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MAJORITY VOTING RULE AND OLIGARCHIC SOCIAL CHOICE RULES
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of
Bilkent University
by
PELİN PASİN
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA
October 2001
ii
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts --------------------------------- Professor Farhad Husseinov Supervisor I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts --------------------------------- Assistant Professor Tarık Kara Examining Committee Member I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts --------------------------------- Associate Professor Azer Kerimov Examining Committee Member Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences --------------------------------- Professor Kürşat Aydoğan Director
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ABSTRACT
MAJORITY VOTING RULE AND OLIGARCHIC SOCIAL CHOICE RULES
Pelin Pasin
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Farhad Husseinov
October 2001
In the first part of this study majority voting rule for two alternatives and
continuum agents is characterized. As in the finite agent case, symmetry among agents,
neutrality between alternatives and positive responsiveness characterize majority voting
rule. In the second part, the relation between T-monotonicity and the group which acts as
the oligarchy in an oligarchic social choice rule, is analyzed. It is shown that the minimal
coalition for which the social choice rule is monotonic constitutes the oligarchy.
Keywords: Social Choice, Majority Voting, Monotonicity, Oligarchy.
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ÖZET
OY ÇOKLUĞU SEÇİM KURALI VE OLİGARŞİK SOSYAL SEÇİM KURALLARI
Pelin Pasin
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü
Tez yöneticisi: Farhad Husseinov
Ekim 2001
Bu çalışmanın ilk bölümünde, iki alternatif ve kontinuum temsilci için oy çokluğu
seçim kuralı karakterize edilmiştir. Sonlu temsilci durumunda olduğu gibi, temsilcilerde
simetriklik, alternatifler arasında tarafsızlık ve pozitif cevaplılık oy çokluğu seçim
kuralını karakterize eder. İkinci bölümde, T-monotonluk ve oligarşik bir sosyal seçim
kuralında oligarşi olarak davranacak grup arasındaki ilişki analiz edilmiştir. Sosyal seçim
kuralının monotonluğu sağladığı en küçük grubun oligarşiyi oluşturduğu gösterilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Seçim, Oy cokluğu, Monotonluk, Oligarşi.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, professor Farhad Husseinov, whose
knowledge and efforts throughout my studies have been a major source of support. I am
also indebted to Assistant Professor Tarık Kara and Associate Professor Azer Kerimov
for accepting to review this material and for their valuable suggestions.
I would like to thank also to my family and my friends, especially Seçil Gergün, for their
support and encouragement.