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This article was downloaded by: [University of Connecticut]On: 08 October 2014, At: 19:03Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK
International Journal ofHospitality & TourismAdministrationPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjht20
Managing the Aftermath ofTerrorismJoan Henderson PhD aa Nanyang Business School , Nanyang TechnologicalUniversityPublished online: 12 Oct 2008.
To cite this article: Joan Henderson PhD (2004) Managing the Aftermath of Terrorism,International Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Administration, 4:2, 17-31, DOI:10.1300/J149v04n02_02
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Managing the Aftermath of Terrorism:The Bali Bombings, Travel Advisories
and Singapore
Joan Henderson
ABSTRACT. This paper discusses the impact of official travel adviso-ries warning citizens about the dangers of travel to countries near tothose which have experienced terrorist attacks. The issues are consideredwithin a Southeast Asian context, using the example of the bombings onthe Indonesian island of Bali in 2002 which had serious implications forits neighbours. Particular attention is given to the consequences for Sin-gapore which found its previously unchallenged reputation for safety be-ing questioned. Advice given by selected governments and the reactionsof the relevant tourism authorities are reviewed, revealing the problemsconfronted by the industry in these circumstances and possible responsestrategies. Terrorism is shown to have the potential to damage place im-ages and visitor arrivals beyond the particular location where it occurs,and travel advisories may contribute to this process with political reper-cussions. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document De-livery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <[email protected]> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2003 by The Haworth Press,Inc. All rights reserved.]
KEYWORDS. Bali, Singapore, terrorism, travel advisories
Joan Henderson, PhD, is Associate Professor, Nanyang Business School, NanyangTechnological University.
Address correspondence to: Joan Henderson, Blk S3-B1A-27, Nanyang BusinessSchool, Nanyang Technological University, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798(E-mail: ahenderson@ ntu.edu.sg).
International Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Administration, Vol. 4(2) 2003http://www.haworthpress.com/store/product.asp?sku=J149
2003 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.10.1300/J149v04n02_02 17
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INTRODUCTION
Tourism’s vulnerability to terrorism is a topic of heightened interestdue to the prevalence of the threat of terrorism and predictions of itsintensification. The 21st century has already seen illustrations oftravel-related terrorism unparalleled in its scale, notably the Al-Qaedastrikes against New York and Washington in 2001 which are expectedto have long-term ramifications for global tourism (WTO, 2002a). Thispaper examines the impact of terrorist activity on tourism at the particu-lar location where it occurs and in the wider region, using the bombingson the Indonesian island of Bali in 2002 as a case study. The focus is onthe reactions of governments overseas which sought to protect their citi-zens through warning of the dangers of travel in Southeast Asia, and theofficial responses of those nations cited in the warnings. Such a discus-sion of the indirect consequences of terrorism allows exploration of animportant aspect of its relationship with tourism, and affords insightsinto approaches to managing the aftermath of terrorist violence.
An opening summary of the literature on the linkages between terror-ism and tourism provides the context for the study, and this is followedby a brief account of the Bali incident in order to set the scene. Thebombings were an unprecedented event in the history of SoutheastAsian tourism, and their repercussions for tourism in Bali, Indonesiaand beyond are outlined. The advice given by selected governmentsabout the risks confronting travellers to Southeast Asian countries,many of which had previously been considered safe, are then reviewed.These moves are shown to have posed a serious challenge for the tour-ism authorities of the states defined as areas of risk. Even Singapore’swell-established reputation for safety and security was called into ques-tion by the new uncertainties, and its resulting strategy is assessed. A fi-nal conclusion presents some general observations derived from theparticular circumstances of the case, and the overall analysis is based onmass and specialised media reporting and press releases of relevant or-ganisations.
TOURISM AND TERRORISM
The political dimensions of tourism have attracted increasing atten-tion (Cheong & Miller, 2000; Hall, 1994), and the theme is acquiringgreater prominence in tourism research. Interactions between politicsand tourism are numerous, but there is a consensus that a degree of po-
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litical stability is essential for tourism to function and prosper. Variousforms of insecurity are detrimental to tourism and war, internal conflictand unstable regimes depress inbound travel (Pizam & Mansfeld, 1996).Nations which have exhibited these characteristics have failed to realisetheir tourism potential (Hall & Oehlers, 2000), and the prolonged politi-cal unrest in Indonesia, which has been a major obstacle to its tourismgrowth, is an appropriate Southeast Asian example (Soemodinoto,Wong & Saleh, 2001). It should be noted, however, that Bali possessesa distinct identity which has allowed it to distance itself from the rest ofthe country and its troubles.
