to make the abolition of visas in relations between the EU and the Eastern European countries possible, the ”spell cast” must be broken on this issue. With the present levels of mobility and people-to-people, business and political contacts the introduction of a visa-free regime will be a natural consequence of the liberalisation processes which have been at work for years. Moreover, the decision to lift the visa requirement is unlikely to significantly stimulate an increase in migration pressure from Eastern European countries but could reduce the operating costs of expanded Schengen consular network. Lifting the visa requirement for Eastern European citizens can be temporary and conditional and allow for actual implementation of an increased conditionality rule. in political terms, making visa liberalisation a key issue would fundamentally change the partners’ approach to the Eastern Partnership and would provide a link to the Partnership for Modernisation targeted at Russia.

Marta Jaroszewicz

Ph.d., expert in department for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, specializes in migration and demography as well as security issues in Eastern Europe

makiNg the impossible possible

thE PRoSPEctS foR viSA-fREE MovEMEnt BEtWEEn thE EU And itS EAStERn PARtnERS

Marta Jaroszewicz

27

NUMBER 27WARSAWMAY 2012

Making the iMpossible possibleThE pRoSpEcTS foR viSA-fREE MovEMENT BETWEEN ThE EU ANd iTS EASTERN pARTNERS

Marta Jaroszewicz

© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / centre for Eastern Studies

content editorsAdam Eberhardt

EditorAnna Łabuszewska

co-operationKatarzyna Kazimierska

Translationilona duchnowicz

co-operationNicholas furnival

Graphic design pARA-BUch

dTpGroupMedia

pUBliShERośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. Marka karpia centre for Eastern Studies

ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, polandphone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl

iSBN 978-83-62936-10-6

Contents

Key points /5

introduCtion /8

I. the Crisis of the eu’s migration and neighbourhood poliCies /10

1. problems of the EU’s migration policy /102. The future of the Eastern partnership /11

II. the migration situation in eastern europe /13

1. The irregular migration threat /132. The readmission agreements /153. The region’s emigration potential /18

III. the state of play. the visa liberalisation proCess /22

1. Ukraine and Moldova: the action plans /222. Russia: a separate ‘path /283. Belarus: at the very end /33

IV. the strengths and the weaKnesses of the neighbouring Countries /37

1. political will and activity /372. The rule of law and corruption /403. Biometric documents /414. Border management /435. The migration policy /45

reCommendations. “to breaK the spell Cast on visas” /47

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Key points

• The present socio-political situation in the European Unionand theglobalfinancialcrisisarecreatingratherunfavour-ableconditionsfortheprocessofvisaliberalisationbetweenthe EU and the countries of Eastern Europe. On the otherhand,thethreatposedbyirregularmigrationfromthisareaisincomparablylowerthanfromNorthAfricancountries,andisdecreasingduetounfavourabledemographictrendsandtheincreasingpossibilities of legal employment abroad for resi-dentsofEasternEuropeancountries.Furthermore, thebor-dermanagementsysteminEasternEuropeisdefinitelymoreefficient thanseveralyearsago.Thecountriesdiscussedarealsocompetentlyfulfillingtheirobligationslinkedtotheim-plementationofthereadmissionagreementstheyhavesignedwiththeEU.ThevisarefusalrateatSchengenconsulatesinEasternEuropeissuccessivelyfalling.

• Theissueofmobilityandvisa-freemovement,withadequateconditionssettoensuresecurity,couldaddnewmomentumtotheEasternPartnership(EaP)andmakethepartnerstatesmoreinterestedinthisinitiative.Russiacouldalsobeinclud-edinthisprocess,whichcouldbecomeanaturalaxisprovid-ingaconnectionwiththePartnershipforModernisationpro-ject.AllthiswouldleadtoanimprovementinthestabilityoftheEU’sneighbourhood,anditwouldalsoencourageEasternEuropeancountriestomakeeffortsatmodernisation.

• TobringabouttheliftingofthevisarequirementinrelationsbetweentheEUandEasternEuropeancountriesitisessentialthat the spell caston this issuebebroken.Now is the stagewhichbringsthelong-termliberalisationprocesstoitsconclu-sion;wearenotwitnessingabreakthroughwithunpredict-ableconsequencesfortheEU.LiftingthevisarequirementforcitizensofEasternEuropeancountriesmaybetemporaryandconditional.Itisworthcombiningitwiththeimplementation

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ofsuchsolutionsaimedat improving theEU’s securitysuchasthesmartborderssystem1ormakingthemechanismsformovingthestatesfromthe‘white’tothe‘black’visalistmoreflexible.Inthetestingphase,visaliberationcanbeintroducedwithregardtocertaincategoriesoftravellersorinconnectionwithapreciselydefinedevent.

• Thebestsolutionwouldbetheintroductionofavisa-freere-gimeforUkraineandMoldovaatthesametimeoroverashorttime-span.ItwillbedifficulttoliftthevisarequirementforcitizensofRussiaatthesametimegiventhesizeofthiscoun-try,itsproblemswithinternalsecurity,andtheneedtoapplyspecialregulations.However,visa-freemovementforcertaincategoriesoftravellersfromRussia,especiallythosewhohaveapositivehistoryoftripstotheSchengenArea(‘bona fide trav-ellers’),appearstobeveryrealistic.OwingtothisEUmemberstates could regain interest in the entire liberalisation pro-cess, which is becoming an overly technical issue. Belarus,despitethepresentdifficulties,shouldalsonotbedeprivedoftheprospectofvisa-freemovement.Intheshortterm,lower-ing thepriceof theuniformSchengenvisas forBelarusiansshouldbeconsidered,regardlessofthepossibilitiesforsign-ingavisafacilitationagreementwithMinsk.

• Thenegotiationprocesscannotbetoolong,andtheEU–alongwiththerequirements–shouldalsocreateanincentivesys-tem.Itisworthconsideringintroducingvisa-freemovementconditionally,whenmostofthecriteriahavebeenmet,whichshouldbeaccompaniedbyputtingintooperationamechanism

1 InOctober2011,theECsuggestedmodernbordermanagementmethodsbeintroducedontheexternalbordersoftheEUinthefuture,i.e.the‘smartborders’system,whichwouldincludeintroducinganelectronicentry-exitregistrationsystemandasystemforthepre-screening of travellers.Themainprincipleinherentinthenewideaistheuseofdifferentbordercontrolmethods,dependingonwhetheragiventravellerposesamigrationriskornot.

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formonitoringfurtherprogress.Thisincreasedconditional-itypolicycouldprovideanadditionalincentivetotheEasternEuropeangovernmentsandmakethemmoreinclinedtofulfiltheirobligationswithregardtotheEUatafasterrate.

• The key short-term challenges include the introduction ofbiometric documents and adequate databases, and ensuringthedueprotectionofborders.Inthelongterm,theEUshouldpressfortheministriesofinternalaffairstobereformedandthe judiciaryandthesystemforcombatingcorruptiontobereinforced.InthecaseofRussiaandBelarus,achangeintherestrictive registration policy applicable to citizens of EUmember states staying in those countries shouldbe thekeyelement.

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introduction

Thispaperisaimedatpresentingtheopportunitiesandthechal-lengeslinkedtotheintroductionofavisa-freeregimeinEU-East-ernEurope relations, and the attempts to propose solutions forbreakingthelengthydeadlockthisissuehasfacedsincethecol-lapseoftheUSSR.Attheoutset,thebackgroundofthevisaliber-alisationprocessbetweentheEUandEasternEuropeancountrieswillbeoutlined.Thentheprogressinnegotiationsbetweenindi-vidualneighbouringcountriesandtheEUandalsoexistingco-operationmechanismsaredescribed.Thenextsectionprovidesananalysisofthestrongandtheweakpointsoftheneighbouringstates,andassesses their levelof readiness for the introductionofvisa-freemovementwiththeEU.Thelastpartpresentsrecom-mendations:howtosteerthefurthernegotiationprocesssothattheultimategoalcanbeachievedandwillbebeneficialforboththeEuropeanUnionandthegovernmentsandsocietiesofEasternEuropeanstates.

ThistextprovidesadescriptionofthoseEasternEuropeancoun-trieswhichshareaborderwiththeEuropeanUnionandwhichareencounteringseriousproblemsduetotheexistenceofthevisaregimewiththeEU:thethreecountriesparticipatingintheEast-ernPartnershipwhichare closest to theEU (Ukraine,MoldovaandBelarus),andalsoRussia,whichisnotcoveredbytheEaP.Thechoiceofthesecountrieswasbasedontheirprogressinprepara-tions,onthemigrationsituationandarealisticpoliticalevalua-tionofthepossibilitytointroduceavisa-freeregimewiththeEU.Inotherwords,thebasiccriterionwastheassessmentofwhetherEUmemberstatesand institutionsand theneighbouringstatessee thisscenarioaspossibleanddesirable,andwhatconditionsshouldbemetforthisplantobesuccessful.

MoldovaandUkraineare themost advanced in thenegotiationprocessonvisaliberalisationwiththeEU.However,theydonothave toomany supporters in the EU, who would be willing to

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lift thevisarequirementwithinashorttimeframe.Ontheoth-erhand, thevisarefusalrate for thecitizensof thesecountriesattheEUconsulateshasbeenfalling(atamuchfasterspeedforUkrainiansthanMoldovans).TheEuropeanCommissionhasalsonotedthatthefunctioningofthelocalbordertrafficregimeontheEU’sborderswiththesecountriesissafe.Inturn,Russiahasnotagreedtobesubjecttotheconditionalityprincipleinvisaissues(liberalisationinexchangeforinternalreforms),towhichotherEasternEuropeancountrieshaveconsented.TheEU-Russiane-gotiationsontheintroductionofavisa-freeregimehavebeeninplaceformanyyears;however,littleprogresshasbeenobservedinthisfield.Itappearsnowthatbothpartiesareincreasinglyin-terestedinbreakingthedeadlock.Intermsofmeetingtheformalandlegalrequirements,Belarusisinlastplace.However,inthecaseofBelarusians,thevisarefusalrateatEUconsulatesisthelowestinthisregion.

Allthecountriesdiscussed(includingBelarus)havedeclaredthatliftingthevisaregimeinrelationswiththeEUisapriorityissueforthem.TheabolitionofvisastotheEUisalsounquestionablysupported by public opinion.Moldova is themost advanced asregardstheissuingofbiometricdocuments;Russiaalsoalreadyissues such documents. Neither Ukraine nor Belarus have in-troducedbiometricdocumentsasyet.Themainproblemall thecountriesinthisregionsharearethedifficultieswithintroducingtheruleoflaw,themanifestationsofwhichincludetheinefficientandweakjudiciaryandhighcorruptionlevels.TheAchillesheelofthesestates is theirministriesof internalaffairs.Thesehavenot been reformed and aremanaged in a non-transparentwaywhentheyshouldbeplayingthecoordinatingroleintheprocessoftheliberalisationofthemovementofpeoplewiththeEU.

