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i
MANAGEMENT OF FRAUD IN NIGERIA COMMERCIAL BANKS
BY
UKPAFE KINGSLEY UZUAJEME PG/MBA/07/46910
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT FACULTY OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
SCHOOL OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA
ENUGU CAMPUS
AUGUST, 2009.
ii
TITLE PAGE
MANAGEMENT OF FRAUD IN NIGERIA
COMMERCIAL BANKS
(A CASE STUDY OF SELECTED COMMERCIAL BANKS)
BY
UKPAFE KINGSLEY UZUAJEME PG/MBA/07/46910
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE
AWARD OF MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
(MBA) IN MANAGEMENT
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT FACULTY OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
SCHOOL OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA
ENUGU CAMPUS
SUPERVISOR
DR C.A EZIGBO
AUGUST, 2009.
iii
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that this project was carried out by Ukpafe
Kingsley U with Registration Number PG/MBA/46910, in the
Department of Management Faculty of Business Administration,
University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus (UNEC).
The work embodied in this research is original and has not
been submitted in part or full for any other degree of this or any
other university.
………………………………………. ………………………. Dr. C.A Ezigbo Date Supervisor ………………………………………. ………………………. Mr. C.O Chukwu Date Head of Department
iv
DEDICATION
This research work is dedicated to God Almighty for his infinite
mercy and love upon me throughout my stay in the university.
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I wish to use this medium to express my profound gratitude to
a number of people who assisted me in various ways during the
course of my studies. I am grateful to God Almighty for his guidance,
mercies, protection and ever abiding presence, which made it
possible for me to cope with the programme.
I am indebted to my humble supervisor Dr. C.A Ezigbo, for her
immeasurable support and patience with me throughout this
research.
I am equally grateful to the Head of Department of
Management, Mr. C.O Chukwu for his stimulating academic
leadership. I cannot forget some of my Lecturers in the Department
of Management, for the knowledge they imparted in me. They
include Chief J.A Eze, Dr. U.J.F Ewurum and Dr. J.U.J Onwumere.
I am grateful to my family, my lovely and precious wife Mrs
Mabel Ukpafe, my children Marvelous, Dora and Divine Ukpafe and
my respectful sister Rosemary Ukpafe for their support and prayers
for me throughout my stay in the university.
I am particularly grateful to the management and staff of Union
Bank, Diamond Bank and Stanbic IBTC Bank for readily providing
vi
some of the data used in this research. Their unequalled
cooperation and assistance quickened the completion of this study.
May God, the rewarder of every good deed bless them abundantly.
Ukpafe Kingsley U. PG/MBA/07/46910
vii
ABSTRACT
This research is on the Management of Fraud in Nigeria Commercial Banks. A case study of selected Commercial Banks in Enugu. The main objective of the study is to identify the causes of fraud in commercial banks. The researcher analyzed the data collected based on the response from the questionnaires distributed. The chi-square test was used to test the hypotheses. The major findings of the study are:
1. The causes of frauds in commercial bank include a. Poor management and poor security arrangement b. Inadequate staff training. c. Staff negligence.
2. The various types of fraud in commercial banks include a. Loan fraud b. Cheque fraud c. Advance fee fraud.
On the basis of the above findings, the study concludes that management of fraud in commercial banks is of great importance and has a lot of benefits which includes giving confidence to the bank customers that their money is safe, encourages or attracting local and foreign investors to invest in the banking sector with the impression that their investment is secure. Also, it exposes fraud victims in commercial banks for punishment and prosecution. On the basis of the above findings it was recommended that
a. Government should establish more anti-fraud and anti-corruption agencies to assist in sanitizing the Nigeria banking system.
b. Bank management should employ strategies that will ensure early and prompt detection, prevention and control of fraud in commercial banks.
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Cover Page
Title Page - - - - - - - - - i
Certification - - - - - - - - ii
Dedication - - - - - - - - - iii
Acknowledgement - - - - - - - iv
Abstract - - - - - - - - - v
Table of Contents - - - - - - - vi
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study - - - - - 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem - - - - - 3
1.3 Objectives of the Study - - - - - 4
1.4 Research Questions - - - - - - 4
1.5 Research Hypotheses - - - - - - 5
1.6 Significance of the Study - - - - - 6
1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study - - - 6
1.8 Definition of Terms - - - - - - 7
References - - - - - - - - 10
x
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.0 Origin of Fraud - - - - - - - 11
2.1 What is Fraud? - - - - - - - 12
2.2 What is Bank Fraud? - - - - - - 14
2.3 Major Causes of Fraud in the Commercial Banks - 26
2.4 Implications of Fraud on the Bank and Entire Economy of
Nigeria - - - - - - - - 35
2.5 Punishment and Penalties to Fraud Perpetrators - 39
2.6 Fraud Detection, Prevention and Control - - 42
2.7 Government Effort towards Fraud Control - - 60
2.8 CBN and NDIC Effort to Fraud Control - - - 62
2.9 Extent of Fraud in Banks - - - - - 62
References - - - - - - - - 65
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0 Introduction - - - - - - - 66
3.1 Area of the Study - - - - - - 66
3.2 Source of Data - - - - - - - 66
3.3 Population and Sample Size Determination - - 67
xi
3.4 Instrument Used For Data Collection - - - 70
3.5 Method of Data Analysis - - - - - 71
3.6 Validity and Reliability of Data - - - - 73
References - - - - - - - - 74
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
4.0 Data Presentation and Analysis - - - - 75
4.1 Analysis of Questionnaires Distributed and Returned 88
4.2 Testing of Hypotheses - - - - - - 88
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Major Findings - - - - - - - 100
5.2 Conclusion - - - - - - - - 101
5.3 Recommendations - - - - - - 101
Bibliography - - - - - - - - 103
Appendix A - - - - - - - - - 106
2
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
The term irregularities are used to refer to intentional distortion
of financial statements, for whatever purpose and to
misappropriations of assets, whether or not accompanied by
distortions of financial statements. Fraud is one type of irregularity.
In auditing guideline, the word fraud is used to refer to irregularities
involving the use of criminal deception to obtain an unjust or illegal
advantage.
Fraud may entail that proper accounting record have not been
maintained, it may also indicate that some internal controls are not
effective and that the auditor cannot rely on these internal controls.
Existence of Fraud in financial statements could jeopardize the
statements from showing true and fair view and complying with the
companies and Allied Matter Acts (CAMA) 1990.
Therefore, fraud in banks must be looked at generally as “acts
that involve the loss of assets by banks through deceitful and
dishonest means. The intention of the fraudster is to dishonestly
benefit himself to detriment of the bank or bank staff or bank
customer or any other member of the public via banking operations.
3
Fraud can be committed by bank customer, bank customer, bank
staff and customers or a third party that is non-customers. (Eze,
2004).
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Fraud in the Nigerian Commercial Banks has remained an
unavoidable problem and has also resisted all practicable treatment.
The incidence has not only become incessant but also been on the
increase in the recent past.
Although, it has assumed global dimension, the rate of growth
in Nigeria has been outstanding in sophistication from N1542.91
million in 1996, the amount involved in commercial banks alone rose
to N3590.31 million in 1997. Where as the actual/expected loss went
from N371.08 million to N224.54 million (NDIC). This has affected
the commercial banks profitability in no small measure.
The general confidence reposed in the banking institutions has
become eroded since the new concepts of distress, bank failures and
closures of 1990’s. From available records, out of about 115 financial
institutions operating in the country as at 1996, surprisingly 52 were
distressed while 6 were acquired. With the frequent of fraud, people
are no longer at ease keeping their monies in the commercial banks
4
but prefer to keep them in their houses or concretizes them in wares
(an uncivilized practice for underdeveloped economy).
The internal control measures in the commercial banks seem to
have faults. Such that, it has aided the perpetration of fraud. As a
result, the industry shares 90% of all cases of malpractices, forgeries
and frauds. (Wiki pedia 2007).
1.3 OBEJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The specific objectives of the study include the following.
a. To identify the causes of fraud in commercial banks.
b. To identify the types of fraud in commercial banks.
c. To evaluate the extent of fraud in commercial banks.
d. To evaluate how fraud is detected and controlled in Nigeria
commercial banks.
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The study poses the following research questions.
i. What are the causes of fraud in commercial banks?
ii. What are the various types of fraud in commercial banks?
iii. What is the extent of fraud in commercial banks?
5
iv. How is fraud detected and controlled in Nigeria commercial
banks.
1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
For the purpose of the study the following research hypotheses
will be formulated and tested.
1. Ho: Poor management and poor security arrangement in
commercial banks cannot cause fraud.
Hi: Poor management and poor security arrangement in
commercial banks can cause fraud.
2. Ho: Loan fraud, cheque fraud and money laundering
fraud do not constitute types of banks fraud.
Hi: Loan fraud, cheque fraud and money laundering fraud
constitute types of banks fraud.
3. Ho: The extent of fraud in commercial banks is high.
Hi: The extent of fraud in commercial banks is low.
4. Ho: Fraud cannot be detected and controlled through the
accounting and personnel control.
Hi: Fraud can be detected and controlled through the
accounting and personnel control.
6
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The study of this nature is expedient as well as timely, coming
at a time when central bank of Nigeria and Nigerian deposit
insurance corporation (NDIC) and government and it’s agencies are
doing something to curb the menace of fraud in commercial banks.
The study will raise public awareness of the presence of fraud in
commercial banks it will also generate public awareness of the
existence of anti-fraud investigators; this will encourage and assist
those who witness or suspect fraud being committed by people to
report it and provide evidence.
This study will sensitize the public on the adverse effect of
fraud on commercial banks and the Nigerians economy at large. It
will equally serve as a reference Material for researchers in the same
field.
1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The study focuses on management of fraud in Nigeria
commercial banks. The main constraints of the study include.
Time Constraint:
Due to limited time given for the study, the researcher could
not get all the information needed for the study.