Terrorism is a particularly damaging manifestation of instability andcan cause a serious decline in visitor arrivals, sometimes over an ex-tended period (Richter & Waugh, 1986; Sonmez, 1998). Problems areexacerbated by extensive media coverage and sensationalism which tendto distort realities and exaggerate dangers (Hall & O’Sullivan, 1996).Dramatic images of death and destruction are transmitted instantlyaround the world, communicating fear and uncertainty. Planned vaca-tions are likely to be cancelled, and tourists are likely to substitute desti-nations they believe to be safer. There may be differences in behaviourrelated to cultural background (Seddighi, Nuttall & Theocharous,2001), although considerations of personal safety usually play a criticalpart in destination choice (Sonmez & Graefe, 1998). Travel agents andtour operators are also risk averse, and avoid selling destinations wheretheir customers might feel threatened. There is the additional possibilitythat investment funding will be withdrawn, thereby further impedingdevelopment.
Another key factor, which is often neglected, is that of action takenby governments to safeguard their nationals who are international tour-ists. Bans on travel and investment have been imposed in exceptionalcircumstances, but discouragement through travel warning advisoryservices is more common with regard to terrorism (Santana, 2001). In-formation about conditions overseas and the risks that might be encoun-tered is directed at private individuals, industry operators and investors,and seeks to apprise rather than compel. However, the advice might beconsidered authoritative by some tourists and the private sector, and lo-cations deemed unsafe are likely to be avoided. Issues of legal liabilityand insurance coverage also deter tour operators and travel agents fromfeaturing these places in their programmes. The official stance adoptedmay be dictated by political motives and goals, and Sharpley, Sharpleyand Adams (1996) registered their scepticism about the objectivity andimpartiality of advisories. Nevertheless, governments have a responsi-
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bility for the welfare of nationals and the system assists them in meetingthese obligations.
In analyses of places afflicted by terrorism as diverse as Northern Ire-land (Witt & Moore, 1992), Sri Lanka (Richter, 1999) and Egypt (Aziz,1995), observers concurred that restoration of a favourable image andrecovery depends on a combination of factors and can take severalyears. Pizam and Fleischer (2002) highlighted the significance of thefrequency and recurrence of any violence in the return to normality, andthe influence of media reporting and recovery marketing campaignshave been acknowledged (EIU, 1994). Revisions to travel advisoriesand the lifting of warnings are an additional consideration to take intoaccount in progress towards recovery.
Terrorism, thus, has the capacity to disrupt tourism and create a se-vere crisis for those involved in the industry at sites which are targeted.It also is a source of problems for proximate destinations which may betarnished by the negative publicity, and for governments concernedabout the welfare of their citizens when travelling overseas. The stancesof these latter two groups are often overlooked, and this account seeksto contribute to the debate about the effects of political disturbance ontourism by focusing on their positions.
TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE BALIBOMBINGS
Questions of the relationship between terrorism and tourism have aparticular relevance in Southeast Asia, where there has been mountingconcern about the presence of extremist Islamic groups, exemplified byassociations such as Jemaah Islamiah (JI) which has cells across the re-gion (Desker, 2002). Many militants have shifted from an essentiallydomestic agenda to aligning themselves with an international terroristnetwork linked to Al-Qaeda, thereby endangering global security (CDI,2002). Expressions of antagonism towards Westerners, especially Anti-American rhetoric, have become more vehement, and are now being fu-elled by opposition to the war in Iraq. International tourists are one tar-get of hostility and there are documented instructions from Al-Qaeda toits members that “assassinating enemy personnel as well as foreigntourists” is a main priority after “overthrowing godless regimes” (TheStraits Times, 2002a). While there have been rare occasions of touristkidnapping, hostage taking and murder in the past, travel now appearsmore hazardous and this is demonstrated by the casualties in Bali.