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i. the crisis of the eu’s migration and neighbourhood policies

1. Problems of the EU’s migration policy

SincetheEUatpresentneedstodealwiththecrisisofitsmigra-tion and enlargement policies and also fundamental economicproblemsinsidetheeurozone,a largepartofEUmemberstateswouldprefertheissueofliftingthevisarequirementforUkraineandMoldovatobepostponedforaslongaspossible.Supportersofdelayingtheresolutionofthevisaissueclaimthatallthecrite-riaforliftingthevisaregime,whichareoftenexcessive,mustbemet.Therefore,thereisariskthatUkraineandMoldovawillgetstuckinanever-endingnegotiationprocess.Ontheotherhand,visa liberalisation in relations between the EU andRussiamaygainmomentumowing to the adoptionof a joint actionplan tothiseffect.However,ifitisconductedonthegroundsofpoliticalpremisesalone,thiswillinnowaymaketheRussiangovernmentmore inclined to implement reforms. In turn,Belarusians,whoareincreasinglycutofffromtheoutsideworldduetothenatureofthepoliticalregimeintheircountry,maydirecttheiraversionanddisillusionmentalsoagainsttheEuropeanUnion.

EasternEuropeancountriesarewatchingseveralcurrentdevel-opmentswithanxiety:thedelayintheacceptanceofBulgariaandRomaniaintotheSchengenarea,thetemporaryreinstatementofbordercontrolbysomeEUmemberstateson theirbordersandFrance’sandHolland’sdesiretochallengetheprincipleofthefreemovementofpeoplewithintheEUbyintroducingregulationsontheexpulsionofundesirableEUcitizens.Themediaandexpertsin thepartner stateshavealsobeenwatching the influxof ref-ugees to theEU in theaftermathof therevolutions in theArabworldcloselyandhavenotedthedifficultiesindividualmemberstateshavehadwithacceptingthem.

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Giventhissituation,theeasternneighboursareaskingtheques-tion,‘IfsomecountriesintheEUfearthefreemovementofpeo-pleofEUmemberstatescitizensof,istheEuropeanUnionreadytoliberaliseitspolicywithregardtoitsexternalpartners?’Sincethe governments of these countries tend to answer ‘no’ to thisquestion,theirdisbeliefinthepossibilityofthevisaregimebe-ingabolishedinrelationwiththeEUisincreasing.Thisinturnis strengthening their reluctance to reform the migration andborderpoliciesinlinewithEUrequirements.Summingup,frus-trationandde-motivationareincreasinginboththeEUandtheneighbouringcountries.

2. The future of the Eastern Partnership

A further liberalisation of themovement of people in relationswithEasternEuropeancountries isalsobeingheldbackdue tothe growing disaffection with the Eastern Partnership project(both inside the EU and among the beneficiary states) result-ingfromtheimpossibilitytoachieverealpoliticalandeconomicgoals,andthusfromtheweakeningofpoliticalwill.ThestrictlyeconomicapproachtotheEaP–giventhecrisisintheEurolandandRussia’seconomicoffensiveintheregion–adoptedsofarisunabletoaddimpetustothisinitiative.Secondly,ineffectoftheenlargementpolicycrisis,anopeningupwouldbeimpossibletobebroughtaboutinthepoliticalsphere.Theharmoniousdevelop-mentoftheEaPisalsolikelytobeupsetbyunfavourablepoliti-caltrendstakingplaceincountriescoveredbytheEaP,especiallythecaseofYuliaTymoshenko–whethershewillstay inprisonformanyyears–andofotherUkrainianprisoners.Thismayhaveadirectimpactontheprospectsofsigninganassociationagree-mentbetweentheEUandUkraine.Thefutureofthepro-Europe-angovernmentcoalitionanditsreformagendaisalsounclearinMoldova,whichhasso farbeen the leaderofdemocratic trans-formation.Takingthisintoconsideration,theissueofmobility–withconditionsimprovingsecurityadequatelyset–couldmaketheEasternEuropeancountriesandsocietiesmoreinterestedin

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theEaP.ThisapproachcouldalsocoverRussia,sincethePartner-ship forModernisation cannot be seen as a successful project,giventhefundamentaldisagreementsbetweentheEUandRussiaregardingitsnatureandgoals.

Doubtlessly,provisionsofthedeclarationdevelopedattheconclu-sionofthesecondEasternPartnershipsummitwerearayofhopeintheprocesstowardsliberalisation.EUmemberstatesagreedtonolongerdefinethevisa-freeregimeasalong-termgoalinmu-tualrelationsandtostatethatthisendeavourcouldbesuccess-fullyrealised“withinduetime”,providedthattheconditionssetintheactionplansonvisaliberalisationhavebeenmet2.Althoughthisdeclarationchangeslittleinpractice,itsfundamentalvalueisthatthesetoftheEU’srequirementstobemetbyEasternEuro-peancountrieshasbeendefined,evenifthissetisverycomplex.

2 JointDeclarationoftheEasternPartnershipSummit,Warsaw,29-30Sep-tember2011,p.4.

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ii. the migration situation in eastern europe

1. The irregular migration threat

Thethreatof irregularmigrationfromEasternEuropeancoun-triestotheEU–unlikeasisthecasewiththeNorthAfricanregion– is falling. The greatest influx ofmigrants from theCommon-wealthof IndependentStates (CIS)areaandof transitmigrantsfromSouthernAsiaandAfrica,whoweretryingtotravelthroughUkraineillegally,andtoalesserextentthroughBelarus(theEU’sborders with Russia and Moldova are definitely less popular)wasseeninthelate20thcentury.Atthattime,Ukrainianborderguardsdetainedapproximately30,000peopleannuallywhoweretryingtocrosstheborderillegally.AmongtheseUkrainiansandRussianswereleadinginthestatisticsofcountriesoforiginofir-regularmigrantsapprehendedintheEU.Itneedstobeaddedthatthe bordermanagement system in Eastern Europe was at thattimeconsiderablylessefficientthanatpresent.

In 2008, theUkrainian border service apprehended 6,100 indi-vidualsattempting tocross theborder illegally,4,800 individu-alsin2009andalso4,800in2010.3,200irregularmigrantswereapprehended in thefirst sixmonths of 2011.Around 90%of allthemigrantsapprehended,andalsoofthosewhoseentrywasre-jected,arecitizensofCIScountries(mainlyresidentsofMoldova,the Russian Federation andUzbekistan), attempting to get intotheEU3.WhilesuchmigrantsusedtobeidentifiedwhentheyhadmanagedtoreachtheUkraine-EUborderinthepast,recentlytheUkrainianborderservicehasimproveditscapacityofapprehend-ingthemonitseasternborders.

AsecondarytransitrouteforillegalmigrationfromtheCISareaaswellasAsiaandAfricatotheEUrunsthroughBelarus.Most

3 DatafromtheStateBorderGuardServiceofUkraine.

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migrantsmost likelyarrive inBelarusthroughtheborderwithRussia, which is totally open; hence the lack of statistical datafromthisborder.Inturn,relativelyhighmigrationactivitycanbe observed at the Ukrainian-Belarusian and the Belarusian-Lithuanianborders.Intotal,in2010theBelarusianbordercom-mitteedetained 1,387 individualsonchargesofviolatingborderlegislation4.AmongthesecitizensofGeorgiawerepredominant(mostlyapprehendedatMinskairport)andfollowingthemciti-zensofKyrgyzstanandMoldova5.

However,itisalsoworthkeepinginmindthatEasternEuropeancountries donot always apply a clearmethodology for definingthenumberofapprehendedirregularmigrants,whichmakesitdifficult to compare theirdatawithEUstatistics. Furthermore,somebordersectionshavesuchalowlevelofprotectionthatthestatisticsshowingthenumberofapprehendedindividualsdonotallowanyconclusionswhatsoevertobemadeabouttheexistingtrendsandthreats.

EUstatisticsalsoshowthatthethreatofirregularmigrationfromEasternEuropeislow.AccordingtotheFrontexreportsy,illegalmigrationat theEU’seastern landborder isremainingatasta-blelowlevel.Asthemostrecentreportfromthisagencyshows,thegreatestthreatontheeasternSchengenborderisposednotbyirregularmigrationbutbycigarettesandfuelsmugglingduetothesubstantialdifferenceinthepricesofthesegoodsonthetwosidesoftheborder,andalsothesmugglingofstolencarsfromEUmemberstates6.TheriskofillegalmigrationisthehighestontheUkrainian-Slovakianborder,whichaccounts for around40%ofallapprehensionsontheeasternEUborder.CitizensofMoldova

4 Thisisabroadercategorythanapprehensionforattemptedillegalbordercrossing.

5 DatafromtheStateBorderCommitteeofBelarus.6 Frontex, Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network Annual Overview 2011,

Warsaw,October2011.

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andGeorgia(and,fromoutsidetheCISarea,citizensofSomalia,AfghanistanandPalestine)arepredominantamongthemigrantsapprehendedbyEUborderpolice.Inturn,entrytotheEUismostfrequentlyrefusedtocitizensoftheneighbouringcountries,i.e.Ukraine,BelarusandRussia,whohavepreviouslybreachedtherulesofstayintheEU7.

2. The readmission agreements

Readmissionagreementsareaperfecttouchstonefortheassess-mentofthemigrationrisk.Overthepasttwoyears,readmissionagreementshavebeenputintoeffecttothefullextentbetweentheEUand:Ukraine(from1January2010),Moldova(from1Oc-tober2010)andRussia(from1June2010).Thismeansthatthesecountries accept from EU member states not only their owncitizensor foreigners caught red-handedbutalsoall irregularmigrants, provided that it is proven that they came to the EUthroughagivenneighbouringcountry.Thereadmissionagree-ments in thepartconcerning thereturnofowncitizenscameintoeffectin2007–2008.

Contrarytoexpectations,theentryintoforceoftheseagreementshasnotresultedinarapidgrowthinthenumberofindividualsreadmittedfromtheEUtoEasternEuropeancountries8.Firstly,thisconfirmsthethesisthatEasternEuropeisnotamajortransitrouteformigrantsfromAfricaandAsiaheadingfortheEuropeanUnion.Secondly,thisalsoindicatesthat,asregardsthosecitizensofEasternEuropeancountrieswhobreaktherulesofstayinEUmemberstates,theprocessoftheirexpulsionwasalreadyquiteunproblematicbefore.ThereadmissionagreementssignedwiththeEUdidnotbringanyaddedvalueinthisarea.Thechangewas

7 Ibid.8 CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliamentandthe

Council,EvaluationofEUReadmissionAgreements,COM (2011) 76Final,Brussels23February2011.

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mainlyofastatisticalnature;thereturneesstartedtobeshowninEUstatisticsinsteadofbilateralstatistics.

Doubtlessly, readmission agreements (both at the communitylevelandthebilateralagreementswhichapplyinreality)9appeartobeaneffectivemechanismincombatingtheirregularmigra-tionofowncitizens.Proofsofthisinclude:thehighnumberofre-questsforacceptingowncitizenssentbyEUmemberstatestothepartnercountries,andtherelativelysmoothprocessofacceptingreadmitted individuals by the receiving states. Co-operation inthis area is especially effectivewithUkraineandMoldova, andalittleworsewithRussia,sinceEUmemberstatesareunabletopresent the sufficientnumberofdocuments requiredbyRussiatorecogniseagivenpersonasitscitizen.InthecaseofUkraine,co-operationisalsogoodinthepartregardingforeignerstrans-ferredwiththeapplicationoftheacceleratedprocedure,i.e.thosewhoaredetainedintheborderareawithin48hoursofillegallycrossingtheborder.

