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Managing Public Expenditures to Make Services Work for
Poor People
Discussion with Public Expenditure Thematic Group
Shanta Devarajan, Shekhar Shah
WDR 2004
October 31, 2002
Objectives1. Discuss WDR framework 2. Explore questions relating to public
expenditure management and service delivery
3. Invite inputs from TG on experiences of PE work & budget formulation, implementation, monitoring that suggest what does & does not work to improve services and outcomes for poor people
Services are failing poor people:MDGs—Global Aggregates
Eradicate poverty and hunger
People living on less than $1 a day
23 .4
29
14 .5
0
10
20
30
1990 1998 2015
Eradicate Poverty & Hunger Achieve Universal primary education
Net primary enrollment
8 4
8 1
1 0 0
8 0
8 5
9 0
9 5
1 0 0
1 9 9 0 1 9 9 9 2 0 1 5
Universal Primary Education
Growth is not enough
Poverty Headcount % living on less than
$1/day
Primary EducationEnrollment
%
Infant Mortalityper 1000
Target
2015 Growth alone
Target2015
Growth alone
Target2015
Growthalone
EAST ASIA
14 3 100 100 14 33
ECA 1 1 100 100 9 22
LAC 8 7 100 100 14 30
MENA 1 1 100 92 20 46
SA 22 18 100 87 29 70
AFRICA 24 40 100 64 33 87
Source: Global Economic Prospects 2001, p.42 base case; Devarajan (2002)
Dominican Republic
Sudan
Belarus
Ukraine
Venezuela, RB
Azerbaijan
Ethiopia
Guatemala
Hungary
Bulgaria
Kuw ait
Zambia
Trinidad and Tobago
MexicoPeru
China
Lao PDRRomania
Burkina Faso
Malaw i
Czech RepublicSlovak RepublicParaguay
Uganda
Macedonia, FYRBotsw ana
Chad
Iran
Zimbabw e
Senegal
El Salvador Poland
Costa Rica
Togo
Chile
India
Congo, Rep.
Albania
Turkey
Kenya
NepalPhilippines
Korea, Rep.
Thailand
Mozambique
Mali
Argentina
Nicaragua
Guinea
JamaicaMauritius
Mauritania
Gambia, The
Malaysia
Oman
Eritrea
Brazil
Benin
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
-160 -120 -80 -40 0 40 80 120 160
Public spending on education per student(Percent deviation from expenditure predicted by GDP per capita)
Pri
ma
ry c
om
ple
tio
n r
ate
(Pe
rce
nt
de
via
tio
n f
rom
ra
te p
red
icte
d b
y G
DP
pe
r c
ap
ita
)
Increasing public spending is not enough
Regression line:Coefficient: -0.055T-statistic: 0.755
Source: WDR 2004 Team
Similar changes in public spending can be associated with
vastly different changes in outcomes…
Primary completion rate
10
20
30
40
50
60
1980s 1990 1990s 1999
Ethiopia
Malawi
Public spending on primary education per child
0
2
4
6
8
10
1980s 1990 1990s 1999
Ethiopia
Malawi
Source: WDR 2004 Team
…And vastly different changes in spending can be associated with
similar changes in outcomes
Primary completion rate
50
60
70
80
90
100
1980s 1990 1990s 1999
Venezuela
Thailand
Public spending on primary education per child
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1980s 1990 1990s 1999
Venezuela
Thailand
Source: WDR 2004 Team
Why are services failing for poor people?
• Governments spend on the wrong goods and people
Benefit Incidence of Public Spending
Health Education
Country/ year Poorest 20% of population
Richest 20% of population
Poorest 20% of population
Richest 20% of population
Cote d’Ivoire (1995) 11 32 13 35 Ghana (1992) 12 33 16 21 Guinea (1994) 4 48 5 44 Kenya (1992) 14 24 17 21 Madagascar (1993) 12 30 8 41 South Africa (1994) 16 17 14 35 Tanzania (1992/93) 17 29 14 37
Source: WDR 2004 Team
Why are services failing forpoor people?
• Governments spend on the wrong goods and people
• Resources fail to reach the service provider (Uganda tracking study)
• Weak incentives for effective service delivery
Examples of ineffective service delivery
• Bangladesh: Absenteeism rates for doctors in primary health care centers: 79%.
• Zimbabwe: 13% of respondents gave as a reason for not delivering babies in public facilities that “nurses hit mothers during delivery”.
• Guinea: 70% of government drugs disappeared.• Costa Rica: absenteeism rate is 30% in public
health facilities.
Why are services failing forpoor people?
• Governments spend on the wrong goods and people
• Resources fail to reach the service provider (Uganda tracking study)
• Weak incentives for effective service delivery
• Demand-side constraints
Accelerating progress: Whatis the problem?
• Economic growth not enough• More public spending not enough - Why?
– Governments often spend on wrong services & people– Resources fail to reach service providers due to corruption– Weak incentives for delivery, monitoring, accountability– Households can’t or don’t utilize services (parents pull
children, particularly girls, out of school; problems of access)
• So, what is needed?