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Two bomb explosions at adjacent night clubs in the popular Balineseresort of Kuta on 12 October 2002 devastated an area the size of a foot-ball pitch and damaged 450 buildings. The final death toll was 191 andover 300 were injured, many suffering severe burns in the fire which en-sued. The largest number of victims were from Australia, although Eu-ropeans, Americans and Balinese residents were amongst those killed.Investigations were still in progress in early 2003, but suspects with JIconnections had already been arrested and confessed to involvement inthe crime. The final costs of the bombings in terms of visitor numbersand revenue have yet to be fully assessed. This task is complicated bythe multiple variables determining tourism demand and their complexpattern of interaction, both of which obscure the contribution of individ-ual elements. While some official figures were released in the periodunder examination confirming a downturn in arrivals, there was muchreporting of anecdotal evidence and predictions from assorted sources.This material is not always consistent, but constitutes a part of the back-ground against which decisions were taken. The absence of reliable datais one dimension of the uncertainty which accompanies terrorism andcan constrain tourism policy making. This may, in turn, lead to pessi-mistic scenarios which compound the urgency of the crisis.
Many tourists left Bali immediately after the bombings, and daily av-erage arrivals dropped from 4,650 to 2,800 in the days that followed theblasts (The Jakarta Post, 2002). Cancellations to all Indonesian destina-tions were apparent in both leisure and business travel markets, and theMinistry of Tourism and Culture anticipated an annual loss of US$1.8and US$2 billion from international and domestic tourism earnings re-spectively, or 6.6% of GDP (WTO, 2002b). Bali itself was expected tolose US$4 million in 2002 (BBC, 2002a). Fears were voiced about thewider prospects for tourism, given that industry and traveller confi-dence globally were still unsettled by the events of 2001 (BBC, 2002b).The slump of 27% in Malaysia’s international arrivals recorded in Oc-tober, for example, was attributed to the terrorists (The Straits Times,2002b), and Thailand forecast that it would receive 135,000 fewer tour-ists in the fourth quarter of 2002 with lost revenue of US$160 million(The Straits Times, 2002c). Many governments and National TourismOrganisations (NTOs) in the region were thus anxious about a sulliedSoutheast Asian image and its costs.
Singapore is renowned for its stability and might once have seemedimmune to such conflicts, despite a location between the two large Is-lamic states of Indonesia and Malaysia and a sizeable Malay Muslimminority within a predominantly Chinese population. Its successes
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have been ascribed to the People’s Action Party (PAP) which has builteconomic prosperity on a foundation of multiculturalism in a regimecharacterised by autocracy and efficiency. The discovery of a JI con-spiracy against both Singaporean and foreign interests in 2001 there-fore came as a profound shock, and exposed the Republic’s vulnerabil-ity. American companies, as well as the American, Australian, Britishand Israeli Embassies, were all found to have been under surveillanceby terrorists after a total of 32 individuals were detained in two roundsof arrests. The government pronounced that it had disrupted the groupin Singapore and that international liaison efforts aimed at strengthen-ing the anti-terrorist movement were underway (Ministry of Home Af-fairs, 2002). The prompt action was praised overseas and did not seemto affect the country’s standing in the international community or de-ter tourists, but the Bali bombings drew world attention to the regionand raised doubts about tourist safety throughout Southeast Asia andin Singapore.
GOVERNMENT TRAVEL ADVICE
Advice given by the governments of Australia, the UK and USA issummarised in this section in order to illustrate the reaction of stateswhose nationals were victims of the Bali bombings. Reference is madeto general observations about Southeast Asia and specific comments onIndonesia and Singapore to indicate the comparative severity of warn-ings regarding the latter. The Australian, British and US governmentswere quick to warn of the dangers of travel to the region as a whole andspecifically to the individual ASEAN (Association of Southeast AsianNations) countries of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, thePhilippines, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as Indonesia and Singapore.While there were some later amendments as the situation evolved, theadvice remained unchanged after two months. It should be recognisedthat other authorities such as those in Canada, Scandinavia and Japanfollowed suit in counselling against visiting Indonesia and pressing theimportance of vigilance everywhere.
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Travel (ADFAT)informed Australian travellers of the global threat from internationalterrorism and acute tensions. Australians were “urged to exercise careand monitor developments that may affect their safety,” and be wary oflarge gatherings and areas known to be frequented by foreigners such as“cultural and tourist sites.” The threat to Australians in Indonesia was
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described as “high” and any citizens “concerned about their securityshould consider departure.” An announcement for Singapore also de-fined threats as “high,” reiterating the message about being aware andcareful in public places like “clubs, restaurants, bars, schools, places ofworship, outdoor recreation events and tourist areas” (ADFAT, 2002).Singapore’s Changi airport was said to be on “heightened alert” andthere was a reminder of the terrorist arrests in 2001 when the AustralianHigh Commission had been a possible target.
