. In addition, all schools except charters and AMPS had to administer Learning First, although some charters and all 79 AMPS schools voluntarily signed up to use Learning First. Two areas piloted CPS math benchmark assessments, with districtwide adoption planned for SY07.

IMPACT The district piloted a comprehensive Web-based technology solution, the Instructional Management Program and Communications Tool (IMPACT), in SY06. IMPACT was designed to replace the district’s 30-plus year-old Legacy student information system; eliminate many paper-based, manual transactions; and provide a one-stop online curriculum and instruction planning resource for schools. IMPACT would allow the district to track the performance of individual or cohorts of students from year to year for the first time. Districtwide implementation of IMPACT would occur throughout SY07.

Reorganizing the Central Office

We’re going to flip the pyramid in CPS this year. When I say flip the pyramid, I’m saying that the job of the central office is to support the schools, not manage them. Principals run schools and we’re here to make their job easier and help them succeed in the only place that matters—in the classroom.

— Arne Duncan, August 19, 2005

Business service centers In the fall of 2005, CPS piloted the first of three business service centers (BSCs). Each BSC would serve roughly 200 schools by providing training, monitoring, and support in budgeting, internal accounts, purchasing and contracts, facilities, security, and limited human resources support. Chief Administrative Officer Vitale commented, “I wanted a team out there that felt like they owned and were accountable for a set of schools. This cross-functional team provides one point of contact for schools—no more having to navigate the central office—and will know each school’s needs.”

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Central-office reorganization CPS unveiled a comprehensive reorganization in June 2006. Central-office departments would be oriented to serve five “school customers”: early childhood, elementary schools, high schools, AMPS schools, and new/charter schools. Vitale explained the rationale for the reorganization. “It’s simple. We wanted the organizational structure—and the way people work—to reflect our beliefs that schools are the unit of change and everyone else serves the schools. Identifying five types of schools reinforces our message that schools are unique and we cannot treat them like ‘one-size-fits-all.’”

In fact, the reorganization worked Vitale out of a job by eliminating the chief administrative officer position. Vitale would phase out by the end of 2006. As a result, all departments would report to either Duncan or Eason-Watkins. The central office streamlining would save the district $25 million in administrative costs.

Creating Consistent Accountability Mechanisms

Consistent Performance Measures for All Schools

School scorecards The high-school scorecard represented the district’s first attempt to rank all schools in Chicago on the same measures (see Exhibit 9). The scorecard was also the first CPS tool for sharing academic and non-academic school performance data with the public. “Parents really drove the design of the new high-school scorecard. It was such a user-friendly tool for promoting transparency around performance that we decided to create one for elementary schools, too,” explained Duncan. The district intended to unveil the elementary scorecard in SY07.

Accountability system to probation policy More broadly, the district revamped its accountability system. Under the accountability system enacted in SY03, any non-charter district school open for more than three years received one of six labels—distinction, excellence, merit, opportunity, challenge, or probation—based on student performance (see Exhibit 6). The distribution of school ratings varied widely across the areas. Absolute performance and gains on the Illinois state tests (ISAT and PSAE) and the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (discontinued in SY06) largely determined a school’s performance rating. Chief Accountability Officer Dan Bugler described the system:

Absolute performance far outweighed gains. We had almost created a permanent underclass of schools that could never get out of probation even if they had been making impressive gains every year, but hadn’t yet gotten above 40% of students meeting standards. And once a school had over 50% of students meeting standards, the labels became irrelevant—nothing really different happened if you were a school of merit, excellence, or distinction.

In March 2006, the Board of Education replaced the six-tiered accountability system with a new probation policy. All schools, except charters and Ren10 schools, would earn one of two ratings—probation or non-probation—based on performance and growth on four measures:

Elementary Schools High Schools > 40% meet ISAT reading standards > 30% meet PSAE (composite score)

> 40% meet ISAT math standards > 60% five-year graduation rate

> 40% meet ISAT science standards > 35% of students make “gains” on college-ready tests

Student absentee rate < 15 days Student absentee rate < 15 days

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For each indicator, a school earned one point for absolute performance and one point for growth, resulting in a score between 0–8. Schools earning a 0–3 were automatically placed on probation; schools earning 6–8 received a non-probation rating. Schools obtaining a score of 4 or 5 received an initial probation rating, but were subject to an automatic review by the AIO.