Althoughirregulartransitmigrationandtheprocessoftransfer-ringirregularmigrantsfromthirdcountriesbyEUmemberstatestothepartnerstateshasnodirectimpactonvisaliberalisation,it still shows the degree of the generalmigration risk.CitizensofEasternEuropeancountries tend tobe less likely to take theriskofillegalmigration.Thisregionisalsobecominglesspopularwithirregulartransitmigrants.ForgedpassportsoftheEasternEuropeancountriesareusedrelativelyrarelybyirregulartransitmigrants.Aboveall,thesetrendsshowthatbordermanagementsystemshaveimprovedandthatthelevelofco-operationbetweenborderguardsonbothsidesoftheborderisrelativelyhigh.

9 Althoughthepreviousbilateralagreements(e.g.Polish-Ukrainian)lostef-fectupontheentryintoforceofthecommunityreadmissionagreements,theyinfactstillapply.Giventhelackofimplementingprotocolstothenewtypeofagreements,thebilateralagreementsarestillusedinreadmissionpractice.

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Table 1.TheimplementationofreadmissionagreementsbetweentheEUandtheEasternPartners

State

Year

Num

bero

frequests

citizens

Num

bero

frequests

thirdstates

Num

bero

fpositive

respon

ses

Num

bero

frefusals

Acceleratedprocedu

re

Num

bero

freturns

Tran

sitcases

russian federation

200720082009Total

35798614283165

0011

1164206711601

984515181067

0000

623885621406

0022

ukraine20082009Total

69510301725

6804951175

120912892498

4082122

02323

159215453137

000

moldova20082009Total

217225680

000

134111483

282351

033

4564461140

000

source*:EvaluationofEUReadmissionAgreements.TheaggregateddataforthechosencategoriesgatheredbytheEuropeanCommissionfromtheMSonabasisofaquestionnaire,Brussels,23February2011,SEC(2011)210.

*Thesedataarenotveryprecise;dataprovidedby individualmember statesareatvariance,notallcountrieshavemadetheirstatisticsavailabletotheEC.Nodatahaveyetbeencollectedfor2010,whenreadmissionagreementscameintoeffectinthefullscope.

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3. The region’s emigration potential

The demographic indicators in Eastern European countries arefarfromoptimistic.Thesocietiesofoureasternneighbours,in-cludingRussia,arecharacterisedbylowfertilityratesandhighmortalityrates,andareageingfast.SincethecollapseoftheUSSR,theRussianFederationwastheonlypost-Sovietstatetohaveseenasubstantialincreaseinmigration,whichdidnothoweverallowittoreversethetrendofitsdecreasingpopulation.Theforecastsfor thedemographicdevelopmentof thisregion indicateclearlythatthepopulationwillfallineachofthecountriesdiscussedde-spitethefactthatoverthepasttwentyyearstheeconomicsitua-tionhasimproved,thetlifeexpectancyhasbeenincreasing,themortality rate has been falling, and, additionally, the fertilityratesimprovedin2005–2010.Thecountriesdiscussedareincreas-inglywaryofthethreatemigrationposes,giventheunfavourabledemographicsituation.Therefore,theyareslowlyembarkingonactivemigrationpolicies.Allthismeansthatnosignificantemi-grationwavefromEasternEuropetotheEUshouldbeexpectedinthelongterm.

However, it cannot be ruled out that in the short term, aftera possible lifting of thevisa requirement,migration fromEast-ernEuropeancountriestotheEUwillgrow.ThistrendcouldbeobservedinthecaseoftheWesternBalkancountries,wherethevisa-freeregimewasintroducedin2009–2010.TheproblemwithunfoundedapplicationsforrefugeestatussubmittedbycitizensofSerbiaandMacedoniawasespeciallydifficulttohandleforsuchcountriesasGermany,SwedenandBelgium.Thesewerepredom-inantlypersonsofRomaorAlbanianoriginwhoseeconomicsitu-ationintheirhomecountrieswasverybad.

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Table 2.KeydemographicindicatorsinEasternEuropeancountries

state russia ukraine belarus moldova

Populationnumber2010(millions)

142.958 45.448 9.595 3.573

Fertilityrate2005–2010(per1,000residents)

11.4 10.4 10.7 12.3

Mortalityrate2005–2010(per1,000residents)

14.2 16.7 14.4 13.5

Populationchangeratio2010–2015in%(mediumvariant)

-0.10 -0.55 -0.33 -0.68

source:PopulationDivisionoftheDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsoftheUnitedNationsSecretariat.WorldPopulationProspects:The2010Revi-sion,http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm

Thenumberoflabourmigrants,includingstudentsandscholarsfromEasternEuropean countries (withboth regulatedandun-regulated status), staying in EUmember states is considerableandreachesseveralmillion.However,itisverydifficulttoassesstheirnumberwithevenroughprecision,becauseEasternEuro-pean countries –usually forfinancial reasons – donot conductcomprehensiveresearchon labourmigration,andoftenusethesimple formula of theborder crossingbalance.Themostmeth-odologically reliable research concerning Ukrainian migrants,whichwasconductedby theStateStatisticsCommittee in2008withsupportfromtheinternationalcommunity,revealedthat1.5millionofUkraine’sresidents,whichaccountedfor5.1%ofitspop-ulationatproductiveage,wereworkingabroadbetween2005andmid-2008.At thesametime, thesurveyprovedthatemigration

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dynamicswasfalling:in2007–2008itwas15%lowerthanintheprecedingtwoyears10.

Well-developedmigrationpracticemayattractnewmigrantsorfacilitatecirculatorymigration.However,incontrasttotheWest-ernBalkans,forwhichtheEUisthemainregiontomigrateto,inthecaseofEasternEurope,Russiaisanequallyimportantdesti-nation.Accordingtoestimates,aroundhalfofalllabourmigrantsfromUkraine andMoldova leave forRussia. This share is evenhigherinthecaseofBelarusianmigrants11.

The EU member states which are the most popular among la-bourmigrants (predominantly Ukrainians andMoldovans, butalsomoreandmoreoftenRussiansandBelarusians,whoprevi-ouslyrarelyparticipatedinlabourmigrationtotheEU)are:Italy,Spain,theUnitedKingdom,GermanyandFrance.Anewcountrywhich isgainingpopularitywithmigrants fromUkraine is theCzechRepublic12.ThenumberofmigrantswhomovefromEast-ernEurope to Polandhas also been increasing recently. This iscertainlyaneffectoftheliberalisationofregulationsconcerningtheemploymentofforeigners.

ThelabouremigrationofBelarusiansisanewphenomenon.Dueto theunprecedentedeconomic crisis this country sustained in2011, Belarusians’ real wages have halved from around US$500toUS$250.Thisisanewtrend,andthusitisdifficulttoconfirmbystatisticaldata.However,bothindependenttradeunionsandtheBelarusianauthoritiesconfirmtheoutflowofhighlyqualified

10 ThissurveywasconductedbytheUkrainianCentreforSocialReformsandtheStateStatisticsCommittee,withsupportfromtheOpenUkrainefoun-dation,theIOMandtheEBRD;formoresee:InstytutDemografiitaSotsy-alnykhDoslizhenNANUkrainy,TrudovaemigratsyavUkraine,Kyiv2010;pp.109–112.

11 See:S.Zivert,S.Zakharov,R.Klinkholts, ‘MigratsionnyerezervyRossii’,Demoscope Weekly,29 August–11 September2011.

12 InstytutDemografiitaSotsyalnykhDoslizhenNANUkrainy,op.cit;Build-ingMigrationPartnership,Ukraine: Extended Migration Profile 2011.

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labour,includingspecialistsintheareasofconstructionandma-chine-building,aswellasother industryworkers.Thedestina-tionforthiswaveofBelarusianemigrantsisRussia,wheresuchspecialists are in demand. What is also important, Belarusianemployeesarenotrequiredtoholdanyworkpermits inRussia.RussiansociologycentresarealsoreportingonanewemigrationwaveofyoungeducatedRussians–predominantlystudentsandyoungbusinessmen–wholeavefortheUSAandWesternEurope-ancountries.AccordingtoestimatesbySergeiStepashin,chair-man of the Russian Accounts Chamber, 1.25 million Russians,mainlyyoungpeople,emigratedfromtheRussianFederationbe-tween2008and201013.Thisisnotstrictlylabourmigration.Themainreasonthesepeopleareleavingisnottofindjobsbutratherbecause theyaredissatisfiedwith theprospectsof thedevelop-mentoftheircountry,thepoliticalsituation,corruption,etc.TheoutflowofthiscategoryofpeopleismoreofaproblemforRussiathanforthecountriestheyemigrateto,sinceRussiaisthuslosingyoungandeducatedhumancapital.

13 http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=111681

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iii. the state of play. the visa liberalisation process

Asattheendof2007theSchengenareawasenlargedtoincludethenewEUmemberstates,Europeancountriesandinstitutionsdecided to launch mechanisms to compensate for the negativeconsequencesoftheintroductionofthenew,morerestrictivevisaregime.Thesemechanismshavebeendevelopingandevolving.Itcanbestatednow,afterseveralyearsoftheirfunctioning,thattheEasternEuropeanareahasbeencoveredwithatightnetworkofliberalisationagreementsand technical assistanceprogrammeson visas and migration (visa facilitation agreements, readmis-sionagreements,localbordertrafficagreements,assistancepro-grammes covering mobility or integrated border management,visadialogue,etc.).However,ithastobeadmittedthattheirrealimpactontheliberalisationofthemovementofpeoplebetweenEastern European countries and the EU is rather insignificant.The security logic and the fear of the influxofundesirablemi-grantsisstillprevalentintheEUpolicyoverthedesiretoopenuptothepeoplefromthesecountries,tofilltheEaPwithcontent,andtobuildmorefriendlyrelationswiththeEasternPartners.Inotherwords,theparadigmofsecuritypolicyisstrongerthantheparadigmofforeignpolicyintheEU’sapproachtovisaissuesintheEast.

1. Ukraine and Moldova: the action plans

Ukraine and Moldova have to be singled out as the most ad-vancedcountriesinthevisaliberalisationprocess.Thesecoun-trieswish for concluding association agreementswith the EU(UkraineofficiallyclosedthenegotiationsinDecember2011)andare at thefirst stageof implementationof theActionPlansonVisaLiberalisation(VLAP),theultimategoalofwhichistoliftthevisarequirementcompletely.TheActionPlanonVisaLiber-alisationgrantedtoUkraineinNovember2010andtoMoldovainJanuary2011isstronglyreminiscentoftheRoadMapswhich

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allowedtheWesternBalkancountriestogainvisa-freeentrytotheEUseveralyearsago.Itincludesconditionsconcerningdoc-umentsecurity(includingbiometrics), illegal immigration(in-cludingreadmission),publicorderandsecurity,externalrela-tionsandfundamentalrights.However,unlikewiththeBalkanstates,theplansforUkraineandMoldovadivideveryambitiousrequirementsnecessarytobemet intotwophases.Theymakeadistinctionbetweentherequirementslinkedtotheintroduc-tionofnecessarylegalchangesandthepreparationofreformsand the requirements related to the direct implementation ofsuchreforms.TheactionplansforUkraineandMoldovacontainanothernewelement,namely theprovision that inparallel totheevaluationofthereformprocess,theliberalisation’spoten-tialimpactonthesituationintheareaofillegalmigrationintheEUwill also be evaluated.Naturally, such construction of thedocumentprovesthattheassessmentoftheeventualprogresstobemadebyKyivandChisinaupredominatinginBrusselsislessoptimistic. This also hints that the visa lifting process in thiscasecouldbeslower14.