7
Financial Constraint:
The researcher has not got enough money to embark on the
study. Due to financial constraint, the researcher could not visit
places where information relevant to the study could be obtained.
Attitude of the Respondents.
Some of the respondents show negative attitude towards the
study because they felt that they have no financial benefit.
1.8 DEFINITION OF TERMS
Commercial Banks:
Commercial bank is any Bank whose business includes the
acceptance of deposits withdrawable by cheque or cash (Okeke,
1996).
Assets:
Assets is what a person or business owns. Castle and Owen (1992).
Fraud:
“Fraud” refers to an intentional act by one or more individuals among
management employees or third parties which results in a
misrepresentation of financial statement. (Adeniyi, 2004).
8
Auditor:
Auditor is an independent person or body charged with the
responsibilities of preventing, detecting financial irregularities (Fraud)
which might impair the truth and fairness of the view given by the
financial statements. (Eze, 2001).
Auditing:
Auditing is the process carried out by the independent examination
of and expression of opinion on the financial statements of an
enterprises by an appointed auditor in pursuance of that
appointment and in compliance with any relevant statutory
obligation. (Adeniyi, 2004).
CBN:
Central Bank of Nigeria.
NDIC:
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Capital Base:
Capital base is the amount contributed by the powers of a business
which gives them right to enjoy all the future earnings
(Anyanwokoro, 1996).
9
Shareholders Funds:
Shareholders Funds are paid up capital, share premium, statutory
reserves, retained earning (Undistributed profit) general reserves,
minority interests and other subsidiary reserves excluding preference
shares and revaluation reserves (Iganiga and Anyanwokoro, 1996).
10
REFERENCES
Adeninyi, A. (2004): Auditing and investigations, Lagos El- Toda Venture limited.
Castle, E.F. and Owens P.N. (1992): Elements of Banking 2nd Edition.
New York, Pretince Hall. Eze, J.C. (2004): Principle and Techniques of Auditing Volume II,
Enugu, Computer Edge Publishers. Johnson, U.O (2007) Introduction to project writing, Enugu. New
Dimension Publishers.
11
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.1 Origin of Fraud
It is very difficult to trace the origin of fraud however, in the
case of fraud perpetration, Adewole, 1990, opines that any minor
mistakes by an individual which is not detected in time or at all
makes such an individual to think that the success of such mistakes
may be taken advantage of and may proceed to enact more
mistakes, this time, deliberately so as to test the system’s check and
balance. He stresses that where a deliberate mistake is made and is
successful, the individual takes benefit of it for selfish end. He refers
to this behaviour as fraud, since it is now a deliberate action aimed
at dishonestly enriching the individual. The next logical step for such
an individual is definitely to continue with such errors until he
eventually graduates to a hardened fraudster.
It can therefore be deduced that the genesis of fraud is
traceable to the committal of minor, undetected mistakes, which are
consequently capitalized upon by individual intending to defraud.
(Adewole, 1990).
12
2.2 What is Fraud?
Fraud has been variously defined in the literature. Most
developing countries of the world regard fraud as criminal act. In
Nigeria, it is equally recognized as a crime too, this promoted the
promulgation of decree on fraud and other fraud related matters/
structures namely “the failed Banks and recovery of public debts
decree 18 of (1994), Banks and other financial institution decree
(BOFID) 1991, money laundering Act No 3 of 1995 Federal
Intelligence Investigation Bureau (FIIB), Independence Corrupt
Practices Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Crime
Commission (EFCC).
According to Oxford Advance Learners Dictionary of Current
English “Fraud” is defined as “a criminal act/ deception. According to
Udok (1992) Fraud is concerned with the activities of those who seek
to divert to their pockets the fruits of others hard work. Adeniyi
(2004) sees Fraud as an intentional act by one or more individuals,
among management, employees or third parties which results in a
misrepresentation, of financial statements which involve.
1. Manipulation falsification or alteration of records or
documents.
2. Misappropriation of Assets.
13
3. Suppression or omission of the effect of transactions from
records or documents.
4. Recording of transaction without substance.
5. Misapplication of accounting policies.
According to Adekanye (1983) “Fraud” is an act of falsifying or
altering of a writing document for the purpose of doing injury to
another person. He therefore, continued by saying any alteration of a
writing document made with intention to defraud is therefore
forgery”.
According to Wiki pedia (2007) fraud is any insidious, sneaky
crime that ruins individuals and families, causes corporation to go
under. Eze (2004) refers to fraud as irregularities involving the use
of criminal deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage.
Another definition of fraud put it that, it is an act by which one
person intends to gain a dishonest advantage over another person.
2.3 What is Bank Fraud?
Frauds in the banks are not new they are as old as the industry
itself. Bank fraud can be defined as a conscious or deliberate effort
aimed at obtaining unlawful financial advantage at the detriment of
another person who is the rightful owner of the fund. Orjih (1998).
14
Bank fraud must be looked at generally as acts that involve the loss
of assets by banks through deceitful and dishonest means. The
intention of the fraudster is to dishonestly benefit himself to the
detriment of the bank or bank staff or bank customer or any member
of the public via banking operations. Fraud can be committed by
bank customers, bank staff or a combination of staff and customer or
third parties that is non-customers.
Also, bank fraud as a canker worm has eaten deep gradually
into our social fabric and a concerted effort by individual,
government, bank staff and authorities concerned will be required to
minimize its occurrence. Unfortunately, bank managements are
generally unwilling to release details of frauds that may have been
perpetrated in their banks for fear of loosing their corporate image.
Eze (2004).
2.4 Nature and Types of Bank Frauds
Frauds in banks vary widely in nature, character and methods
of operation. In general, fraud perpetrators, using different methods
of fraud perpetration, can commit bank fraud. On the basis of
perpetrators, bank fraud may be categorized into three groups
(Shogotola, 1994).
15
a. Internal Fraud
b. External Fraud
c. Mixed Fraud.
a. Internal Perpetrators of Fraud: This relate to members of staff
(insiders) Accountant, Executives Assistants, supervisors, clerk
(cashier), typist/ stenographers, Technicians, Drivers, Cleaners
etc.
b. External Fraud: are fraud related to those committed by
persons not connected with the bank. A typical example was
that of the armed robbery attack either during the banking
hours or during special movement of cash in transit). More so,
some external fraud could result through carelessness and
recklessness or negligence on the part of some customers.
Often times, it comes through corporate accounts in which a
dishonest staff may have access to the company’s cheque
book.
c. Mixed Fraud: These are fraud committed by collusion between
the insider staff and outsiders customers. It is general belief
that no successful fraud is perpetrated without the aid of an
insider staff, for instance, in one of the outrageous armed
robbery incident in 1986 against Union Bank Plc, Nnewi. The
16
staff dispositions charts recovered from the bandits was alleged
to have been designed by a number of staff (insider) that is
why Shongotola cautions that the banking industry has become
not just a battle front with a clear-cut firing line between banks
and the fraudster but a veritable minefield on which some
banks and their top management staff are in secret league
with the enemy.
Categorization on the basis of methods of perpetration is the
most common form of classification employed by banks. Here, the
list of types of fraud is inexhaustible as new methods are devised
with time. However, shongotola identify the following.
• Outright theft and embezzlement.
• Defalcation.
• Forgeries and insider abuse.
• Suppression.
• Fraudulent substitution.
• Tampering with reserve.
• Payment against uncleared effects.
• Unauthorized lending.
• Lending to “Ghost” borrowers.
• Kite flying and cross firing.
17
• Unofficial borrowing.
• Foreign Exchange Malpractices.
• Impersonation.
• Teaming and lending.
• Fake payments.
• False proceeds of collections.
• Influence of evil forces.
• False declaration of cash shortages.
• Ficticious accounts.
• Ledger cards manipulation.
• Misuse of suspense accounts.
• Manipulation of vouchers.
• Dry posting.
• Over invoicing.
• Over/ under valuation of properties.
• Inflation of statistical data.
• Duplication of cheque books, drafts, stamps etc.
• Interception of clearing cheques.
• Interception and switching of telex messages
• Ficticious contracts.
• Laundering.
18
• Computer frauds.
However, the bank administration institutes identify the
following as the most important and common types of bank fraud:
i. Advance Fee Fraud (419).
ii. Cheque kiting.
iii. Account opening fraud.
iv. Letter of credit fraud.
v. Money transfer fraud.
vi. Loan fraud.
vii. Counterfeit securities.
viii. Cheque fraud.
ix. Money laundering fraud.
x. Clearing fraud.
xi. Computer fraud and
xii. Telex fraud.
i. Advanced Fee Fraud (419):
Fee may involved an agent approaching a bank, a company or
an individual with an offer to access large funds at below market
interest rate often for long term. The purported source of such funds
is not specifically identified as the only way to have access to it is
through the agent who must receive fee or commission “in advance”
19
as soon as the agent collects the fee, he disappears into the air and
the facility never comes through. Any bank desperate for funds
especially the distressed banks and banks needing huge funds to
bid for foreign exchange can easily fall victim to this type of fraud
when the deal fails and the fees paid in advance is lost, these victims
are not likely to report the losses to the police or to the authorities.
ii. Cheque Kiting:
Kiting is defined by the United States Controller of the
currency’s policy, guidelines for national bank directors as “a method
whereby a depositors utilizes the time required for cheque to clear to
obtain an unauthorized loan without interest charge”. The aim of the
cheque kiter is to use these uncollected funds interest free for a
short time to overcome a temporary cash shortage or to withdraw
the funds permanently for personal use.
iii. Account Opening Fraud:
This involves the deposit and subsequent cashing of
fraudulent cheques. It usually starts when a person not known to the
bank asks to open a transaction account such as current and saving
account with false identification but unknown to the bank.