Commenting on the new probation policy, Bugler said, “We wanted a consistent way to measure performance of all schools on a broader array of metrics than just test scores. We also wanted to incent progress for schools at all levels and to let AIOs ‘make the call’ more often as to whether a school really belonged on probation.” Of the 226 schools currently on probation, only 150 would have automatically have been placed on probation under the new policy.6

Mahaley explained the exemption of charter and Ren10 schools from the new probation policy. “Their five-year performance agreements are rigorous and already provide opportunities for the district to address concerns if necessary, so we did not see the need to add an extra layer,” she said.

Performance Evaluation

CPS was in the process of designing several new tools to strengthen performance evaluation at the end of SY06. These included:

• Central-office department evaluations based on annual department performance targets and principals’ evaluations of support and service.

• AIO evaluations and bonuses based on area school progress.

• A new principal evaluation tool that included progress toward annual school performance targets as one of the evaluation criteria.

The Challenge Ahead: Putting the Pieces Together

As the school year came to a close in June 2006, Duncan and his leadership team reflected on their efforts to improve student performance. While the district’s strategy was clear in their minds, they wondered how well people throughout the system’s 617 schools and numerous central office departments understood the strategy. Did most people in CPS see a thread of coherence weaving together the various initiatives underway, or did they see a rush of random activities? The team acknowledged that unless it was able to effectively communicate and manage in a way that put all of the pieces together for everyone in CPS, the district would have a difficult time achieving its 2010 outcome goals.

6 Elizabeth Duffrin, “New probation policy lets more schools off the hook,” Catalyst Chicago, April 2006.

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Exhibit 1 CPS Facts and Figures

CPS Overview

District Area Demographics (Census 2000) Total population 2,896,016 Per capita income $20,175 Households below poverty level 17.4% Student Demographics Number of students (PK–12) 426,812

African-American 49.8% Latino 38.0% White 8.8% Asian/Pacific Islander 3.2% Native American 0.2%

Low-income 85.2% Limited English proficiency students 14.1% Special education students 13.0% Graduation rate 70.7% One-year high-school dropout rate 10.2% Mobility rate 24.0% Schools and Staff (Largest district in IL) Number of schools (including charters) 617

Elementary (PK–8 in various configurations) 511 High school (9–12) 106

Total staff 45,792

Teachers 26,719 Average teacher salary $62,985 Teacher turnover 10.3% Pupil/teacher ratios

Elementary 22.7:1 High school 19.6:1

Sources: Census data available at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/singledemoprofile.asp?county1=1709930&state1=17, accessed May 1, 2006. District data from CPS files.

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.7

55.7

55

.2

8.2

74

.0

74.0

75

.7

79.2

79

.2

5.2

5th

32

.0

36.0

44

.0

50.9

49

.6

17.6

61.0

63

.0

68.3

71

.8

73.1

12

.1

Mat

h

8th

25

.0

31.0

30

.7

33.2

32

.3

7.3

50

.0

52.0

53

.1

54.4

54

.3

4.3

4th

37

.0

39.0

39

.5

40.5

43

.3

6.3

65

.0

67.0

66

.5

67.8

71

.4

6.4

Scie

nce

7th

51

.0

53.0

56

.2

56.0

54

.4

3.4

72

.0

73.0

73

.7

74.4

74

.6

2.6

Sour

ce:

CPS

file

s.

Page 19: Managing the Chicago Public Schools - Harvard University · 2015. 8. 31. · PEL-033 Managing the Chicago Public Schools 4 and the schools had failed to demonstrate “academic progress”

PE

L-0

33

-19-

Exh

ibit

4a

Sch

ool C

ateg

orie

s in

Chi

cago

, SY

06

R

egu

lar

Dis

tric

t A

MP

S

CP

S P

rob

atio

n

NC

LB

Res

tru

ctu

rin

g C

har

ter

Per

form

ance

C

ontr

act

Nu

mb

era

280

79

226

185

35

3 1

(SY

07)

Au

tho

rize

r C

PS

C

PS

20

05

CP

S

2003

F

eder

al la

w (

NC

LB)