Thestaunchest supportersof the introductionofavisa-free re-gimewithUkraineandMoldovaintheEUarePolandandothernewEUmember states (includingRomania in the case ofMol-dova).These countriesbelieve that lifting thevisa requirementforthecitizensofEasternEuropeancountriesisthebestwaytopromotecontactsbetweenpeopleandthedevelopmentofdemo-cratic societies.A similar, albeit slightly toned down, approachhasbeentakenbytheforeignministriesofSwedenandGermany,andbusinesscirclesinnumerousEUmemberstates.TheSouth-ernEuropeancountriesarerelativelyindifferent,althoughtheyemphasise that the southerndirection should be givenpriorityinthedevelopmentoftheneighbourhoodpolicy.However,mostinteriorministries of the ‘old’ EUmember states (especially of

14 InthecaseoftheWesternBalkancountries,ittookbetweentwoandthreeyearsonaverage.

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Germany,Austria andHolland)oppose lifting thevisa require-mentforEasternEuropeancountriesintheshortterm,andtheirargumentsincludethecrisisintheEU’smigrationpolicyandthethreatsposedbyEasternEurope.

InFebruary 2012, theEuropeanCommissionpresented the sec-ondconsecutivereports15whichevaluateUkraine’sandMoldova’sadvancementintheimplementationoftheActionPlansonVisaLiberalisation.Although someprogress in the fulfilment of theplan’sprovisions(especiallyinthecaseofMoldova)wasnotedinthereports,theEuropeanCommissiondidnotinvitethepartnerstates toenter the second (implementation)phaseof theActionPlans.ThismeansthatUkraineandMoldovawillstillremaininthephaseofpreparations forVLAP implementation.Moving tothe second,more difficult, phase of Action Plan fulfilmentwillthusnotberuledoutinthesecondhalfof2012,providedthatbothcountrieshaveadoptedall the required legislationchanges.Al-thoughthesetwocountrieshavebeentreatedasa‘tandem’sofar,itispossiblethatonlyMoldovawillbeinvitedtothesecondphaseifUkrainestillhassuchseriousdelaysinintroducingbiometrics.On theotherhand,Moldovaposesahighermigration risk, oneproof ofwhich is the relativelyhigh rate of visa refusals at theconsulatesofSchengenstates.

Whilethevisaactionplanscanberecognisedasthemainelementof thevisa liberalisationdialoguewiththeEU,thevisafacilita-tionagreementsinforcesince2008arethebasicrealinstrumentforactioninthisarea.Theirmainconsequencewasthereductioninthepriceoftheshort-termuniform(‘Schengen’)visafrom60to35euros,offeringfacilitationsinobtainingmultiple-entryvi-saswithlongtermofvaliditytoselectedcategoriesoftravellersandextendingtherangeofsituationswhennochargesforvisasaremade.Sincetheagreementscameintoforce,theyhavebeenmonitoredbynon-governmentalorganisations.Intheiropinion,

15 ThefirstevaluationwasmadeinSeptember2011.

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the consuls of theSchengen countrieshaveoffered the facilita-tions available too rarely, have issued too few long-term visasandhaverequiredtheapplicantstoattachanexcessivenumberofdocuments to eachvisaapplication, seeingevery travellerasapotentialillegalmigrant16.Thelatestreportsstillnoteacertainimprovementinthesituation,includinganincreaseinthenum-berofmultiple-entryvisaswithlongtermofvalidityandfree-of-chargevisas issued17.Furthermore, theEUVisaCodecame intoforceinApril2010,oneoftheresultsofwhichisthattheholdersofnationalvisasofSchengenstateshavebeenallowedto travelwithout restrictions across the whole area, and new solutions,morefriendlyfortravellers,havebeenintroducedtothevisapro-cedure.

Ukraine is negotiating a second-generation visa facilitationagreement. At the EU-Ukraine summit in December 2011, thetwosidesclosedthetalksontheenvisagedamendmentstotheliberalisationagreement.Theywillincludeanextensionofthecategoriesofindividualsauthorisedtoreceivefree-of-chargevi-saswith long termofvalidity (to include forexampleworkersofnon-governmental organisations) and the liquidation of thespecialcharge(70euros)forissuingavisawithanexpresspro-cedure applied. However, the greatest liberalisation impact islikelytobemadebythenewprovision,accordingtowhichmul-tiple-entryvisasaretobeissuedforaperiodofbetweenoneandfiveyearsandnotofuptooneoruptofiveyearsashasbeenthe

16 See for example: Europe without Barriers, Public Monitoring of the EUMemberStates’Visa IssuanceandPoliciesandPractices inUkraine,Kyiv2009; Stefan Batory Foundation, Zmianywpolitycewizowej państwUE.Raportzmonitoringu,Warsaw2009;StefanBatoryFoundation,“GatewaystoEurope”–aFriendlyBorder,Warsaw2009.

17 EuropewithoutBarriers,SchengenConsulatesinAssessmentsandRatings.VisaPracticesoftheEUMemberStatesinUkraine,Kyiv2010;A.Stiglmay-er, Liberalizacja reżimuwizowegowobec Państw BałkanówZachodnich.Doświadczeniaiwnioski,Warsaw2011.

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caseso far. It isexpected that thenewregulationscouldcomeintoforceinthesecondhalfof201218.

Ukraineistheonlyneighbouringstatetohavelocalbordertraf-fic (LBT)agreements ineffecton its almostallwesternborderswith the EU (with the exception of the border with Romania).These agreementshave turned out to be themost efficient visaliberalisationinstrumentsofar.Theyhaveconsiderablyactivat-edthemovementofpeoplebetweenthenewSchengenstatesandUkraine, andhave brought insignificant negative consequences(amarginalnumberofregimeviolationcases)19.Althoughalevelequaltothatin2007,whenPolandwasnotamemberstateoftheSchengenarea,hasnotbeenachieved in themovementofpeo-plebetweenPolandandUkraine,localbordertraffichashadthegreatestimpactonimprovingitsdynamics.Over7.5millionbor-dercrossingswereregisteredaspartoflocalbordertrafficonthePolish-UkrainianborderbetweenJuly2009(whentheagreementcameintoforce)andtheendofSeptember2011(forcomparison:thetotalannualnumberofcrossingsonthisborderis lessthan15million).

MoldovaneighboursonlyoneEUmember state,Romania,withwhichithassignedalocalbordertrafficagreement.However,Mol-dovansenjoyquiteabroadaccesstothiscountry.Firstly,RomaniastilldoesnotbelongtotheSchengenarea,soitsvisarequirementscan bemore liberal. Secondly, it is conducting an active policyaimedatgrantingcitizenshiptoindividualsofRomanianorigin,who–accordingtoitsdefinitions–aredescendantsofcitizensofRomaniaeveninthesecondandthirdgenerations.

18 See: European Union Factsheet, EU-Ukraine Summit (Kiev, 19 December2011);Uhodaprosproshcheniyaoformleniyaviz:shonovogo[not‘shchono-voho’?,Yevropabezbarieriv,26December2011.

19 See:CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliamentandtheCouncil,Secondreportontheimplementationandfunctioningofthelo-calbordertrafficregimesetupbyRegulationNo.1931/2006,Brussels9Feb-ruary2011,COM(2011)41final.

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Table 3.LocalBorderTraffic(LBT)agreements

lbt in force lbt under negotiation

ukraine WithPoland(sinceJuly2009)

WithHungary(sinceJanuary2008)

WithSlovakia(sinceSeptember2008)

WithRomania(atanearlynegoti-atingstage)

belarusWithLithuania(signedinOcto-ber2010;ratificationhasbeendelayed)

WithLatvia(signedinAugust2010;cameintoforceinFebru-ary2012)

WithPoland(signedinFebru-ary2010;ratificationhasbeendelayed)

moldova WithRomania(sinceSeptember2010)

russiaWithNorway(signedinAugust2010;willcomeintoforcemostlikelyinmid-2012)

WithPoland(theentireKalinin-gradOblast;signedon14Decem-ber2011;plannedtocomeintoforceinmid-2012)

WithLatvia(attheleveloftheexchangeofworkingdocuments)

WithLithuania(attheleveloftheexchangeofworkingdocuments)

source:Developedbytheauthorofthispaper

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Moldovahasthebest-developedco-operationwiththeEUintheareaofmigrationwhencomparedtoothercountriescoveredbytheEasternPartnership.ItalsobenefitsfromnumerousassistancemechanismsofferedaspartoftheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPol-icy(ENP).Additionally,itparticipatesinthePartnershipforMo-bility,whichisaimedatsupportingthelegalandstructuredmi-grationofMoldovanstoEUmemberstates20.TheEuropeanUnionisalsohelpingMoldovatoprepareits‘migrationprofile’,areformofmigration statistics in linewithEU standards. Furthermore,aspartoftheEaP,bothUkraineandMoldovaareparticipatinginaprojectaimedatimprovingtheirmigrationmanagementcapac-itywithintheframeworkof‘ComprehensiveInstitutionBuilding’(CIB).Thesetwocountriesarealsoactiveparticipantsoftheflag-shipinitiativeforintegratedbordermanagement,andtheyhaveconcluded (or are negotiating) co-operation agreements withFrontex,EuropolandEurojust.TheEUBorderAssistanceMissiontoMoldovaandUkraine(EUBAM)offershelpinthemanagementoftheUkrainian-Moldovanborder(attheTransnistriansectionwhichisbeyondChisinau’scontrol)21.

2. Russia: a separate ‘path’

CitizensofRussiahavebeengivensimilarvisafacilitationsintheEU to Ukrainians andMoldovans. A visa facilitation agreementhasbeenapplicableinEU-Russiarelationssince2007,asaconse-quenceofwhichthepriceoftheshort-stayvisahasbeenreducedto35eurosandnumerousprivilegesinaccesstovisaswithlongtermof validity have been granted to certain categories of travellers.LikeUkraine,RussiaisnegotiatingwiththeEuropeanCommissionamendments to this agreement to broaden the group of persons

20 ThetwootherEasternPartnerswhicharealsobenefitingfromthismecha-nismareGeorgiaandArmenia.

21 Formoresee:CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliament,the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Commit-teeoftheRegions,OnCooperationintheAreaofJusticeandHomeAffairswiththeEasternPartnership,Brussels,26September2011,COM(2011)564Final.