20
iv. Letters of Credit Fraud:
Letters of credit generally arise out of international trade and
commerce. They stimulate trade across national boarders by
providing a vehicle for ensuring prompt payment by financially sound
commercial banks. However, in some areas of the world, fraud has
historically been a problem. In Nigeria (Nnewi) in particular, letter of
credit (L/C) Fraud rate is statistically high as a result of importation
of motor parts and other machines.
v. Money Transfer Fraud:
Money transfer services are means of moving fund to or from a
bank to a beneficiary account at any banking point worldwide in
accordance with the institution from the banks customers. Some
common means of money transfers are mail, telephone, cheques-
over the counter, telegraphic, electronic process, telex and bill of
exchange. Fraudulent money transfer may result from a request
created solely for the purpose of committing a fraud or the alteration
of a genuine funds request by changing the beneficiary’s name or
account number or changing the amount off the transfer.
vi. Loans Frauds:
Loan and other form of credit extensions to business and
individual customers constitute traditional function of commercial
21
banks. In process of credit extension fraud may occur at any stage
from the first interaction between the customers and the bank to the
final payment of the loan. Loan fraud occurs when credit is extended
to non-borrowing customer or to a borrowing customer who has
exceeded his credit ceiling. The fraudulent aspect of this class is that,
there is intent to conceal it from the head office (inspectorate) staff
on routine check to deceive them with plausible but falsified
statements, documents etc. advanced perpetrators of credit fraud to
the extent to applying credit facility approved for one customer to
credit another who is often unrelated to be first customer, that is to
say a credit facility for a customer “A” yet to be drawn is directed to
the use of customer “B” (Anaeto, 1996).
vii. Counterfeit Security Fraud:
Like counterfeiting of money, counterfeiting of commercial
financial instrument is one of the oldest forms of crime. Modern
photographic and printing equipment has greatly aided criminals in
reproducing good quality forged instruments. According to Agba,
documents may be total counterfeit or may be genuine documents
that are copied, forged or altered an amount payment date, payee or
terms of payment. A common fraud is to present the counterfeit
stocks or bonds as collected to loan. Other counterfeit items such as
22
treasury notes, cashier cheque, bankers acceptances or certificates
of deposit in counterfeit or altered forms may be presented to a
commercial bank for redemption. The presenter would drawn out the
proceeds or disappear before the financial instruments are found
counterfeit.
viii. Cheque Fraud:
This is use as a means of payment or paying for financial
obligations is an essential features of modern economy. Cheque
fraud is now common involving millions of naira annually. Common
types of cheque are personal, business, government travelers,
certified drafts and counter cheque with each having its own
characteristics and vulnerabilities of fraudulent use. The most
common of cheque fraud involve cheques that are stolen, forged
counterfeit or altered.
ix. Money Laundering Fraud:
This is a means to conceal the existence source or use of
illegally obtained money by converting the cash into untraceable
transactions in banks. The cash is disguised to make the income
appear legitimate Commercial Banks as well as other banks should
be advised to avoid handling such funds (Umunna, 1989)
23
x. Clearing Fraud:
Most clearing fraud hinge on suppression of an instrument so
that at the expiration of the clearing period applicable to the
instrument the collecting bankss will give value as through the
paying bank has confirmed the instrument good for payment.
Clearing cheques can also assist fraudsters to complete a clearing
fraud. This is to say a local clearing item can be routed to an up
country branch. In the process of re-routing the instrument to the
proper branch, the delay entailed will give the collecting branch. The
impression that the paying bank has paid the instrument. (Ifeduba,
2002).
xi. Telex Fraud:
Transfer of funds from one location to another can be affected
through the telex. The message though often coded can be altered
(decoded) to enable diversion of the funds to an account not
originally. (Ifeduba, 2002).
xii. Computer Fraud:
Computer fraud can remain undetected for long time. It can
take the form of corruption of the program or application packages
and be ever breaking into the system via a remote sensor by a
24
computer specialist or a programmer. Diskettes can be tampered
with to gain access to unauthorized areas or even give credit to an
account for which the funds were not originally intended. Computer
fraud do rarely occur but when it happens, large sums of money are
lost. (Shongotla, 1994)
2.5 Major Causes of Fraud in the Commercial Banks
Many authors have analyzed in some write-ups different causes
of fraud in the commercial banks.
Shongola, 1994 grouped the major causes of fraud usually into
two classes:-
a. Institutional Factors
b. Environmental or societal factors.
The institutional factors are those traceable to the internal
environment of the financial institution while the environmental or
societal factors are those which result from the influence of the
environment or society of the banking industry.
Institutional Causes of Fraud
According to shongotola, institutional causes of fraud are
classified below;-
1. Volume of Work:
25
The amount of work done by officials could be heavy that
fraud could easily pass undetected by such officials.
2. Number of Staff:
Where an official supervises quite a large number of
staff, there is a high likelihood that fraud could go undetected.
3. Nature of Services:
Fraud may be caused where documents of value and
liquid assets (cash) are exposed to an indiscipline staff or
unauthorized persons, for example, customers.
4. Banking Experience of Staff:
Frauds in commercial banks occur with higher frequency
among staff with little experience and knowledge in financial
practice. The more the experience and knowledge of a staff,
the less the likelihood that fraud would pass such staff
undetected unless with the active support of the staff. Where
professionally qualified finances are involved in fraud, they are
more likely to swindle large chunks of money than less
qualified staff.
5. Inadequate Staff Training:
This could affect the morally weak as well as orally
robust staffs in various ways. Lack of knowledge of the ways of
26
dealing with fraudulent practices in commercial banks could
affect an otherwise honest staff in apprehending and avoiding
the tricks of bank fraudsters.
6. Poor Management:
Commercial banks with poor management record higher
incidence of all sorts of frauds than those with effective
management. Poor management give rise to in-effective and
poor control system, indiscipline among staff and this create an
environment for fraud to flourish.
7. Staff Negligence:
In certain cases, staff negligence could give rise to the
perpetration of fraud in commercial banks. Negligence itself is
a product of several factors including poor supervision, lack of
technical knowledge, apathy and pressure and lack of cognate
experience.
8. Recruitment System:
In the past, recruitment of staff into the banks was
strictly on merit. However, nowadays, poor recruitment and
selection system where cognate experience, relevant technical
knowledge, competence, character and other sterling qualities
are sacrificed on the alter of non performance related factors
27
such as connections and tribalism constitute important
facilitator of fraud in financial institution or commercial banks.
9. Poor Security Arrangement for Documents:
In commercial banks where security arrangements for
valuable documents are week, poor and vulnerable, it is easy
for fraudsters to have their way without detection.
10. Lack of Adequate Job Rotation:
The longer a staff stays in a particular job “ceteris
paribus” the more proficient he is likely to be however, when a
staff over stays her tenure on job, it can encourage fraud as
the perpetrator is assumed of the fact that no one is likely
unearth his fraud.
11. Use of Sophisticated Accounting Machine:
Where sophisticated accounting machines are in use are
manned by inadequately equipped staff, errors could arises and
thus lead to the production of unreliable records. In the hands
of dishonest staff, sophisticated accounting machines could be
employed to deliberately omit entries substitutes improper
calculation and posting, manipulating documents, substitute,
28
fictitous documents and alter genuine ones. All these are
different ways of perpetrating fraud in commercial bank.
12. Inadequate Motivation:
Management practices, when negative to the aspiration
and developmental needs of staff could result in the generality
of staff being frustrated. Frustration in turn can result to
fraudulent practices in commercial banks.
13. Inadequate Infrastructures:
Poor communication system, power failure and frequent
network failure or breakdown which result in backlog of
unbalanced postings congested office space etc. are some
factors which encourage the perpetration of fraud in
commercial banks.
14. Lapses in the Management Control System of Corporate
Customers:
This is classic example where frauds could be externally
hatched and executed. Fraudulent staff in both commercial
banks and in the employment of corporate customers could
collude to take undue advantage of lapses observed in the
management control systems of corporate customer.
15. Negligence by Customers:
29
Traditionally, it is the negligence on the part of
customers that provide ample opportunities to staff or
commercial banks perpetrate frauds. Negligence by customers
takes various forms, consisting errors that might have been
genuine but which are open to abuse, distortions and
defalcations unscrupulous staff both within and outside the
institution in the employment of customer.
Environmental /Societal Causes of Fraud
According to shongotola,1994 Environmental causes of fraud are
classified below:-
1. Personality profile of dramatize personnel:
Most individuals with inordinate ambitions without
qualms are prone to committing frauds. This kinds of individual
is bent on making money by hook or by crook. Such people
dismiss morality as an unnecessary or requisite for virtuous life.
To them the end justifies the means they are usually
unscrupulous and opportunistic.
2. Societal Value:
As for Fagbami, 1990 the value system in any society is
the sets of rules that prescribes what is right or wrong within
30
that society. When the possession of wealth determines the
reputation ascribed to a person, that society is bound to
witness unnecessary competition for acquisition of wealth. This
no doubt will lead to some people using dubious means to get
rich overnight. It can be argued that the main causes of fraud
in commercial banks are traceable to the general dishonest in
society where morality is thrown to the dogs. Misplacement of
society values, unquestioning attitudes of the society towards
the sources of wealth. The rising societal expectations from
staff of commercial banks and the subsequent desire by such
staff to live up to such expectations are also contributory
factors to fraud.
3. Slow and Tortuous Legal Process:
Delays in prosecution of fraud cases have a way of
frustrating the parties to the cases. A frustrated party can
abandon the case midway leading to miscarriage of justice.
The delays can be form of:
a. Lack of specialized manpower for the investigation of
fraud.
b. Late reporting of cases to police.
31
c. Lawyers and persecution witness absenting
themselves from court.
d. Undue delay in the investigation and charging of cases
to court and
e. Frequent adjournment by the court could frustrate
appellant and favour the defendant.
All these make fraudsters to have feeling that they are above
the law and as such can get away with any act of illegality.
(Adewole, 1990)
4. Lack of Effective Deterrence & Punishment:
Although this may be considered as a most point, it is
argued in some quarters that lacks of effective deterrent such
as heavy punishment could be factor that contributes to non-
abetting perpetration of fraud in commercial banks.