2001

S

tate

law

19

96

May

or’s

Ren

10

2004

M

ayor

’s R

en10

20

04

Op

erat

or

CP

S

CP

S

CP

S

CP

S o

r th

ird p

arty

N

onpr

ofit

C

PS

N

onpr

ofit

Go

vern

ance

LS

C

LSC

LS

C

LSC

C

hart

er b

oard

B

oard

or

LSC

B

oard

or

LSC

S

tud

ent

Ass

ign

men

t N

eigh

borh

ood

unle

ss s

elec

tive

Nei

ghbo

rhoo

d un

less

sel

ectiv

e N

eigh

borh

ood

unle

ss s

elec

tive

Nei

ghbo

rhoo

d un

less

sel

ectiv

e Lo

ttery

Lo

ttery

Lo

ttery

NC

LB

an

d IL

A

cco

un

tab

ility

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

CP

S P

rob

atio

n

Po

licy

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

No

No

No

5-yr

CP

S

Per

form

ance

Pla

n

and

An

nu

al

Rev

iew

N

o N

o N

o N

o Y

es

Yes

Y

es

CP

S S

core

card

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

CP

S A

nn

ual

T

arg

ets

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

No

Yes

Y

es

CP

S S

IPA

AA

b Y

es

Yes

Y

es

Yes

N

o Y

es

Yes

R

epo

rt t

o A

IO

Yes

C

hoic

e Y

es

Yes

N

o C

hoic

e C

hoic

e

P

rin

cip

al

Elig

ibili

ty

Sta

te T

ype

75,

CP

S P

ool

Sta

te T

ype

75,

CP

S P

ool

Sta

te T

ype

75,

CP

S P

ool

Sta

te T

ype

75,

CP

S P

ool

Sta

te T

ype

75

Sta

te T

ype

75,

CP

S P

ool

Sta

te T

ype

75

Pri

nci

pal

Hir

ed b

y LS

C

LSC

LS

C u

nles

s re

mov

ed b

y C

PS

LS

C

Gov

erni

ng b

oard

G

over

ning

boa

rd

Gov

erni

ng

boar

d

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33

-20-

R

egu

lar

Dis

tric

t A

MP

S

CP

S P

rob

atio

n

NC

LB

Res

tru

ctu

rin

g C

har

ter

Per

form

ance

C

ontr

act

Pri

nci

pal

E

valu

ato

r LS

C, A

IO

LSC

, AIO

if in

-are

a LS

C, A

IO

LSC

, AIO

G

over

ning

boa

rd

Gov

erni

ng b

oard

G

over

ning

bo

ard

CP

S C

urr

icu

lum

M

and

ates

F

ollo

wed

Y

es

Cho

ice

Yes

Y

es

No

Cho

ice

Cho

ice

CP

S B

ench

mar

k T

ests

: L

earn

ing

1st

, DIB

EL

S

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

No

Yes

Y

es

Sch

oo

l Fu

nd

ing

P

ositi

on-b

ased

P

ositi

on-b

ased

Lum

p-su

m in

SY

07c

Pos

ition

-bas

ed

A

IO c

ontr

olle

d di

scre

tiona

ry fu

nds

Pos

ition

-bas

ed

Per

-pup

il P

er-p

upil

Per

-pup

il

CP

S S

cho

ol

Cal

end

ar a

nd

H

ou

rs

Yes

C

hoic

e Y

es

Yes

N

o C

hoic

e C

hoic

e

T

each

er

Cer

tifi

cati

on

R

equ

ired

100%

10

0%

100%

10

0%

75%

in s

choo

ls

esta

blis

hed

befo

re

2003

; 50%

afte

r

100%

10

0%

Tea

cher

s’

Em

plo

yer

CP

S

CP

S

CP

S

CP

S

Gov

erni

ng b

oard

C

PS

G

over

ning

bo

ard

CT

U T

each

ers

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

Yes

N

o Y

es

Cho

ice

CP

S S

alar

y S

cale

R

equ

ired

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

Yes

N

o Y

es

No

Sour

ce:

Cas

ewri

ter

anal

ysis

bas

ed o

n ca

se in

terv

iew

s an

d C

PS

file

s.

a The

nu

mbe

r of

sch

ools

in e

ach

cate

gory

is fo

r SY

06 o

nly.

The

tota

l num

ber

of s

choo

ls in

this

row

will

exc

eed

617

bec

ause

a s

choo

l cou

ld b

e in

mor

e th

an o

ne c

ateg

ory.