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encompassedbythevisafacilitation.However,inpracticalterms,RussiansseemtobeinabettersituationbecausetheSchengencon-sulatesseethemasattractivetourists.Thusthenumberofvisare-fusalsinRussiaislowerthanintheotherEasternEuropeancoun-tries.Ontheotherhand,theRussianFederationisperceivedintheEUthroughtheprismofthelargewaveofrefugeesandirregularmigrantsfromtheNorthernCaucasus,whichsweptacrossEuropeintheaftermathoftheChechenconflict(Russiaisthesecondcoun-try,afterAfghanistan,intermsofthenumberofasylumseekersintheEU).Attentionisalsopaidtothethreatsofreligiousextremismandterrorism.Ofequalimportanceisthefactthatthenumberofvisas issuedinRussiabytheconsulatesofSchengenstates isthelargestintheworld,whichyieldsconsiderableincomesandisnotmakingEUcountriesinclinedtoabolishthevisaregime.

Table 4.VisastatisticsoftheSchengenmemberstatesinEasternEuropeancountriesin2010

State

Numberofallvisasissued(A,B,C,LTV,Dand‘D+C’)

NumberofSchengenvisasissued(A,BandC)

Numberofnega-tivevisadecisions(uniformvisas)

Visare-fusalrate(uniformvisas)

russia 4,525,985 4,479,220 56,868 1.41%

ukraine 1,227,001 1,061,311 37,916 3.69%

belarus 595,630 471,876 4,580 1.35%

moldova 198,704 179,605 13,345 10.82%

source:DevelopedbytheauthoronthebasisofinformationfromtheEC.Source:http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/borders/borders_visa_en.htm

explanations:Visas:‘A’–airporttransitvisa;‘B’–transitvisa(liquidated);‘C’–uniformshort-stayvisa;‘D’–nationallong-stayvisa;‘D+C’–nationallong-stayvisavalidconcurrentlyasashort-stayvisa(liquidated);‘LTV’–spe-ciallimitedterritorialvalidityvisa.

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Table 5.MajorcountriesoforiginofasylumseekersintheEU27in2009–2010

2010 2009 change 2010 to 2009ranking

2010 to 2009 change

total num-ber of ap-plications

258,945 263,990 -5,045 -1.9% - - -

afghani-stan 20,590 20,455 135 0.7% 1 1 0

russia 18,590 20,110 -1,520 -7.6% 2 2 0

serbia 17,745 5,460 12,285 225% 3 16 +13

iraq 15,800 18,845 -3,045 -16.2% 4 4 0

somalia 14,355 19,000 –4,645 -24.4% 5 3 -2

Kosovo 14,310 14,275 35 0.2% 6 5 -1

iran 10,315 8,565 1,750 20.4% 7 9 +1

pakistan 9,180 9,925 -745 -7.5% 8 8 0

… … … … … … … …

belarus 910 945 -35 -3.8%

ukraine 825 935 -110 -13.3%

moldova 735 1110 -375 -49.7%

source:Eurostat

EU-Russiarelationsintheareaofvisaliberalisationhaveaspe-ciallogic.Forprestigereasons,itwasunacceptableforRussiatobe subject to the conditionality principle, which other EasternEuropeancountriesagreedto.ThismeansthatMoscowwillnot

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implementanythoroughreformprogrammeintheareaofjusticeandhomeaffairsinexchangeforapromisefromtheEUtoabolishthevisaregime.TheattitudeRussiaisclingingtoisthatmutualvisarelationsshouldberegulatedby theprincipleofmutualityandtherefore,unlikeUkraineandMoldova,ithasnotliftedthevisarequirementforcitizensofEUmemberstates.Furthermore,theymustundergomanyadditionalprocedures inRussia, suchasfillingina‘migrationcard’ontheborderandregisteringtheirresidenceintheplaceofstay(iftheirstayexceeds7days).

Formally,theintroductionofavisa-freeregimebetweentheEUandRussiahasbeenstatedasanobjectivetobeachievedinalmosteverydocumentsignedbythetwopartiessince2003.However,morepracticalaspectsstartedtoberaisedintalksonlyin2010.InDecember2011,thetwopartiesmanagedtoagreeonthecontentoftheircommonroadmapentitled‘CommonStepstowardsvisa-freeshort-termtravelforRussianandEuropeancitizens’22.Thisdocument,whichhasbeenmodelledonthevisaactionplansfortheBalkanstatesandUkraine,liststheobligationsofthetwopar-ties.ItmustbeacceptedbothbyEUmemberstatesandbyRussiaandthisfactismakingitsimplementationmoredifficult.

Itisworthkeepinginmindthatthestancesadoptedbyindivid-ualEUmemberstatesandalsoindividualministries(foreignvs.interior) or groups of interest (business circles aremore open)in a givenEUmember stateon lifting thevisa requirement forRussiansarestronglypolarised.ThepredominantopinionintheScandinavianandtheBalticstatesisthatvisa-freeentrytotheEUshouldnotbeofferedtoofficialsofacountrywhichviolateshu-manrights.TheinteriorministriesofsuchcountriesasGermany,BelgiumorHollandfearaninfluxofmigrantsfromtheNorthernCaucasus.TheSouthEuropeanstates, includingSpainandPor-tugal, and the Central Europeanmember states generally takeamore liberalapproachtovisa issues(althoughtheywouldnot

22 EuropeanUnionbackground,EU-RussiaSummit,Brussels,15December2011.

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likeRussiatooutpaceUkraineorMoldovainthisfield).Inturn,theforeignministriesofGermanyandFranceseevisa-freemove-ment as a priceworth paying for closer political and economicrelations with Russia. In November 2011, France and Germanymade an announcement stating that the EU should embark onnegotiationsonavisa-freeregimewithRussiaregardlessofthefactthatthismightsendnegativesignalstoEasternPartnershipcountries23.

Specialrulesappliedtothenegotiationsonlocalbordertraffictobe introduced in theKaliningrad enclave. Pursuant to thepro-posal stated in the regulation of the European Parliament andtheCouncilofJuly2011,theLBTagreementbetweenRussiaandPoland–ashasnotbeenthecasewiththeotherfrontierareas–willnotberestrictedtoa30to50kilometreswideborderzone.Instead,itwillcovertheentireKaliningradOblastandsignificantpartsof thePolishPomeranianandWarmia-Mazuryprovinces,includingGdańsk,Gdynia,ElblągandOlsztyn24.TheagreementwasconcludedbytheforeignministersofPolandandRussia inDecember201125. It stillneeds tobe ratified,andmaycome intoforce in summer 2012 at the earliest. This special agreement,whichgoesbeyondSchengen legislation, isgenerally supportedbytheRussiangovernmentandatthesametimeisgivingrisetofears that decentralist tendencies could emerge in the enclave.MoscowemphasisesthatRussia’spriorityisnotaspecialregimeforKaliningradofferingprivilegestoitsresidents,butavisa-free

23 See:‘EUpreparingtolaunchvisa-freetalkswithRussia’,EU Observer,15No-vember2011.

24 Proposal for aRegulation of theEuropeanParliament andof theCouncilamendingRegulation(EC)No1931/2006asregardstheinclusionoftheKa-liningrad area and certain Polish administrative districts in the eligibleborderarea,Brussels27.07.2011,COM(2011)461final.

25 AgreementonthePrinciplesofLocalBorderTrafficbetweentheGovern-mentoftheRepublicofPolandandtheGovernmentoftheRussianFedera-tion,signedon14December2011.

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movement for all Russian citizens26. Furthermore, the Lithu-aniangovernmentisatthemomentnotreadytosignanequallyambitiouslocalbordertrafficagreement,arguingthatthiswouldsignificantlyraisetheriskofsmuggling.Besidesthis,theLithu-anian government is feeling disaffectedwith negotiationswithRussiaafterMoscowbrokeoff thealmostfinalised talkson theLBTin2009.

3. Belarus: at the very end

Belaruscomeslastofallinlegalandformalterms.NotonlyhasitnotsignedavisafacilitationagreementbutithasnotevenadoptedthebasicdocumentstoregulateitsrelationswiththeEU,includ-ingthePartnershipandCo-operationAgreement(PCA).Therati-ficationofthisdocumentwaswithheldin1997bytheBelarusianside.ThewarmingofBelarus-EUrelationsinlate2007/early2008didhoweverallowMinsktojointheEasternPartnershipandtoparticipate in theflagship initiative for integratedborderman-agementandcross-borderco-operationprogrammes.

The Belarusian regime quashing the demonstration after thepresidential election on 19December 2010 resulted in a coolingofrelationsbetweenBrusselsandMinskandsawtheEUimposevisasanctionsonalmost250individualsaccusedofhumanrightviolations27.NeverthelesstheEUCouncilinearly2011authorisedtheEuropeanCommissiontostartnegotiationsonavisafacilita-tionagreement.However,nowthat the levelofmutualpoliticalrelations is reduced, talks are only possible at the expert level.Furthermore, the EUwould like to target its offer primarily attheBelarusianpublicandnotatofficialsorpoliticians,inwhichtheBelarusianregimeisnotinterested.Therefore,itseemsquite

26 ‘VladimirPutinopposesvisa facilitationfor theKaliningradoblast’,East-Week,8June2011.

27 Thislisthasbeenextended;initiallyitincluded150officials,journalistsandbusinessmen.

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unlikelythatavisafacilitationagreementwiththiscountrywillbesigned in the immediate future (especiallysince it shouldbeaccompaniedbyareadmissionagreement,whichrequirescloseco-operationwiththeinstitutionsinchargeofstatesecurity).

Asaconsequenceofthelackofavisafacilitationagreement,Bela-rusiansstillhavetopay60eurosforthe‘Schengen’visa.Moreo-ver,despite the fact thatbothPolandandLithuaniaratifiedthelocalbordertrafficagreementswithBelarus,Minskhasbeende-layingbringing them into force.Meanwhile, anLBTagreementwithLatviawasputintoeffectinFebruary2012,which–accord-ing to theBelarusian government – is to serve as a test for thepossiblefurtherimplementationofagreementsofthiskind28.Itisworthnotingthat,giventhegeographiclayout,BelarusianscouldbenefitmorethanUkrainiansfromsuchagreements.SomeofBe-larus’slargeurbancentres,suchasGrodnoandBrest,arelocatedintheborderzoneandtheirresidentswouldenjoytheprivilegesofferedbytheLBT.Nevertheless,therealvisasituationofBelaru-sianshasimprovedoverthepastyear.Firstly,thisisaneffectofthegeneralchangesintheEU’svisapolicy.Secondly,inresponsetotherepressionsafterthepresidentialelection,someEUmem-berstates,includingPolandandLatvia,liftedthechargesforna-tionalvisasforBelarusians,whichde factohasmadeitpossibleforthemtotravelwithoutpayingforvisasacrosstheentireSchen-genzone.ThisindicatesthattheEUmemberstates’governmentsarethustryingtoputintoeffecttheirpolicyofsupportingcivilsocietyinBelarus.

However, it seemsunlikely that EU countrieswould be consid-ering lifting thevisa regime forBelarusat themoment.This ispreventedprimarilybythefreezingofmutualrelations,thelowfrequencyofcontactsbetweenthelawenforcementinstitutionsofthetwosides,andthelackofmutualtrust.