5. Fear of Negative Publicity in Reporting Fraud Cases:
Many commercial banks fail to report fraud cases to the
authorities. They believe that doing so will give unnecessary
negative publicity to their institutions, this attitudes encourages
individuals with inordinate to defraud in commercial banks.
They reason correctly that effected institution may not
prosecute them. It is even said to note that some staff whose
32
appointment have been terminated or retired prematurely are
still manage to secure appointments in other commercial
banks. (Shongotola 1994)
2.6 Implications of Fraud on the Bank and entire Economy
of Nigeria
According to Wikipedia, 2007 the following are the various
implications of fraud on the banks and the entire economy of Nigeria.
i. Down Turn in the Economy:
For the past 18 years or so our economic development
has witnessed a serious set-back with graduates roaming the
streets in search of employment which are not available.
Various government polices to revamp the economy though
appear laudable were all frustrated at the implementation
stage because some of the people responsible for
implementing them are fraudulent. Both the political and
economic situation declined from bad to worse with naira
witnessing an unprecedented devaluation of 1,300% within five
years. As at December 2008 and January 2009 the naira
exchange rate with the stood between N149 to N150 per
$1.Devil then found job as idle hands were meant to engage in
one kind of fraud or the other while "419, cocaine pushing,
33
billion naira bank frauds", becoming regular features of our
newspaper, Television and Radio headlines.
ii. Termination/Retirement of Staff:
As a result of this very serious economic crime, some
staff in the industry have either been dismissed, or have their
appointment terminated or prematurely retired. This means
that some experienced hands in the sectors are lost due to
their involvement in frauds and forgeries. During and after the
consolidation exercise that took place in the Nigerian banking
industry it was revealed by the central bank that some bank
directors and senior managers of those banks that couldn't
meet up the N25 billion minimum capital base gave themselves
unserviceable loans in hundreds of millions. The Nigerian
Deposit Insurance Corporation is still in court with those
involved in this unethical behavior. Our problem is that most of
those involved these economic crimes are highly placed or
senior politicians. We can't know their names simply because of
their positions in the country.
iii. Global Perception:
Nigeria has become synonymous with fraud as some of
its citizens use the boom in internet fraud and corruption has
34
become an unfortunate staple in Nigeria’s international
reputation. The country regularly features at the top of
international surveys measuring the part played by graft in
different economies. Successive dictatorships have extracted
billions from the exchequer, denuding the public purse of
revenues from Nigeria's rich oil reserves. Outside the country
Nigeria has become synonymous with fraud as some, of its
citizens use internet and the boom in of cafes to send "spam"
emails, promising millions in exchange for the gullible
recipient's bank details. This makes it difficult for genuine
business men from Nigeria to go into international business
with foreigners or secure credit overseas.
iv. Frauds deplete shareholders funds and lead to loss of money
belonging to customers. This loss invariably results in a
reduction of the available resources, which could lead to the
collapse of the affected bank. These banks are also deprived of
faithful and honest applicants who might be unwilling to apply
for fear of being associated with fraud. Fraud causes
termination, dismissals and retrenchment of staff who may not
be fraudsters, resulting in losing experience staff.
35
v. The welfare of staff may also be adversely affected in a bank
with persistent fraudulent practices. No worker or staff will
have the courage to fight for staff welfare matters such as
promotion, increased salaries, and improvement in general
working condition.
vi. Bank frauds erode public confidence in the banking system.
This constitute a serious set back to the efforts geared at
promoting bank habit in a country where numerous people
prefer to keep their money at home.
vii. Another effect of frauds on bank is that it destroyed the
nation economy and it sovereignty since banking sector help
to survive the economy of the nation through money in
circulation. We are all living witnesses to how Nigerian
sovereignty was called into question and its international
trade threatened when a foreign power issued an ultimatum
to its (Nigerian) National Assembly to pass a bill on financial
malpractice. Had the national assembly failed to pass the bill,
the country would have faced international sanctions.
36
2.7 Punishment and Penalties to Fraud Perpetrators
We appreciate the effort of the federal military government
towards fraud control as represented through the sub-structures set
up via security and exchange commission (SEC) for the capital
market operations. Federal Mortgages Institutions (FMI), National
Board for Community Banks (NBCB). For community Banks,
Insurance Supervisory Board (NISB), For Insurance Companies, the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), decree, National Drug Law
Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), banks and other financial institution
decree (BOFID), Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation decree
(NDIC), Companies and Allied Matter Acts (CAMA), Money
Laundering Degree (ML) Economic Sabotage decree (ESD), Failed
Bank and Debt Recovery (FBDR), others are Justice, the police, the
judiciary and even the armed forces, economic and financial crime
commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
(ICPC).
All these are reasonable pointers to the facts that our financial
system is riddle with fraud. Perhaps, the recent bank return to NDIC
on fraud and forgeries in commercial banks revealed that the
phenomenon has assumed an unimaginable level with this in mind
the monetary authorities (CBN), (NDIC) involved the Federal
37
Intelligence Investigation Bureau (FIIB) as well as the setting up of
tribunal. For example the federal intelligence investigation bureau
are empowered to arrest, detain, prosecute and even confiscate
property of persons accused of any fraudulent practices and the
promulgation of decree No. 18 of 1994 Failed Bank and Debt,
financial malpractices empowered to arrest, detain, prosecute and
even confiscate property of persons directly or indirectly connected
to the failure or distress of any financial institution even where the
person secured assets have been sold off by the banks.
So also, the provision of section 39 and 40 of NDIC decree 232
1988 stressed the need for returns or dismissed, terminated,
disengaged and Retire bank staffs involved in fraud and fraud related
offences
Within the bank, there are internal punishments. Staff who has
any action of fraudulent intentions/behaviors face disciplinary action
via suspension for indefinite period with half pay, denial of year
increment, bonus, demotion, inspection report.
Again, the money laundering decree No 3 of 1995 requires all
commercial banks to disclose to the National Drug Law Enforcement
Agency (NDLEA) and the CBN in writing within 7 days any single
38
lodgement (Cash or cheque in excess of N500,000 for an individual
and N2,000,000 for corporate body.
Furthermore, the banks and other financial institutions decrees
(BOFID) No25 of 1991 section (189) stipulates penalty for the
contravention of section 18 (a) an offences punishable of conviction
to a fine of N100,000 or to imprisonment of a term of 3 years and
forfeiture of gains and benefit to the federal Government section 19
(Prohibition of employment of certain persons interlocking
directorship) etc decree 25. Section 19 (1) provides that no bank
shall
a. Employ or continue the employment of any person who at
any time has been adjusted bankrupt or has compounded
with his creditors or who is or has been convicted by a
court for an offence involving fraud or dishonest or
professional misconduct (BOFID).
(Ribadu, 2004).
2.8 Fraud Detection, Prevention and Control
According to Eze (2004), the problem of fraud and forgeries
endemic in the banking sector, is unavoidable due to a variety of
reasons such as:
39
i. The vary nature of banking business which involves
human being, clients and staff of diverse background and
interest in a relationship trust.
ii. The convertible (i.e. cash or near cash) nature of most
banks assets.
iii. Wide network of branches. Some remotely located,
poorly staffed, ill-equipped and without adequate
communication facilities.
iv. Wide spread application of automated system which have
no finger print or handwriting evidence.
v. Common social misconceptions e.g. that bank have
limitless funds or that banks monies are an institutional loot or body
to be plundered by the able (Eze, 2004).
In this country Nigeria, commercial banks fraud has assumed a
frightened scale of sophistication consequent upon the general
economic depression of last decades and the continuiting travails of
the banking sector in the wake of government frantic policy
experimentation.
However, the unfortunate truth from empirical observation is
that majority of commercial banks fraud are never reported to the
police and (NDIC) in spite of the well known statutory requirement.
40
Some of the fraud actually passes undetected while some are
criminal covered up especially where no actual or significant loss is
sustained.
The common reason for such cover up is to avoid adverse
publicity, protracted police case, litigation and or black mail. Worse
still, some of the new generation banks have been known not only
the condone but actually commit and promote gross malpractices
e.g. kite flying and across firing as a matter of corporate deliberate
business strategy.
The Nigeria banking industry has become not just a battle front
with a clear-cut firing line between the bank and the bandits, but a
variable mine-field in which some banks and their top management
staff are in secret league with the enemy. Only the increased
alertness and collaboration of genuine banks together with improved
supervisory measures by the CBN and NDIC will terminate such
private organization.
Commercial banks must wake up to the concern of elements in
their operating environment and serious threats to their internal
security arising from internal and external factors (Eze, 2004).
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Internal Factors
Internal factors are those factors that relate to the insiders or
members of staff such as
i. Absence of a tough, unambiguous corporate policy
committing top management to pursue the severest
sanctions including prosecution for act of dishonesty.
ii. Lack of clear procedural guidance or updated instruction
manual.
iii. Poor staff of vital functions and loss of experience
personnel.
iv. Low workers morale and employee frustration.
v. Staff dismissed or terminated for fraud be re-enaged in
other financial institution e.g. mortgage banks and
financial houses from where they could sneak attacks on
their erstwhile employers.
vi. Unplanned acquisition of new technologies e.g.
computerization.
External Factors
External factors relate to these factors that are not connected
with the bankers such as:
42
• Special degeneracy which promotes the get rich-quick
syndrome and workshop of materialism.
• Exploitable defects in the legal and panel system.
The essence of the categorization is to focus on the banks shop
floor i.e. (branches) with a view to highlighting controls for fraud
prevention in the first place and timely detection where unavoidable.
Branch Operation Control
In the context, branch is defined as a subordinate division of a
business subsidiary shop, office etc (chambers 20th century
dictionary).
Branches are common features of banking co-operations
(especially commercial banks their establishment being mostly
dictated by market imperatives such as proximity to prime clients.