For

exa

mpl

e, M

arco

ni C

omm

unit

y A

cad

emy

was

on

CPS

pro

bati

on a

nd s

late

d fo

r re

stru

ctu

ring

und

er N

CL

B.

b SIP

AA

A s

tand

s fo

r Sc

hool

Impr

ovem

ent P

lan

for

Ad

vanc

ing

Aca

dem

ic A

chie

vem

ent.

(SIP

AA

A is

des

crib

ed o

n pa

ge 7

.)

c “L

um

p-su

m”

bud

geti

ng is

des

crib

ed o

n p

age

9.

Page 21: Managing the Chicago Public Schools - Harvard University · 2015. 8. 31. · PEL-033 Managing the Chicago Public Schools 4 and the schools had failed to demonstrate “academic progress”

PE

L-0

33

-21-

Exh

ibit

4b

Per

form

ance

Dat

a by

Sch

ool C

ateg

ory:

Ele

men

tary

Sch

ools

Tota

lAt

tend

ance

Enro

llmen

t R

ate

2005

2005

2003

2004

2005

2003

2004

2005

All E

lem

enta

ry S

choo

lsH

igh

1906

98.5

100.

010

0.1

100.

010

0.0

100.

010

0.0

Med

ian

602

94.2

38.7

44.6

46.6

39.4

47.3

46.7

Low

9185

.50.

011

.513

.00.

011

.58.

2

Reg

ular

Dis

tric

t Sch

ools

Hig

h18

9698

.510

0.0

100.

110

0.0

100.

010

0.0

100.

0M

edia

n59

595

.251

.155

.057

.355

.459

.758

.3Lo

w12

088

.70.

011

.518

.30.

011

.516

.5

AMPS

Hig

h17

9697

.796

.910

0.0

97.8

99.0

100.

010

0.0

Med

ian

589

95.8

62.5

65.6

64.4

62.0

67.9

69.7

Low

186

93.7

26.8

35.4

42.1

30.1

43.3

44.2

CPS

Pro

batio

nH

igh

1822

96.4

51.7

50.0

53.7

51.3

81.5

63.6

Med

ian

613

92.1

29.3

32.4

32.7

28.8

29.7

28.3

Low

9188

.66.

915

.613

.07.

512

.68.

2

NC

LB R

estr

uctu

ring

Hig

h19

0696

.257

.460

.468

.155

.281

.557

.1M

edia

n59

892

.228

.232

.233

.228

.029

.828

.6Lo

w91

85.5

6.9

15.6

13.0

7.5

12.6

9.4

Cha

rter

Hig

hn/

an/

a59

.766

.781

.062

.068

.293

.3M

edia

nn/

an/

a51

.549

.364

.748

.163

.369

.3Lo

wn/

an/

a33

.336

.340

.436

.222

.229

.2

Scho

ol T

ype

ISAT

Rea

ding

% M

eet/E

xcee

d St

anda

rds

ISAT

Mat

h%

Mee

t/Exc

eed

Stan

dard

s

Sour

ce:

Cas

ewri

ter

anal

ysis

bas

ed o

n C

PS

file

s.

Not

es:

“All

Ele

men

tary

Sch

ools

” in

clu

des

cha

rter

sch

ools

and

oth

er s

choo

ls n

ot e

ligib

le fo

r pr

obat

ion,

suc

h as

new

and

spe

cial

ed

uca

tion

sch

ools

. The

refo

re, v

alu

es m

ay b

e lo

wer

than

“pr

obat

ion”

and

d

iffe

rent

from

any

dis

tric

t rep

orte

d d

ata

that

exc

lud

es th

ese

scho

ols.

Som

e sc

hool

s m

ay b

e in

mor

e th

an o

ne c

ateg

ory

(e.g

., M

arco

ni C

omm

uni

ty A

cad

emy

was

on

CPS

pro

bati

on a

nd s

late

d fo

r N

CL

B r

estr

uctu

ring

). D

ata

not a

vaila

ble

for

perf

orm

ance

and

con

trac

t sch

ools

.