28 Belarus-Latvia small-scale border traffic to open 1 February 2012, Belta,31January2012.

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Table 6.Existingmechanismsfordialogueandco-operationintheareaofvisaliberalisation

stat

e

poli

tica

l dia

logu

e

vis

a fa

cili

tati

ons

vis

a a

ctio

n pl

ans

lbt

oth

er m

echa

-ni

sms

ukraine Ad-vanced Yes Yes Yes

AssociationAgenda,VisaActionPlan,CIB,theflagshipIBMiniti-ative,cross-borderco-operation,EUBAM,advancedtechnicalassistanceprogrammes(migra-tion,readmission,borderman-agement,refugeeprotection,humantrafficking),readmissionco-operationandoperationalco-operationwithFrontexandEuropol

moldova Ad-vanced Yes Yes Yes

AssociationAgenda,VisaActionPlan,CIB,PartnershipforMobil-ity,theflagshipIBMinitiative,EUBAM,advancedtechnicalassistanceprogrammes(migra-tion,readmission,borderman-agement,refugeeprotection,combatinghumantrafficking),readmissionco-operationandoperationalco-operationwithFrontexandEuropol

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stat

e

poli

tica

l dia

logu

e

vis

a fa

cili

tati

ons

vis

a a

ctio

n pl

ans

lbt

oth

er m

echa

-ni

sms

russia Ad-vanced Yes No No

Commonstepstowardslift-ingthevisaregime,migrationdialogue,negotiationsonspecialstatusforKaliningrad,limitedreadmissionandcross-borderco-operation,limitedtechnicalassistanceprogrammes(com-batingirregularmigrationandhumantrafficking,andrefugeeprotection)andco-operationwithFrontex

belarus Frozen No No Yes

Expertconsultationsonthevisafacilitationagreement,theflagshipIBMinitiative,limitedtechnicalassistanceandcross-borderprojects(developingITinfrastructureontheborder,improvementoftheborderpro-tectionsystemattheBelaru-sian-Ukrainiansection,refugeeprotection,combatinghumantrafficking)andco-operationwithFrontex

source:Developedbytheauthor

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iv. the strengths and the weaKnesses of the neighbouring countries

OnecannotassessthereadinessofUkraine,Moldova,RussiaandBelarus for the introduction of a visa-free regimewith the EUonlyfromatechnicalperspective,whichtoagreatextentwasthecasewith theWesternBalkans. It is increasingly clear that thedecisiontoliftthevisarequirementwillbeinfluencedbyboththelevel of technical preparation and thepolitical evaluation. Fur-thermore,incontrasttothepreviousvisaliberalisationprocessesin the EU’s neighbourhood, this process is not linked to acces-sionpolicy,anditsoutcomeisuncertain.Thisstilldoesnotmeanthattheneighbouringcountriesshouldbedoingnothing,believ-ingthatnotmuchreallydependsonthem.Onthecontrary,theyshouldnotonlyprovetheyhavemadetechnicalprogress–follow-ingthe‘moreformore’principlewhichisincreasinglypopularintheEuropeanUnion–theyshouldalsotakeactivepoliticalstepstoconvinceEUmemberstatesthatliftingthevisaregimeisintheinterestofbothparties.

1. Political will and activity

Allthecountriesdiscussed(includingBelarus)aredeclaringthattheliftingofthevisaregimeinrelationswiththeEUisanissueofhighpriorityforthem.ThemostconvincingseemtobeUkraineandMoldova,whichhaveunilaterallyliftedthevisarequirementforEUcitizens(Ukrainein2005andMoldovain2007)andwhicharedisplayingpro-Europeanaspirationsbymakingeffortstocon-cludeAssociationAgreementswiththeEU.Thedesiretoachievea visa-free regime is shared by all themajor political forces inthesetwocountries.Inturn,theRussiangovernment,althoughunwilling tomakeunilateral visa concessions, has consistentlysoughttheabolitionofthevisaregimeinmajorEuropeancapitals.

Lifting the visa requirement for travellers to the EU is veryclearlysupportedbythepublicinMoldovaandUkraine.Thisis

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particularly important for Moldovan society, almost one thirdofwhomworkinEUmemberstates.Ukrainians,especiallyresi-dentsofwesternUkraine,havealsobeenparticipatinginlabourmigration schemeswith EU states or earning their living fromcross-bordertradeforyears.ThelatterisalsotypicalofresidentsofwesternBelarus,whoearnonthedifferencesinpetrolandcig-aretteprices in theneighbouringEUcountries.Asimilar trendcanalsobeobservedinKaliningradOblast.,ForresidentsofRus-siaproper,whotraveltotheEUmainlyastouristsinorganisedgroups,theexistenceofavisa-freeregimeisnotsovital.Shop-pingintheneighbouringEUmemberstatesisalsoverypopularamongcitizensofRussia,UkraineandBelarus.Tourism is alsogaininginsignificance.However,duetothecomplicatedvisapro-cedureintheSchengenarea,thepreferreddestinationsareusu-allyTurkeyandNorthAfricancountries.

EachofthecountriesdiscussedhasadoptedadifferenttacticindealingwiththeEU.Ukrainehasgenerallybeenundergoingre-formsinlinewiththeEU’srecommendations,butisalsoemphasis-ingitsgreatgeopoliticalsignificanceanditsroleasabufferwhichprotectstheEUfromundesirableimmigrantsfromtheEast.Ithasbeendelayingtheimplementationofthosereformswhichwouldupset its institutional and bureaucratic status quo orwhich re-quiretooradicalchangesofthesystem.However,itco-operatescloselyincombatingillegalmigration,understandingthatthisisthemostimportantpractical issuefortheEU.Moldovaistopoftheclassasregardsthescopeofthereformsimplementedandthedegreeofacceptanceof thesolutionsproposedby theEU.How-ever,ithasproblemswithfinancingandpersonnel,anditsrateoftransformationhasbeensloweddownbythecontinuingpoliticalcrisis.Furthermore,thelevelofvisarefusalsattheEUconsulatesinMoldovaisalsoveryhigh.Chisinau’smainproblemistheun-resolvedTransnistrianconflict,whichgivesrisetoadilemmaastohowinternalsecuritycanbeguaranteedinthecountryinlinewithEUstandardswhileagreateropennessismaintainedwithregardtothepeopleandbusinesscirclesofTransnistria.

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Sofar,Russiahasnotappearedtobereadytomakeseriouscon-cessionstotheEUinexchangefortheabolitionofthevisaregimeortheintroductionofarealprincipleofmutuality29.Itsoperationmethods includemainly appeals and diplomatic talks, and alsoinfluencing interest groups inside theEUwhichare favourablydisposed to it (business circles, the tourism industry and somepolitically friendlygovernments).However, the lengthystagna-tioninrelationswiththeEUandtheincreasinglyevidentsystemcrisismaypersuadetheRussiangovernmenttoadoptadifferenttactic.Belarus,dependingonthepoliticalphaseitisinatagivenmoment,iseitherthreateningtheEUwiththepossibilityofopen-ingitsbordersandthuslettinginahugewaveorillegalmigrants,or is emphasising thehigh levelofprotectionof theBelarusianborderanditsstablemigrationsituation.

UkrainianandMoldovannon-governmentalorganisationsinco-operationwiththeirEUcounterpartsmonitortheEU’svisapolicyandattract thepublic opinion’s attention to the socio-economicproblemsthisentails inEasternEuropeancountries.Theyana-lysethetempoandthecharacterofthereformsconductedbytheirgovernments.Theseorganisationsarebecomingmoreandmoreprofessionalandaregainingsignificanceasapressuregroup.ThesameappliestocivilsocietyorganisationsinBelarus,whichareforexampleinvolvedinthelobbyingaimedatreducingthevisapriceforBelarusiansfrom60to35euros.AsregardsRussia,ap-pealsforvisaliberalisationareheardratherfromwithintheEU.OneproofofthisisthelatestreportfromtheCommitteeonEast-ernEuropeanEconomicRelations(Ost-Ausschuss),aninfluentialGerman business organisation which emphasises the benefits

29 For example, at the end of 2010, Russia introduced stricter visa require-mentsforcitizensofGermanyinresponsetowhatitbelievedwasunfavour-ablevisapracticeattheGermanconsulatesinRussia,asaconsequenceofwhich thenumberofGermansvisitingRussiahas fallenby considerablymorethantenpercent.

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businessworldwouldderivefromliftingthevisarequirementforRussians30.

2. The rule of law and corruption

Difficultieswith introducingtheruleof laware themainprob-lemallthecountriesinthisregionmustdealwith.Onesymptomofthisisajudiciarywhichisineffectiveandalsofarfrombeingindependent. The lack of respect for legal regulations and theprinciplesoftheruleoflawmakesthecourtseithersusceptibletopoliticalinfluencesorpronetocorruptionbybusinesscircles.Thelawenforcementauthoritiesandthejudiciaryareoftenusedinpoliticalclashes.Althoughthecriterialinkedtotheruleoflawandanindependentjudiciaryhavenotbeenstatedexpressis verbisintheVisaActionPlans,stableandeffectivejudiciaryco-opera-tionincriminalmattersbetweenEUmemberstatesandEasternEuropeancountriesobviouslyrequiresamajorreconstructionofthecourtsystemsinthesecountries.However,suchareconstruc-tiondoesnotseemtobeplacedamongtheconditionsnecessarytobemetforavisa-freeregimetobeintroduced.Thischallengeistoocomplexandpertainstoallaspectsofstatelife,soitshouldratherbeseenasakeygoaloftheassociationagreements.

Allthecountriesdiscussedalsohaveproblemswithcorruption.It is themainbarrier in thedevelopmentandmodernisationofUkraineandRussia.Corruptioniswidespreadbothamongcivilservantsandstateadministrationworkers–whomcitizensmeetineverydaylife–andin‘bigcorruption’wherepoliticsandbusi-ness intermingle. As regards legislation,Moldova and Ukrainearetheleadersintermsofcomplianceoftheanti-corruptionlawswithEUstandardsandparticipationintherelevantinternationalinstruments.Whatdoesraisesomedoubts, though, is theprac-tical aspect: the operation of anti-corruption institutions and

30 RoadstoVisa-freeTravel,PositionPaper,CommitteeonEasternEuropeanEconomicRelations,July2011.

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the fulfilmentof thesecountries’practicalobligations resultingfromtheirmembershipintheGroupofStatesagainstCorruption(GRECO).Belarus started to co-operatewithGRECOonlyat thebeginningof2010,soitisdifficulttoevaluatetheconditionofitslegislationandanti-corruptionpractice.AccordingtotheGRECOreporton combating corruption in theRussianFederationpub-lishedinlate2010,Russiabythenimplemented9ofthe26recom-mendationsfromthisorganisation.Russia’smainproblemswereidentifiedas: thenon-transparentfinancingofpoliticalparties,andbriberyinthejudiciaryandpublicadministrationsystem.