The status of bank branches with head office is defined in the
case of prince vs. orient bank corporation where it was stated that
“in principle and in fact, branches are agencies of one principal
banking corporation or firm, notwithstanding that they may be
regarded as district for specially purpose”. It is important to mention
the common rule of agency that would normally apply such that any
notice served in the head office (principal) would be deemed to apply
43
to all its branches (the agent) allowing a reasonable time for
communication.
The agency relationship however, will aid a clear understanding
of the duties of branch management refers both of the function of
managing a branch and to the crops of personnel to whom that
responsibility is entrusted.
A holistic view of both the organization and the active
management process must therefore be adopted at every level of
decision making be it head office or branch level.
Branch management he continued must attain or surpress the
standard of efficiency and security prescribed by head office. To do
so, it must only function complementarily to the head office
management but take initiative in performing the five basic
managerial operations:
a. Setting fraud control objectives and goals.
b. Organizing fraud control activities and exercise.
c. Motivation and communicating effectively.
d. Measuring performance of teams and individuals.
e. Developing people.
Of course, branch work is a very demanding responsibility full
of unpredictable events and unanticipated situations which may
44
precipitate or facilitate frauds. Perhaps, no other position in a bank
carries as much risk exposure since every account and every
transaction is a potential for fraud. It has been indicated that large
branch network increases a banks vulnerability to fraud especially
where there is inferior quality of staff. An empirical fact is that the
massive expansion (Rural banking programme) of the commercial
banking network in Nigeria in the last few years resulted in an
unfortunate dilution of bank staff in key aspects of operation
including branch management be that as it may the branch ability to
prevent or detect and control fraud depends especially on the quality
of personnel assigned to it by the head office and the effectiveness
and adequacy of internal control in place (Eze, 2005).
Internal control is defined by the American Institute of certified
Public Accountant as “the plan of organization and all the co-ordinate
methods and measures adopted by a business to safeguard its
assets, check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting data,
promote operation and encourage adherence to prescribed
management policies. A second similarly definition is offered by the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales who refers
to internal control as “the whole system of controls in financial and
otherwise established by management in order to carry on the
45
business of the company in an orderly manner to safeguard its
assets and secure as far as possible the accuracy and reliability of its
records.
Both the human resources and the internal control system in
which rest on the efficiency and security of the branch must be
closely monitored by the branch. The measures which ensure timely
detection and control of fraud are categorized by Shogotola (1994)
as the following:
a. Personnel control.
b. Administrative control.
c. Accounting control.
d. Financial control.
e. Inventory control.
f. Process control.
a. Personnel Control: Under this we have
i. Proper recruitment procedure: screening, referees sworn,
declaration certificates, photographs, permanent home
address.
46
ii. Proper Disengagements Procedure: Timely notification of
relevant department’s cancellation of rights and
privileges, withdrawal of staff identify cards.
iii. Posting and Placement: Properly documented posting
written job description with defined authority and
responsibility level. Others are:
• Job rotation.
• Attendance logs or register
• Enforced holidays and annual leave or absence training
programmes.
b. Administrative Control: under the administrative control
measure we have:
• Segregation of duties.
• Dual custody.
• Movement logs and registers.
• Access rights and restrictions.
• Security personnel.
• Franking machine.
• Archival system.
• Passwords.
• Regis cope and
47
• Cameras.
c. Accounting Control: Accounting control includes the following:
• Data validation.
• Prompt posting of transaction
• Balancing
• Reconciliation.
• Call over of posting entries.
• Signed authentication and approvals.
• Budgeting standards and projections.
• Variance analysts.
• Reviews and statistics.
• Returns.
d. Finance Control: This includes:
1. Cash limits.
2. Signing power
3. Specialized stationer (e.g. certified payment coupons)
e. Inventory Control: Inventory control identifies the following:
• Logs and listings.
• Physical checks and counts.
• Bin cards, stock receipts noted, stock issued vouchers.
• Locks and keys.
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• Balancing stock, figures with the general ledger.
f. Process Control: This includes the:
• Input/output validation.
• Program.
• Key computer personnel (data processing manager, data
administrator, programmers, system analyst, operator,
librarian data, operators, computer operator). The various
principles and types of controls are rationally applied to every
aspect of branch operation as fraud antidotes or early
warning system. However, it has been accepted fact that
fraud at branch level focused on the following:
• Means of payments (cash cheques, bankers payment,
interbranch transfer) etc.
• Account (house ledgers impersonal accounts customers
accounts).
g. Petty Cash:
Cash payment for goods and services are usually reserved for
very small amounts and made through petty cash control centers on
a specified imprest limit. All expenses must be supported by duly
49
approved vouchers involves and cash receipts and properly entered
in the petty cash book.
Reimbursements to imprest should be covered by cheque
issued and not made directly from the till or vault. Petty cash
advance (IOU’s) must receive prior approval and be retired within a
specified period.
h. Main Cash:
A lot of controls are also exercise over the main cash. These
include dual custody of the vault and strict entry and exit
procedures. Insurance limits on premises and in- transit rules
fort cash movements within or without limits allowable with the
cashier and/ their staff in the banking hall, daily physical
checks and balancing as well as agreeing the vault book with
the bullion officer cash control book on daily basis. Daily
exchange of tills and till book and occasional surprise check on
cashiers are effective control techniques. The use of a control
register to monitor cash movements checks by receiving
cashier branch management should ensure that these controls
are established and adhere to.
50
i. None Cash Payment:
Most fraud in commercial banks involving none cash payment
mode includes:
Cheques (cheques on collection) bankers payments for
payment to other banks. Interbranch vouchers (for transfer between
sister branches. Cash cheques are negotiable free or equities in other
words, they are payable over the counter if regular on the face of it
i.e. drawn according to mandate and correct in particular. A branch
must however, exercise reasonable care to confirm that the cheque
is genuine and that payment is made to the genuine payee (use of
tally in some banks). This may involve measure like contacting the
drawer and using a photocopies camera. The branch internal control
unit (ICU) system would ensure that large payments are scrutinized
by two or more persons in the hierarchy.
j. None Cash Lodgement:
None cash cheques lodges into customers account are
processed for payment in two district ways if they are house cheques
i.e. if the drawers and payees accounts are dominated in the same
branch processing follows more of or less the same branch, the same
treatment as cash credit entry to the payee account. If they are
51
drawn on other banks (or branches) they are sent to them for
collection through the process of clearing. We have witnessed
majority of cheque frauds that involve clearing cheques. For this
reason, branch management must exercise extreme control here.
Caution notices must be sent to the paying branch/bank on any
unusual cheque lodgement received in any account.
This alert has proved quite effective in thwarting many fraud
attempts. Equally important is to ensure that only persons of
impeccable character are entrusted with clearing items which
clearing accounts are balanced and or reconciled daily. Again in
approving any cheques from payment, the branch management must
ensure that account is sufficiently funded or that drawings are within
the approved credit line (if any) attention must be paid to stop
orders in all cases and to caution notices in the cases of clearing
cheques.
k. Inter Bank Settlements:
Bank to bank payments are usually affected with special
instruments known as bankers payment. Similarly, there are pre-
printed as inter-branch voucher for the settlement and transfer
between branches of the same bank. Both sets of instruments are
safe custody items which should be closely controlled even when
52
blank. At issurance, stub or counter foil must signed by the
authorized issuing officers and retained for audit purposes. All serial
numbers must be well accounted for any lost instruments is a danger
signal.
L. Accounts (Current):
The second focal point of anti-fraud control must be
closely guarded from the time of account opening to eventual
closure. It must always be borne in mind that (apart from a
few incident of direct theft or defalcation) most frauds of nay
value are perpetrated on and or through an account. The
opening of an account must therefore be subjected to the
strictest care. For current account, satisfactory references from
reputable persons and precious bankers must be obtained, the
customers business address and other personal records
confirmed before he is issued with a cheque book. For a
corporate body or registered business, a prior search should be
conducted at the Corporate Affairs Commission and a clean
report should be held in the mandate file together with a
certified copy of the registration certificate and memorandum
and Article of Association, passport, photographs and photo
scope impression of account signatories are essential controls
53
and signed mandates (files and signatories cards) must be
securely preserved.
m. Impersonal Ledger Account:
In the case of impersonal ledger account only those on
the head office approved chart of account should be opened
and duplication must be scrupulously avoided (or in
computerized system precluded by program control. Periodic
review of personal accounts should be carried out by branch
management and appropriate precautionary actions being
taken on those not satisfactorily conducted e.g. long standing
credit balances should be transferred to dormant account
while abandoned merger accounts should be closed after due
notice to customers concerned. Closure of current account
must be preceded by a demand for unused cheque leaves.
Furthermore, it is be regularly checked importance that the
ledger balanced be regularly checked. A good computerized
system would provide branch management with the daily
detailing all ledger balanced thus a very important control and
managerial attention should be given to accounts with irregular
balances e.g. assets account with credit balances, liability
accounts with debit balances, rejection accounts and transit
54
accounts with balances. All suspense account (especially
receivables and payable/accreditives) should be kept under
close security with regular balancing and reconciliation while
dormant account and unclaimed balances should be
administrated on top security status.
n. Human Resources Control:
It has become a generally accepted truth that the
personality of the branch manager is perhaps the most
important signal factor in fraud prevention and control; the
best internal measures would be rendered ineffective, If human
agents for their implementation are ineffective. The buck
literally stops with the branch manager to see that controls are
put in place, that they are working that violating or exceptions
are promptly reported and corrective action is timely and
adequate. However, in order to perform these corrective
actions, the personality must posses the following qualities:
���� Knowledge Ability: the branch managers must be
knowledgeable enough not only to supervise but lead by
example both on the job and outside the office.
���� Technical Competence: On the job he must be technical
informed for only so can he succeed in inspiring confidence.