Development outcomes: the hope
Benefi
ts
Gover
nment
Primary education
Countries with well-designed policies are supposed to leverage their own & external resources to produce human development outcomes…
Clie
nts
Government
Providers
Loc
al G
ovt
Benefi
ts
…but, there are many weak links in implementation, and much needs to come together to make services work & produce desirable outcomes
Leakage of Funds
PoliciesInstitutional incentives
Primary education
Inappropriate spending (e.g. high teacher salaries; Insufficient supply of textbooks
Public financingImplementation capacityInformation & transparencyInstitutional incentives
Low-quality instructionCapacity & incentivesCurriculum & technologyMonitoring & evaluation
Lack of demandAbility to payIntra-household behaviorCommunity norms
Development outcomes: the reality
Policy-makers
Clients
Providers
Contract relationships Service
relationships
Voice Relationships
Making services work forpoor people
Providers
ClientsPolicy-makers
Contract relationship Service
relationship
Voice relationship
Unbundling the service chain-1
Policymaker-provider:Contracting NGOs in Cambodia
• Contracting out (CO): NGO can hire and fire, transfer staff, set wages, procure drugs, etc.
• Contracting in (CI): NGO manages district, cannot hire and fire (but can transfer staff), $0.25 per capita budget supplement
• Control/Comparison (CC): Services run by government
12 districts randomly assigned to CC, CI or CO
% Utilization of facilities by poor people sick in last month
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Control CI CO
BaselineFollow-up
Providers
ClientsPolicy-makers
Contract relationship Service
relationship
Voice relationship
Unbundling the service chain-2
Client-Provider:EDUCO Program in El Salvador
• Ministry of Education contracts with parent associations to deliver primary education in rural areas
• Parents’ associations– Hire and fire contract teachers– Visit schools on regular basis
EDUCO: % impact of 1 more class visit by ACE on test scores
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Math Language
Providers
ClientsPolicy-makers
Contract relationship Service
relationship
Voice relationship
Unbundling the service chain-3
Girls’ education in Bangladesh: FSSAP
• Female Sec. Sch. Assist. Project criteria:– Attendance in school– Passing grade– Unmarried
• Girls receive scholarship deposited directly into to account in their name
• School to receive support based on number of girls
Providers
ClientsPolicy-makers
Contract relationship Service
relationship
Voice relationship
Unbundling the service chain-4
Donors
Emerging Messages
• Incentives, Choice, Accountability• No single solution for every service, every country
– Public, private, NGO provision of services all possible
– “Matrix” of characteristics & approaches
– Most neglected actor: the client
• Complementarity between improved service delivery & increased financing
• Need to understand political economy • Aid modalities affect service delivery
Public Expenditures and Service Delivery in the WDR
• Set within WDR approach of unbundling service delivery chain
• Discussed as primary cross-sectoral issue for improving service delivery
• Entry point for broader public sector reform• Civil service, decentralization, M&E, regulation,
anticorruption
• Scope for integration: priorities within government, across sectors, among donors, and over time
Public Spending & Service Delivery
• Well-functioning PE systems vital for health, education, water & sanitation services
• Budget allocations should reflect determinants of health and education outcomes
• However, PEM systems fall short of this ideal: – Often not backed up by good policymaking– Do not allocate adequate resources – Lack outcome orientation– Suffer from conflicting political & bureaucratic
interests– Tradeoffs between sectors and over time not made– Integration across government missing
Cross-cutting PE Reforms for better service delivery
• Raise results-orientation of public expenditure programs: performance budgeting
• Update, regulate, and harmonize public procurement
• Update legal & regulatory framework for financial management
• Improve accounting and audit systems at central and local levels
• Implement regular expenditure tracking surveys• Delineate clear responsibilities for M&E, establish
clear service standards
A Large Agenda: PE work and Poverty Reduction
PE Analysis
PE Management
Fiscal Sustainability
AllocativeEfficiency
IncidenceAnalysis
Poverty Reduction
BudgetFormulation
Budget Execution
Procurement
Fiscal risk
Reporting & oversight
Quality of
PolicyProcess
PRSPPRSC
Trackingsurveys
ServiceDel.survey
Civil Service Reform DecentralizationRelated items
Source: Rajaram, PREM Learning Week, June 2002
Questions for discussion• Ways of cutting into and assisting
countries manage this large, growing agenda when capacities are low (e.g. HIPC)
• Enhancing service orientation of budgets• Integrating across PRSPs, sectors, donors• Experience with MTEFs
– Poverty impacts– Integration of social sectors
• Enhancing monitoring and evaluation • Role of participatory budget analysis
Objectives Today1. Discuss WDR framework 2. Explore questions relating to public
expenditure management and service delivery
3. Invite inputs coordinated through TG• Country-specific material for boxes• Background notes on key questions in PE for
making services work for poor people• Stories of success and failure