Information conveyed by the British government in its Foreign andCommonwealth Country Advice notes was essentially the same and aphrase about the “increased threat to British nationals and British inter-ests from terrorism in South East Asia” was applied to all countries. Theauthorities warned against any travel to Indonesia and suggested Britishnationals there on non-essential business should “consider leaving.”Advice for Singapore outlined the “risk of indiscriminate attacks on ci-vilian targets in public places, including tourist sites” and nationalswere asked to “exercise extreme caution in public places, in particularplaces of entertainment such as nightclubs, bars, restaurants and placesof worship known to be frequented by foreigners.” At the same time,“most visits” were “trouble-free” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office,2002).
The US Department of State released a formal Public Announcementabout the potential for “terrorist actions against US citizens abroad, spe-cifically in the Southeast Asia region.” Extremist groups were said to beplanning attacks on “softer targets such as clubs, restaurants, places ofworship, schools, outdoor recreation events, hotels, resorts and beaches.”A Travel Warning recommended that American citizens should “defertravel to Indonesia” and those already there should “evaluate their secu-rity posture and consider departing.” There was no special warning forSingapore, but the US Consular Information Sheet for Singapore en-couraged visitors to practice caution at venues such as “clubs, discos,bars, restaurants, hotels, places of worship, schools, outdoor recreationvenues, tourist areas, resorts and beaches.” The JI plot was cited, as wasthe likelihood of a repetition of the Bali bombings by extremists whohad “demonstrated transnational capabilities to carry out attacks whereWesterners congregate.” In comparison, the preceding US Consular In-formation Sheet had stated that the Singapore security services had ef-fectively foiled a plot against American interests and that “there havebeen no terrorist or anti-American incidents of any kind in Singapore”(US Department of State, 2002).
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The information and advice proffered by the governments of Austra-lia, the UK and USA was thus fairly consistent in suggesting that it wasimperative for citizens to leave or cancel visits to Indonesia, be on guardthroughout the region and shun spaces where they were easily identifi-able and vulnerable to assault. The Australian warnings were the stron-gest in tone, perhaps because so many Australians lost their lives andthe government was determined to be seen to be acting firmly. In termsof Singapore, the risk to the Australian High Commission was high-lighted by the Australian government alongside dangers at Changi air-port and the country was deemed by American officials to be morehazardous after 12 October. Britain offered a degree of reassurance, yetalso acknowledged the chance of random attacks.
While the material reflects a common official solicitude for the well-being of citizens, there were some minor contrasts in presentation andthese seem to be indicative of differences in interpretation of informa-tion provided by the security services. Politics also had a role to play,and the audiences for the advisories were not just travellers and the tour-ism industry, but the international and domestic communities at largewith one probable government aim being to pre-empt criticism. Whetherthe advice constituted a realistic assessment or overstatement of risks isa matter of dispute and there was a strong belief amongst SoutheastAsian public and private sector tourism agencies that the latter was thecase, leading to unnecessary alarm amongst tourists.
Quantifying the actual effect of the advisories on tourist behaviourand attitudes, and on decisions made by tour operators, travel agentsand transport carriers in generating countries, is an exercise for anotherpaper. Nevertheless, a review of UK trade press reports suggests thatBali and Indonesia were temporarily withdrawn from sale by most com-panies while demand for other Southeast Asian destinations remainedrelatively high. Nervous travellers were seen to be choosing other desti-nations while the more experienced were not deterred from travelling tothe region (TTG UK, 2002). It is not clear how much prominence theUK industry representatives gave to the Foreign and CommonwealthOffice notices in their dealings with customers, although a survey ofUK visitors to Singapore, conducted as part of another exercise, re-vealed that only 49% were aware of the formal advisories. The anxietiesdiscussed below may therefore have been misplaced regarding certainmarkets and destination countries, but further research is necessary be-fore any definite conclusions can be derived.