55
Ability to personally check paper work and ask intelligent
questions would discourage staffs from errors and fraud
attempts. It is therefore necessary that the branch manager
should posses appropriate educational qualification as well as
sound on the job training. He must be capable of developing
both himself and others. He must be receptive to new ideas
and responsive to innovation. He ought to adopt new
technologies (computerization) Okonkwo and Okoye (1984)
���� High Level of Self Discipline: He must posses and exhibit a high
level of self discipline and sound ethnical standards otherwise
he cannot provide the morale and leadership necessary for the
prevention of fraud and abuse. A manager who displays
divided locality or conflict of interest or who indulge in various
corrupt and unethical practices (such as bribery, extortion, kick
back contract inflation) cannot keep his subordinates in check “
he who preaches equity must come with clean hands” indeed,
since the position of a branch mangers is a core factor to fraud
detection, prevention and control, the appointment should be
crucial management decision which should not be subjected to
undue politics or extraneous considerations such as nepotism,
favoritism etc.
56
2.9 Government effort towards Fraud Control
The role of the federal government on prevention and control
of fraud is not only the commercial banks, but almost in all the
financial institutions (Adekanye 1986). The government is mainly
interested in ensure a discipline society, promulgation of appropriate
statutes, enforcement of various legal provisions.
The deduction is based on the realization that indiscipline and
corruption in the society created false value systems and tend to
encourage others to be like them (Joneses). In an attempt to be like
the Jones, people get involved in unorthodox means of making
wealth including fraudulent practices.
It is a common saying that where there is no law, there is no
offences. In recognition of this, the federal government put in place
relevant statutes to ensure safeguard and sound practices in Nigeria
financial system. According to Adeniji (1981), they include CBN
Decree, BOFID Decree, NDIC Decree, FMBN Decree, SEC Decree,
CAM Decree, Community Bank Decree, People Bank Decree. To
further give effects to its resolve to rid the financial institutions of
fraud, the government constituted the National Committee on
Malpractices in banks and other financial institutions in 1990. The
committee after deliberations recommended the promulgation of a
57
special law on fraud and malpractices banks. What is left is to
legislate appropriately so that the incidence of fraud and other
malpractices would be curtailed in the financial system. Again, the
Federal Government puts in place necessary infrastructure that will
ensure that incidence of fraud in commercial banks is abated. It is
for this and many other reasons that we have CBN, NDIC, SEC,
Police Judiciary, ICDC, CPC & EFCC of Olusegun Obasanjo regime.
These agencies in their various activities have been preventing
and controlling fraud. On the enforcement of the various legislation
to curb fraud in the banks, we have the ministry of justice, police
and the Judiciary. It will suffice to add that what is required mainly
from the judiciary is prompt, fair and evenly handled justice.
(Adeniji, 1981).
2.10 CBN and NDIC effort to Fraud Control
The subject of fraud in the commercial banks is of special
interest or concern to the monetary and supervisory authorities
particularly the CBN and NDIC. These government agencies are
concerned about the safety of individual’s institutions and the
soundness of the banking system. Most especially the NDIC is
specifically charge with the responsibility of protesting depositors.
58
The CBN on the hand is to specifically check the activities of
commercial banks operations in order to regulate and to make sure
that no banks operate without following the due process of rules and
regulations (CBN Annual Report, 2007).
2.11 Extent of Fraud in Banks
Bank fraud in Nigeria has increased and will continue to
increase because it is a part of everyday life. “The magnitude of
fraud is, of course, not known because much of is undiscovered or
undetected and not all that is detected is published” Nwankwo
(1991). In Nigeria, where the statistics are non-existent, it is put at
about-N-200 Million per annum of which about 15%-20% would be
successful. It is appropriate to have a feel of the extent of loss
through bank frauds in Nigeria in order to appreciate the havoc the
cankerworm has been wrecking on the economy.
The sum of =N=2.2 billion was involved in banks fraud in 3 year,
1991-1993, out of which commercial banks accounted for about 94.1
percent the actual/expected loss to the banking system within the
same period totaled about #0.3 Billion with commercial banks
accounting for about 95.7 percent thereof.
59
In 1998, the nation’s banking industry lost #3.196 Billion while in
1999, it lost a whopping sum of #7.404 Billion to fraud. Similarly, the
actual/expected loss stood at a higher level of #2.713 Billion relative
to #623.50 Million in 1998 (NDIC Annual report and statement of
account 1999).
Nigeria’s banks have seen almost $10m disappear through employee
fraud in 2002, a rise of more than 40% on the year before, a survey
by the country’s banking regulator has found.
The total amount stolen was 1.29bn naira, up from 906.3m in 2001,
the Nigerian Deposit insurance corporation reported. Ten times that
amount #12.91bn was recorded in attempted fraud, up from
11.24bn for a rise of 15%. Most of the thefts, NDIC said, were the
result of either forgeries or illegal withdrawals from customer’
accounts.
The figures may well be an understatement, though; as NDIC said it
believes financial institutions routinely underreport fraud losses for
fear of negative publicity. In may 2003 Nigerian bank fraud moved
up to 40%. The banking regulator says theft by bank employees
soared last year, but suspects that much more fraud may go
unreported.
60
It is not only Nigerian banks and citizens that are exposed to bank
frauds. Such frauds are also focused on foreign banks and their
citizens. Just how much has been stolen by such fraud is not clear.
But BBC news-business says that US citizens lose in 2004 move than
$100m (£63.4m) a year to Nigerian fraudsters. However, Nigerians
do indeed involve themselves in genuinely legal businesses apart
from the infamous banking scams (Nwankwo, 1991).
61
REFERENCES
Adeniyi, A.A (2004); Auditing and Investigation, Lagos. El-Toda
Ventures Limited.
Adewunmi, W. (1986); Data Processing and Management
Information System, Lagos. Macmillan Nigeria
Publisher Limited.
Alashi, S.O (1994); Fraud Prevention and Control, Role of
Government and its Agents Lagos. July- Dec,
2007.
Anyanwu, J.C (1993); Monetary, Economics Theory, Policy and
Institutions. Onitsha, Hybrid Publishers Ltd.
Eze, J.C (2004); Principles and Techniques of Auditing, Enugu.
Edge Publishers.
Castle, E.F and Owens P.N (1992); Elements of Banking 2nd Edition
New York. Pretince Hall Publishers.
Johnson, U.O (2007); Introduction to Project Writing, Enugu. New
Dimension Publisher.
62
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The aim of the chapter is to discuss the method adopted by the
researcher in carrying out this research work. The chapter contains,
Area of the study, source of data, population and sample size
determination, instrument used for data collection, method of data
analysis, validity and reliability of data.
3.1 Area of the Study
The study was carried out in the following selected commercial
banks in Enugu, Union bank, Diamond bank and Stanbic IBTC bank
plc.
3.2 Sources of Data
Data for this study was generated from both primary and
secondary sources.
Primary Data: The primary data is the original or first hand
information obtained by the researcher from the respondents directly
for the purpose of the study. To generate this data, the researcher
employed the use of questionnaire.
63
Secondary Data: Secondary data are facts that the researcher
collected from already existing sources. In this study, the secondary
sources were from Journals, text books, Newspapers magazines and
internet.
3.3 Population and Sample Size Determination
The target population of the study consists of senior staff of
selected commercial banks in Enugu.
According to the information received from the selected
commercial banks concerning their population.
Union Bank = 610
Diamond Bank = 407
Stanbic IBTC Bank = 203
Total = 1220
Base on the population of the selected commercial banks the
sample size was determined at 5% error tolerance and 95% degree
of confidence, using yamane’s formula
n = N 1+ne2
Where
n = population size
64
N = total number of staff
e = error tolerance (5%)
1 = constant
From the study, the sample size is computed as:
n =1,220 1+1220 (0.05)2
1, 220 1+1220 (0.0025)
1220
4.05
n=301
A stratified sampling method was adopted so as to ensure that the
selected commercial banks were covered in the ratio of 3:2:1 using
proportionality formula thus:
Q = A X n N 1
Where
Q = the number of questionnaires to be allocated to each segment.
A = the population of each segment
N = the total population of all the segment.
n = the estimated sample size used in the study.
From the study, the proportionality formula apply thus:
65
Union bank = 610
Diamond bank = 407
Stanbic IBTC = 203
Total 1220
Union bank plc = 610 x 301 =151 1,220 1
Diamond bank = 407 x 301 =100 1,220 1
Stanbic IBTC bank = 203 x 301 =50 1,220 1
Total = 301
Table 3.1
Organization A Q
Union bank Plc 610 151
Diamond bank 407 100
Stanbic IBTC bank 203 50
Total 1,220 301
66
3.4 Instrument used for Data Collection
Questionnaire
The questionnaire is made up of 17 questions consisting of
multiple choice and dichotomous questions.
(a) Dichotomous questions- These are close ended questions that
require respondents to answer yes or no.
(b) Multiple choice questions- This requires the respondents to
choose from a set of alternative options asked.
Interview
Interview gives an on the spot response from the respondents.
It provides complimentary data to the questionnaire.
3.5 Method of Data Analysis
The data collected were subjected to simple statistical
treatments. They were organized and presented in tables and
percentages.
Also, the chi-square (χ2) statistical method was used to test
the hypotheses.
The chi-square formula is calculated as follows.
Х2 ∑(0-0e)2 0e
67
Where
Х2 = chi-square calculated.
0i = Observed frequency
0e = Expected frequency
∑ = Summation sign.
K = Level of Significance
d = Degree of freedom
The x2 will be tested at a degree of freedom given by
DF (n-1) = (r-1) (c-1)
Where DF (n-1) = Number of degree of freedom
C = Number of columns for response
R = Number of row for responses.
3.6 Validity and Reliability of Data
The questions were made in simple and easy to understand
manner so as to enable the respondents provide relevant
information.
There are four general classes of reliability estimates, they are:
inter-rater or inter-observer test, test-retest reliability, paralled-forms
68
reliability and internal consistency reliability. For the purpose of this
study, test-retest reliability was employed.