Page 22: Managing the Chicago Public Schools - Harvard University · 2015. 8. 31. · PEL-033 Managing the Chicago Public Schools 4 and the schools had failed to demonstrate “academic progress”

PE

L-0

33

-22-

Exh

ibit

4c

Per

form

ance

Dat

a by

Sch

ool C

ateg

ory:

Hig

h Sc

hool

s

% F

resh

men

5-ye

ar1-

year

Tota

lAt

tend

ance

On

Trac

k to

Gra

duat

ion

Dro

pout

En

rollm

ent

Rat

eG

radu

ate

Rat

eR

ate

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2003

2004

2005

2003

2004

2005

All H

igh

Scho

ols

Hig

h42

1497

.810

0.0

94.1

31.3

99.1

98.0

99.0

98.1

99.5

98.5

Med

ian

1088

86.5

57.4

54.8

8.0

23.8

24.1

28.7

13.5

14.9

10.0

Low

6668

.62.

94.

80.

06.

54.

110

.80.

01.

80.

0

Reg

ular

Dis

tric

t Sch

ools

Hig

h21

5297

.810

0.0

75.2

31.3

58.1

77.5

70.8

50.5

64.7

64.3

Med

ian

606

85.4

58.8

59.1

7.5

34.1

29.1

31.0

24.3

24.2

8.1

Low

6668

.62.

94.

80.

06.

54.

110

.80.

03.

11.

3

AMPS

Hig

h42

1496

.697

.494

.18.

099

.198

.099

.098

.199

.598

.5M

edia

n85

993

.383

.980

.62.

876

.182

.784

.067

.671

.866

.4Lo

w51

389

.865

.661

.30.

437

.039

.046

.726

.024

.021

.5

CPS

Pro

batio

nH

igh

2735

91.2

77.5

71.0

22.8

40.2

37.5

48.3

33.6

32.9

29.6

Med

ian

1375

85.2

51.1

50.9

11.6

18.2

18.8

23.9

8.8

9.7

7.9

Low

306

72.0

34.1

27.4

0.2

7.3

9.7

12.2

1.1

1.8

0.0

NC

LB R

estr

uctu

ring

Hig

h25

2390

.366

.056

.920

.523

.720

.625

.012

.919

.716

.4M

edia

n10

7983

.547

.448

.212

.714

.015

.120

.06.

67.

85.

5Lo

w51

472

.034

.127

.47.

48.

89.

715

.21.

11.

80.

5

Cha

rte r

Hig

h47

395

.3n/

a78

.66.

141

.656

.153

.926

.337

.451

.0M

edia

n32

894

.6n/

a76

.13.

823

.824

.130

.414

.314

.910

.0Lo

w15

590

.8n/

a48

.91.

411

.516

.122

.41.

36.

56.

1

Scho

ol T

ype

PSAE

Rea

ding

% M

eet/E

xcee

d St

anda

rds

PSAE

Mat

h%

Mee

t/Exc

eed

Stan

dard

s

Sour

ce:

Cas

ewri

ter

anal

ysis

bas

ed o

n C

PS

file

s.

Not

es:

“All

Hig

h Sc

hool

s” i

nclu

des

cha

rter

sch

ools

and

oth

er s

choo

ls n

ot e

ligib

le f

or p

roba

tion

, su

ch a

s ne

w a

nd s

peci

al e

duc

atio

n sc

hool

s. T

here

fore

, va

lues

may

be

low

er t

han

“pro

bati

on”

and

d

iffe

rent

fro

m a

ny d

istr

ict

repo

rted

dat

a th

at e

xclu

des

the

se s

choo

ls. S

ome

scho

ols

may

be

in m

ore

than

one

cat

egor

y (e

.g.,

Cra

ne T

echn

ical

Hig

h w

as o

n C

PS p

roba

tion

and

sla

ted

for

NC

LB

re

stru

ctur

ing)

. Six

of t

he 1

0 A

MP

S hi

gh s

choo

ls u

sed

aca

dem

ic a

dm

issi

ons

crit

eria

(“se

lect

ive-

enro

llmen

t”).

Dat

a no

t ava

ilabl

e fo

r pe

rfor

man

ce a

nd c

ontr

act s

choo

ls.

Page 23: Managing the Chicago Public Schools - Harvard University · 2015. 8. 31. · PEL-033 Managing the Chicago Public Schools 4 and the schools had failed to demonstrate “academic progress”

Managing the Chicago Public Schools PEL-033

23

Exhibit 5 AMPS Criteria

Autonomous Management and Performance Schools (AMPS) 2005–06 Year Eligibility Overview

Elementary Eligibility: Schools that have met most of the eligibility factors and have been recommended by the Chief Education Office are invited to participate in this program.