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OFFICIAL RESPONSES
The topic of the advisories was on the agenda of the ASEAN sum-mit meeting in early November which called on the “internationalcommunity to avoid indiscriminately advising their citizens to re-frain from visiting or otherwise dealing with our countries, in the ab-sence of established evidence to substantiate rumours of possibleterrorist attacks.” Unfounded fears were being created which servedthe terrorist cause by injuring regional economies and societies, andthere were accusations of double standards (The Straits Times, 2002d).The Secretary General of ASEAN’s Tourism Association (ASEANTA)commented that the advisories were “too sweeping . . . unfair and unjus-tified” (TTG Daily News, 2002). An editorial in Singapore’s StraitsTimes (2002e) observed that the Australian stance would alienate manyin the region and negate Canberra’s endeavours to “build bridges withASEAN states.”
There were also independent protests by governments which assertedthat their territories were safe, and they were dedicated to providing se-curity for tourists and foreign residents. Even Indonesia’s Ministry ofCulture and Tourism lobbied for the moderation of the warnings whichit claimed were unreasonable and served to isolate the nation, impede itsdevelopment and hinder the struggle against terrorism. The Prime Min-ister of Singapore criticised the Republic’s inclusion in Australia’s listof high risk countries as “totally unfair” (The Straits Times, 2002f), andthere was agreement in Parliament about the necessity of countering“alarmist assessments” (The Straits Times, 2002g). The subject wasraised several times at a diplomatic level and, replying to objectionsfrom across the region, the Australian Foreign Minister said that secu-rity information could not be overlooked just to ensure that “nobodythroughout South-east Asia is upset” (The Straits Times, 2002h).
The issue, thus, became highly politicised and a cause of friction ininternational relations, especially between Australia and ASEAN mem-bers. The controversy, however, also had an economic dimension.There was a keen awareness within the region of both the commercialsignificance of tourism and the financial costs of being portrayed as un-stable. Australia is an important source of international tourists and, inthe example of Singapore, supplied 414,107 visitors in the first ninemonths of 2002 when it occupied fourth position in the table of arrivals.The UK and USA were the sixth and eighth largest markets with 339,957and 247,974 tourists respectively, and were the only non-Asian Pacificstates amongst the top twelve (STB, 2002a). An appreciation of the eco-
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nomic contribution of tourism was also displayed by the Australiansthemselves in mid-November after the Japanese government warned ofthe dangers of visits to Australia. The Canberra authorities and Austra-lian Tourist Commission argued that the warning should be lifted, seek-ing to avert a decline in the country’s second largest inbound market(Australian Financial Review, 2002).
NTOs are key representatives of destination countries during timesof crisis, and those in Southeast Asia reacted to the bombings and traveladvisories by giving priority to safety matters and the allaying of fears.Promotion outside the region was maintained, but there was a concen-tration on regional and domestic markets. Discounting was also encour-aged in order to stimulate sales with promises of value for money (TTGAsia, 2002).
Singapore too, irrespective of its long-standing reputation for order-liness and strong government, had to try and convince tourists andthe industry of the absence of undue risk. A Singapore Tourism Board(STB) statement explained that the government was committed to “pro-viding a safe holiday environment for its visitors.” There was no currentspecific threat against Singapore according to the Ministry of Home Af-fairs and “appropriate security measures” had been in place since Sep-tember 2001 at all checkpoints and certain key locations. Police patrolshad been increased and there was regular cooperation and the exchangeof information with intelligence services abroad. Singapore’s highranking in international surveys on personal security and political sta-bility was referred to and the American Ambassador was quoted as say-ing “Singapore remains as secure now as it was even before Bali . . . agreat place for all people to . . . enjoy all the good things in life” (STB,2002b).
Other pronouncements by the STB also communicated reassurance,and it reported that there had been no cancellations in meetings, conven-tions, and incentive travel since the Bali bombings. A gathering of 650Australian travel agents had gone ahead after satisfactory arrangementswere made by the events organiser working in cooperation with theSTB, police, hotel and convention facility managers. Some businesshad also been diverted from Bali and an STB spokesperson affirmedthat “our good track record in safety speaks for itself” (The StraitsTimes, 2002i). In addition, the Board and Singapore Airlines hosted fa-miliarisation trips for 100 British and Irish agents to allow them the op-portunity to experience local conditions for themselves.