Test-Retest Reliability
Test-retest reliability is when we administered the same test to
the same sample on two different occasions. This approach assumes
that there is no substantial change in the construct being measured
between the two occasions.
69
REFERENCES
Johnson, U.O (2007) Introduction to Project Writing for Business and
Financial Studies Enugu. New Dimension
Publishers.
Ugwuonah, G.E. (2005) Data Analysis and Presentation, Enugu.
Cheston Publisher.
70
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 DATA PRESENTATION ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
This chapter deals with presentation, analysis and
interpretation of various data collected in the course of the research,
using chi-square (x2) as the appropriate statistical tool.
The chi-square (x2) x2 test provides basis for testing whether
more than one population may be considered equal. X2 provides a
means of comparing a set of observed frequency with a set of
expected frequencies. The calculated x2 will be compared with the
critical value of x2; the difference will form the basis for accepting or
rejecting the null hypothesis.
DECISION RULE
The rule is to reject Ho (Null hypothesis) if the computed value
of x2c is greater than the critical x2t, otherwise do not reject. This
means that if the Ho (Null hypothesis) is rejected, the alternative
hypothesis (Hi) will be accepted.
71
4.1 Analysis of Questionnaires Distributed and Returned
Table 1
Questionnaires Distributed, Returned and Not Returned
Response
Questionnaire
Given
Percentage
(%) Given
Questionnaire
Returned
Percentage
(%) Returned
Questioner not
Returned
Percentage
(%) not
Returned
Union Bank 151 50 135 45 16 5
Diamond
Bank
100 33 90 30 10 3
Stanbic IBTC 50 17 45 15 5 2
Total 301 100 270 90 31 10
Source: survey data
I observed that out of 301 questionnaires distributed, 270
representing 90% were returned, while 31 representing 10% were
not returned.
72
Table 2. Question 7
The amount of work done by officials could be heavy that fraud
could easily pass undetected?
Option Response Percentage (%)
Agree 90 33
Strongly agree 164 61
Disagree 10 4
Strongly disagree 6 2
Total 270 100
Source: survey data
The table above shows that 90 respondents representing 33%
indicated agree, 164 respondents representing 61% indicated
strongly agree, 10 respondents representing 4% indicated disagree
while 6 respondents representing 2% indicated strongly disagree.
This shows that fraud cannot easily detected when the amount
of work done by officials is too heavy.
73
Table 3 Question 8
When an official supervises quite a large number of staff, there
is a high likelihood that fraud could go undetected?
Option Response Percentage (%)
Agree 155 55.5
Strongly agree 60 22.2
Disagree 35 13
Strongly disagree 25 9.3
Total 270 100
Source: survey data.
The table above shows that 155 respondents representing
55.5% indicated agree, 60 respondents representing 22.2%
indicated strongly agree, 35 respondents representing 13% indicated
disagree while 25 respondents representing 9.3% indicated strongly
disagree.
This shows that when an official supervises quite a large
number of staff, there is a high likelihood that fraud could go
undetected.
74
Table 4 Question 9
Commercial banks with poor management and poor security
arrangement record higher incident of all sorts of fraud than those
with effective management.
Table 4 Questions 9
Option Response Percentage (%)
Agree 86 32
Strongly agree 168 62
Disagree 9 3
Strongly disagree 7 3
Total 270 100
Source: survey data
The table above shows that 86 respondents representing 32%
indicated agree, 168 respondents representing 62% indicated
strongly agree, 9 respondents representing 3% indicated disagree
while 7 respondents representing 3% indicated strongly disagree.
This shows that commercial banks with poor management and
poor security arrangement records higher incidence of all sorts of
fraud than those with effective management.
75
Table 5 Question 10
What are the causes of banks fraud?
Option Response Percentage (%)
Poor management 32 12
Staff negligence 50 19
Poor securely arrangement 36 13
All of the above. 152 56
Total 270 100
Source: survey data
The table above shows that 32 respondents representing 12%
indicated poor management, 50 respondents representing 19%
indicated staff negligence, 36 respondents representing 13%
indicated poor security arrangement while 152 respondents
representing 56% indicated all of the above.
This shows that poor management, staff negligence and poor
security arrangement are causes of banks fraud.
76
Table 6 Question 11
What are the various types of fraud in commercial bank?
Option Response Percentage (%)
Loan fraud 35 13
Cheque fraud 45 17
Money laundering 55 20
All of the above 135 50
Total 270 100
Source: survey data
The table above shows that 35 respondents representing 13%
indicated loan fraud, 45 respondents representing 17% indicated
cheque fraud, 55 respondents representing 20% indicated money
laundering fraud while 135 respondents representing 50% indicated
all of the above.
This shows that loan fraud, cheque fraud, and money
laundering fraud are the various types of fraud in commercial banks.
77
Table 7 Question 12
Would you say that cheque kiting, account opening fraud and
the letter of credit fraud constitute types of bank fraud?
Option Response Percentage (%)
Yes 260 96
No 10 4
Total 270 100
Source: survey data
The table shows that 260 respondents representing 96%
indicated yes while 10 respondents representing 4% indicated no.
This shows that cheque kiting, account opening fraud and
letter of credit fraud constitutes types of bank fraud.
78
Table 8 Question 13
What is the extent of fraud in commercial banks?
OPTION RESPONSE PERCENTAGE (%)
High 8 3
Very high 10 4
Low 170 63
Very low 82 30
Total 270 100
Source survey data
The table above shows that 8 respondents representing 3%
indicated high, 10 respondents representing 4% indicated very high,
170 respondents representing 63% indicated low while 82
respondents representing 30% indicated very low.
This shows that the extent of fraud in commercial banks is low.
79
Table 9 Question 14
Fraud can be detected and controlled through?
OPTION RESPONSE PERCENTAGE (%)
Personnel & Administrative
Control
42 16
Accounting & Financial
Control
58 21
Inventory & Process Control 50 19
All of the above 120 44
Total 270 100
Source: survey data
The table shows that 42 respondents representing 16%
indicated personnel & Administrative control, 58 respondents
representing 21% indicated accounting & financial control, 50
respondents representing 19% indicated inventory and process
control while 120 respondents representing 44% indicated all of the
above.
This show that fraud can be detected and controlled through
i. Personnel and administrative control.
ii. Accounting and financial control.
iii. Inventory and process control.
80
Table 10 Question 15
What constitute personnel control?
OPTION RESPONSE PERCENTAGE (%)
Proper recruitment
procedure.
62 23
Proper Disengagement
procedures
65 24
All of the above 123 46
Non of the above 20 7
Total 270 100
Source: survey data
The table above shows that 62 respondents representing 23%
indicated proper recruitment procedures, 65 respondents
representing 24% indicated proper disengagement procedures, 123
respondents representing 46% indicated all of the above while 20
respondents representing 7% indicated non of the above.
This shows that proper recruitment procedure, and proper
disengagement procedures constitute personnel control.
81
Table 11 Question 16
What constitute accounting control?
OPTION RESPONSE PERCENTAGE (%)
Data validation 47 17
Prompt posting of
transactions
58 22
Balancing 55 20
All of the above 110 41
Total 270 100
Source: survey data
The table shows that 47 respondents representing 17%
indicated Data validation, 58 respondents representing 22%
indicated prompt positing of transactions, 55 respondents
representing 20% indicated balancing while 110 respondents
representing 41% indicated all of the above.
This show that data validation, prompt position of transactions
and balancing constitute accounting control.
82
Table 12 Question 17
What constitute inventory control?
Option Response Percentage (%)
Longs and listing 40 15
Physical checks & counts 49 18
Balancing stock figure with
general ledger.
42 16
All of the above 139 51
Total 270 100
Source: survey data
The table above shows that 40 respondents representing 15%
indicated logs and listing, 49 respondents representing 18%
indicated physical checks & counts, 42 respondents representing
16% indicated balancing stock figure with general ledger while 139
respondents representing 51% indicated all of the above.
This shows that logs and listing, physical checks and counts,
and balancing stock figure with general ledger constitute inventory
control.
83
4.2 Hypotheses Testing
In this section, the hypotheses associated with the study will
be tested. The data already presented will be used in testing the
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1
Ho: Poor management and poor security arrangement in
commercial banks do not cause fraud.
Hi: Poor management and poor security arrangement in
commercial banks can cause fraud.
Using Table 4 Question 9
Commercial banks with poor management and poor security
arrangement records higher incidence of fraud than those with
effective management?
Option Response Percentage (%)
Agree 86 32
Strongly agree 168 62
Disagree 9 3
Strongly disagree 7 3
Total 270 100
84
TEST STATISTICS
X2 = ∑(o-e)2/e
Where
x2 = Chi-square
o = Observed frequency
e = Expected frequency
∑ = Summation
Level of significance is 0.05 (5%)
Degree of freedom is (r-1) (c-1)
(4-1) (2-1)
(3). (1) = 3
Critical value with 3 degree of freedom, at 0.05 level of
significance from chi-square table = 7.81.
Expected frequency = 86+168+9+7 4
= 270 4 = 67.5
85
O E o-e (o-e)2 (o-e)2/e
86 67.5 18.5 342.3 5.1
168 67.5 100.5 10100.3 149.6
9 67.5 -58.5 3422.3 50.7
7 67.5 -60.5 3660.3 54.2
X2 = 259.6
Decision Rule
Reject Ho (Null hypothesis) if the computed value of x2 is
greater than critical value and accept H1, otherwise accept Ho.
X2 computed is 259.6 from the table above, and the value is
grater than the critical value i.e 259.6>7.81.
We reject Ho, the null hypothesis, and accept H1 which states
that poor management and poor security arrangement can cause
fraud in commercial banks.
Hypothesis 2
Ho: Loan fraud, cheque fraud and money laundering fraud do not
constitute types of banks fraud.
Hi: Loan fraud, cheque fraud and money laundering fraud
constitute types of banks fraud.