Anotherkeyprobleminthisregionisposedbytheunreformedandnon-transparentlymanagedinteriorministries,whichafterallshouldbeperformingacoordinatingfunctionintheprocessofvisaliberalisationandcarryingoutthenecessaryreforms.EveninUkraineandMoldova, theministriesof internalaffairshavenot undergone anymajor changes and in fact are rather policeministriesthancivilinstitutionsinchargeofthesupervisionofthelawenforcementagencies.

3. Biometric documents

The second progress report onMoldova in the part evaluatingthe implementationof legislativechanges intheareaofbiomet-ricsstatedthatthiscountryhadinprinciplemettheconditionsset in thefirstphaseof theActionPlanonVisaLiberalisation31.TheMoldovanMinistryforInformationTechnologyandCommu-nicationshasbeenissuingbiometricdocumentssince2008.How-ever,itwasonlyatthebeginningof2011whenInternationalCivilAviation Organization (ICAO)-compliant biometric documentsbecametheonlytypeofpassportissued.Moldovahasacompleteelectronicpopulation registration systemon thebasis ofwhich

31 Second progress report on the implementation by the Republic of Mol-dova of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation, Brussels, 9.2.2012, SWD(2012)12Final.

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documentsareissued32.Allpassportsaretobereplacedwithbio-metriconesby2019.However,EUexpertspointtothefollowingtwo weaknesses of theMoldovan system for issuing biometricdocuments:thechipcarryingthebiometricdataisattachedandnotintegrated,andchildren’snamesarestillwritteninthepass-ports of their parents33. Still themain challenge theMoldovangovernmentneedstocopewithisensuringthesecurityofissu-ingbiometricdocumentstoresidentsofthebreakawayregionofTransnistriasothatthisprocessisfairandtransparent.

Ukrainehasnoticed significant delays as regards the introduc-tion of biometric documents.Not onlydoes it not issuebiomet-ricpassports,italsohasnotadoptedtheproperlegislation.Thisisnotaneffectoftechnologicalorfinancialproblems,butratheroftheconflictofinterestsovertheshapeoftheplannedreform.TheUkrainianpresident,ViktorYanukovych,vetoedthelawondocumentsidentifyingapersonadoptedbyparliamentinOctober2011,whichhasdelayedthe introductionof thenecessary legis-lative changes yet further. The official reason for the presiden-tialvetowasthelaw’snon-compliancewiththeconstitution,butsomeexpertshavestatedofftherecordthatthislawwouldhaveadverselyaffectedtheinterestsofUkrainiancitizensandwouldhaveyieldedconsiderableprofitstoacompanywhichistheonlyoneinUkrainecapableofproducingbiometricdocumentsincom-pliancewithICAOstandards34.Anothermajorproblemisthelack

32 First progress report on the implementation by the Republic ofMoldovaof theAction Plan onVisa Liberalisation, Brussels, 16.09.2011, SEC (2011)1075Final.

33 PolicyAssociationforOpenSociety,“BelarusCountryReport”.PavingtheRoadtowardsVisa-freeTravelbetweentheEasternPartnershipcountriesandtheEU.

34 ThegovernmentadoptedanotherversionofthebillintroducingbiometricpassportsinFebruary2011(allotheridentitydocumentswouldnotcontainbiometricdata).

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of an automatic uniform system for population registration35.Thepersonaldataprotectionsystemis,however,quiteadvanced.

Russiahasbeenissuingbiometricpassportssince2005andtheirnewer, improvedversionsince2010.Russiaalso started issuingbiometricpassportsonamassscaleonlyin2010–around3mil-lionofthesedocumentswereissuedduringoneyear.However,thepassportscurrentlybeingissueddonotmeetalltheEUstandards.TheFederalMigrationServicehasannouncedthatpassportswithintegratedsecuredbiometricchipswillbeissuedstartingin2013.

Belarushasnotintroducedbiometricpassportsasyet,butithastheproperinstitutionalsystemandthetechnologiesneededtodothis.TheyweredevelopedaspartoftheMIGRABELtechnicalas-sistanceprogramme,whichwasimplementedbetween2007and2009bytheInternationalOrganizationforMigration.Belarusisplanningtosupply itsbordercheckpointswithadequateequip-ment capable of reading biometric documents and to begin is-suingbiometricpassports to itscitizens in2012.SinceMinsk isnotengagedinavisadialoguewiththeEU,thesystemforissu-ingdocumentscontainingbiometricdatahasnotbeenofficiallyevaluatedbyEUexperts.

4. Border management

EasternEuropeancountriesareatvariouslevelsofadvancementas regards the development of the bordermanagement systemandtheexistingborderchallenges.However,beyondanydoubt,theyhaveallconductedamoreor lessthoroughreformoftheirrespective border surveillance systems bymaking a transitionfromapurelymilitarysystemtosystemsbasedonpolicetroops.

35 Firstprogress reportof the implementationby theUkraineof theActionPlanonVisaLiberalisation,Brussels,16.09.2011,SEC(2011)1076Final;Sec-ondprogressreportontheimplementationbyUkraineoftheActionPlanonVisaLiberalisation,Brussels,9.2.2012,SWD(2012)10Final.

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Bordermanagementinthesecountries,especiallyofthesectionssharedwith EUmember states, ismuchmore efficient than inthe 1990s.Nevertheless, therearestill somesectionswhicharenotprotectedeitherforpoliticalreasons,asisthecasewiththeRussian-Belarusian border (these two countries form a UnionState),orduetologisticalandfinancialdifficulties,asisthecasewiththeworld’slongestlandborderbetweenRussiaandKazakh-stan.Inturn,theTransnistriansectioniscontrolledonlyontheUkrainianside.Somekeysections,astheUkrainian-BelarusianorUkrainian-Russianbordershavenotbeendelimitedbutareinpracticecontrolledrathereffectively.

Thequalityoftechnicalequipmentvariesimmenselybetweenin-dividualborder sections.Someof themhavecutting-edgeequip-mentattheirdisposal,whileothersareprotectedwiththeuseofmobile patrols and a system of entanglements, ditches and barelandstrips,calledsistema. BasicriskanalysissystemshavealreadybeenimplementedinUkraineandMoldova.Thechannelsforin-formation flow inside border services are insufficient in all thecountriesinthisregion,since–basedontheoldSovietmodels–theagenciesarestronglycentralised,andtheinternalflowofinforma-tioninthemmainlygoestopdown.Furthermore,inter-agencyco-operationchannelsareunderdeveloped.Borderandcustomsser-vicesoftendonothavemutualaccesstotheirrespectivedatabases.ThismeansthatalthoughbothUkraineandMoldovahaveadoptedtheintegratedbordermanagementstrategy,suchasystemdoesnotexistinpracticeinanyofthestatesdiscussed.

Ukraineistheclearleaderinbordermanagement.Firstly,itquiteeffectivelycontrolsallitsborders.Secondly,ithasarelativelywell-reformedandappropriatelymanagedborderpolice.Theprocessofitstransformationfromamilitarystructureintoalawenforce-mentagencyisalmostcomplete.MoldovaisstillnotasadvancedasUkraineinthisprocess(althoughitslegislationcompliesbestwithEUstandards).Inturn,theborderservicesofRussiaandBe-larusare still at the initial stageof reform.Belarus controls its

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borderswith the EU effectively (albeit in a paramilitary style),but it has not developed sufficient mechanisms for controllingtravellerswhoenter thecountry fromRussia.Meanwhile,Rus-siamadeaninterestingexperimentbyremovingthecompetencesconcerningborder infrastructuredevelopment fromtheobliga-tionsoftheborderservice,whichreportstotheKGB,andcreatingamodernagencyinchargeofequippingthestateborder.

5. The migration policy

AllthecountriesdiscussedneedtotackletheirSovietlegacyintheareaofmigrationpolicy,onecharacteristicofwhicharethecom-bined competences covering the policy towards foreigners, con-cerningpopulationregistrationandcitizenshippolicy.Ineffectofthis,migrantsareperceivedmainlythroughtheprismofrequireddocumentsandcertificates,withnolinkbeingmadetotheneedsof the labourmarket. Generally, the immigration policy of eachofthesecountriesneedstobecharacterisedasrestrictiveandbu-reaucratised.Themigrant labourblackmarket exists (especiallyinthecaseofRussia)duetotheimpracticalityoftheregulationsratherthantheirliberalism.Despitetheexistenceofvastdiasporasabroad,emigrationpolicyisalsoinsufficientlydeveloped.Asylumpolicyshould,however,bebasicallyrecognisedasbeingclosetoin-ternationalstandards,especiallyasregardsthelegislativeaspect.

Legislation onmigration and asylum inMoldova is themost ad-vanced in terms of the adaptation of the best EU practices andstandards. Still Chisinau needs to handle institutional problemsrelatedtothecoordinationofmigrationpolicyandalsocontrolofpeoplewhoenterMoldovafromTransnistria.Aftermanyyearsofbureaucraticperturbation,theUkrainiangovernmentestablishedtheStateMigrationServicein2010,whichissettodealwithmostofthetasksrelatedtomigrationpolicy,andthenadoptedthenationalmigrationstrategy.Anotherpositivethingwasparliamentadopt-ing a new law on refugees and temporary protection. However,amodernlawonforeignersisstillmissing.Ukraineisalsolacking

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bothauniformautomateddatabaseonforeignersandmechanismsforcollectingstatisticaldataonmigration.Belarusconductsatypi-callypost-Sovietmigrationpolicy,whereemphasisisputoncontrolandregistrationfunctions.Theauthorityinchargeofitsimplemen-tationistheMinistryofInternalAffairs.ThemostmodernandtheclosesttoEUpracticesarethoseareasofmigrationpolicy(asylumpolicy and combatinghuman trafficking) inwhich internationaltechnicalassistanceprogrammeshavebeenimplemented.

Russia’smigrationpolicyisdifficulttocomparetothepoliciesoftheothercountriesinthisregion.Russiaisnotonlytheworld’slargestcountryintermsofterritorybutalsoishometoequallyintensivemigrationmovementsastheUSA,FranceandGermany,andhas equally serious problemswith integration.Russia is atthecruxofimmigrantmovementsintheCISarea–itaccountsforapproximately75%ofthemigrantsfromthisregion.Sincethecol-lapseoftheUSSR,Russiahasacceptedaround7millionmigrantsfromthepost-Sovietareaaspermanentresidents,andbetween4and6millionlabourmigrantsareworkinginRussia36.Howev-er,theRussianFederation’smigrationpolicyisratherineffectiveand,aboveall,itisoverlyfocusedonshort-termtasks.Ontheonehand,Russiacancarryoutvastliberalisationactions,andontheotheritcansooncancelthechangesadoptedwhenthisisneed-edforinternalpoliticalpurposes.Whatgivesrisetothegreatestcriticism are the annual immigration quotas, which are unad-justedtothelabourmarketneeds,andthepracticeofmodifyingthemduringtheyear.TheauthorityinchargeofthesupervisionofmigrationpolicyistheFederalMigrationService,atypicalpo-lice authority,with complex control and registration functions.RussiaisnottryingtoadopttheEU’sbestpracticesandstandards,althoughthepracticesadopted insomeareas,suchas theread-missionpolicyandcombatinghumantrafficking,areveryclosetothoseusedinEUmemberstates.