Domestic tourism is limited in Singapore due to constraints of sizeand resources, and exploiting this market was not such a viable option
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as it might have been for its neighbours. However, greater attention wasdevoted to regional tourism, which was believed to be more robust thanlong-haul travel and already accounted for the bulk of arrivals. The in-tention was to increase ASEAN visitors by 12% through telling themabout the “amazing range of things they can do in Singapore.” Centralto the incentive was a special Visitor Kit which included S$240 worthof vouchers for discounts and free admission at various attractions andretail outlets. The promotion cost S$2 million and was to be valid in se-lected neighbouring states until the end of 2002, thereby helping “bol-ster confidence in the industry, starting with intra-ASEAN travel” (STB2002c).
The response from the STB was, therefore, to reassure tourists andthe industry, disseminate accurate and up-to-date information, and toreinforce government messages about control and safety. The Board ex-ploited Singapore’s good reputation and made an attempt to use pricediscounting to boost demand, although this technique was more evidentelsewhere and especially in Indonesia. It is difficult to accurately assessthe success of the strategy at this stage, although statistics for October2002 suggest that the immediate impact of the bombings was limited onSingapore visitor arrivals. Table 1 shows that although arrivals from Ja-pan, Australia and Malaysia declined in October compared to Septem-ber, overall arrivals were up 7% (STB, 2002a). The final outcome willonly become apparent in the longer term and sustained recovery and
Joan Henderson 27
TABLE 1. Singapore Visitor Arrivals: September and October 2002
Top Ten Markets September October
Indonesia 102,841 116,945
Japan 77,841 58,466
Australia 52,286 50,025
Malaysia 48,142 44,405
PR China 47,212 57,657
UK 33,780 37,710
India 27,873 33,205
USA 23,498 26,030
South Korea 21,459 28,799
Thailand 19,342 25,622
Total Arrivals 597,115 638,237
Source: Singapore Tourism Board.
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growth will depend on whether there are any further terrorist strikes inthe region or Singapore, their gravity, and the manner in which they arehandled by the authorities.
CONCLUSION
The research literature on terrorism and tourism suggests their closeand dangerous relationship, the presence and threat of terrorist activ-ity representing a severe obstacle to tourism at destinations where itoccurs. This paper has provided evidence of such an effect in Bali, andhas also identified the distribution of travel advisories as a significantindirect consequence of terrorism. Official warnings have been shownto cause further difficulties for the tourism industry in the country andcontinental area where the destination is located, especially whenevents are the subject of worldwide publicity. Warnings may extend tostates once considered safe and secure, such as Singapore, and are an-other indication of the power of terrorism to harm place images, visi-tor arrivals and their expenditure. The circulation of advisories alsohas economic repercussions beyond tourism and is a matter of seriousgovernment concern, capable of adversely affecting international rela-tions, and demonstrating how tourism can become a highly political issue.
Evaluation of different terrorism-related crises offers an insight intogood and bad practice, and the discussion has revealed that NTOs havea key role in informing, reassuring, repairing any damage and restoringa positive image. Authorities in Southeast Asia, and particularly Singa-pore, appear to have taken appropriate measures when confronted withthe dilemmas of destination promotion in the aftermath of terrorism.The effectiveness of conventional marketing in such exceptional cir-cumstances is, however, debatable, and the results of the actions of re-gional NTOs is a subject for continued monitoring in order to fullyevaluate their performance and the allocation of resources.
In general, tourism crises connected to terrorism are important topicsfor future research in view of their anticipated increased frequency.Such studies will lead to a better understanding of the reactions of tour-ists to terrorist strikes, their management by the industry and the link-ages between terrorism and tourism. More specifically, attention shouldbe devoted to assessing the influence of terrorism on tourist decisionmaking and responses to reassurance marketing, as well as the formula-tion and impact of travel advisories and securing a proper balance be-tween realistic assessment of risk and the provocation of unnecessary
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fears. The knowledge gained can hopefully be applied to improve thelevel of readiness of those responsible for tourism marketing and devel-opment, assisting them to devise successful strategies.
Finally, it should be stressed that there are still grounds for optimismabout the future, and tourism has already proved itself resilient, with areluctance amongst leisure tourists to abandon travel and a willingnessto return to formerly troubled locations. It must also be acknowledgedthat opportunities emerge from crisis, and the tourism industry must bequick to identify and exploit new conditions and trends, displaying flex-ibility and adaptability. Tourism has the capacity to survive the threat ofterrorism, provided that the industry learns from past experiences, andacademic research can make an essential contribution to this process.
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RECEIVED: 01/09/03REVISIONS RECEIVED: 04/03/03
ACCEPTED: 04/21/03
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