86
Using Table 6, Question 11
Loan fraud, cheque fraud and money laundering fraud
constitute types of banks fraud.
Option Response Percentage (%)
Loan fraud 35 13
Cheque fraud 45 17
Money laundering fraud 55 20
All of the above 135 50
Total 270 100
Test Statistics
X2 = ∑(o-e)2 e
Where x2 = Chi-square
O = Observed frequency
e = Expected frequency
e = Summation
Level of significance is 0.05 (.5%)
Degree of freedom is
(r-1). (c-1)
(4-1) (2-1)
87
(3) (1)
= 3
Critical value with 3 degree of freedom at 0.05 level of
significance, form chi-square table 7.81
expected frequency = 35+45+55+135 4 = 270 = 67.5 4
Contingency Table
O E o-e (o-e)2 (o-e)2/e
35 67.5 -32.5 1056.3 15.6
45 67.5 -22.5 506.3 7.5
55 67.5 -12.5 156.3 2.3
135 67.5 67.5 4556.3 67.5
X2=92.9
Decision Rule
Reject Ho (Null hypothesis) if the computed value of x2 is
greater than critical value and accept H1. Otherwise, accept Ho
X2 computed is 92.9 from the table above, the computed x2 value is
greater than the critical value i.e 92.9 > 7.81.
88
We reject Ho, the null hypothesis, and accept H1 which states
that loan fraud, cheque fraud and money laundering fraud constitute
types of banks fraud.
Hypothesis 3
Ho: The extent of fraud in commercial bank is low.
H1: The extent of fraud in commercial banks is high.
Using Table 8 Question 13
What is the extent of fraud in commercial banks?
Option Response Percentage (%)
High 8 3
Very high 10 4
Low 170 63
Very low 82 30
Total 270 100
Test Statistic
X2 = ∑(o-e)2 e Where x2 = Chi-square
O = Observed frequency
89
e = Expected frequency
∑ = Summation
Level of significant is 0.05 (5%).
Degree of freedom is (r-1) (c-1)
= (4-1). (2-1)
= (3) . (1)
= 3
Critical value with 3 degree of freedom at 0.05 level of
significance from the chi-square table = 7.81.
The expected frequency
= 8+10+170+82 270 4 4 = 67.5
The Contingency Table
O E o-e (o-e)2 (o-e)2/e
8 67.5 -59.5 3540.3 52.4
10 67.5 -57.5 3306.3 49.6
170 67.5 102.5 10506.3 155.6
82 67.5 14.5 210.3 3.1
X2 = 260.1
90
Decision Rule
Reject Ho (Null hypothesis) if the computed value of x2 is
greater than critical value and accept Hi. Otherwise, accept Ho.
X2 computer is 260.1 from the above table and the value is
greater than the critical value i.e. 260.1 > 7.81.
We reject Null hypothesis, and accept Hi, which states that the
extent of fraud in commercial banks is low.
Hypothesis 4
Ho: Fraud cannot be detected and controlled through the
accounting and personnel control.
H1: Fraud can be detected and controlled through accounting and
personnel control.
Using Table 9 Question 14
Fraud can be detected and controlled through?
Option Response Percentage (%)
Personnel and administrative 42 16
Accounting and financial control 58 21
Inventory and process control 50 19
All of the above 120 44
Total 270 100
91
Test Statistic
X2 = ∑(o-e)2 e Where x2 = chi-square
O = Observed frequency
e = Expected frequency
∑ = Summation
Level of significant is 0.05 (5%).
Degree of freedom is (r-1) (c-1)
= (4-1). (2-1)
= (3) . (1)
= 3
Critical value with 3 degree of freedom at 0.05 level of
significance from the chi-square table = 7.81.
The expected frequency
= 42+58+50+120 270 4 4 = 67.5 e = 67.5
92
The Contingency Table
O E o-e (o-e)2 (o-e)2/e
42 67.5 -25.5 650.3 9.63
58 67.5 -9.5 90.3 1.34
50 67.5 -17.5 306-3 4.54
120 67.5 52.5 2756.3 40.83
X2 = 56.34
Decision Rule
Reject Ho (Null hypothesis) if the computed value of x2 is
greater than critical value and accept H1, otherwise accept Ho.
X2 computed is 56.34 from the table above, the computed x2
value is greater than the critical value i.e 56.34 > 7.81.
We reject Ho, the null hypothesis, and accept H1 which states
that fraud can be detected and controlled through accounting and
personal control.
93
CHAPTER FIVE
5.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS &
RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Major Findings
The major findings at the end of this research investigation
include the following.
1. Poor management and poor security arrangement can cause
fraud in commercial banks
2. Loan fraud, cheque fraud and money laundering fraud
constitute types of banks fraud.
3. The extent of fraud in commercial banks is low.
4. Fraud can be detected and controlled through accounting and
personnel control.
5.2 Conclusion
The conclusion drawn on this study is that bank fraud as a
cankerworm has eaten deep gradually into our social fabric.
Management of fraud in commercial banks is of great importance
and has a lot of benefits to both the banks, customers and the entire
public if properly carried out. This includes:
94
1. Giving confidence to the bank customers that their money is
safe.
2. Encouraging or attract local and foreign invetors to invest their
money into the banking sector with the impression that their
money is secure.
3. Exposing the fraud victim in the commercial banks for
punishment and prosecution.
4. Giving the commercial banks the impression that their business
environment is free from fraud and they are working with
faithful and honest staffs.
5.3 Recommendations
Based on the findings of the study, the researcher made the
following recommendations:
1. Government should establish more anti fraud and anti
corruption agencies to assist in sanitizing Nigeria banking
system.
2. Bank management should employ strategies that will ensure
early and prompt detection, prevention and control of fraud in
commercial banks.
95
3. Banks management should strengthen their security
arrangement and use sophisticated security gadget to ensure
tight security in both inside and outside the bank premises.
4. The recruitment system in the bank should be base strictly on
merit instead of considering who you know, connection and
tribalism. This will ensure efficient and effective staff
functioning.
5. Banks should avoid employing fraud victim in the bank or in
other organizations.
96
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adeniyi, A.A (2004); Auditing and Investigation, Lagos. El-Toda Ventures Limited.
Adewunmi, W. (1986); Data Processing and Management Information System, Lagos. Macmillan Publisher Limited.
Anyanwu, J.C (1993); Monetary, Economics Theory, Policy and Institutions. Onitsha, Hybrid Publishers Ltd.
Eze, J.C (2004); Principles and Techniques of Auditing, Enugu. Edge Publishers.
Castle, E.F and Owens, P.N (1992); Elements of Banking 2nd Edition New York. Pretince Hall Publishers.
Johnson, U.O (2007); Introduction to Project Writing, Enugu. New Dimension Publisher.
Nwankwo, E.O (1991); Bank Management Principles and Practice, Lagos. Mathouse Press Ltd.
Ngotta, S.M (1999); Money, Banking and Finance, Theory and Practice, Owerri. Intercontinental Educational Books and Publishers.
Michael, A. (20005); A Handbook of Human Resources Management
Practice 9th Edition London. Mbamalu, A.A (2002); Research Project on Bank Fraud and its
Implication on Nigeria Economy. University of Nigeria Enugu Campus.
Orjih, J. (1998); Elements of Banking, Enugu, Communications
Publishers.
97
Shongotola, I.O (1994); Fraud Detection, Prevention and Control Lagos, Wwbbcnews.com/business.
Sulavian, A.K (2008); Fraud Prevention and Control Zaria. Department of Business Administration, Ahmadu Bello University
98
Appendix A Department of Management, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus. Dear Respondent, I am a Post Graduate student of the Department of
Management, Faculty of Business Administration, University of
Nigeria Enugu Campus. I am undertaking a study on the
management of fraud in Nigeria Commercial banks.
The information required here is purely for academic purpose.
Kindly respond by providing answers to the following questions.
Thanks. Yours faithfully, Ukpafe Kingsley Uzuajeme.
99
SECTION A
PERSONAL PROFILE
Please tick (√) in the box where appropriate.
1. Sex?
(a) Male (b) Female
2. Age?
(a) 20-30 years (b) 31-40 years
(c) 41-50 years (d) 51-60 Years
3. Educational qualification.
(a) FSLC (b) WAEC/GCE
(c) HND, BSC (d) MSC, MBA PHD
4. Marital Status.
(a) Single (b) Married
(c) Widowed (d) Divorced
5. Number of years worked with the bank.
(a) 0-4 years (b) 5-9 years
(c) 10-14 years (d) 15-19 years
6. Category of staff.
(a) Junior (b) Senior
100
SECTION B:
Please tick (√) in the box where appropriate.
Indicate the name of your bank.
(a) Union bank
(b) Diamond bank
(c) Stanbic IBTC
7. The amount of work done by officials could be heavy that fraud
could easily pass undetected?
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree
(c) Disagree (d) Strongly disagree
8. When an official supervises quite a large number of staff, there
is a high likelihood that fraud could go undetected?
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree
(c) Disagree (d) Strongly Disagree
9. Commercial banks with poor management, record higher
incidence of all sorts of fraud than those with effective
management?
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree
(c) Disagree (d) Strongly Disagree
10. What are the causes of bank fraud?
(a) Poor security management
101
(b) Staff negligence
(c) Poor security arrangement
(d) All of the above
11. What are the various types of fraud in commercial banks?
(a) Loan fraud (b) Cheque fraud
(c) Money laundry fraud (d) All of the above
12. Would you say that cheque kiting, account opening fraud, and
the letter of credit fraud constitute types of bank fraud?
(a) Yes (b) No
13. What is the extent of fraud in commercial banks?
(a) High (b) Very high
(c) Low (d) Very low
14. Fraud can be detected and controlled through.
(a) Personnel and administrative control
(b) Accounting and financial control
(c) Inventory and process control
(d) All of the above
15. What constitute personnel control.
(a) Proper recruitment procedures
(b) Poor disengagement procedure
(d) All of the above
(c) Non of the above