INDICATOR TIME PERIOD RATIONALE Student Performance Indicators 1. Made AYP 2004 rating for

2004–05 school year

Schools making AYP are not subject to federal sanctions.

2. Not in NCLB school improvement

2004 rating for 2004–05 school year

Schools not in NCLB School Improvement are not subject to federal sanctions.

3. Schools of excellence, distinction, merit, and opportunity (see Exhibit 6 in this case)

2004 rating for 2004–05 school year

Schools have high or improving student performance indicators and are not subject to CPS Probation sanctions.

Asset Management Indicators 4. At least 97% of

teachers are highly qualified by NCLB standards

Fall 2004 EQS audit

Shows schools with fully certified teachers who are teaching in their fields.

5. “Excellent” or “adequate” custodial report

FY2004 and FY2003

Shows school has consistent record of maintaining clean, orderly buildings and grounds.

6. Above average internal accounts ratings or no rating

Most recent data available

A rating of financial management.

7.

No major control violations

FY2004 and FY2005

A rating of financial management.

8. Enrollment audit variance less than or equal to 10 students compared to enrollment reported on student information system

Fall 2004 Enrollment Audits

Indicator of school records management.

9.

Elementary daily attendance >= 95%

2003–04 school year

Indicates school does not need to spend extensive amount of time tracking student absences.

10.

Residing not attending <50% or utilization > 80%

2003–04 school year

Shows schools where children are choosing to attend or attending outside of their neighborhoods because the schools are at or above capacity.

INDICATOR TIME PERIOD RATIONALE Special Education Indicators 11. 90% of students

immunized 2004–05 school year

Standard set by State of Illinois.

12. % LRE 3 <=30% or % LRE 3<= low incidence

2004–05 school year

Indicates school does not assign excessive number of students to self-contained special education classrooms.

13. No major violation or citations from IL State Board of Education

CEdO Recommendation Rationale: Data and indicators cannot capture all aspects of school climate and success. Representatives from the Chief Education Office work with schools on a daily basis and have greater insight into schools than what can be derived from the data points alone.

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PEL-033 Managing the Chicago Public Schools

24

AMPS High-School Eligibility

The same as above except: • Asset Management

o For Highly Qualified percent, using high-school average o 28-student variation for Enrollment Audit

• School Climate o Includes: Truancy <= high-school average o Includes: Dropout rate <=high-school average o Removes: Residing Not Attending as an indicator

Source: CPS files.

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Managing the Chicago Public Schools PEL-033

25

Exhibit 6 CPS Accountability System, 2003–March 2006

Source: CPS files. Note: CPS used the same accountability ratings for high schools. The cut-points for student performance on the Prairie State

Achievement Exam (PSAE) were: Level 1, Above 60%; Level II, 40%–59.9%; Level III, 30%–39.9%; and Level IV, Below 30%.

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PE

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33

-26-

Exh

ibit

7 C

PS 2

010

Out

com

e G

oals

Sour

ce:

CPS

file

s.

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PE

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33

-27-

Exh

ibit

8A

MPS

Aut

onom

ies

and

Sch

ool S

elec

tion

s by

Are

a

Are

aN

o. o

f A

MP

S Sc

hool

s

Res

truc

ture

d D

ayN

ew

Tea

cher

In

duct

ion

Cur

ricu

lum

Aut

onom

ous

Scho

ol (o

ut o

f ar

ea)

Aft

er S

choo

lSe

lf-

dire

cted

B

udge

t T

rans

fers

Att

enda

nce

Pla

nSc

hool

C

alen

dar

SIP

AA

A

112

8%83

%83

%33

%75

%50

%92

%92

%17

%83

%2

763

%38

%50

%63

%63

%63

%75

%75

%50

%88

%4

110

0%0%

0%0%

100%

0%10

0%0%

0%10

0%5

10%

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67

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310

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410

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80%

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175

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185

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192

100%

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202

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212

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1.

Res

tru

ctu

red

day

: Cho

ose

own

dat

es fo

r qu

arte

rly

prof

essi

onal

dev

elop

men

t day

s. O

ther

dis

tric

t sch

ools

had

to fo

llow

a s

et s

ched

ule

of h

alf-

day

s, k

now

n as

“re

stru

ctu

red

day

s.”