36 V.Mukomiel,Rossiyskiyediskursyomigratsii:“nulevyegody”,Demoscope.ru,26September–9October2011.

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recommendations “to breaK the spell cast on visas”

general recommendations

• TomaketheabolitionofvisasinrelationsbetweentheEUandtheEasternEuropeancountriespossible,the”spell” must be brokenonthisissue.Withthepresentlevelsofmobilityandpeople-to-people, business, political, etc. contacts betweentheEUandEasternEuropeancountries,the introduction of a visa-free regime will be a natural consequence of the lib-eralisation processes which have been at work for years.

• Firstly, thevisa-freemovement is not linked to enlarge-ment policy, andEUmemberstatesneednotfearthatthiswillgiverisetoahugewaveofaccession-relateddemandsfromthepartners.Inturn,thiswillcertainlyhelpstabilisetheEU’sclosestneighbourhoodandmayimprovethepublicsentimentsintheneighbouringcountries,whichtendtobeincreasinglyunappreciative of theEU.Thiswill also pro-videan incentive forEasternEuropeancountries tomaketheefforttomodernisethemselves.ThefreemovementofpeopleisalsothebestconveyorbelttotransferEUmodelsandpracticesindevelopingentrepreneurshipandself-gov-ernance.

• Secondly,thedecisiontoliftthevisarequirementis unlikely to significantly stimulate an increase in migration pres-sure fromEasternEuropeancountries.Citizensofthecoun-triesfromthisregionareintheleadinglobalstatisticsofvisasgrantedbytheconsulatesofEUstatesanyway,andthelarg-estwaveof labouremigration to theEU tookplaceadecadeago.Anincreasedinfluxofpeopleseekingtobegrantedrefu-geestatusunreasonably,evenif thishappens, is likelytobetemporary.Besideswhich,therearemethodstocombatthis.TheEUshouldnotviewthemigrationflowsfromAfricaand

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EasternEuropeinthesamelight,becausetheriskofmigra-tionfromEasternEuropeiscontinuouslyfalling.

• Thirdly,althoughtheconsulatesof theSchengenstatesgen-erateconsiderableprofitsonthenumerousvisastheygrant,thepresent consular system in eastern europe is very ex-panded (thenumberofemployeesandthemaintenanceofthebuildingsandinfrastructure)and therefore expensive. Itisworthwhileconsideringallocatingthesefundstotheprotec-tion from undesirable migration from Northern Africa andtheMiddleEast,sincethiscouldturnoutalessexpensiveso-lution.Meanwhile,alessexpensivebutequallyeffectivesolu-tionintermsofmeetingtheconditionsnecessarytoguaran-teesafetycouldbe theuseofbiometricpassportsonamassscaleinEasternEurope.

• Fourthly, lifting thevisa requirement forEasternEuropeancitizenscan be temporary and conditional, andmayinvolvetheEU’slatestproposalsforimprovingmigrationsafety,suchasthe‘smartborders’systemorintroducingvisa-freeentryforperiodsshorterthanthreemonths.Thispolicyofincreased conditionality couldhaveamobilisingeffectonthegovern-mentsofEasternEuropeancountriesandthuscouldstimulatethemtofulfiltheirobligationswithregardtotheEU.

• Inpoliticalterms,makingvisaliberalisationakeyissuewouldfundamentallychangethepartners’approachtotheeastern partnership andwouldprovidealinktothepartnership for modernisation targetedatRussia.Aneasternpolicybasedonthemodelofimportingtheacquis andEUvalueswillbeinef-fectiveifsuchstandardsandvaluesremainapurposeper se. Meanwhile,theyshouldbringthegovernmentsandsocietiesofthesecountriesclosertoachievingpracticalgoals,suchastravelfacilitations,forinstance.

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• ThetechnicalapproachisprevalentatthemomentinthevisadialoguewiththecountriescoveredbytheEaP.TheEuropeanUnionisratherprincipledasregardstheprecisefulfilmentofthecriteriaandnoticestoolittlethepoliticalpotentialofthenegotiationprocess.Inturn,inthecaseofRussia,thedialogueistakingplacefirstofallforpoliticalpurposes,andEUofficialsseemtohavelittlefaithinMoscow’sdeterminationtoimple-ment reforms. It seems that inbothcasesthe golden mean should be found between technical issues and politics.

• Fromthepointofviewofsecurityandpolitics,thebestsolu-tionwouldbe togrant thevisa-freeregimetoukraine and moldova at the same time or over a short time-span (pro-videdthattheyhavemettherequiredcriteria).Itwouldbedif-ficulttointroduceavisa-freeregimewithRussiaatthesametimeduetothescaleofthiscountryandtheneedtoapplyspe-cialregulations.EnsuringeffectivebordersurveillanceacrossentirelengthofthebordersorstabilisingsecurityinNorthernCaucasus,fromwheretheindividualswhoseekrefugeestatusintheEUoriginate,willcertainlytakemanyyears.However,lifting the visa requirement for certain categories of trav-ellers from russia, especiallybona fidetravellers,business-menandtouristsseemstobeveryrealistic.ThissolutionmayofferconsiderablepoliticalandfinancialbenefitstoEUmem-berstatesandcarriesalowmigrationrisk.

• The conditions necessary to be met before the visa regimeisliftedistheachievementofasatisfactorylevel of mutual trust between law enforcement agencies of eu member states and the partner states, bothatthestrategiclevelandineverydayoperationalco-operation.EvenifitisimpossibletobuildsuchtrusttodayinrelationsbetweentheEUandBe-larus,minsk should not be excluded completely from the liberalisation process. Paradoxically, this country posesalowmigrationrisk,andtherelevantBelarusianinstitutionscouldcatchupquicklyduringthenegotiationprocess.Inthe

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shortterm,thepossibilityofloweringthepriceoftheuniformvisato35euroswithouttheneedtosignvisafacilitationandreadmissionagreementsshouldbeconsidered.

detailed recommendations

• Thepossibilitiesofaconditionalandtemporaryintroductionofavisa-freeregimeandthechangesnecessarytobemadeforthispurposeinSchengenlegislationneedtobeanalysed.Pos-sible solutionscould include lifting the visa requirement for citizens of a given country for a short period (for ex-ample, at the time of holding a mass sports, cultural or religious event). Such a test phase wouldmake it possibletochecktheoperationoftheinstitutionsinchargeofbordersafetyandtheexpectedincreaseinthedynamicsofthemove-mentofpeople.Althoughtoolittletimehasremainedforthisproposal to be possible to put into practice during the Euro2012 football championship, some security solutions whichcouldbeused inapossible testphaseof thevisa-freemove-mentcouldbetestedatthistime.

• It is alsoworthconsidering lifting thevisa requirementfor specific categories of people (travellers who have had a positive visa history so far, businessmen, students and youth, individuals mentioned in visa facilitation agree-ments, tourists), who pose a low migration risk and whocouldofferEUmemberstatesconsiderableeconomicandso-cial benefits and promote EU models and standards in thecountriestheycomefrom.

• Theintroductionofavisa-freeregimewithEasternEuropeancountriesdoes not need to entail an increase in the pressure migrants from eastern european countries put on the eu labour markets (whichdoesnotseemtobebeneficialduringaneconomicslowdown).Itisworthkeepinginmindthatthesemigrantsarealreadypresentonthesemarketsanyway,and

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theirtotalnumberisnotgrowingbutfalling.Furthermore,inavisa-freeregime,theywouldbemorereadytoseekthepos-sibilitiesoflegalemploymentinEUmemberstates.

• ToreducetheresistanceofthoseEUmemberstateswhichop-posetheintroductionofavisa-freeregime,itisworthconsid-eringsynchronisingthedecisiontoliftthevisarequirementwith introducing other security measures in the SchengenArea, including the ‘smart borders’ system, in particular the mechanism of registering travellers prior to their en-try to the schengen area (providedthattheintroductionofthese instruments isnotexcessivelydelayed). Itmayalsobeworthwhiletointroduceregulationswhichfacilitatethe re-instatement of temporary border control on the internalbordersshould therebeamass influxofmigrantsora seri-ousorganised crime threat37. Equally,making the systemoftransferring third states from the ‘white’ to the ‘black’ visa list moreflexiblecouldbeconsidered.

• Thenegotiationprocesscannot last too long. Otherwise,themotivationofthepartnerstatestolaunchreformswillweak-ensignificantly,andthedialoguewiththeEUwillbeviewedasabureaucraticexercise.

• The criteria necessary to be met can be divided into twogroups: thoseaimedatminimising theriskof illegalmigra-tionfromEasternEuropeancountriestotheEUfollowingtheintroductionofthevisa-freeregime,andthosewhichshouldleadtointernalreformstobeimplementedinthesecountriesin linewithEU standards andvalues. it must be uncondi-tionally ensured that the criteria from the first group

37 See:EuropeanCommission,ProposalforaRegulationoftheEuropeanPar-liamentandoftheCouncilamendingRegulation(EC)No562/2006inordertoprovideforcommonrulesonthetemporaryreintroductionofbordercon-trolatinternalbordersinexceptionalcircumstances,Brussels,16Septem-ber2011,COM(2011)560Final.

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have been met. the fulfilment of the criteria specified in the second category could be treated less rigorously. It isworthconsideringtheintroductionofavisa-freeregimecon-ditionally, aftermostof the criteriahavebeen fulfilled, andatthesametimeintroducingthemechanismformonitoringfurtherprogress.

• Intheshortterm,themostimportantissuesappeartobethe introduction of biometric documents, automatic popula-tion registration systems and uniform databases at law enforcement agencies, and ensuring proper border man-agement. Inthelongterm,theEUshouldinsistthatthe min-istries of internal affairs are reformed and the judiciary and the system for combating corruption are strength-ened, anditshouldtreattheseelementsasaninherentpartofitsassociationagenda(withregardtoUkraineandMoldova).InthecasesofRussiaandBelarus,achange of the restrictive residence registration policy appliedtocitizensofEUmem-berstatesshouldalsobeakeyelement.

• Incentiveforreform(forexample,oncethefirstgroupofthecriteriaaspartoftheactionplanshavebeenmet)couldalsobeprovidedbyamendingthevisafacilitationagreementstocausefurtherliberalisation.

• The regional co-operation onmigration and borders, pro-moted by the EU, in this area is impossible without rus-sia. If itsgoalsalso includedvisa-freemovement forRussia,abreakthroughcouldbemoreeasilyachievedinmanyareaswhichhavebeensubjecttoalengthydispute,suchasborderdelimitationandco-operationonthecontrolover themove-mentofpeople.

• Eastern European countries should takemore effective lob-bying actions in EUmember states, including through an

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intensified exchange of information and strengthening contacts with the institutions in charge of security in in-dividual eu member states (andnotconcentratingonlyonEUagencies).ThiscouldreducethefearofapossibleinfluxofirregularmigrantsfromtheEastintheseEUmemberstatesanddispelmanymythsinthisarea.Althoughvisatalkshavebeen conducted in thebilateral format,partner states couldalsotrytocoordinatetheirnegotiatingstancesbetweenthem-selves(notonlyaspartoftheEaP).

marta Jaroszewicz