2.

New

teac

her

ind

uct

ion

: Opt

out

of d

istr

ict’s

pro

gram

, rec

eive

$80

0 pe

r ne

w te

ache

r, a

nd d

esig

n ow

n pr

ogra

m.

3.

Cu

rric

ulu

m: O

pt o

ut o

f dis

tric

twid

e cu

rric

ulu

m in

itia

tive

s (e

.g.,

Rea

din

g 3-

D p

rogr

ess

mon

itor

ing

tool

for

1st g

rad

e).

4.

Au

ton

omou

s sc

hoo

l: O

pt o

ut o

f the

are

a (w

alkt

hrou

ghs,

pri

ncip

al m

eeti

ngs,

acc

ess

to a

rea

coac

hes)

. 5.

A

fter

sch

ool:

Mor

e fl

exib

ility

in th

e ho

urs,

cou

rse

cont

ent,

and

bud

get a

lloca

tion

for

afte

r-sc

hool

pro

gram

. 6.

S

elf-

dir

ecte

d: A

ssu

me

resp

onsi

bilit

y fo

r sc

hool

ope

rati

ons

and

mai

nten

ance

(e.g

., co

ntra

ctin

g ve

ndor

s d

irec

tly

inst

ead

of g

oing

thro

ugh

cent

ral o

ffic

e).

7.

Bu

dge

t tra

nsf

ers:

Tra

nsfe

r m

oney

acr

oss

line

item

s w

itho

ut a

skin

g fo

r ar

ea-l

evel

app

rova

l. 8.

A

tten

dan

ce p

lan

: Des

ign

own

plan

to in

crea

se a

tten

dan

ce in

stea

d o

f fol

low

ing

the

dis

tric

t’s

plan

. 9.

S

choo

l cal

end

ar: S

et s

choo

l yea

r ca

lend

ar, i

nclu

din

g br

eaks

. (M

ost h

olid

ays

are

set b

y st

ate

law

.) 10

. S

choo

l im

pro

vem

ent

pla

n f

or a

dva

nci

ng

acad

emic

ach

ieve

men

t (S

IPA

AA

): A

ll IL

sch

ools

are

req

uire

d b

y th

e st

ate

to s

ubm

it a

SIP

AA

A.

AM

PS

scho

ols

wer

e ab

le t

o m

anag

e th

e pl

anni

ng p

roce

ss o

n th

eir

own

wit

hou

t AIO

ove

rsig

ht a

nd th

us

wer

e ab

le to

com

plet

e a

shor

ter

doc

um

ent.

Sour

ce:

CPS

file

s.

Not

e:

The

re w

ere

no A

MP

S sc

hool

s in

Are

as 3

, 7, 8

, 14,

and

23.

Page 28: Managing the Chicago Public Schools - Harvard University · 2015. 8. 31. · PEL-033 Managing the Chicago Public Schools 4 and the schools had failed to demonstrate “academic progress”

PEL-033 Managing the Chicago Public Schools

28

Exhibit 9 High-School Scorecard for Kenwood Academy

Source: CPS files.

Page 29: Managing the Chicago Public Schools - Harvard University · 2015. 8. 31. · PEL-033 Managing the Chicago Public Schools 4 and the schools had failed to demonstrate “academic progress”

Managing the Chicago Public Schools PEL-033

29

Exhibit 10 AIO Job Description, SY06

Principal Accountabilities for AIOs Weight

1. Assist area principals to develop data-based school plans for improving instruction aligned with district goals and strategies. Help principals identify and utilize the support and resources necessary to successfully implement their school plans.

2. Supervise and evaluate all area principals against established performance targets. Based on the evaluations, provide principals with opportunities for professional development that build on strengths and address weaknesses. When necessary, recommend principal removal to the chief executive officer. Facilitate conversations and collaboration among principals to address common challenges and share best practices.

3. Assist area principals in planning, coordinating, and delivering school-based teacher professional development. Coordinate the delivery of district- and area-based professional development and other instructional support to area schools.

70%

4. Identify and support the development of potential candidates for the principalship in area schools. Lead principal succession planning, working with Local School Councils to help them identify and hire the best possible principals.

30%

Source: CPS files.